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HOUSE OF COMMONS

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Issue No. 90

Fascicule n° 90

Tuesday, May 3, 1983

Le mardi 3 mai 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

External Affairs and National Defence

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

Main Estimates 1983-84 Vote 1—Operating
Expenditures under EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONCERNANT:

Budget principal 1983-1984 crédit 1—Dépenses de
fonctionnement sous la rubrique AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES

WITNESSES:

(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:

(Voir à l'endos)



First Session of the
Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la
trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appolloni

MEMBERS/MEMBRES

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Maurice Dupras
Stanley Hudecki
Pauline Jewett
Gérald Laniel
Jean Lapierre
Allan B. McKinnon
Donald W. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*)
Jacques Olivier
W. Kenneth Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*)
Douglas Roche
Sinclair Stevens
Terry Sargeant

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES ET DE LA DÉFENSE
NATIONALE

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

Vice-président: M^{me} Ursula Appolloni

ALTERNATES/SUBSTITUTS


Herb Breau
David M. Collenette
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Walter McLean
Lorne Nystrom
Bob Ogle
Irénee Pelletier
Marcel Roy
Ron Stewart
Ian Watson
Robert Wenman

(Quorum 8)

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee



MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, MAY 3, 1983

(145)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9:34 o'clock a.m. this day, the Vice-Chairman, Mrs. Ursula Appolloni, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Dupras, Hudecki, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*) and Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*).

Alternates present: Messrs. Breau, Corbett, McLean, Ogle, Stewart and Watson.

Other Member present: Mr. McRae.

Witnesses: From the Department of External Affairs: M. Massé, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; de M. Marchand, Deputy Minister, Foreign Policy and W.J. Jenkins, Assistant Deputy Minister, Sectoral and Economic Relations.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated Wednesday, February 23, 1983, relating to the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Tuesday, March 15, 1983, Issue No. 83*).

On Vote 1

The witnesses answered questions.

It was agreed,—That the answers dated April 29, 1983, from the Honourable A.J. MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, to questions raised by Messrs. Roche, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*) and McLean, March 29, 1983, be appended to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix "EAND-71"*).

At 11:03 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE MARDI 3 MAI 1983

(145)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale se réunit aujourd'hui à 9h34 sous la présidence de M^{me} Ursula Appolloni, (vice-président).

Membres du Comité présents: M^{me} Appolloni, MM. Dupras, Hudecki, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), et Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*).

Substituts présents: MM. Breau, Corbett, McLean, Ogle, Stewart et Watson.

Autre député présent: M. McRae.

Témoins: Du ministère des Affaires extérieures: M. Massé, sous-secrétaire d'État, Affaires extérieures; de M. Marchand, sous-ministre, Politique étrangère et W.J. Jenkins, sous-ministre adjoint, Relations sectorielles et économiques.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 23 février 1983 portant sur le Budget principal pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984 (*Voir procès-verbal du mardi 15 mars 1983, fascicule n° 83*).

Crédit 1

Les témoins répondent aux questions.

Il est convenu,—Que les réponses en date du 29 avril 1983 de l'honorable A.J. MacEachen, Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et vice premier-ministre, aux questions posées par MM. Roche, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*) et McLean, le 29 mars 1983, soient jointes aux procès-verbal et témoignages de ce jour (*Voir Appendice «EAND-71»*).

A 11h03, le Comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

[Texte]

Tuesday, May 3, 1983

• 0934

The Vice-Chairman: Order, please.

Good morning to all of you.

We are now resuming consideration of the committee's order of reference pertaining to the main estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984.

I call Vote 1, operational expenditures under External Affairs.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

A—Department—Canadian Interests Abroad Program

Vote 1—Canadian Interests Abroad—Operating expenditures.....\$468,903,700

The Vice-Chairman: The witnesses we have are from the Department of External Affairs. I shall read out their names and they will then identify themselves if and when they are called to speak: Mr. Massé, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. Marchand, Deputy Minister, Foreign Policy; Mr. Jenkins, Assistant Deputy Minister, Sectoral and Economic Relations; Mr. Bresnahan, Assistant Under-Secretary, Finance and Management Services Branch; and Mr. Colin Robertson, Department Assistant.

• 0935

So, Mr. Massé, if you have no statement, perhaps we could go immediately to questioning.

Mr. M. Massé (Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs): I do not have a statement.

The Vice-Chairman: I now therefore call on Mr. Munro.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you. I do not have a statement either, Madam Chairman, but I have a couple of questions I would like to ask our witnesses. I welcome them today.

There have been two or three very important developments in the trouble spots around the world about which we hear. I suppose there are several other trouble spots about which we do not hear as frequently; I am thinking of Somalia, Cambodia, and perhaps the war in Iraq and Iran. But the most recent one to meet the press, I suppose, aside from the Lebanese one, is the developments in Namibia. Canada is one of the five—of the Contact Group, as they are generally called, who were, I suppose, hailed before a meeting which I think was held in Geneva recently, convened by the United Nations, and SWAPO... there were some developments there which are not really clear in my mind. The reports we get from the newspapers are a little confused. I would be grateful if we could get some sort of an indication from the witnesses as to

TÉMOIGNAGES

(Enregistrement électronique)

[Traduction]

Le mardi 3 mai 1983

Le vice-président: À l'ordre, je vous prie.

Bonjour à tous.

Nous reprenons l'étude de l'ordre de renvoi du Comité concernant le Budget principal pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984.

Je mets en délibération le Crédit 1, dépenses de fonctionnement aux Affaires extérieures.

AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

A—Ministère—Programme des intérêts du Canada à l'étranger

Vote 1—Intérêts du Canada à l'étranger—Dépenses de fonctionnement.....\$468,903,700

Le vice-président: Nous avons ici les témoins du ministère des Affaires extérieures. Je vous donne leurs noms, ils pourront s'identifier lorsqu'ils seront convoqués, le cas échéant: M. Massé, sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, M. Marchand, sous-ministre de la politique étrangère; M. Jenkins, sous-ministre adjoint aux relations sectorielles et économiques; M. Bresnahan, sous-secrétaire adjoint à la Direction des finances et des Services de gestion; et M. Colin Robertson, adjoint ministériel.

Ainsi, monsieur Massé, si vous n'avez aucune déclaration à faire, peut-être pourrions-nous passer immédiatement à la période de questions.

M. Massé (sous-secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires extérieures): Je n'ai pas de déclaration à faire.

Le vice-président: Je m'adresserai maintenant à M. Munro.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci. Je n'ai pas non plus de déclaration à faire, madame le président, mais j'ai deux questions que j'aimerais poser à nos témoins. Je leur souhaite la bienvenue aujourd'hui.

Il y a eu deux ou trois très importants événements dans les points chauds du monde dont nous avons entendu parler. Je suppose qu'il y a plusieurs autres points chauds dont nous n'entendons pas parler aussi souvent; je pense à la Somalie, au Cambodge, et peut-être à la guerre en Iraq et en Iran. Mais les plus récents dont la presse a parlé, je suppose, à part le conflit du Liban, sont les événements de la Namibie. Le Canada est un des cinq, du groupe contact, comme il est appelé généralement, qui a été, je suppose, acclamé à une réunion qui se pense s'est tenue à Genève récemment, convoquée par les Nations-Unies et SWAPO, il y a eu là quelques événements qui ne sont pas vraiment clairs dans mon esprit. Les comptes rendus que nous trouvons dans les journaux sont un peu confus. Je vous salue gré si vous pouviez me donner quelques indications de

[Texte]

what Canada's role was at this particular meeting, and generally speaking in the Namibian affair, Southwest Africa; and particularly in these recent developments.

My other question has to do with Lebanon and developments there. I was wondering whether there is anything that can be made public here at this meeting by the officials as to the prospects, as seen by our Department of External Affairs, concerning the withdrawal of the foreign forces from Lebanon and the fate of the Palestinians, whether that is a matter that is still a long way down the road or whether there is any hope at all that this very troublesome matter will be settled; because we do have a number of Lebanese in Canada, and they are just as concerned as the rest of us, I am sure. And of course, we also have our Canadian forces in Lebanon.

My third question relates to a publication which used to be the organ of the Canadian trade service, called—I do not know whether it is *Commerce Canada* or *Canada Commerce*, or what it is; it is one of those silly names that have been developed over the last three or four years, putting "Canada" before or after a word—*Canada Post* and *Postes Canada* and all that sort of nonsense, instead of the *Royal Canadian Mail*. This particular publication used to be the organ of the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service. Now the Trade Commissioner Service has moved into the Department of External Affairs. The publication, which was available to all Canadian business men—I think sent out on demand—and a very good publication it has always been—has stayed with the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, and has somewhat changed internally in its editorial policy by indicating some of the developments in Canadian domestic industry; which of course is still useful to the Trade Commissioner Service when they are serving abroad.

• 0940

I was wondering, first of all, why this publication did not come over with the Trade Commissioner Service of the Department of External Affairs. Since it appears not to have done that, is a comparable publication being contemplated for the Trade Commissioner Service now that it is within the general ambit of the Department of External Affairs?

These three questions, then: Namibia, Lebanon, and this trade journal.

Mr. M. Massé: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If Mr. de Montigny would answer the first two questions and Mr. Jenkins the third one...

Mr. de M. Marchand (Deputy Minister—Foreign Policy, Department of External Affairs): Mr. Chairman, on Namibia I would like to say that Canada remains committed to the Contact Group process, as it is the most adapted to advance the cause that is being sought; that is, the independence of that territory. It is our view that the patient labours of the Contact Group have brought some advances towards these ends. In spite of the rather extended nature of the calendar and

[Traduction]

la part des témoins sur le rôle du Canada à cette réunion en particulier, et de façon générale dans l'affaire Namibienne, en Afrique du sud-ouest; et particulièrement dans son évolution récente.

Mon autre question porte sur le Liban et l'évolution de la situation dans cette région. Je me demande s'il n'y a pas quelque chose qui pourrait être rendu public ici à cette réunion par les fonctionnaires en ce qui concerne les perspectives d'avenir, du point de vue du ministère des Affaires extérieures, concernant le départ des forces étrangères du Liban et l'avenir des Palestiniens, que ce soit encore une question de longue haleine ou qu'il y ait quelques espoirs que cette question très épineuse soit réglée; parce qu'il y a un certain nombre de Libanais au Canada et ils sont aussi inquiets que le reste de nous j'en suis sûr. Et bien sûr il y a nos armées canadiennes au Liban.

Ma troisième question porte sur une publication qui était l'organe du service commercial canadien, appelé, je ne sais pas si c'est «Commerce Canada» ou «Canada commerce», ou quoi; c'est un de ces noms stupides qui ont été donnés au cours des trois ou quatre dernières années, plaçant «Canada» avant ou après un mot, *Canada poste* et *Poste Canada* et tout ce genre d'idioties, au lieu de *Royal Canadian Mail*, les postes de Sa Majesté. Cette publication particulièrement avait l'habitude d'être le porte-parole du service des délégués commerciaux du Canada. Maintenant le service des délégués commerciaux fait partie du ministère des Affaires extérieures. Cette publication, qui était mise à la disposition de tous les hommes d'affaires canadiens, je pense qu'elle est envoyée sur demande, et c'était une très bonne publication, et est restée au ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce, et a un peu changé dans sa politique éditoriale en donnant quelques nouvelles sur l'industrie domestique canadienne; ce qui bien sûr est toujours utile au service des délégués commerciaux lorsqu'ils sont à l'étranger.

Je me demandais, surtout, pourquoi cette publication n'a pas été apportée par le service des délégués commerciaux du ministère des Affaires extérieures. Comme il ne semble pas l'avoir fait, envisage-t-on de publier une revue semblable pour ce service maintenant qu'il relève du ministère des Affaires extérieures?

J'aimerais parler de ces trois questions: la Namibie, le Liban et de cette publication commerciale.

M. M. Massé: Merci, monsieur le président.

Si M. de Montigny veut bien répondre aux deux premières questions et M. Jenkins à la troisième...

M. de M. Marchand (sous-ministre, Politique extérieure, ministère des Affaires extérieures): Monsieur le président, au sujet de la Namibie, j'aimerais dire que le Canada demeure engagé dans le processus du groupe de Contact, étant donné qu'il s'agit là du processus le mieux adapté pour faire avancer la cause qui nous intéresse; c'est-à-dire l'indépendance de ce territoire. Nous croyons que les efforts soutenus de ce groupe ont permis de faire certains progrès vers la fin désirée. En dépit

[Text]

in spite of extemporaneous obstacles which periodically come about, the best course is to show some staying power and labouriously to continue to pursue our objects which are common. They involve patient conversations and persuasion with the front-line state along with our principal colleagues, the United States, who have more leverage than any of us on South African attitudes, and indeed, with the South African government itself.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): What about SWAPO? Is it the only interlocutor on the other side? Is one negotiating with SWAPO, or is SWAPO the only organization that is recognized as having any interest whatsoever in Southwest Africa? I understood that there was a parliament in Southwest Africa.

Mr. Marchand: Well, yes. SWAPO is one of many players, and one that has to be reckoned with.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): What about the—what is the name—“Turnhalle”... the name slips me at the moment—the group in Windhoek/Vinter which represents the elected Parliament of Southwest Africa? Are they in any way involved in these negotiations directly or only through an intermediary?

Mr. Marchand: I am afraid I would have to take that question under advisement and give the hon. member...

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Who is our spokesman? Paul Lapointe was at one time, I believe, the contact man. Is he still? Or has he been...

Mr. Marchand: He is the point man as far as London is concerned. As you know, Mr. Lapointe is now in London. The principal member of the Canadian team in the contact group is Michael Shenstone.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): He was at this conference. I understand it was in Paris.

Mr. Marchand: I think it was Mr. Bergbusch who was at that particular meeting. I do not believe Michael Shenstone was there. Eric Bergbusch is the Director of the Anglophone Africa Division.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Is it the belief of the department that the condition of the removal of the Cubans from Angola is part of these negotiations?

• 0945

Mr. Marchand: We have consistently refused, and still do, to link as a condition the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. However, we have consistently made the point to the various participants to the dialogue that any such movement, if it were perceptible and observable, would be indeed a powerful adjunct and a powerful help and boost to the process.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Do you link the removal of the South African troops from Namibia or Southwest Africa as a condition for the settlement of matters there?

[Translation]

de la nature plutôt étendue du calendrier et des obstacles imprévisibles qui apparaissent périodiquement, la meilleure attitude à adopter est de faire preuve de stabilité et de poursuivre sans cesse nos objectifs, qui sont communs. Il faut beaucoup de persuasion et poursuivre de longues conversations avec l'état concerné, de concert avec notre principal collègue, les États-Unis qui ont plus d'influence que n'importe qui d'entre nous sur les attitudes en Afrique du Sud ainsi que sur le gouvernement sud-africain lui-même.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Qu'en est-il de la SWAPO? Est-ce le seul interlocuteur de l'autre camp? Quelqu'un négocie-t-il avec la SWAPO ou la SWAPO est-elle la seule organisation qui est reconnue pour avoir des intérêts en Afrique du sud-ouest? Je crois qu'il y a un parlement en Afrique du sud-ouest.

M. Marchand: Eh bien oui. Le SWAPO est l'un des nombreux intervenants et un intervenant qui doit être reconnu comme tel.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Qu'en est-il du... quel est le nom, déjà, «Turnhalle»?... Le nom m'échappe pour le moment... du groupe de Windhoek/Vinter qui représente le parlement élu de l'Afrique du sud-ouest? Est-il d'une façon ou d'une autre engagé dans ces négociations directement ou seulement en passant par un intermédiaire?

M. Marchand: Je crains d'avoir à demander conseil sur cette question et donner à l'honorable membre...

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Qui est notre porte-parole? Je crois qu'à un moment donné notre contact était Paul Lapointe. L'est-il encore? Ou a-t-il...

M. Marchand: Il est notre contact pour ce qui est de Londres. Comme vous le savez, M. Lapointe se trouve maintenant à Londres. Le principal membre de l'équipe canadienne en contact avec le groupe est Michael Shenstone.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Il était présent à cette conférence. Je crois qu'il était à Paris.

M. Marchand: Je crois que c'était M. Bergbusch qui assistait à cette réunion. Je ne crois pas que Michael Shenstone s'y trouvait. Eric Bergbusch est le directeur de la Division de l'Afrique anglophone.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Le ministère pense-t-il que la condition du retrait des Cubains de l'Angola est partie intégrante de ces négociations?

M. Marchand: Nous avons toujours refusé et refusons encore d'exiger comme condition le retrait des troupes cubaines de l'Angola. Toutefois, nous avons toujours précisé aux divers participants à ce dialogue que tout mouvement en ce sens, s'il était perceptible et observable, constituerait effectivement un atout important et donnerait un sérieux coup de pouce au processus.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Est-ce que vous liez le retrait des troupes sud-africaines de la Namibie ou de l'Afrique du sud-ouest au règlement de ce qui se passe dans ces pays.

[Texte]

Mr. Marchand: Well, that is the nature of the beast. For Namibia indeed to acquire its full independence, the removal of South African troops from its territory would be an extremely important, if not essential, asset.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): But Cuban support for SWAPO is a matter of indifference?

Mr. Marchand: No, we are not saying it is a matter of indifference. What we are saying is that the removal of Cuban troops from Angola should not be, and has not been, cast by the contact group as a precondition.

In answer to your second question, the latest information we have gathered, and that proceeds from a confidential briefing the Prime Minister received when he was in Washington last week, gives us to understand that there are some encouraging signs on the Lebanese situation. The premises on which the American foreign secretary has decided to attempt his latest effort in the region, on-site, are indeed reports from Ambassadors Habib and Draper which, according to the American policy makers and according to the information they have made available to us, authorize some cautious hope and some cautious optimism.

I would like to leave it at that at this point because, Madam Chairman, these negotiations are delicate and they are going forward. All I can say is that we would be inclined to share the American view on that part of the very complicated situation in the Middle East. The American caution and cautious hope are warranted.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Is the cautious hope with respect to Lebanon only...

Mr. Marchand: Yes.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): —or is it linked in any way with the settlement of the Palestinian situation?

Mr. Marchand: Your question indeed was double-pronged. I was on the first prong.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): But not the second?

Mr. Marchand: No. On the second one, we continue to believe—and as you know it is a feature of Canada's policy on the subject, a key feature—that the Palestinian issue and its resolution are central to the disputes.

• 0950

We were saddened by the latest difficulties incurred by those who are responsible for the implementation and pursuit of the so-called Reagan Plan, which we have endorsed. The question now is whether it will be possible to put that process forward and to renew its momentum. The United States, which exercises a position of great influence, if not of leadership, in this process still maintains the view that the Reagan Plan is momentarily wounded but far from being dead. We hope they are right.

[Traduction]

Mr. Marchand: C'est là l'essentiel du problème. Pour que la Namibie acquière effectivement sa pleine indépendance, le retrait des troupes sud-africaines de son territoire est un élément extrêmement important, sinon essentiel.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Mais l'appui apporté par les Cubains à la SWAPO peut-il être sans importance?

Mr. Marchand: Non, ce n'est pas ce que nous disons. Ce que nous affirmons, c'est que le retrait des troupes cubaines de l'Angola ne devrait pas, et n'a pas été exigé par le groupe de contact comme une condition préalable.

Pour répondre à votre deuxième question, d'après les dernières informations que nous avons recueillies, et qui proviennent d'une rencontre confidentielle qu'a eue le Premier ministre lorsqu'il était à Washington la semaine dernière, il semble qu'il y ait des signes encourageants pour ce qui est de la question libanaise. Les fondements sur lesquels le secrétaire américain aux affaires étrangères a décidé d'appuyer son dernier effort dans la région, sur place même, sont effectivement des rapports qui viennent des ambassadeurs Habib et Draper qui, selon les conseillers politiques américains et selon les informations que ceux-ci nous ont communiquées, laissent pointer un espoir et permettent d'afficher un optimisme prudent.

J'aimerais en rester là pour le moment, madame le président, étant donné que ces négociations sont délicates et qu'elles se poursuivent encore. Tout ce que je peux dire est que nous sommes enclins à partager le point de vue américain sur cet aspect de la situation très complexe du Moyen-Orient. Les espoirs prudents des Américains semblent fondés.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Est-ce que espoir a trait uniquement au Liban...

Mr. Marchand: Oui.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): ... ou englobe-t-il aussi d'une façon ou d'une autre le règlement de la situation palestinienne?

Mr. Marchand: Votre question comportait en effet deux volets. J'en étais au premier.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Mais pas au second?

Mr. Marchand: Non. Sur ce deuxième point, nous croyons encore—et comme vous le savez c'est là une composante de la politique du Canada sur le sujet, un élément clé de la politique—que la question palestinienne et sa résolution sont au centre du problème.

Nous avons été attristés par les dernières difficultés éprouvées par ceux qui sont chargés de mettre en oeuvre et d'appliquer le plan connu sous le nom de Plan Reagea, que nous avons approuvé. Il s'agit maintenant de savoir qu'il sera possible de poursuivre le processus et de lui faire reprendre vigueur. Les États-Unis, qui occupent une position de grande influence sinon de dirigerance dans ce processus, sont toujours d'avis que le Plan Reagan est momentanément handicapé mais est loin d'être abandonné. Nous espérons qu'ils ont raison.

[Text]

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): And you still refuse to have any open contact with the PLO, the Palestinian Liberation Organization—not the army but the organization?

Mr. Marchand: That remains a feature... well, we have indirect contact with them, as we have had.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I said direct.

Mr. Marchand: You said direct, and I will answer that it is still a feature of our policy that we do not.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): My third question?

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Jenkins, please.

Mr. W.J. Jenkins (Assistant Deputy Minister, Sectoral and Economic Relations, Department of External Affairs): Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The hon. Member asked about the status of *Commerce Canada*. At the moment of the reorganization of DRIE and of External Affairs, I think two things were recognized—one being that DRIE continues to have a need for a publication in order to deal...

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): DRIE?

Mr. Jenkins: Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Oh, okay.

Mr. Jenkins: It continues to have a need to communicate with Canadian business, Canadian industries. Therefore, the decision was taken to leave that magazine with Industry, Trade and Commerce.

It was also very obvious to the Trade Commissioner Service and to the new Department of External Affairs that we did need some mechanism, a publication, by which we could communicate to companies interested in doing business abroad. Over the past few months, we have been having a series of consultations, discussions, with a number of Canadian exporters but also, I believe, particularly with the Canadian Exporters Association, to try to get their opinion as to what is most needed. I think we saw the fact that we were going to create a new publication as an opportunity for us to refine what we had been doing and to be sure that what we produce is something that is actually required.

I have seen some mock-ups. I think the opinion of the people in the organizations we have consulted was that what was required was more of a bulletin which would provide very timely and rapid information about market opportunities, upcoming projects, and also opportunities being lost or closed. Where they were closing, it could show where new import barriers or restrictions were being put up, or if a country introduced new restrictions.

So I think we have agreement now to come forward with what will be, I believe, a bi-weekly newsletter which, in capsule

[Translation]

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Et vous refusez toujours d'avoir tout contact officiel avec l'OLP, l'Organisation de libération de la Palestine, pas l'armée, mais l'organisation.

M. Marchand: Cela reste une caractéristique... eh bien, nous avons des communications indirectes avec eux, comme nous en avons déjà eues.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): J'ai dit directes.

M. Marchand: Vous avez dit directes et je répondrai que c'est toujours une caractéristique de notre politique de ne pas en avoir.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Ma troisième question?

Le vice-président: Monsieur Jenkins, s'il vous plaît.

M. W.J. Jenkins (sous-ministre adjoint, Relations sectorielles et économiques, Ministère des affaires extérieures): Merci, madame le président.

Le député a posé une question sur le statut de «Commerce Canada». Au moment de la réorganisation du MIC et du Ministère des affaires extérieures, je pense que deux choses ont été dites: l'une est que le MIC continuera à avoir besoin d'une publication pour...

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): MIC?

M. Jenkins: Ministère de l'industrie et du commerce.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Oh, très bien.

M. Jenkins: Il continue à avoir besoin de communiquer avec le commerce canadien et l'industrie canadienne. C'est pourquoi il a été décidé de laisser ce magazine à Industrie et Commerce.

Il était également très évident pour le Service des délégués commerciaux et pour le nouveau Ministère des affaires extérieures que nous avions besoin d'un certain mécanisme, d'une publication au moyen de laquelle nous pourrions communiquer avec les sociétés intéressées à faire des affaires à l'étranger. Au cours des derniers mois, nous avons organisé une série de consultations, de discussions, avec un certain nombre d'exportateurs canadiens mais également, je crois, particulièrement avec l'Association des exportateurs canadiens, pour essayer de connaître leur opinion sur ce sont nous avons le plus besoin. Je pense que nous avons considéré le fait que nous allions créer une nouvelle publication comme une occasion de raffiner ce que nous avions fait et d'être sûrs que nous allions produire quelque chose d'absolument nécessaire.

J'ai vu quelques projets. Je pense que, d'après l'avis des membres de ces organismes que nous avons consultés, c'est plutôt un genre de bulletin auquel il faudrait songer, un véhicule qui donne rapidement des informations au moment souhaité sur les occasions offertes le marché, les projets à réaliser et également les occasions perdues ou qui n'existent plus. Lorsqu'elles n'existent plus, ce bulletin pourrait indiquer si de nouvelles barrières ou restrictions aux importations ont été créées ou si un pays a imposé de nouvelles restrictions.

De sorte que je pense que nous sommes autorisés à présent à créer ce qui sera, je crois, un bulletin bi-mensuel qui, sous

[Texte]

form, will make business men aware of opportunities and new restrictions. Then basically it could tell them that if they wanted further information, they could call the number for the appropriate person or department so as to obtain the information.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): There is no thought of marrying the original *Commerce Canada* with such a bulletin? They do go hand in hand. Canada's produce presumably is one of the purposes of the Trade Commissioner Service to sell, and if they are just looking for opportunities... Did the Trade Commissioner Service receive copies of *Commerce Canada*, for example?

Mr. Jenkins: Oh, yes. As I say, I am not aware of any consideration being given to marrying the two, but certainly it is our intention and our hope that *Commerce Canada* will continue to be relevant to Canadian businessmen. In my view, for it to be relevant, it has to make them aware of market opportunities, given the high dependence of our economy on exports.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Munro.

I now have Father Ogle, to be followed by Mr. Dupras, please.

Mr. Ogle: Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would like to welcome in a special way Mr. Massé, with whom we have worked for several years in CIDA.

• 0955

Today I would particularly like to ask some more detailed information about Canada's relations in Central America. As Mr. Massé and his staff are aware, there has been a good deal of press about Canada's position in the last few days, beginning with the Prime Minister's statement to the press several days ago in which he indicated that we had a distinct and clearly different situation from the United States. Then the press reports while he was visiting Washington gave the impression that he was backing Reagan's positions, and again questions in the House of Commons yesterday, I felt, still left a doubt. I wonder if Mr. Massé would be good enough to tell us basically and in a few minutes just exactly what our relations are with each of the individual countries.

When we visited with the subcommittee several times—and there are members here, I think four or five now at the table, who who were with us at that time—and when I was there several other times, under different auspices, of the church and so forth, I had a feeling the position of Mr. Sirrs, the ambassador we had at that time in Costa Rica, was giving us a bill of goods. Of course, anyone can make their own opinions about that, but I felt the bill of goods was the American position. When we were given an opportunity to seek information—and my colleagues can contradict me if they do not feel this is true—I felt all the time that we were getting one side of the position. You just cannot do that, because people in our group were able to find other positions when we went out on our own

[Traduction]

forme résumée, mettra les commerçants au courant des occasions d'affaires et de nouvelles restrictions, et qui pourrait aussi leur indiquer comment obtenir des renseignements supplémentaires en communiquant par téléphone avec la personne ou le ministère concerné.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): On ne pense pas à conjuguer le «Commerce Canada» original avec ce bulletin? Ils vont bien ensemble. Je présume que vendre les produits canadiens est l'un des buts du Service aux délégués commerciaux et si ceux-ci ne cherchent que des occasions... Est-ce que le Service des délégués commerciaux reçoit des exemplaires et «Commerce Canada» par exemple?

M. Jenkins: Oh, oui. Comme je l'ai dit, j'ignore si la conjugaison des deux publications a été envisagée, mais c'est certainement notre intention et notre espoir que «Commerce Canada» continue à être pertinent pour les hommes d'affaires canadiens. A mon avis, pour qu'il soit pertinent, il doit les mettre au courant des occasions de marchés en raison même de la place importante que les exportations représentent dans notre économie.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Munro.

Je donne maintenant la parole au Père Ogle, qui sera suivi par M. Dupras, s'il vous plaît.

M. Ogle: Merci, madame le président. J'aimerais souhaiter la bienvenue d'une façon spéciale à M. Massé, avec lequel nous avons travaillé pendant plusieurs années à l'ACDI.

Aujourd'hui, j'aimerais particulièrement demander certains renseignements plus détaillés sur les relations du Canada avec l'Amérique centrale. Comme M. Massé et son personnel le savent, on a beaucoup parlé ces derniers jours dans la presse de la position du Canada en commençant par la déclaration du premier ministre à la presse, il y a plusieurs jours, dans laquelle il a indiqué que notre situation était distincte et clairement différente de celle des États-Unis. Puis la presse indique que lorsqu'il était en visite à Washington, il a donné l'impression qu'il appuyait les positions de Reagan, et sa réponse à certaines questions à la Chambre des communes hier, je pense, a encore laissé planer un doute. Je me demande si M. Massé aurait l'obligeance de nous dire en principe et en quelques minutes quelles sont exactement nos relations avec chacun de ces pays.

Lorsque nous les avons visités plusieurs fois avec le sous-comité—et certains de ces membres ici, je pense quatre ou cinq à cette table à présent, qui étaient avec nous à cette époque—et quand j'y ai été plusieurs autres fois sous différents auspices, envoyé par l'église, etc., j'ai eu le sentiment que la position de M. Sirrs, l'ambassadeur que nous avions à cette époque à Costa Rica, était de nous donner un bordereau de consignation. Naturellement, tout le monde peut avoir sa propre opinion là-dessus mais je pensais que ce bordereau de consignation constituait la position américaine. Lorsqu'on nous a donné l'occasion de chercher des informations—et mes collègues peuvent me contredire s'ils pensent que ce n'est pas vrai—j'ai senti tout le temps que nous ne connaissions qu'un

[Text]

and saw other people. But I really felt we had a restricted presentation given to us from both church people and government people; also from certain human rights groups, not other human rights groups, and so on.

At that time, if the Government of Canada was following what the embassy was sending back, I basically could not see any real distinction between the American position and the position being sent back to Ottawa. I can be wrong on all that, but that is certainly my opinion, and a strong opinion.

I feel that the position the Americans have been presenting comes from a problem I would put down as lack of memory. In my visits with the State Department during the last two years, dealing with people who are now directing the American policy in Central America, I always had the feeling that the problems started about 2.30 yesterday afternoon. It is just as if something has suddenly dropped into Central America as 'the problem' and nobody seems to remember that American interference, setting up governments and dictators and so on over the last 60 or 70 years, is the major part of much of the problem.

I wonder if I could ask Mr. Massé or his people what Canada's relation or position or policy is towards, first of all, Guatemala. How do we relate to Guatemala, and is it different from the way the Americans relate to Guatemala?

Mr. Marchand: Madam Chairman, starting with Guatemala, I think it would be fair to say that the aspects that have traditionally concerned us in Guatemala have been the ways in which the human rights record is being taken care of. We are monitoring the situation regularly and it is always with some dismay that we observe that political violence has not much diminished in the hinterland. However, it is the view of our experts, both those who are in the field and those who constantly analyse the situation in the region, that on an extended perspective the record of the Guatemalan administration is improving.

• 1000

It is in fact next to impossible to verify one by one the various testimonies that are regularly being brought about, whether by Amnesty International or by other groups, but as best we can we try to keep abreast of the situation as it evolves in Guatemala; and it is our view that on the whole, all things being equal, although the pace is not as quick as we would like, the situation is improving somewhat. We continue at every occasion we have, either bilaterally or in multilateral fora, to express our concerns and our preoccupations with regard to the performance of the Guatemalan authorities on that score. Other than that, our relations with that country are normal and civilized.

[Translation]

côté de la médaille. Vous ne pouvez tout simplement pas faire cela, parce que certaines personnes de notre groupe ont pu découvrir d'autres positions lorsque nous sommes sortis seuls et avons parlé avec d'autres personnes. Mais je pense réellement qu'une présentation tronquée nous avait été faite par les hommes d'église et les fonctionnaires ainsi que par certains groupes de défense des droits de la personne et pas par d'autres groupes de défense de ces droits, etc.

A cette époque, si le gouvernement du Canada appliquait les conseils que l'Ambassade donnait, il n'y avait aucune différence réelle entre la position américaine et les conseils envoyés à Ottawa. Je peux me tromper sur tout cela mais c'est certainement mon opinion et mon opinion définitive.

Je pense que la position que les Américains ont présentée vient d'un problème que j'appellerais un manque de mémoire. Au cours de mes visites au Secrétariat d'État ces deux dernières années, en parlant avec les personnes qui dirigent à présent la politique américaine en Amérique centrale, j'ai toujours eu l'impression que les problèmes avaient commencé à environ 2h30 de l'après-midi, la veille. C'est juste comme si, soudainement, quelque chose s'était produit en Amérique centrale pour devenir «le problème» et personne ne semble se rappeler que l'interférence américaine, la mise en place de gouvernements et de dictateurs, etc., au cours des 60 ou 70 dernières années constitue la majeure partie du problème.

Je me demande si je pourrais demander à M. Massé ou à ses fonctionnaires quelles sont les relations, la position ou la politique du Canada tout d'abord vis-à-vis du Guatemala. Comment considérons-nous le Guatemala et est-ce différent de la façon dont les Américains considèrent le Guatemala?

M. Marchand: Madame le président, pour commencer par le Guatemala, je pense qu'il serait équitable de dire que l'aspect de la question qui nous a traditionnellement préoccupés au Guatemala a été la façon dont les droits de la personne sont respectés. Nous surveillons régulièrement la situation et c'est toujours avec une certaine consternation que nous constatons que la violence politique n'a pas beaucoup diminué dans l'arrière-pays. Toutefois, selon le point de vue de nos experts, ceux qui travaillent sur le terrain et ceux qui analysent constamment la situation dans la région, le dossier de l'administration du Guatemala s'améliore dans une perspective à long terme.

Il est en fait presque impossible de vérifier un à un les divers témoignages qui sont régulièrement apportés, que ce soit par Amnesty internationale ou par d'autres groupes, mais nous essayons du mieux possible de suivre l'évolution de la situation au Guatemala; et selon notre point de vue, dans l'ensemble, toutes choses étant égales, bien que le rythme ne soit pas aussi rapide que nous aimerions, la situation s'améliore quelque peu. Nous continuons à chaque occasion qui se présente, que ce soit au cours de forums bilatéraux ou multilatéraux, d'exprimer nos préoccupations concernant la manière d'agir des autorités du Guatemala à cet égard. À l'exception de cette réserve, nos relations avec ce pays sont normales et civilisées.

[Texte]

Now I think, Madam Chairman, it would be fair to reiterate the general policy philosophy which guides our action in that region, particularly with regard to El Salvador and Nicaragua.

It has been the case, and it has been stated on a number of instances by our minister to his American counterpart, that it is the view of Canada, because of the depth and acuity of the causes of the difficulties in that region, which are primarily socio-economic in nature, that it would be going in the sense of history to attempt massive and imaginative action to try to cure and address these causes through socio-economic means as contrasted to military means. Canada has consistently stated its inability to condone, its inability to bless, outside intervention in the affairs of these states, wherever it comes from. That has been the case, and that remains the case.

The Canadian government has repeatedly expressed its support for peace initiatives and has offered to play a role in bringing about peace, if this should be the wish of the parties most directly concerned. That being the case, however, the government also has consistently acknowledged and recognized that the United States has a particular strategic interest in what is going on in that region and that it is well founded to express, through various means at its disposal, sympathy for its allies in the region. Whenever that has taken the shape and the form of outright intervention in the affairs of a neighbouring state, we have reminded our interlocutors, be they American . . . , that we could not condone or bless such action.

• 1005

Madam Chairman, I put this out by way of the general thrust of our approach, which is constantly monitored but has been quite consistent.

Mr. Ogle: I would have to say that I did not really understand exactly what you said. I understood the words, but as to what the sense was, I was not able to understand that. I am sorry, but I felt that it was not a very direct answer to the question.

On the question of Guatemala, today there happens to be a group in Ottawa, the Human Rights Commission for Latin America, from the churches, which will be visiting various members of Parliament. I hope if they ask to see the minister, or Mr. Massé, or whomever, they will have a chance to see you, because their reading of Guatemala is very different from what I have heard in here. I have found in the past that generally these groups are much more accurate in their readings than what we get from government sources.

Last week, on Thursday, there was a bishop from Honduras who came to see me. He is actually a Canadian, who has spent his whole life in Honduras as a priest and now is a bishop there. There are only eight bishops in Honduras. They were talking about the difficulties they are having there, naturally, with the refugees and many of the problems that have been coming from other countries around Honduras.

[Traduction]

D'ailleurs je pense, madame le président, qu'il serait juste de réitérer notre ligne de conduite générale qui guide nos actions dans cette région, particulièrement concernant le Salvador et le Nicaragua.

Cela a été le cas, et cela a été mentionné un certain nombre de fois par notre ministre à son homologue américain, que selon la vision du Canada, en raison de la profondeur et de l'acuité des causes des difficultés dans cette région, qui sont surtout de nature socio-économique, qu'il faudrait aller dans le sens de l'histoire et tenter de prendre des mesures massives et imaginatives afin d'essayer d'aborder et de régler ces causes par le truchement de moyens socio-économiques plutôt que par des moyens militaires. Le Canada a constamment exprimé son incapacité à excuser ou à approuver les interventions extérieures, indépendamment de leur provenance, dans les affaires de ces états. Cela a été le cas et cela demeurera le cas.

Le gouvernement canadien a exprimé à maintes reprises son appui aux initiatives de paix et a offert de jouer un rôle dans l'établissement de la paix, si cela est le désir des parties les plus directement visées. Cela étant le cas, toutefois, le gouvernement a également constamment reconnu que les États-Unis ont un intérêt stratégique particulier sur les événements dans cette région et qu'il est approprié d'exprimer, grâce à divers moyens à sa position, sa sympathie pour ses alliés dans la région. Peu importe la forme qu'a prise l'intervention extérieure dans les affaires d'un était voisin, nous avons toujours rappelé à nos interlocuteurs, fussent-ils américains, que nous n'excuserons ni n'approuverons une telle intervention.

Madame le président, je mentionne cela en raison de l'initiative générale de notre approche qui a toujours été surveillée, mais très homogène.

M. Ogle: Je dois avouer que je n'ai pas vraiment compris exactement ce que vous avez dit. J'ai compris les mots, mais pour ce qui est du sens, je n'ai pas été en mesure de le comprendre. Je suis désolé, mais j'estime que ce n'est pas une réponse très directe à la question.

Concernant le Guatemala, il se trouve qu'il y a à Ottawa aujourd'hui un groupe, la Commission des droits sur la personne de l'Amérique latine, formé par les églises, qui rendra visite à divers députés. J'espère, s'ils demandent à rencontrer le Ministre, ou M. Massé ou quelqu'un d'autre, qu'ils auront la chance de vous rencontrer, parce que leur vision du Guatemala est très différente de celle dont j'ai entendu ici la description. J'ai découvert dans le passé qu'en règle générale, les explications de ces groupes sont beaucoup plus précises que celles qui émanent de sources gouvernementales.

Jeudi de la semaine dernière, un évêque du Honduras est venu me voir. C'est en fait un canadien, qui a passé toute sa vie au Honduras en qualité de prêtre et maintenant à titre d'évêque. Il n'y a que huit évêques au Honduras. Ils ont parlé des difficultés qu'ils ont rencontrées là-bas, naturellement, avec les réfugiés et des nombreux problèmes qui sont provoqués par d'autres pays autour du Honduras.

[Text]

He was also saying that a large airport has been built in what would be called Miskito territory, which, as far as they know, although the thing was done under great secrecy, would be being used now as a base to bring in supplies for the *Somozistas*, or those who are now called *Contras*, who are against the Nicaraguan government. Do you have more information about that that you can tell us about? And what has Canada done specifically about the support of the United States and the CIA of the invasion of Nicaragua?

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Marchand.

Mr. Marchand: Madam Chairman, we have neither blessed nor condemned. We are still attempting to get as accurate information as we can on that particular situation. The fact is, however, that if there are—and there is a debate about whether there are—indications amounting to some evidence that the arms path leading to subversion in El Salvador goes through Nicaragua, it would not be surprising at all if there were some counteraction taken to prevent that from happening.

Mr. Ogle: Sir, that is the exact American position. Yesterday the papers clearly indicated . . . and I think the reporting that *The Globe and Mail* is doing right now is good reporting—that a leader of the *Contras* said that that was not the reason for what they were doing, that they had no arms travelling from Nicaragua to El Salvador, that they were there to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua. The kind of position that you have just given to me seems to be really out of touch. Is that the official position of the department . . . one of waiting for information on something that the whole world knows about? I just do not understand that. That is what the Americans have said.

• 1010

How long do you wait? How long do you wait for the information? They could not give me any proof of that when I was at the State Department twice. They say that. They make their policy on that one assertion, but they could not prove any of it.

How does Canada make a different position there? Where do you get your information that is different?

Mr. Marchand: Madam Chairman, Canada is monitoring that situation. We are, like all the others, trying to sort out facts from fancy and sort out hard evidence from propaganda. It is a very, very complicated territory and it is our preference to tread that ground very, very softly. The hon. member may have information that is not available to the government, but as far as we are concerned we are still trying to make sense out of conflicting and confusing reports.

As far as the question of principle at hand is concerned, we have repeatedly stated that any country, whether in that region or any other, is perfectly entitled and legitimized to choose its ways of governing itself, but when it starts to apply unwelcome pressure on its neighbours the situation acquires often a

[Translation]

Il disait également qu'un grand aéroport a été construit dans le territoire appelé Miskito, qui, selon leurs connaissances, bien que l'installation ait été réalisée dans le plus grand secret, serait utilisée maintenant comme base pour importer des approvisionnements pour les *Somozistas*, ou ceux qui s'appellent maintenant les *Contras*, qui sont contre le gouvernement du Nicaragua. Avez-vous d'autres informations concernant cette affaire que vous pouvez nous transmettre? Et qu'est-ce que le Canada a fait particulièrement concernant l'appui des États-Unis et de la CIA à l'invasion du Nicaragua?

Le vice-président: Monsieur Marchand.

M. Marchand: Madame le président, nous n'avons ni approuvé ni condamné. Nous attendons toujours d'obtenir des informations aussi précises que possible sur cette situation particulière. En fait, toutefois, s'il y a, et il y a un débat à cet égard, des indications formant une certaine preuve que le sentier des armes conduisant à la subversion au Salvador passe par le Nicaragua, il ne serait pas surprenant du tout si certaines interventions étaient prises pour tuer le germe dans l'oeuf.

M. Ogle: Monsieur, c'est la position exacte des Américains. Hier, les journaux ont clairement indiqué, et je pense que le reportage publié par *The Globe and Mail* est du bon journalisme, qu'un chef des *Contras* a déclaré que ce n'était pas la raison pour laquelle ils agissaient ainsi, qu'ils n'envoyaient pas d'armes au Salvador à partir du Nicaragua, qu'ils avaient l'intention de renverser le gouvernement du Nicaragua. Le genre de position que vous venez de me présenter semble être réellement irréaliste. Est-ce la position officielle du ministère, c'est-à-dire attendre des informations sur une situation connue du monde entier? Je ne comprends pas du tout cela. C'est ce que les Américains ont dit.

Combien de temps attendez-vous? Combien de temps attendez-vous pour recevoir l'information? Ils n'ont pu me donner aucune preuve de ça lorsque je suis allé au ministère d'État, deux fois. Ils disent ça. Ils fondent leur politique sur cette seule affirmation, mais ne pouvaient rien prouver à cet égard.

Comment le Canada peut-il changer la situation là-bas? Où avez-vous appris que c'était différent?

M. Marchand: Madame le président, le Canada surveille la situation. Comme tous les autres, nous tentons de dégager des faits ce qui relève de la fantaisie et ce qui est de la propagande. C'est un sujet très très compliqué et nous préférons l'aborder avec beaucoup beaucoup de prudence. Le très honorable membre peut avoir obtenu des renseignements qui ne sont pas accessibles au gouvernement, mais en ce qui nous concerne, nous tentons encore de voir clair dans les rapports contradictoires et confus.

Pour ce qui est de la question du principe en cause, nous avons maintes fois affirmé que tout pays, que ce soit dans cette région ou une autre, a un droit parfaitement légitime de choisir la façon de se gouverner, mais lorsqu'il commence à exercer sur ses voisins des pressions indues, la situation prend souvent

[Texte]

the strategic dimension in which other interests come to play. The fact that these interests would come into play should surprise no one, and if at the end of that line there is a perceived or apprehended threat to strategic interests in that region it has been our view that those interests at play are legitimized in doing something about their preservation.

Mr. Ogle: I would just like to suggest, at the end, that we get a subscription to *The New York Times*, *Newsweek*—the standard American news sources. There is a lot of information in there about what we are talking about.

The Vice-Chairman: Father Ogle, thank you very much.

Mr. Ogle: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Before passing the floor to Mr. Dupras, I will make a short administrative comment. Replies to questions from Messrs. Roche, Munro and McLean are going to be appended to today's *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence*.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: I now pass the floor to Mr. Dupras, please.

M. Dupras: Merci, madame le président.

Je voudrais poursuivre dans la même veine que M. Ogle, car c'est une préoccupation que je partage également: il s'agit de l'intervention américaine en Amérique centrale. J'appuie sa recommandation à savoir que nous devrions lire plus souvent le *New York Times*, le *Newsweek* et d'autres journaux américains, ce qui nous renseignerait beaucoup plus que les discours de M. Reagan.

Suite à la lecture du discours que M. Reagan prononçait jeudi dernier, madame le président, ceux qui ne connaissent pas le Nicaragua pourraient croire que c'est un pays qui compte au moins 100 millions d'habitants, dont une immense armée. Certains de ses propos font peur et il dépassent en fait toutes mesures. A la page 6, par exemple, au troisième paragraphe du bas, il dit ceci:

Nicaragua, supported by weapons and military resources provided by the communist bloc, represses its own people, refuses to make peace and sponsors a guerrilla war against El Salvador.

A-t-on déjà pensé que, madame le président, si le Nicaragua fait tous ces péchés-là et s'il a l'intention d'envahir le Salvador avec le peu de ressources qu'il détient au lendemain du triomphe de la révolution alors que Somoza l'a vidé de toute entreprise et de toute ressource financière à la Banque mondiale... On annonçait aujourd'hui dans le journal, qu'on a trouvé un médecin ouest-allemand assassiné par les Somozistes hier au Nicaragua. Alors, j'imagine que s'il s'agit d'une telle guerre, c'est-à-dire que les Nicaraguayens tentent d'envahir le Salvador, c'est qu'ils y ont capturé des prisonniers.

[Traduction]

une dimension stratégique où d'autres intérêts entrent en jeu. Que de tels intérêts entrent en jeu ne devrait surprendre personne, et si en fin de compte on a eu l'impression, ou l'on a craint que les intérêts stratégiques de cette région étaient menacés, nous avons pensé qu'il était légitime pour les personnes en cause de faire quelque chose pour assurer leur survie.

M. Ogle: Si vous permettez, j'aimerais proposer que nous prenions un abonnement au *New York Times*, au *Newsweek*, qui est la source de renseignements reconnue aux États-Unis. Cette revue contient un tas de renseignements au sujet de ce dont nous parlons.

Le vice-président: Père Ogle, je vous remercie beaucoup.

M. Ogle: Merci.

Le vice-président: Avant de céder la parole à M. Dupras, je vais formuler un bref commentaire d'ordre administratif. Les réponses aux questions de MM. Roche, Munro et McLean seront ajoutées au procès-verbal de la réunion d'aujourd'hui.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci.

Le vice-président: Monsieur Dupras, la parole est maintenant à vous.

Mr. Dupras: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

I would like to go on in the same line of thought as Mr. Ogle, for it is a concern that I also share: It is about the United States' action in Central America. I support his recommendation that we should read more often the *New York Times*, *Newsweek*, and other American newspapers, which would inform us much better than Mr. Reagan's speeches.

Madam Chairman, those who have read the speech Mr. Reagan gave last Thursday and who knew nothing about Nicaragua might believe that this is a country with a population of 100 million people and a very large army. Some of the things Mr. Reagan said were scary and in fact were beyond imagination. For instance, on page 6, third paragraph from the bottom, he says:

Le Nicaragua, avec l'aide d'armes et de ressources militaires fournies par le bloc communiste, réprime son propre peuple, refuse de faire la paix et encourage une guerre de guérillas contre le Salvador.

Have we ever thought, Madam Chairman, that if Nicaragua commits all these sins and intends to invade El Salvador with the few resources it still has after the victory of the revolution, Somoza having chased all businesses from the country and prevented it from having access to the financial resources of the World Bank... In today's newspaper, there was an article about a West German doctor who was murdered yesterday in Nicaragua by the Somozans. I therefore imagine that if there is such a war going on, that if the Nicaraguans are attempting to invade El Salvador, it means they have made prisoners in that country.

[Text]

• 1015

On a pris des Nicaraguayens comme prisonniers, on en a exécuté; il doit donc y avoir des corps. Je n'ai jamais vu encore dans les journaux, sans que ce ne soit démenti le lendemain parce que c'était un *fake*, que l'armée du Salvador avait fait prisonniers des soldats du Nicaragua qui étaient censés vouloir envahir le Salvador. Monsieur Massé, pouvez-vous me dire si c'est une question qu'on se pose?

J'aurais également une remarque à faire, et je voudrais avoir votre opinion là-dessus. À la lecture de ce fameux discours, qui ne peut venir que d'une personne obsédée, je me dis que si tout le danger dont on parle dans ce discours existe vraiment, il vaudrait mieux demander au Conseil de sécurité des Nations-unies d'envoyer une troupe internationale en Amérique centrale pour protéger les intérêts américains. Vraiment, si on prête foi à ces propos, nous sommes tous en très grave danger.

M. M. Massé: Juste une courte réponse, monsieur Dupras. Heureusement, je suis encore en mesure de demander au sous-ministre en charge des affaires politiques de répondre à votre question. Avec votre permission, je demanderais à M. Marchand de répondre.

M. Marchand: Madame le président, je suis tenté de dire, pour imiter mon collègue Marcel Massé, que j'aimerais être dans la même position que lui et avoir mon ami Gorham ici pour faire face à la musique.

Je pense que M. Dupras cite des passages du discours du président qui témoigne de l'inquiétude des Américains et de la Maison Blanche devant ce qui se passe en Amérique centrale. La question du Nicaragua, nous ne pensons pas qu'elle se pose en termes de menaces d'invasion du Nicaragua au Salvador.

Il y a un triple aspect à la situation du Nicaragua. Il y a tout d'abord les promesses d'un monde meilleur à l'intérieur du territoire qui ont été formulées par la junte militaire qui a pris le pouvoir. Nous, comme d'autres, devons suivre de très près la façon dont le régime au pouvoir au Nicaragua s'acquitte de ses devoirs, puisque nous entretenons avec ce pays des relations civilisées, des relations d'aide, des relations que nous voudrions le plus sympathiques possible. Il arrive toutefois que notre opinion publique s'émeut de la façon dont les choses évoluent au Nicaragua. Le gouvernement canadien doit donc demeurer sensible et constamment rappeler aux autorités nicaraguayennes que la légitimité de nos rapports avec eux repose, dans une certaine mesure, sur la sanction morale que notre opinion publique peut apporter à cette relation. Chaque fois qu'il est perceptible ou qu'il est observable qu'il y a dans ce pays des entorses aux libertés fondamentales, nous ne pouvons que nous en alarmer. C'est la première dimension.

Deuxième dimension: il existe une contre-révolution dans ce pays, et on a souvent tendance à identifier cette contre-révolution avec le régime somoziste qui a précédé le régime actuel.

• 1020

À notre avis, c'est une simplification. Que nous soyons attentifs comme les Américains le sont ou comme d'autres le sont aux propos et aux préoccupations de cette contre-

[Translation]

Some Nicaraguans were taken prisoner, some were executed, therefore, there must be bodies. I have not yet read in the newspapers, without it having been denied the next day as a false statement, that the Salvadoran army had taken prisoner Nicaraguan soldiers who were supposedly intending to invade El Salvador. Mr. Massé, could you tell me if this question is being asked.

I also wish to make a comment and I would like to have your opinion on this. Upon reading the famous speech that could only have been given by an obsessed person, I figure that if all the danger spoken of truly exists, it would be preferable to ask the United Nations Security Council to send an international force to Central America to protect American interests. If we truly believe these statements, we are all in very serious danger.

Mr. Massé: Just a brief comment, Mr. Dupras. Luckily, I am still able to ask the Deputy Minister for Foreign Policy to answer your question. With your permission, I would ask Mr. Marchand to answer.

Mr. Marchand: Madam Chairman, I am tempted to say, to imitate my colleague Marcel Massé, that I would like to be in the same position as he is and have the possibility of passing this delicate question on to my friend Gorham here.

I believe that the excerpts that Mr. Dupras is quoting from the President's speech are an indication of the concern of the Americans and the White House over Central America. As for Nicaragua, we do not believe that the issue is expressed in terms of the danger of invasion of El Salvador by Nicaragua.

The issue in Nicaragua is three-fold. First, there are the promises of a better world in that country which have been made by the military junta that has taken control. Like others, we must closely monitor the way in which the present government of Nicaragua carries out its obligations, since our relationship with that country is based on civilized behaviour, on help, a relationship that we wish to be as understanding as possible. Sometimes, however, there is a public outcry over developments in Nicaragua. The Canadian government must therefore remain open and constantly remind Nicaraguan officials that the legitimacy of our relationship depends, to a certain extent, upon the moral support afforded this relationship by public opinion in this country. Each time we perceive or note that principles of basic freedom are being violated in that country, we must be alarmed. This is the first dimension.

Second dimension: there is a counter-revolutionary movement in that country and we often tend to identify this counter-revolution with the Somosa regime which preceded the present government.

In our view, this is a simplification. If we are as watchful as the Americans or others are to the statements and concerns expressed by representatives of this counter-revolutionary

[Texte]

révolution, ce tout simplement pour suivre les événements politiques dans un pays qui nous importe.

La troisième dimension est probablement la plus troublante. C'est qu'il y a des signes, qu'il est très difficile de vérifier, des signes alarmants qui nous amènent à penser que les frontières sont très perméables entre le Salvador et le Nicaragua et que la guérilla salvadorienne serait alimentée de façon pas nécessairement subtile à partir du territoire du Nicaragua. Donc, c'est une situation bien différente d'une menace d'invasion. C'est tout simplement un appui à l'insurgence, si vous voulez.

Pour ce qui est de ceux qui estiment qu'il y a dans cela beaucoup de légende et peu de choses vérifiées, il suffit d'évoquer, madame le président, l'intéressante capture par les autorités brésiliennes, la semaine dernière, d'énormes avions libyens gonflés à bloc d'armements destinés au Nicaragua. Ce n'est pas une histoire de croque-mitaine, et le *New York Times*, l'autorité invoquée il y a quelques minutes, en faisait très largement état. C'est un fait qui semble être non contesté. Nous estimons que c'est un fait qui est alarmant. Quant à savoir quelles conclusions très précises on doit ou on peut en tirer, c'est une autre affaire. Vous nous trouverez trop prudents, vous nous trouverez tatillons, mais je pense que les circonstances exigent que, comme conseillers du gouvernement, nous prenions toutes les mesures possibles pour fournir des avis qui sont basés sur des faits vérifiés, vérifiables et le mieux contrôlés possible.

Donc, je souligne ces trois aspects de la conjoncture nicaraguayenne, parce qu'il s'agit de trois aspects interreliés, mais qu'il est souhaitable de bien distinguer.

La dernière question de l'honorable député, quant à savoir si le président Reagan ne serait pas mieux fondé de s'adresser au Conseil de sécurité pour apaiser ses inquiétudes, je la trouve intéressante et à la première occasion, je ferai part de ces vues à nos collègues de l'ambassade américaine que nous voyons régulièrement. Je pense que les États-Unis ne manquent aucune occasion, dans les différentes arènes multilatérales, de faire connaître leurs sentiments et leur point de vue sur ce qui se passe en Amérique centrale.

M. Dupras: Madame le président, je comprends le malaise de M. Marchand comme celui de M. Massé; je le ressens moi aussi lorsque les Canadiens me posent certaines questions sur la conduite du gouvernement canadien vis-à-vis des événements au Nicaragua et dans toute l'Amérique centrale.

Je veux revenir aux promesses que la junte du Nicaragua a faites; ils ont promis qu'ils tiendraient des élections en 1985 et la dernière fois que j'en ai discuté avec l'ambassadeur, cela tenait toujours. Seulement, au moment du triomphe de la révolution, il n'y avait pas eu de recensement depuis un très grand nombre d'années; la population était illettrée à 70 p. 100 et il n'y avait vraiment pas de ressources pour mettre en branle un processus électoral.

• 1025

J'ai beaucoup plus de respect pour un régime qui va tenir compte de ces difficultés-là avant de convoquer des élections

[Traduction]

movement, it is simply because we wish to follow the political events in a country which is important to us.

The third dimension is probably the most worrisome. It is the fact that there are indications, alarming indications, that are difficult to verify and that lead us to believe that the border between El Salvador and Nicaragua is very pervious and that Salvadorian guerillas are getting supplies in Nicaragua in a way that is not necessarily very subtle. We are, therefore, confronted with a situation that is very different from a threat of invasion. It is simply a case of providing help to the insurgents, if you will.

For those who believe that this information is based on fiction and contains very few verifiable facts, we need only recall, Madam Chairman, the interesting news story about the huge Libyan planes that were seized by Brazilian authorities last week and that were filled to capacity with arms being supplied to Nicaragua. This is not a scare story, it was extensively reported in the *New York Times*, the authoritative newspaper you referred to a few minutes ago. This seems to be an uncontested fact. We consider it an alarming fact. As to what we must or can precisely conclude from it, this is another matter. You will find us too cautious or too meticulous, but I believe that the circumstances require that we, as advisers to the government, take all possible measures to provide advice that is based on facts that are verified, verifiable and checked as much as possible.

Consequently, I have underlined these three dimensions of the situation in Nicaragua because they are interrelated and yet should be considered separately.

As to the last issue raised by the honourable member concerning the fact that it might be preferable for President Reagan to ask the Security Council to dispel his concerns, I find it an interesting observation and, at the first chance I get, I will convey it to our colleagues in the United States Embassy whom we meet with regularly. I think that the United States never foregoes the chance to make known its ideas and point of view on events in Central America in the various multilateral arenas.

Mr. Dupras: Madam Chairman, I understand the uneasiness of Mr. Marchand and Mr. Massé; I also feel it when Canadians ask me certain questions concerning the conduct of the Canadian government with regard to events in Nicaragua and in all of Central America.

I want to refer once more to the promises made by the military junta in Nicaragua. They promised to hold elections in 1985 and the last time I spoke of this to the ambassador, it still held. However, when the revolution occurred, there had not been a census for many years; 70% of the population was illiterate and there were not really any means of beginning the electoral process.

I have much more respect for a system that will face these problems before holding an election than for a system that will

[Text]

que pour un régime qui va tout de suite convoquer des élections, comme on l'a vu trop souvent en Amérique centrale et encore tout dernièrement.

Je pense que sur le plan économique, le régime a été plus efficace que le régime Somoza, puisqu'il y a très peu de cas de violation des droits de la personne de signalés aux différentes commissions des droits de la personne. Le Nicaragua a la réputation de rencontrer ses obligations et les intérêts sur sa dette internationale sont payés régulièrement, contrairement à certains autres pays pas très éloignés qui sont incapables de le faire. Peut-être que l'administration américaine actuelle aimerait mieux que le Nicaragua soit à genoux devant elle, comme elle souhaiterait voir toute l'Amérique centrale à ses genoux, pour avoir de bonnes conditions de paiement de leur dette internationale. Madame le président, les récoltes ont augmenté considérablement à chaque année depuis le triomphe de la révolution. On me dit que les récoltes sont bien supérieures aux récoltes qu'ils connaissaient à l'époque de Somoza.

Pour terminer, madame le président, je voudrais dire que je ne comprends pas l'obsession de l'administration américaine et du président à s'inquiéter de ce qui se passe au Nicaragua, quand on pense qu'avec l'équipement militaire qu'ils possèdent, les avions AWACS, la flotte qui est sur les deux côtes, ils peuvent facilement surveiller le territoire très étroit et très restreint du Nicaragua. Ils peuvent suivre tout ce qui vole et qui est plus gros qu'un canard; ils peuvent suivre l'appareil et déterminer où il va atterrir. La question des trois avions venant de Libye est une preuve, madame le président, que les Américains suivent de très près tout mouvement à destination du Nicaragua.

Madame le président, je veux revenir à cette question des attachés militaires. Quel effort le gouvernement canadien va-t-il faire pour obtenir la liste des objets ou du matériel qu'il y avait dans ces trois avions? Moi, je veux bien prendre la parole de certaines personnes; seulement, devant l'expérience qu'on a vécue nous-mêmes en Amérique centrale, j'ai de plus en plus de doutes, et je voudrais savoir de quelle façon on pourrait s'assurer que nous, les Canadiens, nous puissions savoir exactement, de source canadienne, ce qu'il y avait dans ces avions-là.

Le vice-président: Monsieur Marchand.

M. Marchand: Madame le président, je crains que pour ce qui est de la question précise posée par l'honorable député, nous soyons condamnés à devoir procéder par personne interposée. Il serait surprenant que nous puissions, de première main, participer à la prise d'inventaire de ce que contenaient ces avions. Je crois par contre qu'il nous sera très certainement possible d'obtenir des renseignements détaillés sur le contenu de ces avions. Mais je serais très étonné, pour ne pas dire plus, que nous soyons admis à la prise d'inventaire comme observateurs canadiens, ou comme source d'inventaire. Cela ne veut pas dire que nous sommes à la merci de renseignements qui ne sont pas fiables, mais je pense que nous serons condamnés à avoir des renseignements de deuxième main, ce qui n'est déjà pas si mal.

M. Dupras: Je voudrais demander à M. Massé, ou peut-être à M. Marchand, quelle est la possibilité pour le Canada de

[Translation]

call outright for an election, as it has too often been the case in Central America and as we have again witnessed recently.

I believe that from an economic viewpoint, this government has been much more efficient than the Somoza government since very few violations of human rights have been reported to the different human rights commissions. Nicaragua has the reputation of meeting its commitments and the interest on its national debt is paid regularly which is more than can be said about certain other countries in the area who are unable to do the same. Maybe the present administration in the United States would prefer to see Nicaragua fawn before it, as it would like to see the other countries in Central America so as to ensure repayment of their international debts. Madam Chairman, the harvests have considerably increased each year since the revolution. I am told they are much better than under Somoza.

Finally, Madam Chairman, I would like to add that I do not understand the obsession of the present American administration and of the President with the situation in Nicaragua, when one knows that with their military equipment, their AWACS, their Navy deployed on both coasts, they can easily control the whole of Nicaragua which covers a very narrow and small territory. They can monitor anything that flies or is bigger than a duck; they can monitor any aircraft and guess where it will land. The case of the three aircraft from Libia is proof enough, Madam Chairman, that the Americans monitor very closely any traffic towards Nicaragua.

Madam Chairman, I would like to get back to the military attachés. What measures will the Canadian government take to get the list of equipment or material carried on the three planes? I for one, am ready to take the word of certain people; however, from our own experience in Central America, I am beginning to have doubts and I would like to know how we Canadians could learn precisely, from a Canadian source what was in those planes.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Marchand.

Mr. Marchand: Madam Chairman, I am afraid that, to answer the honourable member's specific question we have no alternative but to proceed on second-hand information. It is very unlikely that we could, first hand, participate in the stocktaking of the things carried on those planes. Notwithstanding, I am quite sure that we will be able to obtain detailed information on the content of those planes. But I would be very surprised, to say the least, if we were admitted, as Canadian observers or inventory source, to witness this stocktaking. This does not mean that we are left at the mercy of unreliable information but I believe that we will have to make do with second-hand information, which is not so very bad.

Mr. Dupras: I would like to ask Mr. Massé, or maybe Mr. Marchand, if there is any hope that the Canadian government

[Texte]

nommer des attachés militaires en Amérique centrale le plus rapidement possible. On en a 17 en Europe de l'Ouest, en excluant la Grande-Bretagne; on en a, par exemple, dans des pays où on pourrait peut-être s'en passer, madame le président. On en a en Belgique, en Espagne, en Turquie. Étant donné que pour nous, sur le plan stratégique, ces trois ou quatre pays ne revêtent pas le même caractère que certains pays de l'Amérique centrale, je me demande si on ne devrait pas, dans nos missions à Costa Rica et au Guatemala, avoir des attachés militaires pour développer des sources canadiennes d'information qui soient au moins aussi bonnes que le *Newsweek* ou le *New York Times*. Ou bien une C.I.A. canadienne comme le suggère mon ami Herb Breau.

• 1030

Le vice-président: Monsieur Marchand.

M. Marchand: Madame le président, je vais tenter de répondre à la question de M. Dupras, mais je voudrais préférer ma réponse en disant que c'est un point de vue personnel que j'exprime ici, qui ne représente pas nécessairement les vues du gouvernement. Si on me demandait mon avis quant à la désirabilité de nommer des attachés militaires en Amérique centrale, je serais porté à donner à cet égard un avis négatif, et ce pour la raison suivante: je craindrais, encore une fois toutes choses étant égales, que le Canada ne dilue de façon dangereuse sa position traditionnelle qui est de privilégier des solutions et des approches de type politique et de type socio-économique aux problèmes de l'Amérique centrale. Si nous devons nommer des attachés militaires dans ces pays, fatalement nous établirions un canal de communications privilégié d'attachés militaires à interlocuteurs militaires. Nous risquerions par là sinon d'encourager, du moins de monter en épingle la dimension militaire des problèmes de cette région. Je pense en revanche—c'est un point de vue personnel—que nous avons tout avantage à privilégier la dimension politique de notre rapport avec ces pays et qu'en privilégiant cette dimension politique et en diversifiant nos sources de renseignements politiques, nous avons les meilleures chances de garnir notre éventail de données, même sur les questions militaires, mais sans nécessairement passer par le mécanisme des attachés militaires, lequel mécanisme, bien sûr, a fait ses preuves dans plusieurs domaines. Je ne dénigre pas l'instrument qu'est l'attaché militaire qui a fait ses preuves à plusieurs égards et dans de nombreuses circonstances. En général, nous avons des attachés militaires dans des pays qui font, avec nous, partie d'une alliance, partie d'un accord de défense, ou qui présentent pour nous un intérêt militaire particulier. Nous avons des attachés militaires en Union Soviétique et on n'a pas d'alliance avec l'Union Soviétique, mais on a un intérêt très marqué pour le volet militaire de la relation avec l'Union Soviétique.

J'aimerais pour ma part nous mettre en garde contre le risque que pourrait comporter la nomination d'attachés militaires. Mais en disant cela, madame le président, je prends une liberté que peut-être je ne devrais pas prendre.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Dupras.

At this moment, the Chair finds itself in a slight predicament. Up until now, members of all three parties have been

[Traduction]

will appoint military attachés in Central America in the near future? We already have 17 in western Europe, not counting those in Great Britain; we even have some in certain countries where we could do without, Madam Chairman. We have some in Belgium, in Spain, in Turkey. Since for us these three or four countries in Central America, I wonder if we should not, in our missions in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, have military attachés to develop Canadian sources of information at least as good as *Newsweek* or the *New York Times*. Or maybe a Canadian CIA as my friend Herb Breau was suggesting.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Marchand.

Mr. Marchand: Madam Chairman, I will try to answer Mr. Dupras' question, but I would like to begin by saying that I am expressing a personal point of view that does not necessarily reflect the government's views. If I were asked about the desirability of appointing military attachés in Central America, I would tend to give a negative answer for the following reason: I would fear, once again all things being equal, that Canada would water down dangerously its traditional position, which is to favour political and socio-economic solutions and approaches to problems in Central America. If we were to appoint military attachés in those countries, we would fatally establish privileged communication channels between military attachés and military counterparts. We would therefore risk if not encouraging at least blowing up out of proportions the military dimension of problems in that region. I rather think—this is a personal point of view—that it is to our advantage to concentrate on the political dimension of our relations with those countries and that in concentrating on the political dimension and in diversifying our sources of political information, we have the best chances of gathering diversified data, even on military issues, but without necessarily going through the military attachés, which, obviously, has proved useful in several areas. I am not putting down the military attaché as a tool, which has proved useful in several areas and numerous circumstances. Generally, we have military attachés in countries that belong to the same alliance or defence agreement as us or that represent for us a special military interest. We have military attachés in the Soviet Union and no alliance with the Soviet Union, but we have a very definite interest in the military aspect of our relations with the Soviet Union.

I would like for myself to warn against the possible risk of appointing military attachés. But so saying, Madam Chairman, I am taking a freedom that maybe I should not take.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Dupras.

La présidence se retrouve actuellement dans une situation un peu fâcheuse. Jusqu'ici, des députés des trois partis ont été

[Text]

represented and have raised most interesting but highly complex questions. I would remind members that at 11:00 a.m. we have another meeting with CIDA officials, but I still have six speakers on my list.

Mr. Ogle: At 11:00 a.m.?

Mr. Dupras: On Thursday.

The Vice-Chairman: I beg your pardon. The clerk corrects me. However, there is another meeting in this room at 11:00 a.m. The point is that I have six speakers left on my list. I would ask you kindly to regulate yourself; I would suggest perhaps five minutes per speaker, and I will start with the Honourable Mr. McKinnon, the critic for the Official Opposition.

Mr. McKinnon: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

I can guarantee the questions will not take over five minutes.

As a relative newcomer to this part of the standing committee, I find myself in a position that politicians should try to avoid; that is, asking questions they do not know the answer to.

• 1035

I would like to ask if it is Canada's position that the Palestinians are entitled to a homeland. We might do this under a 1-2-3 system on that question. Do we agree? Does Canada feel they should have a homeland? Secondly, do we favour a possible West Bank homeland for the Palestinians? and if not, where do we favour?

Mr. Marchand: This is, Madam Chairman, a mulberry bush that is very thick, but I will try to make my answer short.

Yes, it is, and has been, the position of the Canadian government that the Palestinian people are entitled to a homeland and that they have a part to play—a full part to play—in negotiations to determine their future. It is also our view that the homeland would best be found within a clearly defined territory. As far as the West Bank and Gaza are concerned, we think this is an option which, while compelling, is not necessarily the only option if the negotiation process, in which the Palestinian people took a full part, arrived at a different conclusion. We would, by consensus, support those conclusions. In essence, we are saying it is for the Palestinian people to have the paramount say in those conclusions.

To paraphrase somebody whose name escapes me, the West Bank and Gaza if necessary, but not necessarily the West Bank and Gaza.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): It was in Germany.

Mr. McKinnon: It was MacKenzie King talking about conscription in World War II. This is where it started, was it not?

Trade relations of External Affairs; I have had a question hanging around for several years about trade relations in a

[Translation]

représentés et ont soulevé des questions très intéressantes, mais fort complexes. Je voudrais rappeler aux députés qu'à 11h00, nous avons une autre réunion avec des fonctionnaires de l'ACDI, mais j'ai encore six orateurs sur ma liste.

M. Ogle: À 11h00?

M. Dupras: Jeudi.

Le vice-président: Je m'excuse. Le greffier me corrige. Il y a toutefois une autre réunion dans cette salle à 11h00. Le problème est qu'il reste six orateurs sur ma liste. Je vous demanderais de bien vouloir vous restreindre; je propose peut-être cinq minutes par orateur et je débiterai par l'honorable M. McKinnon, critique de l'opposition officielle.

M. McKinnon: Merci, madame le président.

Je peux vous assurer que les questions ne prendront pas plus de cinq minutes.

A titre de relatif néophyte dans cette partie du Comité permanent, je me trouve dans une situation que les hommes politiques cherchent à éviter, c'est-à-dire poser des questions dont ils ne connaissent pas la réponse.

J'aimerais connaître la position du Canada en ce qui concerne la patrie des Palestiniens. L'on pourrait diviser cette question en trois parties. Sommes-nous d'accord? Estimons-nous que les Palestiniens devraient avoir une patrie? Ensuite, préconisons-nous la possibilité que les Palestiniens s'installent sur la rive occidentale? Et sinon, quel endroit serait préférable?

M. Marchand: Madame le président, il s'agit d'une question fort complexe, mais j'essaierai de répondre brièvement.

Oui, dans le passé et encore actuellement, le gouvernement canadien est d'avis que le peuple palestinien a droit à une patrie et qu'il a un rôle important à jouer dans les négociations qui portent sur leur propre avenir. Nous croyons également qu'il serait préférable que les limites de leur territoire soient nettement désignées. En ce qui concerne la rive occidentale et la bande de Gaza, bien que cette option s'impose plus ou moins, il ne s'agit pas nécessairement de l'unique solution, si les négociations auxquelles les Palestiniens ont participé à part entière, aboutissent à des conclusions différentes. Nous accepterions alors, d'un commun accord, d'appuyer ces décisions. Nous croyons essentiellement que le peuple palestinien a un rôle capital à jouer au cours de ces négociations.

Pour reprendre les paroles d'une personne dont le nom m'échappe, la rive occidentale et la bande de Gaza au besoin, mais non nécessairement la rive occidentale et la bande de Gaza.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): C'était en Allemagne.

M. McKinnon: C'était Mackenzie King qui parlait au sujet de la conscription de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. N'est-ce pas le moment où tout a commencé?

A propos des relations commerciales du ministère des Affaires extérieures; depuis plusieurs années, je me pose une

[Texte]

high-technology area. There was a high-level committee, I believe, in which the United States played a very strong position, which decided what products made by a variety of western countries were of such high technology they should not be allowed to be exported to the U.S.S.R. because of the advantage it would give them, which would then equal our advantage in those areas. I was thinking particularly of such things as the Pisces submarine.

I wonder if your trade people could tell me if the Pisces submarine, which had a remarkable ability for very, very deep diving... it really was not as much a submarine as a kind of bathysphere, which could go down to 5,000 feet below sea level, or that region. There was quite a controversy three or four years ago as to whether that company should be allowed to export their technology or not. I am wondering if they were allowed to and if the department has found any connection between the deep diving ability of the Pisces and the new Russian Typhoon submarine, which can go down to 6,000 feet, which is a rather remarkable achievement. The Typhoon, you will know, is about the same size as a Trident submarine of the United States, but weighs about 50% more, for some strange reason. I wonder if there is a connection between the Pisces exportation of their technology and the capability of the Typhoon.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Jenkins, please.

Mr. Jenkins: Thank you, Madam Speaker.

The hon. member did refer to a committee that has established a list of items which are considered to be of strategic importance to the Soviet Block. Countries—largely NATO countries... have agreed that export of these items should not be authorized.

I am sorry, I cannot answer your question whether the Pisces submarine is on that list. I will gladly look into it and pass the information to you.

• 1040

Mr. McKinnon: That will be fine, thank you.

Now my final question. I was not very satisfied with the answer to Mr. Dupras' question about what I thought were the four aircraft in Brazil. I understand there were one Hercules and three Aleutians, allegedly having 200 tonnes of munitions on them. Those four aircraft could not lift 200 tonnes unless they were running a shuttle service of some kind; but that is beside the point.

Surely, if we are adopting the position that some days we claim we are—and our subcommittee on Canada's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean recommended in July last year that Canada should seize every opportunity to make a positive contribution to the search for stability in the Caribbean and Central America, I find it difficult to countenance that you would tell us this morning that you do not really feel it is in our interest to be curious about these tonnes of munitions that are floating around with an indeterminate destina-

[Traduction]

question au sujet des relations commerciales dans les domaines de la technologie de pointe. Il existait, je crois, un Comité composé de hauts fonctionnaires et dans lequel les États-Unis ont joué un rôle très important; son mandat était de décider quelles étaient les technologies de pointe des divers pays occidentaux qui ne devaient pas être exportées en URSS de manière à ne pas permettre aux Russes les mêmes possibilités que les pays de l'Ouest dans ces domaines. Je pense particulièrement aux produits comme le sous-marin Pisces.

J'aimerais avoir si vos représentants pourraient me dire si le sous-marin Pisces, qui pouvait descendre à des profondeurs exceptionnelles... il ne s'agit pas réellement d'un sous-marin, mais plutôt d'une bathysphère qui pouvait descendre à une profondeur d'environ 5,000 pieds en-dessous du niveau de la mer. Il y a trois ou quatre ans, une vive controverse a été soulevée à ce sujet; il fallait déterminer si la société devait être autorisée à exporter leurs technologies. Je me demande si elle a reçu l'autorisation et si le ministère a fait un lien entre le sous-marin Pisces et le nouveau sous-marin russe de classe Typhoon qui peut descendre à une profondeur de 6,000 pieds, ce qui est une réussite remarquable. Comme vous le savez sans doute, les sous-marins de classe Typhoon sont environ de la même taille que les sous-marins de classe Trident aux États-Unis, mais pour des raisons inconnues, pèsent environ 50 p. 100 de plus. Je me demande s'il y a un lien entre l'exportation de la technologie de Pisces et les possibilités des Typhoon.

Le vice-président: M. Jenkins, à vous la parole.

M. Jenkins: Merci madame le président.

Le député parlait d'un Comité qui a dressé la liste de produits considérés comme étant d'une importance stratégique pour l'Union soviétique. Divers pays, principalement les pays de l'OTAN ont décidé que l'exportation de ces produits ne devait pas être autorisée.

Je regrette, mais je ne peux pas vous préciser si le sous-marin Pisces était sur la liste. Je me ferai un plaisir de me renseigner et de vous communiquer les informations.

M. McKinnon: Ce sera parfait, merci.

J'aimerais maintenant poser une dernière question. La réponse à la question de M. Dupras au sujet de ce que je croyais être les quatre avions du Brésil ne m'a pas satisfait. À ma connaissance, il y avait un avion Hercules et trois Aleutians qui, prétend-on, transportaient deux cents tonnes de munitions chacun. Ces quatre avions n'avaient pas la capacité de transporter deux cent tonnes chacun à moins d'assurer un service de navette; mais je m'éloigne de la question.

Tout de même, si notre position change au jour le jour—et notre sous-comité concernant les relations du Canada avec l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes a recommandé en juillet dernier que le Canada devrait profiter de chaque occasion pour aider les Caraïbes et l'Amérique centrale à se stabiliser. D'après moi, il est donc difficile de comprendre pourquoi vous nous avez dit ce matin que vous ne croyez pas réellement qu'il est dans notre intérêt de poser des questions au sujet des tonnes de munitions transportées par avion à une destination inconnue

[Text]

tion in that area of the world. I would like you to clarify it a bit, if you can.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Marchand.

Mr. Marchand: Madam Chairman, I certainly apologize to the hon. member if I led him to believe that we were not curious, or we were not vigorous in pursuing our curiosity. On the contrary, we were just as dismayed, to use perhaps an understatement, as the rest of the world to find out what has happened in Brazil. Indeed, we will take all means at our disposal to find out what was the exact content of these planes; and also to express the depth of our views about such a turn of events.

If it is the wish of the hon. member, and of this committee, Madam Chairman, as soon as we obtain this information, in whatever detail we have it, we would be prepared to make it available to the committee if the security ties and obligations that we might have contracted would not otherwise be breached in so doing; and the hon. member is very familiar with such imperatives.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Marchand. The committee members would appreciate receiving that answer.

Mr. Ogle: Madam Chairman, just a short supplementary. Would it be possible to get the same information for the material going into the new airport in the Honduras?

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Marchand.

Mr. Marchand: Is that CIDA?

Mr. Ogle: No, I am talking about the new airport that has been built in the Miskito area for bringing in military equipment to the fight in Nicaragua.

Mr. Marchand: Madam Chairman, I guess it would be fair to undertake to provide to the committee whatever information we have on that and whatever information we can find.

Mr. Ogle: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Now, if I may, I will pass the floor to Mr. Watson, followed by Mr. McLean.

Mr. Watson: While you are at your task of obtaining this information, you might also supply information to the committee as to what Israel is selling in Central America, and whether or not Canada indicated any objection to General Sharon's visit there two or three months ago to sell arms and to act presumably as some kind of an American proxy in activities down there.

The question that I have first relates to what appears to have happened to the Reagan plan. From all reports it would seem that it ran up against the rocks recently because the Americans were not able to give King Hussein, or the PLO, the kind of minimum guarantees they requested; and the minimum guarantee was simply that they would put sufficient pressure on Israel after the negotiations started under King Hussein's auspices—the Americans would put sufficient pressure on the Israelis to halt West Bank settlements. The Americans were not able to give that guarantee and as a result

[Translation]

dans cette région du monde. J'aimerais que vous me donniez de précisions à ce sujet, si vous êtes en mesure de le faire.

Le vice-président: Monsieur Marchand.

M. Marchand: Madame le président, je regrette sincèrement si j'ai laissé entendre au député que nous n'étions pas intéressés ou que nous n'étions pas suffisamment curieux pour obtenir des renseignements précis. Au contraire, pour utiliser un euphémisme, nous étions aussi consternés que le reste du monde de voir ce qui s'est passé au Brésil. En effet, nous prendrions tous les moyens possibles pour savoir précisément ce que transportaient ces avions et également pour élucider entièrement notre position à l'égard de ces événements.

Madame le président, si le député et le comité le désire, dès que nous aurons des renseignements à ce sujet, des renseignements partiels ou complets, nous serons disposés à les présenter au Comité si les restrictions et les obligations en matière de sécurité nous le permettent; le député est au courant de ce genre d'impératifs.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Marchand. Les membres du Comité aimeraient obtenir ces renseignements.

M. Ogle: Madame le président, une petite question. Serait-il possible d'avoir les mêmes informations au sujet du matériel débarqué dans le nouvel aéroport d'Honduras?

Le vice-président: Monsieur Marchand.

M. Marchand: S'agit-il de l'ACDI?

M. Ogle: Non, je parle du nouvel aéroport qui a été construit dans la région de Miskito pour recevoir l'équipement militaire nécessaire à la guerre du Nicaragua.

M. Marchand: Madame le président, je crois qu'il serait bon d'essayer de fournir au Comité toutes les informations dont nous disposons à ce sujet et toutes les informations que nous pourrions obtenir.

M. Ogle: Merci.

Le vice-président: À présent, si vous le permettez, je laisse la parole à M. Watson et, ensuite, à M. McLean.

M. Watson: Pendant que vous essayez d'obtenir les renseignements, pourriez-vous également préciser au Comité ce que Israël vend à l'Amérique centrale et si le Canada s'est opposé à la visite du général Sharon il y a deux ou trois mois afin de vendre des armes et pour, semble-t-il, jouer le rôle de mandataire des États-Unis dans ce pays.

J'aimerais d'abord poser une question concernant le plan Reagan. D'après toutes les sources, il semble que le plan Reagan a échoué récemment parce que les Américains n'étaient pas en mesure d'offrir les garanties minimales exigées par le roi Hussein ou l'OLP; ceux-ci exigeaient simplement qu'au cours des négociations entreprises sous les auspices du roi Hussein, les Américains exercent suffisamment de pression sur Israël pour arrêter la colonisation de la rive occidentale. Les Américains ne pouvaient accorder cette garantie, en conséquence, Hussein ne se sentait pas assez en sécurité pour poursuivre les négociations.

[Texte]

Hussein did not feel safe enough to proceed with the negotiations.

• 1045

The bottom line appears to be this. So you can wring your hands as much as you like about the failure of the negotiations, the failure of the Reagan plan so far, but it does seem pretty obvious that the Israelis, the statements by Israeli ministers, by the Prime Minister—that Israel has no intention of listening to anyone, including the Americans, on the question of the West Bank settlements. Everything that is happening now from the Israeli point of view seems to be designed to speed up those settlements so they will be able to present the world with a fait accompli, and then they will start the negotiations.

I think most countries in the Middle East are aware of this, and I think most countries in the world are aware of this.

My question is, since everyone seems to be aware of what is going on, and everyone seems now to know what the Israeli plans are, are we telling the Americans they should be putting more pressure on the Israelis to stop these West Bank settlements? The Americans are the only ones who have that leverage. Are we telling them this, publicly or privately? I would like to know that.

Secondly, in the time left, I would also like to know whether the Department of External Affairs received a complaint from the Israeli Embassy regarding the showing on CBC of two very excellent documentaries which were shown here the other day by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. They were excellent documentaries on the situation in the Middle East—the Palestinian problem. Did the Department of External Affairs receive a communication from the Government of Israel complaining about this particular set of documentaries?

Finally, I would like to know what you consider to be the two or three major complaints which the United States have with Canada. I would like you to set them clearly before us. It may seem unrelated, but it is not in my mind. It strikes me that what is happening, and part of the explanation of our timidity, Canadian timidity, both in Central America, where we seem unwilling to criticize an American course, which is a disaster course in the minds of many Americans, as it is in the minds of most observers in Europe and elsewhere . . . We seem, in Canada, to be unwilling to criticize publicly our American friends on Central American affairs, and to some extent even in the Middle East, because we do not want to use up our credit with them. Our credit is in jeopardy because of some other problems we have with them.

I would like you to pinpoint these other problems that the Americans have with us. What are their main complaints?

[Traduction]

Voici essentiellement ce qui s'est passé. Vous pouvez donc vous tordre les mains de désespoir autant que vous voulez à la suite de la rupture des négociations, de l'échec du plan Reagan, mais il semble très évident que les Israéliens, les déclarations des ministres israéliens et du Premier ministre, qu'Israël n'a aucune intention d'écouter qui que ce soit, y compris les Américains, en ce qui a trait aux nouvelles colonies sur la rive occidentale. Tout ce qui se passe actuellement du point de vue israélien semble désigné à accélérer l'établissement de ces colonies de façon à pouvoir mettre le monde devant le fait accompli, pour ensuite commencer les négociations.

Je crois que la plupart des pays du Moyen-Orient sont conscients de ce fait et je crois que la plupart des pays du monde le sont également.

Ma question est la suivante: étant donné que tout le monde semble savoir ce qui se passe et que tout le monde semble maintenant savoir ce que les Israéliens ont l'intention de faire, ne devrions-nous pas dire aux Américains d'exercer plus de pression sur les Israéliens afin qu'ils mettent un terme à ces nouvelles colonies sur la rive occidentale? Les Américains sont les seuls à avoir ce pouvoir. Allons-nous le leur dire en public ou en privé? J'aimerais le savoir.

Deuxièmement, pour le temps qu'il me reste, j'aimerais également savoir si le ministère des Affaires extérieures a reçu une plainte de la part de l'Ambassade d'Israël au sujet de la présentation au réseau CBC de deux excellents documentaires qui ont été présentés devant le comité, l'autre jour, par le Comité sénatorial sur les relations extérieures. Il s'agissait d'excellents documentaires sur la situation au Moyen-Orient, le problème palestinien. Le ministère des Affaires extérieures a-t-il reçu une communication du gouvernement israélien se plaignant de ces deux documentaires?

Enfin, j'aimerais savoir ce que vous considérez comme étant les deux ou trois principales doléances des États-Unis à l'égard du Canada. J'aimerais que vous nous les énumériez très clairement. Cela peut sembler n'avoir aucun lien avec notre propos, mais je ne le vois pas de cette façon. Il me semble que ce qui se passe, et une partie de l'explication de notre timidité, la timidité canadienne, aussi en Amérique centrale où nous ne semblons pas vouloir critiquer la politique des Américains, qui semble désastreuse pour bien des Américains, tout comme pour la plupart des observateurs européens et autres . . . Nous semblons, au Canada, ne pas vouloir critiquer publiquement nos amis américains sur les affaires d'Amérique centrale, et jusqu'à un certain point, sur les affaires du Moyen-Orient, parce que nous voulons continuer à jouir d'un grand crédit auprès d'eux, mais ce crédit est en danger parce que nous avons d'autres problèmes avec eux.

J'aimerais que vous nous disiez quels sont ces autres problèmes que nous avons avec les Américains. Quelles sont leurs principales doléances?

[Text]

That is it.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Marchand, please.

Mr. Marchand: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: In three seconds or less.

Mr. Marchand: In three seconds or less.

On your second question, Mr. Watson, I am not aware of any complaint by the Israeli Embassy. There may have been, but not that I am aware of, and I will verify and let you know through the chairman if there is anything.

• 1050

First of all, the latest difficulties in the Reagan plan are attributable to the fact that what is alleged to have been an agreed text, *ad referendum* admittedly, but an agreed text, between King Hussein and Mr. Arafat, *ad referendum* to the PLO Council, was unable to be approved by Mr. Arafat's people, and therefore King Hussein was presented with a modified text, the modifications of which have been found unacceptable and to go quite beyond what he had agreed.

Now, to the extent that these modifications related to the guarantees that you have referred to, our own position is well known and has been affirmed on a number of occasions, and I will reaffirm it. We regard the settlement activity of Israel as contrary to international law and extremely unhealthful to the peace process. We would like to see an end to the settlement activity, not just a freeze. The latest move to convert military outposts close to Arab population centres into civilian settlements is a continuation of the activity which we find regrettable. We have repeatedly made those views known to the Israeli government and continued settlement activity reminds us once again of the need for the parties to move to negotiations without which there cannot be a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace. We have said that much to the Americans as well as to the Israelis.

Now, what you describe as the government's unwillingness to criticize the United States and whether, if your perception is right, it amounts to a wise course—I must say, Madam Chairman, that I would be more comfortable if my minister were here to answer that question, because it is very much one of political judgment, concerning which a public servant is very much out of his depth. I would, however, answer the hon. member's question literally, and my colleagues may wish to complement what I will say.

I would characterize the main criticisms that the United States are currently laying at our doorstep as residing primarily if not exclusively in the conduct of our bilateral economic and trade relations. The main criticism that is, as I say, placed at our doorstep resides with things like FIRA, the National Energy Policy, and the likes, which the Americans have for the last little while characterized as unfair and unduly discriminating, although they have recently acknowledged that

[Translation]

C'est tout.

Le vice-président: Monsieur Marchand, s'il vous plaît.

M. Marchand: Merci, madame le président.

Le vice-président: En trois secondes ou moins.

M. Marchand: En trois secondes ou moins.

Au sujet de votre deuxième question, monsieur Watson, je ne suis au courant d'aucune plainte présentée par l'Ambassade d'Israël. Il se peut qu'il y en ait eu, mais pas à ma connaissance; toutefois, je vais vérifier et je vous le ferai savoir par le président.

Tout d'abord, les toutes dernières difficultés du plan Reagan sont attribuées au fait que ce qui est considéré comme un texte adopté, *ad referendum*, effectivement, un texte approuvé entre le roi Hussein et M. Arafat, *ad referendum* n'a pu, une fois soumis au Conseil de l'OLP, être approuvé par les gens de M. Arafat, et ainsi le roi Hussein s'est vu présenter un texte modifié qui n'était pas acceptable et qui allait au-delà de ce qui avait été accepté.

Maintenant, dans la limite où ces modifications ont trait aux garanties dont vous avez fait mention, notre propre proposition est très bien connue et a été affirmée à plusieurs occasions et je la réaffirme encore. Nous considérons la colonisation par Israël contraire à la loi internationale et extrêmement dangereuse pour la paix de cette région. Nous aimerions que cette colonisation soit arrêtée complètement et pas seulement temporairement. La dernière décision du gouvernement israélien de convertir les avant-postes militaires près des centres de population arabe en établissements civils concrétise la continuation de cette activité que nous considérons comme regrettable. À plusieurs reprises, nous avons fait connaître nos vues à ce sujet au gouvernement israélien et la poursuite de l'activité de colonisation nous rappelle, encore une fois, la nécessité d'amener les parties à entreprendre des négociations sans lesquelles il ne peut y avoir de paix complète, juste et permanente. Nous avons dit tout cela aux Américains et aux Israéliens.

Maintenant, ce que vous décrivez comme étant la réputation du gouvernement à critiquer les États-Unis et, si votre perception est bonne, si cela semble une bonne façon d'agir... je dois dire, madame le président, que j'aimerais beaucoup que mon ministre soit ici pour répondre à cette question, parce que c'est beaucoup plus un jugement politique qui dépasse de loin le cadre d'un simple fonctionnaire. Je vais cependant répondre littéralement à la question du député, et mes collègues pourront compléter ce que je vais dire.

Je dirais que les principales doléances que les États-Unis ont envers nous résident principalement, sinon exclusivement, dans notre façon de mener nos relations bilatérales économiques et commerciales avec eux. Comme je l'ai déclaré, la principale critique du gouvernement américain réside dans des questions comme l'AEIE, la politique énergétique nationale et d'autres programmes semblables que les Américains ont considérés dernièrement comme une discrimination injuste à leur égard,

[Texte]

there are some reasons to find that FIRA is less of a monster than they have described it to be. So I would characterize their criticism as being primarily in that territory of our relationship.

• 1055

In terms of our indigenous and original stances in international affairs, I do not recall that the Americans have criticized us for not particularly sharing their view on East-West economic relations, for example, in some of their more advanced views on the subject, or for going a little beyond what their own position is on the Middle East. They have not criticized us for not sharing some of their fundamental premises on Central America. I do not recall that they would have criticized us for having criticized them on those issues.

But my colleagues may wish to add . . .

Mr. Watson: I think I have run over my time, so I will stop there.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Marchand.

I still have five names: Mr. McLean, Mr. Hudecki, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Breau and Mr. Robinson, in that order. In the interest of fairness—but I am in the hands of the committee—I would suggest that each of you ask one question now, one after the other, and the answers will be given in sequence. Do you agree or not? So each at least has a chance to ask one burning question.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Get on with it.

The Vice-Chairman: Agreed? If you are agreed, then I would ask Mr. McLean to ask his question, and perhaps all the answers could be given at the end.

Mr. McLean, followed by Mr. Hudecki.

Mr. McLean: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Coming out of the discussion we have had on Central America, I have a sequence of short questions which you may respond to. We have listened at some length, and I confess to being no more informed as a result of listening than I was when we started. I have heard the under-secretary say—and I think I am right—that Canada recognizes that the U.S. has a strategic interest in the area, in Central America. We have before us the Prime Minister's statement in which he observes that there were major differences. My first part, and it can be just a yes or no—is the government considering making any policy statement of its own regarding Central America, since the more ministers respond and officials respond, the less clear we are, and yet we understand there is an unease about it?

The question was raised about our information-gathering sources, and we have had a number of interventions on that. I would like to know whether on the recommendation of the subcommittee that we increase our own staff in Central America—whether we are on short-term postings or others, we

[Traduction]

bien qu'ils aient reconnu récemment qu'ils avaient certaines raisons de considérer l'AEIE moins monstrueuse qu'ils le croyaient. C'est pourquoi je crois que leurs doléances s'appliquent principalement dans ce domaine des relations entre nos deux gouvernements.

En ce qui touche nos prises de position nationale et originale sur les affaires internationales, je ne me rappelle pas que les Américains nous aient critiqués pour ne pas partager certaines de leurs vues plus avancées sur les échanges économiques entre l'Est et l'Ouest, par exemple, pour avoir été un peu plus loin qu'eux sur la question du Moyen-Orient. Ils ne nous ont pas critiqués pour ne pas avoir partagé certaines de leurs prises de position fondamentales sur l'Amérique centrale. Je ne me rappelle pas qu'ils nous aient critiqués pour les avoir critiqués en ces matières.

Mais mes collègues veulent peut-être ajouter quelque chose.

M. Watson: Je pense que j'ai pris plus de temps qu'il m'en était accordé. Je vais arrêter ici.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Marchand.

J'ai encore cinq noms sur ma liste, dans l'ordre suivant: M. McLean, Hudecki, Stewart, Breau et Robinson. Pour être équitable envers ces cinq personnes, je suggère que chacune d'elles pose une question et que les réponses leur soient données ensuite l'une après l'autre—mais c'est le Comité qui doit en décider. De cette manière, tous auront l'occasion de poser une question brûlante. Êtes-vous d'accord avec ma proposition?

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): D'accord, allons-y.

Le vice-président: D'accord? Si vous êtes d'accord, je demanderais à M. McLean de poser sa question; et toutes les réponses pourraient peut-être être données à la fin.

Monsieur McLean, suivi de M. Hudecki.

M. McLean: Merci, madame le président.

La discussion qui a eu lieu sur l'Amérique centrale m'amène à poser une série de petites questions. J'ai écouté attentivement, et j'avoue ne pas en savoir plus long à ce sujet que je n'en savais lorsque la discussion a commencé. J'ai entendu le Sous-secrétaire dire—c'est bien cela, je pense—que le Canada reconnaît l'intérêt stratégique des États-Unis dans la région, en Amérique centrale. Nous avons, ici, la déclaration du premier ministre, selon laquelle les deux pays ont d'importantes divergences de vues sur cette question. Ma première question est la suivante—et on peut y répondre simplement par oui ou par non—le gouvernement envisage-t-il d'émettre son propre énoncé de politique en ce qui concerne l'Amérique centrale, car plus il y a de ministres et de fonctionnaires qui se prononcent, plus la situation s'embrouille, d'autant plus qu'il existe un certain malaise à ce sujet?

Il y a eu un certain nombre d'interventions au sujet de nos sources d'information. J'aimerais savoir si le sous-comité recommandera l'accroissement de nos effectifs en Amérique centrale, si nous avons établi des mécanismes administratifs

[Text]

have made any administrative machinery; and have we any system in place for alternative briefings from the churches?

The third part which is not clear, coming out of the discussion on Central America, is that the subcommittee recommended that Canada seek to make a positive contribution to the search for stability in the Caribbean and Central America. We have had some discussion about the aircraft, but there was a major proposal put forward—and recently augmented by Colombia . . . of Mexico and Venezuela which the subcommittee suggested that we be seen to be supporting . . . negotiations. We have now had undisputed evidence that the American administration is committed to a military solution.

Could I ask for a response in terms of the prospects for negotiations? What are we doing, or are we just whispering about that? Is the government prepared to follow the subcommittee's concerns in that area?

The Vice-Chairman: Here again, in the interest of time, may I suggest, again with the committee's indulgence, that the answers be given in writing? All right?

Mr. Hudecki, please, a very brief, punchy question.

Mr. Hudecki: A new area of concern is the number of refugees at the Horn of Africa. This has been brought about by the drought and the war between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as the civil war in Ethiopia. I was wondering what Canada is doing in the way of helping the refugee problem. They have increased it only to 1,000 persons to be sponsored this year. What aid are they allotting to the NGOs and the church groups in that field?

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Hudecki.

Mr. Stewart, Mr. Breau, and Mr. Robinson. Please, very fast questions, to which the witnesses may . . .

• 1100

Mr. Stewart: Two things concern me, Madam Chairman, the two reports, the Auditor General's report on External and the McDougall report. The Auditor General's report, considering that foreign loans are really gifts, the \$4 billion that we have out, much of it for 50 years at no interest with a pay-back not until the eleventh year—has the government changed its position on that? There was the lack of management techniques mentioned by the Auditor-General; in particular, I would like to zero in on the fraudulent payments to Haiti. What are we doing about this? Are we changing our management techniques? Also, there was the McDougall report, referring to people and the treatment thereof, experience-wise, etc. What are the actions of the government on those two reports, please?

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Stewart.

Mr. Breau, followed by Mr. Robinson.

M. Breau: Merci, madame le président. J'aurais une question à poser à M. Massé. Il sait que malgré les énoncés de politiques ou les positions officielles, il y a toujours danger,

[Translation]

sous forme d'affectations à court ou à long terme, et si nous sommes en mesure de recueillir le point de vue des Églises?

Troisièmement, un autre aspect de la discussion sur l'Amérique centrale est obscur: le sous-comité a recommandé que le Canada apporte une contribution positive à la recherche de la stabilité aux Caraïbes et en Amérique centrale. Nous avons discuté des avions, mais le sous-comité a fait une importante proposition, appuyée par le Mexique et le Venezuela—et, récemment, par la Colombie—soit que nous nous prononcions pour la voie des négociations. Maintenant, nous avons la preuve irréfutable que l'administration américaine favorise la voie militaire.

En somme, des négociations ont-elles des chances d'aboutir? Que faisons-nous pour favoriser la négociation; ou sommes-nous trop timides pour intervenir? Le gouvernement est-il prêt à suivre les recommandations du sous-comité en cette matière?

Le vice-président: Encore une fois, pour gagner du temps, puis-je suggérer que les réponses aux questions soient écrites? Êtes-vous d'accord?

Monsieur Hudecki, s'il vous plaît, une question très courte et très directe.

M. Hudecki: La question des réfugiées dans la Corne de l'Afrique est un autre sujet de préoccupation. Il s'agit d'une situation engendrée par la sécheresse et la guerre que se livrent l'Éthiopie et la Somalie, ainsi que la guerre civile qui fait rage en Éthiopie. Que fait le Canada pour aider à résoudre le problème des réfugiés? Le nombre de réfugiés admissibles à une aide a été augmenté à 1,000 par année seulement. Quelle aide apportons-nous aux organisations non gouvernementales et charitables dans ce domaine?

Le vice-président: Merci beaucoup, monsieur Hudecki.

Messieurs Stewart, Breau et Robinson. S'il vous plaît, posez de très courtes questions, auxquelles les témoins pourront . . .

M. Stewart: Deux choses me préoccupent, madame le président, le rapport du Vérificateur général sur les Affaires extérieures et le rapport McDougall. Premièrement, le rapport du Vérificateur général: considérant que les prêts aux pays étrangers sont de vrais cadeaux—la majeure partie des \$4 milliards que nous avons prêtés l'ont été pour 50 ans, sans intérêts, et sans obligation de remboursement avant la onzième année—le gouvernement a-t-il modifié sa position à ce sujet? Le rapport révèle également l'existence de lacunes en matière de gestion. J'aimerais surtout aborder la question des sommes versées frauduleusement à Haiti. A-t-on pris des mesures à ce sujet? Avons-nous modifié nos méthodes de gestion? De plus, le rapport McDougall portait notamment sur les populations et les conditions qu'on leur fait subir, les questions d'expérience. Quelles suites le gouvernement donne-t-il à ces deux rapports?

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Stewart.

M. Breau suivi de M. Robinson.

Mr. Breau: Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would like Mr. Massé to answer my question. He knows that despite any policy statement or official stand, there is always the danger

[Texte]

dans l'administration courante d'un programme d'aide au développement, que les intérêts à court terme du Canada pour la vente de biens industriels ou la création d'emplois viennent, par la force des choses, déformer le programme d'aide. Vu qu'il est toujours difficile de maintenir une politique qui continue de s'occuper des besoins fondamentaux dans les domaines social et humain, surtout dans une période de récession économique, pourrait-il nous assurer que l'administration du programme continue vraiment de se faire dans l'esprit du groupe de travail parlementaire sur les relations Nord-Sud qui disait que de l'aide, c'est de l'aide, et que le budget d'aide au développement, c'est pour cela. Si on a besoin d'aider l'industrie canadienne pour des raisons légitimes, qu'on le fasse par le biais de programmes de promotion industrielle.

M. M. Massé: Je peux répondre en deux mots: pour la plus grande partie, oui.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Massé.

M. Breau: C'est-à-dire qu'il continue d'être administré de cette façon.

The Vice-Chairman: One final brief question from Mr. Robinson, please.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): The hon. member from Saskatoon East made reference to Ambassador Sirrs, to the effect that he took the United States position because he wanted to follow this position and not because it was the same or a similar position to that of Canada, based on the information available to him. I want him to understand, for the record, that we did not all agree with everything he said in that regard; in fact, my impression or my view is that Ambassador Sirrs gave the best opinion he could from the information that was available to him. It may be that the hon. member from Saskatoon East had additional information. If he had additional information and it changed his view, I think that is fair, but I do not think it is fair to suggest, by way of innuendo, that Ambassador Sirrs was taking the position of the United States just for the sake of taking that position; rather, I think, it was based on the best information that he had.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you for your comment, Mr. Robinson—which I gather was not a question.

I would like to thank the witnesses for their courtesy in appearing before us today. I am sure that each and every one of the final questioners will have a written answer to his questions. I am sorry that we did not have enough time to pursue it more at length . . .

Mr. McLean: On a point of order, Madam Chairman: in terms of the definition of time, this morning we had one hour of time gone before any of us could begin, and then we waited for an hour. Could the steering committee . . .

The Vice-Chairman: On the point of order, Mr. McLean, the committee was due to start at 9.30 a.m. We were all in our places at 9.30 a.m. We did not lose any time.

Mr. McLean: Right. I am just asking about the orders of the committee. The first hour is 20-minute openings and for

[Traduction]

that the short term interest of Canada for the export of industrial goods or jobs creation could, through the force of circumstances, interfere with the objectives of a development assistance program during the current management of the said program. Considering that it is always difficult to maintain a policy of fulfilling the basic social and human needs, especially during an economic recession, could Mr. Massé confirm that the program is still managed according to the views of the Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations: the development assistance budget is established only for development assistance purposes? If the Canadian industry needs any assistance, even for legitimate reasons, industrial promotion programs should be implemented for that purpose.

Mr. M. Massé: I can answer very shortly: for the most part, yes.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Massé.

Mr. Breau: Meaning that the program is still managed that way.

Le vice-président: Monsieur Robinson, une dernière question, s'il vous plaît.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Le député de Saskatoon est à affirmer que l'ambassadeur Sirrs a adopté le point de vue des États-Unis de son propre chef, à partir des renseignements dont il disposait, et non parce que ce point de vue était identique ou similaire à celui du Canada. Je veux qu'il comprenne, pour mémoire que nous ne partageons pas entièrement son opinion à ce sujet. Un fait, mon impression, ou mon opinion, est que l'ambassadeur Sirrs a fait de son mieux avec les données dont il disposait. Le député de Saskatoon avait peut-être plus de renseignements; si c'est le cas, et si c'est cela, qu'il l'a fait changer de point de vue, très bien. Mais je ne crois pas que l'on puisse insinuer que l'ambassadeur Sirrs a adopté le point de vue des États-Unis de son propre chef; je pense plutôt qu'il a agi de son mieux avec les renseignements qu'il avait.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Robinson—je pense plutôt que c'était un commentaire plutôt qu'une question.

J'aimerais remercier les témoins qui ont bien voulu comparaître aujourd'hui. Je suis sûr que les derniers intervenants auront une réponse écrite à leurs questions. Et je regrette que le manque de temps nous empêche de poursuivre.

M. McLean: Question d'ordre, madame le président. En ce qui concerne le temps, ce matin, il s'est passé une heure avant que nous ne puissions commencer, puis nous avons attendu une autre heure. Est-ce que le Comité directeur pourrait . . .

Le vice-président: À ce sujet, monsieur McLean, nous devons commencer nos délibérations à 9h30 ce matin. Nous étions tous prêts à commencer à cette heure-là. Nous n'avons pas perdu de temps.

M. McLean: D'accord. Je veux seulement parler de l'ordre du jour. La première heure est consacrée à des interventions de 20 minutes, puis les autres membres du Comité doivent de

[Text]

the rest of the committee, then, it is catch-as-catch-can. Is that the standing order at the moment?

The Vice-Chairman: Generally speaking, Mr. McLean, the Chair allows as much time as possible to the lead speaker from each party. This morning we started the committee meeting at 9.34 a.m. At that time there were very few members present and the Chair felt that she could allow a certain amount of flexibility to the three lead speakers. As I repeated before, the subjects raised were extremely interesting but also extremely complex, as a result of which some of the answers had to be a little more lengthy than perhaps would otherwise have been the case. The Chair has tried, by every means at her disposal, to make sure that everyone was recognized. Your questions will be answered in writing and appended, presumably, to future minutes.

I now adjourn to the call of the Chair. The next meeting will be with CIDA on Thursday, May 5, at 11.00 a.m.

[Translation]

débrouiller. Est-ce que c'est la façon de procéder à l'heure actuelle?

Le vice-président: Monsieur McLean, en règle générale, le président accorde le plus de temps possible au principal porte-parole de chaque parti. Ce matin, la réunion a commencé à 9h34. Beaucoup des membres étaient absents et j'ai fait montre d'une certaine souplesse envers les trois porte-parole principaux. Comme je l'ai déjà dit, nous avons abordé des sujets extrêmement intéressants, mais aussi extrêmement complexes, de sorte que certaines réponses devaient être un peu plus longues que d'habitude. J'ai tenté, par tous les moyens dont je disposais, de permettre à tous ceux qui voulaient s'exprimer de le faire. Vos questions recevront une réponse écrite, qui devrait être annexée au procès-verbal de la prochaine réunion.

Maintenant, je déclare la séance levée. La prochaine réunion qui portera sur l'ACDI, aura lieu le mardi 5 mai à 11 heures.

APPENDIX "EAND-71"

April 29, 1983

QUESTION: Mr. Roche

Finally, can the Minister confirm that the domestic budget for disarmament measures under Ambassador Beesley's section of the department is now \$450,000 in the forthcoming fiscal year, and that \$450,000 is separate from the \$100,000 which is in the supplementary estimates to be directed to the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign? Can the Minister confirm that these are two different figures and why the contribution to the world disarmament campaign appears only as a one-time item and is not continued into the next fiscal year?

ANSWER: At the beginning of FY 1982/83, \$150,000 was allocated to the Disarmament Fund of the Department of External Affairs. Subsequently, as Mr. Roche indicated, a further \$300,000 was made available for new initiatives in the field of arms control and disarmament. Part of the new money was designated to support two specific Canadian priorities: to promote the realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; and to assist in the preparation of a chemical weapons convention. The remaining \$138,000 was allocated to the Disarmament Fund thereby increasing its size from \$150,000 to \$288,000. The increase was designated to assist research and teaching facilities in Canada through contributions and contracts. In FY 1983/84 the contributions component of the Disarmament Fund will be increased by a further \$50,000.

Apart from the Disarmament Fund, financial assistance for research and public information activities in the field of arms control and disarmament is also provided to Canadian organizations and individuals by a number of government departments and agencies.

The \$100,000 contribution to the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign is separate from the Disarmament Fund. The government wishes to examine the UN Secretary General's reports on the specifics for a programme and on the financial implications in order to determine how best to contribute to the effective conduct of the World Disarmament Campaign. The report on

the programme became available during UNGA 37 after work on the main estimates had been completed. Although the report on financial implications has not yet been issued, the government proceeded to make a contribution of \$100,000 in the 1982/83 fiscal year to the objectives of the Campaign. The government will follow closely developments related to the Campaign, including the annual review of its activities, with a view to determining the most effective ways of further contribution to its objectives.

QUESTION: Mr. McLean

In a memorandum of March 2 from the United Nations Association of Canada, they indicate that the national office has been advised that Ambassador Alan Beesley is not prepared to accept invitations to address the public during the forthcoming media tour organized by the United Nations Association of Canada. The ambassador will attend only background information meetings with selected editorial boards, news editors and producers, to which he originally agreed. Could the Minister give an indication about the change or the directive to the ambassador? It is my understanding that the direction and background for the Ambassador for Disarmament is to liaise with the public and with groups. In the past his predecessor had been speaking to public groups, and I wonder whether he would indicate what has been the reason for this. Is the government now wanting to shield the ambassador from groups who may not share the government's thinking on the matter?

ANSWER:

In the short period since his appointment on October 21, 1982, Mr. Beesley has faithfully carried out the responsibilities of the position. One of his first acts as Ambassador for Disarmament was to address a large student conference in Toronto held during Disarmament Week. He was the Canadian Representative on the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly which met from October to December. Throughout this period he chaired the Barton Group, the Western consultative body on arms control and disarmament matters at the United Nations. He was one of the senior officials accompanying me on my visit to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Immediately afterwards he spoke in Ottawa to Canadian parliamentarians who are members of Parliamentarians for World Order.

He has more recently spoken on Canadian arms control and disarmament policy in Moncton and Halifax and participated as a guest on Front Page Challenge. He also chaired the meeting on March 15-16 of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, which is

convened by the Department of External Affairs and brings together academics and representatives of non-government organizations interested in disarmament.

The media tour being organized by the United Nations Association in Canada, to which Mr. McLean referred, has the objective of increasing coverage and analysis of international affairs. The Department of External Affairs concurred with the programme last summer and left it to UNAC to organize with Mr. Beesley a mutually satisfactory programme. The Association invited Mr. Beesley last July, some three months before his appointment as Ambassador for Disarmament. In light of his new appointment it would be natural to include arms control and disarmament among the subjects to be covered in a series of meetings with media representatives in a number of Canadian cities.

QUESTION: Mr. Munro

My second question relates to the comments on pages 1 and 2 of the Minister's statement concerning the IMF and Bank meetings, I think in Switzerland in January 1983. I was wondering whether the Minister would be prepared to provide a report or assessment of that meeting, including such matters as the decisions, or the discussion, relating to the rescheduling of debt to the developing countries, the increasing contributions -- I believe the contributions from the developed countries were increased by about 50% -- and why the 50%, if it was 50%, level was chosen, given the size of the indebtedness and the size of the repayment problems.

I would also like to have, in that assessment, any comments about the role of the private banking institutions, the private banking institutions in Canada particularly, vis-à-vis the debtor countries. Is provision made for direct contact, for example, between the private member banks and the debtor countries, or is everything to be channelled through the IMF and the bank?

ANSWER:

As a result of the prolonged recession in industrial countries, weak commodity prices and high interest rates, a growing number of developing countries face unsustainable balance of payments situations. This development has in turn put substantial strains on the international financial system. A number of large borrowers encountered liquidity crises in 1982 that required cooperation among governments, international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), commercial banks and debtor countries. This international cooperation was essential to the successful management of these debt problems. Canada, in view of its large stake in an effectively functioning international trade and payments system, has participated in these multilateral exercises. Such cooperation and consultations will likely continue to be necessary as long as strains on the financial system persist.

The mandate of the IMF is to provide assistance and support to member countries experiencing balance of payments difficulties and it has come to play an increasingly active role in dealing with current international financial problems. In return for receiving financial assistance, the member country must agree to implement appropriate economic adjustment measures in order for the IMF to fulfill its responsibilities, it became increasingly apparent that the resources available to the Fund had to be increased as the size of current account deficits and the number of countries with debt problems had increased substantially since 1979. Therefore, at the February 10-11, 1983 meeting of the Interim Committee of the Fund in Washington, it was agreed that Fund quotas should be increased by 47.5%, subject to national ratification of this decision. This means that the total of Fund quotas will increase from SDR 60 billion to SDR 90 billion, and that individual member's quotas will be increased proportionately.

These resources will be supplemented by additional funds available under the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB). The GAB was established in 1962 by ten industrialized countries to provide additional resources to the IMF to be activated when any of the ten wished to borrow from the Fund. Finance Ministers of the Group of Ten agreed that the GAB should be increased from \$7.1 billion to \$19 billion and that access to these resources be extended to other Fund members in situations involving a threat to the stability of the international monetary system. This action to increase IMF quotas and to enlarge the GAB are important steps to ensure that existing institutions are able to respond to the difficulties confronting the international financial system.

You also raised a question about the role of commercial banks. In fact, one of the significant developments in the 1970s was the dramatic expansion of bank lending to developing countries, although it was concentrated on the more advanced members of this group. Canadian banks participated in this trend. In this

matter, banks deal directly with the borrowing countries and make their own arrangements concerning extending credit or rescheduling debt. However, it is evident that the banks attach importance to the existence of an IMF program in dealing with a country encountering debt problems.

STATEMENT: Mr. Munro

(Referring to the purchase of an Italian limited company to acquire an official residence for the Canadian Ambassador to the Holy See).

"... We had the privilege today of having the former ambassador from Riyadh and also a former ambassador from Belgrade sitting here; I do not know whether they lived in hovels while they were in their various embassies or not. Now they are finding that in order to house ambassadors properly, we are going to spend \$63 million for the acquisition of those two, but for the Holy See, authority to expend \$56 million is being requested."

REPLY:

The acquisition of an official residence for the Ambassador to the Holy See will be by purchasing all issued and outstanding shares of the Italian company called Societa a Responsibilita Limitata Immobiliare San Sebastiano for a total sum of \$1.15 million which is being paid out of the \$56 million appearing in the estimates. The latter is the total capital budget estimate for the Department of External Affairs.

QUESTION: Where has the Ambassador been residing and on what terms?

ANSWER: The Ambassador to the Holy See has been residing in the property being purchased since May 22, 1970.

The property was held under lease to Her Majesty for various terms since the initial date, the last renewal occurring May 1, 1980 for a term expiring on April 30, 1983.

QUESTION: Mr. Munro

Has he been paying rent and if so, how much?

ANSWER: Rent for the property was \$75,000 CDN per annum for the period May 1, 1980 to April 30, 1983.

The Ambassador's contribution to the rent consists of the usual shelter cost based on his income and family configuration.

QUESTION: Mr. Munro

Why is it necessary to purchase a company, and, in effect, all issued and outstanding shares of that company to purchase the property?

ANSWER: The property is the sole asset of the company and sale of the company rather than the property separate from it resulted in substantial tax-on-income savings to the shareholders.

These savings, estimated at close to 50% of the sale price, resulted in a reduction by a similar amount in the asking price to the Crown.

QUESTION: Mr. Munro

What is the nature of the Company?

ANSWER: The Company is a private one, incorporated under the laws of Italy for the purpose of owning and administering its sole asset, the property which became in 1970, the residence for the Canadian Ambassador to the Holy See.

The only shareholders were members of one family who inherited the property from their father.

QUESTION: Mr. Munro

Is it a real estate company, or are there other real estate companies they would like to purchase in Canada for the acquisition of properties in Canada for their various regional operations?

ANSWER: The company is a real estate company in the sense it was created to hold title to and administer the property in question.

It is intended to transfer title to the property to Her Majesty and to dissolve the company once control of it has been acquired.

There is no intention of utilizing the company to acquire property in Canada for departmental purposes.

QUESTION: Mr. Munro

My next question: I would like to get into the cruise business, but I just cannot; I will allow others to do that. My next question relates to Poland. The Minister, I believe, is aware that the grain credit arrangements with Poland are due to be negotiated. I was wondering whether the Minister could say whether that agreement has been renegotiated. I believe \$1.25 billion is outstanding as a result of Poland's failure to meet its payments. What new arrangements are being made to handle the food credits with Poland?

ANSWER: The question of further credit grain sales to Poland following the expiration of our bilateral grain agreement on December 31, 1982, is still before Ministers. A final decision is expected shortly, and a public announcement will be made once this decision has been conveyed to the Poles. On the subject of Poland's outstanding debt, you will no doubt recall that in response to the imposition of martial law in December

1981, Canada and its allies decided to postpone the negotiations on the rescheduling of Poland's 1982 debt service to official creditors. Following the suspension of martial law in December 1982 the NATO allies agreed to reconsider their commonly-held policy with respect to Poland. This reconsideration has not yet taken place, pending the outcome of the United States reassessment of its policy.

APPENDICE "EAND-71"

Le 29 avril 1983

QUESTION:

M. Roche

Enfin, le ministre peut-il nous confirmer le budget interne affecté aux mesures de désarmement et relevant du service de l'ambassadeur Beesley, soit une somme de \$450,000 pour l'année financière qui vient? Peut-il aussi confirmer que ce \$450,000 est distinct du montant de \$100,000 qui figure dans les prévisions budgétaires supplémentaires comme devant servir à atteindre les objectifs de la campagne mondiale sur le désarmement? Le ministre peut-il confirmer que ces postes sont distincts, et nous dire pourquoi notre contribution à la campagne mondiale sur le désarmement ne figure qu'une fois, c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne reparait pas dans le prochain exercice financier?

RÉPONSE:

Au début de l'année financière 1982-1983, \$150,000 ont été alloués au Fonds pour le désarmement du ministère des Affaires extérieures. Par la suite, comme M. Roche l'a mentionné, \$300,000 supplémentaires ont été accordés pour le financement de nouvelles initiatives dans le domaine du contrôle des armements et du désarmement. Une partie de cette somme a été destinée à soutenir deux priorités canadiennes particulières: la réalisation d'un traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires et l'élaboration d'une convention interdisant les armes chimiques. Les \$138 000 restants ont été versés au Fonds pour le désarmement qui est ainsi passé de \$150,000 à \$288 000. Cette augmentation devait permettre d'appuyer des institutions canadiennes de recherche et d'enseignement grâce à des contributions et des contrats. Pour l'année financière 1983-1984, la partie contribution du Fonds pour le désarmement augmentera de \$50,000.

Outre les Affaires extérieures, un certain nombre de ministères et d'organismes gouvernementaux aident également à financer des projets de recherche et d'information

publique menés par des organisations et des particuliers canadiens dans le domaine du contrôle des armements et du désarmement.

Les \$100,000 attribués en faveur de la Campagne mondiale pour le désarmement ne proviennent pas du Fonds pour le désarmement et doivent être considérés à part. Le gouvernement désirait étudier les rapports du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies sur les modalités et le coût du programme envisagé, afin de déterminer la meilleure façon de contribuer à la conduite efficace de la Campagne mondiale pour le désarmement. Lorsque le rapport concernant le programme a été publié durant la 37^e Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, le budget principal des dépenses avait déjà été arrêté. Bien que le rapport sur le coût du programme n'ait pas encore été publié, le gouvernement a décidé de prévoir une contribution de \$100 000 pour les objectifs de la Campagne dans l'année financière 1982-1983. Le gouvernement s'intéressera de près au déroulement de la campagne, ainsi qu'à l'examen annuel de ses activités, pour voir quelle est la meilleure façon de continuer à contribuer à la réalisation de ses objectifs.

QUESTION:

M. McLean

L'Association canadienne des Nations Unies nous a fait savoir, dans une note datée du 2 mars, que le bureau national a été avisé que l'ambassadeur Alan Beesley n'envisage pas d'accepter d'invitation à rencontrer le public et à discuter avec lui lors de la tournée organisée par l'Association canadienne des Nations Unies qu'il va bientôt faire. L'ambassadeur ne participera qu'aux réunions d'information pour lesquelles il s'est déjà engagé et auxquelles ne pourront assister que certains rédacteurs et producteurs des médias. Le ministre pourrait-il nous renseigner au sujet des directives qui ont été données à l'ambassadeur? D'après ce que j'ai cru comprendre, il avait été recommandé à l'ambassadeur responsable du désarmement d'entretenir des rapports assez étroits avec le public et avec les groupes intéressés. Son prédécesseur prononçait des discours devant des groupes publics et j'aimerais savoir pourquoi la situation a changé. Le gouvernement souhaite-t-il à l'heure actuelle protéger l'ambassadeur contre les groupes qui ne partagent pas le point de vue des autorités fédérales?

RÉPONSE:

Depuis sa récente nomination le 21 octobre 1982, M. Beesley a loyalement rempli ses devoirs d'ambassadeur au désarmement. L'un de ses premiers gestes a été de s'adresser à un vaste auditoire d'étudiants réunis en conférence à Toronto pendant la semaine du désarmement. Il a représenté le Canada à la Première commission de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies qui s'est réunie d'octobre à décembre. Pendant cette période, il a présidé le Groupe Barton, organe consultatif des pays occidentaux aux Nations Unies pour les affaires de limitation des armements et de désarmement. Il était parmi les hauts fonctionnaires qui m'accompagnaient dans ma visite au Comité du désarmement à Genève. À son retour à Ottawa, il s'est immédiatement adressé aux parlementaires canadiens membres de l'Association internationale des

parlementaires pour un ordre mondial. Plus récemment, il a donné des conférences à Moncton et à Halifax sur la politique canadienne en matière de contrôle des armements et de désarmement, et il a participé à l'émission télévisée "Front Page Challenge". Les 15 et 16 mars, il a présidé le Groupe consultatif sur le désarmement et le contrôle des armements, qui réunit sous l'égide du ministère des Affaires extérieures des universitaires et des représentants d'organisations non gouvernementales qui s'intéressent aux questions de désarmement.

Le but de la tournée organisée par l'Association canadienne pour les Nations Unies que M. McLean mentionne est d'inciter les médias à faire une plus grande place à la présentation et à l'analyse des questions internationales. Le ministère des Affaires extérieures a approuvé le projet l'été dernier et a laissé à l'ACNU le soin de fixer avec M. Beesley un programme mutuellement acceptable. L'Association a invité M. Beesley en juillet dernier, environ trois mois avant sa nomination au poste d'ambassadeur au désarmement. En raison de sa nouvelle charge, il semblerait normal que les questions de contrôle des armements et de désarmement soient parmi les sujets discutés au cours de ses rencontres dans diverses villes canadiennes avec les représentants des médias.

QUESTION:

M. Munro

Ensuite, j'aurais voulu moi aussi parler des missiles de croisière, mais je préfère laisser faire les autres. Je vais donc passer à la Pologne. Je crois que le ministre sait que les facilités de crédit consenties à la Pologne pour l'achat de céréales doivent être renégociées. Le ministre pourrait-il nous dire si leur renégociation est terminée. Je crois que la Pologne doit toujours 1.25 milliard de dollars qu'elle n'a pas pu rembourser aux échéances prévues. Quelles nouvelles ententes sont conclues pour régler ce problème de la Pologne?

RÉPONSE:

Les ministres ne se sont pas encore prononcés sur la question de vendre à crédit d'autres chargements de céréales à la Pologne suivant l'expiration, le 31 décembre 1982, de notre accord bilatéral sur les céréales. Ils devraient prendre leur décision prochainement et celle-ci sera annoncée dès qu'elle aura été communiquée au gouvernement polonais. En ce qui concerne la dette extérieure de la Pologne, vous vous souviendrez sans doute qu'après la proclamation de la loi martiale en décembre 1981, le Canada et ses alliés ont décidé de reporter les négociations sur le rééchelonnement du service de la dette pour 1982. Après la suspension de la loi martiale en décembre 1982, les pays membres de l'OTAN ont convenu de réexaminer leur politique commune à l'égard de la Pologne. Cet examen n'a pas encore eu lieu, les alliés attendant que les États-Unis aient terminé l'évaluation de leur propre politique.

J'espère que ces renseignements répondent à la question de M. Munro.

QUESTION:

M. Munro

Le ministre pourrait-il nous fournir un rapport ou une analyse de ces réunions en mentionnant les décisions prises, la teneur des discussions, surtout pour ce qui est de la refonte des dettes des pays en développement, de la hausse des cotisations qui devrait être d'environ 50 p. 100 pour les pays développés. Je voudrait savoir pourquoi on a fixé ce taux de 50 p. 100 étant donné le niveau d'endettement et l'envergure des problèmes de remboursement.

Dans cette même analyse, j'aimerais trouver des commentaires sur les relations des institutions bancaires privées, surtout celles du Canada, avec les pays débiteurs. Par exemple, est-il possible pour une banque privée d'entrer directement en contact avec les pays débiteurs ou tout doit-il passer par le FMI et la Banque?

RÉPONSE:

La longue récession dans les pays industrialisés, la faiblesse des prix des produits de base et les taux d'intérêt élevés ont rendu insoutenable l'état de la balance des paiements dans un nombre croissant de pays en développement. Cette situation a mis à dure épreuve le système financier international. En 1982, plusieurs gros emprunteurs ont eu de graves problèmes de liquidités qui ont rendu indispensable la collaboration entre les gouvernements, les institutions financières internationales, le Fonds monétaire international (FMI), la Banque des règlements internationaux (BRI), les banques commerciales et les pays débiteurs. Le Canada a participé à ces consultations multilatérales car il a un grand intérêt à voir fonctionner efficacement le système des échanges et des paiements internationaux. Cette collaboration devra d'ailleurs se poursuivre aussi longtemps que les pressions continueront de peser sur le système financier.

Le FMI a pour mandat de venir en aide aux pays membres dont la balance des paiements est en mauvaise position. Il a ainsi été

mené à prendre une part de plus en plus active dans la résolution des problèmes financiers internationaux. En échange d'une aide financière, le pays membre doit accepter de prendre les mesures économiques appropriées pour corriger la position de sa balance des paiements et améliorer du même coup sa solvabilité. L'importance des déficits des comptes courants et le nombre des pays en difficulté s'étant considérablement accrus depuis 1979, il est devenu de plus en plus évident que les ressources du Fonds devaient être augmentées si celui-ci devait continuer à remplir son mandat. Lors de la réunion du Comité intérimaire du FMI qui a eu lieu les 10 et 11 février à Washington, il a donc été convenu, sous réserve de ratification dans chacun des pays, que les quotes-parts seraient haussées de 47,5%. Cela signifie que le total des quotes-parts passera de 61 milliards de DTS à 90 milliards, et que les quotes-parts de chaque membre augmenteront proportionnellement.

À ces ressources viendront s'ajouter des fonds supplémentaires aux termes des Accords généraux d'emprunt (AGE). Les AGE ont été établis en 1962 par 10 pays industrialisés afin de donner au FMI des ressources supplémentaires qui pourraient être utilisées si l'un des Dix désirait souscrire un emprunt auprès du Fonds. Les ministres des finances du Groupe des dix ont décidé que les ressources tirées des AGE devaient passer de 7,1 milliards à 19 milliards et qu'elles devaient être mises à la disposition d'autres membres du Fonds dont la situation fait peser une menace sur la stabilité du système monétaire international. Ces mesures - augmentation des quotes-parts au FMI et l'élargissement des AGE - doivent permettre aux institutions de faire face aux difficultés que rencontre le système financier international.

Vous avez également soulevé la question du rôle des banques commerciales. En fait, l'un des événements marquants des années 70 a été

l'essor fulgurant des prêts bancaires aux pays en développement, même s'ils étaient consentis surtout aux pays les plus avancés. Les banques canadiennes ont suivi cette tendance. Dans ce cas, les banques traitent directement avec les pays emprunteurs et elles font leurs propres arrangements pour les facilités de crédit ou le rééchelonnement de l'échéancier de la dette. Toutefois, il est évident que les banques attachent une grande importance dans leurs transactions avec un pays en difficulté, à l'existence d'un programme du FMI.

QUESTION:

M. Munro

Ext-ce une société immobilière ou y a-t-il d'autres sociétés immobilières qu'ils aimeraient acheter au Canada dans le but d'acquérir ici des propriétés pour leurs diverses opérations régionales.

RÉPONSE:

Il s'agit bien d'une société immobilière en ce sens, qu'elle a été créée aux fins de gérer la propriété en question et d'en détenir le titre.

Il est prévu de transférer le titre de propriété à Sa Majesté et de dissoudre ensuite immédiatement la compagnie.

Il n'est pas question d'utiliser cette société pour acquérir des propriétés au Canada pour le compte du Ministère.

QUESTION:

M. Munro

Où l'ambassadeur a-t-il résidé jusqu'à maintenant, et en vertu de quels arrangements? A-t-il payé un loyer, et si tel est le cas, à combien s'élève-t-il?

RÉPONSE:

L'ambassadeur du Canada auprès du Saint-Siège habite depuis le 22 mai 1970 la propriété qui va être achetée.

Celle-ci avait été donnée à bail à Sa Majesté et le dernier contrat de location, signé le 1er mai 1980, vient à terme le 30 avril 1983.

QUESTION:

M. Munro

A-t-il payé un loyer, si tel est le cas, à combien s'élève-t-il?

RÉPONSE:

Pour la période du 1^{er} mai 1980 au 30 avril 1983, le loyer annuel de la propriété était de \$75 000 CAN.

L'ambassadeur a absorbé les frais de logement habituels, calculés en fonction de son salaire et de sa situation familiale.

QUESTION:

M. Munro

Pourquoi est-il nécessaire d'acheter une entreprise ainsi que toutes ces actions émises et en circulation pour acquérir la propriété?

RÉPONSE:

La propriété est le seul bien de la société et le fait de vendre cette dernière plutôt que de vendre la propriété à part a permis aux actionnaires de réaliser des économies fiscales importantes.

Le prix demandé à la Couronne a été réduit d'un montant équivalent à celui des économies d'impôt évaluées à près de 50% du prix de vente.

QUESTION:

M. Munro

Quelle est la nature de l'entreprise en question?

RÉPONSE:

Il s'agit d'une compagnie privée, dûment constituée en vertu des lois italiennes dans le but de posséder et de gérer son seul bien, soit la propriété qui en 1970 est devenue la résidence de l'ambassadeur du Canada auprès du Saint-Siège.

Les actionnaires étaient tous membres de la même famille et avaient hérité la propriété de leur père.

DÉCLARATION:

M. Munro (parlant de l'acquisition d'une société limitée italienne dans le but d'acheter la résidence officielle de l'ambassadeur du Canada auprès du Saint-Siège).

"... nous avons aujourd'hui le privilège d'avoir ici l'ancien ambassadeur à Riyad et l'ancien ambassadeur à Belgrade. Je ne sais pas s'ils vivaient dans des taudis quand ils étaient en poste... le Ministère a maintenant décidé que pour bien loger les ambassadeurs, il fallait dépenser \$63 millions dans ces deux villes, tandis que l'on ne dépense que \$56 millions pour l'ambassade du Saint-Siège".

RÉPONSE:

L'acquisition de la résidence officielle de l'ambassadeur du Canada auprès du Saint-Siège se fera par l'achat, au prix de \$1,15 millions, de toutes les actions émises et en circulation de la compagnie italienne "Societa a Responsibilita Limitata Immobiliare San Sebastiano". La somme sera tirée des \$56 millions inscrits au chapitre des dépenses d'équipement dans les prévisions budgétaires du ministère des Affaires extérieures.



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WITNESSES—TÉMOINS

From the Department of External Affairs:

M. Massé, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs;
de M. Marchand, Deputy Minister, Foreign Policy;
W.J. Jenkins, Assistant Deputy Minister, Sectoral and
Economic Relations.

Du département des Affaires Extérieures:

M. Massé, sous-Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires Extérieures;
de M. Marchand, sous-Ministre, Politique étrangère;
W.J. Jenkins, sous-Ministre, Relations sectorielles et
économiques.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 91

Thursday, May 5, 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 91

Le jeudi 5 mai 1983

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

External Affairs and National Defence

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

Main Estimates 1983-84: Votes 25, 30 and L35—
Canadian International Development Agency under
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONCERNANT:

Budget principal 1983-1984: crédits 25, 30 et L35—
Agence canadienne de développement international sous
la rubrique AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

WITNESSES:

(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:

(Voir à l'endos)



First Session of the
Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la
trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

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AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

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Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appolloni

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Stanley Hudecki
Pauline Jewett
Gérald Laniel
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Allan B. McKinnon
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Douglas Roche
Sinclair Stevens
Terry Sargeant

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Ian Watson
Robert Wenman

(Quorum 8)

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE JEUDI 5 MAI 1983

(146)

[Texte]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale se réunit aujourd'hui à 11h10, sous la présidence de M. Marcel Prud'homme (président).

Membres du Comité présents: M^{me} Appolloni, MM. Dupras, Lapierre, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Prud'homme, Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*) et Roche.

Substituts présents: MM. Breau, Corbett, Darling, McLean, Ogle, Stewart et Watson.

Témoins: De l'Agence canadienne de développement international: M. William McWhinney, vice-président principal et président par intérim; M. Arthur Wright, vice-président, Asie et M. Lewis Perinbam, vice-président, Programmes spéciaux.

Également présents: M. Robert Miller, conseiller en recherche, Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 23 février 1983 portant sur le Budget principal pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984 (*Voir procès-verbal du mardi 15 mars 1983, fascicule n° 83*).

M. McWhinney fait une déclaration puis, avec les autres témoins, répond aux questions.

Il est convenu,—Que les lettres en date du 5 mai 1983 en réponse à des questions posées par MM. Roche, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*) et Stewart à la réunion du 29 mars 1983 soient jointes aux Procès-verbaux et témoignages de ce jour (*Voir Appendice "EAND-72"*).

A 12h45, le Comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, MAY 5, 1983

(146)

[Translation]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:10 a.m. this day, the Chairman, Marcel Prud'homme, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Mr. Dupras, Mr. Lapierre, Mr. McKinnon, Mr. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Mr. Prud'homme, Mr. Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*), Mr. Roche.

Alternatives present: Messrs. Breau, Corbett, Darling, McLean, Ogle, Stewart and Watson.

Witnesses: From the Canadian International Development Agency: Mr. William McWhinney; Senior Vice-President and Acting President, Mr. Arthur Wright, Vice-President, Asia and Mr. Lewis Perinbam, Vice-President, Special Programs.

In attendance: Mr. Robert Miller, Research Adviser, Parliamentary Centre for External Affairs and Foreign Trade.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference, dated Wednesday, February 23, 1983, relating to the main estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Tuesday, March 15, 1983, Issue No. 83*).

Mr. McWhinney made a statement and, with other witnesses, answered questions.

It was agreed,—That the letters dated May 5, 1983, in reply to questions of Messrs. Roche, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*) and Stewart at a committee meeting dated March 29, 1983, be appended to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix "EAND-72"*).

At 12.45 p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

[Texte]

Thursday, May 5, 1983

The Chairman: Good morning. *Bonjour.* Prior to the meeting is a point of order I certainly will receive, that I was told early this morning may help smooth the case. It seems that the announcement was made in the elevators for a 9.30 meeting. So one member showed up. I always take blame for things that are not necessarily my fault, so I will apologize to that member first.

I came back late last night from the IPU meeting, just for this meeting today. I thank M^{me}. Appolloni very much for having chaired in my absence.

In my book, it was 11.00; in the green paper, it was 11.00; in the elevator it was announced for 9.30. So Mr. Munro, having given this explanation, I still recognize you on your justified point of order.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Breau: Did you explain that you were there in Moscow, or in Western Europe?

An hon. member: It depends on what party he is with.

An hon. member: As a gentleman he will honour the firm, I am sure.

The Chairman: I have done so with you, sir, December 11, 1979. I did not vote when I was there with you, that famous week. Mr. Munro.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too, wish to thank M^{me}. Appolloni for chairing the committee so well in your absence.

Mrs. Appolloni: Thank you. Oh boy.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): She gave me plenty of time.

The Chairman: You notice why I do not let her chair too often.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): My point of order this morning, Mr. Chairman, is not an effort to assign blame, because I do not know where the blame lies. I think inquiry ought to be made to find out where it does lie. I wasted half an hour this morning looking for this committee at 9.30. As you say, one of your assistants saw me looking for the committee, and one of our Whip's assistants found me wandering around in these rooms, looking for the committee as well.

I left my office at about 9.25 this morning, and I was guided by the latest piece of paper in my office about this matter. It has a number up here. I do not quite know how to designate it, but it did say that this committee was meeting at 9.30 this

TÉMOIGNAGES

(Enregistrement électronique)

[Traduction]

Le jeudi 5 mai 1983

Le président: Bonjour. *Good morning.* J'anticipe déjà un rappel au Règlement et je voudrais avant de commencer donner quelques explications. Il semble que les avis de convocation affichés dans les ascenseurs annonçaient que la réunion aurait lieu à 09h30. Un membre du comité s'est donc présenté à cette heure-là. Même si ce n'est pas nécessairement ma faute, j'accepte toujours la responsabilité de ces contre-temps et c'est pourquoi je prie ce député de bien vouloir m'excuser.

Je suis rentré hier soir de la réunion de l'UIP précisément pour la réunion d'aujourd'hui. Je remercie M^{me} Appolloni qui a bien voulu me remplacer en mon absence.

Mon emploi du temps indiquait que la réunion avait lieu à 11h00. L'avis de convocation indiquait 11h00 mais la feuille affichée dans l'ascenseur, 09h30. Monsieur Munro, sans plus d'explication, je vous donne la parole pour que vous fassiez valoir votre point de vue.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci, monsieur le président.

M. Breau: Avez-vous précisé que vous étiez à Moscou, ou était-ce en Europe de l'ouest?

Une voix: Tout dépend du parti qu'il représente.

Une voix: Puisque c'est un gentilhomme, il fera honneur à ceux qu'il représente, j'en suis convaincu.

Le président: Monsieur, je vous l'ai prouvé le 11 décembre 1979. Lors de cette semaine mémorable, je n'ai pas voté puisque j'étais votre correspondant. Monsieur Munro.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci, monsieur le président. Moi aussi je tiens à remercier M^{me} Appolloni qui a présidé les réunions du comité en votre absence.

Mme Appolloni: Merci. Oh là là.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Elle m'a donné beaucoup de temps.

Le président: Vous comprenez pourquoi je ne lui laisse pas présider les réunions trop souvent.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Monsieur le président, je n'essaierai pas ce matin de blâmer qui que ce soit car je ne sais pas qui est responsable. Je pense que l'on devrait se renseigner pour le découvrir. Ce matin, j'ai perdu environ une demi-heure à chercher la salle où siégeait ce comité à 09h30. Comme vous l'avez dit, un membre du bureau de votre whip m'a rencontré errant dans les couloirs car lui aussi cherchait la salle où siégeait le comité.

J'ai quitté mon bureau vers 09h25 ce matin me fiant au dernier avis que j'avais reçu. Cette feuille était numérotée. Je ne sais pas comment on appelle cette feuille mais on y indiquait que la réunion du comité aurait lieu ce matin à

[Texte]

morning, and the witnesses would be officials of the Department of External Affairs.

Shortly after I left my office, Mr. Chairman, having visited all three possibilities over in this building, I phoned my office and found that a correction had come in, which said that the meeting was at 11.00 and that the witnesses would be officials of the Department of External Affairs. That reached my office at about 9.30 this morning.

These two pieces of paper are here in front of me. The green paper, which you mentioned, I checked as I was leaving the Confederation Building just now for this meeting. The point of order is that I wasted half an hour this morning. I am not going to waste half an hour, but I want it on record . . .

Mr. Breau: Do you want us to waste our time too?

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): —I think we should all know that there is some mistake in delivery of notices of meetings, possibly more meetings than this one, in this system. It is not working.

The Chairman: Mr. Munro, I receive your point. It is a valid point. In my 20 years, soon, of experience—17 on this committee—it is the first time something of that kind happened. I say, I do not pass the buck; I take the blame.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): No. I do not think you were expected even to notice it.

The Chairman: I do not issue that, but you are the only one. All others seem to have received the green paper. Yes, they did.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I am the only one in the Confederation Building, perhaps.

Mrs. Appolloni: No sir.

The Chairman: Therefore, there is a mistake somewhere. May I kindly say to you, sir, that the meeting this morning was CIDA. Everything was arranged two weeks ago, because I made sure we knew ahead of time where we were going. So, the mistake seems always to fall on you. There must be something written in heaven, because that is two or three times that something has happened to you. I will have to check on that.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I am just getting crotchety; I am damned annoyed about things.

The Chairman: Having said all that this morning at CIDA, we will go as long as members ask questions. But CIDA will be back twice before the end of this month.

We have the acting chairman, Mr. McWhinney. He has no statement but will give some explanations. We have answers to many requests ready for distribution. Therefore, I ask Mr. McWhinney to take the floor. By agreement, I will recognize

[Traduction]

09h30 et que les témoins seraient des représentants du Ministère des affaires extérieures.

Peu de temps après avoir quitté mon bureau, monsieur le président, après m'être rendu dans les trois salles possibles de cet édifice, j'ai téléphoné à mon bureau pour découvrir qu'il y avait eu rectification et que la séance aurait lieu à 11h00. On m'a dit que les témoins seraient des représentants du Ministère des affaires extérieures. Cet avis est parvenu à mon bureau vers 09h30 ce matin.

J'ai sous les yeux les deux feuilles. D'une part la convocation verte, dont vous avez parlé, que j'ai consultée avant de quitter mon bureau tout à l'heure à l'Édifice de la Confédération. Je tiens à signaler que j'ai perdu une demi heure ce matin. Je ne tiens pas à ce que cela se reproduise . . .

M. Breau: Voulez-vous que nous perdions aussi notre temps?

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): . . . nous devrions être tous conscients qu'il y a parfois des erreurs dans les avis de convocation, et que cela se produit peut-être plus souvent qu'on ne le pense. Cela ne va pas.

Le président: Monsieur Munro, j'ai bien compris votre point de vue. Vous avez tout à fait raison. J'aurai bientôt 20 ans d'expérience, ici, 17 au Comité, et c'est la première fois que cela arrive. Je n'essaie pas de me défilier car j'en assume le blâme.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Il ne s'agit pas de cela. Je pense que l'on n'aurait même pas pu vous demander de remarquer cette erreur.

Le président: Ce n'est pas ce que je conteste mais vous êtes le seul à vous être trompé. Tous les autres ont reçu la convocation verte. C'est un fait.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Peut-être suis-je le seul à avoir son bureau à l'Édifice de la Confédération.

Mme Appolloni: Non.

Le président: Par conséquent, il y a eu une erreur quelque part. Je vous rappelle en outre que ce matin ce sont les représentants de l'ACDI que nous accueillons. Tout cela est prévu depuis deux semaines car j'ai voulu m'assurer que nous savions à l'avance où nous allions. Il semble que vous soyez toujours la victime. C'est peut-être un sort qui vous est jeté, car c'est la deux ou troisième fois que cela arrive. Il faudra que je me renseigne.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je commence à la trouver mauvaise. Je suis très agacé.

Le président: Ce matin, nous accueillons les représentants de l'ACDI et la séance durera tant que vous voudrez. Je vous signale cependant qu'ils reviendront deux fois avant la fin du mois.

Notre témoin est le président suppléant, M. McWhinney. Il n'a pas de déclaration, mais il voudrait nous donner des explications. Nous pouvons distribuer les réponses préparées par l'ACDI à certaines questions déjà posées. Par conséquent,

[Text]

whoever is the leading official critic of the Official Opposition... either himself or his designated person. Reverend Father Ogle and Mr. Dupras will be the first three questioners; Mr. Breau will also be recognized. I will be a little more strict so we can have a second turn. I would like to adjourn at 12:30 p.m. Unless there are other points... Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. William McWhinney (Senior Vice-President and Acting President, Canadian International Development Agency): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As a follow-up to the meeting of the committee on April 21, I have provided a number of letters to the chairman answering questions raised by hon. members.

I wanted to indicate that three of these relate to exhibits that will be provided to the clerk. There were requests and there is information on the groups that have received funding from CIDA for development education, as well as the criteria for that program. These are being tabled with the clerk.

I also wish to advise the committee that at our request officials of the organization known as CESO will be providing information to the committee and some of the detail that is not available directly to CIDA. Although, in response to Mr. Darling's question, there is a letter to the chairman, answering some of the other parts of the question that he asked with regard to that organization.

Also, with regard to a question from Mr. Robinson concerning non-governmental organizations that received funds from CIDA for the first time during the fiscal year 1982-1983, that information is being provided to the clerk.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to clarify one or two points from the last meeting, very briefly. Mr. McLean had raised a question regarding foreign students, which I endeavoured to reply to off the top of my head. I indicated that I thought there were some 50,000 foreign students in Canada, and that the number sponsored, if you will, by CIDA, was relatively small.

Subsequent to the meeting, I have been advised the number is closer to the order of 84,000, rather than 50,000. We do not have a complete handle on equivalent figures on all trainees, but by way of information, which I hope will be helpful to the hon. member, in 1982 we sponsored in our bilateral program 925 trainees in Canada. As the hon. member probably knows, we sponsored in the order of 300 programs, training under the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Program. We sponsored 25 under the CIDA Research Associates Program and an indeterminant number, not excessively large, through our co-operative support with the industrial co-operation development services program for trainees, part of our programs of institutions and organizations in Canada. But the numbers, as you will see, are a relatively small part of the total that are assisted by CIDA.

I should also indicate that I did not reply, because I did not pick it up at the time, to one of the questions from Mr. Stewart

[Translation]

je donne la parole à M. McWhinney. Selon ce qui est convenu, je donnerai la parole au porte-parole de l'opposition officielle. Peu importe que ce soit lui ou une personne qu'il désignera. Ensuite, la parole sera au Père Ogle et à M. Dupras. Ensuite, ce sera à M. Breau. Je limiterai le temps de parole pour que nous puissions avoir un deuxième tour. Je voudrais lever la séance à 12h30. À moins qu'il n'y ait autre chose... Monsieur McWhinney.

M. William McWhinney (premier vice-président et président suppléant, Agence canadienne pour le développement international): Merci, monsieur le président. Suite à la réunion du Comité du 21 avril, j'ai envoyé certaines lettres au président en réponse à des questions soulevées par des députés.

Je tiens à vous signaler que trois d'entre elles se rapportent à des documents que nous déposerons auprès du greffier. Il s'agit donc de demandes qu'on nous a faites et nous fournissons des renseignements sur les groupes qui reçoivent des fonds de l'ACDI pour l'éducation, de même que les critères de ces programmes. Nous déposons ces documents auprès du greffier.

À notre demande, les responsables d'une organisation connue sous le nom de CESO fourniront des renseignements aux membres du Comité, car l'ACDI n'avait pas tous les renseignements nécessaires. En réponse à une question de M. Darling, nous avons envoyé une lettre au président qui constitue une réponse partielle sur ce qu'il a demandé au sujet de l'organisation.

En outre, en ce qui a trait à une question posée par M. Robinson sur les organismes non gouvernementaux qui reçoivent des fonds de l'ACDI pour la première fois au cours de l'exercice financier 1982-1983, le greffier pourra vous donner la réponse.

Si vous le permettez, monsieur le président, je voudrais apporter des précisions très brièvement sur une ou deux questions posées à la dernière réunion. M. McLean m'a posé une question sur les étudiants étrangers et j'ai essayé d'y répondre de mémoire. J'ai dit qu'il y avait environ 50,000 étudiants étrangers au Canada et que le nombre d'entre eux qui étaient parrainés par l'ACDI était assez minime.

Après la réunion, on a signalé qu'il y en avait 84,000 plutôt que 50,000. Nous n'avons pas encore de chiffres précis sur tous les apprentis, mais j'espère que le député trouvera utile de savoir qu'en 1982, nous avons parrainé 925 apprentis au Canada en vertu de notre programme bilatéral. Comme le député le sait peut-être, il y en a environ 300 qui profitent des bourses d'études et de perfectionnement du Commonwealth. Le programme des adjoints à la recherche de l'ACDI a promis d'en parrainer 25 autres et un nombre indéterminé, pas très élevé, reçoit de l'aide par notre participation au programme de coopération industrielle pour le développement, dans le cadre de nos programmes qui font intervenir des institutions et des organisations canadiennes. Vous constaterez donc que seul un petit nombre d'étudiants étrangers sont aidés par l'ACDI.

M. Stewart a posé une question que je n'ai pas relevée à la dernière réunion. Il m'a demandé quel était le montant réservé

[Texte]

that was asked at the last meeting, which was with regard to the amount in the reserve in 1983-1984 for Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation. That amount was \$55 million.

I would also like to report to the committee, and the hon. member in particular, that at our request, the Chairman of Petro-Canada International Acceptance Corporation has written to the chairman of the committee in response to the questions which Mr. Stewart asked on that organization, which does not fall under the jurisdiction of CIDA.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

At the request of the hon. Mr. McKinnon, as first leading off for the Official Opposition, I recognize the hon. Mr. Roche. Mr. Roche, I think you have received the official answers from Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Roche: Thank you.

The Chairman: We shall annex them to the minutes of today's proceedings.

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

• 1120

Mr. Roche: Indeed, I have received quite full answers from Mr. McWhinney to the seven key questions I posed in my opening statement of March 29. In recommending to you that the questions and the answers be appended to the minutes of today's meeting, and also in thanking Mr. McWhinney, I would like to say that I think these answers are very substantive. Sometimes, perhaps, I have been less than enthusiastic over some of the answers I have received over the years, and I want to say now, Mr. Chairman, I think these answers reflect a depth in CIDA that is not, perhaps, well enough understood. While it is not my purpose here this morning to launch a paean of praise for anybody, I think I would be less than fair if I did not comment on the strength of the information that is contained in these answers. I would like to commend them to...

Mr. Ogle: On a point of order, is that information available for everybody?

The Chairman: I will issue them now, because it is going to be printed. Because of the word of Mr. Roche, I will also issue to the members of the press; those faithful who are with us once in a while. Those who are there are the faithful ones. So I will distribute them right now to all members of the committee and the press.

Mr. Roche: I commend the questions and the answers to all the members of the committee and the media, and indeed, not only the people who read the minutes of the External Affairs committee. I think there is a substantial community across Canada that does follow these minutes, Mr. Chairman. I would like to commend them to all today, who are raising the question of why Canada is involved in international development and what is in it for Canada, in the largest sense of that question. On the assumption that these are going to be

[Traduction]

en 1983-1984 pour la Société d'aide internationale Petro-Canada. Il s'agit de 55 millions de dollars.

A notre demande, le président de la société d'aide internationale Petro-Canada a écrit au président du Comité en réponse aux questions de M. Stewart, car cette société ne relève pas de l'ACDI.

Merci, monsieur le président.

Le président: Merci beaucoup.

A la demande de M. McKinnon, c'est M. Roche qui posera d'abord les questions de l'opposition officielle. Monsieur Roche, je pense que vous avez reçu les réponses officielles de M. McWhinney.

M. Roche: Merci.

Le président: Elles seront annexées au compte rendu de la séance d'aujourd'hui.

Des voix: D'accord.

M. Roche: En effet, j'ai reçu des réponses fort complètes de M. McWhinney à cette question que j'ai posée le 29 mars dernier. Je tiens à remercier M. McWhinney et à vous recommander que ces questions et réponses soient annexées au compte rendu de la séance d'aujourd'hui. Ces réponses sont très bien développées. Parfois, j'ai été peut-être moins enthousiaste à l'égard de certaines réponses que j'ai reçues dans le passé mais monsieur le président, ces réponses témoignent d'une réflexion de la part de l'ACDI qui n'est peut-être pas reconnue. Ce matin, il ne m'appartient pas d'être élogieux à l'égard de qui que ce soit mais je pense qu'il serait injuste de ne pas signaler la qualité des renseignements contenus dans ces réponses. Je les recommande à...

M. Ogle: J'invoque le Règlement. Tout le monde a-t-il accès à ces renseignements?

Le président: Ces renseignements seront imprimés et je vais faire le nécessaire dès maintenant. Étant donné les remarques de M. Roche, j'en ferai distribuer des exemplaires aux représentants de la presse, aux fidèles qui sont avec nous parfois. Ceux qui sont ici sont les fidèles. Je vais donc demander que l'on distribue ces réponses à tous les membres du Comité et aux représentants de la presse.

M. Roche: Je recommande la lecture des questions et réponses à tous les membres du Comité et aux représentants des media et non seulement à ceux qui lisent régulièrement les procès-verbaux du Comité des affaires extérieures. Je pense qu'il y a un groupe assez important de gens qui lisent les comptes rendus des séances du comité, monsieur le président. Aujourd'hui, je recommande la lecture de ces questions et réponses à tous ceux qui se demandent pourquoi le Canada s'occupe de développement international et ce qu'il en retire,

[Text]

appended to the minutes, I will not dwell on them, Mr. Chairman. I take it that you are going to include them in the minutes.

I just want to ask Mr. McWhinney. With respect to the seventh question, there is just a little concern in my mind about the answer. The question has to do with the staff of CIDA, 1,062 of whom are in CIDA headquarters—it is an overwhelming percentage—as distinct from those in the field. In the answer from Mr. McWhinney, I learned that 150 to 175 person-years are overseas, but that these people are under the control of the Department of External Affairs. I am just raising the question now; I do not want to dwell on it, because I want to raise other subjects.

I want to indicate my concern as to whether or not people who are supervising CIDA projects in this ever-expanding budget—the few Canadians who are overseas: Are they working for External Affairs; are they External Affairs officers, as indicated in this answer; or are they working directly for CIDA? That is a distinction with a difference, I respectfully submit, because of the impact on the External Affairs reorganization today, which is still somewhat nebulous as to what criterion is really shaping foreign policy today. I suppose that is a subject for another day. It is also related to the question of whether or not the President of CIDA, or the chief responsible officers of CIDA, are responsible through the line authority in External Affairs, as distinct from being responsible for the conduct of CIDA's operation directly to the Minister of External Affairs. I think I have indicated to Mr. McWhinney my concern, and perhaps he could just indicate to me briefly whether or not I am on the right track in my analysis or whether or not I have read it wrong. Are there Canadian officers in the field who are directly responsible to the president of CIDA as distinct from being responsible to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs?

• 1125

Mr. McWhinney: Well, Mr. Chairman, to reply to the hon. member, let me say at the outset that the overall responsibility situation, to my knowledge, over the last three or four years has not changed; namely, that the head of mission—the ambassador or high commissioner and his or her staff—is responsible on matters with regard to official development assistance under the jurisdiction of CIDA, to the president of CIDA.

What has changed really, in the last year or so, as a result of the government's announced foreign service integration, is that those permanent employees, if you will, or full-time employees, as distinct from short-term attachment, who are serving in our high commissions and embassies abroad, will be members of the so-called foreign service team. As such, they are responsible in that sense, in their classification and personnel terms, to the Department of External Affairs. Within that context as well, as the hon. member may know, there will be a development assistance stream. This stream is under the joint management and jurisdiction of the Department of External Affairs and CIDA, in terms of the management of the employees.

[Translation]

d'une manière générale. Puisque ces renseignements seront consignés au compte rendu, je ne m'apesantirai pas. C'est donc convenu, ils seront imprimés.

Je voudrais demander à M. McWhinney, au sujet de la septième question, quelques précisions concernant la réponse. Il s'agit de l'effectif de l'ACDI dont 1,062 personnes se trouvent au siège social, ce qui représente un pourcentage imposant, par rapport à ceux qui sont en mission. D'après la réponse de M. McWhinney, 150 à 175 années-personnes en mission relèvent du Ministère des affaires extérieures. Je ne fais que signaler cela, sans vouloir m'y attarder, car j'ai d'autres questions à poser.

Voici ce que je voudrais savoir: Les gens qui surveillent les projets de l'ACDI, qui disposent d'un budget toujours plus gros, les gens qui sont en mission, relèvent-ils du Ministère des affaires extérieures? S'agit-il d'agents du Ministère des affaires extérieures, comme vous le dites dans votre réponse? Travaillent-ils directement pour l'ACDI? C'est une distinction qui laisse supposer une différence, selon moi, étant donné la refonte que subit le Ministère des affaires extérieures aujourd'hui, étant donné que l'on ne sait pas très bien encore en vertu de quel critère on formule la politique extérieure aujourd'hui. C'est peut-être une question qu'il me faudrait poser à un autre moment. Les cadres de l'ACDI sont-ils dans l'échelle hiérarchique du Ministère des affaires extérieures ou sont-ils responsables directement au ministre des Affaires extérieures? J'ai déjà signalé cela à M. McWhinney et peut-être pourrait-il nous dire brièvement si j'ai bien compris sa réponse, si mon analyse est juste. Y a-t-il des fonctionnaires canadiens en mission qui sont comptables directement au président de l'ACDI plutôt qu'au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures?

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, je dirai tout d'abord que l'ensemble des responsabilités, à ma connaissance, est toujours la même depuis trois ou quatre ans. Le chef de mission, l'ambassadeur ou le haut commissaire et son personnel, sont responsables pour les questions concernant l'aide publique au développement sous l'égide de l'ACDI et ils sont comptables au président de l'ACDI.

Ce qui a changé, depuis un an environ, par suite de l'intégration des services extérieurs gouvernementaux, c'est le fait que les employés permanents, les employés à plein temps, par opposition à ceux qui ne sont là que temporairement, qui sont en mission dans les hauts commissariats et dans les ambassades à l'étranger, deviendront des membres du service extérieur. Comme tel, ils deviennent donc du point de vue de leur classification et pour toutes les questions de personnel, comptables au ministère des Affaires extérieures. Comme le député le sait peut-être, il y aura également toute une équipe d'aide au développement. Cette équipe relève, pour la gestion, du ministère des Affaires extérieures et de l'ACDI, conjointement, pour toutes les questions de personnel.

[Texte]

But on the fundamental point, as to the responsibility in the field, the head of post is obviously the responsible officer for all of Canada's interests abroad. But with regard to the particular questions of development assistance policy and management and programming, the responsibility is not through the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to the president of CIDA, but rather directly to CIDA.

Mr. Roche: Thank you very much. I would like to just turn to a subject under bilateral... Mr. Chairman, as you know, one of the problems we face in the estimates' hearings is trying to focus on where the particular department is going and so we cannot do every aspect of it. That is the problem concerning the Parliamentary rules.

So in trying to focus on where CIDA is going this year, I focused on India because it is the largest recipient of the bilateral, which is a chief component of ODA. I made the observation before that India had gone up to first place with \$59.9 million and I asked for a study of the country program review so I could understand the sense of direction that CIDA is establishing that would merit India's coming into first place. I want to emphasize that I am not in any sense opposing the choosing of India for the amount that has put it into first place. I only want to understand the rationale... since it is the largest recipient of bilateral, I want to know the reasons.

I thank the acting president for sending me the material on India, but I want to just make the observation that apparently the latest material he is working on is the 1979-1980 country program review. First of all, have I assumed correctly, that there is no later country program review for India than 1979-1980?

Mr. McWhinney: In the sense of a formal country program review document, that is correct.

Mr. Roche: Well, I just wonder then what material CIDA has used for study purposes, which reflects the changing conditions in India, that has brought the program to this new high level. In other words, are you still using, basically, the material of 1979-1980, which of course was the time of the Janata Party's government, which has been replaced by the present government of India, with a new set of priorities? I just would like to know the rationale that CIDA has used for the current conditions in India that have brought about the current Canadian commitment to India.

Mr. McWhinney: Well, Mr. Chairman, perhaps I could start off, with your concurrence, in response to the hon. member.

• 1130

For countries that are major recipients of our bilateral assistance, sometimes known as "core countries"—but it includes some other countries—the agency has had a process, and still does, of undertaking periodic detailed country program reviews. These involve analyses of the projects and programs until that time, the situation in the country concerned, an analysis of data from other sources, such as the

[Traduction]

Pour ce qui est de la responsabilité en mission, c'est le chef de mission qui de toute évidence est le fonctionnaire responsable de tous les intérêts canadiens à l'étranger. Pour ce qui est de la politique d'aide au développement, de la gestion et de la programmation, cela se fait non pas par l'intermédiaire du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures mais c'est une responsabilité directe du président de l'ACDI.

M. Roche: Merci beaucoup. Je voudrais passer aux programmes bilatéraux... Monsieur le président, comme vous le savez, quand nous étudions les prévisions budgétaires, il nous faut nous attacher à l'orientation particulière d'un ministère et nous ne pouvons pas tout couvrir. Ce problème découle du règlement parlementaire.

En essayant de voir quelle était l'orientation de l'ACDI cette année, je me suis attardé auprès de l'Inde qui est le pays qui bénéficie de la plus importante aide bilatérale, c'est donc la composante la plus importante de l'aide publique au développement. L'Inde est désormais au premier rang et reçoit 59.9 millions de dollars. J'ai demandé qu'on prépare une étude sur les programmes qui intéressent ce pays afin que je puisse comprendre l'orientation de l'ACDI et pourquoi l'Inde se trouve au premier rang des pays bénéficiaires. Ce n'est pas parce que je m'oppose à ce que l'Inde soit au premier rang mais parce que je veux comprendre les motifs. Je veux savoir pourquoi l'Inde est le pays qui bénéficie de la plus grande part de l'aide bilatérale.

Je remercie le président de m'avoir envoyé des renseignements sur l'Inde mais je lui signale que ces renseignements remontent à 1979-1980, pour ce qui est des programmes. Est-ce que cela s'explique du fait qu'il n'y a pas eu d'examen de programmes visant l'Inde depuis 1979-1980?

M. McWhinney: C'est cela il n'y a pas eu depuis d'examen officiel des programmes visant ce pays.

M. Roche: Sur quoi l'ACDI s'est-elle fondée pour étudier la situation qui semble traduire des conditions modifiées en Inde justifiant que le programme a pris une telle expansion. En d'autres termes, ce fonde-t-on sur des données de 1979-1980, à l'époque où c'est le parti Janata qui gouvernait, qui désormais a été remplacé par le gouvernement actuel qui a un nouvel ordre prioritaire? Je voudrais savoir sur quoi l'ACDI s'est fondée pour évaluer la situation actuelle en Inde et pour motiver le niveau d'aide canadienne actuelle là-bas?

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, avec votre permission, je répondrai à la question du député.

Dans le cas des pays recevant notre aide bilatérale, et qu'on appelle parfois les «pays de concentration», l'agence procède périodiquement à un réexamen détaillé des programmes d'aide aux pays en question. Je rappelle également que l'aide est accordée à d'autres pays que ceux faisant partie de ce groupe. Au cours du réexamen, on étudie les projets et les programmes administrés jusqu'à ce jour, la situation du pays récipiendaire,

[Text]

World Bank, advice from Canadian and other groups who have been involved with our programs, both bilaterally and through the non-governmental organization community.

The process itself is extremely thorough, but it is also, frankly, very time-consuming. It is usually done on a cycle of every four to five years.

If I use that as a backdrop to the point the hon. member made about the last report being in 1979-1980, my understanding is that we would be envisaging a possible new country program review for India in the near future. It does not imply, however, that the programs and projects are not being reviewed in the meantime, even if it has not led to a formal country program review. Indeed, the former President of CIDA, if my memory serves me, in the fall of 1981 undertook a full-scale visit to India, and a couple of other countries at that particular time, to review the program; and therefore some of the changes that may have come since the 1979-1980 document reflect ongoing advice, a response to new circumstances, and a review of the program that was undertaken by the president.

Mr. Roche: In the new circumstances of India, Mr. Chairman, does India really need \$10 million in food aid? You will recall the extensive comments made by the North-South task force on food, and the rationale for food aid as distinct from helping to create greater sources of food inside a country indigenously. Since India is now self-sufficient, I wonder what the rationale is for food aid to India—\$10 million—when perhaps a country like Bangladesh could have used that \$10 million to supplement its very much needed food aid.

Mr. McWhinney: If the hon. member will permit me, perhaps I will ask Mr. Wright, who knows the program in detail, to answer that. I am not aware of the reasons why particularly the \$10 million proposed in food aid for India and the \$60 million food aid for Bangladesh...

Mr. Roche: I would like only a one- or two-sentence answer—without being disrespectful—because I do want to move on.

Mr. Breaux: How much did you say to Bangladesh?

Mr. McWhinney: \$60 million.

Mr. Arthur Wright (Vice-President, Asia, Canadian International Development Agency): Mr. Chairman, if I can respond to that question, I will try to be very brief.

The Chairman: Yes, briefly, because I want to recognize as many members as possible.

Mr. A. Wright: The \$10 million food aid to India is part of a program to increase oil seeds development in India. We are providing oil seeds for India this year in a sense to provide

[Translation]

et on analyse les données provenant d'autres sources comme la Banque mondiale ainsi que les avis donnés par des groupes canadiens et autres ayant participé à l'administration de nos programmes, qu'il s'agisse de l'aide bilatérale ou accordée par le truchement des organisations non gouvernementales.

Le processus est méticuleux et très poussé mais franchement, il est également très long. Il a lieu d'habitude à tous les quatre ou cinq ans.

Le député a parlé du dernier rapport portant sur 1979-1980, et je crois savoir que nous envisageons d'effectuer un tel réexamen des programmes de l'aide dans un avenir rapproché. Cependant, cela ne signifie pas que les programmes et projets ne fassent pas l'objet de réexamen entre-temps, même s'il ne s'agit pas d'une étude officielle de programme par pays. De fait, si ma mémoire ne me trompe pas, l'ancien président de l'ACDI entreprit, à l'automne 1981 une visite très étendue de l'Inde et de quelques autres pays afin de réexaminer le programme en vigueur. En conséquence, certaines des modifications apportées depuis la parution du document de 1979-1980 illustrent les avis reçus depuis, la réaction à de nouvelles circonstances et le réexamen du programme effectué par le président.

M. Roche: Compte tenu des nouvelles circonstances que connaît l'Inde, monsieur le président, ce pays a-t-il vraiment besoin de 10 millions de dollars au titre de l'aide alimentaire? Vous vous rappellerez à ce sujet, les nombreuses observations faites par le groupe de travail chargé d'étudier les relations nord-sud, et les justifications sous-tendant l'aide alimentaire et la présentant comme quelque chose de distinct de l'aide permettant de créer davantage de sources d'alimentation dans un pays donné. Or, étant donné que l'aide a atteint le niveau de l'autosuffisance, je me demande quelle justification il y a pour qu'on accorde pour 10 millions de dollars d'aide alimentaire à l'Inde alors qu'un pays comme le Bangladesh aurait probablement pu bénéficier de ces sommes comme aide alimentaire supplémentaire car il en a bien besoin.

M. McWhinney: Avec la permission du député, je demanderais peut-être à M. Wright de répondre à cela car il a une connaissance très poussée du programme. Pour ma part, j'ignore pourquoi on a proposé 10 millions de dollars d'aide alimentaire à l'Inde et 60 millions de dollars au Bangladesh.

M. Roche: Sans vouloir vous brusquer, j'aimerais une réponse brève car j'aimerais passer à autre chose.

M. Breaux: Vous avez dit qu'on accordait quelle somme au Bangladesh?

M. McWhinney: Soixante millions de dollars.

M. Arthur Wright (vice-président, Asie, Agence canadienne de développement international): Monsieur le président, si vous permettez, je répondrai très brièvement à cette question.

Le président: Oui, très brièvement, car j'aimerais accorder la parole au plus grand nombre de membres possible.

M. A. Wright: Les 10 millions de dollars accordés à l'Inde au titre de l'aide alimentaire font partie d'un programme dont l'objectif est d'augmenter l'exploitation des graines oléagineu-

[Texte]

counterpart funds so that they can invest more in oil seeds production locally. It is not anticipated that this will be an ongoing commitment.

Mr. Roche: This is food that is actually sold and not made available to the poorest people of India?

Mr. A. Wright: It will go into the market of India.

Mr. Roche: But it is required to have money in order to buy it; it does not go to the poorest people?

Mr. A. Wright: It does not. That is correct.

Mr. Roche: Therefore it then follows the customary pattern of food aid, in which food, when it arrives in a recipient country, is put into the food-chain market and is not distributed in those areas of the poorest people. Is that not correct?

Mr. A. Wright: It differs from the customary pattern of food aid in that the funds that are realized from the sale of this will be directly invested through a counterpart fund in the production of edible oil products within India.

Mr. Roche: And you are monitoring that?

Mr. A. Wright: That is right.

Mr. Roche: The largest components of India are the Idukki hydroelectric project equipment of \$18 million, and under lines of credit, oil and gas, \$14 million. Mr. Chairman, do we have yet contracts let on those two items, which comprise the major aspect of the aid to India in this year?

Mr. A. Wright: Mr. Chairman, the answer to that is yes, we do have contracts let. The Idukki program is well under way, and in fact the inaugural ceremony for the Idicki Dam was attended by the High Commissioner of Canada earlier this year.

Mr. Roche: But it is a fact, then, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McWhinney, that by far the largest component of this increased aid to India, which has put India in first place in bilateral aid, is for high-technology items? Is that correct?

Mr. A. Wright: No, that is not correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Roche: The figures would challenge any other interpretation.

• 1135

Mr. Wright: The 1982-1983 bilateral disbursements for India are 58% in agriculture and 37.9% in energy. Minerals, communications, and other parts of the program are a very small percentage over all.

[Traduction]

ses en Inde. Nous fournissons donc des graines oléagineuses à l'Inde cette année afin de leur permettre de tirer des fonds de leur exploitation cette année et pour que les Indiens puissent investir davantage dans la production de ces graines oléagineuses sur le plan local. On ne prévoit pas que ce programme soit permanent.

M. Roche: S'agit-il d'aliments vendus plutôt que distribués aux plus pauvres parmi les Indiens?

M. A. Wright: Ils seront sur le marché en Inde.

M. Roche: Cependant, il faudra avoir de l'argent pour en acheter, ils ne seront pas acheminés vers les plus pauvres, n'est-ce pas?

M. A. Wright: Non, c'est exact.

M. Roche: Cela signifie donc que cette forme d'aide se calque sur le schéma habituel de l'aide alimentaire, où les aliments, une fois arrivés dans le pays bénéficiaire sont intégrés à la chaîne alimentaire et non distribués dans les régions où se trouvent les plus pauvres. C'est bien ainsi n'est-ce pas?

M. A. Wright: En l'occurrence, cette aide diffère du schéma habituel de l'aide en ce que les fonds qui proviendront de la vente de ces aliments seront directement investis dans la production de produits oléagineux en Inde, ce par le truchement d'un fonds prévus à cette fin.

M. Roche: Et vous surveillez ce processus?

M. A. Wright: C'est exact.

M. Roche: Les composantes les plus importantes de l'aide accordée à l'Inde sont 18 millions de dollars affectés à l'achat de matériel nécessaire au projet hydroélectrique Idukki, et 14 millions de dollars au titre du pétrole et du gaz, sous forme de marge de crédit. Monsieur le président, des contrats portant sur ces deux volets ont-ils déjà été signés car ils constituent la part la plus importante de l'aide accordée à l'Inde cette année.

M. A. Wright: Monsieur le président, oui, les contrats ont été signés. Le programme Idukki est en cours et d'ailleurs, le haut commissaire du Canada a assisté à la cérémonie inaugurale du barrage Idukki cette année.

M. Roche: Il demeure tout de même, monsieur le président, que la part la plus importante de l'aide majorée accordée à l'Inde, cette aide qui met ce pays au premier rang de nos bénéficiaires d'aide bilatérale est affectée à des projets de technologie de pointe, c'est bien cela?

M. A. Wright: Non, c'est inexact, monsieur le président.

M. Roche: Pourtant, les chiffres ne permettent certainement pas qu'on en arrive à une autre conclusion.

M. Wright: Les débours bilatéraux accordés à l'Inde pour 1982-1983 se répartissent à raison de 58 p. 100 en agriculture et de 39.9 p. 100 dans le domaine énergétique. Les minéraux, les communications et d'autres parties du programme ne constituent donc qu'un très faible pourcentage du total.

[Text]

Mr. Roche: Nonetheless, you do not dispute that \$18 million and \$14 million are the two largest items in the current estimates?

Mr. Wright: In the current estimates; that is right.

Mr. Roche: Let me ask just one final question, Mr. Chairman. This question is connected to the announcement that the Prime Minister of Canada made at the United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, held in Nairobi in August, 1981 at which conference \$40 million was pledged by Canada to be used for the purpose of new and renewable energy. Of the \$40 million, CIDA is to handle \$30 million and IDRC is to handle \$10 million. I want to ask the president in what way has that money been administered, bearing in mind that, of the \$30 million that CIDA is administering, \$25 million is to go through CIDA's bilateral and \$5 million through the industrial co-operation division.

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, if the hon. member will allow me, I will get back to him on the details on the \$25 million. I do not have them in front of me at the moment. May I indicate with regard to the \$5 million that the information is contained in a letter in response to a question at the last meeting by Mr. Stewart. The particular program of the \$5 million new facility was in operation in late 1981 under the administration, as indicated by the hon. member, of our industrial co-operation program. Since its inception some seven projects, I have been advised, have been accepted for funding. There is a typographical error perhaps in the copy of the hon. member. I have been advised of this only this morning—seven projects.

The objectives of the project, the type of project, are indicated in response to the hon. member on that particular program. But I apologize; I do not have the details on the \$25 million and the information with me at the present time.

The Chairman: Your last question, Mr. Roche.

Mr. Roche: My information is that the \$25 million, which is the major component of the commitment made in 1981, has not yet been either spent or committed in specific ways. I regard this as somewhat serious, but I stand to be corrected if my information is wrong. There is a story now going around that the Canadian commitment to the new and renewable energy conference has not been fulfilled. So, Mr. Chairman, if the president wants to respond later on, I would invite him to do that and have that answer also put into the minutes of the meeting.

The Chairman: Yes. He will answer in writing, which be put in the minutes of next meeting. Thank you, Mr. Roche.

Next, Reverend Father Ogle, followed by Mr. Dupras. I have on my list, if it is of interest, Mr. Roche, Rev. Father Ogle, Mr. Dupras, Mr. McLean, Mr. Breau, Mr. Munro, Madam Apolloni. Please proceed.

[Translation]

M. Roche: Néanmoins, vous ne contesterez pas que les 18 millions de dollars et 14 millions de dollars constituent les deux affectations les plus considérables du budget actuel?

M. Wright: Oui, dans le cas du budget actuel, c'est exact.

M. Roche: Si vous permettez, monsieur le président, j'aimerais poser une dernière question. Elle porte sur la déclaration faite par le Premier ministre du Canada lors de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur les sources nouvelles et renouvelables, tenue à Nairobi en août 1981, et à l'occasion de laquelle le Canada s'est engagé à donner 40 millions de dollars au titre des sources d'énergie nouvelles et renouvelables. Sur ces 40 millions de dollars, l'ACDI est censée administrer 30 millions de dollars et le CRDI 10 millions de dollars. J'aimerais demander au président comment ces sommes ont été administrées en gardant à l'esprit le fait que, sur les 30 millions de dollars relevant de l'ACDI, 25 millions de dollars sont accordés sous forme d'aide bilatérale alors que 5 millions de dollars passent par la division de la coopération industrielle.

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, si le député permet, je lui fournirai les détails relatifs aux 25 millions de dollars plus tard car je n'ai pas ces chiffres en main en ce moment. Pour ce qui est des 5 millions de dollars maintenant, je lui rappellerai que les renseignements s'y rapportant figurent dans une lettre envoyée en réponse à une question posée par M. Stewart lors de la dernière réunion. Les nouvelles installations construites grâce au programme de 5 millions de dollars ont commencé à fonctionner à la fin de 1981, dans le cadre de notre programme de coopération industrielle comme l'a bien rappelé le député. Depuis son début, on me dit que sept projets ont été acceptés et ont donc été financés. Il y a toutefois une erreur typographique dans l'exemplaire de la lettre envoyée au député. C'est seulement ce matin qu'on m'a parlé de sept projets.

Quant aux objectifs du projet, son genre, cela est indiqué dans la réponse envoyée au député au sujet de ce programme précis. Je m'excuse cependant de ne pas avoir en main les détails relatifs aux 25 millions de dollars.

Le président: C'est votre dernière question monsieur Roche.

M. Roche: D'après les renseignements que j'ai obtenus, les 25 millions de dollars, qui constituent la portion la plus importante des affectations consenties pour 1981 n'ont pas encore été dépensées ou engagés dans des projets précis. Cela me paraît donc assez sérieux, mais corrigez-moi si je fais erreur. Une rumeur veut même que les sommes promises par le Canada lors de la Conférence sur les sources d'énergie nouvelles et renouvelables n'ont pas été concrétisées. En conséquence, monsieur le président, si le président désire répondre ultérieurement, je l'enjoins à la faire, et j'annexerai sa réponse au procès-verbal de la réunion.

Le président: Oui. Il répondra par écrit, et cette réponse sera annexée au procès-verbal de la prochaine réunion. Merci monsieur Roche.

Le suivant sera le Révérend père Ogle suivi par M. Dupras. Figurent donc sur ma liste M. Roche, le père Ogle, M. Dupras, M. McLean, M. Breau, M. Munro et M^{me} Apolloni. Poursuivez s'il vous plaît.

[Texte]

Mr. Ogle: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome again to Mr. McWhinney.

On March 29, when we met with the minister—although I was not here myself that day—Miss Jewett questioned the minister on Petro-Canada International; the minister gave the impression that the moneys that were not listed in the budget for Petro-Canada International under CIDA were listed in the energy envelope. My people have tried to find that. Is it in there? Are there moneys for Petro-Canada International? Is there a budget?

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, in reply to the hon. member, I must confess that I have not looked at the estimates of the energy envelope, so I cannot answer the question directly. But the funding for Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation, which is counted within ODA—that being the reference and context for the question at that meeting—is under the responsibility of the energy envelope rather than the external affairs and national defence envelope. But I cannot technically answer you, because personally I have not checked it. I will try to find that information for the hon. member.

Mr. Ogle: We were not able to find it anywhere. Does CIDA have anything at all to do with energy exploration? I mean, petroleum exploration?

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Mr. McWhinney: I know we are involved in Pakistan, Mr. Chairman, with assisting the oil and gas development corporation of that country in their activities. I think there is some training involved. I do not think we are involved in drilling, but we are involved in assisting them in exploration. I am not sure that we are involved in any other countries in the areas of activity that you indicated—to my knowledge.

Mr. Ogle: We will look up that. We will do some more study on that then.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): May I interrupt on a point of order, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Yes, Mr. Munro.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I received a letter dated May 4 from Peter Towe, the Chairman of Petro-Canada International. I have just let Father Ogle have a copy of it. I would suggest, if I may, that copies of that be distributed to all members of this committee. It is in answer to questions Mr. Stewart and I raised on an earlier occasion, and it provides a fair amount of information about the . . .

The Chairman: If you would be kind enough to give me one . . . I did not receive a copy of it.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Yes, okay.

Mrs. Appolloni: I think all members should receive a copy of it, because I am totally confused now . . .

[Traduction]

M. Ogle: Merci, monsieur le président, et à mon tour, je souhaite la bienvenue à M. McWhinney.

Le 29 mars, je n'étais pas ici lors de la réunion à laquelle le ministre a assisté, mais M^{lle} Jewett a interrogé ce dernier sur Petro-Canada International. Or, le ministre a donné l'impression que les sommes ne figurant pas au budget de Petro-Canada International sous l'ACDI faisaient partie de l'enveloppe de l'énergie. Or, mes collaborateurs ont essayé de trouver cela. J'aimerais donc savoir si ces crédits figurent bien là; s'il y en a correspondance à Petro-Canada International? Est-ce qu'il y a un budget?

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, je dois avouer n'avoir pas regardé les prévisions budgétaires de l'enveloppe de l'énergie, je ne puis donc répondre directement à la question. Toutefois, le financement de la Société Petro-Canada pour l'assistance internationale figure sous l'Aide officielle au développement, et cela relève de l'enveloppe de l'énergie plutôt que de celle des Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale. Cela dit, je ne puis vous répondre de façon précise car je n'ai pas vérifié ces renseignements. J'essaierai toutefois de le faire.

M. Ogle: Nous avons été incapables de trouver cela où que ce soit. L'ACDI a-t-elle quelque chose à voir, de près ou de loin avec la prospection en matière énergétique? J'entends par là la prospection pétrolière.

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, je sais que nous aidons à la Société de développement du pétrole et du gaz du Pakistan. Je crois que nous nous occupons de formation là-bas. Je ne pense pas cependant que nous participions au forage, mais enfin nous aidons ce pays dans ses activités de prospection. À ma connaissance, je ne suis pas sûr que nous participions aux genres d'activités que vous avez mentionnées dans d'autres pays.

M. Ogle: Nous examinerons donc davantage cette question.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Monsieur le président, puis-je invoquer le Règlement?

Le président: Oui, monsieur Munro.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): J'ai reçu une lettre datée du 4 mai, de M. Peter Towe, le président de Petro-Canada International. Je viens d'en donner une copie au père Ogle. Je propose également qu'on en distribue des copies à tous les membres du Comité. Il y répond aux questions posées par M. Stewart et moi-même lors d'une séance antérieure, et fournit beaucoup de renseignements sur le . . .

Le président: Auriez-vous l'obligeance de m'en donner une copie, car je n'en ai pas reçue.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): C'est bien, oui.

Mme Appolloni: Je crois que tous les membres du Comité devraient en recevoir une, car pour ma part la situation me paraît tout à fait embrouillée maintenant . . .

[Text]

An hon. Member: I agree. I agree.

Mrs. Appolloni: —with Petro-Canada International; even though the chairman seems to have put some distance between PCI and CIDA there seems to be quite a link, and I want to know exactly what it is.

The Chairman: That is why I will ask first to look at the document and have it reproduced and distributed.

Mr. Ogle: I will pass on that line right now until people have more information, myself included. I had not seen that letter.

I wonder if I could ask—I see Mr. Perinbam is here, or Mr. McWhinney himself—if we could follow up a little more on the ideas of another facility, an international facility in the NGO community. I was talking to Mr. Perinbam before we started today . . . Would it be possible for him to tell us what information or what possibilities there are for that kind of an international facility? Going back again to the question I asked previously from the suggestion that is made by the Brandt report or the recent Brandt writings called *Common Crisis*, one of their suggestions is that there would be an international facility that would handle non-government organizational type of work, something like IMF or World Bank or UN Development handles other types. Could Mr. Perinbam tell us a little more about that or the possibilities of that?

The Chairman: Mr. Perinbam.

Mr. Lewis Perinbam (Vice-President, Special Programs, Canadian International Development Agency): Mr. Chairman, this is an idea, the author of which is Mr. Brian Walker, the Executive Director of Oxfam in Great Britain; he contributed that particular part of the reference that the hon. member made to the Brandt report relating to non-governmental organizations.

I have had an occasion to discuss this idea quite informally with Mr. Walker, and his thought, which he recognizes would require considerable study and examination, is that there should be some exploration of the idea of creating an international non-governmental facility which would play a role similar to that played by the United Nations Development Program in that it would be multilateral in character but that it would focus very much on people-oriented activities in the developing world. It might also be a way of mobilizing resources internationally in a way that often cannot be done on a national or regional basis. But, as I indicated earlier, this is simply an idea that he feels ought to be explored.

I am not aware of any formal discussions that have taken place on the subject other than what I have heard. There has been nothing formal out of it.

Mr. Ogle: Could I ask further then, just in your own judgment and from your own experience, how you relate to that kind of an idea?

Mr. Perinbam: Mr. Chairman, I think one of the things that is increasingly evident in the development field is that there is a great deal of room for initiative and action. I think this idea

[Translation]

Une voix: C'est un fait.

Mme Appolloni: . . . pour ce qui est de Petro-Canada International. Même si le président a mis une certaine distance entre cet organisme et l'ACDI, les deux semblent très liés, et j'aimerais savoir comment.

Le président: C'est pourquoi je demanderai d'abord qu'on examine le document et qu'on le fasse reproduire et distribuer.

M. Ogle: Je m'abstiendrai donc de poser des questions là-dessus d'ici à ce que les gens soient plus renseignés, moi y compris, car je n'avais pas vu cette lettre.

Je remarque la présence de M. Perinbam, j'aimerais donc lui demander soit à lui, soit à M. McWhinney si nous pouvons savoir davantage sur une installation internationale relevant des organismes gouvernementaux. J'ai d'ailleurs discuté avec M. Perinbam avant que nous ne commencions aujourd'hui . . . Peut-il nous dire quelles sont les possibilités que ce genre de centre international soit mis sur pied? Pour revenir à la question que j'ai déjà posée et qui découlait du rapport Brandt ou des textes récemment écrits par Willie Brandt et intitulés *Cause commune*, ces documents proposent, entre autres choses, qu'on crée un centre international qui s'occuperait du travail d'organisation non gouvernementale, un peu à l'instar de ce que font le Fonds monétaire international ou la Banque mondiale ou encore le Programme de développement des Nations Unies. M. Perinbam peut-il nous en dire un peu plus long sur ces possibilités?

Le président: Monsieur Perinbam.

M. Lewis Perinbam (vice-président, Programmes spéciaux, Agence canadienne de développement international): Monsieur le président, c'est M. Brian Walker, le directeur exécutif d'Oxfam en Grande-Bretagne qui est à l'origine de cette idée. C'est lui qui a d'ailleurs mentionné cette partie du rapport Brandt ayant trait aux organisations non gouvernementales, et dont le député vient lui aussi de parler.

J'ai eu l'occasion de discuter quelque peu de cette idée avec M. Walker, et il est d'avis qu'il faudrait longuement et attentivement étudier la question. Ce centre non gouvernemental international pourrait jouer un rôle semblable à celui assumé par le Programme de développement des Nations Unies, en ce sens qu'il serait multilatéral tout en concentrant ses efforts sur les populations du monde en développement ainsi que sur leurs activités. Il pourrait servir à mobiliser des ressources internationales alors que cela est souvent plus difficile à l'échelle nationale ou régionale. Toutefois, comme je l'ai dit plus tôt, il estime qu'il faut d'abord étudier la question.

A part ces discussions non officielles, à ma connaissance, il n'y a eu aucun entretien officiel sur le sujet. Il n'y a donc rien d'officiel encore.

M. Ogle: Dans ce cas, pouvez-vous nous dire, compte tenu de votre expérience et de votre jugement, ce que vous pensez de cette idée?

M. Perinbam: S'il y a quelque chose qui devient de plus en plus évident, c'est bien qu'il y a beaucoup de place pour l'initiative et l'action dans le domaine du développement. A

[Texte]

is one that does merit very careful study, but I think it would be very important that the international and national non-governmental organizations that have been very active should be very involved in a discussion of this, to see its potential in terms of adding to what they are doing rather than replacing what they are doing or competing or conflicting with what they are doing. I sense from my meetings and associations that there is perhaps room to explore this idea and I think it would be one that would certainly be worth exploring.

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Mr. McLean: Could I ask, Mr. Chairman, who is putting forward this idea that you are discussing? Whose proposal is it?

Mr. Perinbam: Mr. Chairman, the idea has not been put forward formally. It was Mr. Walker who was asked by the Brandt commission to assist in formulating some ideas relating to the non-governmental sector and therefore he put that in the proposals that were embodied in the second Brandt report, *Common Crisis*.

Mrs. Appolloni: Could I ask a supplementary question, please? This centre that you are referring to, is it the same establishment that the Secretary of State, Mr. MacEachen, commented on on March 29, some kind of Third World foundation, or is this something different?

Mr. Perinbam: No, this would be something quite different.

Mrs. Appolloni: Thank you.

Mr. Ogle: Could I suggest again, at this point, that I could not agree more with what Mr. Perinbam says. Non-governmental organizations must be involved, naturally and very necessarily, in the preparation of something like that. But could I also suggest that CIDA might make this a kind of priority? In our studies on the north-south and in our studies on Latin America, and so on, it became almost a common piece of information, as you are aware from the reports, as to the effectiveness of non-governmental organizations. If an international facility would further improve that possibility, I think it should be seriously looked at. If, on the other hand, it may complicate and stop that kind of human-development type of thing, it should not be used. I would suggest to CIDA that that become a kind of priority, to see the possibilities of that. I think there is a good basis on which to talk about it, now that the grant people have put it in as a possibility.

My final question is on another theme. Yesterday, as you probably are aware, the Mennonite Central Committee had four people from Viet Nam visiting Ottawa. The Mennonite Central Committee, I think I can say without any fear of contradiction, is one of the Canadian-American NGOs that does really effective work around the world. They stayed in Viet Nam after the war for awhile; their people did not come out, as you probably know.

[Traduction]

mon avis, cette idée mérite une étude très attentive, mais je crois qu'il est extrêmement important de faire participer les organisations non gouvernementales internationales et nationales à ce genre de discussions afin qu'on voit ce qu'elles peuvent faire de plus plutôt que de les remplacer ou de les faire entrer en concurrence ou en conflit avec une nouvelle structure. Enfin, d'après mes rencontres et mes discussions, je crois qu'il est certainement possible d'étudier cette idée, et je crois qu'elle mérite d'ailleurs qu'on s'y arrête.

M. McLean: Monsieur le président, qui a proposé cette idée dans vos discussions? De qui est cette proposition?

M. Perinbam: Monsieur le président, cela n'est pas une idée qui a été officiellement présentée. A la demande de la Commission Brandt, qui voulait qu'on l'aide à formuler certaines idées ayant trait au secteur non gouvernemental, M. Walker a inscrit cette proposition parmi les autres qui constituaient le second rapport Brandt, intitulé *Common Crisis*. (Cause commune).

Mme Appolloni: Puis-je poser une question supplémentaire, s'il vous plaît? Le centre auquel vous faites allusion est-il le même que celui mentionné par le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, M. MacEachen, le 29 mars, c'est-à-dire une espèce de fondation du Tiers-Monde, ou est-ce quelque chose de différent?

M. Perinbam: Non, ce serait quelque chose de très différent.

Mme Appolloni: Merci.

M. Ogle: J'aimerais préciser que je suis tout à fait d'accord avec M. Perinbam lorsqu'il dit que les organisations non gouvernementales doivent participer à l'élaboration d'un projet semblable, cela est naturel et très nécessaire. Cela dit, puis-je également proposer que l'ACDI en fasse une priorité? En effet, lors des études que nous avons effectuées sur les relations nord-sud et sur l'Amérique latine, etc., un fait a presque toujours ressorti, et vous avez dû certainement vous en rendre compte si vous avez lu les rapports, il s'agit de l'efficacité des organisations non gouvernementales. Or, si un centre international pouvait encore améliorer leurs actions, je crois que sa création devrait être sérieusement envisagée. Si, par ailleurs, son existence risque de compliquer et d'arrêter le développement humain, alors il ne faut pas le créer. Je propose cependant que l'ACDI fasse de ce projet une priorité, qu'elle étudie ses possibilités de réalisation. Les prémisses nécessaires à une bonne discussion existent maintenant, depuis que ceux qui ont la responsabilité d'accorder les subventions considèrent le projet comme une possibilité.

Ma dernière question porte sur autre chose. Vous n'ignorez probablement pas qu'hier, le *Mennonite Central Committee* (Comité central Mennonite) était accompagné de quatre Viet-Namiens en visite à Ottawa. Je crois que tout le monde conviendra que le *Mennonite Central Committee* (Comité central Mennonite), organisation non gouvernementale canado-américaine est très efficace dans le monde. Ses membres sont restés au Viet-Nam quelque temps après la

[Text]

They still have a program going on, a related program to Viet Nam, not specifically administered by Mennonite Central Committee people, if I understand it properly, but through other groups they have found in Viet Nam. I know that they do not get parallel funding, or they do not get equal funding from CIDA. Is there any way in which CIDA could find a way to support initiatives like that? From what I could gather, the human situation in Viet Nam—and I appreciate the complicated political thing and war and all that stuff that is still going on—is really requiring aid. Is there any way now in which Canada can do something there?

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, in response to the hon. member, the kinds of initiatives that are being undertaken by the Mennonite Central Committee and others, as you know, are sponsored in many cases by CIDA. CIDA is involved in sponsoring activities of this kind. The difficulty in this particular context is the locale, or the country, namely Viet Nam.

• 1150

As the hon. member may know, there are several countries that are specifically excluded from the receipt of Canadian official development assistance, whether it be through our bilateral program, or whether it be through our support of Canadian non-governmental organizations or institutions for their programs abroad. The only response I can give, therefore, at this time to the hon. member, would be to say that it would have to be reviewed at a higher level with regard to any possibility, but I am not optimistic that the government would have a favourable response to such a suggestion at this time.

May I, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, with regard to the first question from the hon. member, I think basically my reply with regard to the particular case that I was generally aware of in Pakistan is accurate. We provided some equipment and some training, some of which may lead to drilling later on, although we ourselves are not directly involved in that aspect of it. I have also been advised by some of my colleagues that we are involved from time to time in geological surveys, which in some cases may lead to ground follow-up for petroleum.

Perhaps I might, if you will permit me, just add a very brief word that the Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation, as hon. members are aware, is a relatively new organization and CIDA has been in business for some years. We are working out with them as they gain their expertise in areas of complementarity and of jurisdiction, if you will, between the two organizations. That is just being worked out at the present time.

Mr. Ogle: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Father Ogle.

S'il vous plaît, monsieur Dupras.

Mr. Dupras: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome back to Ottawa. Perhaps it will improve the weather if you stay a little longer. Let me join my colleagues and tell you that your

[Translation]

guerre; vous n'ignorez probablement pas qu'ils n'en sont pas sortis.

Or, ce comité, par l'entremise d'autres groupes fondés au Viet-Nam, administre encore un programme dans ce pays. Il ne reçoit cependant aucun financement parallèle, ni de financement concurrentiel de la part de l'ACDI. J'aimerais donc savoir s'il y a un moyen permettant à l'ACDI d'appuyer ce genre d'initiative? D'après mes renseignements, compte tenu de la situation politique compliquée du Viet-Nam, de la guerre et de tout ce qui s'y déroule, les habitants du pays ont vraiment besoin d'aide. Le Canada peut-il donc prendre certains moyens pour faire quelque chose là-bas?

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, bon nombre des initiatives prises par le *Mennonite Central Committee* (Comité central Mennonite) sont parrainées par l'ACDI. Notre organisme s'occupe en effet de subventionner ce genre d'activités. En l'occurrence, la difficulté tient à l'endroit, au pays en question, c'est-à-dire le Viet-Nam.

M. Ogle n'ignore probablement pas que quelques pays ne peuvent recevoir l'Aide officielle au développement de la part du Canada, que ce soit par le truchement de notre programme bilatéral ou celui d'organisations ou d'institutions non gouvernementales canadiennes, dans le cadre de leurs programmes à l'étranger. Tout ce que je puis donc répondre, pour le moment, c'est qu'il faudra réexaminer le dossier en haut lieu afin de voir si c'est possible, mais je ne suis pas très optimiste, je ne crois pas que le gouvernement sera favorable à ce genre de mesures pour le moment.

Monsieur le président, si vous le permettez, au sujet de la première question posée par le député, la réponse que j'ai d'abord donnée au sujet du Pakistan est exacte. Nous avons fourni du matériel et avons formé des gens, et cela pourrait mener à des travaux de forage plus tard, bien que nous-mêmes ne participions pas directement à ces dernières activités. Mes collègues me disent également que de temps à autre, nous participons à des expéditions géologiques, ce qui dans certains cas peut mener à des recherches de pétrole.

Si vous le permettez, j'ajouterais brièvement que la Société Petro-Canada pour l'Assistance internationale est une organisation relativement nouvelle alors que l'ACDI existe depuis quelques années déjà. Nous travaillons donc en collaboration avec la première au fur et à mesure qu'elle acquiert des connaissances dans des domaines complémentaires et où nos responsabilités se chevauchent. C'est ce qu'on est en train de faire en ce moment.

M. Ogle: Merci.

Le président: Merci beaucoup, père Ogle.

Mr. Dupras, the floor is yours, please.

M. Dupras: Merci monsieur le président, et soyez le bienvenu à Ottawa. Si votre séjour se prolonge, il y aura peut-être des effets bénéfiques sur le temps qu'il fait. Permettez-moi

[Texte]

vice-chairman did a good job in chairing the committee meetings.

This is a question that interests me, the question of the matching funds by CIDA to the NGOs. We all know that the people of Canada support funding programs, the activities of NGOs. I do not have the figures before me, but perhaps Mr. Applebaum can tell me what the increase was from the year before last and the last year in terms of popular funding by Canadians to the NGO activities, before I pursue my line of thought on this.

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, perhaps before I ask Mr. Perinbam to reply in detail, we are talking about a program of the special programs branch. This includes the support for non-governmental organizations, Canadian institutions, church groups, professional associations, labour organizations. It also includes industrial co-operation, as the hon. member may know. The main estimates for 1982-1983 were of the order of \$127 million. The main estimates for 1981-1982 had been of the order of \$104 million. The increase therefore was of the order, if I read it correctly here, of 22.31%. The allocation in the current budget of 1983-1984 is, I believe, of the order of \$156 million.

Mr. Dupras: Thank you very much, Mr. McWhinney.

I apologize to Mr. Perinbam for having changed his name.

An hon. Member: Both names are friends of Jacques Hébert.

Mr. Dupras: Yes, that is right.

This indicates, then, Mr. McWhinney, the support Canadians bring to the activities of NGOs, and also indirectly to the activities of CIDA and our involvement in international development. The increase of funding for CIDA from the government, if ever it matched that of the popular funding by Canadians to NGOs, would make for a spectacular increase over the funding of CIDA by the government; that if we were to use the increase of the public funding to activities of NGOs as a benchmark—that is if the government was to follow this as a benchmark—it would mean spectacular increases of the funds for CIDA. Nevertheless, this is a reflection on how Canadians perceive our international aid programs, the activities of CIDA and, of course, indirectly the activities of NGOs.

[Traduction]

d'ajouter ma voix à celle de mes collègues pour rappeler que votre vice-président s'est bien acquitté de ses fonctions en votre absence.

Cela dit, la question du financement des organisations non gouvernementales de la part de l'ACDI m'intéresse. Nous sommes tous au courant du fait que la population canadienne appuie les activités des organisations non gouvernementales ainsi que leurs programmes de financement. Je n'ai pas les chiffres devant moi, mais M. Applebaum pourra peut-être me dire quelle augmentation on a observée d'il y a deux ans à l'année dernière pour ce qui est de l'argent donné par les Canadiens pour les activités des organisations non gouvernementales. J'aimerais savoir cela avant de poursuivre.

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, avant de demander à M. Perinbam de répondre de façon détaillée, je précise qu'il est question ici d'un programme relevant de la Direction des programmes spéciaux. Cela englobe l'appui accordé aux organisations non gouvernementales, aux institutions canadiennes, aux groupes appartenant à des églises, aux associations professionnelles et syndicales. J'ajouterai aussi la coopération industrielle, dont le député a probablement entendu parler. Les prévisions de 1982-1983 atteignent \$127 millions. Celles de 1981-1982 s'étaient établies à \$104 millions. En conséquence, à moins que je ne fasse erreur, il y a eu un accroissement de 22.31 p. 100. Pour ce qui est du budget courant, c'est-à-dire de 1983-1984, je crois qu'il est de \$156 millions.

M. Dupras: Merci beaucoup, monsieur McWhinney.

Je m'excuse auprès de M. Perinbam d'avoir modifié son nom.

Une voix: Les deux noms sont des amis de Jacques Hébert.

M. Dupras: C'est exact.

Monsieur McWhinney, cela donne donc une idée de l'appui que donnent les Canadiens aux activités des organisations non gouvernementales, et indirectement, aux activités de l'ACDI et partant à notre participation au développement international. Si la population canadienne donnait aux organisations non gouvernementales des sommes faisant concurrence aux subventions gouvernementales accordées à l'ACDI, cela représenterait une hausse spectaculaire par rapport au financement de l'ACDI par le gouvernement. J'entends par là que si nous achevions l'augmentation des deniers publics vers les activités des organisations non gouvernementales et faisons de la somme ainsi obtenue une cible, cela correspondrait à des hausses spectaculaires des fonds accordés à l'ACDI, étant bien entendu qu'il faudrait que le gouvernement considère cette somme comme une cible. Cela montre néanmoins comment les Canadiens perçoivent nos programmes d'aide internationale, les activités de l'ACDI et, bien sûr, indirectement les activités des organismes non-gouvernementaux.

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What I want to get at is this. I know there is a short list of countries that are excluded; that is to say, CIDA has no

Je veux donc dire que je sais qu'il y a un certain nombre de pays exclus, à savoir que l'ACDI n'offre pas à ces pays des

[Text]

matching funds for activities of NGOs and, as Father Ogle mentioned, Vietnam is one of them. But Canadians who support the NGOs never made a distinction of what countries should and should not be included in these programs. Has CIDA ever tested whether CIDA is on the right track to say that Vietnam and two or three more countries should be excluded from the matching-fund program?

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, in reply to the hon. member by way of profile, if I could use that expression, we have some 99 countries at the present time in which Canadian assistance through CIDA may be operationalized. Some 49 of these countries, in rough terms, are in a category where the level of Canadian activity, either in terms of number of projects or in size of dollar commitment, is not very large and are principally, but not exclusively, through the support for the activities of Canadian non-governmental organizations. There are some seven countries, by decision of the government, that are specifically excluded and are called not eligible, and there are some other countries that are on a list, if you will, of developing countries that are non-recipients. The fact of the matter is that we have projects and programs, directly or indirectly, in some 99 countries; if I may be permitted, Mr. Chairman, we find that more than a manageable load.

On the question of the five or six other countries, I would respond to the hon. member, really, in the same way as on one of the previous questions from another hon. member. This question is reviewed from time to time by the government, and these are the government policy instructions. The operations of Canadian non-governmental organizations in such countries, to the extent that they receive funding officially from a source of the government, does raise certain matters of a diplomatic and political nature, which obviously are part of the decision of the government not to have programs in those countries.

Mr. Dupras: Nevertheless, Mr. McWhinney, we Canadians are distinct from other developed nations close to us. We have accepted the notion of pluralism, and it does not stop at only selling them wheat, but is to also deal with them in many ways. Personally, I do not accept the fact that we would exclude some of these developing countries on the basis of ideology. I think that if the Canadian public supports the NGOs in funding their activities in those countries, I cannot see how the government should exclude these countries in its matching-funds programs since the Canadian public is already engaged in supporting NGOs financially.

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, in reply to the hon. member—and I hope he will accept the sincerity of this reply—I am obviously not in a position to comment on his last question. This is not a decision of CIDA; it is a decision of the government and there are various factors that are taken into account from time to time in the some seven countries where at this point in time we are not allowed to operate.

May I also ask Mr. Perinbam to add a comment to the member's questions.

[Translation]

subventions correspondant aux montants dépensés par les organismes non-gouvernementaux et, comme l'indiquait le père Ogle, le Vietnam fait partie de ces pays. Toutefois, les Canadiens qui soutiennent les organismes non-gouvernementaux n'ont jamais précisé les pays qui devaient pouvoir bénéficier de ces programmes à l'exclusion des autres. L'ACDI s'est-elle jamais demandée si elle avait raison d'exclure le Vietnam et deux ou trois autres pays de ce programme de subvention de contrepartie?

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, j'indiquerais en réponse que d'une façon générale, l'ACDI se fait le véhicule de l'assistance canadienne dans 99 pays. Environ 49 d'entre eux sont des pays où le niveau d'activités canadiennes, qu'il s'agisse du nombre de projet ou de l'importance des sommes engagées n'est pas très importante et est essentiellement, bien que non exclusivement, une forme de soutien aux activités des organismes non-gouvernementaux canadiens. Sept pays ont par décision gouvernementale été spécifiquement exclus et ne peuvent de ce fait recevoir d'assistance. Il y a quelques autres pays sur la liste des pays en développement qui ne reçoivent pas d'assistance. Il n'en reste pas moins que nous avons des projets et programmes, directs ou indirects, dans quelque 99 pays; or, monsieur le président, nous trouvons que c'est déjà presque plus que nous ne pouvons faire.

Pour les cinq ou six autres pays, je répondrai en fait au député comme je le faisais tout à l'heure à un de ses collègues. La question est réexaminée périodiquement par le gouvernement et il s'agit là d'instructions gouvernementales. Les opérations des organismes non gouvernementaux canadiens dans ces pays, dans la mesure où ils reçoivent des subventions officielles d'un organisme gouvernemental, posent certains problèmes diplomatiques et politiques qui font certainement poids dans la décision du gouvernement à ce sujet.

M. Dupras: Cela n'empêche, monsieur McWhinney, que les Canadiens peuvent avoir une politique distincte de celle d'autres nations développées proches de nous. Nous avons accepté la notion de pluralisme et cela ne doit pas s'arrêter aux ventes de blé, bien au contraire. Personnellement, je n'accepte pas que l'on exclut certains de ces pays en développement pour des raisons idéologiques. Si la population canadienne soutient des organismes non gouvernementaux dans leurs activités dans ces pays, je ne vois pas comment le gouvernement peut exclure ces pays de ses programmes de subventions de contrepartie étant donné que la population soutient déjà financièrement les organismes non gouvernementaux.

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, je répondrai, et j'espère que le député reconnaîtra ma sincérité, que je ne puis évidemment donner d'avis sur cette dernière question. Il ne s'agit pas d'une décision de l'ACDI mais du gouvernement et l'on examine régulièrement divers facteurs dans ces quelque sept pays où nous ne sommes pas à l'heure actuelle autorisés à agir.

Puis-je demander à M. Perinbam de compléter ma réponse?

[Texte]

Mr. Perinbam: Mr. Chairman, just by way of a supplement to what Mr. McWhinney has said, there is a degree of flexibility which in collaboration with the NGOs we have been able to exercise, and it is that quite often by financing those activities that we are permitted to do, it releases NGO funds to enter into those territories or areas which for one reason or another we may not be able to do. In other words, a non-governmental agency, for all kinds of reasons, does enjoy a great deal of flexibility, and sometimes credibility, than governments can do. In this way we have, over the years, worked out with a fairly good amount of understanding with Canadian NGOs that by taking the burden where we can take the burden, we are often able to release funds that they can then utilize in their areas of interest. So, in this sense, I think that we are not losing, but we are trying, on our side, to remain within the constraints of government policy and at the same time helping the NGOs to do those things which they regard to be important.

• 1200

Mr. Dupras: Thank you, Mr. Perinbam.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Dupras.

Mr. McLean, followed by Mr. Breau, followed by Mr. Munro.

Mr. McLean: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to continue the focus, which is another aspect in relation to the NGO sector, when we have both the acting president and Mr. Perinbam here. They will be aware that the Minister of Finance removed the \$100 tax deduction for charitable donations in his recent budget and that the Canadian voluntary sector is reeling as a result of the lack of any incentives to their sector at a time when inflation is eating up a good portion of the revenues they receive, and also due to high unemployment there is a sizeable drop in giving.

By not implementing the 50% tax credit, as advocated by the national voluntary organizations, of which the international NGOs play a part, and by simply eliminating the standard deduction, the finance minister in a sense has inhibited the ability of voluntary organizations, including many that we are familiar with around this table. When we think of many of the national agencies we think of OXFAM or CUSO or UNICEF or others, peace and development, the church groups; but there are also smaller, local groups which make a contribution.

I received a copy of a letter, Mr. Chairman, addressed to the Minister of Finance from the K-W Overseas Aid Inc., which reads as follows:

We are discouraged by your decision to eliminate the \$100 standard deduction for charitable donations without implementing the 50% charitable tax credit as advocated by the National Voluntary Organizations (NVO).

[Traduction]

M. Perinbam: Monsieur le président, je voudrais en effet ajouter à ce que disait M. McWhinney que nous jouissons toutefois d'une certaine liberté d'action dans la façon dont nous collaborons avec les organismes non gouvernementaux et qu'il arrive très fréquemment qu'en finançant les activités que nous sommes autorisés à financer, cela dégage des fonds dans ces organismes qui peuvent ainsi pénétrer certains territoires ou régions dans lesquelles nous ne pouvons aller pour une raison ou une autre. Autrement dit, un organisme non gouvernemental, j'ouit, pour toutes sortes de raisons, d'énormément plus de souplesse d'action et quelquefois de crédibilité que les gouvernements. Il y a donc des années qu'il est bien entendu entre les organismes non gouvernementaux canadiens et nous qu'en assumant une partie du fardeau là où cela nous est possible, nous leur permettons de libérer des fonds qu'ils peuvent ainsi utiliser ailleurs. En ce sens, je ne pense pas que nous perdions mais nous essayons de ne pas nous écarter de la ligne gouvernementale tout en aidant les organismes non gouvernementaux à faire ce qu'ils considèrent important.

M. Dupras: Merci, monsieur Perinbam.

Merci, monsieur le président.

Le président: Merci beaucoup, monsieur Dupras.

M. McLean, suivi de M. Breau puis de M. Munro.

M. McLean: Merci, monsieur le président. J'aimerais poursuivre sur la question des organismes non gouvernementaux puisque nous avons à la fois le président suppléant et M. Perinbam. Ils savent certainement que le ministre des Finances a supprimé le dégrèvement fiscal de \$100 pour les dons à des organismes de charité dans son récent budget et que ces organismes souffrent maintenant de l'absence de toute incitation à contribuer à leur secteur alors que l'inflation avale une bonne part de leurs recettes et que la crise du chômage a considérablement diminué les dons.

En n'appliquant pas le crédit d'impôt de 50 p. 100 comme le préconisent les organisations nationales de bénévolat dont font partie des organismes non gouvernementaux, et en éliminant tout simplement la déduction normalisée, le ministre des Finances limite dans un certain sens les possibilités des organismes bénévoles, notamment beaucoup de ceux que nous connaissons bien ici. Nous pensons en effet tout de suite aux organismes nationaux comme OXFAM, SUCO ou l'UNICEF ou encore d'autres, paix et développement, les groupes d'église, mais il y en a également des plus petits, des groupes locaux qui apportent une contribution importante à la société.

J'ai reçu copie d'une lettre adressée au ministre des Finances par K-W Overseas Aid Inc. que je vous lis:

Nous sommes très déçus de votre décision d'éliminer la déduction normalisée de \$100 pour les dons de charité sans appliquer un crédit d'impôt de 50 p. 100 pour ces mêmes dons comme le préconisaient les organisations nationales volontaires (ONV).

[Text]

We understand that the NVO has spent three years formulating a proposal to remedy the charitable donation imbalance in the Income Tax Act. That you have considered only the elimination of the Standard \$100 deduction does not do justice to the NVO.

On behalf of the Board of K-W Overseas Aid Inc., I wish to ask you to implement the full NVO proposal, that would include the introduction of a 50% tax credit allowing donors to deduct half the cost of their donation from their tax payable, rather than their taxable income as now is the case.

I would like to ask Mr. McWhinney and Mr. Perinbam for their views on how they foresee these tax measures as limiting, if not reducing the ability of the aid agencies, such as this local one and other national ones, in the light of what is happening and the increase in funding. I see, for example, one \$78 million figure reflected in the estimates for support of Canadian NGOs; the question as to whether or not the imbalance—what is the level of imbalance from the contributions of voluntary agencies and their ability to match, as has been either on the three to one, two to one, or whatever the formulae have been.

Secondly, on this particular subject, I would like to know whether there have been any meetings initiated by CIDA officials with the officials or the minister in revenue and in finance in order to underline with those departments the significance of the failure of the budget to give any incentives to the voluntary sector.

• 1205

Mr. McWhinney: In reply, if I may, to the hon. member, the first comment I would make is that we ourselves, I think I am right in saying subject to correction, do not have any independent analysis as to the effect on the non-governmental organizations. We do not ordinarily have that kind of data about their organizations and, therefore, we would be heavily dependent on information they would provide to us, which presumably is of the order of the kind of information they have made available both before and after the most recent budget.

The second comment I would make, Mr. Chairman, is that the question of the decisions and policies contained in the budget, as the hon. member may know, are matters of some delicacy, and are matters of policy discussions held, I would have assumed, at the policy and political level rather than at the bureaucratic level.

I think I am at liberty to say that the minister would be aware of the possible concerns of the community—the non-governmental organization community—about these matters; that would be a question I would not be able to answer on his behalf in response to the hon. member.

Third, I would add that to the point raised by the hon. member as to whether or not we have initiated any meetings, the answer is no.

Mr. McLean: Thank you. I wonder if I could then continue this line of questioning, Mr. Chairman. I am concerned about

[Translation]

Les ONV ont passé trois ans à élaborer une proposition pour remédier à la façon injuste dont étaient traités les dons de charité dans la Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu. Il est injuste que vous n'ayez retenu de leur proposition que l'élimination de la déduction normalisée de \$100.

Au nom du conseil de K-W Overseas Aid Inc., je viens vous demander de mettre en oeuvre toute la proposition des ONV, notamment le crédit d'impôt de 50 p. 100 permettant aux donateurs de déduire la moitié du coût de leurs dons de leur impôt à payer plutôt que de leur revenu imposable comme c'est actuellement le cas.

Je demanderais donc à M. McWhinney et à M. Perinbam ce qu'ils pensent de ces mesures fiscales, s'ils ne trouvent pas aussi qu'elles limitent, sinon diminuent, les possibilités des organismes d'assistance comme cette organisation locale et les organisations nationales étant donné la situation actuelle et l'augmentation du financement. Je vois par exemple au budget 78 millions de dollars pour soutenir les organismes non gouvernementaux canadiens; n'y a-t-il pas un déséquilibre? Dans quelle mesure les organismes bénévoles réussissent-ils à avancer les fonds nécessaires pour ces subventions de contrepartie? Est-ce qu'il s'agit d'un rapport de 3 à 1, de 2 à 1, ou d'un autre?

Deuxièmement, les fonctionnaires de l'ACDI ont-ils eu des rencontres avec les fonctionnaires ou les ministres du Revenu et des Finances pour leur souligner l'importance de cette grave lacune dans le budget pour le secteur bénévole.

M. McWhinney: Je répondrai tout d'abord que nous n'avons pas nous-mêmes, et je ne crois pas m'être trompé, analysé les faits que cette mesure aurait sur les organismes non gouvernementaux. Nous n'avons pas en général ce genre de données sur de tels organismes et nous devons donc nous contenter des renseignements qu'ils nous fournissent, à savoir à peu près le genre d'informations fournies avant et après le dernier budget.

D'autre part, monsieur le président, le député sait très bien que les décisions et grandes lignes du budget sont des questions délicates qui sont abordées plutôt dans les sphères politiques qu'au sein de la bureaucratie.

Je crois pouvoir dire que le ministre doit être au courant des inquiétudes que cela peut poser aux organismes non gouvernementaux; mais je ne puis répondre moi-même à la question du député.

Troisièmement, nous n'avons pas eu le genre de réunion que suggère le député.

M. McLean: Merci. Puis-je poursuivre, monsieur le président? Je regrette que l'ACDI déclare qu'elle n'a pas

[Texte]

the statement that CIDA has no independent analysis of what is happening to these international NGOs, and I want to then move to the line of thinking about the structuring of CIDA to really be responsive to what is happening in the NGOs.

Much of the information accumulated now over nearly a decade, through studies initiated and encouraged by the government, has included the voluntary sector, both domestic and international, and is public. But one of the strong recommendations is the need for some intergovernmental mechanism so that whether it be health care, international, or whatever the range of NGOs, somebody is initiating a discussion to see what is happening to the groups as to their fitness or whatever in that sector.

Now one of the questions we have is accountability; as I talk to international NGOs, I find there is a certain feeling from time to time—and particularly if they are regionally located—that there is no real direct mechanism with CIDA except for occasional meetings, maybe annually, and an increasing amount of paperwork to see that they are doing their work properly.

I would like to pose for some discussion and reaction this: Perhaps it is being done, but if it is not being done, there should be a proposal that CIDA begin to use the nationwide offices of the Secretary of State.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear!

Mr. McLean: The department's regional offices—as I understand it as critic for Secretary of State who visits some of these offices, work with voluntary groups in each of the communities—are located there, and have some sense of the life of these agencies. In some cases they are not equipped with large staff; they are not equipped with large infrastructure to make the kind of response as increasingly larger amounts of funding become available; also, there is an increased amount of need in the way of paperwork.

There are two reasons why I feel this network could prove useful to CIDA officials in monitoring the activities and in a sense be able to analyse what is happening. It would cut down, I think, some of the administrative costs within CIDA and the paperwork in the agencies, and see that there is a sense of efficiency available to the public in terms of the expenditure of these funds. It would ensure that the eligibility of NGOs to receive . . . that they are what they say they are. There are a number of questions as to whether or not it is possible in the way CIDA—NGO funding is done for groups on a regional base to set up. If they are good at doing paperwork, the fact that they may be known by Secretary of State officials in the area to be a front group, there would be suspicions of it. There is no mechanism that in a sense feeds this back.

• 1210

So I would like to know what is an outline of the existing procedures for investigating agencies and the delivery of these public funds, particularly to regional or local groups. And

[Traduction]

analysé ce qui arrive aux organismes non gouvernementaux et je voudrais maintenant passer aux problèmes de la structure de l'ACDI pour voir si elle permet de suivre ce qui arrive aux organismes non gouvernementaux.

Il y a maintenant près d'une décennie que l'on effectue des études, lancées et encouragées par le gouvernement, sur le secteur du bénévolat, tant national qu'international. Une des recommandations premières est qu'il devrait exister un mécanisme intergouvernemental permettant, qu'il s'agisse de santé ou d'aide internationale, ou de toute autre chose que font les organismes non-gouvernementaux, d'entamer un dialogue pour voir ce qu'il advient de ces groupes.

Il y a évidemment le problème des responsabilités. Quand je m'adresse aux organismes non gouvernementaux internationaux, je constate que de temps en temps, et en particulier s'ils sont situés dans une région ou une autre, qu'ils ont l'impression qu'il n'existe pas de mécanismes directs de liaison avec l'ACDI sinon pour certaines réunions occasionnelles, peut-être annuelles et que par contre la paperasserie visant à les surveiller ne cesse d'augmenter.

J'aimerais donc que l'on en discute un peu car peut-être que l'on fait quelque chose mais peut-être aussi que l'on devrait envisager que l'ACDI commence à utiliser les bureaux que le secrétariat d'État a dans tout le pays.

Des voix: Bravo!

M. McLean: Les bureaux régionaux du Ministère, d'après ce que mon rôle de critique de l'Opposition pour le secrétariat d'État m'a permis de constater en en visitant certains, travaillent avec des groupes bénévoles dans chacune de ces régions. Ils sont sur place, ont quelques idées de ce que sont ces organismes. Dans certains cas, le personnel n'est pas très important; l'infrastructure non plus si bien qu'ils ne peuvent pas utiliser adéquatement les fonds plus importants qui sont mis à leur disposition; il y a d'autre part toujours davantage de paperasserie.

Je pense donc que ce réseau pourrait être utile aux fonctionnaires de l'ACDI pour suivre les activités et dans une certaine mesure analyser ce qui se passe. Cela pourrait considérablement diminuer les coûts administratifs de l'ACDI et la paperasserie dont sont inondés ces organismes. Les dépenses pourraient ainsi sembler plus justifiées à la population. Cela permettrait d'assurer que les organismes non gouvernementaux sont bien ce qu'ils prétendent. On peut évidemment se demander si la façon dont l'ACDI est organisée permet de financer ainsi des groupes à l'échelon régional. S'ils sont bons à la paperasserie s'ils sont bien connus des fonctionnaires du secrétariat d'État, c'est peut-être un élément. Or il n'existe aucun mécanisme qui permette à l'heure actuelle d'utiliser ces renseignements.

J'aimerais donc savoir à peu près quelle est la procédure actuelle pour examiner ces organismes et la façon dont ces fonds publics sont utilisés, en particulier dans le cas des groupes régionaux ou locaux. D'autre part, peut-on parler de

[Text]

what collaboration or discussions are ongoing about making use of the Secretary of State facilities across the country?

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I might give an initial comment and then ask Mr. Perinbam to provide the details.

I would like to clarify, if there is any misunderstanding from any of the words I used, my earlier response. What I was trying to suggest is that we have an awful lot of information from our colleagues in the NGO communities about their programs, on the basis of the material that they give us related to their projects overseas. But we certainly do not ask for and do not have an awful lot of other information that gives one a total picture of their activities, because a number of them are doing overseas activities as part only of their national activities.

Secondly, I think a clarification needs to be made on international non-governmental organizations, because I believe the hon. member is referring to Canadian non-governmental organizations that are working internationally. We assist those through the special programs branch; but we also through the special programs branch assist international non-governmental organizations that are not Canadian. Therefore, when we use the words "international NGOs", we are referring to those that are international in the sense that their corporate headquarters, if you will, are other than Canadian.

Mr. McLean: Thanks for that clarification.

Mr. McWhinney: So with that clarification, I might ask Mr. Perinbam if he would talk about some of the details. I know our contacts with the NGO's are extensive on projects and programs overseas, on public education facilities; some of these are regional activities, some of them are national, international.

The Chairman: Mr. Perinbam.

Mr. Perinbam: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am not quite sure if I understood all the points that Mr. McLean raised. Certainly we do a very careful job of examining every proposal that comes to us. The first thing we do is to make sure about the integrity of an organization and make sure it meets the criteria we have for funding before we begin any funding process.

I take it that the hon. member might have had in mind some of the public participation groups that are scattered across the country and whose activities are entirely within the country. In those instances also there are two vital elements: one, as I mentioned, the examination of the organization itself, and the second the matching requirement that we make, which usually is a very good way to ensure that government funds are not misused, because when there are matching funds, government funds are pretty safe, especially after we look very carefully at every project.

Now, we certainly would welcome any way that we can ease the bureaucratic burden and ensure that we have access to the

[Translation]

collaboration ou des pourparlers ont-ils été entrepris quant à l'utilisation des locaux du Secrétariat d'État dans toutes les régions du pays?

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, je pourrais peut-être commencer et demander ensuite à M. Perinbam de fournir les détails.

Je préciserai d'abord ma réponse de tout à l'heure. J'essais en effet de dire que nos collègues des organismes non gouvernementaux nous fournissent énormément de détails sur leur programme puisqu'ils doivent nous soumettre une documentation sur les projets qu'ils ont à l'étranger. Toutefois, nous ne demandons pas beaucoup d'autres renseignements qui nous permettraient d'avoir un aperçu général de leurs activités, car pour certains, les activités à l'étranger ne concernent que leurs organisations nationales.

Deuxièmement, je préciserai quelque chose à propos des organismes non gouvernementaux internationaux, car je crois que le député parle d'organismes non gouvernementaux canadiens qui travaillent sur la scène internationale. Notre direction générale des programmes spéciaux leur vient en aide; cette direction aide d'autre part les organismes non gouvernementaux internationaux qui ne sont pas canadiens. Lorsque nous parlons donc d'organismes non gouvernementaux internationaux, nous pensons aux organismes dont les sièges sociaux, si vous voulez, ne sont pas au Canada.

M. McLean: Merci de cette précision.

M. McWhinney: Cela dit, je demanderai à M. Perinbam de vous donner quelques détails. Je sais que nos contacts avec les organismes non gouvernementaux sont très développés pour les projets et programmes à l'étranger, pour les services d'éducation publics; il y a pour certains des activités régionales, pour d'autres ces activités sont nationales ou internationales.

Le président: Monsieur Perinbam.

M. Perinbam: Merci, monsieur le président.

Je ne suis pas certain d'avoir compris toutes les questions soulevées par M. McLean. Il est évident que nous examinons très soigneusement toutes les propositions qui nous sont soumises. Nous nous assurons tout d'abord de l'intégrité de l'organisme qui les soumet et nous vérifions qu'elles correspondent aux critères de financement que nous nous sommes fixés.

Je suppose que le député pensait à certains groupes faisant appel à la participation du public dans tout le pays et dont les activités sont entièrement concentrées sur le pays. Dans de tels cas, il y a également deux éléments cruciaux: d'une part, comme je le disais, l'examen de l'organisme lui-même, deuxièmement la contrepartie que nous exigeons pour toute subvention, ce qui habituellement est une très bonne façon d'assurer que les fonds gouvernementaux ne sont pas gaspillés, car lorsque les organismes doivent fournir également des fonds, c'est une bonne sécurité, surtout si nous avons examiné soigneusement tous les projets.

Il est évident que nous serions ravis de pouvoir alléger le fardeau bureaucratique et accéder aux meilleures sources

[Texte]

best knowledge across the country, whether it is in the Secretary of State's office or in other government offices around the country. As I say, we would welcome any specific suggestions on this.

I should add—and perhaps my colleague, our comptroller, might have something to say on this—there is also now, at the request of the Auditor General, a process in motion to ensure there is co-ordination in the audits of non-governmental organizations receiving funds from the government, especially if those funds derive from different departments, to ensure that there is no double-funding and to ensure that funds are used for the purposes for which they are granted.

So there is a fair amount of co-ordination which is part of the existing process. If we can do anything to lessen the bureaucratic elements of it, to increase the efficacy, then we would certainly be very hospitable to any ideas and suggestions.

Mr. McLean: Let me suggest through you, Mr. Chairman, to Mr. Perinbam, that it would be I think welcomed by some of the community groups, such as the K-W Overseas Aid Inc., which I mentioned. There is a Secretary of State office out of Hamilton. There is a field officer who is dealing with other similar voluntary agencies, dealing with groups on acid rain or whatever the community senses. He goes into the community on a regular basis. There is an office in Vancouver similar to the Secretary of State, dealing with groups. There is a lot of activity on international concerns and local concerns. But many of these groups feel there is no relationship there, when we get into the sensitive area of what is political activity.

When my colleague, Mr. Dupras, raised the question of what are acceptable countries for which, we get into the question of what are the activities that suddenly become designated as political.

• 1215

If one of these groups begins an advocacy, a concern that is then considered to be at foreign policy odds, and there is not someone in touch with them to be able to interpret, and at a distance someone decides suddenly that they are subversive, their funding is cut off because of the nature of the activity they seem to be addressing. Now, suddenly what you have is a whole initiative dealt with without what I would call the question of the integrity of the organization.

I am encouraged to hear Mr. Perinbam—I know from his long experience that he is concerned with the integrity of the organization. I want to suggest that the structures at the moment, I believe, when you get into a debate of this sort, may leave the voluntary agencies highly vulnerable, in terms of someone interpreting what the legitimacy or otherwise—at least being close enough to it to make some judgment. I would encourage him to work in the direction of seeing whether there can be that type of closer linkage.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. McLean: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Traduction]

d'information existant au pays, qu'il s'agisse du bureau du Secrétariat d'État ou de tout autre bureau gouvernemental. Je répète que nous serions ouverts à toute suggestion précise à ce sujet.

J'ajouterais, et peut-être que mon collègue, le contrôleur, aura également quelque chose à dire à ce sujet, qu'à la demande du vérificateur général, nous avons également un système qui nous permet d'assurer la coordination des vérifications des organismes non gouvernementaux recevant des fonds du gouvernement, surtout si ces fonds viennent de divers ministères. Cela permet d'assurer qu'il n'y a pas double subvention et que les fonds sont utilisés aux fins pour lesquelles ils ont été demandés.

Il y a donc beaucoup de coordination dans le système actuel. Si nous pouvions faire quoi que ce soit pour diminuer la paperasserie, augmenter l'efficacité, nous serions tout disposés à envisager d'autres formules.

M. McLean: Monsieur le président, je crois pouvoir dire à M. Perinbam que certains de ces groupes locaux comme le *K-W Overseas Aid Inc.*, dont je parlais, serait très favorable à une telle simplification. Il y a un bureau du Secrétariat d'État à Hamilton. Il y a quelqu'un sur le terrain qui s'occupe d'autres organismes bénévoles similaires, des groupes de lutte contre les pluies acides, etc. Il se rend sur place régulièrement. Il y a un bureau à Vancouver similaire au Secrétariat d'État. Il y a beaucoup d'activités touchant les problèmes internationaux et locaux. Toutefois, nombre de ces groupes estiment qu'il n'y a aucune relation entre eux, lorsque l'on passe au point délicat de savoir ce qu'est une activité politique.

Lorsque mon collègue, monsieur Dupras, a soulevé la question des pays dans lesquels on pouvait avoir des activités, il faut alors savoir quelles sont les activités qui soudain sont jugées politiques.

Si l'un de ces groupes commence à lutter pour ou contre quelque chose qui tout d'un coup est considéré comme contraire à la politique étrangère, et qu'il n'y a personne pour interpréter ce genre de décision si bien que finalement à distance on décide qu'il s'agit d'un groupe subversif, alors les subventions sont interrompues du fait de l'activité qu'on leur attribue. C'est alors que sans qu'on s'interroge même sur l'intégrité de l'organisation, toute une initiative peut ainsi être anéantie.

Les propos de M. Perinbam me semblent encourageants, je sais qu'il se préoccupe depuis longtemps de l'intégrité de l'organisation. Je crois qu'à l'heure actuelle lorsque l'on entre dans ce genre de débat, ce peut être très dangereux pour les organismes bénévoles, il faudrait au moins que quelqu'un soit en mesure d'interpréter la légitimité, ou du moins de décider de la légitimité de ces organismes. J'encouragerais donc M. Perinbam à voir si l'on ne peut établir des moyens de contacts plus étroits.

Le président: Merci.

M. McLean: Merci, monsieur le président.

[Text]

The Chairman: Next on my list is Mr. Breau, followed by Mr. Munro, followed by Madam Appolloni.

Le président: Monsieur Breau, s'il vous plaît.

Mr. Breau: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I must say that I am surprised that some people, and I have heard this elsewhere than in this committee, are critical of the government's proposed change in the budget to eliminate the \$100 automatic deduction for charitable donations. I understand that some people were asking for another change that would have been a tax credit measure, but to suggest that this change will not be a big boon to non-profit organizations in the country is not to understand how canvassing is done. I have been a canvasser since I was about age 10, and I know that most canvassers know very much how the income tax system works.

They are not stupid people. They are very entrepreneurial people, and they will now be able to tell taxpayers that if they do not give any money to a charitable organization, they will not get this automatic deduction any more. This is going to be a great incentive to ordinary people... It will be a great boon to ordinary people. Ordinary people, who normally would not give to charitable organizations because they thought they could not afford it, will realize that they will lose the tax deduction if they do not. So I can understand making political arguments, and to suggest that it would be better to have a tax credit...

Mr. McLean: My argument... let the voluntary agencies make it.

Mr. Breau: Well, I make the same criticism to them...

The Chairman: If I may, the debate budget terminated.

Mr. Breau: But it was raised...

The Chairman: There will be a motion in the House... I am not interrupting you; I am interrupting those who are interrupting you.

Mr. Munro (Esquimaux—Saanich): Wrong committee.

The Chairman: Well, members are allowed to proceed their own way. It is a friendly committee. Leave it that way. Mr. Breau has the floor.

Mr. Breau: Mr. Chairman, I was not commenting at all on the fact that Mr. McLean should not have raised this here, because he is correct that this has a relationship to what we are discussing. All NGOs are charitable organizations. To the extent that they were not having contributors who were low income people, who were not giving over \$100, I think this can be a boon to them. I am not suggesting that I would not like to see a tax credit approach. But to have a tax credit approach, which I would like, one would have to become a lot stricter about the designation of the organizations, because you would not want the loose interpretation of what is a charitable organization now to receive tax credits.

[Translation]

Le président: J'ai maintenant M. Breau, puis M. Munro et ensuite M^{me} Appolloni.

The Chairman: Mr. Breau, if you please.

M. Breau: Merci, monsieur le président.

Je dois tout d'abord déclarer que je suis surpris que certains—et ce n'est pas propre au Comité—critiquent l'élimination dans le budget de la déduction automatique de 100 dollars pour les dons de charité. Je sais que l'on avait demandé une autre modification visant à appliquer un crédit d'impôt. Dire toutefois que la modification apportée n'aidera pas les organismes à but non lucratif montre que l'on ne comprend pas la façon dont on sollicite des fonds. J'en sollicite moi-même depuis que j'ai 10 ans et je sais que les gens qui font ce genre de chose savent en général très bien comment fonctionne le régime de l'impôt sur le revenu.

Ce ne sont pas des idiots. Ils ont au contraire l'esprit d'entreprise et ils pourront maintenant dire aux contribuables que s'ils ne donnent pas d'argent aux organismes de charité, ils ne pourront plus bénéficier de cette déduction automatique. Cela sera une incitation très importante pour les gens ordinaires. Cela va rapporter. Ceux qui normalement ne donneraient pas aux organismes de charité, pensant qu'ils ne peuvent se le permettre, comprendront qu'ils perdraient de ce fait la déduction fiscale. Je peux comprendre donc que l'on puisse préférer un crédit d'impôt...

M. McLean: Ce que je suggère, c'est que les organismes bénévoles puissent s'en sortir.

M. Breau: Ma foi, je leur fais la même remarque.

Le président: Si vous permettez, le débat sur le budget est terminé.

M. Breau: Mais on a soulevé...

Le président: Il y aura une motion à la Chambre... Je ne vous interromps pas; j'interromps ceux qui vous interrompent.

M. Munro (Esquimaux—Saanich): Ce n'est pas le bon comité.

Le président: Ma foi, les députés peuvent procéder comme ils le veulent. C'est un comité où l'on s'entend bien, continuons. M. Breau a la parole.

M. Breau: Monsieur le président, je ne disais pas du tout que M. McLean n'aurait pas dû soulever ce problème, car il a raison de dire que cela est lié à ce dont nous parlons. Tous les organismes non gouvernementaux sont en effet des organismes à but non lucratif. Dans la mesure où ils ne recevaient pas de contributions des couches sociales inférieures, de ceux qui ne donnaient pas plus de 100 dollars, cela pourra leur rapporter. Je ne dis pas du tout que le crédit d'impôt me semblerait une mauvaise formule. J'y serais au contraire favorable, mais il faudrait pour cela que l'on soit beaucoup plus strict sur la désignation de ces organismes, car vous ne voudriez pas que l'on interprète trop largement une telle définition pour pouvoir bénéficier de crédits d'impôt.

[Texte]

[Traduction]

• 1220

Since, Mr. Chairman, this is the first opportunity I have had this year, in 1983, to be in a parliamentary forum where this has been discussed, I want just to say, because I think it is important that we put this on the record, that I am a strong supporter of the Canadian Development Assistance Program, that I am a strong supporter of the administration of that program. While I recognize that any administration should be scrutinized and criticized and analyzed and commented upon, I think it is fair to say we have as good an administration as we deserve for the development assistance program.

I would like the Canadian Parliament and the Canadian government to do more in development assistance. I am of the opinion that we can convince our constituents that it is good for the country and in the interest of the country to do more. I happen to think people who are elected to public office are not only called leaders but really are leaders; therefore, we should not be followers of public opinion, but we should be leaders in public opinion. There is a tremendous opportunity out there among the Canadian people, in my view, to fill that leadership role.

I want to say that the Canadian taxpayer would be willing to do more and the taxpayer should do more in terms of development assistance, because our interests as a nation are bound up with the rest of the world, particularly with the Third World. It is in the political interest, in terms of the future of this country, to develop links with the poorest countries of the world, the middle countries in the Third World, the newly industrialized countries in the Third World, because more and more, unfortunately, the Western World, the industrialized world, will become difficult to manage. I am not so sure that Canada will be able, and I say this regretfully, to maintain within the structure of the democratic, industrialized countries the same proportion of influence that we have had in the past. Therefore, in terms of our foreign policy interest, our relationship with the Third World becomes crucial for the future.

I have a few questions. The first one is to Mr. McWhinney: What is the volume of outstanding loans—I forget what you call them technically—the loans that are the more generous ones? I think there were 10 years of grace and 15 years, then a 50-year repayment. How many of these loans do we have outstanding that developing countries owe to Canada? And what are the terms and what are the technical terms?

Mr. McWhinney: I think I would be better advised, Mr. Chairman, in response to the hon. member, to get a more up-to-date list. The list that I have is the total value of CIDA loans as at December 31, 1981.

Mr. Breau: Okay. But these are not all at the more generous terms?

Mr. McWhinney: No, to be frank with the hon. member, the material that I have is for December 31, 1981, broken down by country and not by type of loan.

Mr. Breau: You can send this to me and maybe to the other members of the committee. And I would like an estimate made by a competent financial analyst to determine what is the real

Étant donné, monsieur le président, que c'est la première fois cette année, en 1983, que je participe à une tribune parlementaire discutant cette question, je tiens simplement à rappeler que je suis un ardent défenseur du Programme canadien d'aide au développement, un ardent défenseur des administrateurs de ce programme. Bien que reconnaissant que toute administration doit faire l'objet de contrôle, de critique, d'analyse et de commentaires, je crois pouvoir dire qu'en matière d'aide au développement nous avons l'administration que nous méritons.

J'aimerais que le Parlement et le gouvernement canadiens fassent plus en matière d'aide au développement. Je suis persuadé que nous pouvons convaincre nos électeurs que faire plus sert les intérêts de notre pays. J'estime personnellement que les représentants du peuple ne doivent pas être seulement des dirigeants en titre, mais en action; par conséquent, nous ne devrions pas suivre l'opinion publique mais la façonner. Les Canadiens, à mon avis, ont une occasion unique de jouer un rôle de premier plan.

Les contribuables sont prêts à faire plus et ils devraient faire plus en matière d'aide au développement, car nos intérêts en tant que nation sont liés au reste du monde, tout particulièrement au tiers monde. Sur le plan politique, notre avenir dépend de la création de liens avec les pays les plus pauvres du monde, car malheureusement, le monde occidental, le monde industrialisé, deviendra de plus en plus difficile à gérer. Je ne suis pas certain que le Canada pourra continuer, et je le dis avec regret, à exercer la même influence qu'auparavant au sein des pays démocratiques et industrialisés. En conséquence, au plan de la politique étrangère, nos liens avec le tiers monde seront un élément fondamental pour notre avenir.

J'ai quelques questions à poser. La première s'adresse à M. McWhinney: quel est le nombre de prêts non remboursés, j'ai oublié le terme technique, le nombre de prêts privilégiés? Je crois qu'ils correspondent à un délai de grâce de 10 et de 15 ans avec un remboursement sur 50 ans. Quel est le nombre de ces prêts que les pays en voie de développement doivent nous rembourser? Quelles en sont les modalités?

M. McWhinney: Je crois qu'il serait préférable, monsieur le président, que j'aie une liste plus à jour avant de répondre au député. La liste en ma possession indique la valeur totale des prêts de l'ACDI au 31 décembre 1981.

M. Breau: D'accord. Il ne s'agit pas uniquement de prêts privilégiés?

M. McWhinney: Non, je serai franc avec vous, la liste que j'ai au 31 décembre 1981, donne le détail par pays, mais pas par type de prêts.

M. Breau: Vous pourrez m'envoyer ces renseignements ainsi qu'aux autres députés le souhaitant. J'aimerais qu'un analyste financier compétent détermine la valeur réelle de ces prêts, car

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value of that loan, because if it is a 15-year loan at a very low interest rate, it is worth theoretically nothing, in my view.

The point I want to make is that if some of them are worth, theoretically, nothing and they do affect the reserve position of poor countries, particularly the poorest countries, why should Canada keep that on the books as a payable by them and a receivable by us? It would only be repaid in 50 years, I believe, in some cases with interest as low as 3%. The appropriation process here may be different, but if it is only that, I think we should write them off. I would like the information as a basis for my argument.

• 1225

My second question is that I would like to know what percentage of the bilateral development assistance program is under lines of credit. You do not have to give me the exact amount, but I would like a ballpark figure.

I take it that under a line of credit that comes under a framework of some kind that is agreed upon by Canada with a country and it goes over a period of years and then the country decides, out of the variety of goods in Canada, what it wants to buy. Is this correct?

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, in response to the hon. member, by way of a perspective on lines of credit, in 1981-82, for which we do have complete figures now, as distinct from 1982-1983, of the \$548 million dispersed by bilateral programs approximately \$102 million, or 18.6%, was utilized for lines of credit. We at present have 24 line-of-credit projects that are operational with a total value of some \$458 million. The number, the value, and to some extent the percentage of bilateral projects represented by lines of credit have been increasing.

The lines of credits are specific projects, principally, I think I am right in saying, agreed to by CIDA and the recipient country for specific commodities, goods or services, as distinct from a general line of credit. I think we have had general lines of credit, but they are relatively small as a type of line of credit. Most of them are very specific. India, for example: oil and gas sector line of credit, mineral sector line of credit.

Mr. Breau: Okay. I thank you very much. I was not aware it was in the letter that was sent to us this morning.

Mr. McWhinney: Some of the information, yes.

Mr. Breau: I do not want what I am going to say to be interpreted as being made in the absolute sense because I think it is an error in the development assistance program to be absolute and to say one instrument is better than the next, or whatever. I think we need a mix and we need a balance because government-to-government relationships are too complex to be simplified and to be absolute about. But I would warn the administrators of CIDA and the government that, while it is acceptable in terms of this balance and this mix that I am talking about to have a line of credit because in some

[Translation]

s'ils courent sur 15 ans à un taux d'intérêt très faible, théoriquement, à mon avis, ils sont à fonds perdus.

S'ils sont, théoriquement, à fonds perdus et s'ils hypothèquent la situation financière des pays pauvres, tout particulièrement celle des pays des plus pauvres, pourquoi le Canada les considère-t-il toujours comme des comptes payables et à recevoir? Je crois que dans certains cas ils doivent être remboursés sur 50 ans à un taux d'intérêt aussi faible que 3 p. 100. Le calcul est peut-être fait de manière différente, mais si tel est bien le cas, nous devrions purement et simplement les éliminer de nos comptes. J'aimerais ces renseignements pour défendre mon argument.

Deuxièmement, j'aimerais savoir quel pourcentage des programmes bilatéraux d'aide au développement se fait sous forme de ligne de crédit. Je ne vous demande pas de chiffre exact, une simple approximation.

Je suppose que le Canada conclut avec un pays un accord de ligne de crédit courant sur un certain nombre d'années et le pays bénéficiaire doit alors déterminer quel genre de biens canadiens il veut acheter. C'est bien ainsi?

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, pour mettre ces lignes de crédit en perspective, permettez-moi de vous dire qu'en 1981-1982, année pour laquelle nous avons maintenant tous les chiffres, par opposition à 1982-1983, sur les 548 millions de dollars consacrés aux programmes bilatéraux environ 102 millions, ou 18,6 p. 100, ont été utilisés sous forme de lignes de crédit. À l'heure actuelle, nous avons 24 projets financés par des lignes de crédit en cours pour une valeur totale de quelque 458 millions de dollars. Le nombre, la valeur, et dans une certaine mesure, le pourcentage de projets bilatéraux financés par ligne de crédit ont augmenté.

Je ne pense pas me tromper en disant que ces lignes de crédit correspondent principalement à des projets précis approuvés par l'ACDI et les pays bénéficiaires pour des services, des biens ou des denrées particulières contrairement à une ligne de crédit globale. Nous avons déjà offert des lignes de crédit globales, mais cela représente une petite minorité. La majorité porte sur des projets très précis. Par exemple, nous avons offert une ligne de crédit à l'Inde pour son secteur gazier et pétrolier, et une autre pour son secteur minéralier.

M. Breau: Très bien. Je vous remercie infiniment. J'ignorais que c'était dans la lettre que l'on nous a envoyée ce matin.

M. McWhinney: Certains de ces renseignements, oui.

M. Breau: Je ne veux pas que l'on interprète mes propos comme étant péremptores, car je pense qu'être péremptores et dire qu'une méthode est meilleure qu'une autre en matière d'aide au développement est une erreur. Un mélange et un équilibre sont nécessaires, car la complexité des rapports de gouvernement à gouvernement interdit la simplification et les prises de position péremptores. J'avertirai cependant les administrateurs de l'ACDI et le gouvernement que, bien que ces lignes de crédit dans un but d'équilibre et de mélange soient une bonne méthode dans certains cas, elles peuvent

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instances it is a good instrument, it can, in my view, work in contradiction with a basic needs approach. In the basic needs approach and in the food and agricultural development approach, the kind of approach that Mr. Wright told us about earlier, is very much the philosophy of the parliamentary task force on north-south relations, where you provide food aid when it can be linked into a food production program. That implies—two examples: basic needs approach and the food aid through food development approach; that link implies a lot of negotiation and it implies bargaining. It implies that you have to look at what you are going to do more carefully than you do under a line of credit. I would warn against that, but I would want Dr. McWhinney to confirm to me that under a line of credit there is, under that kind of instrument, less of that negotiation . . . and therefore can go counter to a basic needs or a link to food production approach.

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, I do not think I could confirm that there is less negotiation. In our parlance, in our terms, a line of credit under our bilateral program is one kind of a project. It goes through the same process of consideration within the context of the country priorities as established between Canada and that country, the same process of discussion with the recipient government, as any other project.

• 1230

Although I do not have the data perhaps to support this, and I am subject to correction by my colleagues, I am not sure that the extent to which one talks about lines of credit . . . —that the linkage with basic human needs is absent. Both in specific cases of lines of credit they are quite often directed, and in many cases of lines of credit they are indirect, through the provision of counterpart funds for basic need projects.

That is just a general comment, and I stand to be . . .

Mr. Breau: But is it not correct that under a line of credit, in most cases—if it be known that there is a line of credit, that there is this framework . . . —sometimes private financing will be involved, will be part of the framework; the first contact with Canada, in fact, for the provision of goods could be with the Canadian supplier, and maybe a financial institution? Therefore you run the risk that you will have put before you a project that is cooked in advance and will not be totally consistent with the development assistance philosophy you may have outside your line of credit. Is that not correct?

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, again I am subject to correction from my colleagues. I would suspect that it is possible that a Canadian firm may have had contact in a given recipient country with another firm, or other firms or institutions, that subsequently may be, in part or in whole, involved with a line of credit. I think I am correct in saying that we have not developed lines of credit to take into account those pre-situations, and the lines of credit are established with the recipient government for specific purposes. If subsequently a Canadian firm benefits from previous contacts that are now covered by that, this is something that happens.

Lines of credit in part, for example, are used, at the request of recipient countries and where they meet other criteria, to

[Traduction]

s'opposer à l'objectif des besoins fondamentaux. L'objectif du développement agro-alimentaire, objectif dont M. Wright nous a parlé un peu plus tôt, est à la base de la philosophie du groupe d'études parlementaires sur les relations nord-sud, qui lie l'aide alimentaire à des programmes de production alimentaire. Ce lien entraîne nécessairement de nombreuses négociations. Il vous incite à beaucoup plus réfléchir que lorsqu'il s'agit d'une simple ligne de crédit. Cette dernière méthode peut représenter un danger. J'aimerais que M. McWhinney me confirme que, s'agissant de lignes de crédit, les négociations ne sont pas aussi minutieuses et que par conséquent elles peuvent contrarier l'objectif des besoins fondamentaux ou le lien à la production alimentaire.

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, je ne pense pas pouvoir confirmer que les négociations soient moins minutieuses. Dans notre jargon, une ligne de crédit dans le cadre de nos programmes bilatéraux correspond à un projet précis. Il est soumis au même exercice de réflexion portant sur les priorités déterminées par le Canada et le pays intéressé, au même exercice de discussion avec le gouvernement bénéficiaire, que tout autre projet.

Mes collègues peuvent me reprendre si je me trompe, je n'ai rien pour étayer cette opinion, mais je ne suis pas sûr qu'il ne soit jamais tenu compte des besoins humains fondamentaux lorsque des lignes de crédit sont accordées. Au contraire, il arrive très souvent que les lignes de crédit, directement et indirectement tiennent compte des besoins fondamentaux.

Jusqu'à preuve du contraire, c'est la situation . . .

M. Breau: Mais n'est-il pas exact que le processus d'octroi de lignes de crédit fait une place au financement privé? Très souvent le premier contact au Canada est le fournisseur canadien de matériaux ou une institution financière quelconque. Il y a ce risque que vous vous retrouviez devant des projets qui ont été conçus sans vous et qui ne correspondent pas entièrement à vos idées sur l'aide au développement.

M. McWhinney: Encore là, je puis me tromper, mais je pense que la situation est celle-ci. Il est possible qu'une société canadienne ait communiqué avec une autre société ou certaines institutions du pays bénéficiaire, qui aient quelque chose à voir avec la ligne de crédit. Cependant, nos lignes de crédit ne sont pas établies en fonction de ce genre de situation prédéterminée. Elles sont là pour répondre à des besoins précis des gouvernements bénéficiaires. Ce qui arrive très souvent, c'est que des sociétés canadiennes profitent après coup des contacts qui ont été établis.

Les lignes de crédit peuvent servir en partie, par exemple, à la demande des pays bénéficiaires et sous certaines conditions,

[Text]

respond to emergency balance of payments situations. I would have assumed that in some of those cases the importing agencies, be they firms, governmental or non-governmental, are probably prevented from proceeding as they wish to because of the shortage of foreign exchange, and when Canada or some other country—and a lot of other countries put in a line of credit—some of those things then become freed up so that the previous contacts are then operationalized . . . —if I can use that phraseology.

I think the main point I am trying to say to the hon. member really is that the line of credit is a specific project for a specific purpose that we negotiate with and after the request of the recipient government.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Breau.

The two last—and I want to be giving to both of them a fair chance, equal time: Mr. Munro and the vice-chairman of the committee.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I am wondering if it is not possible to allow those who may not have had a chance to put questions today to be on the list next time.

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): At the top of the list.

I have a couple of questions. I am just going to put the questions; I am not sure that Mr. McWhinney is going to be able to answer them, because they derive from the letter from Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation, in the main—this letter that I have in front of me. Perhaps Mr. McWhinney might like to have a copy in front of him, in case he can answer some of these questions.

Did I understand him correctly in his opening statement to say there was a \$55 million reserve set aside in one budget or another for the operations of Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation?

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, within the Official Development Assistance framework for fiscal 1983-1984 the provision for Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation is \$55 million.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): That then is up from the \$21 million that is admitted as being the cost of the first year of operation, as listed on page 2 of this letter. So it is \$21 million in calendar year 1982 and \$55 million available for the budget year of 1983-1984. Is that correct?

Mr. McWhinney: That is my understanding. They operate on a calendar year, and the ODA and CIDA operate on a fiscal year. I am sure hon. members, as I, have run into that problem before. Those are the correct orders of magnitude as I understand them.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Is it the understanding of the witness, Mr. Chairman, that one of the objects of Petro-

[Translation]

au soulagement de problèmes urgents de balance commerciale. Il arrive parfois que les importateurs, quels qu'ils soient, gouvernementaux ou non-gouvernementaux, soient limités dans leur action. Il peut y avoir une pénurie de devises étrangères. À ce moment-là, le Canada et d'autres pays accordent des lignes de crédit pour rétablir quelque peu la situation. À la suite de cette intervention, les contacts qui ont été établis au préalable peuvent redevenir utiles.

En résumé, je dirai que les lignes de crédit sont établies en fonction de certains projets précis et à la suite d'entretiens avec les gouvernements bénéficiaires.

Merci.

Le président: Merci, monsieur Breau.

Il y a encore deux personnes qui veulent prendre la parole. Je vais leur accorder le même temps à chacune. Ce sont M. Munro et le vice-président du Comité.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je me demande s'il ne serait pas possible de donner la priorité la prochaine fois à ceux qui n'auront pas eu l'occasion de poser leurs questions aujourd'hui.

Le président: Certainement.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Ils seront les premiers sur la liste.

J'ai quelques questions à poser au témoin. Je ne sais pas s'il aura le temps d'y répondre. Il s'agit surtout de la lettre de la société Petro-Canada pour l'assistance internationale. Je l'ai ici. M. McWhinney en voudrait peut-être un exemplaire pour savoir de quoi il s'agit au juste.

Il a bien fait allusion dans sa déclaration d'ouverture à un montant de 55 millions de dollars, qui aurait été prévu dans un budget quelconque aux fins de la Société Petro-Canada pour l'assistance internationale.

M. McWhinney: Dans le cas de l'aide officielle au développement, monsieur le président, un montant de 55 millions de dollars est prévu dans le budget de 1983-1984 aux fins de la Société Petro-Canada pour l'assistance internationale.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): C'est donc une augmentation par rapport aux 21 millions de dollars qui ont été dépensés au cours de la première année, selon ce qui est indiqué à la page 2 de cette lettre. C'était 21 millions de dollars au cours de l'année civile 1982, ce sera 55 millions de dollars au cours de l'année financière 1983-1984.

M. McWhinney: C'est ce que je crois savoir. Cette société fonctionne selon l'année civile. Pour l'aide officielle au développement et l'ACDI, on utilise l'année financière. Les honorables députés ont dû, comme moi, se trouver devant cette difficulté auparavant. Pour ce qui est des chiffres, je pense qu'ils sont exacts.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Selon le témoin, monsieur le président, l'un des buts visé par Petro-Canada International

[Texte]

Canada International is to contract for Canadian firms and Canadian capital equipment, where capital equipment is used on a project?

• 1235

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, as a general response, that is my understanding, but I am not fully aware of the details. In fact, that information the hon. member has is additional information to my knowledge base, as of yesterday.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I see. Mr. Chairman, I will forgo and I will ask these questions of the author of this letter. There are a number of questions arising out of the letter to which I would like answers, and rather than using the time of the committee and taxing Mr. McWhinney's ingenuity in answering, I will address them directly to Mr. Peter Towe. Thank you.

Le président: Merci.

Madame Appolloni, s'il vous plaît.

Mrs. Appolloni: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that at the moment I will restrict my questions too, because like my colleague, Mr. Munro, I would like to have more time but not at anybody's expense. So perhaps at the next meeting with CIDA...

The Chairman: May I, at this time...

Mrs. Appolloni: May I have the one question?

The Chairman: Yes, but I want to tell you that you might as well get what you can today, because there may be no more CIDA between now and the end of May...

Mrs. Appolloni: I see.

The Chairman: Because next week, as you know, by agreement and well understood, there are two meetings with National Defence, plus an IPU meeting Friday, a report on the Rome conference. The following week there is one defence, and there are only four left after that.

Mrs. Appolloni: In other words, grab the ball while it is bouncing. Okay.

The Chairman: Please.

Mrs. Appolloni: Thank you.

Mr. McWhinney, like my colleague, Mr. Breau, I am in favour of the aims and objects of CIDA. I think it is an excellent institution. However, I have to say that I feel very, very uneasy. Like many of my colleagues around the room, I am just echoing what Mr. Munro just said about this reference to Peto-Canada International.

Frankly, I would not have even thought about it if it had not appeared in a recent CIDA publication, *Energy*, January 1983, which reports that CIDA will be using aid funds of \$250 million over the next four years, and by that PCI will assist in pre-exploration studies, exploration and technical assistance.

[Traduction]

est-il d'obtenir des contrats pour les sociétés canadiennes, les sociétés canadiennes d'équipement, en particulier, lorsque cet équipement est nécessaire en vue d'un projet?

M. McWhinney: En gros, c'est à peu près cela, mais je ne suis pas au courant des détails. La lettre à laquelle a fait allusion l'honorable député contient des choses que j'ignorais jusqu'à hier.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Dans ce cas, je poserai plutôt mes questions à l'auteur de la lettre. Il y a un certain nombre de choses qui m'intéressent à ce sujet. Il est inutile de faire perdre le temps du Comité et de demander à M. McWhinney de faire des tours d'adresse. J'interviendrai directement auprès de M. Peter Towe. Merci.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mrs. Appolloni, please.

Mme Appolloni: Merci, monsieur le président. Comme mon collègue, je vais me limiter dans mes questions. Je voudrais avoir plus de temps, mais pas aux dépens de qui que ce soit. Je vais attendre la prochaine rencontre avec les représentants de l'ACDI...

Le président: Puis-je...

Mme Appolloni: J'aimerais quand même poser une question.

Le président: J'allais vous suggérer de tirer le meilleur parti possible de la réunion d'aujourd'hui parce que les représentants de l'ACDI ne doivent pas revenir d'ici la fin du mois de mai...

Mme Appolloni: Je vois.

Le président: La semaine prochaine, comme vous le savez, nous avons convenu de tenir deux réunions au sujet de la Défense nationale; en outre, il y a la réunion de l'Union interparlementaire vendredi et le rapport sur la conférence de Rome. La semaine suivante, il y a encore une réunion de prévue au sujet de la Défense nationale, après quoi il ne restera plus que quatre réunions.

Mme Appolloni: En d'autres termes, il faut que je profite de l'occasion.

Le président: Si vous voulez.

Mme Appolloni: Merci.

Monsieur McWhinney, comme mon collègue, M. Breau, j'appuie les objectifs poursuivis par l'ACDI. C'est une excellente institution, selon moi. Il y a quand même des choses qui me mettent très mal à l'aise. M. Munro a parlé, par exemple, de Petro-Canada international.

Je ne m'y serais pas arrêté si je n'avais pas lu dans une récente publication de l'ACDI *Energie*, de janvier 1983, que l'ACDI dépensera 250 millions en aide au cours des quatre prochaines années et que PCI aura un rôle à jouer dans les études préliminaires, la prospection et l'aide technique.

[Text]

I am trying to find out what the relationship is between PCI and CIDA. I want to assure myself that there is absolutely no danger of costly and futile duplication. I feel a little frustrated in these efforts, as I am sure my colleagues do, particularly since the new rules of parliamentary reform came and in we are not able to flit from one committee to the other, as we were in the past; therefore it is almost impossible for us to question Mr. Towe whose letter I now have before me.

Now, despite his letter and despite his assurances on page 3 that in developing its program PCI consults extensively with CIDA and other federal departments to ensure that proposals reflect Canada's foreign aid policies and do not overlap with other Canadian government activities, despite that assurance, I do not feel assured.

This \$250 million in aid funds to be provided to PCI, are they going to come through CIDA or through some other source? I wonder what exactly is going to be done with them. And if it is only PCI business, why is it mentioned at all in a CIDA publication? I know you cannot answer these questions very fully and very quickly, but I want answers to them.

This question I am sure you can answer very well, and it is the question of priorities. As far as we know from the 1975 to the 1980 report, the priorities were agriculture, energy and human resources—a very broad description. I am wondering what share of funds goes to each and every one of those areas. But more specifically, I would like to know exactly what is meant by “agriculture”? It could mean a million things to each of us. Does it mean infrastructure to help agriculture or does it mean the delivery of food, or what? In human resources, does it mean training in high technology, or does it mean basic education? What is your strategy for arriving at those?

• 1240

Thirdly—and I will put all my questions together in order to save some time—this Third World foundation, I now understand, thanks to a supplementary, is not the same foundation to which the Brandt report referred, but a different one that was referred to by Mr. MacEachen on March 29, 1983. He said at that time that the recommendation had not come forward, the specific recommendation, but it was on its way. I would like to know if it is on its way now in May; and if so, are we going to have consultations between this committee and department officials? What kind of thing is being planned? I would like as much information as I could get on it, please.

Mr. McWhinney: Mr. Chairman, in response to the hon. member, may I say, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, that I have learned one thing in the last little while, which is not to bite off more than I can chew. But let me try to be

[Translation]

Je suis curieux de savoir quels sont les liens entre PCI et l'ACDI. Je tiens à m'assurer qu'il n'y a absolument pas double emploi. Comme mes collègues, je suis quelque peu gêné dans mon travail, parce qu'avec le nouveau règlement et la réforme parlementaire il est impossible maintenant d'aller d'un comité à un autre. Par exemple, il m'est presque impossible d'aller interroger M. Towe au sujet de cette lettre que j'ai ici.

Malgré ce qui est dit à la page 3 de cette lettre, sur le fait que *PCI*, dans l'élaboration de ses programmes, consulte pleinement l'ACDI et les autres organismes du gouvernement fédéral pour s'assurer que ces propositions reflètent la politique d'aide étrangère du Canada et n'empiètent pas sur les autres activités du gouvernement canadien, je ne suis pas du tout rassuré.

Ces 250 millions de dollars en aide, qui passeront par l'intermédiaire de *PCI*, viendront de l'ACDI ou d'une autre source? Je me demande ce qu'il en adviendrait exactement. Par ailleurs, si c'est quelque chose qui concerne seulement *PCI*, pourquoi cette publication de l'ACDI en fait-elle mention? Je sais que vous n'êtes pas en mesure de répondre entièrement à ces questions, mais je veux savoir ce qu'il en est.

Je vous pose cette question-ci, à laquelle vous pouvez certainement répondre, et qui concerne les priorités. En ce qui nous concerne, de 1975 à 1980, les priorités ont été l'agriculture, l'énergie et les ressources humaines de façon générale. Je me demande quelle est la part qui est allée à chacun de ces secteurs d'activité. Également, je serais curieux de savoir ce que signifie «agriculture» dans ce contexte. Ce pourrait être un tas de choses. Peut-il s'agir de l'infrastructure nécessaire à l'agriculture, par exemple, ou est-ce que le terme s'applique seulement à la production de denrées alimentaires dans ce contexte? En ce qui concerne les ressources humaines, s'agit-il de formation dans le domaine de la technologie de pointe ou alors d'un enseignement de base? Quelle est votre stratégie à cet égard?

Troisièmement, et je vais vous poser toutes mes questions ensemble pour ne pas prendre trop de temps, cette fondation du tiers-monde, dont je comprends beaucoup mieux le rôle maintenant grâce à une question supplémentaire qui a été posée, est différente de celles dont il est question dans le rapport Brandt, mais ce n'est pas la même que celle à laquelle M. MacEachen a fait allusion le 29 mars 1983. À l'époque, il a dit que la recommandation, je veux dire la recommandation très précise, n'avait pas encore été faite, mais qu'elle était sur le point de l'être. Je voudrais savoir où en sont les choses maintenant, c'est-à-dire en mai, et si cette recommandation a été faite, y aura-t-il des consultations entre le Comité et les fonctionnaires du Ministère? Qu'envisage-t-on de faire? Je voudrais en savoir le plus possible à ce sujet.

M. McWhinney: Monsieur le président, en réponse à l'honorable député, contrairement aux apparences, j'ai appris tout dernièrement qu'il ne fallait pas trop embrasser au risque de mal étreindre. Je vais quand même essayer de dire ce que je

[Texte]

helpful on the first question with regard to Petro-Canada International and the linkages with CIDA.

The minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and frequently the President of CIDA, are requested, both by government and by members of Parliament, to make available information on Canada's Official Development Assistance program.

Canada's ODA program is predominantly managed by CIDA, but not exclusively. It includes the following components that are not under, as the acting president, my jurisdiction at the present time: Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation, International Development Research Centre, and the contributions of the Government of Canada to the World Bank and related institutions that are under the responsibility and the votes of the Department of Finance. But CIDA is asked from time to time to provide information on Canada's ODA, because members are interested in our total program, and because international forums are dealing with total flows... —for instance the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development, which deals with total official flows—and so they are dealing with programs that are broader than CIDA.

With regard to the question of duplication, as I mentioned earlier, Petro-Canada International is a fairly new organization. It has already developed a number of projects that are outlined in the letter from Mr. Towe. We have had discussions, I know, with regard to our program in Pakistan, and also with regard to our program in the Caribbean, to make sure there is not duplication, to make sure, where appropriate, there is complementarity. These discussions are ongoing but at a fairly early stage, just because that organization is relatively new in getting involved in the field. What I mean by that is I am not sure if you were to ask me this question a year from now or two years from now whether the decision might have been made that CIDA would gradually bow out of any activities in oil and gas completely, and I am being theoretical now. Those kinds of questions have not been addressed fully because of the newness of the organization.

So at the working level there is contact. In addition, the portfolio of the Department of External Affairs is on—I think the official title is the Board of Directors of Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation. So there are linkages at what I would call the policy level.

On sectoral priorities, the second question the hon. member...

Mrs. Appolloni: Just if I may interrupt for one second. If the money has come through another department, why is it even mentioned in the CIDA publication? That is where the confusion is arising from.

Mr. McWhinney: CIDA is trying to explain, as Mr. MacEachen did in his statement before this committee on March 29, what Canada is doing for official development assistance overall. CIDA is trying to provide that information, because it is the only logical place to provide that information to members of Parliament and Canadian citizens about the totality of the program. It is the largest... within the govern-

[Traduction]

sais en répondant à la première question portant sur Petro-Canada International et sur ses rapports avec l'ACDI.

Le ministre et le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et, fort souvent, le président de l'ACDI se voient demander, tant par le gouvernement que par les députés, de donner des renseignements sur le Programme d'aide au développement officiel.

Ce programme est presque entièrement administré par l'ACDI, mais pas exclusivement. En tant que président suppléant, certaines parties du programme ne relèvent pas de mes services, c'est le cas de la Société Petro-Canada pour l'assistance internationale, du CRDI, et des contributions du gouvernement canadien à la Banque mondiale et aux autres institutions connexes relevant du ministère des Finances. Mais on demande à l'ACDI de temps en temps de fournir certains renseignements sur le Programme d'aide au développement du Canada, parce que les députés s'intéressent à l'ensemble du programme, et parce que les organisations internationales centralisent toutes les contributions—c'est le cas du Comité d'aide au développement de l'OCDE, qui administre des programmes beaucoup plus importants que ceux de l'ACDI.

En ce qui a trait au double emploi, comme je l'ai dit avant, la société Petro-Canada internationale est relativement jeune. Elle a déjà mis en oeuvre plusieurs projets brièvement décrits dans la lettre de M. Towe. Nous avons parlé de notre programme au Pakistan, mais également de celui que nous avons mis en oeuvre dans les Antilles, pour nous assurer qu'il n'y aura pas double emploi, mais plutôt complémentarité. Les discussions continuent, mais n'en sont qu'au début, car, comme je viens de le dire, la société est relativement jeune dans ce domaine. Par là, je veux dire que si vous me posiez la même question dans un an ou deux, si vous me demandiez si l'ACDI devrait complètement se retirer de l'exploration pétrolière et gazière, je ne saurais pas trop quoi vous répondre. Nous n'avons pas discuté exhaustivement de ce type de question, étant donné que nous n'existons que depuis très peu de temps.

Donc, il y a des contacts au niveau du travail. En outre, le portefeuille du ministère des Affaires extérieures... je crois que le titre officiel est le Conseil d'administration de la société Petro-Canada pour l'assistance internationale. Il y a donc des rapports, au niveau politique, dirais-je.

Au sujet des priorités sectorielles, c'est-à-dire la seconde partie de la question de l'honorable député...

Mme Appolloni: Permettez-moi de vous interrompre. Si les fonds viennent d'un autre ministère, pourquoi en fait-on mention dans le rapport de l'ACDI? C'est de là que provient la confusion.

M. McWhinney: L'ACDI essaie d'expliquer, comme M. MacEachen l'a fait dans sa déclaration du 29 mars devant le Comité, la contribution du Canada au titre du Programme d'aide au développement. L'ACDI essaie de donner ces renseignements, parce que c'est l'endroit le plus indiqué pour en informer le Comité ainsi que les Canadiens. Dans l'organisme du gouvernement, pour ainsi dire, nous représentons

[Text]

ment system we have been designated, if you will, as the lead department for Canada's official development assistance. So it is in the information context. Even if you confine yourself to CIDA, if I may say so to the hon. member, it is confusing enough. I understand the confusion that you may have on this, but that is the purpose behind that.

• 1245

Regarding sectoral priorities, I must confess to hon. members that it is one of the weaknesses of our data base at the present time that we do not have the degree of precision on our sectoral breakouts or activities as we would like to have. You asked me about sectoral activities funded by the agency. I would have to answer with regard to three quite different kinds of programs.

I have a breakout, which I can provide hon. members, of our estimated expenditures in 1982-1983, and possibly very rough estimates for 1983-1984 with regard to our bilateral program. In addition to that, however, there are the activities of non-governmental organizations, some of which are fuzzy in terms of overlapping several areas. A project may be dealing with several things, which is a further complication.

Thirdly, indirectly we are involved in different sectors by our support of international financial institutions and UN organizations. I am not sure whether I could get a sectoral breakout from them, but I will try. So I will provide, if the hon. member permits me, what information I can get.

Regarding the particular question of the definition of agriculture as a sectoral priority, it includes, I think I am right in saying, all aspects related to agriculture: production, distribution, and all of those kinds of questions. It also includes what we call rural development. It also includes fisheries and it also includes forestry.

Regarding the third question, which is the Canada-Third World foundation, as the hon. member indicated, the minister did refer to this in response to a question at the meeting of the committee on March 29. Since that time we have submitted proposals—I guess that is the right word—or thoughts or ideas to the minister on this activity. The background, which has been discussed before to some extent, is that the government feels, the agency feels, that there has been insufficient attention in the experience of, say, the last 20 years to the human dimension in development in recipient countries and to the specific priority given to the provision of training, either by arranging for training in the recipient country, in a third country as we call it—another country in the Third World usually—or in Canada or through the provision of what are often referred to as advisers or *coopérants*, who, in addition to doing a particular assignment, are often involved in training as part of their assignment.

We feel that there should be a higher priority given to this activity. We have been trying to assess the best ways of doing this in a context where there are a large number of interested, experienced and capable institutions in Canada—academic

[Translation]

le ministère le plus important, qui contribue au Programme d'aide au développement. Voilà ce qu'il en est pour l'information. Même si vous vous en tenez au rôle de l'ACDI, je dirai à l'honorable député que les choses ne sont pas très claires. Je comprends très bien pourquoi, mais je viens de vous en donner la raison.

En ce qui concerne les priorités sectorielles, les renseignements que nous avons à leur égard constituent le maillon le plus faible de notre base de données pour l'instant, étant donné que la ventilation de nos activités par secteur n'est pas aussi précise que nous le souhaiterions. Vous m'avez posé une question sur les activités sectorielles subventionnées par la société. Pour vous répondre, il faut que je vous parle de trois types de programmes tout à fait différents.

J'ai ici une ventilation que je pourrais vous remettre, portant sur nos prévisions de dépenses en 1982-1983 et peut-être même certaines prévisions très approximatives pour 1983-1984 relatives à notre programme bilatéral. En outre, il faut également prendre en compte les activités des organisations non gouvernementales, dont certaines se chevauchent dans plusieurs domaines. Ainsi, un programme peut porter sur plusieurs choses, ce qui complique davantage les choses.

Troisièmement, nous aidons indirectement certains secteurs par le biais de nos contributions à certaines organisations financières internationales ainsi que par l'ONU. Je vais essayer de demander à ces organisations une ventilation par secteur, que je ferai parvenir à l'honorable député.

En ce qui concerne la définition de l'agriculture en tant que priorité sectorielle, je pense pouvoir dire qu'il s'agit de tous les aspect qui ont trait à l'agriculture, c'est-à-dire la production, la distribution, entre autres choses; y compris le développement des zones rurales, les pêcheries et l'exploitation forestière.

En ce qui touche maintenant la troisième question c'est-à-dire la fondation Canada-tiers monde, comme l'honorable député l'a dit, le ministre effectivement fait référence à cette fondation en réponse à une question qui lui avait été posée le 29 mars à l'occasion d'une séance du Comité. Depuis lors nous avons fait certaines propositions, je pense que c'est le mot exact, bref nous avons porté à l'attention du ministre certaines idées à ce sujet. Les tenants et les aboutissants dont on a parlé avant font que le gouvernement et que la société sont d'accord qu'on ne s'est pas soucié comme on aurait dû le faire, disons, au cours des 20 dernières années, de la dimension humaine du développement dans les pays récipiendaires d'aide, ainsi que de la priorité qui doit être donnée à la formation, soit dans le pays récipiendaire, dans les pays tiers, c'est-à-dire généralement dans un pays du tiers monde, ou encore en mettant à la disposition de ces pays des conseillers ou des coopérants, qui en plus de s'acquitter des tâches qui leurs sont confiées, s'occupent souvent de formation.

Nous pensons que le côté formation doit recevoir une plus haute priorité. Nous avons essayé de voir quels seraient les organismes qui pourraient le mieux s'acquitter de cette tâche; nous savons qu'il y a au Canada un grand nombre d'organismes

[Texte]

institutions, non-governmental organizations—and, frankly, in a context where the administrative wherewithall or base in CIDA would at present not allow for the kind of implementation of such a higher priority that we would like to see, the main reason being that the administration of technical assistance defined to include Canadians serving abroad or trainees in various capacities is extremely demanding in terms of personnel to manage the programs.

So there are a whole series of factors that are behind the possibility of looking at ways and means of having possibly an outside group that might have a larger mandate in this field to implement Canada's activities with regard to technical assistance, broadly defined.

The Chairman: Thank you all.

Next week we have two meetings of National Defence. There are four meetings left. Oh, we have three meetings next week: Tuesday at 9.30 a.m. and Thursday at 3.30 p.m.—9.30 a.m., 3.30 p.m. Does that check with all your books?

• 1250

That is National Defence. The minister will be present to vote.

On Friday the 13th it is a very new but I think important report from the people who stand on behalf of parliamentarians in various organizations, or various meetings, in the world. It is going to be the first time in this committee: Friday morning at 9.30, the honourable Senator Molgat. He is a former Chairman of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. And the delegate who went to Rome will be here to be questioned on the report that will be in your hands on what is taking place in these meetings of the International Parliamentary Union. You have the report already.

By the way, I can tell you that coming back from Finland there was a very furious debate that took place after Rome. In Rome it was decided that next September or October we would go to South Korea. But ever since that time, power plays were being made that we revert and go to Togo. You can imagine who did not want us to go to South Korea. But after healthy and vigorous actions were taken by the Canadian group—that is going to be my report—we stood our decision; we remained firm in our decision, and we are going to South Korea next year.

So that is the kind of discussion that will take place next Friday.

After that, there are four meetings left before the end of the estimates time. So I may ask kindly—I will do that in my usual way, by consultation. It seems to me that Thursday, May 19, the Minister of National Defence will not be here, but we could change May 19 and May 17; what was to take place on Tuesday, May 17 will take place on May 19. I could do that now—call a meeting of the study committee. But if I do not see much disagreement, the meeting of May 17 is scheduled for 9.30 a.m., and the meeting for Thursday is scheduled for 11.00 a.m.

[Traduction]

mes et d'institutions tant universitaires que non gouvernementales ou autres, qui seraient en mesure de le faire, étant donné que dans certains cas l'ACDI ne peut faire face à une telle priorité, à tout le moins pas autant que nous le voudrions, la principale raison étant que la gestion des programmes d'aide technique est une tâche extrêmement exigeante.

Il y a donc toute une série de facteurs qui militent en faveur de la mise en place d'un groupe qui aurait un mandat plus important dans ce domaine, et qui s'occuperait de l'aide technique au sens large fournie par le Canada.

Le président: Merci.

La semaine prochaine il y aura deux séances du Comité de la défense nationale. Il nous en reste quatre. Excusez-moi il y aura trois séances la semaine prochaine mardi à 9h30, jeudi à 15h30, 9h30, 15h30. Est-ce que cela correspond à votre calendrier? Merci.

C'est la Défense nationale qui sera à l'étude. Le ministre assistera au vote.

Le vendredi 13, nous entendrons pour la première fois un rapport très important de ceux qui représentent les parlementaires appartenant à divers organismes ou ayant assisté à diverses réunions dans le monde. Ce sera donc une première pour le comité le vendredi matin à 9h30 lorsque nous recevrons l'honorable sénateur Molgat. Il est ancien président de l'Union interparlementaire. Le délégué qui a assisté à la réunion de Rome sera disponible pour répondre à vos questions sur le rapport concernant les réunions de l'Union interparlementaire, que l'on vous aura distribué. En fait, vous l'avez déjà en main.

A ce propos, au retour de la Finlande, j'ai constaté qu'il y a eu un débat furieux à la suite de la réunion de Rome. On y avait décidé que nous irions en Corée du sud en septembre ou en octobre. Toutefois, depuis lors, il y a eu des pressions pour que nous changions d'idée et que nous allions au Togo. Vous vous en doutez bien que l'on était opposé à ce que nous allions en Corée du sud. Toutefois, grâce à l'action ferme et vigoureuse du groupe canadien, comme j'en témoigne dans mon rapport, nous avons respecté la décision initiale. Nous sommes restés fermes et, ainsi, nous irons en Corée du sud l'an prochain.

Ceci vous donne une idée de la teneur de la réunion de vendredi prochain.

Ensuite, les quatre réunions subséquentes nous amèneront jusqu'à la fin de l'étude du budget. Si vous me permettez, je vais mettre au point le programme à ma façon habituelle, c'est-à-dire, en consultation. Le jeudi 19 mai, le ministre de la Défense nationale sera absent. Toutefois, nous pourrions échanger les réunions du 19 et du 17 mai. Je peux, à l'instant, convoquer une réunion du comité directeur, mais si vous ne vous y opposez pas, la réunion prévue pour le 17 mai aura lieu à 9h30 et celle prévue pour jeudi aura lieu à 11h.

[Text]

There is in the City of Ottawa a great visit of a strong delegation from the Soviet Union. One Michael Gorbachev, member of the Politburo of the U.S.S.R., is visiting Canada mainly for agricultural reasons; he is member of the Politburo, and we have been asked if we are interested in having a joint meeting.

Due to the actual circumstances . . .

An hon. Member: Joint with whom?

The Chairman: With the Senate.

He will be meeting that afternoon with a joint meeting on agricultural matters, but we could have a meeting that morning at 10.30 a.m. We could have a special meeting at 10.30 a.m., Tuesday, May 17. I think in view of the situation of the world, we may at least consider—I do not want to push it on you, but consider it. I will give you all the explanation in writing. The clerk will send you a copy of his biography—what he is here for. He is going to be visiting every province, especially on agricultural matters.

Mr. McKinnon: Mr. Chairman, this seems to be doing everything exactly backwards, if we are going to discuss it here in full committee. Is the steering committee then going to veto it, or are we going to discuss it in the steering committee?

The Chairman: No; if it is too long, I will call a steering committee meeting.

So far what I am asking you is next week there is no change. We have engagements up to the end of next week, by agreement here and in the steering. I am talking now about Tuesday, May 17, and Thursday, May 19. The least we could do here is make the May 17 meeting May 19, if we want the Minister of National Defence.

Mr. McKinnon: I do not think it is of great consequence whether the minister attends or not.

The Chairman: Good. So we know for sure today that there are two meetings next week with National Defence, and I will call a meeting of the steering committee.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): May I contribute at this stage? I am rather reluctant to go along with any notion that just because we have a visiting official from the Soviet Union, we use one of the meetings at this committee . . .

The Chairman: That is right.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): —for that purpose. But the other thing is that I think the steering committee might well consider the notion of having Peter Towe appear for at least part of one of the meetings. It has become quite evident from the correspondence that he is playing a larger part in the external aspects of Canada's energy policy than was ever envisaged by any law passed by the Parliament of Canada. Therefore, I think he should be . . .

[Translation]

En ce moment, nous avons un visiteur très important dans la ville d'Ottawa, c'est-à-dire, une délégation de l'Union soviétique. M. Michael Gorbachev, membre du Politburo de l'URSS visite le Canada surtout pour des raisons agricoles. Comme je vous l'ai dit, il est membre du Politburo, et on nous a demandé si nous souhaitons qu'une réunion conjointe soit convoquée.

Dans les circonstances actuelles . . .

Une voix: Conjointement avec qui?

Le président: Avec le Sénat.

L'après-midi, il assistera à une réunion concernant des questions agricoles, mais nous pourrions nous réunir avec lui à 10h30 le même jour. Une réunion extraordinaire aurait lieu à 10h30 le mardi 17 mai. Étant donné la situation mondiale, il vaudrait mieux y réfléchir, du moins. Je ne veux pas vous l'imposer, mais réfléchissez-y. Je vous fournirai les explications par écrit. Le greffier vous enverra un mémoire sur ce visiteur et l'objet de sa visite. Il se rendra dans toutes les provinces pour discuter des questions agricoles.

M. McKinnon: Monsieur le président, il me semble que tout se fait à l'envers. Si nous commençons d'abord par en discuter au comité plénier, est-ce qu'il incombera ensuite au comité directeur de l'interdire? Allons-nous en discuter au comité directeur?

Le président: Non. Si la discussion s'éternise, je convoquerai une réunion du comité directeur.

Donc, pour la semaine prochaine, il n'y aura pas de changement. Nous sommes pris jusqu'à la fin de la semaine prochaine selon le désir du comité plénier et du comité directeur. Maintenant, pour ce qui est des réunions du mardi 17 mai et du jeudi 19 mai, nous pourrions, au moins, les échanger afin que le ministre de la Défense nationale puisse y assister.

M. McKinnon: Que le ministre y assiste ou non, n'importe que peu.

Le président: D'accord. Donc, nous savons avec certitude que les deux réunions de la semaine prochaine porteront sur la Défense nationale. Entre temps, je vais convoquer une réunion du comité directeur.

M. Munroe (Esquimalt—Saanich): Puis-je émettre mon avis à ce stade-ci? J'hésite à accepter de bouleverser notre horaire simplement parce qu'un fonctionnaire de l'Union soviétique est en visite ici.

Le président: Bien.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Aussi, le comité directeur pourrait envisager d'inviter M. Peter Towe à comparaître durant une partie de l'une de nos réunions. D'après la correspondance, il est devenu manifeste qu'en matière de politique énergétique extérieure du Canada, M. Towe joue un rôle beaucoup plus important qu'il n'était prévu par les lois adoptées par le Parlement du Canada. Donc, j'estime que . . .

The Chairman: Therefore, there are two meetings of the National Defence committee next week. There will be a

Le président: Donc, la semaine prochaine, deux réunions porteront sur la Défense nationale. Le Comité directeur se

[*Texte*]

meeting of the steering committee at a convenient time on Tuesday to decide for the rest of the activities for us this year.

Mr. McKinnon: And the present disposition is to leave them as they are?

The Chairman: Yes.

The meeting is adjourned.

[*Traduction*]

réunira mardi à un moment convenable pour fixer le programme des activités pour cette année.

M. McKinnon: Pour le moment, il est proposé que le programme actuel soit maintenu, n'est-ce pas?

Le président: Oui.

La séance est levée.

APPENDIX "EAND-72"

PETRO-CANADA INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
LA CORPORATION PETRO-CANADA POUR L'ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONALE

Ottawa, May 4, 1983

Dear Mr. Prud'homme,

Yesterday it was brought to my attention that questions were raised by Mr. Ron Stewart and Mr. Donald Munro during the April 21, 1983, proceedings of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence concerning the operations of Petro-Canada International Assistance Corporation (PCIAC). I would like to provide you by means of this letter some initial information on this corporation. I will also ensure that our first annual report, to be released in the next month, is made available to you and your committee.

PCIAC was established in early 1982 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Petro-Canada to act as an arm of Canada's official aid program by assisting developing countries find indigenous sources of oil and gas in order to reduce their dependence on imported oil. All PCIAC funds are counted as part of Canada's Official Development Assistance and are provided by Parliament through the spending estimates of the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources. As well, the corporation reports to Parliament through the Minister.

The corporation is a unique instrument, both on the Canadian scene and internationally. As a subsidiary of Petro-Canada, PCIAC has access to expertise for

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme,
Chairman,
Standing Committee on
External Affairs and National Defence,
Room 265,
West Block,
House of Commons,
O T T A W A

project evaluation and execution, through an operating agreement with the parent company. All PCIAC operations are executed by Petro-Canada personnel with their time and expenses, including overhead, charged back to PCIAC at cost. Much of the work is farmed out to other Canadian businesses, giving them a valuable entry into overseas operations.

In its first year of operations (calendar 1982), with a budget of \$21 million, PCIAC has responded to four of the numerous requests for assistance. The following is a short synopsis of each project approved by the PCIAC Board of Directors:

JAMAICA: PCIAC is assisting the Petroleum Corporation of Jamaica with management services for onshore drilling operations, an assessment of Jamaica's onshore and offshore oil and gas potential and training for Jamaican technical personnel.

TANZANIA: Efforts in Tanzania include the drilling of an offshore exploratory well by the drillship Pelerin, under contract to Petro-Canada, a review of existing geophysical data from the Rukwa Rift Valley, provision of management and operational advisors and training of personnel.

SENEGAL: PCIAC activities include the assessment of the western Casamance basin off the southern coast by evaluating existing seismic data, and collecting additional offshore data, using a Canadian seismic vessel.

BARBADOS: Assistance involves the training of local personnel to assume the operation and upgrading of a small producing onshore oil field and the evaluation and delineation of new onshore resources.

Projects currently under preparation for 1983 and subsequent years include exploration programs in the Philippines, Thailand, The Gambia, Sri Lanka and a regional marine seismic project in the Windward Islands.

In developing its program PCIAC consults extensively with CIDA and other federal departments to ensure that proposals reflect Canada's foreign aid policies and do not overlap with other Canadian government activities.

It has been our experience that despite the recent drop in world oil prices, developing countries continue to be hard pressed to meet the foreign exchange require-

ments of the imported oil needed to secure for them a margin of success in their development efforts. Many less developed countries would be greatly helped with the discovery and development of a small oil or gas deposit. Moreover, since it is part of the PCIAC concept to utilize to the greatest extent possible, Canadian goods and services, PCIAC has been able to respond positively to the current availability in the Canadian oil and gas industry.

I trust this information is helpful to you and committee members in reviewing Canada's Official Development Assistance.

Yours sincerely,

Peter M. Towe
Chairman

Response of the Canadian International Development Agency to questions raised by Mr. Douglas Roche, Member for Edmonton South, during the meeting of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on March 29, 1983.

Question 1

Why should Canadians support a 5 percent increase in ODA (Official Development Assistance) at a time when 1.6 million Canadians are out of work, when bankruptcies have increased to 10,765 in 1982?

The statement by the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, which was tabled at the meeting of the Standing Committee on March 29, 1983, outlines the reasons for Canada's ODA programmes and the benefits to Canada, both immediate and long-term, both political and economic.

Humanitarian concerns are the traditional basis of public support for the Canadian aid programme. In one recent survey, for example, 49 percent of those polled indicated humanitarian reasons as the central basis for giving aid. Closely related to humanitarian motives for aid is the promotion of social justice. Canadian concerns with social justice and the amelioration of the living and working conditions of the poor in developing countries are particularly germane at the present time as developing countries hard hit by the world recession have faced tremendous difficulties in preventing the loss of hard-won gains in the areas of nutrition, health, education and employment.

In recent years there has been increased recognition that peace and stability in the world as a whole rests in considerable measure on peace and stability in developing countries. Adequate rates of economic growth and a suitable distribution of the fruits of economic progress, both of which are measurably affected by the level and quality of aid, play major roles in securing stable conditions in developing countries.

Also given the increasingly interdependent world economy, the economic interests of all countries require developing and expanding economies in the world. Efforts to promote self-sustaining growth in the developing countries will pay dividends in terms of the creation of markets for Canadian raw materials and manufactured goods, as well as the creation of additional sources of supply for tropical products and other goods not produced in Canada.

Question 2

How does Canada's assistance help to create present and future jobs in Canada?

While data are not available which would allow an accurate quantitative assessment of the number of jobs maintained or created through the aid program, some qualitative assessment of the employment impact of the various components of the aid program is possible.

The bilateral program (with a budget of \$657.6 million for 1983/84) makes up about 36 percent of Canadian ODA. About 70 to 75 percent of the bilateral program is spent on goods and services purchased in Canada, with the remainder to cover transportation, and local costs in recipient countries. Purchases in Canada for the bilateral program take several forms and have a significant impact on employment. These purchases include capital goods (including, in particular, transportation equipment, power generation and transmission equipment, materials for farming, mining, water supply and irrigation systems, and construction materials); commodities (including aluminum, copper, asbestos, other minerals and fertilizers); professional services (currently some 1,800 professional service contracts involving over 3,000 person-years of employment) and cooperants involved in implementing projects in developing countries (about 750 at present).

In addition, CIDA employs the services of a large and varied number of firms and institutions as executing agents for bilateral projects. At present, there are roughly 900 bilateral projects, with a total value of \$4.7 billion in terms of CIDA financing over the years. Detailed statistics are not available as to the impact on direct employment in Canada, but the above figures indicate the level of activity involved.

In addition to the direct employment impact of the bilateral program, indirect employment is generated through further orders which frequently follow the aid-generated initial procurement.

Food aid is the second largest Canadian program of direct assistance and makes up about 18 percent of ODA (\$325.6 million for 1983/84). Between 80 and 85 percent of the food aid budget is spent on Canadian procurement, with the remainder covering transportation costs and cash contributions to the World Food Programme. Major commodities provided through the food aid program include wheat, flour, corn, vegetable oils, fish products and skim milk powder. These transfers affect employment in the agriculture sector in a positive way.

Contributions to the International Financial Institutions (about \$350 million or 19 percent of ODA in 1983-84) and other multilateral activities (including funds channelled through United Nations institutions and Commonwealth and "Francophonie" agencies which will receive about \$109.8 million or 6 percent of ODA) also generate significant amounts of Canadian employment. For the IFI's, about two-thirds of our encashed contributions to

date have returned to Canada in the form of service contracts or equipment purchases. The return on other multilateral activities is not known but is of some significance in terms of service contracts for advisors or experts.

CIDA supports the activities of Canadian institutions, non-governmental organizations and professional associations in their international development activities. The budget for 1983-84 for these programmes is \$133 million, or 7.3% of ODA. Although data are not available, these programmes support employment in Canada.

The Industrial Cooperation Programme is designed to support the initiatives of the Canadian commercial private sector. The budget for 1983-84 is \$23 million. CIDA's support for these initiatives has some impact on direct employment, but probably a more important impact on indirect employment. For example, CIDA has provided \$2.247 million in funding to several firms under the Canadian Project Preparation Facility. The known, direct benefits to Canada from these activities is \$34.2 million to date.

The activities of the International Development Research Centre also affect direct employment in Canada. Its budget is \$67.4 million in 1983-84, or 3.4% of ODA. It employs 320 Canadians in Canada and 15 Canadians overseas.

Finally the activities of the Petro Canada International Assistance Corporation affect direct employment in Canada as a large proportion of the Corporation's budget is directed to the provision of Canadian goods and services. Its budget is \$55 million in 1983-84, or 3% of ODA.

Question 3

What monitoring is in place to ensure that Canada's assistance gets through to the poorest people?

CIDA is responsible for a number of development assistance programmes and projects and the majority of these activities are designed to support the objectives of assisting the poorest people in developing countries, both directly and indirectly. The monitoring that takes place depends on the nature of the programme.

CIDA provides financial support to many organizations for their development assistance programmes. A decision to support an organization includes an analysis of its objectives, programmes, and administration to see if these are consistent with Canadian objectives. Once a decision has been taken to support an organization, CIDA then monitors the situation in different ways depending on the nature of the organization and the nature of CIDA's support.

In the case of non-governmental organizations, CIDA is usually in fairly regular contact with such organizations, to review their activities and their request for programme/project funding. Their projects overseas are often visited by CIDA staff in the field or from Canada. There are as well periodic reviews and possibly evaluations of their programmes. CIDA's staff

assigned to a particular country, as well as officials assigned to the Canadian Embassy or High Commission accredited to a particular country maintain an on-going awareness of CIDA supported programmes and projects overseas.

In the case of multilateral technical assistance organizations such as the United Nations, Commonwealth or "Francophonie" institutions, CIDA monitors their programmes on a regular basis. In most cases, Canada is represented on the governing bodies of these institutions. In addition, CIDA undertakes annual programme reviews and also undertakes periodic evaluations of their programmes.

The same procedures apply in the case of Canada's contributions to the international financial institutions. In the case of these institutions, Canada has a full time Executive Director assigned to the Asian, African and InterAmerican Development Banks and a part time Executive Director assigned to the Caribbean Development Bank and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

With regard to bilateral programmes, there are a number of specific monitoring activities which are undertaken by CIDA to ensure that both programmes and individual projects contribute to the achievement of Canada's development cooperation objectives. Each CIDA project proposal goes through several stages during its life cycle. The following are illustrative of some of these monitoring activities during the project life cycle.

During the project identification stage the proposal is appraised by the planning officer to see whether it will contribute to the achievement of CIDA's objectives. In doing so it is necessary to determine the target groups which will be the ultimate direct or indirect beneficiaries of the project. All of CIDA's bilateral projects have specific target groups designated in the design stage of the project.

During the project development stage, all bilateral projects are discussed in close co-operation with the recipient country to make sure that such a project is a priority in its development plan. Detailed "specifications" with respect to the target group are outlined at this stage.

The Plan of Operations for the project agreed to between Canada and the recipient country contains specific reference to the objectives of the project vis-à-vis the target group as well as seeking to clarify who will benefit and who will pay for the various components of the project.

After a project has been approved by Canada and the Memorandum of Understanding has been signed with the recipient government, the executing agency and/or executor responsible for the project (it may be a single co-operant, or a Canadian firm, institution, or government department) is also responsible for achieving the project's objectives.

During the implementation stage periodic project reviews are undertaken to ensure that the objectives will be achieved and that the specific target group will benefit. If it appears that it will be impossible to complete the project as mutually agreed, the project may be terminated or a revised plan of operations negotiated with the recipient country.

After completion or termination, the project is often subject to an evaluation. This review seeks to determine whether the project was effective in achieving its stated goals and usually produces some useful "lessons learned" which are helpful in appraising new requests for similar projects.

During the above stages the project is continuously monitored on a regular basis by the planning and project officers and by the officer in the Canadian Embassy or High Commission concerned. These professionals receive documentation and reports from firms, institutions and individuals under contract with CIDA in the recipient country and may, as required, visit project sites.

Often very large and complex projects have a project monitor in the developing country who is able to identify deviations from plan and to work with Canadian and host government officials to ensure that the project proceeds as planned to achieve its goals.

Question 4

What assurance does Parliament have that CIDA is being run in the most cost-efficient way possible?

CIDA undertakes detailed assessments of the cost estimates for each programme and project it finances. Most of these are reviewed on a regular basis.

CIDA makes contributions to many international financial institutions, and technical assistance programmes of the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and La Francophonie. The vast majority require approval by the Treasury Board and by Parliament. In addition, CIDA undertakes regular reviews and periodic evaluation of the activities of these institutions.

With regard to financial support for the activities of non-governmental organizations, CIDA conducts a thorough review of the estimated costs of each programme or project proposal, many of which receive Treasury Board consideration. In addition to regular reviews and periodic evaluations of these programmes and projects, CIDA also does a major indepth, annual review of the major non-governmental organizations presenting projects and programs. Most of these organizations are responsible to an elected board whose constituency is concerned that their donated, non-governmental funds are being spent in the most cost efficient way possible.

CIDA's bilateral activities cover a wide variety of projects in a wide variety of sectors. These projects are executed either by the recipient countries or by executing agencies acting for and on behalf of CIDA. The costs of related goods and services are acquired through a competitive process and the resulting contracts are subjected to monitoring. In addition, CIDA has a regular, on-going audit plan that includes coverage of bilateral projects.

With regard to the administration of CIDA, the Agency is subject to the regular and special audits of the Auditor General, and the requirements and reviews of the Treasury Board and the Comptroller General. In addition, CIDA has an established, on-going audit programme which includes internal administration. The audit function in CIDA reports directly to the President and Senior Vice-President.

In 1979, the Office of the Comptroller General (OCG) selected the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) as one of several departments and agencies of the Federal Government where management practices would be studied. This study, called Improving Management Practices and Controls (IMPAC), reviewed the financial management practices of the Agency along with the related planning and control procedures upon which the financial function depended.

At the same time as the OCG was conducting the IMPAC study, the Office of the Auditor General was carrying out a Comprehensive Audit of CIDA. The Auditor General's report in the fall of 1979 contained recommendations on major areas of activity in the Agency and in many cases his observations were similar to those of the IMPAC survey, as well as to those of an internal study conducted in CIDA the previous year, entitled the Corporate Review.

Rather than dealing with each of these reports independently, the President of CIDA decided to set up a working group to develop a Comprehensive Agency Management Plan (CAMP) which would respond in an integrated way to the findings of the IMPAC survey, the Auditor General's Comprehensive Audit, and the Corporate Review. The CAMP Plan was approved by CIDA management and the Comptroller General in 1980.

The CAMP Plan was originally composed of 116 projects; about two-thirds of these have now been completed or incorporated into other projects. Of course, since we regard the CAMP as a dynamic process, some newer projects have been articulated and added to the Plan since its inception. At this moment we have 40 projects still active.

The Auditor General has given CIDA positive remarks in his 1981 review of the management practices of the Bilateral Branch, conducted as a follow-up to the 1979 Comprehensive Audit. A CAMP project has been instituted to reform procurement practices and obtain cost savings by encouraging volume purchasing and transportation, and by undertaking a training and recruiting plan to acquire better market expertise. This is expected to save some \$9 million per year in 1982 dollars. A new regulation

requiring pre-audits of private firms' overheads prior to the negotiation of contracts resulted in savings of \$2.75 million in 1982, largely due to a resulting reduction in the average rate of profits allowed in bilateral contracts.

The Agency undertakes periodic reviews of its personnel requirements as well and reassigns person-years internally wherever possible to improve management. During the past two years, some 30 person-years have been reassigned within the Agency.

Question 5

Will it (the Government) concentrate on helping the poorest with more health, water, education and community development programs, or will it be turned into a barely camouflaged promotor of high technology exports?

The Government has stated that the main sectors of concentration of the ODA programme are in agriculture and rural development, and energy, and in activities related to human resource development. CIDA is active in helping the poorest with programmes and projects in the sectors of health, water, education, and community development and expects that there will be increasing support in these areas.

CIDA supports projects in other sectors as well, including high technology. In seeking to ensure that Canadian assistance is effective in the context of self-sustaining development, each project request from a developing country is examined in relation to the country's official development plans and to its needs and priorities, and in relation to Canada's capability to provide the necessary and appropriate resources to implement such a project. One of the major criteria used in appraising projects is to determine, with the recipient country, the appropriate level of technology. The technology should be suitable to that particular developing country's needs and resources, its cultural, social and economic situation, its ability to use the technology effectively, and its capacity to maintain the system or equipment involved. What may be appropriate technology in a "modern" industrial sector may not be appropriate in a "traditional" rural, subsistence farming or nomadic agricultural sector. Each country, each region and each sector is unique in terms of its objectives and the target population.

Question 6

Why does CIDA not switch a large part of its bilateral program to lines of credit, under which a designated country would be able to use those Canadian goods and services it really needs, rather than having unwanted projects foisted on it by Canadian officials?

A line of credit is one of about 20 different types of transfer instruments which may be used to deliver Canadian ODA to developing countries. Other examples of transfer instruments include various kinds of

bilateral projects, assistance provided through multilateral agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) or a regional development bank, cooperation with Canadian and International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), balance of payments support, etc... Lines of credit are tied to the procurement of goods and services in Canada to meet the recipient's developmental needs.

When CIDA is considering a request for development cooperation the program manager concerned seeks the most effective and efficient transfer mechanism to achieve Canada's objectives in that country. Like any other request for development assistance, proposals involving a line of credit must meet the normal criteria for Canadian ODA. Each type of transfer mechanism has its own unique advantages and disadvantages and its appropriateness depends on the circumstances in the country concerned, the form of assistance required, the objectives of the proposed project or program, the economic or social sector concerned, the target group, etc... Lines of credit represented about 18.6% (\$102 million) of the \$548 million bilateral (government-to-government) ODA disbursements in FY 1981-82. Currently, there are 24 operational lines of credit with a total value of \$458.6 million. The number and value of lines of credit have increased over the past two years, as has the proportion of bilateral assistance represented by this activity.

Question 7

Why does CIDA not trim its overly centralized staff - 1062 of the total 1134 are in CIDA headquarters - and cut its administrative costs which have reached an all time high of nearly \$60 million?

These figures need clarification. CIDA has 1062 authorized person-years and these relate to headquarters personnel located in Canada. However, aid administration overseas is covered in two ways:

- (a) in terms of public officials, there are between 150-175 person-years overseas in Canadian missions under the responsibility of the Department of External Affairs to assist with the management of CIDA's programmes; and
- (b) CIDA implements its development assistance programmes through support to other institutions and organizations for their programmes and projects, and through contracts and other agreements with Canadian firms, institutions, and governmental bodies to act as executing agents for bilateral projects.

It is estimated that it costs the Government between two and three times as much to maintain an employee overseas as it does in Canada and this is one factor which has to be taken into account in assessing the cost-effectiveness of managing CIDA's programmes.

Finally, CIDA's administration costs in relation to CIDA's total budget were 4.1% in 1982-83, and 4.0% in 1983-84.

APPENDICE "EAND-72"

PETRO-CANADA INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE CORPORATION
LA CORPORATION PETRO-CANADA POUR L'ASSISTANCE INTERNATIONALE

Ottawa, le 5 mai, 1983

Cher monsieur Prud'homme,

J'ai appris hier que Monsieur Ron Stewart et Monsieur Donald Munro, membres de votre comité parlementaire, ont posé des questions concernant les activités de la Corporation Petro-Canada pour l'assistance internationale (PCI). En tant que président du conseil, j'aimerais vous transmettre par l'entremise de cette lettre quelques renseignements préliminaires sur cette corporation. Je me ferai un devoir de vous fournir, à vous et aux membres de votre comité, des copies de notre premier rapport annuel qui sera complété dans les prochaines semaines.

PCI a été créé au début de l'année 1982 en tant que filiale à part entière de Petro-Canada et agit directement en tant que fournisseur d'aide canadienne aux pays en voie de développement, afin de promouvoir la découverte de sources nouvelles de pétrole et de gaz qui pourront réduire leur dépendance à l'égard du pétrole importé. Les fonds de PCI font partie de l'aide publique au développement accordée par le Canada, et figurent dans le budget de dépenses du Ministre de l'Energie, des Mines et des Ressources, soumis à l'approbation du Parlement. De plus, la corporation répond devant le Parlement par l'entremise de ce même ministre.

La corporation est une initiative unique tant sur la scène canadienne qu'internationale. Du point de vue de son fonctionnement, PCI, à titre de filiale à part

M. Marcel Prud'homme,
Président,Comité permanent des Affaires extérieures
et de la Défense nationale,

Pièce 265,

Edifice de l'ouest,

Chambres des Communes,

O T T A W A

entière de Petro-Canada, peut puiser à même les connaissances et les ressources de la société nationale pétrolière pour l'évaluation et la mise en oeuvre de ces projets de coopération internationale. Les travaux de PCI sont effectués par l'entremise du personnel de Petro-Canada, et ce conformément aux principes de la récupération des coûts sans bénéfices. La plupart des contrats sont alloués au secteur privé canadien, favorisant ainsi son expansion internationale.

Durant la première année de son fonctionnement, c'est-à-dire 1982, PCI, doté d'un fonds de \$21 millions, a répondu à quatre des nombreuses demandes officielles d'aide. Les éléments principaux des projets approuvés par le Conseil d'administration de PCI sont résumés ci-dessous.

JAMAÏQUE: PCI fournit à la Petroleum Corporation of Jamaica des services en gestion pour le forage. Une autre partie importante du projet comprend une évaluation du potentiel en hydrocarbures, autant "l'on-shore" que "l'off-shore". PCI apporte aussi une assistance technique pour la formation du personnel local.

TANZANIE: En plus de fournir des conseils d'ordre technique et administratif et d'offrir une formation au personnel local, PCI procède au forage d'un puits d'exploration au large de la côte de la Tanzanie, en utilisant le navire de forage Pelerin, sous contrat pour Petro-Canada. Une autre partie importante du programme comprend des levés gravimétriques dans un fossé d'effondrement situé entre les lacs Rukwa et Usangu.

SENEGAL: PCI entreprend des levés sismiques au large de la côte de Sénégal à l'aide d'un navire sismique canadien, et fournit l'évaluation de données provenant d'autres levés effectués dans le bassin de Casamance.

BARBADE: PCI fournit au personnel local la formation requise pour exploiter et améliorer le champs de pétrole situé su l'île. PCI évalue également le potentiel de l'île en hydrocarbures grâce au forage de puits de délinéation.

D'autres projets d'exploration aux Philippines, en Thaïlande, en Gambie et au Sri Lanka sont en élaboration. Un projet régional de levés sismiques au large des côtes des îles Sous-le-Vent est également en préparation.

Lors de l'élaboration de son programme, PCI travaille en étroite collaboration avec l'ACDI et avec

plusieurs ministères. Deux raisons principales expliquent cet état de fait. D'une part, la corporation doit traiter les propositions d'assistance au développement conformément à la politique canadienne à cet égard et, d'autre part, elle doit s'assurer que ces projets ne chevauchent pas les activités du gouvernement canadien dans ce domaine.

Nous avons constaté que les importations pétrolières des pays en voie de développement drainent rapidement leurs réserves en devises, et ce malgré le fléchissement mondial du prix du pétrole. Ce fardeau financier réduit les marges de succès du développement économique dans ces pays. Il est évident que même des découvertes moindres de pétrole et de gaz pourraient être grandement profitables pour les pays importateurs de pétrole. De plus, il importe de noter que PCI, en vertu de son mandat, utilise le maximum de biens et de services canadiens pour la réalisation de ces projets d'assistance, offrant ainsi, à cette conjoncture, des possibilités utiles à l'industrie canadienne du pétrole et du gaz.

En espérant que cette information facilitera la revue de la politique canadienne d'aide au développement par votre comité, je vous prie d'agréer, cher monsieur Prud'homme, l'expression de ma haute considération.

Le président du Conseil,



Peter M. Towe

Réponse de l'Agence canadienne de développement international aux questions posées par M. Douglas Roche, député d'Edmonton Sud, pendant la réunion du Comité permanent des Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale, tenue le 29 mars 1983

Questions

Pourquoi les Canadiens devraient-ils appuyer l'augmentation de 5 % de l'APD (aide publique au développement) à un moment où 1,6 million d'entre eux sont en chômage, où les faillites ont augmenté à 10 765 en 1982?

a) Je commencerai par me reporter à la déclaration faite par l'honorable Allan J. MacEachen, Vice-premier ministre et secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, à l'occasion de la réunion du Comité, le 29 mars. M. MacEachen a en effet souligné la raison d'être des programmes d'APD du Canada et les avantages à court et à long termes qu'en tire notre pays tant sur le plan politique que sur le plan économique.

Permettez- moi d'ajouter les observations suivantes:

b) Le soutien qu'apporte l'opinion publique au programme d'aide du Canada s'est toujours fondé sur des considérations humanitaires. Ainsi, lors d'une récente enquête, 49 % des personnes interrogées étaient d'avis que

l'aide devait avant tout avoir un but humanitaire. Une autre raison, très proche de ces considérations, est la la promotion de la justice sociale. Dans la conjoncture actuelle, les préoccupations des Canadiens en ce qui concerne la justice sociale et l'amélioration des conditions de vie et de travail des pauvres des pays en développement sont d'autant plus pertinentes que ces derniers, durement éprouvés par la crise mondiale, se heurtent à d'énormes difficultés pour simplement conserver les gains acquis à grand peine dans les domaines de la nutrition, de la santé, de l'enseignement et de l'emploi.

Depuis quelques années, on reconnaît de plus en plus que la paix et la stabilité du monde dépendent dans une très large mesure de la paix et de la stabilité régnant dans les pays en développement. Or, la stabilité des pays en développement est conditionnée par l'existence d'un taux de croissance économique satisfaisant et d'une répartition équitable des fruits de l'expansion économique, tous deux étant fonction du volume et de la qualité de l'aide.

Par ailleurs, étant donné l'interdépendance croissante de l'économie mondiale, l'intérêt de tous les pays réside dans le développement et l'expansion des économies du tiers monde. Les efforts déployés pour promouvoir une

croissance autonome dans les pays en développement seront payés de retour grâce, d'une part, à l'ouverture de débouchés pour nos matières premières et nos produits finis et, d'autre part, à la création de nouvelles sources d'approvisionnement en produits tropicaux et autres biens que le Canada doit importer.

Question 2

Comment l'aide du Canada contribue-t-elle à créer des emplois futurs et présents dans ce pays?

Bien que nous ne disposions pas de données permettant une évaluation quantitative des emplois conservés ou créés grâce au programme d'aide, il est possible d'évaluer qualitativement les répercussions de ses divers éléments sur l'emploi.

Le programme bilatéral (dont le budget pour l'année 1983-1984 est de \$657,6 millions) constitue environ 36 % de l'APD du Canada. Approximativement 70 à 75 % de ce budget sont consacrés à l'achat de biens et services canadiens, le reste servant à couvrir les frais de transport et les dépenses engagées dans les pays bénéficiaires. Ces achats qui revêtent plusieurs formes,

influent considérablement sur l'emploi. Il s'agit entre autres de biens d'équipement (notamment de matériel de transport, d'équipement de production et de distribution d'électricité, de machines agricoles et d'exploitation minière, de systèmes d'approvisionnement en eau et d'irrigation et de matériaux de construction), de produits de base (notamment l'aluminium, le cuivre, et l'amiante, d'autres minéraux et des engrais), de services professionnels (soit, à l'heure actuelle, quelque 1 800 contrats représentant plus de 3 000 années-personnes) et de l'engagement de coopérants pour la mise en oeuvre de projets dans les pays en développement (environ 750 à l'heure actuelle).

En outre, l'ACDI fait appel aux services d'un grand nombre d'entreprises et d'institutions différentes en tant qu'agents d'exécution des projets bilatéraux. Pour le moment, environ 900 projets bilatéraux sont en cours d'exécution, ce qui représente de la part de l'ACDI un financement total de \$4,7 milliards échelonné sur plusieurs années. Bien que nous ne disposions pas de données statistiques détaillées révélant l'incidence directe sur l'emploi au Canada, les chiffres susmentionnés donnent une idée de son importance.

Outre les répercussions directes du programme bilatéral sur l'emploi, celui-ci se trouve indirectement stimulé par le biais des commandes supplémentaires qui viennent fréquemment s'ajouter aux achats initiaux effectués dans le cadre de l'aide.

Au second rang des programmes canadiens d'assistance directe se situe l'aide alimentaire qui constitue environ 18 % de l'APD (soit \$325,6 millions pour l'année 1983-1984). De 80 à 85 % de ce budget sont dépensés au Canada, le reste étant consacré aux frais de transport et aux contributions en espèces versées au Programme alimentaire mondial. Les principaux produits fournis sont le blé, la farine, le maïs, les huiles végétales, les produits halieutiques et le lait écrémé en poudre. Ces commandes ont un effet positif sur l'emploi dans le secteur agricole.

Les contributions versées aux institutions financières internationales (environ \$350 millions, soit 19 % de l'ODA, en 1983-1984) et dans le cadre d'autres programmes multilatéraux (notamment les sommes attribuées aux institutions des Nations Unies et aux organismes du Commonwealth et de la Francophonie, qui représentent environ \$109,8 millions, soit 6 % de l'APD) entraînent

également la création d'un nombre non négligeable d'emplois pour les Canadiens. En ce qui concerne les institutions financières internationales, environ deux tiers des contributions en espèces versées à ce jour ont été réinvestis au Canada sous la forme de contrats de services ou d'achats de matériel. Si les retombées des autres programmes multilatéraux ne sont pas quantifiées, elles sont néanmoins substantielles dans le domaine des contrats de service et des prestations de conseillers ou d'experts.

L'ACDI soutient les activités de certaines institutions, organisations non gouvernementales et associations professionnelles canadiennes en faveur du développement international. En 1983-1984, le budget consacré à ces programmes s'élève à \$133 millions, soit 7,3 % de l'APD. Bien que nous ne disposions pas de données à cet égard, il ne fait aucun doute que ces programmes stimulent l'emploi au Canada.

Le programme de coopération industrielle, dont le budget de 1983-1984 s'élève à \$ 23 millions, est destiné à appuyer les initiatives du secteur commercial canadien. L'appui qu'apporte l'ACDI à ces initiatives se répercute, certes, directement sur l'emploi, mais ce sont

probablement les retombées indirectes qui sont les plus importantes. Par exemple, l'Agence a accordé à plusieurs entreprises un financement de \$2,247 millions dans le cadre du Mécanisme canadien de préparation de projets. Jusqu'ici, on évalue à \$34,2 millions les avantages directs que cela représente pour le Canada.

Les activités du Centre de recherches pour le développement international influent, elles aussi, directement sur l'emploi. Pour l'année 1983-1984, son budget s'élève à \$67,4 millions, soit 3,4 % de l'APD; il emploie 320 Canadiens au Canada et 15 à l'étranger.

Enfin, les activités d'assistance de la société Petro-Canada international ont une incidence directe sur l'emploi étant donné qu'une large part du budget de cette société est consacrée à la fourniture de biens et services canadiens. Pour l'année 1983-1984, le budget en question atteint \$55 millions, soit 3 % de l'APD.

Question 3

Quel contrôle avons-nous prévu pour nous assurer que l'aide du Canada parvienne aux gens les plus pauvres?

L'ACDI est responsable de différents programmes et projets d'aide au développement, qui pour la plupart ont

pour objet d'apporter une aide directe et indirecte aux populations les plus défavorisées des pays en développement. Le type de contrôle adopté est fonction de la nature du programme.

L'ACDI accorde un soutien financier à de nombreuses organisations qui travaillent dans le domaine de l'aide au développement. Pour décider s'il convient ou non d'apporter un tel appui à une organisation donnée, on procède entre autres à une analyse de ses objets, de ses programmes et de son administration afin de déterminer s'ils sont compatibles avec les objectifs du Canada. Une fois que la décision est prise, l'ACDI peut prendre différentes mesures dépendant de la nature de l'organisation et de la nature du soutien à accorder.

L'Agence entretient généralement un contact régulier avec les organisations non gouvernementales, dont elle passe en revue les activités et examine les demandes de financement de programmes ou de projets. Elle charge souvent son personnel de terrain ou des agents envoyés du Canada de se rendre sur les lieux de réalisation des projets. Elle procède également à des examens périodiques et, dans certains cas, à une évaluation des programmes. Le personnel de l'ACDI affecté dans un pays donné ainsi que

les responsables des ambassades ou hauts commissariats canadiens se tiennent informés de l'évolution des programmes et des projets financés par l'Agence.

L'ACDI suit de près les programmes des organismes multilatéraux d'assistance technique tels que les Nations Unies et les institutions du Commonwealth ou de la Francophonie. Dans bien des cas, le Canada est représenté au sein des organes directeurs de ces institutions. En outre, l'ACDI procède à un examen annuel ou semestriel ainsi qu'à une évaluation régulière de leurs programmes.

Il en va de même pour les contributions versées aux institutions financières internationales. Le Canada a d'ailleurs nommé un directeur exécutif à plein temps auprès des Banques asiatique, africaine et interaméricaine de développement, et un directeur exécutif à temps partiel auprès de la Banque de développement des Caraïbes et du Fonds international pour le développement agricole.

L'ACDI s'est dotée d'un certain nombre de mécanismes spéciaux de suivi de façon à garantir que non seulement des programmes globaux, mais également les différents projets contribuent à la réalisation des objectifs du

Canada en matière de coopération au développement. Chaque proposition de projet soumise à l'ACDI chemine par plusieurs étapes. Voici en gros comment les choses se passent.

Au cours de la phase de définition du projet, l'agent de planification évalue la proposition afin de déterminer si elle répond bien aux objectifs de l'ACDI. Pour ce faire, il est nécessaire d'identifier les groupes cibles qui bénéficieront directement ou indirectement du projet. Tous les projets bilatéraux de l'ACDI s'adressent à des groupes cibles particuliers désignés à l'étape de la conception.

Au cours de la phase d'élaboration, tous les projets bilatéraux sont examinés en consultation étroite avec le pays bénéficiaire afin de s'assurer que le projet choisi correspondra à un aspect prioritaire du plan de développement de ce dernier. C'est à ce stade que sont délimitées les coordonnées précises du groupe cible.

Le plan d'opération sur lequel se sont mis d'accord le Canada et le pays bénéficiaire mentionne expressément les objectifs du projet à l'égard du groupe cible et précise dans toute la mesure du possible qui bénéficiera

et qui devra assumer les coûts des différents éléments du projet. Une fois le projet approuvé par le Canada et le protocole d'entente signé avec le gouvernement bénéficiaire, l'organisme ou l'agent d'exécution (il peut s'agir d'un seul coopérant, d'une entreprise ou d'une institution canadienne ou encore d'un ministère) devient également responsable de la réalisation des objectifs du projet.

Au cours de la phase d'exécution, on procède à des examens périodiques du projet de façon à garantir que les objectifs seront bien réalisés, et ce, au profit du groupe cible désigné. S'il s'avère impossible de mener le projet à terme dans la forme sur laquelle on s'était mis d'accord, on peut soit y mettre fin, soit négocier un nouveau plan d'opération avec le pays bénéficiaire.

Une fois le projet terminé, on procède souvent à une évaluation en vertu de laquelle on s'efforce de déterminer si les buts définis au départ ont bien été atteints. Cette activité est généralement riche d'enseignements sur lesquels on se base par la suite pour évaluer de nouvelles propositions de projets du même type.

Au cours des différentes phases décrites ci-dessus, les agents de la planification et les chargés de projets ainsi

que le personnel de l'ambassade canadienne ou du haut commissariat concerné contrôlent en permanence le projet. Ils reçoivent de la documentation et des rapports des entreprises, institutions et personnes travaillant à contrat pour l'ACDI dans le pays bénéficiaire et peuvent, à l'occasion, se rendre sur le lieu d'exécution des projets.

Dans le cas de projets complexes de très grande envergure, un responsable se trouve souvent sur place pour déterminer si l'on s'écarte du plan original et veiller, en collaboration avec les représentants canadiens et du gouvernement hôte, à ce que l'on reste fidèle aux buts fixés.

Question 4

Quelle garantie le Parlement a-t-il que l'ACDI est gérée de la façon la plus rentable possible?

L'ACDI vérifie dans le détail les prévisions budgétaires concernant les programmes et projets qu'elle finance, et la plupart de ceux-ci font l'objet d'examens périodiques.

L'ACDI verse des contributions à de nombreuses institutions financières internationales de même qu'aux programmes

d'assistance technique des Nations Unies, du Commonwealth et de la Francophonie. Dans la grande majorité des cas, l'approbation du Conseil du Trésor et du Parlement est nécessaire. En outre, l'ACDI étudie et évalue régulièrement les activités de ces institutions.

Pour ce qui est de l'appui financier accordé aux activités des organisations non gouvernementales, l'ACDI analyse de près les coûts estimatifs de chaque programme ou projet proposé, dont bon nombre sont soumis au Conseil du Trésor. Outre les examens courants et les évaluations périodiques de ces programmes et projets, l'ACDI passe tous les ans en revue chacune des grandes organisations non gouvernementales qui les présentent. La plupart de ces organismes sont responsables envers un conseil d'administration élu qui veille à ce que les dons soient utilisés de la façon la plus rentable possible. Les activités bilatérales couvrent un large éventail de projets et de secteurs. Les projets en question sont exécutés soit par les pays bénéficiaires soit par des organismes d'exécution agissant au nom et pour le compte de l'ACDI. Les biens et services connexes sont acquis selon les règles de la concurrence, et les contrats qui en résultent font l'objet d'un suivi. L'ACDI a également un plan de vérification permanente des comptes qui englobe les projets bilatéraux.

Quant à l'administration de l'ACDI, elle est assujettie aux vérifications ordinaires et extraordinaires du Vérificateur général, de même qu'aux exigences et examens du Conseil du Trésor et du Contrôleur général. L'Agence est en outre dotée d'un programme permanent de vérification des comptes qui couvre son administration interne. La fonction de vérification à l'ACDI relève directement du Président et du Vice-président principal.

En 1979, le Bureau du Contrôleur général (BCG) a décrété qu'une étude serait effectuée sur les pratiques de gestion de l'ACDI et de plusieurs autres ministères et organismes du gouvernement fédéral. Cette étude, intitulée Perfectionnement des pratiques et contrôles de gestion (PPCG), a passé en revue les pratiques de gestion financière de l'Agence de même que les procédures connexes de planification et de contrôle régissant les finances.

En même temps que s'effectuait l'étude PPCG du Contrôleur général, le Bureau du Vérificateur général procédait à une vérification intégrée de l'ACDI. Le rapport qui en est résulté à l'automne de 1979 contenait des recommandations sur les grands secteurs d'activités de l'Agence et, dans de nombreux cas, ses observations s'apparentaient à celles de l'étude PPCG ainsi qu'aux conclusions de la vaste Revue organisationnelle interne menée par l'ACDI l'année précédente.

Plutôt que d'envisager une action distincte à l'égard de ces rapports, le Président de l'ACDI a décidé de mettre sur pied un groupe de travail qui établirait un Plan d'action global de gestion de l'Agence (PAGGA) intégrant les conclusions de l'étude PPCG, de la vérification du Vérificateur général et de la Revue organisationnelle. Le plan PAGGA a reçu l'approbation de la direction de l'ACDI et du Contrôleur général en 1980.

Le plan PAGGA comprenait à l'origine 116 projets, dont environ les deux tiers ont été menés à terme ou incorporés dans d'autres projets. Bien entendu, le PAGGA se voulant un processus dynamique, de nouveaux projets sont venus se greffer au Plan initial. À l'heure actuelle 40 projets sont encore en cours d'exécution.

En 1981, l'ACDI a fait l'objet de commentaires positifs de la part du Vérificateur général lors de son examen des pratiques de gestion au sein du Bilatéral, qui faisait suite à sa vérification intégrée de 1979. Un projet du PAGGA a été mis sur pied pour réaménager les modes d'approvisionnement et réaliser des économies grâce à l'achat et au transport de produits en grande quantité de même qu'à un programme de recrutement et de formation permettant d'acquérir une meilleure connaissance du marché. Il devrait en résulter une économie annuelle de quelque \$9 millions en 1982. Un nouveau règlement exigeant une vérification des

frais généraux des entreprises privées avant la négociation des contrats, a permis de réaliser en 1982 une économie de \$2,75 millions, principalement due à une diminution de la moyenne des profits aurotisés dans le cadre des contrats bilatéraux.

Afin d'améliorer sa gestion, l'Agence effectue des examens périodiques de ses besoins en personnel et des réaffectations internes de ses années-personnes lorsque cela est possible. Environ 30 années-personnes ont ainsi été réaffectées au sein de l'ACDI au cours des deux dernières années.

Question 5

L'Agence va-t-elle s'efforcer surtout d'aider les plus pauvres grâce à ses programmes concernant l'hygiène, l'eau, l'éducation et le développement communautaire, ou va-t-elle, de façon à peine déguisée, se faire le promoteur des exportations de technologie de pointe du Canada?

Le Gouvernement a déclaré que les principaux secteurs de concentration du programme d'APD étaient l'agriculture et le développement rural, l'énergie et les activités liées au développement des ressources humaines. L'ACDI aide activement les plus démunis en mettant en oeuvre des programmes et des projets dans les secteurs de la santé, de l'eau, de l'éducation

et du développement communautaire, et elle s'attend à un renforcement du soutien dans ces domaines.

L'ACDI appuie également des projets dans d'autres secteurs, dont celui de la technologie de pointe. Pour que l'aide canadienne ait un maximum d'efficacité dans le contexte du développement autonome, l'ACDI examine chaque demande de projet au regard des plans de développement officiels du pays en question ainsi que de ses besoins et priorités, compte tenu de la capacité du Canada à fournir les ressources nécessaires à la mise en oeuvre du projet. L'un des principaux éléments de l'évaluation des projets est la détermination, de concert avec le bénéficiaire, du niveau approprié de technologie. Les apports technologiques devraient être compatibles avec les besoins et les ressources du pays, sa situation culturelle, sociale et économique, ainsi que sa capacité d'utiliser efficacement le système ou l'équipement en cause et de l'entretenir. Par exemple, une technologie appropriée dans un secteur industriel ou "moderne" peut très bien ne pas convenir dans un secteur rural "traditionnel" où l'on pratique une agriculture de subsistance ou nomade. Chaque pays, chaque région et chaque secteur est unique quant à ses objectifs et à sa population cible.

Question 6

Pourquoi l'ACDI ne convertit-elle pas une grande partie de ses programmes bilatéraux en lignes de crédit, en vertu desquelles

les pays désignés pourraient utiliser les biens et services canadiens quand ils en ont vraiment besoin, plutôt que de se voir imposer par les fonctionnaires canadiens des projets inutiles?

La ligne de crédit est l'un des quelque 20 instruments de transfert de l'APD dans les pays en développement. Les autres instruments englobent différents types de projets bilatéraux, l'aide fournie par le biais d'organismes multilatéraux comme le Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement (PNUD) ou les banques régionales de développement, la coopération avec les organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) canadiennes et internationales, le soutien de la balance des paiements, etc. Les lignes de crédit sont liées à l'acquisition de biens et services canadiens destinés à favoriser le développement du pays bénéficiaire.

Lorsqu'il étudie une demande de coopération au développement, l'administrateur de programme de l'ACDI choisit le mécanisme de transfert qui permettra de réaliser les objectifs du Canada dans le pays en question avec la plus grande efficacité et la meilleure rentabilité. Comme toutes les autres demandes d'aide au développement, les propositions relatives aux lignes de crédit doivent satisfaire aux critères habituels d'admissibilité à l'APD canadienne. Chaque type de transfert ayant ses avantages et inconvénients, le choix de l'un ou de l'autre dépend de la

situation du pays en question, de la nature de l'aide requise, de l'objet du projet ou programme proposé, du secteur économique ou social en cause, du groupe cible, etc. Les lignes de crédit ont constitué environ 18,6 % (\$102 millions) des \$548 millions consacrés aux apports bilatéraux (de gouvernement à gouvernement) d'APD au cours de l'AF 1981-1982. À l'heure actuelle, 24 lignes de crédit d'une valeur totale de \$458,6 millions sont opérationnelles. Le nombre et la valeur des lignes de crédit ont augmenté au cours des deux dernières années, tout comme la proportion de l'aide bilatérale qu'elles représentent.

Question 7

Pourquoi l'ACDI n'essaie-t-elle pas de réduire son effectif trop centralisé - 1 062 employés sur un total de 1 134 travaillent au siège social de l'ACDI - et de réduire ainsi ses dépenses administratives qui ont atteint un montant record de près de \$60 millions?

Ces chiffres appellent des éclaircissements. L'ACDI dispose de 1 062 années-personnes autorisées pour l'effectif de l'administration centrale au Canada. Toutefois, à l'étranger, l'aide est administrée de deux façons:

- (a) pour ce qui est des agents de l'État, les missions canadiennes à l'étranger sont dotées de 150 à 175 années-personnes qui relèvent du ministère des Affaires extérieures et qui aident à la gestion des programmes de l'ACDI;
- (b) par ailleurs, l'ACDI réalise ses programmes d'aide au développement en contribuant aux programmes et projets d'autres institutions et organismes, et en passant des contrats et d'autres accords avec des firmes et des institutions canadiennes de même qu'avec des organes gouvernementaux qui agissent à titre d'agents d'exécution des projets bilatéraux.

On estime qu'un employé travaillant à l'étranger coûte de deux à trois fois plus cher au gouvernement qu'un employé travaillant au Canada, facteur qui doit être pris en compte au moment d'évaluer la rentabilité de la gestion des programmes de l'ACDI.

Enfin, les dépenses d'administration ont représenté 4,1 % du budget total de l'ACDI en 1982-1983, et 4 % en 1983-1984.



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WITNESSES—TÉMOINS

From the Department of External Affairs:

Mr. William McWhinney, Senior Vice-President and Acting President;
Mr. Arthur Wright, Vice-President, Asia;
Mr. Lewis Perinbam, Vice-President, Special Programs.

Du département des Affaires extérieures:

M. William McWhinney, vice-président principal et président par intérim;
M. Arthur Wright, vice-président, Asie;
M. Lewis Perinbam, vice-président, Programmes spéciaux.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 92

Thursday, May 12, 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 92

Le jeudi 12 mai 1983

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

External Affairs and National Defence

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

Main Estimates 1983-84 under NATIONAL
DEFENCE: Vote 1—Operating Expenditures

CONCERNANT:

Budget principal 1983-1984 sous la rubrique DÉFENSE
NATIONALE: Crédit 1—Dépenses de fonctionnement

APPEARING:

The Honourable J. Gilles Lamontagne,
Minister of National Defence

COMPARAÎT:

L'honorable J. Gilles Lamontagne,
Ministre de la Défense nationale

WITNESSES:

(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:

(Voir à l'endos)



First Session of the

Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la

trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

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Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appolloni

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Pauline Jewett
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Jacques Olivier
W. Kenneth Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*)
Douglas Roche
Sinclair Stevens
Terry Sargeant

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES ET DE LA DÉFENSE
NATIONALE

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Vice-président: M^{me} Ursula Appolloni

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Ian Watson
Robert Wenman

(Quorum 8)

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

Pursuant to Standing Orders 69(4)(b):

On Tuesday, May 10, 1983:

Mr. Skelly replaced Mr. Sargeant

On Wednesday, May 11, 1983:

Mr. Sargeant replaced Mr. Skelly

Conformément à l'article 69(4)b) du Règlement:

Le mardi 10 mai 1983:

M. Skelly remplace M. Sargeant

Le mercredi 11 mai 1983:

M. Sargeant remplace M. Skelly

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, MAY 12, 1983
(147)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:23 o'clock p.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Bradley, Hudecki, Laniel, Lapierre, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Prud'homme, Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*) and Sargeant.

Alternates present: Messrs. Corbett and Darling.

Other Member present: Mr. McRae.

Appearing: The Honourable J. Gilles Lamontagne, Minister of National Defence.

Witnesses: From the Department of National Defence: L.Gen. G.C.E. Thériault, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff; VAdm D.N. Mainguy, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff; Mr. J.R. Killick, Assistant Deputy Minister (Matériel); Mr. L.E. Davies, Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance); Mr. W.R. Green, Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel); MGen. P.D. Manson, Chief Air Doctrine and Operations.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Mr. Roger Hill, Assistant Director.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated Wednesday, February 23, 1983 in relating to the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984. (*See Minute of Proceedings, Tuesday, March 15, 1983, Issue No. 83*).

The Chairman presented the Thirteenth Report of the Sub-Committee on Agenda and Procedure, as follows:

Your Sub-Committee met on Thursday, May 12, 1983 to consider the future business of the Committee in relation to its Order of Reference dated Wednesday, February 23, 1983 respecting the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984.

Your Sub-Committee has agreed to recommend the following schedule of meetings:

Tuesday, May 17, 1983:

9:30 a.m.—10:30 a.m.: Officials from the Department of External Affairs;

10:45 a.m.—12:00p.m.: Special joint public working session with the Senate standing Committee on Foreign Affairs on the occasion of Soviet Delegation visit;

Thursday, May 19, 1983:

9:30 a.m.: The Honourable J. Gilles Lamontagne, Minister of National Defence;

Tuesday, May 24, 1983:

9:30 a.m.: Witnesses to be confirmed;

Thursday, May 26, 1983:

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE JEUDI 12 MAI 1983
(147)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale se réunit aujourd'hui à 15h23 sous la présidence de M. Marcel Prud'homme (président).

Membres du Comité présents: M^{me} Appolloni, MM. Bradley, Hudecki, Laniel, Lapierre, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Prud'homme, Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*) et Sargeant.

Substituts présents: MM. Corbett et Darling.

Autre député présent: M. McRae.

Comparait: L'honorable J. Gilles Lamontagne, ministre de la Défense nationale.

Témoins: Du ministère de la Défense nationale: LGen G.C.E. Thériault, vice-chef de l'état major de la Défense; VAm D.N. Mainguy, sous-chef de l'état major de la Défense; M. J.R. Killick, sous-ministre adjoint (Matériel); M. L.E. Davies, sous-ministre adjoint (Finances); M. W.R. Green, sous-ministre adjoint associé (Personnel); Mgen. P.D. Manson, Chef—Doctrine et opérations aériennes.

Aussi présent: Du Centre parlementaire des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur: M. Roger Hill, directeur adjoint.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 23 février 1983 portant sur le budget principal pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984. (*Voir procès-verbal du mardi 15 mars 1983, fascicule n° 83*).

Le président présente le Treizième Rapport du Sous-comité du programme et de la procédure suivant:

Votre Sous-comité s'est réuni le jeudi 12 mai 1983 pour étudier les prochains travaux du Comité relativement à son Ordre de renvoi du mercredi 23 février 1983 concernant le budget principal pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984.

Votre Sous-comité a convenu de recommander le calendrier suivant des séances:

Le mardi 17 mai 1983:

9h30—10h30: Hauts fonctionnaires du ministère des Affaires extérieures;

10h45—12h00: Session d'étude spéciale mixte et publique avec le Comité sénatorial permanent des affaires extérieures à l'occasion de la Visite de la délégation soviétique;

Le jeudi 19 mai 1983:

9h30: L'honorable J. Gilles Lamontagne, ministre de la Défense nationale;

Le mardi 24 mai 1983:

9h30: Témoins à confirmer;

Le jeudi 26 mai 1983:

3:30 p.m.: Officials from the Department of National Defence.

It was agreed,—That the Thirteenth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure be concurred in.

The Committee resumed consideration of Vote 1 under NATIONAL DEFENCE.

The Minister and the witnesses answered questions.

It was agreed,—That the replies submitted by the Minister in response to questions raised by Mr. McKinnon at a meeting of the Committee of March 17, 1983 and by Mr. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), at a meeting of the Committee of April 19, 1983 be appended to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix "EAND-73"*).

At 5:05 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

15h30: Hauts fonctionnaires du ministère de la Défense nationale.

Il est convenu,—Que le Treizième Rapport du Sous-comité du programme et de la procédure soit adopté.

Le Comité reprend l'étude du crédit 1 sous la rubrique DÉFENSE NATIONALE.

Le ministre et les témoins répondent aux questions.

Il est convenu,—Que les réponses soumises par le ministre en réponse aux questions posées par M. McKinnon lors d'une séance du Comité du 17 mars 1983 et par M. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*) à la séance du Comité du 19 avril 1983 soient jointes aux procès-verbal et témoignages de ce jour (*Voir Appendice «EAND-73»*).

A 17h05, le Comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

[Texte]

Thursday, May 12, 1983

• 1533

The Chairman: Gentlemen and Madam, regarding future work of the committee: next Tuesday, at 9.30 a.m., your steering committee recommends that we have *les haute fonctionnaires* bureaucrats of the Department of External Affairs. Thursday, next week, at 11.00 a.m., I have heard that we could have the minister for the last time this year if we could find a slot at 9.30 a.m. So if we can arrange it, the minister will be back at 9.30 a.m. I hear from his office . . . If not, at 11.00 a.m. we will sit on national defence, but without the minister. So the minister at 9.30 a.m. If it is impossible to find a room, then we will have national defence at 11.00 a.m., as announced on your schedule published two months ago.

As for the two next meetings, May 24 and May 26, by agreement with your steering committee representing all parties we will advise after consulting with various critics of various parties as to what they want that week. But we know for sure that Thursday, May 26, will be reserved for defence if necessary, and by agreement we may do some CIDA or we may do the Department of External Affairs, depending on negotiations going on between parties. That is for the next two meetings.

Do not forget tomorrow at 9.30 a.m. It is a première. We will have ITU, a travelling delegation according to the press; but I invite the press to be here and see how seriously this ITU delegation works, not because I am now the new chairman.

• 1535

It is the ex-chairman, Senator Molgat, and those who were with him in Rome who will come and be at the disposal of members of the committee as to the very important discussion that is taking place in the UPI, *l'Union parlementaire internationale*, known in English as the International Parliamentary Union. Therefore tomorrow, 9.30 a.m., IPU, Senator Molgat and a few members who were in Rome; and next Tuesday, 9.30 a.m., CIDA, and then Thursday, National Defence, the two last meetings by negotiation—External Affairs . . . I am sorry; next Tuesday, External Affairs and Defence by negotiation. We may not sit on the 24th at 9.30 a.m. because I am afraid the day after a long weekend there may be some bureaucrats missing—because members of Parliament are always here, of course. We will advise as to what we are going to do.

I need your indulgence after long discussion. Next Tuesday, as you know, Mr. Gorbachev, who is supposed to be number three at the Politburo . . .

TÉMOIGNAGES

(Enregistrement électronique)

[Traduction]

Le jeudi 12 mai 1983

Le président: Messieurs et madame, à propos de nos travaux à venir, j'ai ceci à dire: votre comité directeur recommande que nous entendions *the Officials*, les hauts fonctionnaires du ministère des Affaires extérieures. Jeudi, de la semaine prochaine, à 11h00 du matin, nous pourrions avoir le ministre pour la dernière fois, cette année, si nous trouvons un espace libre à 9h30 du matin. Si nous arrivons à arranger cela, le ministre pourrait donc être là à 9h30 du matin. Voilà ce que son bureau me dit . . . Dans la négative, nous nous retrouverons à 11h00 de la même matinée, pour la Défense nationale, mais sans le ministre. Donc, le ministre à 9h30 du matin. S'il est impossible de trouver une salle, nous entendrons les représentants de la Défense nationale à 11h00, comme nous l'avons annoncé dans notre programme publié il y a deux mois.

En ce qui concerne les deux prochaines réunions, du 24 et du 26 mai, nous avons décidé en accord avec votre comité directeur qui représente tous les partis de prendre notre décision après consultation des divers critiques des divers partis. Mais nous savons déjà que ce jeudi du 26 mai sera réservé à la Défense si cela doit être, et nous parlerons peut-être aussi un peu de l'ACDI, ou du ministère des Affaires extérieures, tout dépend de ce que les partis voudront. Voilà donc pour nos deux prochaines réunions.

N'oubliez pas que demain à 9h30, c'est une première: nous rencontrons une délégation itinérante de l'UPI, si ce que la presse nous dit est bien exact. J'invite donc la presse à être présente, afin qu'elle puisse témoigner du sérieux de nos travaux, et non pas simplement parce que je suis le nouveau président.

L'ex-président, le sénateur Molgat, et ceux qui l'avaient accompagné à Rome seront présents, et pourront répondre aux questions des membres du Comité qui s'intéresseraient aux discussions très importantes qui ont lieu au sein de l'Union parlementaire internationale, *International Parliamentary Union*, que l'on connaît en anglais sous ce titre. Demain donc, à 9h 30 du matin, l'U.P.I., le sénateur Molgat et quelques députés qui l'avaient accompagné à Rome seront présents; mardi prochain, à 9h 30 du matin, l'ACDI, et ensuite jeudi la Défense nationale, nous avons donc décidé que ce serait les deux dernières réunions—Affaires extérieures . . . Excusez-moi; mardi prochain, Affaires extérieures et Défense nationale, selon ce qui sortira des négociations. Peut-être qu'il n'y aura pas de réunion à 9h 30 le 24, étant donné que certains hauts fonctionnaires ne seront peut-être pas là après ce long week-end—les députés, eux, sont toujours sur la Colline, bien sûr. Nous aviserons donc.

Je vous demande donc un peu d'indulgence. Mardi prochain, comme vous le savez, M. Gorbachev, qui est censément le numéro 3 du Politburo . . .

[Text]

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Before you leave that...

The Chairman: There is going to be a meeting next Tuesday. I hope that this committee will discipline itself very well, as we can do once in a while, and adjourn as early as possible so we could have a longer time with Mr. Gorbachev. Mr. Gorbachev will be the guest of Canada for 10 days. He will be meeting with various ministers, various bureaucrats, various departments, and also will meet with two committees. He will have a public meeting in the afternoon with the committee of agriculture of the Senate and the House of Commons. In the morning he is meeting with us, and by consensus, a large consensus, the meeting will be public; it will be held in the Railway Committee Room. I would hope to start at 10.45 a.m. sharp. That means we will discipline ourselves next Tuesday. If not, we will start at 11.00 a.m. in the Railway Committee Room. There will be complete translation—French, English, and Russian.

This is the report of your steering committee, and I suppose it is acceptable without discussion.

Mr. Munro, please.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Do I understand, then, that the Secretary of State for External Affairs will not be before us again?

The Chairman: Thank you very much for raising that. I always can see what you may have in mind. I try to accommodate, so I made an official request at his office personally yesterday. I will get the answer next Monday. We shall advise accordingly when we get the answer. I have asked the...

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): May I suggest...

The Chairman:—minister to be present at one of our last meetings, either Tuesday or the following week.

Mr. McKinnon: That is the 24th?

The Chairman: Yes. If he were to come on the 24th and we do not want a meeting on the 24th, we will look into the slot available, the room available facilities, and I will make a meeting later on so there will be a maximum number of members. Is that agreeable to you? I said that if we have the minister but see fit not to have a meeting on the 24th at 9.30, your steering committee has recommended to me to look into the possibility of having that meeting a bit later on that day or Wednesday afternoon.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): With the minister?

The Chairman: Of course.

Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: One thing we can be helpful with is by saying it will not be CIDA on May 24.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): It will be External.

The Chairman: It will therefore be External.

[Translation]

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Avant d'abandonner ce sujet...

Le président: Nous allons avoir une réunion mardi prochain. J'espère que le Comité fera preuve de discipline, comme nous pouvons le faire une fois de temps en temps, et ajournera aussitôt que possible pour que nous puissions ensuite passer un bon moment avec M. Gorbachev. Il sera l'hôte du Canada pendant 10 jours. Il rencontrera divers ministres, divers hauts fonctionnaires, divers représentants des ministères, et il participera à deux comités. Il y aura une réunion publique dans l'après-midi avec le Comité de l'agriculture du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes. Le matin, il sera avec nous, et par consensus, un large consensus, nous avons décidé que la réunion serait publique; elle aura lieu dans la salle du Comité des chemins de fer. J'aimerais que nous commencions à 10h 45 du matin, précises. C'est-à-dire que nous aurons besoin de faire preuve d'un peu de discipline. Sinon, nous commencerons à 11 heures, toujours dans la salle du Comité des chemins de fer. Il y aura interprétation intégrale—français, anglais et russe.

Voilà donc le rapport de votre comité directeur, et je pense qu'il sera accepté sans débat.

Monsieur Munro, je vous en prie.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Est-ce que donc, si je comprends bien, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures ne revient plus?

Le président: Merci de poser la question. Cela me permet de suivre ce que vous gardez présent à l'esprit. Je cherche à accommoder tout le monde, et j'ai fait parvenir à son bureau une demande officielle personnelle, hier. Je recevrai la réponse lundi prochain. Nous déciderons en fonction du moment où cette réponse nous parviendra. J'ai demandé que...

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Puis-je proposer...

Le président:... le ministre soit présent à l'une de nos dernières réunions, mardi ou celle de la semaine suivante.

M. McKinnon: C'est-à-dire le 24?

Le président: Oui. S'il devait venir le 24 et que nous ne voulons pas de réunion ce jour-là, nous prendrons des dispositions pour que la réunion ait lieu plus tard et nous chercherons une salle, afin qu'un maximum de députés puisse être présent. Cela vous convient-il? Si nous désirons que le ministre soit présent à l'une de nos réunions, mais que nous ne voulons pas qu'elle ait lieu le 24 à 9h 30 du matin, votre comité directeur a recommandé que je m'occupe de faire tenir cette réunion un peu plus tard le même jour ou le mercredi après-midi.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Avec le ministre?

Le président: Bien sûr.

Monsieur McKinnon.

M. McKinnon: Je crois que nous pourrions faciliter les choses en décidant qu'il ne s'agira pas de l'ACDI le 24 mai.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Affaires extérieures seulement.

Le président: Oui, Affaires extérieures.

[Texte]

Mr. McKinnon: So the CIDA people can stay at home.

The Chairman: So if there is a meeting, it will be External Affairs—thank you for that—as it will be next week, Tuesday. Right, Mr. McKinnon? Okay.

Mr. Munro? If nothing, I will pass to . . .

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): The other matter was about the meeting on Thursday of next week with the minister in the morning. I do hope that we will be looking into all possible rooms for that meeting, including the Railway Committee Room if necessary.

The Chairman: In order to have the . . .

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): In order to have the minister. We really want you back, Mr. Minister.

The Chairman: So we may have the minister at 9.30 a.m. next week if we find a room, and knowing the very able clerk, Mr. Vaive, he always does his utmost by negotiation with all the clerks. We always find a room.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Use a Senate room, if necessary.

The Chairman: I have no objection. I am ready—so is the minister—to join this very noble institution. Are you, sir?

Hon. Gilles Lamontagne (Minister of National Defence): Not now.

The Chairman: Therefore, unless the minister has a long statement—or question, answer, or otherwise—I will immediately go to questioning, hoping to resume very shortly today.

• 1540

Mr. Lamontagne: I have no statement, but I wonder whether the question that was supposed to be answered from Mr. McKinnon on March 17 about the listing of major capital projects, and one from Mr. Munro on the facilities available to the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean, have been tabled. Do they have a copy of it?

The Chairman: It was distributed to everybody. It will be annexed to the *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* of today.

Thank you, Mr. Minister.

As there is no statement, I will go immediately to the official critic of the Official Opposition. I have had many requests by members to shorten the meeting today because of a very important prior engagement by four members of this committee; please indicate now if you wish to question. First, the Hon. Mr. McKinnon. I will be very disciplined to keep you all short, since the minister is coming back Thursday. Mr. McKinnon, please.

[Traduction]

M. McKinnon: Les représentants de l'ACDI pourront donc rester chez eux.

Le président: S'il y a une réunion, elle portera sur les Affaires extérieures—merci pour cela—et ce sera la semaine prochaine, mardi. Exact, monsieur McKinnon? Très bien.

Monsieur Munro? Sinon, je passerai à . . .

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): L'autre question concernait la réunion du jeudi de la semaine suivante, où le ministre devait comparaître le matin. J'espère que nous allons tout faire pour trouver une salle, y compris éventuellement la salle du Comité des chemins de fer, si nécessaire.

Le président: Pour cela . . .

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Pour que le ministre vienne. Nous voulons vraiment vous revoir, monsieur le ministre.

Le président: Il est donc possible que le ministre soit à nouveau parmi nous à 9h 30 du matin la semaine prochaine, si nous trouvons une salle, ce que M. Vaive, dans sa diligence, ne manquera pas d'arriver à négocier une fois de plus avec les autres greffiers. Une salle, cela se trouve toujours.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Au Sénat, si nécessaire.

Le président: Je n'ai rien contre cela. Je suis prêt—le ministre aussi—à travailler dans le cadre de cette noble institution. N'est-ce pas, monsieur le ministre?

L'honorable Gilles Lamontagne (ministre de la Défense nationale): Pas encore.

Le président: Aussi, à moins que le ministre n'ait une longue déclaration à faire—ou une réponse à donner à une question qui avait été posée—je vais passer directement à la période des questions, ne perdons pas de temps.

M. Lamontagne: Je n'ai pas de déclaration à faire, je voudrais simplement savoir ce qui va se passer pour les réponses aux questions de M. McKinnon, du 17 mars, à propos des grands projets d'immobilisations, et de M. Munro sur les installations portuaires de l'Océan Indien auxquelles la marine soviétique a accès. En avez-vous une copie?

Le président: Tout le monde en a reçu une copie. Cela sera joint en annexe aux *Procès-verbaux et témoignages* de la séance d'aujourd'hui.

Merci, monsieur le ministre.

Puisqu'il n'y a pas de déclaration d'ouverture, nous allons commencer tout de suite par le critique officiel de l'Opposition officielle. Plusieurs membres du Comité ont demandé que la réunion d'aujourd'hui ne se prolonge pas trop, pour qu'ils puissent se rendre à certains rendez-vous importants qu'ils ont; faites-vous donc inscrire tout de suite sur la liste. Tout d'abord, l'honorable M. McKinnon. Et puisque le ministre sera encore parmi nous jeudi, je vais faire preuve de beaucoup de rigueur dans l'allocation du temps de parole. Monsieur McKinnon, je vous en prie.

[Text]

Mr. McKinnon: First of all I would like to ask about Bill C-38 again. Have the people contacted the Ministry of Justice to determine what is holding it up, and why?

Mr. Lamontagne: Before I give the answer to that question, I would like to thank Mr. McKinnon, who dressed properly this afternoon with the proper tie, which is a frigate tie. Thank you very much for your support on that.

The Chairman: Boy, I need one.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): You heard the minister. He has no frigate.

Mr. McKinnon: I got this in the Bronx.

An hon. member: It is an old style.

The Chairman: I hear that Thursday, for the last meeting, the minister will honour the chairman by having a provo tie.

Mr. McKinnon: I received this in a plain brown envelope, with a gracious note of thank you.

What is the status of Bill C-38 today?

Mr. W.R. Green (Assistant Deputy Minister, Personnel, Department of National Defence): We have received from Treasury Board, Supply and Services, and the understanding of Justice... all civilian employees in the department are aware, as are all military employees. The instructions are in place within the Department of National Defence.

Mr. McKinnon: In compliance with the last words in the bill, has a day been fixed by proclamation yet when parts II, III, and IV come into force?

Mr. Green: Mr. McKinnon, with respect to that, I cannot give you the answer. The Department of Justice has that particular responsibility. We are instructed now to proceed with all the regulations applicable to garnishees, and that in effect is what is in process.

Mr. McKinnon: The garnishment is in part I of the bill, not in parts II, III and IV, which cover among other things the diversion of pensions.

Mr. Green: That is also in place, sir.

Mr. McKinnon: That is in place?

Mr. Green: Yes.

Mr. McKinnon: Well then has it been proclaimed? This is the question I asked you before, is it not?

Mr. Green: With respect to the public service at large, the instructions we have... I guess the answer, sir, would be yes, with respect to the instructions being implemented by every department in the Public Service of Canada.

With respect to proclamation as such by justice, I cannot answer that. We have been told to implement everything, and that, sir, is what we are doing.

[Translation]

M. McKinnon: Je voudrais revenir au projet de loi C-38. Est-ce que l'on a contacté le ministère de la Justice pour savoir ce qui retient les choses et pourquoi?

M. Lamontagne: Avant de répondre à cette question, j'aimerais remercier M. McKinnon de s'être ceint de la cravate de capitaine de frégate, c'est tout à fait à l'ordre du jour ce après-midi. Merci donc pour ce soutien que vous nous apportez.

Le président: Mon Dieu, il m'en faudrait une aussi.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Vous avez entendu ce qu'a dit le ministre, il n'a pas de frégate.

M. McKinnon: J'ai trouvé ça dans le Bronx.

Une voix: Cela fait très rétro.

Le président: Pour notre dernière réunion, jeudi, le ministre nous fera honneur en arborant une cravate militaire.

M. McKinnon: On me l'a envoyée dans une enveloppe toute simple, avec une note fort aimable de remerciement.

Qu'en est-il du projet de loi C-38?

M. W.R. Green (sous-ministre adjoint, Personnel, ministère de la Défense nationale): Nous avons reçu du Conseil du Trésor, d'Approvisionnements et Services, et ce que comprend le ministère de la Justice... tous les employés civils du ministère sont au courant, de même que nos employés militaires. Pour ce qui est du ministère de la Défense nationale, nous avons déjà donné nos instructions.

M. McKinnon: Est-ce qu'une date a été fixée, par proclamation, conformément aux derniers mots du projet de loi, pour l'entrée en vigueur des parties II, III et IV?

M. Green: Monsieur McKinnon, je ne peux pas vous donner de réponse là-dessus. Cela relève du ministère de la Justice. Nous avons reçu des instructions en ce qui concerne les mesures d'application des saisies-arrêts, et c'est ce qui pour le moment est déjà en place.

M. McKinnon: Cela concerne la partie I du projet de loi, et non les parties II, III et IV, où il est question entre autres de la distraction des pensions.

M. Green: Nous avons également pris des mesures pour cela, monsieur.

M. McKinnon: Cela fait déjà l'objet de mesures d'application?

M. Green: Oui.

M. McKinnon: Y a-t-il eu donc promulgation? Voilà la question que je vous ai posée.

M. Green: En ce qui concerne la Fonction publique de façon générale, nous avons des instructions... Je pense, monsieur, que la réponse est oui, en ce qui concerne les mesures d'application relatives à la Fonction publique du Canada.

En ce qui concerne la promulgation en tant que telle par le ministère de la Justice, je ne peux pas répondre. On nous a dit de faire appliquer les dispositions de la loi, et nous le faisons.

[Texte]

Mr. McKinnon: Have you received any requests for diversion of pensions backed up by court orders? Have they been diverted?

Mr. Green: As you may know, sir, through the Armed Forces Superannuation Act, we have been involved in that process for a number of years. We are regularly receiving them. I cannot answer in the last few days, but certainly within the last few months we have received such requests.

Mr. McKinnon: My understanding is when this act is proclaimed, from then on the minister will have no choice. He must divert the pensions. Is that correct?

Mr. Green: That is correct, sir. Under the act the minister must because now this act encompasses all aspects of garnishee including diversions.

But again, the regulations regarding diversions are the same as the Armed Forces Superannuation Act. In other words, they apply only to spouses and to dependents for purposes of diversion.

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Mr. McKinnon: Yes, but heretofore the minister had a choice; from now on he does not, if this act has been proclaimed. And my understanding was the choice was generally that it would not be diverted.

Mr. Green: For the armed forces, the decisions are made by a judge advocate general within the Department of National Defence, under the minister, and advice from justice on each request for diversion.

My understanding, Mr. Chairman, is that there is no change in the application of the current act, which now of course is in force for the garnishees and the diversions. There is no change, sir.

Mr. McKinnon: I am talking about Bill C-38. I hope that is pretty clear at least, if nothing else is. I will check in the *Canada Gazette* and with the Department of Justice myself, if I have to, to find out if this has been proclaimed or not, because it makes quite a difference, and I have quite a long mailing list of people who want to know. It seems impossible to get an answer convincing to me. They are mainly divorced women who have court orders for a certain amount of maintenance...

Mr. Green: Correct; and dependants.

Mr. McKinnon: Yes. The husbands have found it fairly easy until now to avoid it by moving to another jurisdiction if the minister were not willing to order a diversion. Now he has no choice, is the way I read this bill, so this waiting list should be asking for the diversion to take place.

I do not want to waste any more time when it is obvious right now that we are not going to get the answer to it anyway.

[Traduction]

M. McKinnon: Est-ce que vous avez reçu des demandes de distraction de versements de pensions, consécutives à une ordonnance de tribunal? Et est-ce que vous avez obtenu?

M. Green: Comme vous pouvez le savoir, monsieur, nous le faisons déjà depuis plusieurs années en vertu de la Loi sur la pension de retraite des forces canadiennes. Nous recevons donc régulièrement de telles demandes. Je ne peux pas vous parler des derniers jours, mais je puis vous assurer que nous en avons reçu au cours des derniers mois.

M. McKinnon: Le ministre n'aura plus le choix, dès que la loi sera entrée en vigueur, si je ne me trompe. Il devra s'exécuter. Est-ce bien exact?

M. Green: C'est exact, monsieur. Le ministre y sera tenu, étant donné que la loi prend en compte tous les aspects possibles de la saisie-arrest, y compris la distraction des pensions.

Mais ce sont des dispositions qui sont exactement les mêmes que celles de la Loi sur la pension de retraite des forces canadiennes. Autrement dit, cela concerne les conjoints et les personnes à charge.

M. McKinnon: Oui, mais jusqu'ici, le ministre pouvait refuser, alors qu'il n'a plus le choix, du moins il ne l'aura plus dès que la loi aura été promulguée. Or, si je ne me trompe, de façon générale, la réponse était négative.

M. Green: En ce qui concerne les forces armées, c'est un juge avocat général du ministère de la Défense nationale qui prend les décisions, il relève du ministre, et prend conseil auprès du ministère de la Justice pour chaque demande de distraction.

Monsieur le président, il n'y a aucune modification dans l'application de la loi en vigueur, pour ce qui concerne les saisies-arrests et les distractions. Aucune modification, donc.

M. McKinnon: Je parle du projet de loi C-38. Je pense que cela est clair, si certaines choses ne le sont pas. Je vérifierai dans la *Gazette du Canada* et auprès du ministère de la Justice, moi-même, s'il le faut, pour savoir s'il y a eu promulgation, parce que cela fait tout de même une différence, et j'ai toute une liste de gens qui m'ont posé la question. Or, il semble impossible d'obtenir une réponse absolument convaincante. Il s'agit essentiellement de femmes divorcées, pour lesquelles il y a une ordonnance du tribunal, demandant que l'on maintienne un certain montant...

M. Green: Exactement, et certaines personnes à charge.

M. McKinnon: Oui. Les maris jusqu'ici arrivaient à s'en tirer facilement en s'adressant à une autre instance, lorsque le ministre n'était pas disposé à ce que l'on ordonne la distraction. Maintenant, celui-ci n'a plus le choix, si je comprends bien le projet de loi, et je vois ici toute une liste de gens qui attendent que l'on ordonne la distraction.

Je ne voudrais pas perdre plus de temps sur cette question, puisque de toute évidence nous n'allons pas en savoir plus là-dessus.

[Text]

I would like to ask one other question about pensions of servicemen. If a serviceman goes to his annuity and dies, his widow gets a partial pension; I believe it is 50%. When she remarries, she loses it the day she remarries: right?

Mr. Green: Yes.

Mr. McKinnon: Then if the second husband dies, she becomes re-entitled to the pension she was getting. My question is: Is that as a matter of right, or is there any kind of means test attached to it, or is every double widow whose first husband was a serviceman drawing an annuity entitled to this as a right rather than with a means test?

Mr. Green: Mr. Chairman, I cannot give you a definitive answer on that. We will have to verify . . .

LGen G.C.E. Theriault (Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): My understanding, Mr. Chairman, is that she may reapply. However, I think it would be preferable that we undertake to provide a written reply to Mr. McKinnon, to be certain that we provide him with a precise answer.

Mr. McKinnon: Okay.

If I have time for another question—I have so many here, I hardly know which one to pick.

Let us start with this mobilization plan. Mr. Minister, you made a rather odd remark in the House a couple of days ago, when you said, on May 9:

As far as the mobilization plan is concerned, it is always developing. It is therefore more or less a fact at the moment that we have one.

I do not know whether you are aware or not, but when I have asked the department on several occasions to look into a variety of things, including particularly reorganization of militia units, the answer I have had was, wait until the mobilization plan is approved; we cannot do these things, such as increasing a battery to a regimental strength or increasing a company to battalion strength or vice versa, until we have a mobilization plan and see where we need them. If, as you said on May 9, we have a mobilization plan—"it is therefore more or less a fact at the moment that we have one"—I wonder if it would now be appropriate to get this reorganization of the reserves done.

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, I think when you talk about a military mobilization plan you talk about all the actions we must take in case of preparing for war or preparing for other emergencies. It is also a plan to assemble and organize all the national resources available to have such a plan. I think you can easily understand that the mobilization plan is not a static plan. It is a plan which is re-evaluated constantly. I do not think it would be wise to say exactly what we plan because, in case of hostilities, I do not think it is good that we tell everybody how we intend to do it. There was a very good article—it was an interview by Lieutenant-General Belzile on this question in the Saskatoon *Star-Phoenix*. It is

[Translation]

Je voudrais maintenant poser une autre question qui concerne les pensions des anciens militaires. Lorsqu'un ancien militaire à la retraite meurt, sa veuve touche une partie de la pension; 50 p. 100, si je ne me trompe. Si elle se remarie elle perd cette pension, le jour même où elle se remarie: est-ce bien exact?

M. Green: Oui.

M. McKinnon: Si son deuxième mari meurt, elle peut à nouveau toucher la pension qu'elle touchait de son premier mari. Ma question est celle-ci: cela est-il automatique, est-ce un droit, ou y a-t-il un certain nombre de conditions qui peuvent faire que celle-ci ne touche pas cette première moitié de pension?

M. Green: Monsieur le président, je ne peux pas donner de réponse absolue là-dessus. Il faudra que nous vérifions . . .

Lieut-général G.C.E. Thériault (Vice-chef de l'État-major de la Défense, ministère de la Défense nationale): Monsieur le président, la veuve peut refaire une demande. Je pense toutefois qu'il serait préférable de donner une réponse écrite à M. McKinnon, pour plus de précision et de sûreté.

M. McKinnon: Très bien.

Si j'ai le temps de poser une autre question, j'en ai tant, que je ne sais pas laquelle choisir.

Parlons du plan de mobilisation. Monsieur le ministre, vous avez fait une remarque plutôt curieuse à la Chambre il y a quelques jours, lorsque vous avez dit le 9 mai:

Quant au plan de mobilisation, il est toujours en voie d'élaboration. Nous pouvons dire que nous en avons un par les temps qui courent.

Je ne sais pas si vous le savez, mais à chaque fois que j'ai demandé au ministère certains renseignements concernant entre autres la réorganisation de la milice, on m'a toujours répondu qu'il fallait attendre l'approbation du plan de mobilisation; on m'a toujours répondu qu'on ne pouvait pas faire telle ou telle chose, augmenter les effectifs d'un bataillon pour en faire un régiment, ou faire un bataillon d'une compagnie, ou vice versa, jusqu'à ce que l'on ait le plan de mobilisation pour voir quels seront les véritables besoins. Si, comme vous l'avez dit le 9 mai, nous avons un plan de mobilisation, «nous pouvons donc dire que nous en avons un, par les temps qui courent»—le moment ne serait-il pas venu justement de réorganiser les réserves.

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, lorsque l'on parle de plan de mobilisation militaire, cela comprend toutes les mesures qu'il faut prendre en cas de préparation d'une situation de guerre, ou de toute autre situation d'urgence. Il s'agit donc également de rassembler et d'organiser toutes les ressources disponibles au plan national en prévision d'une telle situation. Vous comprendrez facilement qu'un tel plan de mobilisation n'est pas quelque chose de statique. C'est un plan réévalué en permanence. Je ne pense pas qu'il serait sage de dire exactement ce que nous envisageons de faire, car, en cas d'hostilités, je ne pense pas qu'il serait bon de dire à tout le monde ce que nous avons l'intention de faire. J'ai lu un

[Texte]

entitled *Military Mobilization Plan In Works*. It states what can be said about it, how they intend, and what would be needed then, in case of mobilization.

• 1550

It is a plan that is a part of a strategy of the department if we need it. It is a plan that Lieutenant-General Belzile has said is a question of announcing the preparedness and system ability at the same time. Mobilization, I think, is a word we should maybe discard completely, because it is a term that was used in the previous wars and things like that. I think now we should use more adequately these two words, which are preparedness and system ability, because they go together. When you talk about the reserves, there is no doubt about it—there it is a question of preparedness in the country, preparedness in the military. At the same time, system ability would be done through reinforcing militia and reserves, and that does not mean only the preparedness of the military. It also means the preparedness of the civilian capability, facilities or whatever it is.

There is no doubt that, in the case of a conflict being imminent or something like that, we would mobilize right away, for example, all the facilities of Air Canada and other airlines. We would probably mobilize public transportation—we would mobilize whatever we can. Hospitals would be in a way required to take care of possible casualties and things like that. It is a whole system which comes into effect. So it is very hard today to tell you, a mobilization plan is there which will tell us that Hôtel-Dieu de Montreal will do this, the firemen in Toronto will do this, in case of mobilization, in case of preparedness.

So it is there. We know what we should do and I think as General Belzile, who is in charge more or less of this new word, preparedness and system ability plan, is the one who looked constantly at the evolution of such a plan. I think there is in fact a plan, but it is a moving plan in a way. It is a plan which has to be reassessed constantly—the planning and resources available.

Mr. McKinnon: Mr. Chairman, an answer like that tends to make one forget what the question was.

Mr. Lamontagne: You asked about the mobilization plan, and I think I did answer pretty well that it is something of the past. Now, we should turn the other way.

Mr. McKinnon: I suppose I can take from that that the next time I ask that a militia unit have its size changed, I will not get the answer back to wait for the mobilization plan, then. I will wait for the sustainability and operational ability or something.

Mr. Lamontagne: Could be.

Mr. McKinnon: Could I have one more question about...

[Traduction]

excellent article, une interview du lieutenant-général Belzile sur la question dans le *Star-Phoenix* de Saskatoon. Cet article était intitulé *Military Mobilization Plan In Works* (Le plan de mobilisation militaire au travail). Il dit ce qui peut en être dit, les intentions, les besoins, en cas de mobilisation.

Ce plan fait partie de la stratégie du ministère en cas de besoin. Selon le lieutenant-général Belzile, il faut à la fois que les hommes soient prêts et que l'intendance suive. Je crois que nous ne devrions plus du tout parler de mobilisation, car c'est un terme lié aux guerres précédentes. Je crois qu'il serait maintenant plus judicieux de parler d'état d'alerte préventive et d'intendance, car les deux vont ensemble. Lorsqu'on parle de réserves, il est indubitable qu'on parle d'état d'alerte préventive du pays, d'état d'alerte préventive militaire. Simultanément, quand on parle d'intendance, il faut parler de renforcement de la milice et des réserves et non pas seulement des militaires. Il faut qu'il y ait également état d'alerte préventive sur le plan civil.

Il ne fait aucun doute qu'en cas de conflit imminent, par exemple, nous mobiliserions immédiatement, par exemple, les installations d'Air Canada et des autres compagnies aériennes. Nous mobiliserions probablement les transports publics... nous mobiliserions tout ce que nous pourrions. Les hôpitaux seraient mobilisés pour les victimes éventuelles, et cetera. Il s'agit de la mise en place de tout un système. Il est donc très difficile de vous dire aujourd'hui qu'un plan de mobilisation existe et que l'Hôtel-Dieu de Montréal fera telle chose, les pompiers de Toronto telle autre chose, en cas de mobilisation, en cas d'alerte.

Ce plan existe. Nous savons ce que nous devons faire et je crois que le général Belzile, qui est plus ou moins responsable de cette nouvelle notion d'état d'alerte préventive et d'intendance, est celui qui surveille en permanence l'évolution de ce plan. Il existe un plan, mais c'est un plan en évolution constante. C'est un plan qui doit être réévalué en permanence... une réévaluation de la planification et des ressources disponibles.

M. McKinnon: Monsieur le président, c'est le genre de réponse qui vous fait oublier quelle était la question.

M. Lamontagne: Vous m'avez posé une question au sujet du plan de mobilisation et je crois vous avoir répondu que c'était quelque chose du passé. Nous devrions nous tourner vers l'avenir.

M. McKinnon: Je suppose, dans ce cas, que la prochaine fois que je demanderai que les effectifs d'une unité de milice soient modifiés, on ne me répondra pas d'attendre le plan de mobilisation. Je suppose qu'on me parlera d'état de préparation, d'intendance, et cetera.

M. Lamontagne: C'est possible.

M. McKinnon: Pourrais-je poser une autre question au sujet...

[Text]

The Chairman: One more question. Then I will go to the critic of the NDP, Mr. Sargeant.

Mr. McKinnon: On April 19, Mr. Killick gave evidence about the GATE vessels having been dropped from the program or not dropped. He said that there had not been a straight cancellation. And yet at the evidence given to the Senate committee in May 1982, Captain W. Fox-Decent said:

We are told that the line in the budget to provide the necessary funding for these vessels has been dropped—I believe in the amount of \$120 million—as the regular forces face urgent priorities with regard to finding money.

And on the eleventh day, I guess, of the fifth month of 1982, Rear Admiral Wood said:

The GATE vessel replacements now appear on what we call the unfunded list or the shortage list. I thought I had about \$120 million, but it has disappeared, gone up in smoke, within the last six months.

Yet Mr. Killick tells us there has not been a straight cancellation. I wonder if we could get an update on this thing that has gone up in smoke but has not been cancelled?

• 1555

Mr. Lamontagne: There is smoke or fire.

The Chairman: Number one, name please?

Mr. J.R. Killick (Assistant Deputy Minister, Materiel, Department of National Defence): John Killick, Assistant Deputy Minister, Materiel. Mr. Chairman, it is neither smoke nor fire. The requirement remains. At this point in time it has not gotten high enough on the priority list to be where money has been attached to the program.

Mr. McKinnon, if you look at the response that we have given you today in the summary to a question, you will see, for example, on the second page: those programs that are under way; those major programs that are departmentally approved where there will be responses given to you; and then you will see those programs that are under consideration and being worked on.

Mr. McKinnon: When would you estimate that we will have gate ships in the water?

Mr. Killick: I cannot give you that determination at this time, sir.

Mr. McKinnon: The minister said a year ago that it was the highest priority, or a high priority, and that still leaves it up... as to when it is going to come about at all. Is that right?

Mr. Lamontagne: I think it would be very difficult to set a date or to set a time at which these auxiliary vessels will be replaced. We have given it some priority and I hope we can manage to get it through as resources become available.

Mr. McKinnon: Mr. Chairman, I do not want to ask another question because I do not have another small field to get into, except that I want to reiterate the feeling of the Conservative Party about the Canadian patrol frigate, which I have

[Translation]

Le président: Une dernière question. Ensuite, je donnerai la parole au critique du NPD, M. Sargeant.

Mr. McKinnon: Le 19 avril, M. Killick nous a dit que les navires-écoles avaient été supprimés du programme tout en ne l'ayant pas été. Il nous a dit qu'il n'y avait pas eu annulation. Pourtant, lors de son témoignage devant le comité du Sénat, en mai 1982, le capitaine W. Fox-Decent a dit:

On nous a informés que le poste budgétaire pour les fonds nécessaires à ces navires a été supprimé... une somme de 120 millions de dollars, sauf erreur... les forces armées régulières devant faire face à des priorités urgentes par manque de financement.

Et le onzième jour, je crois, du cinquième mois de 1982, le vice-amiral Wood a dit:

Les remplaçants des navires-écoles semblent maintenant figurer sur ce que nous appelons la liste non financée. Je croyais avoir 120 millions de dollars environ, mais ce poste a disparu, est parti en fumée au cours des six derniers mois.

Pourtant, M. Killick nous dit qu'il n'y a pas eu annulation. Pourrait-on m'éclairer un peu plus sur cette chose qui est disparue en fumée, mais qui n'a pas été annulée?

M. Lamontagne: C'est de la fumée ou un incendie.

Le président: Micro n° 1, votre nom, s'il vous plaît.

M. J.R. Killick (sous-ministre adjoint, Matériel, ministère de la Défense nationale): John Killick, sous-ministre adjoint, Matériel. Monsieur le président, il n'y a ni fumée ni incendie. La demande demeure. Pour le moment, la priorité n'est pas suffisante pour correspondre à une partie créditée du programme.

Monsieur McKinnon, si vous lisez la réponse écrite qui vous a été communiquée aujourd'hui, vous pourrez constater, par exemple, qu'à la deuxième page sont cités les programmes en cours et que des réponses vous seront données au sujet de ces programmes importants approuvés par le ministère avec la liste des programmes à l'étude.

M. McKinnon: Quand prévoyez-vous la mise à l'eau de ces navires-écoles?

Mr. Killick: Je ne peux pas vous répondre pour le moment, monsieur.

M. McKinnon: Le ministre a dit il y a un an que c'était la priorité des priorités, ou une des priorités importantes, et il semblerait que rien n'a bougé. N'est-ce pas?

Mr. Lamontagne: Je pense qu'il sera très difficile de dire avec exactitude quand ces navires auxiliaires seront remplacés. Nous avons accordé une certaine priorité à cet exercice et j'espère que nous y parviendrons dès que les ressources seront disponibles.

M. McKinnon: Monsieur le président, je ne veux pas poser d'autres questions car je n'ai pas d'autres petits domaines qui m'intéressent, mais je tiens à répéter le sentiment du parti conservateur au sujet des frégates de patrouille, sentiment que

[Texte]

explained to the minister; that is, we are not greatly concerned about which consortium wins the contest as long as he does pick the best ship. One thing that we are not open on is that we do believe there are tremendous advantages to having the work done in more than one shipyard, preferably in three. Thank you for the time.

Mr. Lamontagne: Thank you for this remark, Mr. McKinnon. I think we will be taking it in a good way.

The Chairman: Thank you. *Merci*, Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. Sargeant, followed by Mr. Laniel, *s'il vous plaît*.

Mr. Sargeant: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a few brief questions. I would like to ask the minister a few questions about some of the latest stories in the ongoing saga of our favourite airplane, the F-18, and the recent story out of Washington that the Americans are considering—and indeed, McDonnell Douglas is already looking at—major overhauls to the airplane. Could the minister tell us what he knows about that?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, I know that what was just mentioned about the F-18 was negated in the latest number, I think, of the *Aeronautical Review*. Even the navy itself has said that they do not want any modification of the plane, they are quite happy with it and the trial this summer should prove satisfactory—the trial of the plane. I think, at the moment, in every way possible the plane seems to be proving satisfactory to the navy. For us, of course, as far as our requirements are concerned, the experiences we have to correlate at the moment are, I would say 100% and above, if it were possible. It seems to me that there are still some people who are running after ghost stories about that airplane, and they wish something wrong would happen. I am sorry to disappoint them. The reports we have are good, perfect.

Mr. Sargeant: It does not seem to me necessarily that people are taking runs at the airplane. The company, McDonnell Douglas, has admitted that they are carrying out an extensive redesign of the attack version of the airplane. In particular, they are looking at a plane that carries two persons, one of the criticisms being that the aircraft is simply too complicated with all its high technology for one pilot to fly and also carry out the attack role.

• 1600

Mr. Lamontagne: I am concerned with the conversation I had with the McDonnell Douglas people over the last month or so. They do not seem to accept that statement which was made by one—I do not know who—of their staff, if it was made.

The question is at the moment, as you know, the F-18 is a new plane, a new generation of plane, and it is possible that on paper there might be some modification or different version, as you have in all the planes more or less—747, F-4—and you have A, B, C, D, E, depending on the modification you do on them. So it is possible that on paper they are still looking at it. There is a possibility in a few years, five or ten years, to have a new version—or not a new version, but some modification—which will be called probably the F-18C or D, whatever they

[Traduction]

j'ai déjà exprimé au ministre. Peu nous importe que le consortium emportera le contrat à condition qu'il choisisse le meilleur navire. Par contre, nous sommes persuadés que faire faire le travail par plus d'un chantier naval, de préférence trois chantiers, présente d'énormes avantages. Je vous remercie infiniment.

M. Lamontagne: Je vous remercie de cette remarque, monsieur McKinnon. Nous en tiendrons compte.

Le président: Merci. Thank you, monsieur McKinnon.

M. Sargeant, suivi de M. Laniel, please.

M. Sargeant: Merci, monsieur le président. J'ai une série de petites questions. J'aimerais poser au ministre quelques questions au sujet des derniers rebondissements de la saga permanente de notre avion favori, le F-18, le tout dernier venant de Washington et selon lequel les Américains envisagent—McDonnell Douglas fait d'ailleurs déjà plus que l'envisager—l'apport de modifications importantes à cet avion. Le ministre pourrait-il nous dire ce qu'il en sait?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, je sais que ce qui vient juste d'être dit au sujet du F-18 a été nié dans le dernier numéro de l'*Aeronautical Review*. La marine elle-même a dit ne souhaiter aucune modification de l'appareil, elle dit qu'elle s'en satisfaisait pleinement et que les essais de cet été devraient s'avérer satisfaisants—les essais de l'appareil. Je crois que pour le moment, cet appareil semble pleinement satisfaire la marine sur tous les plans. De notre côté, bien entendu, en fonction de nos besoins, je dois dire que nous sommes satisfaits à 100 p. 100 et même plus, si c'était possible. Il me semble qu'il y a toujours des gens qui courent après des fantômes au sujet de cet appareil et qui souhaitent que quelque chose arrive. Je suis désolé de les décevoir. Les rapports que nous recevons sont excellents, parfaits.

M. Sargeant: Je ne pense pas qu'il s'agisse d'attaques délibérées contre cet appareil. La compagnie, McDonnell Douglas, a reconnu revoir tous les plans de la version d'attaque de cet appareil. En particulier, ils étudient la possibilité de le transformer en biplace car selon certains, la technologie de cet appareil est simplement trop compliquée pour que la même personne le pilote et se serve de son armement.

M. Lamontagne: Ce qui m'intéresse, ce sont les conversations que j'ai eues avec les représentants de McDonnell Douglas depuis un mois ou deux. Ils ne semblent pas être d'accord avec la déclaration qui a été faite par un des membres de leur personnel, je ne sais qui exactement.

Comme vous le savez très bien, le F-18 est un nouvel appareil, une nouvelle génération d'appareils, et il est possible que sur le papier, il existe des versions différentes ou modifiées, comme cela se fait plus ou moins pour tous les avions, les 747, les F-4, où vous en avez des séries de modèles A, B, C, D, E, correspondant à des versions un peu différentes. Il est donc possible que sur le papier, ils envisagent toujours de telles versions différentes. Il est possible que d'ici quelques années, d'ici 5 ou 10 ans, nous ayons une nouvelle version, peut-être

[Text]

call it. But I am not aware of any substantial modification to the plane being ongoing.

Mr. Sargeant: Has the Canadian Air Force tried out the plane in its attack version? Do we have attack versions presently? Have we tried it out? Are we satisfied with the attack role?

Mr. Lamontagne: I would like to see this question answered by an eminent flyer, who is the VCDS.

The Chairman: Mr. Thériault, please.

LGen Thériault: The answer, Mr. Chairman, is, yes, indeed; right from the beginning we have been using the airplane in its attack mode, and we shall be doing so operationally. The training squadron is training right now in Cold Lake, and the airplane is being used routinely on the tactical range and on the bombing range every day. When we procured the aircraft, of course, the specifications were considered very carefully with a view to multi-role employment of the airplane; that is to say, in the attack as well as in the air defence mode.

Mr. Sargeant: Are you satisfied with the reduction of the specifications that has occurred, that the airplane does not quite meet the specifications that were first required of it?

LGen Thériault: We are completely satisfied with the performance, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Sargeant: Do you have any problems . . .

LGen Thériault: I am sorry, I was just going to add, Mr. Sargeant, that of course in the tactical business the more the airplane will carry and the farther it will carry it, the better it is. But there are always real physical limits to that. But the F-18 did bring very substantial improvements in capability, both in terms of its ability to carry varied weaponry and in the range it affords us; and both these capacities are very, very respectable in terms of the state of the art today. A fighter airplane is a compromise. Every airplane design is always a compromise.

Mr. Sargeant: Are you finding any of the problems that some of the American critics have pinpointed, about the plane's being too complicated for one person to operate in the attack mode?

LGen Thériault: In that respect, Mr. Chairman, I would just comment that, when I was flying F-104s 20 years ago in the attack role, in the nuclear attack mission we had then, that controversy was raging then. It has always been a matter of controversy with aircrew as to whether a tactical airplane is best crewed by a pilot-navigator team or by a pilot alone.

I can say, though, with great confidence, having seen the airplane and flown it once, that the enormous help digital technology brings the pilot in the F-18 makes the job incomparably easier than it was and than we experienced many, many years ago. Combining that with the tremendous resolution on the radar, the automation and so on, there is just no comparison. So if the job has been done in the past and has

[Translation]

pas une nouvelle version mais une version modifiée, qui s'appellera probablement le F-18C ou D, au choix. Cependant, j'ignore l'éventualité de toutes modifications importantes de l'avion actuellement.

M. Sargeant: Est-ce que l'Armée de l'air canadienne a essayé la version d'attaque de cet appareil? Est-ce que nous avons de telles versions à l'heure actuelle? Les avons-nous essayées? En sommes-nous satisfaits?

M. Lamontagne: J'aimerais qu'un émérite, le vice-chef de l'État-major de la Défense, réponde à cette question.

Le président: Monsieur Thériault, s'il vous plaît.

Le Lgén Thériault: La réponse, monsieur le président, est définitivement affirmative; depuis le début, nous nous servons de la version d'attaque de cet appareil et nous continuerons à le faire lorsqu'il sera opérationnel. L'escadrille affectée à cet appareil s'entraîne actuellement à Cold Lake, et les pilotes font des exercices de tir et de bombardement tous les jours. Lorsque nous avons commandé cet appareil, bien entendu, nous avons étudié avec grande attention ses caractéristiques car nous voulions qu'il puisse aussi bien servir à l'attaque qu'à la défense.

M. Sargeant: Malgré le fait que les caractéristiques de cet appareil aient été réduites par rapport à ce qui était prévu et exigé au départ, vous en êtes quand même satisfaits?

Le Lgén Thériault: Nous sommes totalement satisfaits de ses performances, monsieur le président.

M. Sargeant: Est-ce que vous avez des problèmes?

Le Lgén Thériault: Je m'excuse, j'allais simplement ajouter, monsieur Sargeant, que bien entendu, sur le plan tactique, plus le rayon d'action à pleine charge d'un appareil est long, meilleur c'est. Il y a toujours des limites physiques irréductibles. Cependant, le F-18 offre un progrès de performance très net tant sur le plan de sa capacité à transporter un armement varié que sur le plan de son rayon d'action et dans sa catégorie, ses performances sont tout à fait respectables. Un avion de chasse est un compromis. Chaque avion est toujours un compromis.

M. Sargeant: Avez-vous constaté certains des problèmes signalés par les critiques américains selon lesquels cet appareil est beaucoup trop compliqué pour qu'une seule personne s'occupe de tout en cas d'attaque?

Le Lgén Thériault: À cet égard, monsieur le président, je dirai simplement que lorsque je pilotais il y a 20 ans les versions d'attaque des F-104, dans le cadre de notre mission d'attaque nucléaire d'alors, cette controverse faisait rage. De tout temps, on a débattu pour savoir s'il était préférable d'affecter un pilote et un navigateur ou un pilote seul aux appareils tactiques.

Je peux cependant vous affirmer qu'ayant vu cet appareil et l'ayant piloté une fois, l'assistance énorme apportée par la technologie numérique au pilote du F-18 rend sa tâche incomparablement plus facile qu'elle ne l'était pour nous il y a de nombreuses années. Si vous ajoutez cela à la couverture énorme du radar, l'automatisation, etc., il n'y a pas de comparaison. Donc, si nous avons pu le faire dans le passé et

[Texte]

been done reasonably—and I think we have done the job well in the past—it stands to reason that it can be done very, very much more effectively now within this one airplane.

Mr. Sargeant: I can understand that it would stand to reason; but specifically, have you found any problems, or have you found that it can easily be handled by one person?

LGen Thériault: I would say yes, Mr. Chairman. Now, perhaps if Mr. Sargeant is anxious to . . .

Mr. Sargeant: That is sufficient. Thank you.

LGen Thériault: I think General Manson has been closer to it than I have.

• 1605

Mr. Sargeant: There is another subject, Mr. Chairman, I would like to direct to the minister. There is a story in today's paper about the campaign at the Department of National Defence—I believe also that External Affairs is going to be involved—to counter the cruise missile protests in this country.

I wonder if the minister could describe this campaign a little bit to us.

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, this program was originated, and it has not terminated yet, through my urging. I have been urging our staff to sort of put forward a kind of program to fight, in a way, the . . .

An hon. Member: An educational program.

Mr. Lamontagne: An educational program, giving most Canadians the proper information about what is going on, what we should know about NATO, what we should know about NORAD, what we should know about nuclear weapons, the right information about the cruise missile, what it is, and all that. We have found out, and I have found out, that there is a lot of misinformation and a lot of ignorance, in the right sense of the word, about all these matters. Considering the tremendous amount of money, and the tremendous amount of effort, which is expended by the people who are, in a way, fighting the policy of NATO, and the policy of this government, being part of NATO, I think it is just normal that our department join forces with the Department of External Affairs to try to give the proper information to the people of Canada.

Mr. Sargeant, you probably have read much of the literature that comes from Russia and other places, and by activists too, explaining their side of the story. So I think it is only fitting that we see that Canadians get the unbiased information about all that.

I have just received a little book here that is called: *How to Avert the Threat of Europe*, printed in Moscow, which is selling and is in the library, or is distributed freely to any person, giving their side of the story. Sometimes we just wonder why we did not react earlier to this kind of misinformation. I will read one part. I think it is worth it. It is the

[Traduction]

de manière raisonnable, je pense que nous avons bien fait ce travail dans le passé, il semble raisonnable de penser qu'avec ce nouvel appareil, nous pourrions le faire avec encore plus d'efficacité.

M. Sargeant: Je peux comprendre qu'il puisse sembler raisonnable de le penser, mais n'avez-vous quand même pas constaté certains problèmes, ou avez-vous constaté qu'une seule personne pouvait très bien s'en sortir.

Le Lgén Thériault: Je répondrai par l'affirmative, monsieur le président. Maintenant, si M. Sargeant désire . . .

M. Sargeant: Cela suffit. Merci.

Le Lgén Thériault: Je crois que le général Manson a suivi de beaucoup plus près la question.

M. Sargeant: Il y a un autre sujet, monsieur le président, dont j'aimerais parler avec le ministre. Les journaux d'aujourd'hui parlent d'une campagne du ministère de la Défense nationale—je crois que le ministère des Affaires extérieures va également y participer—pour contrer les protestations contre les missiles de croisière dans ce pays.

Le ministre pourrait-il me parler un peu plus de cette campagne?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, ce programme a été conçu, il n'est pas encore terminé, à l'origine à ma demande. J'ai demandé à notre personnel de mettre sur pied une sorte de programme pour combattre, d'une certaine manière, . . .

Une voix: Un programme éducatif.

M. Lamontagne: Un programme éducatif, renseignant véritablement la majorité des Canadiens sur ce qui se passe, sur ce que nous devrions savoir au sujet de l'OTAN, au sujet de NORAD, au sujet des armes nucléaires, au sujet des missiles de croisière, ce qu'ils sont et ce qu'ils représentent. Nous avons constaté, et j'ai constaté, qu'il y avait beaucoup de mésinformations et beaucoup d'ignorance, dans le sens propre du terme, au sujet de toutes ces questions. Compte tenu des énormes sommes d'argent et des énormes sommes d'efforts consacrées par ceux qui, d'une certaine manière, combattent la politique de l'OTAN, et la politique de ce gouvernement, puisque nous faisons partie de l'OTAN, j'ai pensé qu'il était juste et normal que notre ministère joigne ses forces à celles du ministère des Affaires extérieures pour essayer d'informer objectivement la population canadienne.

Monsieur Sargeant, vous avez probablement lu toute la littérature venant de Russie et d'ailleurs, et celle publiée également par les activistes exposant leurs arguments. Je pense donc qu'il est tout à fait normal que les Canadiens soient objectivement informés à ce sujet.

Je viens tout juste de recevoir une petite brochure intitulée: *Comment éviter la menace de l'Europe* imprimée à Moscou, brochure qui est vendue et qui se trouve à la bibliothèque ou qui est distribuée gratuitement et exposant les arguments des auteurs. Parfois, nous nous demandons pourquoi nous n'avons pas réagi plus tôt à ce genre d'information partielle. Je vais vous en lire un extrait. Je crois que cela vaut la peine. Il s'agit,

[Text]

question about what the west is, and about the Warsaw Pact, I believe. It says:

Soviet military policy is built on a clear understanding of the fact that neither intimidation nor pressure nor threat of aggression can impose an alien political will upon the other social system, or force it to change its social order.

I wonder what Russia is doing in Afghanistan. But they say the contrary here. So I think it is time to wake up and give Canadians the right answers to these questions.

Mr. Sargeant: I do not think they are especially succeeding in Afghanistan in imposing their way. They are having great difficulty.

You say it is going to be an unbiased point of view—unbiased according to whom? I think the *Canadian Press*, for instance, has carried almost every possible side of this story in the last year or two since it has been controversial.

Mr. Lamontagne: I think it is right to give the policy, to say what NATO policy is, to give information about our Canadian position, about NATO, about disarmament. How many people know, under the administration, why NATO was started in 1949, or what was the basis on which we founded it? Canada was one of the founders of NATO, with other countries. The main objective of NATO at the time was to make sure that we preserve our democratic rights, our liberties, our freedom. Because then the worst attack was very accurate on the other side. So we thought we had to balance the forces by activating what we call now NATO. This was the prime reason why NATO was born, to make sure that our democratic society and our freedom and liberty were preserved. We have been succeeding in doing that for the last 35 years. And all that through our policy of NATO, and I do not want to answer for about half an hour on this either. I talked to you for about half an hour on our policy of deterrents, trying to balance the two-track decision, as you know as well as I do: on one side to try to reinforce and create a balance of power or forces on each side, a balanced one, and at the same time making every effort possible to try to get negotiation constructed.

• 1610

Mr. Sargeant: I am quite aware of the history of NATO, and I think that most thoughtful people who are opposing the cruise missile testing in Canada are as well. I do not want to get into a debate, Mr. Minister, with you on other points, but can I ask you one last question? Can you give us an indication as to what this advertising campaign will cost in dollars and in staff?

Mr. Lamontagne: I do not have any specific budget to give you, but I would like to stress the fact that it is information; it is not advertising. I think there is a great difference between trying to inform our people and give them the truth about our own policy and just advertising, publicizing and things like

[Translation]

je crois, des positions respectives de l'Ouest et du Pacte de Varsovie. Je lis:

La politique militaire soviétique se fonde sur la réalité bien comprise que ni l'intimidation, ni les pressions, ni les menaces d'agression ne peuvent imposer la volonté d'une politique étrangère à l'autre système social, ou l'obliger à modifier son ordre social.

Je me demande ce que fait la Russie en Afghanistan. Ils disent le contraire ici. Je pense donc qu'il est temps de nous réveiller et de donner aux Canadiens les vraies réponses à ces questions.

M. Sargeant: Je ne crois pas que l'imposition de leur volonté rencontre spécialement le succès en Afghanistan. Ils ont de très grandes difficultés.

Vous dites que cette information sera impartiale, impartiale du point de vue de qui? Je crois que la *Presse canadienne*, par exemple, a rapporté les arguments de tous depuis le début de cette controverse, il y a un an ou deux.

M. Lamontagne: Je crois juste d'indiquer ce qu'est la politique de l'OTAN, d'indiquer ce qu'est la position canadienne au sujet de l'OTAN et du désarmement. Combien de gens savent pourquoi l'OTAN a été créée en 1949 ou savent sur quelle base elle a été créée. Le Canada a été l'un des fondateurs de l'OTAN avec d'autres pays. L'objectif principal de l'OTAN à l'époque était d'assurer la préservation de nos droits démocratiques et de nos libertés. Les pires attaques contre ces droits et ces libertés étaient alors lancées par les autres. Nous avons pensé que pour équilibrer les forces, il fallait créer ce que nous appelons maintenant l'OTAN. Si l'OTAN est née, c'est parce que nous voulions assurer la préservation de notre société démocratique et de nos libertés. Cela fait 35 ans que nous assurons cette préservation. Grâce à notre politique de l'OTAN, et je ne tiens pas à consacrer une demi-heure à cette question. Je vous ai parlé pendant une demi-heure de notre politique de dissuasion, de nos efforts de participation à un équilibre entre les deux Grands, vous le savez tout aussi bien que moi: d'une part, on essaie de renforcer et de créer un équilibre entre les forces en présence tout en faisant simultanément tous les efforts possibles pour que les négociations aboutissent.

M. Sargeant: Je connais très bien l'histoire de l'OTAN, et je pense que la plupart des gens réfléchis qui s'opposent aux essais du missile de croisière au Canada la connaissent également. Je ne veux pas me lancer dans un débat avec vous au sujet d'autres questions, monsieur le ministre, mais puis-je me permettre de vous poser une dernière question? Pourriez-vous nous donner une idée du coût de la campagne de publicité en dollars et en personnel?

M. Lamontagne: Je n'ai pas de chiffres précis à vous donner, mais je tiens à préciser qu'il s'agit d'une campagne d'information, et non pas de publicité. Je pense qu'il existe une grande différence entre une campagne d'information pour la population, pour lui dire la vérité au sujet de notre politique, et une

[Texte]

that. I think there is a big difference, and we call it information; we do not call it publicity.

Mr. Sargeant: All right, fair enough. But can you undertake to let us know what kind of budget this information program is going to have?

Mr. Lamontagne: Sure. When the plan is terminated or we know exactly what we are going to do on this issue, we can let you know. Whatever the amount is, I think it is very cheap for what we are trying to accomplish, to make people understand why they are living in this great country as freely as they are.

Mr. Sargeant: I think we know.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Sargeant.

Mr. Laniel, *s'il vous plaît*, followed by Mr. Bradley.

M. Laniel: Monsieur le président, pour poursuivre le point de mon collègue, M. Sargeant, qui arrive de la rencontre de l'Union interparlementaire à Helsinki... C'est souvent dans des réunions semblables que l'on peut voir toute la propagande anti-occidentale qui est faite par l'U.R.S.S. et par ses instruments qui s'appellent Cuba, le Zimbabwe et beaucoup de pays non engagés, qui en somme prêtent leur parole, leur langage acerbe, leur condamnation absolue..., et qui mettent les méchants seulement de d'un côté... Je pense que la population canadienne a besoin de connaître une opinion, un autre point de vue et d'être mise au courant de tous les faits en ce qui concerne toutes ces questions, ce qui lui permettra de porter un jugement beaucoup plus clair. Ce n'est pas de la propagande comme il se fait de l'autre côté.

Monsieur le ministre, la question que je voudrais vous poser me vient d'un article qui a paru dans *The Gazette* de Montréal, je pense hier, et que je n'ai pas devant moi, mais qui concerne la défense de l'avenir, la défense aérospatiale. Dans cet article, on semble se demander si le Canada va s'engager dans le programme américain de la défense future, dans le domaine de l'aérospatiale, et si on n'est pas prêts à le faire, immédiatement, est-ce que cela ne nous coûtera pas un prix exorbitant que l'on ne pourra pas se permettre dans les années 2000?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, I would like to answer this question probably in a simplistic way. You know very well that today new technology of defence, especially in the aerospace special issue, is evolving very fast.

J'aimerais ajouter qu'il faut être un petit peu avertis de ce qui se développe au niveau des nouvelles technologies aérospatiales. Et lorsque justement on discute en ce moment, par exemple, de certaines négociations au sujet de la défense aérienne nord-américaine, il est évident que nous avons un peu dépassé l'âge des radars simplistes. Il y a tout un domaine spatial qui va s'ouvrir éventuellement. Je pense que le Canada, par ses industries et par ses recherches, peut compléter les efforts que les États-Unis semblent faire dans ce domaine, dans le moment. Je pense que le Canada devra collaborer éventuellement avec les États-Unis et ses alliés de l'OTAN dans certains domaines aérospatiaux et de développement.

[Traduction]

campagne de publicité. Je pense qu'il existe une grande différence. Il s'agit d'information et non pas de publicité.

M. Sargeant: D'accord. Mais pouvez-vous vous engager à nous informer du budget du programme d'information?

M. Lamontagne: Certainement. Lorsque nous aurons élaboré les projets, ou lorsque nous saurons exactement ce que nous allons faire, nous pourrions vous en informer. Quel que soit le montant, à mon avis, c'est très peu, compte tenu de notre objectif, c'est-à-dire de faire comprendre à la population pourquoi elle jouit d'autant de liberté en ce pays magnifique.

M. Sargeant: Je pense que l'on connaît la réponse.

Le président: Merci beaucoup, monsieur Sargeant.

Monsieur Laniel, *please*, suivi de M. Bradley.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow up on the point raised by my colleague, Mr. Sargeant, who is just back from the meeting of the Interparliamentary Union in Helsinki. Often meetings such as this are forums for antiwestern propaganda by the USSR, and by its satellites such as Cuba and Zimbabwe, and a number of non-aligned countries. They use harsh language in condemning one side and in putting all the sinister forces on one side. I think that the people of Canada need to hear another point of view to be informed of all the facts relating to all these issues. In this way, they would be able to make a much more enlightened assessment. This is not the sort of propaganda that the other side carries out.

Mr. Minister, the question I would like to ask flows out of an article which appeared in the *Montreal Gazette*, yesterday, I believe. I do not have it in front of me, but it relates to defence in the future, to aerospace defence. The writer of the article seemed to be wondering whether Canada will be involved in the future American defence programs, in the aerospace field. If we are not prepared to get involved at the present time, would the cost not be so exorbitant after the year 2,000 that we would not be able to afford to do so?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, je voudrais répondre à la question d'une façon qui est probablement simpliste. Comme vous le savez très bien, la nouvelle technologie de la défense, surtout dans le domaine aérospatial, évolue très rapidement.

I must add that we must keep pace with new aerospace technologies. For example, now, we are dealing with negotiations about North America Air Defence, and obviously we are away from the simple radar age. A whole space sector is going to emerge, eventually. I think Canada, through its industries and research, can complement the present U.S. efforts in that area. I think Canada will have eventually to cooperate with the U.S. and its NATO allies in some aerospace and development areas. As for the costs and cetera, I think Canada has always managed, very modestly and moderately, to allow the needed funds for these defence programs.

[Text]

Quant aux coûts et le reste, je pense que le Canada a toujours su, de façon très modeste et très modérée, mettre les sommes d'argent nécessaires pour ces programmes de défense.

• 1615

Je pense que l'on ne peut pas dire que le Canada est un pays qui a exagéré dans les dépenses militaires ou dans les dépenses relatives à la Défense. Je pense que nous y allons de façon très prudente et nous regardons partout où nous pouvons collaborer; mais vous n'avez pas à vous inquiéter sur la question de dépenses exorbitantes dans ce domaine-là.

M. Laniel: En somme le but de ma question c'est de savoir si en prévoyant une collaboration, même si le Canada, en autant que la défense nord-américaine est concernée, a opté pour l'option défense plutôt que pour l'option totale, défense et contre-attaque, est-ce que quand même on n'aurait pas à gagner, sans s'engager dans une histoire de *Star Wars* qui intéresse notre jeunesse d'aujourd'hui, de penser que même dans cette technologie, la technologie de la surveillance par satellites, des contrôles par satellites, la défense par satellites..., le Canada n'aurait-il pas à gagner, dis-je, une certaine technologie qui pourrait lui être utile même dans la paix? On critique beaucoup la décision éventuelle de faire les tests des *Missiles Cruise* au Canada, mais quand même il reste que c'est dans des programmes de collaboration semblables, sur le plan technologique, qu'il y a quelques années, je pense, au moment où on a adopté le CR-104, cela a permis à certaines compagnies canadiennes d'acquérir un *know how*, une technologie, qu'elles ont transposée, qu'elles ont développée sur le plan de la navigation commerciale.

Alors, est-ce que le gouvernement canadien actuellement cherche à mettre au point certains paramètres au sujet de toute cette question, non seulement celle de la défense nord-américaine, mais aussi celle de la collaboration avec les Américains sur le plan technologique, par le biais de notre industrie, pour le développement de cette aspect important de la défense future?

M. Lamontagne: Le général, sur la question de la défense, pourrait peut-être compléter ma réponse.

Lgén Thériault: De fait, monsieur le président, le ministre faisait référence, il y a quelques instants, au programme de modernisation de la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord. À l'intérieur des discussions qui ont lieu présentement, et qui auront lieu, très certainement que l'on explorera différents domaines dans lesquels le Canada pourrait s'engager comme partenaire à l'intérieur du cadre de la défense du continent. Et il se pourrait que dans cette participation nous options pour un effort qui toucherait à l'espace. Il y a de fait, comme le mentionnait M. Laniel, possiblement des retombées technologiques, des retombées industrielles éventuelles qui pourraient être très intéressantes pour le pays. Il pourrait y avoir dans le domaine de la surveillance, comme vous l'avez mentionné, des raisons pour le pays de coopérer bilatéralement avec les États-Unis dans ce domaine. Mais je pense en fin de compte qu'il serait prématuré à ce stade de porter des jugements sur les choix éventuels qui seront mis devant les ministres pour décision.

[Translation]

I do not think that it can be said that Canada has gone overboard in military or defence spending. I think we proceed very cautiously, and that we look around to see where we can co-operate; but you need not worry about exorbitant expenditures in that area.

Mr. Laniel: What I was really asking is whether Canada might not stand to gain from this sort of co-operation even though as far as North American defence is concerned, it has chosen the defence option rather than the total defence and counter-attack option. Without getting into a *Star Wars* scenario, which is of such interest to young people today, might Canada not stand to gain from this technology which could be used even in peace time? I am thinking of satellite surveillance, satellite control, and satellite defence. There is a great deal of criticism about the possibility of testing the cruise missile in Canada, but the fact remains that it was through this sort of technological co-operation program, when Canada introduced the CF-104, that some Canadian companies were able to acquire technological expertise which they applied to the field of commercial navigation.

Is the Canadian government currently working out some parameters on this whole issue, not only as regards North American defence, but also as regards technological co-operation with the Americans through our industry to develop this important aspect of defence in the future?

Mr. Lamontagne: I think that Lieutenant-General Thériault could add to my answer as regards defence.

LGen Thériault: Mr. Chairman, the Minister was referring to the modernization of the North American air defence program just a few moments ago. There is no doubt that as part of the discussions that are going on at the present time, and that will go on in the future, we will be looking at the various fields in which Canada could make a commitment as a partner for the defence of the continent. It is possible that we might opt for the aerospace field in this context. As Mr. Laniel was saying, there may be some technological and industrial spin-offs which could be very attractive for Canada. As you said as well, there could be some reasons for Canada co-operating bilaterally with the United States in the area of surveillance. However, I think that it would be premature at this stage to make any judgment about the choices to be made by Cabinet.

[Texte]

M. Lamontagne: Je pourrais peut-être ajouter un mot là-dessus, à savoir que vous aviez raison, monsieur Laniel, lorsque vous disiez que beaucoup de ces recherches, de ces programmes qui touchent le militaire s'appliquent aussi au plan civil, par le biais des satellites. Par exemple, voyez le magnifique travail qui est fait par les satellites au point de vue sauvetage et recherche, et qui a eu pour origine probablement certaines expériences militaires, et qui maintenant est appliqué au domaine civil, et qui rend de grands services au plan humanitaire. Alors, beaucoup de domaines s'appliquent au plan civil, au fur et à mesure.

M. Laniel: Une dernière question, un peu dans la même direction. On nous a laissé croire que bientôt un Canadien pourra participer à un vol spatial en collaboration avec les Américains.

• 1620

Peut-être que M. Munro comme ancien navigateur et moi, comme ancien pilote, on pourrait aller voir cela. Ce sont des gens de notre âge qui vont là actuellement.

Mais quand même, est-ce que le ministère de la Défense nationale est concerné dans cette collaboration ou bien non, est-ce simplement le département des recherches?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Killick, will you give some information about the possibility of a Canadian's going to a space ship?

The Chairman: You will be followed by the hon. member from Haldimand—Norfolk.

Mr. Killick: Mr. Chairman, Canada has received an invitation from NASA for a Canadian to go aboard a space program at some future date, and there are various discussions as to who the individual should be at this point in time.

An hon. Member: You mean they have not started the selection yet?

The Chairman: The hon. member from Haldimand—Norfolk, Mr. Bradley.

Mr. Bradley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, for the minister, the minister is aware, I am sure, that one of the greatest advantages of the attack mode of the F-18 is the on-board capabilities with laser bombing devices and infra-red radar. He is also aware, with the terrain and climatic conditions in Europe, this is an absolute necessity. I wonder if the minister could tell us if the F-18s we will be deploying in Europe will have those capabilities?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, maybe General Manson, who is here as the expert on that and is going to Germany, I think...

The Chairman: General Manson is Chief, Air Doctrine and Operations. Am I right?

Mr. Lamontagne: Which is going to Air Command.

[Traduction]

Mr. Lamontagne: I could, perhaps, add one comment. You are quite right, Mr. Laniel, when you say that a great deal of military research and programs on satellites also have civilian applications. We need only think of the fine work done by satellites in search and rescue. At the outset, this use was probably designed for military experiments, but it is now applied to the civilian field, and has provided a great humanitarian service. So, with time, we find that many military programs have civilian applications.

Mr. Laniel: My final question is along the same lines. We have been given to understand that a Canadian may soon be participating in a space flight in co-operation with the Americans.

Perhaps Mr. Munro, a former navigator, and myself, a former pilot, could see about that. People our age are going now.

I would like to know whether the Department of National Defence is involved in this co-operation, or whether it is simply the National Research Council?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur Killick, voulez-vous répondre à la question concernant la possibilité qu'un Canadien participe à un vol spatial?

Le président: L'intervenant suivant sera le député de Haldimand—Norfolk.

M. Killick: Monsieur le président, le Canada a reçu de la part de la NASA une invitation aux termes de laquelle un Canadien participerait à un programme spatial à un moment donné. Il y a des discussions en ce moment au sujet de la personne qui devrait être choisie.

Une voix: Voulez-vous dire qu'ils n'ont pas encore amorcé le processus de sélection?

Le président: Le député de Haldimand—Norfolk, monsieur Bradley.

M. Bradley: Merci, monsieur le président.

Monsieur le président, comme le ministre le sait sans doute, l'un des grands avantages des particularités d'attaque du F-18 est son potentiel à bord qui comprend des appareils de bombardement à laser et son radar infrarouge. Il sait également que ce potentiel est indispensable étant donné les conditions du terrain et du climat en Europe. Le ministre pourrait-il nous dire si les F-18 que nous allons déployer en Europe seront dotés de ce potentiel?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, le général Manson, qui est l'expert dans ce domaine et qui va se rendre en Allemagne, je crois...

Le président: Le général Manson est chef des doctrines et opérations aériennes. Est-ce exact?

M. Lamontagne: Qui va relever du Commandement aérien.

[Text]

MGen P.D. Manson (Chief, Air Doctrine and Operations, Department of National Defence): Yes, I am Major-General Manson, Chief of Air Doctrine and Operations.

The F-18 aircraft we have acquired will come equipped with a wide variety of devices which will permit it to navigate in all weathers and day and night; and it will be applied in the European role in both air-to-air missions and air-to-ground missions. It will not at the outset be equipped with some of the devices that are now under development in the western world that will permit the use of laser systems to deliver weapons on target. The equipment the aircraft does have, which includes a very high precision radar and some accurate computers that permit very precise delivery of weapons, will permit the CF-18 to operate in virtually all weather conditions in central Europe, except for the most extreme conditions of bad weather.

Mr. Bradley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, you have told me, then, it will not have the laser bombing devices at the onset, as you were saying.

MGen Manson: Yes.

Mr. Bradley: Will it or will it not have the infra-red radar?

MGen Manson: No, it does not have an infra-red radar; it has a microwave radar on board. It should be pointed out, however, that these systems are systems that can be added very simply to aircraft. Generally speaking, they are mounted in pods that can be attached to the under-surface of the aircraft itself. So the aircraft, the CF-18 that we have purchased, does have complete facility for addition of these during the 20 or 30-year life span of the aircraft.

Mr. Bradley: I understand, Mr. Chairman, that the American versions are, in fact, having the capabilities I was discussing; I was wondering if the minister could tell us why the Canadian version will not.

Mr. Lamontagne: Maybe General Manson can answer that better than I.

MGen Manson: Yes, I can. There are limitations to the size of the budget that was assigned for the purchase of the CF-18 aircraft. Our intention at the outset is to buy the aircraft itself and all the necessary facilities to bring that aircraft into service. We do have reasonable stocks of weapons that can be applied in the early years of its life, but we do have programs within the department for ultimately improving the weapons the aircraft will carry and the systems that will be on board that aircraft.

Mr. Bradley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I hope, Mr. Minister, you will put tremendous importance on putting these capabilities on board those European aircraft.

I have another question to the minister. The minister I am sure is aware, if he has read the correspondence, that the FNCI, which I was issued in 1957 when I joined the forces and was still using some 18 or so years later when I left, is now an international collector's item. He may also be aware that

[Translation]

Le major-général P.D. Manson (chef, Doctrines et opérations aériennes, ministère de la Défense nationale): Oui, je suis le major-général Manson, chef des doctrines et opérations aériennes.

Le F-18 que nous avons acheté sera doté de toute une gamme d'appareils qui lui permettront de voler dans toutes sortes de temps et le jour et la nuit. On s'en servira en Europe et pour les missions air-air et les missions air-sol. Au début, le F-18 ne sera pas doté de certains des appareils qu'on élabore maintenant dans l'Ouest pour permettre l'utilisation des systèmes à laser pour faire en sorte que les armes suivent la trajectoire prévue. Toutefois, l'appareil est doté d'un radar de très grande précision, et de certains ordinateurs très précis qui permettront un bombardement très précis et permettront au F-18 de fonctionner dans n'importe quelles conditions atmosphériques en Europe centrale, sauf les conditions les plus extrêmes.

M. Bradley: Merci, monsieur le président.

Vous dites, général, que l'appareil n'aura pas les appareils de bombardement au laser au début.

Le MGen Manson: Oui.

M. Bradley: Aura-t-il oui ou non le radar infrarouge?

Le Mgen Manson: Non, il n'a pas le radar infrarouge, mais il est doté d'un radar à micro-ondes. Il convient de signaler, pourtant, qu'il est très facile de rajouter ces appareils au F-18. En général, on les met en place dans des nacelles que l'on attache sous le dessous de l'appareil. Il sera donc possible de rajouter ces appareils au F-18 que nous avons acheté pendant sa durée de vie de 20 ou 30 ans.

M. Bradley: Je crois savoir, monsieur le président, que la version américaine de l'appareil sera dotée du potentiel dont je vous parlais. Le ministre pourrait-il nous dire pourquoi la version canadienne n'en sera pas dotée?

M. Lamontagne: Peut-être que le général Manson est mieux en mesure de répondre à la question que moi.

Le Mgen Manson: Oui. Le budget affecté à l'achat des appareils CF-18 est quand même limité. Notre intention au départ est d'acheter l'appareil lui-même et toutes les installations nécessaires pour que l'on puisse le mettre en service. Nous avons des stocks suffisants d'armes que nous pourrions utiliser pendant les premières années, mais il existe au ministère des programmes qui prévoient l'amélioration éventuelle des armes et des systèmes dont l'appareil sera doté.

M. Bradley: Merci, monsieur le président.

J'espère, monsieur le ministre, que vous allez attacher beaucoup d'importance à la mise en place de ce potentiel dans les avions dont on se servira en Europe.

J'ai une autre question à poser au ministre. Si le ministre a lu la correspondance, il saura que le FNCI qu'on m'a donné en 1957 lorsque je suis devenu membre des forces armées et qui était toujours en usage dix-huit années plus tard lorsque j'ai quitté les forces armées, est maintenant devenu une pièce de

[Texte]

Canadian customs refused its entry into Canada by Canadian collectors. Hopefully, we will not become too much of an embarrassment through continuance of this. I wonder if we could have an update on when its replacement will be in the hands of Canada's military.

• 1625

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, the replacement of these small arms is a top priority in our department, and General Thériault might give you an update where we are in it. His staff are expert on it. It is one of the programs which are ongoing at the moment in negotiation and all that, so maybe these details can be given by General Thériault.

LGen Thériault: That is correct, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, the program is one of the top priorities in terms of equipment renewal in the department right now. As you know, we have participated in a NATO trial that agreed on common calibre and we have conducted our own trial internally. We have come to some preliminary determinations in terms of the options before us, and the program submission is in the process of being finalized for consideration by departmental and political authorities.

Subject to programming, at this time I could suggest that we are hopeful of seeing production undertaken in Canada and perhaps—I would like to make that clear, Mr. Chairman—perhaps with some deliveries starting by late 1984 and 1985.

Mr. Bradley: Very good. Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Bradley.

I have to tell you that the minister has an appointment at 5.00 p.m., and I want to give a fair chance to everybody. So, if we keep going on like this everybody will have a chance, please. Next on my list is Mr. Robinson, followed by Mr. Darling. I will name the others after. Five minutes, please.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask the minister about the Canadian ice station *CESAR*, and what he knows about the Soviet station NP-25 as well. Could he tell us in his explanation what exactly Canada is going to do in the north, apart from studying the undersea Alpha Ridge? Could he tell us if the Soviet Union is doing the same study?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, I think that *CESAR* operation is not necessarily a Canadian operation. I mean, we are supporting it. Again, I think the DCDS can give you the explanation about this *CESAR* operation.

The Chairman: Vice-Admiral Mainguy.

VAdm D.N. Mainguy (Deputy Chief, Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Insofar as the Department

[Traduction]

collection internationale. Il saura peut-être aussi que la douane canadienne a refusé aux collectionneurs canadiens l'entrée de cette arme au Canada. J'espère qu'on aura bientôt une nouvelle arme, pour éviter cette situation gênante. Je me demande si vous pourriez nous dire lorsque les forces armées canadiennes auront une nouvelle arme pour remplacer le FNCL.

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, l'une des premières priorités de notre ministère est le remplacement de ces armes de petit calibre, et le général Thériault pourra vous dire où en est le programme. Son personnel se spécialise dans ce domaine. C'est l'un des programmes qui fait l'objet de beaucoup de négociations en ce moment, donc peut-être que le général Thériault pourra vous donner davantage de détails.

Le LGen. Thériault: C'est exact, monsieur le président. En fait, le programme constitue l'une des premières priorités pour ce qui est du renouvellement de l'équipement du ministère en ce moment. Comme vous le savez, nous avons participé à certains essais de l'OTAN au cours desquels on s'est mis d'accord sur un calibre commun. Nous avons également effectué nos propres essais. Nous avons pris quelques décisions préliminaires quant aux options qui s'offrent à nous, et on est en train de finaliser la soumission que l'on présentera aux responsables du ministère et du gouvernement.

Sous réserve de la programmation, je puis vous dire que nous espérons que la production sera amorcée au Canada et que peut-être—et j'insiste sur le peut-être, monsieur le président—nous commencerons à recevoir les nouvelles armes vers la fin de 1984 et en 1985.

M. Bradley: Très bien. Merci.

Le président: Merci, monsieur Bradley.

Je dois vous dire que le ministre a un rendez-vous à 17 heures, et je veux donner à tout le monde la possibilité de poser des questions. Donc, si l'on continue de la même façon, tout le monde aura l'occasion de poser des questions. Le prochain intervenant sur ma liste est M. Robinson, qui sera suivi de M. Darling. Je vais nommer les autres députés par la suite. Cinq minutes, s'il vous plaît.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Merci, monsieur le président. Je voudrais poser certaines questions au ministre au sujet de la station canadienne *CESAR*, et la station soviétique NP-25 également. Pourrait-il nous dire exactement ce que fait le Canada dans le Nord, en dehors des études sur le plateau sous-marin Alpha? Pourrait-il nous dire si l'Union soviétique effectue la même étude?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, je ne pense pas que l'opération *CESAR* soit forcément une opération canadienne, même si nous l'appuyons. Je pense que le sous-chef de l'État-major de la défense peut répondre à la question au sujet de la station *CESAR*.

Le président: Vice-amiral Mainguy.

Le vice-amiral Mainguy (sous-chef de l'État-major de la Défense, ministère de la Défense nationale): Pour ce qui est du

[Text]

of National Defence is concerned, CESAR was a support operation to Canadian continental shelf research in the arctic. What we did was to land some heavy equipment to build a runway on which aircraft could be landed, and we helped to set up the party on the ice to do their continental shelf research.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Is this airstrip you have just for small planes like the Twin Otter, or would it be sufficient for the F-18s?

VAdm Mainguy: I am fairly certain we landed Hercules aircraft on it, but I do not think they built it to land an F-18.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): The information I have is that Canadian Twin Otter aircraft were used to visit the Soviets. I assume they travelled from CESAR to the Soviet base in the Twin Otter. Would that be correct?

VAdm Mainguy: There were Twin Otters up there, but they were civilian Twin Otters operating out of there. They could well have gone to the Soviet base from CESAR, but as far as I know, no DND aircraft did.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Are we monitoring what the Soviet Union is doing up in this base of theirs known as NP-25?

• 1630

VAdm Mainguy: Yes, I think so.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): And what do we know they are doing so far, apart from the satellite receiving equipment they have up there . . .

An hon. Member: Freezing.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): —their weather instruments and the oceanography?

VAdm Mainguy: I think that is what they are doing: scientific research and weather observations on a piece of floating ice.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Did the armed forces have anything to do with making the arrangements for the Canadians to visit the Russians?

VAdm Mainguy: Not as far as I am aware.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Then this was probably done through external affairs.

VAdm Mainguy: I do not think there was anything like that. I think it was something locally arranged, as far as I know. I do not know.

Mr. Lamontagne: It is an EMR operation.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Is Mr. Hans Weber, the expedition's chief scientist, doing any work for the Department of National Defence?

[Translation]

ministère de la Défense nationale, *CESAR* constitue une opération qui appuie les recherches du Canada sur le plateau continental dans l'Arctique. Nous y avons envoyé certains équipements lourds par avion pour construire une piste d'atterrissage. Nous avons également aidé le groupe de recherche à s'installer sur la glace pour effectuer leurs recherches sur le plateau continental.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): S'agit-il d'une piste d'atterrissage pour des petits avions comme le Twin Otter, ou serait-il possible pour le F-18 d'y atterrir?

Le VAm Mainguy: Je suis assez certain qu'un avion Hercules y a atterri, mais je ne pense pas qu'on l'a construit de façon à permettre à un F-18 d'y atterrir.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): On me dit qu'on s'est servi du Twin Otter canadien pour rendre visite aux Soviétiques. Je suppose que les Canadiens ont voyagé de *CESAR* à la base soviétique dans le Twin Otter. Est-ce exact?

Le VAm Mainguy: Il y avait des Twin Otter là-haut, mais il s'agissait d'avions civils. Il se peut fort bien qu'ils se soient rendu à la base soviétique depuis la base *CESAR*, mais à ma connaissance, ils ne se sont pas servis d'un avion du ministère de la Défense nationale.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Est-ce que nous contrôlons les activités de l'Union soviétique à leur base qui s'appelle NP-25?

VAm Mainguy: Oui, je crois que oui.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Et que font-ils? Que savent-ils de leurs activités; ils ont leur équipement satellite . . .

Une voix: Ils gèlent.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): . . . leurs instruments météorologiques et océanographiques?

VAm Mainguy: C'est précisément ce qu'ils font: de la recherche scientifique, de l'observation météorologique sur une banquise.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Les Forces armées ont-elles eu quelque chose à voir avec l'organisation de la visite de Canadiens chez les Russes?

VAm Mainguy: Pas à ma connaissance, non.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): C'est probablement les Affaires extérieures qui ont tout arrangé.

VAm Mainguy: Je ne crois pas que ça se soit passé comme cela. Pour autant que je sache, tout s'est organisé là-bas. Je ne sais pas.

M. Lamontagne: C'est une opération du ministère de l'Énergie, des Mines et des Ressources.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Le chef scientifique de l'expédition, M. Hans Weber, fait-il du travail pour le ministère de la Défense nationale?

[Texte]

Vadm Mainguy: As the minister says, it is an EMR operation. As far as I know, DND support was what I said, which was to build a runway and help them get in there; and that is it.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): In view of the fact that Mr. Hans Weber has apparently made this statement, that he intended to borrow one of the planes at the station and visit the Soviet neighbours whether he was invited or not, would this not have some impact on the Department of National Defence?

Mr. Laniel: If he pays cash, why not?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Weber is somebody working with EMR, I believe. It has nothing to do with us.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): In view of the fact that it appears both stations are drifting in international waters—in other words, I suppose the studies that are being done of this ridge—unless it can be shown that it is attached in some way to Canada, it is really beyond the purview of Canada's forces. Is that right?

Vadm Mainguy: DND has no particular program going on in the region in which CESAR is operating. As I say, there was a co-operative arrangement between departments, that we would help out EMR to get their team in there; and that is period. That is all the DND involvement there was, as far as I know.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): So if it is determined that in fact this Alpha Ridge is part of an extension of Canada, then our claim to the arctic would be that much greater and there would then be a role for DND. Is that right, Mr. Minister?

Mr. Lamontagne: I do not think there would be a special role for DND to protect the continental shelf, as long as our security is not in danger. At the moment I do not think the continental shelf in the north is in danger at all—I hope not—unless some drifting is towards our continental shelf; and then we will see to it.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Mr. Minister, do B-52 bombers of the United States Air Force fly over Canada?

Mr. Lamontagne: Yes. We have some agreements that sometimes when the Americans ask to fly over Canada with B-52s we have certain specifications that permission has to be granted according to different requirements or regulations of the Canadian government. What all the specific regulations are, maybe somebody could tell me. I think they must not be armed, they must be only experimental or on exercises, which means absolutely no atomic weapons, no nuclear weapons, and all that. So it is very well monitored to make sure that all these regulations that we put forward when we give permission are well observed.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): My concern was that I understand some four B-52s have crashed since Decem-

[Traduction]

Vam Mainguy: Comme le ministre l'a dit, il s'agit d'une opération du ministère de l'Énergie, des Mines et des Ressources. Pour autant que je sache, l'aide du MDN a consisté, comme je l'ai dit, à aménager une piste d'atterrissage et à aider l'équipe à se rendre sur place, et c'est tout.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Le fait que M. Hans Weber ait apparemment dit qu'il avait l'intention d'emprunter l'un des avions de la station et d'aller visiter ses voisins soviétiques, avec ou sans invitation, n'aurait-il pas eu une certaine incidence sur le ministère de la Défense nationale?

Mr. Laniel: S'il paie comptant, pourquoi pas?

Mr. Lamontagne: M. Weber travaille pour le compte du ministère de l'Énergie, des Mines et des Ressources, je pense. Cela n'a rien à voir avec nous.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Étant donné que les deux stations sembleraient dériver en eaux internationales, ce qui veut dire que les études qu'on y effectue, à moins qu'on puisse démontrer que la banquise appartient au territoire canadien, les stations ne relèvent vraiment pas de la compétence des Forces canadiennes. Est-ce exact?

Vam Mainguy: Le MDN n'a aucun programme particulier dans la région où se déroule le projet CESAR. Je le répète, il y a eu une entente de coopération entre les deux ministères suivant laquelle nous devions aider le ministère de l'Énergie, des Mines et des Ressources à y amener son équipe; et c'est tout. Pour autant que je sache, le MDN n'a rien fait de plus.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Alors, s'il était établi que la crête Alpha faisait partie du territoire canadien, notre droit à l'Arctique serait d'autant plus marqué et le MDN y aurait un rôle à y jouer. N'est-ce pas, monsieur le ministre?

Mr. Lamontagne: Je ne crois pas que le MDN aurait un rôle spécial à jouer pour protéger le plateau continental, tant et aussi longtemps que notre sécurité ne serait pas menacée. À l'heure actuelle, je ne crois pas que le plateau continental au Nord soit menacé du tout, du moins je l'espère, à moins que la dérivation pousse les glaces vers notre plateau continental; alors là, nous ferions quelque chose.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Monsieur le ministre, des bombardiers B-52 des Forces de l'air américaines survolent-ils le Canada?

Mr. Lamontagne: Oui. Il existe certains accords qui permettent aux Américains, lorsqu'ils en font la demande, de survoler le Canada en B-52; dans certaines conditions, les Américains doivent être autorisés à survoler le pays, conformément à divers règlements du gouvernement canadien. En quoi consistent ces règlements, qu'on me le dise. Je pense qu'ils ne doivent pas être armés, qu'ils doivent mener des opérations expérimentales seulement ou des exercices, ce qui signifie que les B-52 ne portent aucune arme atomique, aucune arme nucléaire et ainsi de suite. Tout est très bien contrôlé afin de s'assurer que tous nos règlements soient bien respectés.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Ce qui m'inquiète, c'est que quatre B-52 se sont écrasés depuis décembre dernier.

[Text]

ber of last year. In every case, I guess, they were not carrying nuclear weapons, but I just wanted to get the assurance from the minister that B-52 bombers—which apparently are hazards at the present time, or appear to be, because of their age—would not be flying over Canada with nuclear weapons.

Mr. Lamontagne: I can assure you of that.

• 1635

LGen Thériault: I was just going to point out, Mr. Chairman, that the four B-52 accidents that have taken place, tragically, have all been in very low-level training; it should not be generalized from that that the B-52 is inherently an unsafe aircraft. On the contrary, their safety record is a very outstanding one, and any B-52 flying over Canada unarmed and at high altitude of course would be in a different employment mode.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): When you said . . .

The Chairman: Your very last question, Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Oh, but I need a clarification on that, if I might, and then one other question. If you say a high level as against low level, are you talking about a height above which you require oxygen?

LGen Thériault: Oh, absolutely, sir, yes. I mean at 30,000 and 40,000 feet. They are on oxygen all the time anyway.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): My last question, then: In regard to the frigate program, my understanding is that there are two vessels at the present time being considered, the Scan vessel and the Sperry vessel. They both seem to have virtually the same specifications except one, and it has to do with the size of the gun, which on the Scan vessel is a 76 millimetre, and on the Sperry vessel is a 57 millimetre. Is this the basis upon which the decision would be made as to which ship will be obtained?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, as far as I am concerned as Minister of National Defence—I gave this answer in the House—my department is just ending the evaluation of the two propositions we received, and my concern and responsibility is to try to choose the best ship possible, as Mr. McKinnon has just said. As far as the other decision to be taken, as far as the funding required, the sharing between different yards and all that, these decisions will be taken at the level of the Cabinet.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

The hon. member from Parry Sound—Muskoka, Mr. Darling, *s'il vous plaît*.

Mr. Darling: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

On the frigate program, we have been waiting for years and years. It is finally coming to its fruition as far as deciding, but is still on the drawing . . . I am looking with some interest here at some figures where it says the government intends to spend \$9,355,000 in 1983-1984. Do you mean to tell me that would

[Translation]

Chaque fois, ils ne portaient pas d'arme nucléaire, mais je voulais simplement m'assurer auprès du ministre que les bombardiers B-52 qui semblent être dangereux à l'heure actuelle à cause de leur âge, ne survoleraient pas le Canada avec des armes nucléaires.

M. Lamontagne: Je peux vous l'assurer.

LGen Thériault: J'allais justement dire, monsieur le président, que les quatre accidents tragiques impliquant les B-52 se sont tous produits lors d'exercices à très basse altitude; et il ne faudrait pas en déduire que le B-52 est dangereux. Au contraire, son dossier de sécurité est très reluisant, et tout B-52 non armé survolant le Canada à haute altitude aurait une mission différente.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Quand vous dites . . .

Le président: Votre dernière question, monsieur Robinson.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Mais oh, j'ai besoin d'éclaircissements là-dessus, si vous me permettez, ensuite une autre question. Quand vous parlez de haute altitude par opposition à basse altitude, vous voulez dire une altitude au dessus de laquelle on utilise de l'oxygène?

LGen Thériault: Absolument, monsieur. Je parle de 30,000 et 40,000 pieds d'altitude. De toute façon, on utilise toujours de l'oxygène.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Ma dernière question donc: au sujet du programme de fré gates, je pense qu'on envisage actuellement deux possibilités, le Scan et le Sperry. Tous deux semblent présenter virtuellement les mêmes caractéristiques sauf pour ce qui est du canon; le Scan étant doté d'un 76 millimètres, et le Sperry d'un 57 millimètres. Est-ce sur cette considération que reposera votre choix?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, en ce qui me concerne en tant que ministre de la Défense nationale, et c'est la réponse que j'ai donnée à la Chambre, mon ministère est sur le point de terminer l'évaluation des deux propositions que nous avons reçues, et je dois m'assurer de choisir la meilleure des deux, comme vient de le dire M. McKinnon. Quant aux autres décisions relatives au financement, aux travaux des divers chantiers et ainsi de suite, elles seront prises au niveau du Cabinet.

Le président: Merci beaucoup.

L'honorable député de Parry Sound—Muskoka, monsieur Darling, *s'il vous plaît*.

M. Darling: Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président.

Au sujet du programme des fré gates, nous attendons depuis de nombreuses années. Nous avons finalement pris une décision, mais le programme n'est pas encore . . . J'ai en main quelques chiffres intéressants montrant que le gouvernement compte dépenser \$9,355,000 en 1983-1984. Est-ce tout ce que

[Texte]

be the total money spent by National Defence in this year and next year when the thing is finally supposed to get under way?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, I am told that the figure, which is supposed to be the right figure, is \$190 million in 1983-1984.

Mr. Darling: Well, that is certainly different here. Then it says also a total of \$62,416,000 is estimated for this project definition work in the next few years.

Mr. Lamontagne: Maybe Mr. Davies can give an explanation of these figures.

Mr. Darling: Those are pretty paltry figures in this inflationary period, if we expect to get those ships going at all.

Mr. L.E. Davies: (Assistant Deputy Minister, Finance, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, the \$9 million is the balance of the contract definition funds that have been spent over the past two, three, four years, \$60 million to \$67 million. The actual amount to be spent on the Canadian patrol frigate is still in negotiation and will not be determined until the contract is signed and approved by Cabinet. The cashflow will have to be determined at that time.

Mr. Darling: That is what I am wondering, but that looks as if there is an estimate set in there for all the expenditures over the next two years.

Mr. Davies: No, Mr. Chairman, the \$9 million is for the Canadian patrol frigate contract definition. When the contract is approved by Cabinet there will be a line item appearing in the estimates for the Canadian patrol frigate. At that time it will show the amount of the contract and the amount of the annual cashflow.

Mr. Darling: Originally, what was the figure? It was \$1.5 billion 6 or 7 years ago, back in 1977, and then it went to \$3.5 billion a year or so ago. What would a guess be now, the guesstimate?

• 1640

Mr. Davies: Mr. Chairman, as the member has mentioned, the original figure in 1977 was \$1.585 billion. In today's dollars, that equates to, as you stated, something like \$3.5 billion. On budget-year dollars, by the time the thing is completed, will be somewhere in the range of \$5 billion.

Mr. Darling: That is \$5 billion for the six of them.

Mr. Davies: For the six.

Mr. Darling: The earliest possible date, if they started building on Friday morning, would probably be what, at least two years? I see General Thériault laughing.

An hon. Member: At least two.

Mr. Darling: It would be, at the very earliest, what, two years down the way before the first one would slide down—over longer than that? I do not need it in days, but in years.

[Traduction]

dépensera la Défense nationale cette année et l'an prochain pour ce programme?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, on me dit 190 millions de dollars pour 1983-1984.

M. Darling: C'est très différent. Ensuite, on parle d'un total de \$62,416,000 pour l'établissement de contrats au cours des prochaines années.

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur Davies peut peut-être vous expliquer ces chiffres.

M. Darling: C'est très peu, en période d'inflation, si nous voulons vraiment réaliser ce programme.

M. L.E. Davies (sous-ministre adjoint, Finances, ministère de la Défense nationale): Monsieur le président, les 9 millions de dollars sont le reste des fonds d'établissement des contrats qui ont été dépensés au cours des deux, trois ou quatre dernières années pour un total de 60 à 67 millions de dollars. Le montant réel qui sera consacré à la construction de la frégate de patrouille canadienne est toujours en train d'être négocié et ne sera pas établi avant que le contrat ne soit signé et approuvé par le Cabinet. Le montant sera déterminé à ce moment-là.

M. Darling: C'est ce que je me demandais, parce qu'on dirait que nous avons là une prévision de toutes les dépenses pour les deux prochaines années.

M. Davies: Non, monsieur le président, les 9 millions de dollars sont destinés à l'établissement des contrats relatifs à la frégate de patrouille canadienne. Quand le contrat sera approuvé par le Cabinet, il y aura un article de dépense dans le budget pour la frégate. À ce moment-là, on aura le montant du contrat et le montant des liquidités annuelles.

M. Darling: Au début, de combien parlions-nous? C'était 1.5 milliard de dollars, il y a six ou sept ans en 1977, ensuite cela a monté à 3.5 milliards de dollars il y a environ un an. Qu'est-ce que ce serait maintenant?

M. Davies: Monsieur le président, comme le député l'a mentionné, le chiffre original en 1977 était 1.585 milliard. En dollars courants, cela équivaut, comme vous l'avez dit, à environ 3.5 milliards de dollars. D'ici à ce que le projet soit terminé, le programme aura coûté environ 5 milliards de dollars.

M. Darling: Cinq milliards de dollars pour les six frégates?

M. Davies: Pour les six, oui.

M. Darling: Le plus vite qu'on pourrait les avoir, si nous commençons à les bâtir vendredi matin, serait probablement quand? Dans deux ans au moins? Je vois le général Thériault qui rit.

Une voix: Au moins deux ans.

M. Darling: Il faudrait tout au moins deux ans avant que la première frégate ne soit construite, ou plus que cela? Je ne veux pas savoir combien de jours, mais combien d'années.

[Text]

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, I think it was said that, if everything goes according to our plan and we manage to get a decision by the end of June or the beginning of July, I think the first ship would be in about 1987, is it?

LGen. Thériault: Or 1988.

Mr. Lamontagne: That is the end of, let us say, 1987 or the beginning of 1988; and the last one will be operational by 1992, I believe. So that is the time span we are looking at in building these ships. It takes about three years to build ships.

Mr. Darling: That is nine years down the way. I hope you are not going to build them, Mr. Minister, one at a time.

Mr. Lamontagne: We will see. It all depends on which shipyard has it and what is going on.

Mr. Darling: I think Mr. McKinnon's suggestion that you divide it up like a Christian . . .

Mrs. Appoloni: Like a what?

Mr. Darling: Like a Christian. Is there anything wrong with that?

The Chairman: Or the Moslems.

Mr. Darling: All right, all right, and have three under way at once, especially with unemployment the way it is.

An hon. Member: We cannot afford it that way.

Mr. Darling: We cannot afford it? It is going to end up costing more the longer you delay it. So surely, Mr. Minister, that suggestion of Mr. McKinnon that you build one in Victoria and . . . I was going to say one in Burks Falls, but they would not draw quite enough water there.

Mr. McRae: One in Thunder Bay.

Mr. Darling: One in Quebec and one in the Maritimes, in Saint John.

Mr. Lamontagne: You can be sure, after what you just said and what Mr. McKinnon had mentioned, our government will try to build these ships as fast as it is possible to be done at the yard, anyway.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): It would be in my riding, anyway.

Mr. Darling: 1992 is not as fast as possible.

Mr. Lamontagne: Well, that is what the contractor tells us. It could be the time span of the building of ships; and apparently, it cannot be faster than that, even if they have the six ships in the same yard.

Mr. Darling: What about during the war? They sure did not take nine years to build six then.

Mr. McRae: I was on one of them, then. It nearly sunk with water leaking in.

The Chairman: Please, please.

Mr. Darling: If you had a real scare, I will bet you would have the damned things built in a lot less than nine years.

[Translation]

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, je pense qu'on a déjà dit que, si tout allait comme prévu, et si nous obtenons une décision d'ici à la fin juin ou au début juillet, la première frégate serait prête environ en 1987, n'est-ce pas?

Lgén Thériault: Ou 1988.

M. Lamontagne: Vers la fin de 1987 ou début 1988; et la dernière sera complétée d'ici à 1992, je pense. Voilà ce que nous envisageons comme délai pour la construction de ces navires. Il faut environ trois ans pour en construire un.

M. Darling: Cela nous donne neuf ans. J'espère, monsieur le ministre, que vous n'allez pas les construire un à un.

M. Lamontagne: Nous verrons. Tout dépend du chantier naval qui obtiendra le contrat. Tout dépend de ce qui arrivera.

M. Darling: Je pense que la suggestion de M. McKinnon qu'on divise cela comme des chrétiens . . .

Mme Appoloni: Comme quoi?

M. Darling: Comme des chrétiens. Y a-t-il quelque chose de mal là-dedans?

Le président: Ou comme des musulmans.

M. Darling: Bon, bon! Et qu'on en construise trois à la fois, compte tenu particulièrement de la situation du chômage.

Une voix: Nous n'avons pas les moyens de le faire comme cela.

M. Darling: Nous n'avons pas les moyens? Plus on attend, plus cela va coûter cher. Alors, monsieur le ministre, la suggestion de M. McKinnon qu'on en construise une à Victoria et . . . j'allais dire une autre à Burks Falls, mais il n'y a pas suffisamment d'eau là-bas.

M. McRae: Une autre à Thunder Bay.

M. Darling: Une au Québec et une autre dans les Maritimes à St-Jean.

M. Lamontagne: Vous pouvez être sûr qu'après ce que vous et M. McKinnon venez de dire, notre gouvernement essaiera de construire les frégates aussi rapidement qu'il est possible de le faire au chantier.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Ce serait dans ma circonscription, au moins.

M. Darling: Je ne crois pas que 1992 soit aussi vite que possible.

M. Lamontagne: Eh bien, c'est ce que l'entrepreneur nous dit. C'est le temps qu'il faut pour construire les navires; et on ne peut le faire plus rapidement, semble-t-il, même si les six frégates sont au même chantier.

M. Darling: Mais pendant la guerre? Il n'a sûrement pas fallu neuf ans pour en construire six alors.

M. McRae: J'ai presque coulé à bord d'un de ces navires qui prenait l'eau.

Le président: S'il vous plaît, s'il vous plaît.

M. Darling: Si vous étiez vraiment obligés, je suis sûr que vous les construiriez en beaucoup moins que neuf ans.

[Texte]

Mr. Lamontagne: Probably the first one would be slower; but then, the repetition is not always faster. That is what happened in the war. It was a staple ship, and they started production. But apparently, contractors are people who know, who are competent, and they say that is the time it takes. I cannot contradict them.

The Chairman: A supplementary by the Hon. Mr. McKinnon, and then I will go to another member.

Mr. McKinnon: I was rather surprised at Mr. Davies' answer to that question by my distinguished colleague from Parry Sound—Muskoka about the money in the estimates for the Canadian patrol frigate this year, in case the contracts are awarded and ready to go. As Mr. Davies himself pointed out, on April 19 in the minutes, page 88:27, he was pointing to . . . Mr. McKinnon said: "Page 17-16". Mr. Davies said:

Page 17-16, yes. Under "Ships", you will see an estimate for 1983-1984 of \$133 million. Now that does not mean that it is all going to the Canadian patrol frigate. That is the general classification of ships. But as the deputy minister stated earlier, approximately \$100 million—\$92 million is the exact figure,—is set aside and planned for the Canadian patrol frigate, if it goes forward this year.

I presume that still pertains. If it goes forward this year, if the contracts are let, there will be \$90 million available for them to use between the time of the awarding of the contract and the end of next March. Without benefit of a supplementary estimate, is that right?

• 1645

The Chairman: Briefly, please.

Mr. Davies: Mr. Chairman, I did not mean supplementary estimates for more funds. The supplementary estimate gives us the opportunity to enter into the estimates the line item: patrol frigate. We cannot put it in the estimates until it is approved.

Mr. McKinnon: Now, you can use that \$133 million without having . . .

Mr. Davies: That is right.

Mr. McKinnon:—before the supplements.

Mr. Davies: Now, we have to go back into a bit of the methodology we use in putting these estimates together. When the patrol frigate is included in this line item for the \$133 million, it is put in as—we refer to it as C capital, which is discounted by 50%, because we are not sure it is going ahead. So the money in there is discounted, it is \$90-some-odd million in that build-up to the \$133 million. In actual fact, the cash planned is \$180-some-odd million, discounted by 50% and put

[Traduction]

M. Lamontagne: Le premier navire prendrait probablement plus de temps; mais encore là, les autres ne prennent pas nécessairement moins de temps. C'est ce qui est arrivé durant la guerre. On en avait besoin, et on a commencé à produire. Mais les entrepreneurs sont des gens qui savent, des gens compétents, et c'est ce qu'ils nous disent. Je ne peux pas les contredire.

Le président: Une question supplémentaire de l'honorable M. McKinnon, ensuite je vais passer la parole à un autre député.

M. McKinnon: J'ai été un peu surpris de la réponse de M. Davies à la question de mon distingué collègue de Parry Sound—Muskoka au sujet des fonds prévus dans le budget pour le programme de frégates canadiennes de patrouille cette année, advenant que les contrats soient octroyés et prêts à être exécutés. Comme M. Davies l'a dit lui-même, à la page 88:27 des procès-verbaux du 19 avril, dans un échange avec M. McKinnon qui disait: «A la page 17-17». Et M. Davies a répondu:

Oui, à la page 17-17. Vous verrez que nous avons prévu 133 millions de dollars pour le poste «Navires» pour l'exercice financier 1983-1984. Mais cela ne veut pas dire pour autant que nous allons consacrer toute cette somme à notre programme de frégates canadiennes de patrouille. Il s'agit plutôt de la classification générale des navires. Mais comme le sous-ministre l'a dit plus tôt, quelque 100 millions de dollars, 92 millions de dollars pour être précis—seront mis de côté pour le programme de frégates canadiennes de patrouille, si le contrat est octroyé cette année.

Je suppose que cela tient toujours. Si les contrats sont octroyés cette année, il y aura 90 millions de dollars à dépenser entre le moment de la passation du contrat et la fin du mois de mars prochain. Sans possibilité de budget supplémentaire, n'est-ce pas?

Le président: Brièvement, s'il vous plaît.

M. Davies: Monsieur le président, je n'ai pas parlé du budget supplémentaire pour plus de fonds. Le budget supplémentaire nous permet d'inscrire un article de dépense précis comme la frégate de patrouille. Nous ne pouvons l'y inscrire avant que le programme ne soit approuvé.

M. McKinnon: Alors vous pouvez utiliser ces 133 millions de dollars sans . . .

M. Davies: C'est exact.

M. McKinnon: . . . avant la présentation du budget supplémentaire.

M. Davies: Maintenant, je pense que nous devons parler un peu de la façon dont nous établissons les prévisions budgétaires. Quand nous incluons la frégate de patrouille dans les 133 millions de dollars, nous l'y inscrivons au titre de ce que nous appelons immobilisations C, qui sont réduites de la moitié parce que nous ne sommes pas certains que les dépenses seront effectuées. Alors, ce n'est pas la somme totale; il y a quelque 90 millions de dollars sur la somme globale de 133 millions de

[Text]

into the estimates at that figure. Once the contract is approved and we have a firm cashflow, then we will make money available to the level required, and in this case, \$180 million—whatever.

Mr. McKinnon: And that would require a supplementary estimate.

Mr. Davies: No, no, the funds will be there in the program. We over-program, as you know, so that we have projects always more than the money we have available. But when a contract becomes firm, the money is applied to it out of the estimates that exist. We will not need supplementaries this year for the patrol frigate.

The Chairman: Thank you.

I have two more members of the committee, and then someone who is not yet a member. But the next one is the chairman of the Canada-Arab World Parliamentary Group, the hon. member from Fundy—Royal, Mr. Corbett. I repeat, for taping, Canada-Arab World Parliamentary Group.

Mr. Corbett: Thanks for the plug.

The Chairman: I have a special inclination for that group.

Mr. Corbett: Mr. Minister, you will recall the incident at the Sussex Firing Range last summer, which you have corresponded with me about, whereby a house in the immediate vicinity was struck by two or three rounds of ammunition. The rifle range was subsequently shut down and an investigation was launched. Mr. Minister, could you give me an update or could some of your officials give me an update?

Mr. Lamontagne: Okay, Admiral Mainguy.

VAdm Mainguy: The investigation into that incident is completed and we have come to the conclusion that it is safe to reopen the range for a very restricted light ammunition use. So it will be back in action, but not to the full level until we can do some more surveys around to make sure it is completely safe to use again.

Mr. Corbett: In correspondence I have received from a Colonel D. H. Smith, who is Chief of Staff of the Atlantic Militia Area, he indicates to me that the restriction was on the live firing of 7.62 mm weapons until further notice. The range, in the meantime, was entirely shut down, I understand, until the completion of your investigation.

VAdm Mainguy: That is correct.

Mr. Corbett: What weapons have you prohibited from use?

VAdm Mainguy: We have prohibited all automatic fire weapons 7.62 and any heavier calibre than that. As far as I recall, but I can get you a completely accurate answer if it is important, we have reopened it to single-shot firing by trained marksmen and pistol firing. But if you really want a complete answer, I would have to provide it in writing to you later.

[Translation]

dollars. En fait, les dépenses prévues s'élèvent à quelque 180 millions de dollars et c'est cette somme réduite de la moitié qui est inscrite dans le budget. Une fois le contrat prouvé et les liquidités disponibles, les fonds seront débloqués dans leur totalité et nous inscrirons à ce moment-là 180 millions de dollars.

M. McKinnon: Et c'est alors qu'on aurait besoin d'un budget supplémentaire.

M. Davies: Non, non, les fonds seront affectés au programme. Nous prévoyons toujours trop de programmes, comme vous le savez, de sorte que nous avons toujours plus de projets que de fonds. Mais quand un contrat est octroyé, les fonds qui sont affectés sont tirés directement du budget. Nous n'aurons pas besoin de budget supplémentaire cette année pour la frégate de patrouille.

Le président: Merci.

Il y a encore deux autres membres qui ont demandé la parole et une autre personne qui n'est pas encore membre du Comité. Le prochain intervenant est le président du groupe parlementaire sur le Canada et le monde arabe, l'honorable député de Fundy-Royal, M. Corbett. Je le répète, pour l'enregistrement, président du groupe parlementaire sur le Canada et le monde arabe.

M. Corbett: Merci pour la publicité.

Le président: J'ai un penchant spécial pour ce groupe.

M. Corbett: Monsieur le ministre, vous vous souviendrez de l'incident qui s'est produit l'été dernier au champ de tir Sussex, où une maison du voisinage immédiat a été frappée par une ou deux salves de tir. Vous m'avez écrit à ce sujet. Le champ de tir a subséquemment été fermé, et une enquête a été menée. Est-ce que monsieur le ministre, ou un de ses hauts fonctionnaires, pourrait nous mettre à jour sur la question?

M. Lamontagne: Très bien, Amiral Mainguy.

VAm Mainguy: L'enquête est terminée et nous sommes arrivés à la conclusion qu'il n'est pas dangereux de réouvrir le champ de tir pour l'utilisation de munitions légères très limitées. Alors le champ de tir réouvrira, mais ne fonctionnera pas à pleine capacité avant la conclusion d'autres enquêtes visant à nous assurer que l'exploitation ne présente aucun danger.

M. Corbett: D'après la correspondance que j'ai reçue du colonel D.H. Smith, Chef d'État-major de la Milice de la région de l'Atlantique, la restriction porte uniquement jusqu'à nouvel ordre sur l'utilisation d'armes de 7.62 mm. Entre temps, le champ de tir a été complètement fermé, je pense, jusqu'à la conclusion de votre enquête.

VAm Mainguy: C'est exact.

M. Corbett: Quelles armes avez-vous interdit?

VAm Mainguy: Nous avons interdit l'utilisation de toutes les armes automatiques de 7.62 mm. et de calibre plus fort. Si je me souviens bien, et je pourrais vous donner une réponse des plus précises si vous y tenez, nous avons réouvert le champ de tir pour l'utilisation par des tireurs d'élite compétents d'armes à coup unique et de révolvers. Mais si vous voulez vraiment

[Texte]

Mr. Corbett: Yes, I would appreciate a complete answer.

Have you taken any further precautionary measures to ensure the security of the area of that range?

VAdm Mainguy: Yes, indeed. The main thing is to . . .

Mr. Corbett: Besides this.

VAdm Mainguy: What we have to do is to resurvey the range, to find out what extra safety precautions we need to take to reintroduce the firing of a more complete range of weapons. But we will not fire any more weapons until that survey is complete.

• 1650

Mr. Corbett: When was the announcement made that the range would be re-opened?

VAdm Mainguy: This is pretty fresh information. It would be within the last couple of weeks, but I can find that as well.

Mr. Corbett: I suggest to you that it was made this afternoon.

VAdm Mainguy: Was it this afternoon?

Mr. Corbett: I must here register my disappointment with the co-operation that I have received from the department on this, or the lack of co-operation. Indeed, I had been in contact with the minister's assistants on a number of occasions. I have written several pieces of correspondence and have asked to be kept advised of developments as they were made. I was receiving my information continuously either through media reports through the newspaper or from outside information, such as I have received this bit of information that indeed the announcement has been made. I have not been kept informed or kept up to date on it; I just want to register that for the record. Hopefully, there will be no future incidents but if there is, perhaps something could be done to improve the relationship of the department with members of Parliament. I would appreciate a copy of that restrictive order.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Lamontagne: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Corbett.

Next on my list is the hon. member from Esquimalt—Saanich, Mr. Munro.

L'ambassadeur Munro.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci bien.

J'ai deux questions à poser au ministre.

On the question of emergency arrangements, I believe they would come under your general jurisdiction, or if not . . .

Mr. Lamontagne: The emergency measures comes under the Privy Council.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): The Privy Council.

[Traduction]

une réponse complète, je peux vous la faire parvenir par écrit plus tard.

M. Corbett: Oui, j'aimerais bien une réponse complète.

Avez-vous pris d'autres mesures de précaution pour assurer la sécurité du voisinage du champ de tir?

VAm Mainguy: En fait, oui. Le principal . . .

M. Corbett: À part cela.

VAm Mainguy: Ce que nous devons faire, c'est de réétudier le champ de tir, pour déterminer quelles précautions supplémentaires il faut prendre avant d'autoriser de nouveau l'utilisation d'une gamme plus complète d'armes. Mais nous n'utiliserons pas d'autres armes avant que l'étude ne soit terminée.

M. Corbett: Quand a-t-on annoncé que ce champ de tir serait réouvert?

VAm Mainguy: Tout récemment, sans doute au cours des deux dernières semaines. Je pourrais vérifier la date si vous voulez.

M. Corbett: Je crois plutôt que cette annonce a été faite cet après-midi.

VAm Mainguy: Cet après-midi?

M. Corbett: J'en profite ici pour vous dire combien je suis mécontent du manque de collaboration du Ministère à ce sujet. J'ai pris contact avec des adjoints du ministre à plusieurs reprises; j'ai envoyé plusieurs lettres en demandant d'être tenu informé régulièrement de la situation. Or, c'est toujours par des journaux ou d'autres moyens d'information que j'ai reçu mes informations, comme c'est le cas de l'annonce dont je viens de parler. Le Ministère ne m'a donc pas tenu informé sur cette question et je tiens à le faire savoir publiquement. J'espère qu'il n'y aura pas d'autres incidents, mais s'il y en a, j'espère qu'on pourra améliorer les relations existant entre le Ministère et les députés. J'aimerais bien avoir un exemplaire de cette ordonnance restrictive.

Le président: Merci.

M. Lamontagne: Merci.

Le président: Merci, monsieur Corbett.

C'est maintenant au tour du député d'Esquimalt—Saanich, M. Munro.

The Ambassador Munro.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you.

I have two questions for the Minister.

En ce qui concerne les mesures d'urgence, je crois qu'elles relèvent de votre compétence générale, à moins que . . .

M. Lamontagne: Les mesures d'urgence relèvent du Conseil privé.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Du Conseil privé, bien.

[Text]

Mr. Lamontagne: Yes.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): So the emergency measures man, whoever he is . . . You may be able . . . Rumour is getting about, prompted I think by people, for reasons of their own, that the legislators of this land have very conveniently managed to have arrangements made for their safety in case of an emergency. Is that true? In other words, are the House of Commons and the Senate and the government being moved to some underground place somewhere or other in case of a real emergency?

Mr. Lamontagne: I cannot give you a precise answer, except to tell you that there is a locale that will be at the disposal of the government in case of emergency and in case also some of the provincial governments . . . To give you assurance now there is enough room . . .

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Accommodation . . .

Mr. Lamontagne:—accommodation for the whole House of Commons and the whole Senate, I cannot assure you that negatively or affirmatively. I can enquire.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Could the minister make that . . .

Mr. Lamontagne: I would make a request to get this information . . .

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I would not know quite where to key into it actually.

Mr. Lamontagne: You want to know where you would go.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): No, I am not asking that. I am asking to determine whether this rumour that is being circulated has any foundation in fact, not for my own safety but for the purposes of convincing the person who is circulating this rumour.

Mr. Lamontagne: I will enquire.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you.

• 1655

My other question is two-sided in a way; it is about the cruise missile. Has any approach been made to the Department of National Defence under the terms of the umbrella agreement to work out the terms under which the cruise missile guidance system might be tested in Canada?

Mr. Lamontagne: My answer about the cruise missile would be, no. As you know, the umbrella agreement gives the requirements about the American weapons system in general. Then I have signed with Mr. Weinberger a memorandum of understanding, which gives the particulars under which these tests could be done—but no test in particular—in a general way of all the tests which one day will be requested; that is, the conditions under which they could be done. That is all we have at the moment. We have had no requests that I know of for any testing yet.

[Translation]

M. Lamontagne: C'est cela.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Donc, le responsable des mesures d'urgence, quel qu'il soit . . . La rumeur veut que les législateurs du pays se soient dotés d'un bon dispositif de sécurité en cas d'urgence. Est-ce vrai? En d'autres termes, la Chambre des communes, le Sénat et le gouvernement seront-ils transférés dans un abri souterrain en cas d'urgence?

M. Lamontagne: Je ne peux pas vous donner une réponse précise, si ce n'est qu'il existe bien un abri destiné à accueillir le gouvernement en cas d'urgence et au cas également, où des gouvernements provinciaux . . . Quant à savoir s'il y a suffisamment de place . . .

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Cet abri peut accueillir . . .

M. Lamontagne: . . . pour la totalité des députés et des sénateurs, il faudrait que je vérifie.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Le ministre pourrait-il . . .

M. Lamontagne: Je vais essayer d'obtenir ces renseignements . . .

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je ne sais pas très bien à quoi m'en tenir.

M. Lamontagne: Vous voudriez savoir où vous iriez.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Non, ce n'est pas du tout cela. J'aimerais plutôt savoir si cette rumeur est fondée, non pas par intérêt personnel pour ma propre sécurité, mais plutôt dans le but de convaincre celui qui a fait circuler cette rumeur.

M. Lamontagne: Je me renseignerai.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci.

Ma deuxième question, qui porte sur les missiles de croisière, comporte deux volets. J'aimerais savoir si le ministère de la Défense nationale a été informé des conditions dans lesquelles, conformément à l'entente cadre, les missiles de croisière seront testés au Canada?

M. Lamontagne: Non. Comme vous le savez, l'entente cadre énonce les exigences relatives aux systèmes d'armements américains en général. J'ai signé avec M. Weinberger un protocole d'entente qui énonce les conditions particulières dans lesquelles ces tests peuvent se faire, mais il s'agit de tests en général; en d'autres termes, ce protocole d'entente énumère les conditions dans lesquelles les tests peuvent être faits. C'est tout ce que nous avons pour le moment. Nous n'avons reçu aucune demande officielle pour l'expérimentation de ces missiles.

[Texte]

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Is that exchange of correspondence between the minister and Mr. Weinberger available for the public?

Mr. Lamontagne: It is a public document.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I am not talking about the umbrella agreement.

Mr. Lamontagne: No, the memorandum of understanding is a public document.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): All right. Will it be possible for the minister to let us know when negotiations start, dealing with the cruise missile guidance system, or will those be conducted from beginning to end without any public knowledge of their taking place?

Mr. Lamontagne: This will have to be judged when we get the requests. Considering it is a bilateral agreement with the United States, in the same way as we have bilateral agreements with the provinces or something like that, I think it is important to have the acquiescence of the country in question. Beside that, I have difficulty to really think we could hide such testing, with the public view going on.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I am not talking about testing. I am talking about the negotiations which would authorize the testing.

Mr. Lamontagne: Negotiations about the cruise missiles, if there is a request about the cruise missiles, are the same as any other kind of weapons system testing. There is no special consideration. It is the guidance system of a cruise missile. As far as testing is concerned, the guidance system of a cruise missile is to us the same thing as testing a helicopter, testing a new cannon shell, testing any kind of weapon. Do not forget we will be requested—if we are—to test the guidance system of the missile, not necessarily the missile as a whole weapon.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I fully understand that. There will not then be a separate agreement between your department and Mr. Weinberger's department . . .

Mr. Lamontagne: No.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): —relating to the testing of the missile system, contrary to what is said in the umbrella agreement?

Mr. Lamontagne: No. It has to abide by the umbrella agreement and by the MOU.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): My reading of the umbrella agreement suggests that any negotiations concerning the testing of any weapon under this umbrella agreement will be undertaken between the Department of National Defence in Canada and the Secretary of Defense of the United States.

An hon. member: Oh no.

Mr. Lamontagne: Or their representatives.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Or their representatives. In other words, notification of any such agreements, specific or

[Traduction]

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Les lettres échangées entre le ministre et M. Weinberger peuvent-elles être rendues publiques?

M. Lamontagne: Il s'agit d'un document public.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je ne parle pas de l'entente cadre.

M. Lamontagne: Non, le protocole d'entente est un document public.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Très bien. Le ministre pourrait-il nous faire savoir quand les négociations vont commencer au sujet de l'expérimentation des missiles de croisière, ou bien si ces négociations doivent se faire complètement à l'insu du public?

M. Lamontagne: Cette décision sera prise lorsque nous aurons pris connaissance de la demande officielle. Étant donné qu'il s'agit d'une entente bilatérale avec les États-Unis, et cela est également valable pour les ententes bilatérales que nous avons signées avec les provinces ou avec d'autres paliers de gouvernement, il importe que nous ayons le consentement du pays en question. Par ailleurs, je crois qu'il serait plutôt difficile de procéder à ces tests à l'insu du public.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je ne parle pas des tests, mais plutôt des négociations destinées à approuver ces tests.

M. Lamontagne: Si une demande nous est soumise en ce qui concerne l'expérimentation des missiles de croisière, les négociations se dérouleront comme pour n'importe quels autres tests d'armement. Il n'y a aucune considération spéciale ici. Il s'agit du système de guidage d'un missile de croisière. Pour nous, l'expérimentation du système de guidage d'un missile de croisière est semblable à celle d'un hélicoptère, d'un nouveau type d'obus ou autres. N'oubliez pas que si l'on nous demande officiellement de tester le système de guidage du missile, ce qui n'est pas encore évident, nous ne testerons pas nécessairement tout le missile.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je comprends bien. Donc, votre ministère ne signera pas d'accord distinct avec le département de M. Weinberger . . .

M. Lamontagne: Non.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): . . . relativement à l'expérimentation du système de missile, contrairement à ce que stipule l'entente cadre.

M. Lamontagne: Non. Nous devons nous conformer à l'entente cadre et au protocole d'entente.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Pourtant, si je comprends bien le libellé de l'entente cadre, toutes négociations concernant l'expérimentation d'une arme couverte par cette entente devront se faire entre le ministère canadien de la Défense nationale et le Secrétariat américain à la Défense.

Une voix: Oh non.

M. Lamontagne: Ou leurs représentants.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Ou leurs représentants. En d'autres termes, le public ne sera informé de l'existence de

[Text]

general, will not be public until they are concluded. Is that correct?

Mr. Lamontagne: I think you are partly right in your assessment. It will be done between United States and ourselves.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): And will be concluded without public knowledge?

Mr. Lamontagne: Not necessarily.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): That matter is not covered in your . . .

Mr. Lamontagne: The thing you have to understand is that we might be testing as has been ongoing for many, many years on all kinds of issues. If we had to advertise every time we tested any kind of weapon or any kind of testing . . . I do not think there is any reason to do that.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Well, why did you have to have an umbrella? Was it raining?

• 1700

Mr. Lamontagne: The umbrella sets the conditions, that is the policy of it and if you read it we will abide by the policies of the umbrella.

The Chairman: First, before I recognize for a second round and others as long as I can, the minister has rescheduled his agenda with the understanding that he will come next week, next Thursday, between 9:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. We have found a room, while we were deliberating; it will be in the Railway Committee Room—you suggested that very well—except that the minister will be absent for half an hour. It is the only condition, because he has an engagement in his office with an ambassador. So, with the understanding that the minister will be absent for half an hour, Thursday, May 19, between 9:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., the meeting will be held in room 253-D. That will be the last time the minister can appear for the estimates; but of course he could be called back for other matters.

I think on a second tour I have to go by our own set of rules. The minister was supposed to leave at 5:00 p.m., but Mr. McKinnon said he has a question, and Mr. McRae has a question, but I do not know what I can do now, at 5:00 p.m. The minister told me he has a very firm commitment.

Mr. McKinnon: I am willing to abide by your timing, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: So to those who I may not recognize, will they be kind enough to come back next Thursday, room 253-D, the Railway Committee Room, Thursday, May 19, between 9:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., knowing the minister will be absent for half an hour.

The next meeting is tomorrow morning at 9:30 a.m.

Mr. McRae: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order.

[Translation]

ces ententes, spécifiques ou générales, que lorsqu'elles auront été signées. C'est bien cela?

M. Lamontagne: Vous avez en partie raison. Cela se fera entre les États-Unis et nous.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Et ces ententes seront signées à l'insu du public?

M. Lamontagne: Pas nécessairement.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Vous ne traitez pas de cette question dans votre . . .

M. Lamontagne: Il faut bien comprendre que cela fait des années que nous procédons à ce genre de tests. Si nous devions faire une déclaration dans les journaux chaque fois que nous voulions procéder à des tests . . . à mon avis, cela n'est pas justifié.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Pourquoi avez-vous donc jugé bon de signer une entente cadre? Pour vous protéger de quoi?

M. Lamontagne: Cette entente cadre énonce les conditions dans lesquelles ces tests doivent se faire, et nous nous engageons à respecter ces conditions.

Le président: Avant que nous commençons le second tour, j'aimerais vous faire part de plusieurs choses. Le ministre a remanié son programme afin de pouvoir venir jeudi prochain à 9h30, jusqu'à 11 heures. Nous avons trouvé une salle, pendant que la discussion se poursuivait, et notre réunion aura donc lieu dans la salle des Chemins de fer. Toutefois, le ministre sera absent pendant une demi-heure, étant donné qu'il doit rencontrer un ambassadeur dans son bureau. C'est la seule condition. Donc, à condition que le ministre puisse s'absenter pendant une demi-heure, nous nous réunirons le jeudi 19 mai de 9h30 à 11 heures, dans la salle 253-D. C'est la dernière séance prévue en présence du ministre au sujet du budget; bien sûr, nous pourrions le reconvoquer sur d'autres sujets.

Maintenant, pour ce qui est du second tour, nous devons nous conformer à nos propres règles. Le ministre était censé partir à 17 heures, mais M. McKinnon a dit qu'il avait une question à poser, tout comme M. McRae d'ailleurs. Étant donné qu'il est 17 heures, je ne sais que faire, d'autant plus que le ministre m'a dit que son engagement était très ferme.

M. McKinnon: Je suis prêt à accepter votre décision, monsieur le président.

Le président: Dans ce cas, ceux à qui je n'ai pas eu le temps de donner la parole ce soir auront-ils l'obligeance de revenir jeudi prochain, dans la salle 253-D, c'est-à-dire la salle des Chemins de fer? Je le répète, cette réunion aura lieu le jeudi 19 mai, de 9h30 à 11 heures, étant bien entendu que le ministre s'absentera pendant une demi-heure.

Notre prochaine séance aura lieu demain matin à 9h30.

M. McRae: Monsieur le président, j'invoque le Règlement.

[Texte]

The Chairman: Well, I have adjourned, I may be . . .

Mr. McRae: The point of order is this . . .

The Chairman: I have adjourned.

Mr. McRae: Okay.

The Chairman: I will listen to your point of order, but I need three members to stay.

Mr. McRae: The only question I ask is, is there any way that a nonmember of this committee, one who has spent a lot of time and concerns about disarmament and the whole defence situation, can get to ask a question longer than a minute? For instance, the next time, can I be assured of getting on earlier? Is there any way of doing that?

The Chairman: For so many years you have been here, and so have I. I try to be as kind as possible to every member, but my duty is to recognize the time and questioning of members of the committee. I do so once in a while; I did it for you once . . .

Mr. McRae: For one minute.

The Chairman: Well, that is even better than other committees. But I do not want to use the guillotine. If three members want to stay, you may put your question to the Chief of the Defence Staff. I have no objection. I said I was going to adjourn. The minister has to leave, but the others could stay just to listen to you for a question. To show our good faith, I would not mind, but it is an act of kindness by the members. I have called the meeting to adjourn. I do not know if I can reopen a meeting that I have already adjourned myself.

Mrs. Appolloni, the vice-chairman.

Mrs. Appolloni: Mr. Chairman, in fairness to the Chair, I honestly believe that our colleague would have been recognized and would have had more than one minute if the minister had not had to leave early. So let us be fair to the chairman.

Mr. McRae: I accept that.

The Chairman: You are very kind.

Mr. McRae: That is not my argument, Mr. Chairman. I am not objecting to not being recognized today. I am hoping that the next time I can get some time; that is basically my argument. I accept this. I just want to make sure that the next time the minister comes perhaps I can get two or three minutes.

The Chairman: Mr. McRae, if I may say that, my dear colleague, I will do my utmost, but I cannot take that . . . *comment dit-on . . . je ne peux pas faire d'avance ce que je ne peux pas soutenir*: I cannot promise something I cannot deliver. If members are less in number that morning and they question less, of course I will recognize you. But if members take up the time, what can I do? I am in the hands of my members first.

Mr. McRae: All right, we will see the next time.

[Traduction]

Le président: J'ai déjà levé la séance, mais . . .

M. McRae: Mon rappel au Règlement est le suivant . . .

Le président: Je suis désolé, mais j'ai déjà levé la séance.

M. McRae: D'accord.

Le président: Je suis prêt à entendre votre rappel au Règlement, à condition que trois députés au moins restent.

M. McRae: J'aimerais simplement savoir si un député qui n'est pas membre de ce Comité, mais qui a consacré beaucoup de temps et d'efforts à la question du désarmement et de toute la défense, peut poser une question pendant plus d'une minute? Par exemple, à la prochaine réunion, pouvez-vous m'assurer que j'aurai la parole un peu plus tôt? Cela est-il possible?

Le président: Cela fait des années que vous êtes ici, tout comme moi d'ailleurs. J'essaie d'être aussi indulgent que possible vis-à-vis de chacun des membres, mais je me dois de donner aux membres du Comité le temps de parole qui leur est dû. Parfois, je fais exception à la règle, et je l'ai déjà fait dans votre cas . . .

M. McRae: Oui, pendant une minute.

Le président: C'est mieux que dans certains autres comités. Toutefois, je ne tiens pas à utiliser la guillotine. Si trois membres sont prêts à rester, vous pouvez adresser votre question au chef de l'État major de la défense. Je n'ai pas d'objection. J'ai annoncé tout à l'heure que nous allions lever la séance. Le ministre doit partir, mais les autres peuvent rester pour écouter votre question. Vous voyez donc que nous sommes pleins de bonne volonté, et croyez-moi, c'est une faveur que vous font les membres du Comité. J'ai déjà levé la séance, de sorte que je me demande si je peux rouvrir la séance que j'ai déjà levée moi-même.

Madame Appolloni, vice-présidente.

Mme Appolloni: Monsieur le président, il est évident que notre collègue aurait eu la parole et aurait eu plus d'une minute à sa disposition si le ministre n'avait pas été obligé de partir si tôt. Soyons justes à l'égard du président.

M. McRae: J'accepte cela.

Le président: Vous êtes très aimable.

M. McRae: Toutefois, monsieur le président, ce n'est pas le fait de ne pas avoir eu la parole aujourd'hui que je critique. En fait, ce que je cherche à savoir, c'est si je pourrai intervenir la prochaine fois. J'accepte vos arguments, mais je tiens simplement à m'assurer que, la prochaine fois que le ministre sera parmi nous, je pourrai m'adresser à lui pendant deux ou trois minutes.

Le président: Monsieur McRae, je ferai de mon possible, mais je ne peux pas . . . je ne peux pas vous faire cette promesse si je suis incapable de la tenir. Si, ce jour-là, les membres du Comité ne sont pas très nombreux et si leurs questions ne durent pas très longtemps, alors j'aurai le temps de vous donner la parole. Toutefois, si les membres du Comité prennent tout le temps de la séance, que puis-je faire? Je suis d'abord responsable à l'égard des membres.

M. McRae: Très bien, nous verrons la prochaine fois.

[Text]

The Chairman: Mr. McKinnon, on this point.

Mr. McKinnon: This has something to do with the new rules that are being enforced—the restriction of the numbers that can serve on a committee. Positions on this committee were the cause of quite considerable competition in the party I belong to, and some very difficult decisions were made. If people who are not members of the committee are going to be allowed to speak, I can assure you I have about six Conservatives who want to come here and speak. It is up to you, Mr. Chairman, whether you are going to throw it open again or not. I will leave it at that.

The Chairman: I thank you all for that. That is food for reflection for the Chair between now and next Tuesday at 9:30 a.m. I would hope again, as I have said, to adjourn at 10:30 a.m. to go for the other session. Thank you very much. Oh, I mean tomorrow morning at 9:30 a.m.

• 1706

The meeting is adjourned to the call of the Chair.

[Translation]

Le président: Monsieur McKinnon, vous avez quelque chose à dire à ce sujet.

M. McKinnon: Cette discussion concerne les nouvelles règles qui ont été appliquées et qui entraînent, notamment, la réduction du nombre de membres d'un comité. Dans mon propre parti, je sais que beaucoup de députés voulaient être membres de ce Comité et il a donc fallu prendre des décisions très difficiles. Si des députés qui ne sont pas membres de ce Comité sont autorisés à prendre la parole, je peux vous assurer qu'au moins six conservateurs vont vouloir en faire autant. C'est à vous de décider, monsieur le président.

Le président: Merci beaucoup. J'y réfléchirai d'ici mardi prochain, à 9h30. J'espère, comme je l'ai déjà dit, pouvoir lever la séance à 10h30 afin de passer à l'autre. Merci beaucoup. Oh, excusez-moi, je voulais dire demain matin à 9h30.

La séance est levée.

APPENDIX "EAND-73"

Response to Mr. McKinnon's request for an updated
Capital Program Projection raised on 17 Mar 83

SUMMARY NOTELISTING OF MAJOR CAPITAL PROJECTS

1. Departmental planning for major Capital Projects in the Defence Program is conducted through the medium of a formal program management system. Major Capital Projects for this purpose are classified as costing \$50 million or greater and for planning purposes are integrated into the total Capital Program of the Department which is established at present on a 15 year basis.


2. Major weapon systems in the category of aircraft, ships, tanks, etc., may require between four to twelve years from design to delivery and this factor, together with the importance of sound, long range resource planning, has resulted in the current 15 year Capital Program Plan. This Capital Program projection is displayed graphically in constant 1983 dollars in Appendix 1 for the period 1983 to 1996 inclusive. It will be noted that a number of the projects shown have not yet received government approval and in fact some are still in varying stages of approval within the Department but without this degree of long term visibility it would be virtually impossible to develop a balanced, comprehensive program. It should also be noted that not all projects will necessarily be funded in the years shown on the chart.

NOTES ON DND CAPITAL PROGRAM PROJECTION

1. Major projects currently underway:
 - a. AURORA - Long Range Patrol Aircraft
 - b. New Fighter Aircraft
 - c. CPF(CD) - Canadian Patrol Frigate (Contract Definition only)
 - d. DELEX - Destroyer Life Extension
 - e. MLV(W) - Medium Logistic Vehicle (Wheeled)
 - f. AVGP - Armoured Vehicle General Purpose
 - g. TRACS - Terminal Radar Systems
 - h. ADLIPS - Automatic Data Link Plotting System
 - j. ROCC - Regional Operations Control Centre
2. Major Projects under consideration by the Department:
 - a. SARP - Small Arms Replacement Project
 - b. Plan 2000 - Strategic Communications
 - c. Ship Replacement 1 (CPF) Ship Replacement 2, 3
 - d. DDH 280 Update (now includes ASSM) - TRUMP
 - e. UHF Secure Voice
 - f. MOST - Military Operational and Support Trucks
 - g. CF 18 Attrition Procurement
 - h. SAR Help - Search and Rescue Helicopter Replacement
 - j. Medium Tactical Utility Transport
 - k. Submarine Replacement Project
 - l. FFCSA - Future Family of Close Support Artillery Weapons
 - m. C 135 Midlife Update
 - n. C 136 Midlife Modernization

- o. LLAD - Low Level Air Defence
- p. NORAD Modernization (Formerly Surveillance Radar Replacement)
- q. A/A Missile - Air to Air Missile
- r. AURORA Update
- s. A/S Weapons - Advanced Air to Surface Weapons
- t. TAC Comd - Tactical Command Control and Communications Systems
- u. Training Aircraft Replacement
- v. Torpedoes
- w. SKR - Sea King Replacement
- x. Auxiliary Vessel Replacement
- z. Land Combat Vehicles
- aa. Heavy Transport Aircraft Replacement
- ab. AOR Replacement - Operational Support Ship Replacement

CAPITAL PROGRAM PROJECTION - CONSTANT 1983 DOLLARS - 1983-1996



RESPONSE TO QUESTION BY MR. MUNRO CONCERNING BASES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA RAISED AT STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE ON 19 APR 83


BACKGROUND

1. Soviet ships regularly operate in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean.
2. Soviet naval presence in the South China Sea increased during the Sino-Vietnam war in 1979. Since then, the Soviet Navy has been using and improving port facilities and airfield in Vietnam. Ports usually visited in Vietnam are Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City and Cam Ranh Bay.
3. Facilities available to the Soviets in these ports are:
Da Nang: Use of airfield, use of anchorage, port visits.
Ho Chi Minh City: Repair of Soviet auxiliaries and ships visits.
Cam Ranh Bay: Floating drydock, floating pier, fuel storage, use of airfield.
4. Regular deployments to the Indian Ocean commenced in 1968. The expulsion of the Soviet Navy from Somalia in 1977 caused no diminution of their operational activities in the general area but they had to concentrate their activities in other local areas for logistic facilities.
5. Facilities available to the Soviets in the Indian Ocean are as follows:

| | |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| SOCOTRA ISLAND | Anchorage, plus repair and supply from Soviet auxiliary ships in the area. |
| DAHLAK ISLAND | Floating drydock, floating pier, barracks, fuel storage, repair and support ships. |
| ADEN | Logistic and repair facilities and use of airfield. |

| | |
|---------|------------------------------------------|
| MAPUTO | Floating drydock |
| BOMBAY | Water and provisions |
| COLOMBO | Research ships maintenance and logistics |
| ASSAB | Logistic supplies and use of airfield. |
| MASSAWA | Water and provisions. |

6. Indian Ocean squadron ships call at a variety of other ports in the region such as Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, North Yemen and Djibouti. They obtain food and water commercially but seldom refuel or use the repair facilities in these countries.





APPENDICE "EAND-73"

Réponse à M. McKinnon, qui demandait, le 17 mars 1983, une mise à jour des projections relatives au programme d'immobilisations

RÉSUMÉ ANALYTIQUELISTE DES GRANDS PROJETS D'IMMOBILISATIONS

1. Au sein du Ministère, la planification des grands projets d'immobilisation prévus au Programme de la défense s'effectue grâce à un système structuré de gestion des programmes. Aux fins de la classification, les grands projets d'immobilisations sont ceux qui coûtent au moins 50 millions de dollars et, aux fins de la planification, ils sont intégrés au Programme global d'immobilisations du Ministère, à présent échelonné sur 15 ans.

2. Un délai de quatre à douze ans peut séparer l'étape de la conception de celle de la livraison des grands systèmes d'armement compris dans les catégories des avions, des navires, des chars, etc; c'est à cause de ce facteur et de l'importance d'une saine planification à long terme des ressources, qu'on a opté pour le plan actuel (échelonné sur 15 ans) qui régit le programme d'immobilisations. L'appendice 1 donne la représentation graphique du programme d'immobilisations (Projections), en dollars constants de 1983, pour la période qui va de 1983 à 1996 inclusivement. Il convient de remarquer qu'un certain nombre des projets illustrés n'ont pas encore reçu l'approbation gouvernementale; en fait, certains n'ont pas encore reçu l'assentiment final du Ministère. Cependant, on comprendra qu'à défaut d'une telle vue d'ensemble des projets à long terme, il serait virtuellement impossible de concevoir un programme global et cohérent. Il convient également de noter que tous les projets ne seront pas nécessairement financés au cours des années indiquées sur le graphique.

REMARQUES SUR LES PROJECTIONS RELATIVES AU PROGRAMME
D'IMMOBILISATIONS DU MDN

1. Grands projets en cours:
 - a. AURORA - avion patrouilleur à grande autonomie
 - b. Nouvel avion de chasse
 - c. FCP (DC) - frégate canadienne de patrouille
(définition du contrat seulement)
 - d. DELEX - prolongation de la durée de vie des destroyers
 - e. MLV(W) - véhicule logistique moyen à roues
 - f. VBP - véhicule blindé polyvalent
 - g. TRACS - système de radar terminal et de contrôle
 - h. SARAD - système automatique de réception-affichage des données
 - j. CRCO - centre régional de contrôle opérationnel
2. Grands projets encore à l'étude au Ministère:
 - a. SARP - projet de remplacement des armes portatives
 - b. Plan 2000 - communications stratégiques
 - c. Remplacement des navires 1 (FCP), remplacement des navires 2 et 3
 - d. PMNT - programme de modernisation des navires
DDH 280 (inclut désormais le système de missiles anti-navires - ASSM)
 - e. Système protégé de communications UHF (discrétion phonique)
 - f. MOST - Camions militaires opérationnels et de soutien

- g. acquisition d'appareils CF-18 de remplacement
- h. SAR Help - remplacement des hélicoptères affectés aux missions de recherche et de sauvetage
- j. transport moyen tactique de servitude
- k. projet de remplacement des sous-marins
- l. FFCSA - nouvelle famille de pièces d'artillerie d'appui rapproché
- m. C 135 - révision à mi-vie
- n. C 136 - modernisation à mi-vie
- o. LLAD - défense aérienne à basse altitude
- p. Modernisation du NORAD (Anciennement: remplacement des radars de surveillance)
- q. missiles air-air
- r. révision des appareils Aurora
- s. perfectionnement des armes air-surface
- t. système de contrôle et de communication du commandement tactique
- u. remplacement des avions d'entraînement
- v. torpilles
- w. remplacement des hélicoptères Sea King
- x. remplacement des navires auxiliaires
- z. véhicules de combat terrestre
- aa. remplacement des avions gros porteurs
- ab. remplacement des navires d'appui opérationnel

A) MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE
PROJECTIONS - PROGRAMME D'IMMOBILISATIONS POUR
LA PÉRIODE 1983-1996, EN DOLLARS CONSTANTS DE 1983

B) ÉQUIPEMENTS DIVERS RENOUEVABLES
 CONSTRUCTION
 RECHERCHE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT

C. NOTA

ÉCARTS NON INCLUS
 MONTANTS AFFECTÉS:

| | <u>83</u> | <u>84</u> | <u>85</u> | <u>86</u> |
|---------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| M \$ (en dollars de 1983) | 66 | 136 | 219 | 142 |

D) * PAS ENCORE APPROUVÉ

- 1) Remplacement des sous-marins *
- 2) PMNT *
- 3) SARP *
- 4) Programme de remplacement des navires (FCP) *
- 5) LLAD *
- 6) MOST
- 7) Modernisation du NORAD *
- 8) Remplacement des hélicoptères Sea King *
- 9) Véhicules de combat terrestre *
- 10) Remplacement des navires III *
- 11) Nouvel avion de chasse
- 12) Remplacement des navires II *
- 13) Missiles air-air *
- 14) Armes air-surface *
- 15) Systèmes de contrôle et de communication du commandement tactique *
- 16) Plan 2000 *
- 17) Transport moyen tactique de servitude *
- 18) FFCSA *
- 19) CRCO
- 20) CH 136 - Modernisation à mi-vie *
- 21) MLV(W)
- 22) Aurora
- 23) DELEX
- 24) TRACS
- 25) CH 135 - Révision à mi-vie *
- 26) Torpilles *
- 27) Révision des appareils Aurora *
- 28) VBP *
- 29) SARAD
- 30) Système protégé de communications UHF *
- 31) Remplacement des navires auxiliaires *
- 32) Acquisition d'appareils CF-18 de remplacement *
- 33) SAR Help *
- 34) Remplacement des avions d'entraînement *
- 35) Remplacement des avions gros porteurs *
- 36) Remplacement des navires d'appui opérationnel
- 37) AUTRES ÉQUIPEMENTS

RÉPONSE À UNE QUESTION DE M. MUNRO CONCERNANT LES BASES DANS LA RÉGION DE L'OCÉAN INDIEN, SOULEVÉE AU COMITÉ PERMANENT SUR LES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES ET LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE, LE 19 AVRIL 1983


GÉNÉRALITÉS

1. Les navires soviétiques opèrent d'une manière régulière dans la mer de Chine méridionale et dans l'océan Indien.
2. La présence navale soviétique dans la mer de Chine méridionale s'est accrue durant la guerre sino-vietnamienne de 1979. Depuis lors, la marine soviétique a utilisé et amélioré les installations portuaires et les aérodromes du Viet-Nam. Les ports habituellement visités au Viet-Nam sont Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh Ville et la Baie de Cam Ranh.
3. Les Soviétiques disposent dans ces ports des installations suivantes:
 - Da Nang: utilisation de l'aérodrome, droit de mouillage, visites au port.
 - Ho Chi Minh Ville: réparation de navires auxiliaires soviétiques et vescales au port.
 - Baie de Cam Ranh: Bassin de radoub flottant, embarcadere flottant, entreposage de carburant, utilisation de l'aérodrome.
4. Les déploiements réguliers dans l'océan Indien ont commencé en 1968. L'expulsion de la marine soviétique de Somalie en 1977 n'a entraîné aucune diminution de ses opérations dans l'ensemble de la région, mais l'a obligée à concentrer ses activités dans d'autres secteurs disposant d'installations logistiques.

5. Les Soviétiques disposent dans l'océan Indien des installations suivantes:

| | |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ÎLE DE SOCOTRA | Droit de mouillage, plus réparation et approvisionnement à partir de navires auxiliaires soviétiques dans la région. |
| ÎLE DE DAHLAK | Bassin de radoub flottant, embarcadere flottant, caserne, entreposage de carburant, navires de réparation et de soutien. |
| ADEN | Installations de logistique et de réparation, et utilisation de l'aérodrome. |
| MAPUTO | Bassin de radoub flottant. |
| BOMBAY | Eau et provisions. |
| COLOMBO | Entretien de navires de recherche et logistique. |
| ASSAB | Fournitures logistiques et utilisation de l'aérodrome. |
| MASSAWA | Eau et provisions. |

6. Les navires de l'escadre de l'océan Indien accostent à plusieurs autres ports de la région, comme à l'île Maurice, aux Seychelles, au Sri Lanka, au Yemen du nord et à Djibouti. Ils obtiennent de la nourriture et de l'eau sur le marché, mais ils font rarement le plein et utilisent peu les installations de réparation de ces pays.







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WITNESSES—TÉMOINS

From the Department of National Defence:

LGen G.C.E. Thériault, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff;
VAdm D.N. Mainguy, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff;
Mr. J.R. Killick, Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel);
Mr. L.E. Davies, Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance);
Mr. W.R. Green, Associate Assistant Deputy Minister
(Personnel);
MGen. P.D. Manson, Chief Air Doctrine and Operations

Du ministère de la Défense nationale:

Lgén. G.C.E. Thériault, Vice-chef de l'état-major de la
Défense;
VAm D.N. Mainguy, Sous-chef de l'état-major de la
Défense;
M. J.R. Killick, Sous-Ministre adjoint (Matériels);
M. L.E. Davies, Sous-Ministre adjoint (Finances);
M. W.R. Green, Sous-Ministre adjoint associé (Personnel);
Mgén P.D. Manson, Chef-Doctrines et opérations aériennes

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 93

Friday, May 13, 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 93

Le vendredi 13 mai 1983

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

External Affairs and National Defence

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

Report of the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Union
Conference—Rome, Italy, 14 to 22 September 1982

CONCERNANT:


Rapport de la 69^e Conférence de l'Union
interparlementaire—Rome, Italie, 14-22 septembre
1982

WITNESSES:

(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:

(Voir à l'endos)



First Session of the

Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la

trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

HOUSE OF COMMONS

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(Voir à l'endos)

First Session of the
Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la
trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

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Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appolloni

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Jacques Olivier
W. Kenneth Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*)
Douglas Roche
Sinclair Stevens
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COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES ET DE LA DÉFENSE
NATIONALE

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

Vice-président: M^{me} Ursula Appolloni

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Lorne Nystrom
Bob Ogle
Irénee Pelletier
Marcel Roy
Ron Stewart
Ian Watson
Robert Wenman

(Quorum 8)

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

ORDER OF REFERENCE

Friday, May 23, 1980.

ORDERED,—That the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be empowered to receive and examine reports from official Canadian Parliamentary delegations which have met with delegations from foreign Parliaments or attended inter-parliamentary meetings, and to report from time to time thereon.

ATTEST

ORDRE DE RENVOI

Le vendredi 23 mai 1980

IL EST ORDONNÉ,—Que le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale soit habilité à recevoir et examiner les rapports des délégations officielles du Parlement canadien qui ont rencontré des délégations de Parlements étrangers ou ont assisté à des réunions interparlementaires, et à faire à l'occasion un rapport à leur sujet.

ATTESTÉ

Le Greffier adjoint pour Le Greffier de la Chambre des communes

M.R. PELLETIER

Clerk Assistant for The Clerk of the House of Commons

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FRIDAY, MAY 13, 1983
(148)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9:40 o'clock a.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mr. Hudecki, Miss Jewett, Messrs. Laniel and Prud'homme.

Alternates present: Messrs. Darling and Wenman.

Other members present: Messrs. Crosby (*Halifax West*), Lawrence, Neil, and Orlikow.

Representing the Senate: The Honourable Senator Yvette Rousseau.

Witnesses: The Honourable Senator G.L. Molgat, Former Chairman of the Inter-Parliamentary Union—Canadian Group; Mr. Charles Lussier, Clerk of the Senate.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Mr. Roger Hill, Assistant Director.

The Order of Reference dated Friday, May 23, 1980, being read as follows:

ORDERED,—That the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence be empowered to receive and examine reports from official Canadian Parliamentary delegations which have met with delegations from foreign Parliaments or attended inter-parliamentary meetings, and to report from time to time thereon.

The Committee proceeded to the consideration of the Report of the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, Rome, Italy, 14-22 September 1982.

The Honourable Senator Molgat made a statement and answered questions.

In accordance with a motion of the Committee at the meeting held on Thursday, February 24, 1983, the Chairman authorized that the Report of the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference be appended to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix "EAND-74"*).

At 11:05 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE VENDREDI 13 MAI 1983
(148)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale se réunit aujourd'hui à 9h40 sous la présidence de M. Marcel Prud'homme (président).

Membres du Comité présents: M. Hudecki, M^{lle} Jewett, MM. Laniel et Prud'homme.

Substitués présents: MM. Darling et Wenman.

Autres députés présents: MM. Crosby (*Halifax-Ouest*), Neil et Orlikow.

Représentant le Sénat: L'honorable sénateur Yvette Rousseau.

Témoins: L'honorable sénateur G.L. Molgat, ancien président de l'Union inter-parlementaire, Groupe canadien; M. Charles Lussier, greffier du Sénat.

Aussi présent: Du Centre parlementaire des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur: M. Roger Hill, directeur adjoint.

Lecture est faite de l'ordre de renvoi suivant du vendredi 23 mai 1980.

IL EST ORDONNÉ,—Que le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale soit habilité à recevoir et à examiner les rapports des délégations officielles du Parlement canadien qui ont rencontré des délégations de parlements étrangers ou ont assisté à des réunions inter-parlementaires et à faire à l'occasion un rapport à leur sujet.

Le Comité entreprend l'étude du rapport de la Soixante-neuvième conférence inter-parlementaire tenue à Rome (Italie), du 14 au 22 septembre 1982.

L'honorable sénateur Molgat fait une déclaration et répond aux questions.

Conformément à une motion du Comité adoptée à la séance du jeudi 24 février 1983, le président permet que le rapport de la Soixante-neuvième conférence inter-parlementaire soit joint aux procès-verbal et témoignages de ce jour (*Voir Appendice "EAND-74"*).

A 11h05, le Comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

[Texte]

Friday, May 13, 1983

• 0942

Le président: À l'ordre s'il vous plaît!

Bonjour mesdames et messieurs. Comme vous le savez, le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale est habilité à recevoir et examiner les rapports des délégations officielles du Parlement canadien, qui ont rencontré des délégations de parlements étrangers ou ont assisté à des réunions interparlementaires, et à faire à l'occasion un rapport à leur sujet.

Pendant de nombreuses années, nous avons agonisé en fait, à savoir comment nous pourrions disposer, dans le peu de temps mis à notre disposition, de cet ordre de renvoi de la Chambre des communes. Mais je pense que le temps est venu, et je me souviendrai toujours des pressantes invitations de l'honorable député, M. Wenman, pour qu'il y ait un suivi une fois que la délégation a atteint son but, qu'elle a fait sa visite.

Alors, c'est pour moi un grand plaisir ce matin, que nous avons pu mettre de côté une séance de nos travaux dédiés à l'étude des crédits des Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale, pour étudier un premier rapport. Cela fait des années que nous nous devons de le faire, ça fait des années que nous souhaitons le faire et ce matin c'est la première d'une nombreuse série, j'espère, puisque nous avons l'autorité de recevoir, d'écouter les diverses délégations qui sont allées à l'étranger, pour et au nom du Parlement canadien.

Ce matin, nous avons donc avec nous l'honorable Gildas Molgat, notre ami, qui jusqu'en décembre dernier, a été le très compétent, très habile et très agréable président du groupe canadien de l'Union parlementaire internationale. Nous avons pensé que rien ne serait plus important et plus agréable que de demander à la délégation qui a accompagné le sénateur Molgat à Rome, de bien vouloir l'accompagner ici ce matin.

Il y avait à Rome une nombreuse délégation composée des sénateurs Molgat, Asselin, Bosa, du sénateur M^{me} Yvette Rousseau et des députés suivants: M. Dennis Dawson, M. Benno Friesen, M. Gérald Laniel, l'honorable Allan Lawrence qui aussi est le vice-président de la délégation, l'honorable Bryce Mackasey, M. Douglas Neil, M. David Orlikow, M. Prud'homme, moi-même, M. Roger Hill, comme assistant, conseiller à la délégation, M. Charles Lussier, qui nous accompagne ce matin, le greffier du Sénat, M. Richard Greene, l'assistant-greffier du Sénat, D^r Koester, le greffier de la Chambre des communes, et notre très compétent et très diligent secrétaire administratif, M. Martin Lavoie.

• 0945

Nous avons avec nous ce matin le président sortant, M. le sénateur Molgat, ainsi que M. l'honorable Allen Lawrence, l'honorable M^{me} Rousseau, MM. les députés Orlikow et Gérald Laniel, pour le moment. Je remarque aussi dans l'assistance M. Charles Lussier, M. Greene, M. Martin Lavoie et M.

TÉMOIGNAGES

(Enregistrement électronique)

[Traduction]

Le vendredi 13 mai 1983

The Chairman: Order, please.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. As you know, the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence is empowered to receive and examine reports from official Canadian Parliamentary delegations, which have met with delegations from foreign parliaments or attended inter-parliamentary meetings, and to report from time to time thereon.

For a number of years, we have agonized about how we could deal with this Order of Reference from the House of Commons, given the limited time available to us. However, I think the time has come to act on this Order of Reference, and I will always remember the urging of the honourable member, Mr. Wenman, that there be some follow-up to visits by Canadian delegations.

It is therefore a great pleasure for me this morning to study the first report of such a delegation. We have managed to set aside one of the meetings that we had planned to devote to the study of the estimates of External Affairs and National Defence. For years we have been planning to do just this, and this morning's meeting is the first in a long series of such meetings, I hope, because we are authorized to hear from the various delegations which go abroad for and on behalf of the Parliament of Canada.

This morning, we have with us the Honourable Gildas Molgat, who is a good friend of ours. Until December of last year, he was the very competent and pleasant chairman of the Canadian group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. We thought it would be most important and desirable to invite the delegation, which accompanied Senator Molgat to Rome, to attend this morning's meeting as well.

We had quite a large delegation in Rome: Senators Molgat, Asselin and Bosa, Senator Mrs. Yvette Rousseau, and the following members of Parliament: Mr. Dennis Dawson, Mr. Benno Friesen, Mr. Gérald Laniel, the Honourable Allan Lawrence, who is also the vice-chairman of the delegation, the Honourable Bryce Mackasey, Mr. Douglas Neil, Mr. David Orlikow, Mr. Prud'homme, myself, Mr. Roger Hill, the adviser to the delegation, Mr. Charles Lussier, who is with us this morning, the Clerk of the Senate, Mr. Richard Greene, the Assistant Clerk of the Senate, Dr. Koester, the Clerk of the House of Commons, and our very competent and diligent administrative secretary, Mr. Martin Lavoie.

So far this morning we have with us the outgoing chairman, Senator Molgat, the honourable Allen Lawrence, the honourable Mrs. Rousseau, and Messrs. Orlikow and Laniel. Also in attendance this morning are Mr. Charles Lussier, Mr. Greene, Mr. Martin Lavoie and Mr. Roger Hill. For a Friday morning,

[Text]

Roger Hill. Pour un vendredi matin, c'est presque un succès. J'espère que d'autres députés et sénateurs qui ont assisté à ces réunions se présenteront. Je pense qu'il faut démontrer, non seulement à nos collègues, mais aussi à la Chambre des communes, au Sénat et au public que, non seulement ces délégations font un travail important, comme nous le dira sans doute le sénateur Molgat, mais qu'il y a un suivi à ces importantes assises et réunions.

Alors, sans autre préambule, j'invite un ami de longue date, un excellent collègue de l'autre Chambre, comme on dit, du Sénat, l'honorable Molgat, à bien vouloir commencer ces délibérations.

Then I will ask various members to question either the Chairman, Mr. Molgat, or to question any of the members who were in Rome, and that would be the inauguration of a new series of reports to the committee when, of course, time permits. I may apply that to other organizations. I have in mind Canada-United States, a very important group of parliamentarians who, on our behalf, try to get our relationship closer together with the United States of America, and various other organizations.

I had better go slowly and do it, rather than announce too much and not do anything.

So Senator Molgat, *s'il vous plaît*.

Le sénateur G. L. Molgat (président sortant de l'Union interparlementaire—Groupe canadien): Merci bien, monsieur le président, membres du Comité de la Chambre des communes et mes chers collègues.

D'abord, monsieur le président, je voudrais, à titre personnel, et peut-être aussi au nom de tous les membres de l'Union dont j'ai été le président, vous remercier et féliciter votre Comité pour cette initiative.

Nous en parlons depuis bien longtemps, et M. Wenman est très au courant, puisqu'il avait fait la proposition il y a maintenant plusieurs années à une réunion du Comité exécutif de l'Union interparlementaire. M. Wenman parlait à ce moment-là pour l'Union plus précisément, mais il avait proposé que l'on étudie, pour toutes les associations qui font des voyages, de meilleures façons de faire rapport au Parlement et de donner des bénéfices et des résultats plus directs et plus clairs des travaux que font ces délégations qui voyagent. Comme Canadiens, nous dépensons tout de même d'assez fortes sommes pour ce genre de voyages, et il convient que nous en ressortions tous les bénéfices possibles.

Je vous félicite donc pour cette entreprise. Je crois que c'est la première fois que l'on a l'occasion d'apparaître devant votre Comité.

Au Sénat, nous nous servons d'une autre formule qui est celle d'avoir un débat au Sénat même sur le rapport des délégations, ce qui est normal chez nous. Mais ici, à la Chambre des communes, je pense que c'est un début et j'espère que cela va se continuer. Peut-être même trouverons-nous d'autres formules aussi.

Maintenant, pour ce qui en est de l'Union même, nous nous servons d'un système qui, je crois, est très bon pour les

[Translation]

that almost qualifies as a success. I hope that some of the other members of Parliament and senators who attended the meetings will be joining us. I think that we have to demonstrate to our colleagues, the House of Commons, the Senate and the public, that not only do these delegations do an important job, as Senator Molgat will no doubt be telling us, but that there is a follow-up to the meetings held abroad.

Without further ado, I will now ask my old friend and excellent colleague from the other House, that is the Senate, the honourable Senator Molgat, to make his opening remarks.

Je vais ensuite donner la parole aux députés et aux sénateurs qui auront des questions à poser, soit au président, M. Molgat, ou à n'importe quel membre de la délégation qui est allée à Rome. Si le temps nous le permet, nous espérons examiner à l'avenir d'autres rapports de délégations canadiennes. Je pense par exemple au groupe de parlementaires canado-américains qui, au nom de nous tous, essaient de resserrer les liens entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Il existe bien sûr d'autres organismes semblables.

Mais il vaut mieux que je procède lentement et réussisse à faire quelque chose, plutôt que de trop prévoir et ne rien faire.

Vous avez donc la parole, sénateur Molgat, *please*.

Senator G. L. Molgat (Outgoing Chairman of the Inter-Parliamentary Union—Canadian Group): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee from the House of Commons, and colleagues.

I would like to begin, Mr. Chairman, on my own behalf and on behalf of all the members of the union of which I was the chairman, by thanking you and congratulating your committee on this initiative.

As Mr. Wenman knows very well, we have been talking about this for a very long time, because he made the suggestion several years ago at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Mr. Wenman was referring specifically to the union at that time, but he also suggested that we try to find better ways of having all travelling Canadian delegations report back to Parliament to give the benefit and the most direct and clear results of their work. After all, we do spend quite a bit of money on this type of trip, and we should get as much benefit out of them as possible.

I therefore congratulate you on this undertaking. I think this is the first time that we have had an opportunity to appear before your committee.

The Senate proceeds somewhat differently. We have a debate in the Senate on the reports tabled by the delegations. This is customary practice in the Senate. But in the House of Commons, I think this meeting is a first, and I hope the trend will continue. Perhaps we may find other forums as well.

Turning now to the union itself. In my opinion, we have a very fine system in place for preparing our delegations.

[Texte]

préparations de nos délégations. Nous avons, grâce au service du ministère des Affaires extérieures et d'autres ministères, des réunions approfondies avant le départ, des *briefings* qui nous sont des plus utiles.

Le problème, peut-être, est de savoir comment mettre en vigueur ou même comment disperser au retour les renseignements que nous avons obtenus.

It has been the practice of the Interparliamentary Union, for as many years as I recall, to submit on return a complete report in both languages. This is sent to all parliamentarians who belong to the union. Anyone who is a union member automatically gets at the return, as soon as possible, a complete report in both languages.

• 0950

The problem has been, in the past, the discussion of that report with other parliamentarians, and I think also the input to the Department of External Affairs. I think when a delegation comes back, while they may not be experts in the field of external affairs, they certainly have obtained a great deal of information. They have rubbed shoulders . . . in the case of the IPU—with delegates from all over the world, because the IPU is not simply, in our terms, the free world, it includes the Soviet bloc, it includes 90 countries of very different social, economic and political backgrounds. I think there has to be, in addition to what we are doing here, a look at how we could best make use of the information, the impressions that delegates come back to Canada with after a meeting.

In the same way, we, as parliamentarians, do not want to have external affairs determine for us what our point of view must be on things; nevertheless, we get them before our committee before we go, to give us all the information they can. In the same way, while we may not be able to determine the direction of external affairs, I think it would be important to have a meeting with them on our return, so that we can exchange views and get our story across, and provide any information we can.

Those are my first general comments, Mr. Chairman, and maybe it is something that we can continue to look into.

Insofar as the specific meeting in Rome, I think the Canadian delegation there took a very active part. I say this, not because I was the chairman, because that is a matter that has gone on I think throughout the years in the IPU, regardless of who was the chairman. The Canadian group has always been a very active group at IPU meetings. It has been able to be active because of the work we do in advance, the preparation. By virtue of our briefings and our method of work, we have played a major role within the IPU; I think a role beyond what our numbers, in world terms, would warrant.

[Traduction]

Through the services of the Department of External Affairs and other departments, we have in-depth briefings before we leave, which are extremely useful.

The problem is determining how to implement or even disseminate the information we obtain abroad, on our return to Canada.

Autant que je m'en souviens, l'Union interparlementaire a toujours présenté un rapport complet dans les deux langues. Le document est envoyé à tous les parlementaires membres de l'Union. Dès le retour, tous les membres de l'Union reçoivent automatiquement un rapport détaillé dans les deux langues officielles.

Par le passé, les discussions sur le rapport avec d'autres parlementaires et l'apport du ministère des Affaires extérieures ont soulevé quelques problèmes. Lorsqu'ils reviennent au pays, bien qu'ils ne soient pas spécialistes en matière d'affaires extérieures, les membres d'une délégation ont certainement recueilli beaucoup de renseignements. Dans le cas de l'Union interparlementaire, ils ont côtoyé des délégués venant de partout au monde, car l'Union interparlementaire ne regroupe pas seulement des représentants du monde libre, tel que nous le connaissons, mais également des représentants des pays du bloc soviétique; l'Union regroupe 90 pays dont l'histoire politique, économique et sociale diffère beaucoup. Outre l'exercice de ce matin, il faudrait étudier comment utiliser au mieux les renseignements recueillis, les impressions que rapportent au pays les gens qui ont participé à une rencontre.

Par ailleurs, en tant que parlementaires, nous ne voulons pas que les Affaires extérieures décident pour nous comment il faut aborder certaines questions; on nous fait tout de même part de certaines données, ce qui nous permet d'être aussi renseignés que possible. Parallèlement, même si nous ne sommes pas en mesure de fixer une orientation des affaires extérieures, il serait utile, à mon avis, d'en rencontrer les représentants dès notre retour, ce qui permettrait un échange d'idées et nous donnerait l'occasion de faire valoir notre point de vue et de donner certains renseignements éventuels.

Monsieur le président, voilà ce que je voulais dire au départ; il serait peut-être bon de pousser l'étude de cette question.

Parlons maintenant de la réunion tenue à Rome: Selon moi, la délégation canadienne y a participé de façon très active. Je ne dis pas cela parce que j'étais président de la délégation, car la participation canadienne au sein de l'Union interparlementaire a été active, quel que soit le président. Le groupe canadien a toujours été très actif aux réunions de l'Union interparlementaire, grâce à nos activités préalables, à nos préparatifs. Nos séances d'information et nos méthodes de travail nous ont permis de jouer un rôle important au sein de l'Union interparlementaire; un rôle beaucoup plus important, à mon avis, que celui auquel on pourrait s'attendre d'une délégation si peu nombreuse par rapport à d'autres délégations.

[Text]

The specific items discussed in Rome are listed in the report. I do not think I need to go over those in detail at this point. We can answer any questions that you wish, and I have here colleagues who were at the Rome meeting and who participated directly in each section. The other items, not part of the Rome meeting, but which were highlights of our session there, were a visit and a speech by Mr. Arafat, which would have been considered impossible just a very few years ago, and on this occasion went along with a minimum of disruption. In addition to that, we had an audience with the Pope.

We were there at the time of the Beirut massacre, which had I think an important influence on the attitude, at least, of delegates. We were involved in a somewhat bitter debate, as to the site of future meetings, whether or not the invitation of South Korea could be accepted. We were meeting at a time of major world tension with the situation in Afghanistan still outstanding; the Iran-Iraq war still going on, and the situation in Lebanon. So it was an extremely serious international moment, and all of these items had an effect on the process of the meeting in Rome.

Mr. Chairman, I think we might get more benefit now if we could go into question and answer and discussion, as to the specific meeting, but also the future of parliamentary associations.

• 0955

The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Molgat. I will proceed as we usually do in an orderly fashion and I will start with the Official Opposition. One of the prime movers for many years of this kind of meeting, and who wrote a report as a matter of fact, you may remember, was Bob Wenman, our colleague from British Columbia. So I will recognize him first. Mr. Wenman.

Mr. Wenman: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like, of course, to begin by expressing my appreciation to the IPU for, first of all, the very fine and thorough report which was prepared and distributed to us—even in advance. I want to thank the IPU for taking the initiative of carrying the work of the IPU and, thereby, all parliamentary groups to the chairman of this committee, who has always been open to this idea. In fact, I am sure it would not have occurred that we be here today, had it not been for his active support of this kind of an activity.

I think the format that has been established of senators and members of Parliament meeting together—which which is another of our current chairman's initiatives—throughout this year is very healthy for Canada, particularly in external affairs, where we do all work so closely together. It is good to establish this further unity in this way.

I think this adds to the structure of Parliament, because it adds accountability, serious discussion and, ultimately, recommendation. It is particularly useful to a member like myself who was unable to attend but, yet, in a vacarious way

[Translation]

Le rapport fait état des questions précises discutées à Rome. Je ne vois pas l'utilité de les exposer de façon détaillée à ce moment-ci. Nous pouvons répondre à toutes les questions que vous pourriez vouloir poser; je suis accompagné de collègues qui se sont rendus à Rome et qui ont participé directement à chaque discussion. Je vous signale deux autres activités qui ne faisaient pas partie de la réunion de Rome proprement dite, mais qui ont jalonné notre séjour: la visite de M. Arafat et un discours prononcé par ce dernier, événement que l'on aurait cru impossible il y a seulement quelques années et qui s'est déroulé sans trop de remous. En outre, le pape nous a accordé une audience.

Nous nous trouvions à Rome au moment du massacre de Beyrouth, incident qui a fortement influencé l'attitude de certains délégués. On s'est lancé dans une discussion assez pénible sur les endroits où il faudrait dorénavant tenir les réunions; on se demandait s'il fallait accepter l'invitation de la Corée du Sud. Notre réunion se tenait à un moment de grande tension mondiale, étant donné la situation en Afghanistan, la guerre irano-irakienne et les événements au Liban. Sur le plan des relations internationales, la situation était très délicate, et la réunion de Rome en a senti quelques retombées.

Monsieur le président, il me semble qu'à ce moment-ci, il serait plus utile de passer à une période de questions, de réponses et de discussion sur la réunion proprement dite et sur l'avenir des associations parlementaires.

Le président: Merci, sénateur Molgat. Nous allons procéder, comme d'habitude, de façon bien ordonnée: je cède la parole aux députés de l'opposition officielle. Un des principaux défenseurs de ce genre de réunion, depuis bon nombre d'années, est M. Bob Wenman, notre collègue de la Colombie-Britannique; il a même, vous vous en souviendrez, rédigé un rapport à ce sujet. Je lui cède donc la parole. Monsieur Wenman.

M. Wenman: Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président.

Bien entendu, j'aimerais tout d'abord remercier l'Union interparlementaire d'avoir rédigé et fait distribuer, même avant la tenue de notre réunion, un rapport bien conçu et détaillé. Je tiens à remercier l'Union interparlementaire d'avoir porté les travaux de l'Union et, par conséquent, de tous les groupes parlementaires, à l'attention du président de ce Comité, qui a toujours appuyé cette idée. En fait, nous ne serions pas là aujourd'hui pour discuter de ces questions s'il n'avait pas fortement soutenu ce genre d'activité.

L'idée de réunir des sénateurs et des députés, au cours de cette année—autre initiative prise par le président actuel—s'est avérée très utile pour le Canada, et notamment pour les affaires extérieures, domaine dans lequel nous travaillons tous en étroite collaboration. Il est bon de chercher ainsi une plus grande unité.

La structure du Parlement s'en trouve renforcée, car cette façon de procéder nous rend plus responsables, plus aptes à discuter et, éventuellement, à faire des recommandations. Ce genre de tribune est particulièrement utile à un député qui,

[Texte]

could gain an understanding and a feel for what is occurring in world fora. Whether it be in this forum, the United Nations, or whatever, trends do run, and it is helpful to gain that information secondhand.

I am aware of the concept of debate in the Senate. I would hope, as we look for future directions now that we have achieved this one—and I am very happy that we have come this far—that our next step might be to try to raise the profile of interparliamentary travel.

Reporting directly to our House of Commons is the obvious next step. I would hope, as we seek toward the step of moving to our House of Commons, that we recognize that too seldom in the House of Commons do we, in fact, debate external affairs. I would hope that, as we seek parliamentary reform, we might look at least to one or two days of debate per year, wherein these reports might be carried together; obviously we cannot discuss all these items, but it could be referral of the report or perhaps the committee here itself meeting to choose one or two very significant resolutions of a non-partisan nature, which in fact could be carried to the House of Commons. That could lead to a debate—one that would feature non-partisanship and the attitude of free voting and co-operation which exists in this committee.

So I would hope that, while this is the first step toward moving directly into the House of Commons with some resolution and some statement by the Parliament of Canada on the important issues of the day, it becomes important relative to other changes in the House of Commons. I mean, too, particularly as it relates to Standing Order 43, which has gone from the House of Commons where the House made unanimous statements on certain subjects. With that being one vehicle lost to us, this might be the way back in for statements of the House of Commons on matters of common international concern.

I myself would want to recommend today that this particular debate and these ideas be carried forward by our chairman directly to the committee for parliamentary reform as suggestions they might want to discuss in that forum. Then they will come back to Parliament in that way for certain, even if we do not feel we can move them directly from this stage today.

So my compliments again to all those concerned for bringing these matters forward. I will be interested in hearing comments by the members of the committee on the new suggestions I have just made today.

• 1000

I would also like to hear some comments of substance on some of the particular items of concern to myself. I am interested in hearing from our witness and others, particularly concerning one section that relates to the adherence of all states to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. The United Nations has received a considerable number of reports on this subject. I

[Traduction]

comme moi, n'a pas pu participer, mais qui, par procuration, pourrait comprendre davantage ce qui se passe ailleurs dans le monde. Qu'il s'agisse de cette tribune, des Nations Unies, ou d'une autre organisation, des tendances se dégagent, et il est très utile d'obtenir des renseignements de seconde main.

Je suis au courant du concept des discussions au Sénat. Je suis très heureux des progrès que nous avons marqués jusqu'à présent; j'espère que la prochaine étape consistera à tenter de vanter les mérites des rencontres interparlementaires.

La prochaine étape est évidente: faire rapport directement à la Chambre des communes. En cherchant à faire cela, j'espère que nous reconnaitrions qu'à la Chambre, on ne discute pas assez souvent des affaires extérieures. Dans le cadre de la réforme parlementaire, j'espère qu'on cherchera à consacrer un ou deux jours à la discussion des questions relevant des affaires extérieures; à ce moment-là, on pourrait adopter ces rapports; bien entendu, on ne peut pas discuter de toutes ces questions, mais on pourrait s'en remettre aux rapports, ou peut-être aux membres de ce Comité, qui choisiraient une ou deux résolutions non partisans très importantes dont serait saisie la Chambre des communes. Cette façon de procéder susciterait une discussion qui serait caractérisée par un esprit non partisan, un vote libre et de la collaboration, qualités que l'on constate au sein de ce Comité.

J'espère que dans le cadre des autres changements prévus à la Chambre des communes, on tiendra compte de cette première initiative visant à saisir la Chambre des communes d'une résolution ou d'une déclaration du Parlement du Canada au sujet des questions d'actualité importantes. D'autant plus que cela relève de l'article 43 du Règlement, dans le cas où la Chambre s'est prononcée à l'unanimité au sujet de certaines questions. Nous ne pouvons plus procéder ainsi; cette nouvelle initiative pourrait nous permettre d'obtenir l'avis de la Chambre des communes sur des questions internationales d'intérêt commun.

Pour ma part, je propose que le président soumette le compte rendu de ces discussions et ces idées au comité chargé de la réforme parlementaire; les membres de ce dernier comité pourraient en discuter. Puis, ils s'adresseront sûrement au Parlement de la même façon, même si nous ne croyons pas pouvoir les influencer en ce moment.

Je tiens donc à féliciter encore une fois tous ceux qui ont fait valoir ces idées. J'aimerais entendre les commentaires des membres de ce Comité sur les propositions que je viens de faire.

J'aimerais également entendre, tant des témoins que d'autres, des commentaires pertinents sur certaines questions qui m'intéressent particulièrement, dont l'adhésion de tous les États au Protocole de Genève de 1925 sur la prohibition de l'arme bactériologique, qui défend l'utilisation de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques, ou autres. Les Nations Unies ont reçu bon nombre de rapports à ce sujet. À la conférence, dans vos discussions individuelles ou personnelles avec d'autres délé-

[Text]

wonder if, at your conference, in your individual or personal discussions with people, anything new was brought to light, either officially or unofficially, about the use of poisonous gases, particularly in two areas of the world—one is Afghanistan, the other, Southeast Asia. Did any of you gain any new information, or was that matter brought forward and discussed in any way, shape or form?

I would have some other questions, but that one is found three times in the report. It is also found in a treaty... suggesting a treaty prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for their destruction. So it was an element of concern, but I am looking particularly for new evidence that may have been gathered, or for information from private discussions that may have been held.

Mr. Chairman, does any other member have a comment on that?

Senator Molgat: If I can just make a comment on that, Mr. Wenman: The practice has been in the union that we divide the topics between all the members and allocate members. Your question would be dealing largely with the disarmament committee operations, and in that area Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Prud'homme were the two members of the delegation particularly responsible for disarmament matters. I am not trying to escape...

Mr. Wenman: I think, as to both the gentlemen you have mentioned, it ends up that my question is very appropriate, since it is to our chairman and to our senior delegation member for IPU from the Conservative Party.

The Chairman: The Hon. Mr. Lawrence shared with me the responsibility for that resolution on disarmament; he even did the same in Helsinki and in Cuba, so I will ask him to comment on your question.

Mr. Lawrence: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As far as I know, Mr. Wenman, there was no new information nor were there any really new dangerous aspects of this potentially tragic problem that is facing the world unveiled to us in Rome. I should point out to you that, on page 55 of the report, you will see paragraph 2 of the General Resolution on Disarmament, subparagraph (i), in which there was inserted a fairly strong exhortation to all the nations to adhere to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

My experience has been that there is usually a reference to biological weapons and the use of biological weapons. I think, really, this is the first time that we not only put that in but, as well, added those four very pregnant words at the very end of the paragraph, "and on their destruction". Some of us were very pleased, not only to see the strength of that subparagraph, but also that those four words were added and approved by the meeting in general.

The Chairman: Mr. Wenman, if I may just add, you may find in these resolutions many resolutions that were adopted previously, either at the United Nations or in other forums. One of the main tasks of the International Parliamentary

[Translation]

gués, a-t-on fait des déclarations officielles ou officieuses au sujet de l'utilisation de gaz toxiques, particulièrement dans deux régions du monde, l'Afghanistan et le Sud-Est asiatique? Avez-vous pu obtenir de nouveaux renseignements, ou a-t-on discuté, de quelque manière que ce soit, de cette question?

J'ai d'autres questions à poser, mais celle-ci est soulevée trois fois dans le rapport. On parle également d'un traité interdisant le développement, la production et la constitution de réserves d'armes chimiques; ce traité prévoirait aussi la destruction de ces armes. On s'est donc intéressé à la question, mais j'aimerais savoir si l'on a recueilli de nouvelles preuves ou de nouveaux renseignements grâce à des discussions qui pourraient avoir eu lieu en privé.

Monsieur le président, d'autres membres veulent-ils ajouter quelque chose à cela?

Le sénateur Molgat: Permettez-moi de dire quelque chose à ce sujet, monsieur Wenman: à l'Union, on a tendance à créer des groupes qui sont chargés d'étudier certaines questions. Votre question porte principalement sur les activités du comité du désarmement, domaine dont a discuté une délégation chargée d'étudier les questions de désarmement; MM. Lawrence et Prud'homme étaient membres de ce groupe. Je ne veux pas éviter de répondre...

M. Wenman: Il se trouve donc que ma question est très appropriée, puisqu'il s'agit de notre président et du plus ancien membre de la délégation à l'Union interparlementaire, qui est également membre du parti conservateur.

Le président: L'honorable M. Lawrence et moi-même étions responsables de cette résolution sur le désarmement. Il s'est également intéressé à cette question à Helsinki et à Cuba; je lui demanderai donc de répondre à votre question.

M. Lawrence: Merci, monsieur le président. Monsieur Wenman, pour autant que je sache, à la conférence de Rome, on ne nous a pas fait part de nouveaux renseignements ou de nouveaux aspects dangereux de ce problème, qui risque de mener le monde à la tragédie. Je vous signale qu'à la page 64 du rapport, au paragraphe 2 de la Résolution générale sur le désarmement, sous-paragraphe (i), on exhorte fortement les États à adhérer à la Convention de 1972 sur l'interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication et du stockage des armes bactériologiques (biologiques) ou à toxines, et sur leur destruction.

Habituellement, on fait référence aux armes biologiques et à leur utilisation. Mais c'est la première fois que nous ajoutons, à la toute fin du paragraphe, les mots très importants: «et sur leur destruction». Certains d'entre nous étaient très heureux non seulement de la vigueur de ce sous-paragraphe, mais également de l'adjonction de ces quatre mots, qui a été approuvée par l'ensemble des délégués.

Le président: Monsieur Wenman, permettez-moi d'intervenir. Parmi ces résolutions, vous en trouverez certaines qui ont déjà été adoptées, soit aux Nations Unies, soit ailleurs. Une des tâches principales de l'Union interparlementaire est non

[Texte]

Union is not only to come up with new material, but is—not only to support—to re-emphasize what has been done by governments. Because we are not a governmental organization, we are a parliamentary organization.

• 1005

Sometimes we feel that governments have decided to take some position at the United Nations or, as I said, in other fora, and it does end there, so it is the task of parliamentarians. You suggested to us many years ago, and you have always emphasized it, that it should not die out. So one of the tasks of parliamentarians is not only to right things, sometimes it is something that is very well known, and you wonder why we are putting Item A, B, C, D, or E or J or K in a resolution that is well known by government. It is just to re-emphasize the importance of it so that parliamentarians, when they go back to their countries, try to impress on their government decisions that their government has already taken at the United Nations. So one of the exercises of the IPU is not only to come up with new avenues, new possibilities of agreement on any subject, but also to support, encourage, and spread what government has decided in either the United Nations or in other fora.

Mr. Wenman: In asking this question, I did ask it in exactly that spirit, because in fact Canada was one of the first countries . . .

The Chairman: That is right.

Mr. Wenman: —as a result of interviews with refugees, through corridor talk and so forth, to find out about the tremendous holocaust that occurred in Kampuchea, who reported on the suspicion of gas, and in fact carried that to the United Nations. The United Nations, in turn, was one of the major generators of that discussion, including the most recent discussions that have been going on on the subject.

Therefore, I wanted to bring this forward in the same continuing spirit and hope that IPU members might carry the continuity of this new and horrible form that may actually be being deployed and experimented on in the field; and if this is so, we want these experiments on mankind stopped. I just wanted to express that concern and ask if there had been further information there.

The Chairman: If I may kindly say, we will be here until 11.00 a.m. Though I see four or five who would like to question, I will of course give you, having been the limelight in this new exercise, five more minutes.

Mr. Wenman: Well, in respect to my colleagues, I will pass and come back for a second or third round, if there is time.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

I think I recognize Dr. Pauline Jewett from the New Democratic Party. Please, Dr. Jewett.

Miss Jewett: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Traduction]

seulement de soulever de nouvelles questions, mais également d'appuyer et de renforcer des mesures prises par certains gouvernements. Car nous ne sommes pas une organisation gouvernementale, mais plutôt une organisation parlementaire.

Parfois, nous croyons que certains gouvernements ont adopté une position aux Nations Unies ou, comme je l'ai dit, ailleurs, mais qu'il ne faut pas en rester là: à ce moment-là, c'est aux parlementaires d'intervenir. Vous nous avez dit, il y a un bon nombre d'années, en le soulignant fortement, qu'il ne fallait pas abandonner certaines questions. Le rôle des parlementaires ne se borne pas à rectifier certaines situations; parfois, vous vous demandez peut-être pourquoi on met l'accent sur un élément ou un autre d'une résolution bien connue. Il s'agit tout simplement de rappeler l'importance de cet élément de la résolution; ainsi, les parlementaires, de retour dans leur pays, tenteront de faire comprendre à leur gouvernement l'importance des décisions que ce même gouvernement a prises aux Nations Unies. L'Union interparlementaire ne doit pas seulement trouver de nouvelles solutions, de nouvelles possibilités d'accord sur une question donnée; elle doit également appuyer, encourager et faire connaître la décision prise par un gouvernement, soit aux Nations Unies, soit dans un autre cadre.

M. Wenman: Voilà ce que j'avais à l'esprit en posant cette question, car le Canada est un des premiers pays . . .

Le président: C'est vrai.

M. Wenman: . . . grâce à des entrevues avec les réfugiés, à des entretiens dans les coulisses, on a pu apprendre des choses au sujet du terrible holocauste au Kampuchéa; le Canada a pu signaler aux Nations Unies qu'il se doutait que l'on faisait appel à des gaz. À leur tour, les Nations Unies ont été parmi les premières organisations à susciter la discussion à ce sujet, y compris les discussions récentes qui ont eu lieu.

Par conséquent, je tenais à signaler cela, et j'espère que les membres de l'Union interparlementaire pourront continuer de lutter contre cette arme nouvelle et horrible qui pourrait être utilisée ou mise à l'essai sur le terrain; si tel est le cas, ces expériences sur des humains doivent cesser. Je tenais simplement à vous exprimer mon intérêt envers cette question et à vous demander si vous avez de plus amples renseignements.

Le président: Permettez-moi d'intervenir: Nous serons là jusqu'à 11 heures. Puisque quatre ou cinq d'entre vous veulent encore poser des questions, je vais vous accorder cinq autres minutes, car c'est vous qui avez mis cette affaire en branle.

M. Wenman: Eh bien, par respect pour mes collègues, je vais leur céder la parole; j'interrogerai le témoin au deuxième ou au troisième tour de questions, si le temps le permet.

Le président: Merci beaucoup.

Il me semble que c'est le tour de M^{lle} Pauline Jewett, du Nouveau parti démocratique. Allez-y, je vous en prie, mademoiselle Jewett.

Mlle Jewett: Merci, monsieur le président.

[Text]

I have not myself been to any of the meetings of the IPU, although I have been a member. I suppose that is partly because as external affairs critic I tend to get to things at the UN and trips to Latin America for the work of this committee and the subcommittee of this committee, whereas other of my colleagues do not have those opportunities. Therefore I cannot compare the work of the IPU with, say, the work of the subcommittee of the external affairs committee on Canada's relations with Latin American and the Caribbean. But I wonder if the senator or other members of the delegation to the IPU who have sat on this committee, SCEAND, could contrast for me the relative benefits to be derived from being involved with IPU and being involved with a Senate or a House of Commons standing committee examining a certain question and the relative outcomes, if you follow me, of the activities of the two kinds of committees.

The Chairman: Either Senator Molgat or others will answer; or if not them, I will.

Senator Molgat.

Senator Molgat: I would like to make a very brief comment. I am not a member of your committee, of course, so I cannot speak about how it functions. Although I might make a passing comment there, the work of your committee, by the way, was very influential insofar as the disarmament resolution, because a good deal of the disarmament resolution accepted by the IPU came directly from the work of your committee and its report. And I owe particular thanks there to your chairman who was the rapporteur at the IPU meetings on the matter of disarmament. So there was a very, very close link in Canada.

• 1010

Now, on the overall, speaking now as a member of the Senate foreign affairs committee, I do not think there is any question that those members who have participated in IPU meetings can have a much greater influence in the foreign affairs committee by virtue of their having seen much more than just the Canadian point of view or the point of view we may get from other parliamentary associations, be it CPA, NATO or Canada-U.S. It is not that I depreciate those in any way; they are important and they have to be kept up. This particular involvement in IPU, though, brings you in contact with the other world, those who do not participate in those other associations, because we include all of the Soviet bloc in this. So I think we have a broader point of view as a result of attending IPU meetings, and this is of benefit to our members who attend; and I presume the same would apply to members of your committee.

[Translation]

Pour ma part, je n'ai participé à aucune des réunions de l'Union interparlementaire, bien que j'en aie été membre. Cela est en partie attribuable, je suppose, au fait qu'en tant que critique des Affaires extérieures, je m'intéresse aux activités des Nations Unies et je fais des voyages en Amérique latine, dans le cadre des travaux de ce Comité et du sous-comité; par contre, certains de mes collègues n'ont pas l'occasion de le faire. Par conséquent, je ne peux pas comparer le travail de l'Union interparlementaire et les travaux, disons, du sous-comité sur les relations du Canada avec l'Amérique latine et les Antilles. Mais je me demande si le sénateur ou d'autres députés faisant partie de la délégation à l'Union interparlementaire, qui ont également siégé au Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale, pourraient me dire quels avantages pourrait comporter une participation à l'Union interparlementaire pour un membre d'un comité du Sénat ou d'un comité permanent de la Chambre des communes chargé d'étudier une question précise; quels seraient les avantages sur le plan des activités des deux sortes de comités?

Le président: Je demanderais au sénateur Molgat ou à d'autres de répondre; s'ils ne le veulent pas, j'y répondrai moi-même.

Monsieur le sénateur.

Le sénateur Molgat: J'aimerais répondre très brièvement. Je ne suis pas membre de votre Comité; par conséquent, je ne peux pas me prononcer sur ses travaux. Je peux toutefois me permettre un commentaire et vous signaler que les travaux de votre Comité ont eu une grande influence sur la résolution concernant le désarmement, étant donné qu'une grande partie de la résolution approuvée par l'Union interparlementaire découlait directement des conclusions tirées par votre Comité et exposées dans son rapport. À ce chapitre, je dois une fière chandelle à votre président, qui était rapporteur aux réunions de l'Union interparlementaire qui portaient sur le désarmement. Ainsi donc, pour le Canada, le lien était très, très étroit.

En tant que membre du Comité sénatorial des affaires étrangères, dans l'ensemble, je ne crois pas que l'on puisse dire que ceux qui ont participé à des réunions de l'Union interparlementaire peuvent avoir une plus grande influence au sein du Comité des affaires étrangères, étant donné qu'ils ont entendu des points de vue autres que le point de vue américain ou le point de vue d'autres associations parlementaires, qu'il s'agisse de l'association canadienne, de l'OTAN ou des groupes canado-américains. Je ne veux pas les amoindrir de quelque façon que ce soit; ces groupes sont importants et il faut les maintenir. Par contre, cette participation à l'Union interparlementaire nous permet d'entrer en contact avec d'autres personnes, des personnes qui ne sont pas membres de ces autres associations, car nous regroupons également des représentants du bloc soviétique. Par conséquent, il me semble que notre vue d'ensemble est plus large si nous avons participé aux réunions de l'Union interparlementaire, ce qui est un avantage pour ceux qui ont l'occasion de s'y rendre; ce doit être la même chose pour les membres de votre Comité.

[Texte]

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel would like to elaborate; and I would just like, with your permission, to add a word.

M. Laniel: Monsieur le président, sans vouloir être méchant...

I want to tell Miss Jewett that everything is relative; and the work of an IPU delegation is sometimes relative to the subject matter on which it is easy to make a consensus, as it is not easy on other matters. When you speak of colonialism, everybody is going in all directions. It is all right to praise a very nice report from a subcommittee or from a committee... and I am sure all the work of your subcommittee on South America was serious—but when you look at the report and all the minority reports, you ask yourself quite a few questions, and you just transpose that at the international level. Actually, these meetings are there to help develop consensus, help obtain information, make up your own mind and not always come to a unanimous agreement. So I think they have their purpose, and I think that is going in the same direction as this committee and as subcommittees of this committee.

The Chairman: If I may, madam, this is the reason of this meeting, really. It is to give and take and exchange views, and I will profit from this by saying something that has been in the back of my mind for so many years. It is also relative to the degree of work that the member chosen wants to do. I will explain.

It has been for too long a long custom—and I know that our words are being now registered, and I will make sure every Whip of every party from the Senate and the House gets a copy of this, plus the two Speakers—for too long, people have seen the so-called “trip” as a distribution of good conduct in the House or presence in committees. I detest that system—and I want to be on record for saying so—because the IPU in particular, of all the organizations that I have seen in 20 years...

Personally, being now the chairman, of course, but having seen the others, without downgrading the others, I realize this organization in particular applies not to a specific group. The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association is something just for the Commonwealth; NATO is something just for NATO. The French-speaking parliamentarians' association is just for the French-speaking parliamentarians. But this one has an immense scope. It is for parliamentarians of the NATO group, the Warsaw group and all the non-aligned. That is the reason the Whip must always make absolutely sure they send not only experts... otherwise, it will become very difficult for some to catch expertise or to learn—but people who not only are interested in following briefings...

We must say for the public who will read us in the *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* of this morning that, prior to these meetings, there is a series of briefings, long hours of briefing sessions, to prepare yourself. We also want these people who go over there to start working, and Senator Molgat

[Traduction]

Le président: M. Laniel voudrait renchéirir; et si vous le permettez, j'aimerais intervenir moi-même.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to be mean...

Je signale à M^{lle} Jewett que tout est relatif; le travail d'une délégation de l'Union interparlementaire peut parfois porter sur une question sur laquelle il est facile d'en arriver à un consensus; mais quand il s'agit d'autres questions, ce n'est pas aussi facile. Lorsqu'on parle de colonialisme, chacun prend une direction différente. Je suis convaincu que les travaux du sous-comité sur les relations du Canada avec l'Amérique latine ont été très sérieux; votre rapport est excellent; mais il faut également tenir compte de tous les rapports de groupes minoritaires, ce qui nous permet de nous poser bon nombre de questions; on peut transposer cette situation sur le plan international. A vrai dire, ces réunions sont prévues pour faciliter un consensus, échanger des renseignements et permettre aux participants de tirer leurs propres conclusions, même si l'on n'en arrive pas à un accord unanime. Ces réunions sont utiles et leur objectif est sensiblement le même que celui de ce Comité et des sous-comités.

Le président: Si vous me le permettez, mademoiselle, voilà essentiellement le but de cette réunion. Il s'agit d'entendre le point de vue des autres, de donner le sien; je profite de cette occasion pour dire quelque chose que j'ai à l'esprit depuis un bon nombre d'années. Cela dépend également de l'ampleur des travaux que le député choisit de faire. Je m'explique.

Je sais que ces mots sont enregistrés; je m'assurais que le whip de chaque parti représenté au Sénat et à la Chambre obtienne un exemplaire du fascicule; j'en enverrai aux deux présidents; depuis trop longtemps, les gens ont tendance à considérer les «voyages» comme une façon de récompenser les députés pour leur bonne conduite ou leur assiduité à la Chambre ou aux comités. Cette façon de voir les choses me déplaît, et je tiens à le signaler, d'autant plus que l'Union interparlementaire, parmi toutes les organisations que j'ai vues au cours des vingt années...

En tant que président, sans vouloir dénigrer les autres, je me rends compte que cette organisation intéresse un groupe très précis. L'Association des parlementaires du Commonwealth s'intéresse aux questions concernant le Commonwealth; l'OTAN ne s'intéresse qu'à l'OTAN. L'Association des parlementaires de langue française ne s'intéresse qu'à la situation des parlementaires de langue française. Mais l'Union interparlementaire a une vue beaucoup plus large. Elle est conçue pour les parlementaires des pays membres de l'OTAN, des pays membres du pacte de Varsovie et de tous les pays non alignés. Voilà pourquoi le whip doit s'assurer d'envoyer non pas seulement des spécialistes, car il serait difficile à certaines personnes de se spécialiser ou d'apprendre, mais également des gens qui non seulement s'intéressent aux séances d'information...

Pour la gouverne des gens qui liront le compte rendu de cette séance, il faut dire qu'avant la tenue des réunions de l'Union interparlementaire, on prévoit une série de séances d'information, pour préparer les membres. Ces gens doivent se rendre aux conférences et travailler d'arrache-pied; le sénateur

[Text]

and I are meeting at 7.30 every morning. At 7.30 a.m., even if you are away from home, you have meetings to review the activities of the day before and the activities of the day to come. The chairman is always very severe on that, and members have no other choice. If everybody is there, the one who does not want to attend feels very bad by not going.

• 1015

Also, it is the duty of these members, when they come back, to participate better. I would say that one of the great advantages of parliamentarians attending these international delegations, especially the IPU, is to find so many colleagues who are also members of their foreign affairs committees. You would be amazed, madam, to know the number of chairmen of foreign affairs committees who either are members of various delegations or are leaders of the local IPU of their country. As you know, the IPU is a gold-mine for contact between parliamentarians.

We are too accustomed in the west . . . We can easily get our information with parliamentarians who may not directly be connected to the power of the day. But for the majority of the countries . . . and I would like my colleagues who are there and who are expert, like our vice-chairman of the IPU, Mr. Lawrence, to add or to subtract, depending on how far I go—there are an immense number of these delegates who are parliamentarians, yes, but parliamentarians in parliaments that have only one political party. That means these people, even though they are parliamentarians, really are directly connected to the power of the day. That may not be the case for, let us say, the NATO countries delegations or the western countries. You have all kinds of members who represent the three political parties in Canada, for instance. But in all the non-aligned, the south . . . You know the north-south dialogue; well, let us say in the south part of the north-south dialogue. Most of these members—and this was the experience of Senator Molgat . . . are directly connected with the authorities of their country and the contact that could be made by Canadian parliamentarians, on behalf of not only Canadians but on behalf of what we stand for in Canada, either in human rights questions, either in trade, either in aid, could be of an immense advantage to our country and to the Canadian taxpayer.

So I wanted to put that on record. But I think someone wants to have . . . So I recognize Madam . . . still, please.

Miss Jewett: Yes. Well, I am glad that you have had that opportunity, because I do think a lot of the public do sometimes question the benefits to be derived from this kind of activity. I do not personally question them, but I think it is useful to have what you have just said on the record.

The other part of my question, though, related to outcomes. Marcel has just said that in one-party states there may well be more outcome than there is in a democratic state because it is possible that they have more direct contacts and are even perhaps listened to more by the governments in those coun-

[Translation]

Molgat et moi-même participons à des réunions dès 7h30 le matin. À 7 h 30, même à l'étranger, on prévoit des réunions pour passer en revue les activités de la veille et préparer celles du jour. Le président est toujours très pointilleux à cet égard et les participants n'ont pas le choix. Si tous les autres participants se trouvent à ces réunions, l'absent se culpabilise.

Par ailleurs, les membres doivent manifester beaucoup plus d'intérêt envers la question, à leur retour. Bon nombre des membres des délégations à ces réunions internationales, notamment celles de l'Union interparlementaire, sont également membres des comités des affaires étrangères de leur pays, ce qui est un grand avantage. Vous seriez étonnée, mademoiselle, de connaître le nombre de présidents de comités des affaires étrangères qui sont soit membres des diverses délégations, soit dirigeants de l'Union interparlementaire de leur pays. Comme vous le savez, l'Union interparlementaire est une occasion en or, qui permet un contact entre parlementaires.

Nous, du monde occidental, nous sommes trop accoutumés . . . Nous pouvons facilement obtenir des renseignements auprès de parlementaires qui ne sont pas directement reliés au pouvoir du jour. Je demanderais à mes collègues spécialistes en la matière, notamment le vice-président de l'Union, M. Lawrence, d'ajouter quelque chose, ou de rectifier, selon le cas. Dans bon nombre de cas, les délégués de certains pays sont parlementaires, d'accord, mais parlementaires dans un parlement qui ne compte qu'un seul parti politique. Autrement dit, ces délégués, même s'ils sont parlementaires, sont directement affiliés au gouvernement du jour. Ce n'est peut-être pas le cas, disons, de certaines délégations des pays membres de l'OTAN ou des pays occidentaux. Dans le cas du Canada, par exemple, on trouve des représentants des trois partis politiques. Mais dans le cas des non-alignés, le Sud . . . On parle du dialogue Nord-Sud; eh bien, parlons du côté Sud. Le sénateur Molgat l'a constaté: la plupart des membres sont directement reliés aux autorités de leur pays, et le contact de ces gens avec les parlementaires canadiens, qui ne représentent pas seulement les Canadiens, mais aussi les intérêts des Canadiens envers certaines questions, qu'il s'agisse des droits de la personne, du commerce, de l'aide, ou autres, peut être très avantageux à la fois pour notre pays et pour le contribuable canadien.

Je tenais à le signaler. Mais quelqu'un veut . . . Je cède la parole encore une fois à M^{lle} Jewett.

Mlle Jewett: Oui. Eh bien, je suis heureuse d'entendre que vous avez eu cette occasion, car une bonne partie des citoyens se demandent parfois quels sont les avantages à tirer de ce genre d'activité. Pour ma part, il n'y a pas de problème, mais il est utile, à mon avis, de le verser au compte rendu.

L'autre partie de ma question portait sur les retombées. Marcel vient de dire que dans les États unitaires, les retombées peuvent être plus importantes que dans un État démocratique, car les membres de la délégation peuvent avoir des contacts plus directs et une influence plus grande sur leur gouvernement; mais que pensez-vous des retombées au Canada?

[Texte]

tries, but what is your view as far as outcomes are concerned in our country?

Senator Molgat: We are a parliamentary group—we are not the government—and when the delegation goes it is there as a parliamentary group. We make that very clear when we go. So we cannot enforce our point of view on government when we come back. But it is up to us—and I presume that is part of why we are assembled this morning—to see how we can have a more effective voice as a result of the work that we do.

Miss Jewett: Do you brief the Department of External Affairs when you come back?

Senator Molgat: That is one of the things we discussed, I think prior to your coming in, in my opening comments. We have great briefings before we go. Those are excellent, and our delegation goes well informed and ready. Those who are prepared to work are well informed. But on the return how do we get the input back into the system? That is one of the problems. I frankly do not think it is adequate, no.

I think there could be benefits for external affairs in meeting with us in this kind of a meeting. The same old problem is, of course, the pressures of time for all of us. But I think it could be better. Nevertheless, we have a standard practice that all the resolutions that are passed go to external affairs on the return. The chairman sends a letter to the minister, encloses all of the resolutions. The resolutions also go to all the briefers who came from external affairs or whatever department, and they are asked to comment and come back with a reply of some kind. So to that extent there is a push, because in the IPU we have an obligation under the statutes that we must, when we come back, report and we must try to get a reaction from our governments. So that goes on, but I think it can be improved. And we should maybe look at ways and means of doing that. But that contact does go on.

• 1020

Miss Jewett: Do you find that all members, regardless of party, will occasionally discover some phenomenon that is taking place in some country or some development that is taking place that you had not known about before? Bob mentioned Kampuchea a moment ago. That is the sort of thing I am thinking of. Does that happen frequently?

Senator Molgat: I do not think it is usually a phenomenon that has not been heard before, but possibly a focus on something that is happening, that we really have not focused on in the same way. Let me give you an example: the drought in the Maghreb—the south Sahara area. I do not think Canadians were maybe as conscious of the problems until they spoke to some of the delegates from that region. I well recall a lady delegate who came forward and made an impassioned

[Traduction]

Le sénateur Molgat: Nous ne sommes pas un gouvernement, mais un groupe parlementaire; Nous participons aux réunions à titre de groupe parlementaire. Nous le précisons dès le départ. Nous ne pouvons pas imposer notre façon de penser au gouvernement dès notre retour. Mais c'est à nous de voir comment on peut obtenir des résultats plus efficaces, compte tenu des travaux que nous effectuons; c'est un peu comme ce que nous faisons aujourd'hui.

Mlle Jewett: Lorsque vous rentrez au pays, faites-vous une séance d'information avec des représentants du ministère des Affaires extérieures?

Le sénateur Molgat: Voilà une des questions dont nous avons discuté avant que vous n'arriviez, il me semble; j'en ai parlé au tout début de la séance. Avant de partir, nous tenons un bon nombre d'excellentes séances d'information, de sorte que notre délégation est bien renseignée et prête à discuter de certaines questions avant son départ. Ceux qui ont l'intention de travailler sont bien renseignés. Mais au retour, comment communiquer ce que nous avons appris? Voilà un des problèmes. Selon moi, la communication, lors du retour, laisse à désirer.

Il me semble que les Affaires extérieures auraient intérêt à nous rencontrer. Bien entendu, il faut tenir compte des contraintes de temps de tous et chacun. Mais il me semble que nous pourrions établir une meilleure communication. Quoi qu'il en soit, dès notre retour, on saisit les Affaires extérieures de toutes les résolutions qui ont été adoptées. Le président adresse au ministre une lettre à laquelle il annexe les résolutions. Les résolutions sont aussi envoyées à tous les fonctionnaires des Affaires extérieures ou d'autres ministères qui nous ont donné des renseignements, et nous leur demandons de faire des commentaires et de nous dire ce qu'ils en pensent. C'est donc un processus très actif, car d'après les statuts de l'U.I.P., à notre retour, nous sommes tenus de faire un rapport et nous devons essayer d'obtenir une réaction de nos gouvernements. C'est bien ce que nous faisons, mais il y a encore des progrès à faire, et il faudrait peut-être envisager le moyen d'y parvenir. Mais ces contacts existent.

Mlle Jewett: Arrive-t-il que des membres, quel que soit leur parti, découvrent parfois que des événements exceptionnels surviennent dans certains pays, événements qu'ils ignoraient auparavant? Bob a mentionné le Kampuchéa, il y a un moment. C'est à ce genre de situation que je suis en train de penser. Ce phénomène est-il fréquent?

Le sénateur Molgat: Je ne pense pas qu'il s'agisse en général d'un phénomène dont personne n'a entendu parler auparavant, mais plutôt d'une façon d'aborder un élément d'actualité selon une autre perspective. Je vous donnerai comme exemple la sécheresse dans le Maghreb, dans la région du Sahara méridional. Je ne pense pas que les Canadiens étaient vraiment conscients de la gravité de la situation avant d'avoir parlé à certains des délégués de cette région. Je me souviens fort bien

[Text]

plea about the problems. Certainly, we focused more on the problem.

One area—somewhat of an aside—in the human rights field where we do find specific information, and where the union does have a very specific action, is on the human rights of parliamentarians. This is a special committee that deals only with the human rights of parliamentarians. This may seem to be somewhat self-serving from parliamentarians, but after looking at the whole field of human rights, it was felt that this was one area where possibly we could have direct action, have results, and that would in turn benefit the over-all area of human rights. Again, I have to compliment the Canadian group. Before I was chairman, one of our Canadian delegates, Senator Neiman, was very active in that proposal, in the initial instance, and the committee was set up. It investigates any complaint about parliamentarians, anywhere in the world, whose human rights have been affected. It has had very definite results of having parliamentarians released from jail in certain cases, allowed to leave their country in other cases—it has really worked.

Miss Jewett: In that connection, if I may just have one final question, to what extent has the whole human rights question become a larger issue in the councils of the IPU in the last few years, as it has become in the councils of Europe, for example, since Helsinki and elsewhere?

Senator Molgat: Possibly some of my other colleagues have some comments. My impression is that in the last two years it has not peaked any more so than at previous times. The IPU has been very much involved with the whole Helsinki Accord and has held its own conference. Usually we have tried to have it before the government conference. This has been a continuing action, but we normally function on the basis of four areas of study, resulting in resolutions each year, and they have not particularly focused more on human rights, to my knowledge, in the last two years.

Miss Jewett: And there has been no discussion that it should become a larger centre of interest?

Senator Molgat: Well, certainly, any resolution can come forward on the subject. For example, there has been every year in the last three, I think, a resolution on decolonization, so there has been discussion in that area about human rights. But a specific resolution on human rights, not recently. Any of my colleagues...

The Chairman: I will now go to Mr. Lawrence.

Mr. Lawrence: One of the four committees, of course, is set up to deal particularly with the human rights question and in different years there has been different emphasis placed on it. At the Rome meeting, Mr. Mackasey and Mr. Laniel both played a part in that committee and certainly there was reference in the resolutions that were finally adopted. Again there were stirring and brave words about the need for stricter adherence to the general concept of human rights.

[Translation]

de la supplique passionnée d'une déléguée au sujet de ces problèmes, qui nous a amenés à nous y pencher davantage.

Une question, accessoire peut-être, dans le domaine des droits de la personne, où nous trouvons des renseignements bien précis, et à propos de laquelle l'Union peut intervenir, concerne les droits individuels des parlementaires. Il existe un comité spécial qui traite uniquement de cet aspect. A première vue, cela peut paraître un peu abusif, mais après avoir examiné toute la question des droits de la personne, nous avons pensé que c'était là qu'il serait possible d'intervenir de façon directe, d'avoir des résultats qui pourraient ensuite profiter à l'ensemble de ce domaine. Là encore, je dois féliciter le groupe canadien. Avant que je ne devienne président, l'un de nos délégués canadiens, le sénateur Neiman, avait très activement appuyé une proposition dans ce sens, d'où la création de ce comité. Il fait enquête sur les plaintes de parlementaires, quel que soit leur pays d'origine, dont les droits individuels ont été lésés. Il a obtenu des résultats très certains, car dans certains cas, des parlementaires ont pu être libérés de prison, d'autres ont été autorisés à quitter leur pays; donc, les travaux de ce comité ont vraiment porté des fruits.

Miss Jewett: À cet égard, j'aurais une dernière question, à savoir dans quelle mesure la question des droits de la personne est devenue une question plus vaste dans les conseils de l'U.I.P., ces dernières années, à l'instar des conseils de l'Europe, par exemple, depuis Helsinki et ailleurs.

Le sénateur Molgat: Certains de mes autres collègues auraient peut-être des commentaires à faire sur cette question. Je ne pense pas qu'on en ait davantage parlé ces deux dernières années qu'auparavant. L'U.I.P. a suivi de très près l'accord d'Helsinki et elle a tenu sa propre conférence à ce sujet. En général, nous essayons de nous réunir avant que le gouvernement ne tienne sa conférence. Nous suivons toujours de près cette question, mais normalement, nous prévoyons quatre champs d'étude, aboutissant à des résolutions chaque année, mais à ma connaissance, ces deux dernières années, elles n'ont pas porté plus particulièrement sur les droits de la personne.

Miss Jewett: N'avez-vous pas discuté de la nécessité d'en faire une question plus importante?

Le sénateur Molgat: Il est certain qu'une résolution peut être présentée à ce sujet. Par exemple, tous les ans, depuis trois ans, il y a eu une résolution sur la décolonisation, et nous avons donc discuté des droits de la personne. Mais il n'y a pas eu récemment de résolution précise sur cette question. N'importe lequel d'entre mes collègues...

Le président: Je cède maintenant la parole à M. Lawrence.

M. Lawrence: L'un des quatre comités est évidemment constitué pour traiter particulièrement de la question des droits de la personne, et chaque année, on y a insisté de façon différente. Lors de la réunion de Rome, MM. Mackasey et Laniel ont été membres de ce comité, et les résolutions qui ont été finalement adoptées faisaient mention de cette question. Il y avait des termes bouleversants et courageux à propos de la nécessité de respecter de façon stricte le concept général des droits de la personne.

[Texte]

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Generally speaking, of course, this is a toothless organization. The only power we have is the power of public opinion, and that varies according to the publicity that is received. Certainly, in those countries obviously where human rights have to be emphasized far more than others, it is not strange, I suppose, that the human rights question does not receive the play in the media that some of us think it should. That is one of the problems. On the other hand, it is always a very deep problem in the world today; it is obviously getting deeper. I think there has been a continuing dialogue and discussion on it, sometimes without too many results, but at other meetings with a great deal of results.

The Rome meeting did discuss human rights. The subcommittee especially dealt with the human rights of parliamentarians.

Maybe Mr. Laniel, who took a leading part in the . . .

Mr. Laniel: No. May I correct you? It was Dennis Dawson. I was on parliamentary institutions.

Mr. Lawrence: Oh, right; I am sorry.

The Chairman: Madam? Thank you.

Next Dr. Hudecki, followed by Mr. Stan Darling.

Mr. Hudecki: I congratulate the committee as well. I have observed the operations of these committees and I felt that there was quite a distinction between what has been taking place in Parliament and what, for example, takes place at universities. Those of us who have been sent on various delegations or various conventions were expected to come back to present a report and to be criticized on the basis of it, whereas here it seemed to be a form of a bonus to be selected on a committee and to be given an opportunity to study procedures outside the country. This certainly restores my faith in the process, and I think it does set a pattern, but certainly it sets a rather difficult pattern for subsequent committees because this report is very complete and very thought provoking.

I have just two questions. One is on the matter of selecting members. It would seem to me that the process—I am sure I am wrong—is one in which the same kind and able faces are selected for these various committee meetings. They include the executives but very few of the other members of the organization, and I wonder if you would make some comments on how many apply and what selection over and above the executive are selected on these meetings.

And the last question—I have to leave early, so I will put these two questions to you. The second one is on a question of hunger in the world. We will shortly be meeting with a high-powered delegation from the U.S.S.R. There appears to be a new form of hunger that will gradually develop in the world, and that is countries under the U.S.S.R. influence . . . and I am using as an example Poland, who at the end of June will no longer have any credit to obtain wheat from Canada and who do not have the funds to be able to supply their country with food, and the fact that the U.S.S.R. itself is in dire straits in

[Traduction]

De façon générale, il s'agit bien sûr d'un organisme impuissant. Notre seul pouvoir est celui de l'opinion publique, qui varie selon la publicité qui nous est accordée. De toute évidence, dans les pays où il faut insister davantage sur les droits de la personne que dans d'autres, il n'est pas étonnant que cette question n'intervienne pas autant dans les médias que certains d'entre nous le souhaiteraient. C'est l'un des problèmes. D'autre part, c'est aussi un problème très grave dans le monde actuel; il est évident qu'il s'accroît encore davantage. Le dialogue et la discussion se poursuivent, parfois sans beaucoup de résultats, encore que d'autres réunions aboutissent à des résultats très satisfaisants.

Il a été question des droits de la personne à Rome. En particulier, le sous-comité a examiné cet aspect du point de vue des parlementaires.

M. Laniel, qui a participé activement à . . .

M. Laniel: Non. Puis-je vous corriger? Il s'agissait de M. Dennis Dawson. Je m'occupais des institutions parlementaires.

M. Lawrence: Oh, c'est vrai. Je suis désolé.

Le président: Madame? Merci.

Nous avons ensuite M. Hudecki, puis M. Stan Darling.

M. Hudecki: Je voudrais aussi féliciter le Comité. J'ai examiné le fonctionnement de ces comités, et j'ai pensé qu'il existait une grande différence entre ce qui se passait au Parlement et dans les universités, par exemple. Ceux d'entre nous qui ont été envoyés dans diverses délégations ou à diverses conférences étaient censés en revenir pour présenter un rapport qui susciterait certaines critiques, alors qu'ici, il semblait que c'était une sorte de prime que d'être choisi pour participer à un comité et d'avoir la possibilité d'étudier des procédures à l'étranger. Ce que j'ai vu m'a redonné confiance dans le processus, mais le travail des futurs comités sera sans doute difficile, car ce rapport est très exhaustif et il incite, de plus, à la réflexion.

J'aurais deux questions à poser. La première concerne le choix des membres. Il me semble que le processus—et je me trompe sans doute—consiste à choisir les mêmes personnes pour les réunions de ces divers comités. Cela inclut les membres de l'exécutif, mais un très petit nombre des autres membres de l'organisation, et j'aimerais savoir si vous pourriez nous dire combien de parlementaires présentent une demande, et comment se fait la sélection pour ces réunions, outre l'exécutif.

Et la dernière question . . . Je dois partir assez vite, et je vais donc vous poser ces questions. La seconde concerne la faim dans le monde. Nous allons bientôt rencontrer une délégation très puissante de l'Union soviétique. Il semble qu'une nouvelle forme de faim émergera progressivement dans le monde, dans les pays sous l'influence de l'U.R.S.S. . . J'utilise comme exemple la Pologne, qui, à la fin de juin, n'aura plus de crédit pour obtenir du blé du Canada, et qui ne possède pas les fonds nécessaires pour s'approvisionner en produits alimentaires, à propos desquels l'U.R.S.S. connaît elle-même de graves

[Text]

this particular issue. How are some of these satellite countries going to be supported? I wonder whether the members on that particular committee had any insight as to what the future holds in that particular field.

Senator Molgat: Dr. Hudecki, on your first question regarding the selection procedure, you are not aware that it has been a continuing problem. Mr. Prud'homme referred to it in his comments regarding the Whips. It is, without any question, a critical element to the proper functioning of a delegation because it must be delegates who are interested and interested in the subject-matters.

The procedure followed by the IPU is that a message is sent to all members of the IPU... not to all parliamentarians, but to all IPU members... outlining the subject-matters to be discussed at the next meeting and asking those people who are interested to indicate why they are interested and which subject would be of interest to them.

• 1030

Then there is a selection committee. The selection is made up in the case of the IPU of three members of the executive; two members of the IPU who are ex-delegates, who have been on a delegation and know what the workings of a delegation are all about; plus the Whips of our parties. That means three Whips in the House of Commons and two Whips in the Senate. So the selection procedure is not dominated by members of the executive.

Having said that, though, the people who are on the executive of the IPU are there basically because they are interested in IPU and in external affairs. It is true that it is common for executive members to go, but I do not think it is because they are executive members, it is because they are in fact interested in the IPU and in the process, and in external affairs.

One little comment I may add there on the selection procedure is that, insofar as the IPU is concerned, there is a need for some continuity, because it is impossible for delegates to do a proper job if there is a complete switch of new delegates at each meeting, and the delegation cannot function. A delegate really should go to a minimum of two meetings in order to be really an effective delegate, probably three. Probably the idea would be to come on in the fall, which is the larger delegation, continue in the spring, which is the preparatory meeting, and conclude the following fall. I realize this presents a particular problem for your group, Miss Jewett, but I would emphasize that it is important.

Insofar as hunger in the world, I am not able to give you any detail on it. The two members who are responsible for it are Mr. Friesen and Senator Asselin, and neither of them are here. The resolution as passed was passed unanimously insofar as the whole of the IPU was concerned. You will find it specifically on page 74 of the report, in part (a).

Now, your specific question there, Dr. Hudecki, was?

[Translation]

pénuries. On peut donc se demander comment certains de ces pays satellites vont pouvoir subvenir à leurs besoins. Je voudrais savoir si les membres de ce comité ont pu déterminer ce que l'avenir nous réserve pour cette question.

Le sénateur Molgat: Monsieur Hudecki, je voudrais d'abord dire, à propos de votre première question touchant le processus de sélection, que vous savez sans doute que c'est là un problème qui n'est pas nouveau. M. Prud'homme l'a évoqué dans ses remarques concernant les whips. Il est indéniable que c'est là un élément critique du bon fonctionnement de la délégation, dont les membres doivent s'intéresser aux questions qui sont traitées.

Voici le processus adopté par l'UIP: tous les membres, et pas uniquement les parlementaires, reçoivent un message décrivant les questions qui seront débattues lors d'une prochaine réunion; on demande aux intéressés d'expliquer ce qu'ils motive et de donner leur préférence.

Ensuite, un comité de direction est constitué. Dans le cas de l'UIP, on choisit trois membres de l'exécutif; deux membres qui sont d'anciens délégués, qui ont participé à une délégation et qui en connaissent bien le fonctionnement et les travaux; plus les whips de nos partis. Il s'agit de trois whips à la Chambre des communes et de deux au Sénat. Par conséquent, le processus de sélection n'est pas dominé par les membres de l'exécutif.

Cela dit, ceux qui font partie de l'exécutif de l'UIP participent évidemment parce qu'ils s'intéressent à l'Union, aussi bien qu'aux affaires extérieures. Il est vrai qu'il est courant que les membres de l'exécutif voyagent, mais non pas parce qu'il s'agit de membres de l'exécutif, mais plutôt parce qu'ils s'intéressent à l'UIP et à ses activités, de même qu'aux affaires extérieures.

Je voudrais ajouter une petite remarque au sujet du processus de sélection; l'Union interparlementaire tient à une certaine continuité, car il est impossible que des délégués fassent un bon travail s'ils sont tous renouvelés à chaque réunion; la délégation ne pourrait même pas fonctionner. Un délégué devrait en fait se rendre à au moins deux réunions pour être vraiment efficace, peut-être même à trois. Il faudrait qu'il participe aux travaux d'automne, qui comptent la plus grande délégation, pour continuer au printemps avec la réunion préparatoire, et terminer l'automne suivant. Je conçois que cela présente un problème pour votre groupe, mademoiselle Jewett, mais il me semble que c'est là une chose importante.

En ce qui concerne la faim dans le monde, je ne suis pas en mesure de vous en donner beaucoup de détails. Les deux membres qui en sont responsables sont M. Friesen et le sénateur Asselin, qui sont tous les deux absents. La résolution a été adoptée à l'unanimité par l'ensemble de l'UIP. Vous la trouverez à la page 74 du rapport, au paragraphe a).

Quelle était votre question à ce sujet, monsieur Hudecki?

[Texte]

Mr. Hudecki: Whether or not we could perhaps direct some appropriate questions to the delegations coming from Russia as to how food distribution will be directed, particularly grain into countries under their influence, and particularly when they themselves are short of food, because the countries themselves have so little financial backing in order to obtain credit from countries that have food and have grain for sale. I was just wondering whether there was any indication from the tone or the tenor of the meeting that might give us some idea how these . . . I think it will be a real problem in some of these satellite countries who do not have any credit with the United States or Canada and who will be short of grain very shortly—and I am not even touching the Third World countries, where the problems are even more acute—and yet there is an excess of grain in other countries.

Senator Molgat: I have no specific comment that I could add, Dr. Hudecki, but I wonder if some of my colleagues could.

Mr. Lawrence.

Mr. Lawrence: I do not think it has been specifically referred to in any of the resolutions, but one of the very great values of this type of meeting, as distinct from some of the others, Dr. Hudecki, is the fact that you do get around and you do talk to people; and quite frequently even the eastern bloc people let their hair down at these meetings. Sometimes at the corridor discussions and the backroom discussions you learn far more.

Obviously, I would assume what you are looking for is some idea of how you can sensibly discuss with the Soviet people—who are appearing before your committee, I believe, next Tuesday . . . —food production and hunger in the world.

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One of the, as I understand it, very rigidly adhered to and adamant trade concepts of the Soviet Union, whether it is food, whether it is arms, whether it is energy, no matter what it is, is they rigidly adhere to the concept that they will not, no matter what their need is, go into a trade deficit position with any other country. For instance, we have just had the last IPU meeting in Finland. Finland's exports to the Soviet Union—one of their biggest customers, as a matter of fact—are very rigidly controlled by the Soviet Union; the Soviets will not permit the value of the Finnish goods exported to the Soviet to exceed the amount of gross product exported by the Soviets to Finland. No matter what the need may be in the Soviet bloc at all, this is very rigidly controlled.

When you get to some of the satellite nations of the Soviet bloc—or even, I would assume, some of the Third World nations in which there is a great deal of influence by the Soviet bloc—they are really handicapped by this concept. It prevents them from building up a credit with some nations of the world to use that credit with the food production countries of the world, such as Argentina, Canada, the United States. It really does prevent them from building up a credit so they can import food from the food producers of the world.

[Traduction]

M. Hudecki: Je voulais savoir s'il serait possible de poser quelques questions aux délégations de l'URSS à propos de la répartition des produits alimentaires, notamment les céréales dans les pays satellites de l'URSS, en particulier lorsque cette dernière connaît des pénuries à cet égard, étant donné que ces pays n'ont pas suffisamment de moyens financiers pour obtenir du crédit auprès des pays qui ont des produits alimentaires et des céréales à vendre. Le ton ou la teneur de la réunion ont-ils permis de savoir comment ces . . . Il y aura là un problème très réel dans certains de ces pays satellites qui n'ont pas de crédit auprès des États-Unis ou du Canada et qui connaîtront bientôt des pénuries de céréales—je ne parle même pas du Tiers-monde, où les problèmes sont même plus graves—alors qu'il existe par ailleurs des excédents de céréales dans d'autres pays.

Le sénateur Molgat: Je n'ai pas de remarque précise à ajouter, monsieur Hudecki, mais un de mes collègues pourrait peut-être vous renseigner davantage.

Monsieur Lawrence.

M. Lawrence: Je ne pense pas qu'il en ait été fait mention de façon précise dans chacune des résolutions, mais l'un des très grands mérites de ce genre de réunion, par rapport à certaines autres, monsieur Hudecki, est le fait qu'il est possible de parler avec les délégués; et très fréquemment, même des représentants du bloc de l'Est se montrent plus détendus dans ces réunions. On en apprend parfois beaucoup plus dans des discussions de couloir, ou en coulisse.

En fait, ce que vous cherchez à savoir, c'est la façon de discuter de façon raisonnable avec les représentants de l'Union soviétique qui comparaitront devant votre Comité mardi prochain, je crois, pour parler de la production alimentaire et de la faim dans le monde.

L'un des principes commerciaux auxquels s'en tient de façon vigoureuse l'Union soviétique, qu'il s'agisse de l'alimentation, des armements, de l'énergie, et ainsi de suite, consiste, quels que soient ses besoins, à ne pas se trouver en position déficitaire dans ses échanges avec n'importe quel autre pays. Par exemple, la dernière réunion de l'U.I.P. s'est tenue en Finlande. Les exportations de ce pays à destination de l'Union soviétique—l'un de ses plus grands clients, soit dit en passant—sont rigideusement contrôlées par l'Union soviétique; cette dernière n'admettra pas que la valeur des biens finnois exportés en Union soviétique dépasse le volume des produits bruts exportés par les Soviétiques en Finlande. Quels que soient les besoins que puisse avoir l'ensemble du bloc soviétique, des contrôles très stricts s'exercent dans ce domaine.

Certains des pays satellites du bloc soviétique—et même sans doute certains des pays du Tiers monde, où s'exerce une très grande influence du bloc soviétique—sont réellement handicapés par ce principe. Il les empêche de se constituer un crédit auprès de certains pays du globe, en particulier ceux qui vendent des produits alimentaires, comme l'Argentine, le Canada et les États-Unis.

[Text]

I would think, without being presumptuous or attempting to be impertinent about it, your committee on Tuesday could well develop this whole argument with people from the Soviet bloc, and especially from the U.S.S.R. As far as I know, it is not causing any great hardship in the Soviet Union, because the information I get from Third World people and from other people who are under the direct influence of the Soviet bloc is it is really causing hardship in some of those countries, because they are prevented by this trade concept from building up the credits in the material they can export, and they are prevented from importing the stuff they really need from other nations.

The Chairman: If I may make an announcement, following your great interest in this matter, Doctor, as you know, a member of the Politburo will be a witness before a joint session of the House and the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee next Tuesday at 10.45 a.m., and that specific question could be addressed, because that specific person from the Soviet Union would be more than the best person to answer your question directly. So I invite you to be present there. I know you will be there.

If you have terminated, I will now ask our good friend, Mr. Stan Darling, a very faithful member of the committee . . .

Mr. Darling: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am very interested in the IPU. I did have the privilege in 1978 of attending the IPU meeting in Lisbon, Portugal, and I am aware of all the many topics that have to be covered. A good deal of them are motherhood. When I say that, I mean the resolutions: they are reaffirming, considering, bearing in mind . . .

Mr. Lawrence: As he gets older, he is against motherhood.

Mr. Darling: —it goes on and on. And then finally it says, calls upon.

The one particular field in which I have a vital interest as a member of the subcommittee on acid rain is the word "acid rain". Air pollution is in here, and Senator Rousseau, I believe, spoke on the environmental setup, but the word "acid rain" is not in here at all. You can talk all you want about disarmament and you can talk about this and talk about that, but one thing that is going to have to be done on a world basis is the air pollution.

I am just wondering what the feeling is there. I have been checking various ones, and I noted Senator Rousseau's comments on page 12; but over finally on page 73, annex 5, it calls upon national groups to encourage their competent national authorities to promote and expand, and so on, and urges that where transboundary pollution problems occur, national groups take every opportunity to promote, for example, within the framework of the convention on long-range transboundary air pollution activity, the amelioration of these problems.

[Translation]

Sans être présomptueux ni vouloir manquer de respect à votre Comité, je pense que mardi, vous pourriez présenter cette question aux porte-parole du bloc soviétique, et en particulier de l'U.R.S.S. Pour autant que je sache, cette dernière ne connaît pas de très grandes difficultés du fait de ce principe commercial, mais la situation est tout autre dans le Tiers monde et dans d'autres pays sous influence directe du bloc soviétique; en effet, d'après les renseignements que j'ai pu obtenir à ce sujet, ces pays traversent de très grandes difficultés, car ce principe commercial les empêche de se constituer des crédits dans les produits qu'ils peuvent exporter, et de plus, ils n'ont pas le droit d'importer, en provenance d'autres pays, ce dont ils ont vraiment besoin.

Le président: Je voudrais ajouter ceci, à la suite de votre intérêt marqué envers cette question: vous savez sans doute, monsieur, qu'un membre du Politburo comparaitra lors d'une séance mixte du comité de la Chambre et du Sénat chargé des affaires extérieures, qui se tiendra mardi prochain, à 10h45; il sera alors possible de poser cette question, car ce représentant de l'Union soviétique sera la personne idéale à qui vous pourriez vous adresser. Je vous invite donc à être présent à cette séance, et je sais que vous y serez.

Si vous avez terminé, je vais demander maintenant à notre cher ami, M. Stan Darling, membre très fidèle du Comité . . .

M. Darling: Merci, monsieur le président.

Je m'intéresse beaucoup à l'U.I.P. En 1978, j'ai eu le privilège d'assister à la réunion de l'Union tenue à Lisbonne, au Portugal, et je suis au courant de tous les nombreux problèmes qui ont été débattus. Un grand nombre d'entre eux vont de soi. Lorsque je dis cela, je veux dire que dans les résolutions, il est question de réaffirmer, de considérer, de tenir compte de . . .

M. Lawrence: Avec l'âge, il rejette, semble-t-il, les questions qui vont de soi.

M. Darling: . . . et ainsi de suite. Et, finalement, dans la résolution, on demande telle ou telle chose.

Le domaine particulier auquel je m'intéresse de façon cruciale en tant que membre du sous-comité des pluies acides est justement le terme «pluies acides». Je vois bien la pollution de l'air, et je crois que le sénateur Rousseau a parlé du contexte de l'environnement, mais je ne vois pas du tout les termes «pluies acides». Vous pouvez parler tant que vous voulez du désarmement, d'autres questions aussi, mais il faudrait examiner, à l'échelle mondiale, la pollution de l'air.

J'aimerais savoir quels sont vos sentiments là-dessus. J'ai examiné les diverses résolutions, et j'ai vu les commentaires du sénateur Rousseau à la page 12 de la version anglaise; mais finalement, à la page 73, à l'annexe 5, toujours de la version anglaise, on demande aux groupes nationaux d'encourager leurs responsables nationaux pertinents à promouvoir, étendre, et ainsi de suite, et en cas de pollution transfrontière, on demande instamment aux groupes nationaux de prendre toutes les mesures voulues, par exemple, dans le cadre de la Convention sur la pollution atmosphérique transfrontière à longue distance, afin d'améliorer ce problème.

[Texte]

• 1040

Now, certainly it is a world problem and it has been getting more publicity in recent months than we on the subcommittee ever hoped we would get. I would certainly appreciate knowing whether this is high in the IPU discussions, or whether it just air pollution, period. The acid rain problem is serious in Canada, but we are fortunate in the seriousness of it that we are only dealing with one boundary and dealing with two countries; it is purely a bilateral deal. When you get in Europe, and certainly in Asia where it is close to Europe, you are in a very serious problem with literally dozens of countries. I would appreciate some comments on that, Mr. Chairman, or probably Senator Rousseau.

Senator Molgat: Perhaps Senator Rousseau would . . .

Le sénateur Rousseau: Monsieur le président, peut-être n'avons-nous pas élaboré suffisamment sur le sujet, comme vous l'auriez souhaité. L'an passé, plus particulièrement, lors de la Conférence à Rome, la question n'était peut-être pas aussi évidente au Canada qu'elle l'est actuellement. Tous les pays du monde n'en ont pas attaché autant d'importance . . . Il est probable qu'on s'y attachera à la prochaine conférence, mais j'anticipe peut-être, à ce moment-ci. J'ai essayé de rappeler les points saillants des dernières conférences, surtout celle qui s'est tenue à Lagos et celle de Stockholm, qui a eu lieu dix ans plus tard. Le gouvernement canadien . . . car nous sommes, en fait, un des gouvernements qui, à travers le monde, possède un ministère de l'Environnement. Nous nous devons de le mentionner quelque part, et c'est dans les commissions que nous le disons. Le temps est assez limité quand même pour le faire connaître à tout le monde.

Je vous avoue franchement que je suis de votre avis. Ce n'est pas une question qui a été soulevée avec agressivité ou vigilance, surtout dans le domaine des pluies acides. Peut-être que dans un avenir rapproché, nous prendrons position de façon plus agressive et plus vigilante sur cette question.

Je ne sais pas si cela répond . . .

The Chairman: Now that you have raised the question, you have attracted our attention. I notice that the staff took vigorous note, so that when the next conference occurs—by the way, I would like to give our best wishes to the consul of the embassy of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Paik, who is here today. Quite a vigorous debate took place in Rome on where we will go next September. We had to take a vote. The first time it was decided to go to South Korea. We had to take another vote in Finland, because many countries, you know, do not see very well the fact that we may go to South Korea.

Having said that, first I will give the salutation to the embassy, to the ambassador, and to his country. Regarding Saigon, I will say that we took note. This is exactly one of the reasons for this meeting. You know, someone says why did we not talk about that. Madam Senator Rousseau said in a very honest way that it was because it did not occur to us at that time. It was not as vigorously defended in Canada. Your views are well known and your representations are taken down in

[Traduction]

Il s'agit, bien entendu, d'un problème mondial qui a reçu, depuis quelques mois, davantage de publicité que nous, les membres du sous-comité, n'aurions jamais osé espérer. J'aimerais certainement savoir si les pluies acides constituent une priorité lors des discussions de l'Union interparlementaire, ou s'il s'agit tout simplement de la pollution de l'air. Le problème des pluies acides est grave au Canada, mais au moins, il s'agit d'un problème bilatéral, entre deux pays uniquement. Mais en Europe, et en Asie de l'Ouest, le problème touche des dizaines de pays. J'aimerais entendre vos commentaires à ce sujet, monsieur le président, ou peut-être le sénateur Rousseau.

Le sénateur Molgat: Peut-être que le sénateur Rousseau aimerait . . .

Senator Rousseau: We may not have dealt with this topic inasmuch depth as you would have hoped, Mr. Chairman. Last year, at the Rome conference, the question may not have been as much in the forefront in Canada as it is at the present time. Not all the countries in the world attach as much importance to it. It will probably be discussed at the next conference, but it is rather premature to say so at this point. I have tried to recall the highlights of recent conferences, particularly the one held in Lagos and the one held in Stockholm, which took place ten years afterwards. Canada is one of the few countries whose governments include a Department of the Environment. We have to make this point known somewhere, and we do so in the committees. However, the time is rather limited to get the point across to everyone.

I must tell you quite frankly that I share your opinion. The question of acid rain was not raised aggressively or in a sustained manner. Perhaps in the near future, we will take a more aggressive and sustained stand on this issue.

I do not know whether that answers.

Le président: En soulevant la question, vous avez attiré notre attention sur le problème. J'ai remarqué que le personnel en a pris bonne note; donc, lors de la prochaine conférence . . . à propos, je tiens à souhaiter la bienvenue au consul de l'ambassade de la République de Corée, M. Paik, qui est présent aujourd'hui. Il y a eu un débat assez animé, à Rome, au sujet de la ville où nous tiendrons notre réunion, au mois de septembre prochain. Il a fallu procéder à un vote. Il a d'abord été décidé de tenir la réunion en Corée du Sud. Mais il a fallu procéder à un autre vote en Finlande, car beaucoup de pays n'étaient pas d'accord pour qu'on aille en Corée du Sud.

Cela dit, je tiens à saluer l'ambassade, l'ambassadeur et son pays. Pour ce qui est de Saigon, je dirais que nous en avons pris note. C'est l'une des raisons pour lesquelles nous avons organisé cette réunion. Quelqu'un nous demande pourquoi on n'a pas parlé de tel ou tel sujet. Madame le sénateur Rousseau a dit très franchement que si on n'en a pas parlé, c'est qu'on n'y a pas pensé à ce moment-là. La question n'avait pas autant d'importance, au Canada. On connaît bien votre point de vue,

[Text]

notes. I know Mr. Roger Hill and Mr. Martin Lavoie will remember that; so will we. We will not only take note but we will make sure that in the future activities when they talk about that we shall do so.

Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: On this point, I just want to give some kind of warning to those who took note and to those who might be going to prepare for future delegations for that kind of discussion. You also have to consider that at that kind of meeting, and I am sure you have noticed that yourself if you were at Lisbon, there is also some propaganda that is going around, you know, the anti-America, the pro-this and the anti-this. And I would hope that if we prepare a delegation to talk about acid rain based on the Canadian experience, we should try and find some more horror about the effects of acid rain in Europe caused by other people and not only the Americans. This could easily develop into some kind of an anti-American flap, you see. And it would not help us at all. So we should look at the problem in the whole perspective.

• 1045

The Chairman: Mr. Darling.

Mr. Darling: Further along that line, Mr. Laniel, what you have brought out I am delighted about, because this is one case where you would not have the anti-American feeling that is on so many others.

Mr. Laniel: If you prepare yourself well.

Mr. Darling: I know. Quite true. I would hope they would. But the point is this: Everybody is in the same bed. Everybody really is going to be in serious trouble—Americans, Russians, and so on. This is the importance of it. Get it across there. Ideology has nothing to do with it. We are all in a very serious situation. It affects the future, unless we do something about it, of every country. It does not matter a damn if you are a communist or the most right-wing type of government there is.

Mr. Chairman, one other point. I am aware that this is the Rome report but, briefly, for those of you who have just returned from Helsinki, was there anything on acid rain mentioned there at Helsinki? In that area up there, Sweden of course is very close, and they are one of the countries that are screaming loud and long about the pollution they are receiving from West Germany, from Poland, and Great Britain, of course.

Mr. Wenman: Mr. Chairman, on the same point, now just structure-wise and because that is part of what we are exploring today, you see, it would be important . . . I am sure Mr. Darling is well aware that his suggestion then may end up being an agenda recommendation from here. That ties back with the consistency aspect that one person who goes will then in fact follow this initiative through. And there is both the multilateral and the bilateral method.

[Translation]

et le personnel a pris bonne note de vos observations. Je sais que MM. Roger Hill et Martin Lavoie s'en souviendront; nous aussi. Nous allons nous assurer que nous interviendrons lorsque la question sera soulevée à l'avenir.

Monsieur Laniel.

M. Laniel: Je tiens simplement à avertir ceux qui ont pris note de la question, et ceux qui vont se préparer à participer à de futures délégations, qu'il ne faut pas oublier non plus qu'il y a toujours une certaine propagande—anti-américaine, pour ceci et contre cela—à ce genre de réunion. Vous avez pu sans doute le constater vous-même si vous étiez à la réunion de Lisbonne. A mon sens, si notre délégation parle au sujet des pluies acides à partir de l'expérience vécue au Canada, elle devrait s'enquérir des effets néfastes des pluies acides en Europe et trouver d'autres coupables à part les Américains. Il se pourrait que cette question se prête à une propagande anti-américaine, ce qui ne nous aiderait guère. Il faudrait donc examiner le problème dans son contexte global.

Le président: Monsieur Darling.

M. Darling: Je suis ravi du point soulevé par M. Laniel, car il s'agit d'une question où il n'y aurait pas de propagande anti-américaine comme c'est le cas de tant d'autres.

M. Laniel: Si l'on se prépare bien.

M. Darling: Oui, c'est tout à fait vrai. J'espère que la délégation se préparera bien. Mais l'important, c'est que tout le monde se trouve dans le même cas. Tous—Américains, Russes, etc.—vont avoir de graves problèmes. C'est la raison pour laquelle il faut transmettre ce message dans ce genre de tribune. L'idéologie n'a rien à voir là-dedans. Nous nous trouvons tous dans une situation très grave. Si nous ne prenons pas de mesures, les pluies acides vont avoir une incidence sur l'avenir de tous les pays. Peu importe s'il s'agit d'un gouvernement communiste ou d'extrême droite.

Je voudrais soulever une autre question, monsieur le président. Je sais que nous sommes saisis du rapport de la réunion qui a eu lieu à Rome, mais est-ce que certains d'entre vous qui viennent de retourner d'Helsinki pourraient me dire si on a parlé des pluies acides à Helsinki? La Suède se trouve bien entendu très près de la Finlande. C'est un des pays qui se plaint le plus au sujet de la pollution qu'il reçoit de l'Allemagne de l'Ouest, de la Pologne et de la Grande-Bretagne.

M. Wenman: Monsieur le président, il serait important, non seulement du point de vue des structures, mais également du point de vue de . . . je suis convaincu que M. Darling sait fort bien que sa proposition pourra finir par une recommandation d'insérer cette question à l'ordre du jour. Ceci rejoint l'aspect de la cohérence dont j'ai parlé: la personne qui assiste à la réunion donnera suite aux questions abordées à son retour. On peut avoir recours aux formules multilatérales et aux formes bilatérales.

[Texte]

At the same time at the same conference, there will be members from the United States. Delegations can be specifically arranged for a breakfast meeting, or whatever, for Canada—U.S. And again it emphasizes this process. But for that to occur, it would be appropriate that, when people are selected, we make sure we have a special committee of the House of Commons studying acid rain; that someone who is a member of IPU from that should in fact, be a part of the delegation to again add credibility.

So these are the kinds of considerations which should be made—that is, continuity, experience, interest, information to upgrade our delegations, as has been done very very well in IPU in particular, in the last few years. So I just want to bring that up. The idea, as it comes through, should not be dropped here. There should a consistency of follow-through to pull in people of competence to the delegation.

An hon. Member: Quite right.

Mr. Darling: May I have just a short answer to my question? Was there much discussion?

The Chairman: No, not in Helsinki.

Mr. Darling: Was Senator Rousseau in Helsinki?

The Chairman: No. But it was pointed out that three years ago IPU had very important meetings specifically on the environment, and acid rain was mentioned. The representative from Canada—we sent only one delegate—was Mr. Alvin Hamilton, a colleague, so you may ask him. I have just been made aware of the fact that there was an environment conference, that acid rain was mentioned, and that our delegate was Alvin Hamilton. So, madam, I think you want to add something?

Le sénateur Rousseau: J'aimerais ajouter une chose pour les membres ici présents. Il s'agit d'une question qui n'est quand même pas si ancienne que cela. La question de l'environnement, a dix ans au plus, si on se reporte à la Conférence de Stockholm. Je pense toutefois que toutes les personnes qui participent à ces conférences, telles que l'I.P.U., doivent se demander à un certain moment, d'après ces conférences d'évaluation, tout d'abord si ce sont des questions administratives et deuxièmement, si les structures administratives répondent bien au besoin de ce problème. Il fallait le mettre en évidence à cette conférence. Personnellement, c'est ce que j'ai tenté de faire à la commission.

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C'est ce que j'ai essayé de dire aussi dans le bref discours que j'ai prononcé, parce que si les structures administratives et les structures qui font face aux besoins ne sont pas bonnes et que ça ne sensibilise pas assez la population mondiale, il y a un travail à faire et je suis d'accord avec M... j'oublie son nom, qui a dit qu'il faut vraiment étudier cette question et probablement avoir une position claire du Canada là-dessus, parce que quand nous y allons en tant que membres, nous votons en tant

[Traduction]

Il y aura des délégués des États-Unis qui assisteront à la même conférence. Il est possible d'organiser des réunions le matin au petit déjeuner, etc., entre les représentants du Canada et ceux des États-Unis. Puisque nous avons un comité spécial de la Chambre des communes sur les pluies acides, il faudrait qu'un membre de ce comité, qui est également membre de l'Union interparlementaire, soit membre de la délégation canadienne afin de rehausser notre crédibilité.

Ce sont donc le genre de facteurs dont on devrait tenir compte en choisissant les membres de la délégation: la continuité, l'expérience, l'intérêt et des délégués bien informés. Depuis quelques années, on a très bien respecté ces critères pour ce qui des choix des membres de l'Union interparlementaire. Je tenais simplement à faire cette observation. Il ne faudrait pas abandonner les idées qui sont mentionnées en cours de route. Il faudrait qu'il y ait un suivi, et que les membres de la délégation soient compétents.

Une voix: Tout à fait.

M. Darling: Est-ce que l'on pourrait répondre brièvement à ma question? A-t-on parlé beaucoup de la question des pluies acides?

Le président: Non, pas à Helsinki.

M. Darling: Est-ce que le sénateur Rousseau était à Helsinki?

Le président: Non. Toutefois, il a été signalé qu'il y a trois ans l'Union interparlementaire a tenu des réunions fort importantes au sujet de l'environnement, et on a fait allusion à la question des pluies acides. Le Canada n'a envoyé qu'un représentant—M. Alvin Hamilton, qui est un de vos collègues. Vous pourriez lui poser la question. On vient de m'informer qu'il y avait une conférence sur l'environnement, qu'on a parlé des pluies acides, et que notre délégué était Alvin Hamilton. Avez-vous quelque chose à ajouter, madame?

Senator Rousseau: I would like to add something for the benefit of the members present. The question of the environment has not been around for such a long time—at most it dates back 10 years to the Stockholm Conference. However, I do think that the delegates to conferences such as those held by the IPU have to consider at a certain point, based on the assessment conferences, whether the questions are administrative in nature, and whether the administrative structures can deal with the problem appropriately. This point had to be made at the conference, and this is what I tried to do in the committee.

This is what I tried to say in the short speech I made because if the administrative structure and the structures that are in place to meet the needs are lacking and do not raise enough the awareness of the world population, some work has to be done and I agree with Mr... I do not remember his name... who said that we really have to look into that and come up with a clear Canadian position on this because whenever we go there we vote as private members and

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que membres personnels et selon notre sensibilisation. J'avais bien en tête les pluies acides mais il reste que, si nous y allons en tant que parlementaires du Canada, il faut bien représenter les points de vue d'un gouvernement canadien. Il ne s'agit pas juste de dire je vote contre ou pour mais il faut en faire une évaluation très juste. C'est tout ce que j'avais à dire.

The Chairman: Senator Molgat.

Senator Molgat: Just a general comment. Arising out of this morning's discussion, for example, has been one specific that one of the subjects might be more emphasis on environment. Miss Jewett suggests the human rights question. Every year, each national group is asked to propose subjects for the following year. So these arising out of this discussion are two possible areas. Furthermore, on the selection procedures, you have here several members of the present executive of the IPU. All of those, I am sure, have listened to the comments.

The Chairman: Yes. Now Mr. Neil, please.

Mr. Neil: I was just going to say that Senator Molgat indicated that we have the opportunity of making recommendations; in Rome you made a recommendation, I think at the instigation of Mr. Laniel, on a proposal to have a discussion on the strengthening of the United Nations, and I think that was accepted and is part of the conference. Senator Bosa, I guess it was. This is something that could certainly be considered as a proposed resolution, the question raised by Mr. Darling on acid rain.

Mr. Laniel: And on that point, Mr. Chairman, my further recommendation that was accepted unanimously was, in that perspective, the re-enforcement of the participation of parliamentarians, and that was adopted unanimously. So that we do not let the United Nations be something only for government, and we should try and seek formulas whereby parliamentarians would be more than observers at annual meetings or special meetings of the United Nations. Maybe we could, within our world organization, like the IPU, seek some formula where we could hold a meeting and maybe have parliamentarians independent from their government representatives, or the Canadian member of Parliament who will go and make a speech on the stand of... the official speech at the stand of the United Nations will be prepared by the officials of the department normally. He can maybe get up from it. But what we were seeking was another means where expression could be made in adjacent rooms or in an adjacent platform, where it could be heard by official delegations of governments, and give a chance to parliamentarians to express views at that moment on those subjects. And it was accepted unanimously by... of course...

The Chairman: Also for the interest of those who are going to read the minutes. With your permission, I may like to ask the Clerk of the Senate, Charles Lussier. There is a special group within the IPU, and when we have a delegation some representatives from both the Senate and the House of Commons attend a meeting within the meeting. Instead of describing it, I will kindly ask Charles Lussier if he would be kind enough, just in a couple of minutes, to describe, first, the title of the organization he belonged to that is always taking place at the same time as the IPU.

[Translation]

according to our own ideas. I, for one, was mainly concerned with acid rain, but if we go there as members of the Parliament of Canada we should project the views of the Canadian government. It is not enough to say I am for or against, you have to come up with a very precise evaluation. That is all I wanted to say.

Le président: Sénateur Molgat.

Le sénateur Molgat: Juste un mot d'ordre général. On a dit ce matin que l'un des sujets particuliers pourrait être la protection de l'environnement. M^{lle} Jewett propose la question des droits de l'homme. Chaque année, chaque groupe national est invité à proposer des sujets pour l'année suivante. Nous avons donc déjà entendu deux possibilités. Par ailleurs, en ce qui concerne la procédure de sélection, plusieurs membres de l'exécutif actuel de l'UPI sont présents ce matin. Je suis certain qu'ils ont écouté attentivement ce débat.

Le président: Oui. Monsieur Neil, s'il vous plaît.

M. Neil: Je voulais simplement faire ressortir que le sénateur Molgat a dit que nous pouvions faire des recommandations; à Rome vous avez fait une recommandation, à l'instigation de M. Laniel, je pense, proposant l'ouverture d'un débat sur le renforcement des Nations-unies, et cette recommandation a été acceptée et inscrite à l'ordre du jour de la conférence. Je crois que c'était le sénateur Bosa. La question soulevée par M. Darling concernant les pluies acides pourrait certainement faire l'objet d'un projet de résolution.

M. Laniel: À ce sujet, monsieur le président, j'avais recommandé en outre le renforcement du rôle des parlementaires à cet effet, et cette recommandation a été adoptée à l'unanimité. Il s'agit en effet d'éviter que les Nations-unies soient l'apanage des gouvernements et de trouver des moyens ou des formules qui permettent aux parlementaires de ne pas être que des observateurs dans les sessions annuelles spéciales des Nations-unies. Peut-être pourrions-nous, dans le cadre de nos instances mondiales comme l'UPI, rechercher une formule, telle qu'une réunion où des parlementaires indépendants de leurs gouvernements respectifs pourraient prendre position sur... la position officielle du gouvernement aux Nations-unies est normalement arrêtée par les responsables du ministère. Ce député canadien pourrait s'en écarter. Nous cherchons donc un moyen par lequel les parlementaires pourraient exprimer leur avis dans un forum en quelque sorte parallèle, où les délégations officielles des gouvernements pourraient en prendre connaissance. Cela a été accepté à l'unanimité.

Le président: Pour faciliter aux lecteurs du procès-verbal sa compréhension, j'aimerais demander au greffier du Sénat, M. Charles Lussier, de nous expliquer la situation. Il existe au sein de l'UPI un groupe spécial et lorsque nous envoyons une délégation, des représentants, venant aussi bien du Sénat que de la Chambre des communes, se réunissent à part ou dans le cadre de la réunion. Je vais demander à Charles Lussier de bien vouloir nous dire comment s'appelle cette organisation à laquelle il appartenait et qui se réunit toujours en même temps que l'UPI.

[Texte]

S'il vous plaît.

Mr. Charles Lussier (greffier du Sénat): Ce sera fait assez rapidement, monsieur le président. Le nom est l'Association des secrétaires généraux des parlements et c'est une association qui n'a de but en somme que l'entraide entre les différents greffiers ou secrétaires généraux. C'est en quelque sorte exclusivement pour l'amélioration des procédures à l'intérieur de nos différents, ou parlements, ou Sénats, ou Chambres des communes ou assemblées législatives.

• 1055

Nous essayons d'alterner d'année en année pour que les mêmes orateurs ne reviennent pas trop souvent et pour donner une chance à tous les pays d'être représentés. Il n'y a rien de très formaliste, et ce sont des questions d'ordre général qui touchent plus précisément la procédure. C'est assez égoïste en quelque sorte, c'est retourner sur soi-même.

The Chairman: But since Canada always sends two, you would suggest that we never stop sending. You find it useful, you find it informative, you find it...

M. Lussier: Personnellement, je crois aux relations internationales. Autrefois, le Sénat n'était pas représenté; la Chambre des communes l'était. C'était une décision de mes prédécesseurs de ne pas y participer, mais depuis deux ans, nous y sommes et c'est reconnu comme normal. On reconnaissait comme anormale l'absence du Sénat canadien à ces réunions internationales. C'est en somme très intéressant pour nous, parce que nous trouvons souvent les solutions que nous cherchons à des problèmes communs.

The Chairman: Maybe I will ask Dr. Jewett, because I wanted to announce—I have been given an announcement this morning—that Mr. DesRosiers has been selected to be a permanent representative of the House of Commons secretariat, if I may, and will accompany the delegation from now on.

Monsieur DesRosiers, bienvenue à bord.

Dr. Jewett, please.

Miss Jewett: Mr. Chairman, I have had one more question occur to me as we have been talking, and that has to do with the participation of American representatives at the various gatherings. It has been my observation that although the U.S. legislature is really one of the most powerful in the world, both houses, really, when I see them abroad they seem not to exercise the same kind of aggressiveness in point of view; they seem more to leave it to the administration representatives. Is that a correct impression, from your experiences with the IPU?

Senator Molgat: Yes, certainly from the IPU standpoint I would say that you are absolutely correct. They have not, obviously, attached the importance to parliamentary associations, or to the IPU... I should correct that—that I think it deserves, and that Canada has. Mind you, nor have we attached the importance to the IPU that most of the other countries have—I should not necessarily say most, many. Certainly in the case of the one-party states they attach much

[Traduction]

Please.

Mr. Charles Lussier (Clerk of the Senate): It will not take long, Mr. Chairman. The title is Association of Secretaries General of Parliament and its sole function is to provide help to the various clerks or secretaries general. It is concerned exclusively with improving the procedures within our various Parliaments, upper or lower houses or legislative assemblies.

We tried to arrange alternates from year to year in order to give all countries a turn and to avoid having the same speakers coming up too often. It is all very informal and we deal mainly with general questions relating to procedure. It is a rather self-centred or inward looking arrangement.

Le président: Mais puisque le Canada en envoie toujours deux, vous proposez que cela continue. Vous trouvez cela utile et...

Mr. Lussier: I personally believe in international relations. In early times the Senate was not represented, only the House of Commons. My predecessors had decided not to participate but we have been doing it now for two years and it is considered normal. The absence of the Canadian Senate in those international meetings was viewed as abnormal. These meetings are very useful for us because they often provide solutions to common problems we had been searching for.

Le président: Je vais peut-être demander à M^{lle} Jewett, car je voulais annoncer... on m'a demandé d'annoncer ce matin que M. DesRosiers a été choisi représentant permanent du secrétariat de la Chambre des communes et fera partie dorénavant de la délégation.

Mr. DesRosiers, welcome aboard.

Mademoiselle Jewett, s'il vous plaît.

Mlle Jewett: Monsieur le président, j'aimerais poser une question concernant la participation des représentants américains aux diverses réunions. J'ai été frappée par le fait que les représentants américains des deux chambres défendent rarement un point de vue très indépendant, alors qu'ils représentent le parlement le plus puissant du monde; ils ont beaucoup tendance à s'en remettre aux représentants de leur gouvernement. Avez-vous retiré la même impression de votre expérience au sein de l'UPI?

Le sénateur Molgat: Oui, vous avez tout à fait raison en ce qui concerne l'UPI. Je pense qu'ils n'accordent pas aux associations parlementaires, ou plutôt à l'UPI, l'importance qu'elles me paraissent mériter et que le Canada leur donne. Nous-mêmes, d'ailleurs, ne donnons pas autant d'importance à l'UPI que la plupart des autres pays... ou du moins beaucoup d'entre eux. Les pays à parti unique y attachent certainement beaucoup d'importance comme en témoignent le choix de leurs

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greater importance to it, and the selection of their delegates, the whole process, is elevated in their system. As the chairman said earlier, we find everywhere present ministers of external affairs, ambassadors of these countries who are ex-IPU delegates. The Americans have not used that route.

I think it is unfortunate, because they are abdicating an excellent forum for discussion and getting their point of view across. We have said so to them on a number of occasions, but it remains usually a small delegation; they very often do not even stay until the end for the votes; they very often split the delegation half-way through the meetings so that there is no continuity; they simply have not raised it up to the level that it deserves.

The Chairman: I would like to add, because I want to make sure to send this to my friends, the American delegates, that one of the beauties of this IPU was, for instance, the fact that even though the United States does not recognize, as you know, Cuba, there was a full delegation of Americans in Cuba. That was very healthy for the life of the IPU.

If I may just conclude before recognizing Mr. Lawrence. We are to go to South Korea after a very lengthy debate, and I would hope that all my friends and the chairmen of other IPU delegations who voted not to go to South Korea, will realize that we are not going to South Korea *per se*; we are going to a place where the IPU is holding its meeting of parliamentarians.

• 1100

This is not an admission of recognition of a government that we accept to hold a conference there. So I would hope that those countries who have decided to vote against going to South Korea will understand that it is in their interest and the survival of the IPU to attend the conference, which coincidentally happens to be held in South Korea. Again I repeat, it is not a recognition of the regime; it is acceptance of an invitation which was tendered to us and which we agreed to accept by a majority vote.

I think, Mr. Lawrence, you have a word to say, and then I will ask Mr. Wenman.

Mr. Lawrence: I just want to say, Mr. Chairman, that partially as a result of certain discussions held prior to Helsinki and at Helsinki, I think the attitude of the leaders of both houses in Washington is changing with respect to the IPU. We have been assured now that, in spite of the time difficulties they frequently have with regard to the autumn meetings and conflict with certain election processes in the United States, which sometimes makes it hard for them to have a full delegation then, nevertheless they do realize they have not been playing their full part in the past, and at Helsinki they did have a full delegation. They were there at the beginning and they were there at the end. I think the encouraging aspect of it is that they realize they have got to play a fuller and more comprehensive part in these meetings and, according to the assurances we received in Helsinki, they are going to do that.

[Translation]

délégés et le niveau auquel se déroule toute la procédure. Comme le président l'a dit, on voit partout des ministres des Affaires étrangères et des ambassadeurs de ces pays, qui sont d'anciens délégués en l'UPI. Les Américains ne suivent pas du tout la même voie.

Je pense que c'est regrettable, car ils négligent ainsi un excellent lieu de rencontre et de débat, où ils pourraient défendre leur point de vue. Nous le leur avons dit à plusieurs reprises, mais la délégation américaine reste généralement très restreinte et s'en va souvent avant même la fin des votes; souvent, la délégation se scinde en deux parties, qu se relèvent en plein milieu des travaux, si bien qu'il n'y a pas de continuité; le congrès, tout simplement, n'attache pas à ces rencontres l'importance qu'elles méritent.

Le président: J'ajouterais, car je veux envoyer ce procès-verbal à nos amis américains, que les États-Unis, bien qu'ils ne reconnaissent pas Cuba, ont envoyé toute une délégation dans ce pays, et c'est cela qui est merveilleux. C'est une très bonne chose pour l'UPI.

Je voudrais conclure là-dessus avant de donner la parole à M. Lawrence. Nous avons décidé, après un très long débat, d'aller en Corée du Sud et j'espère que tous mes collègues et les présidents des autres délégations de l'UPI qui ont voté contre prendront conscience que nous n'allons pas en Corée du Sud en opposition à la Corée du Nord; nous nous rendons dans un lieu où l'UPI tient sa réunion de parlementaires.

Le fait que nous nous réunissions quelque part ne signifie pas que nous reconnaissons le gouvernement du pays. J'espère donc que les pays qui ont voté contre la tenue de la réunion en Corée du Sud comprendront qu'il y a de leur intérêt et de la survie de l'UPI, dont il se trouve que la conférence se tienne en Corée du Sud. Je répète, encore une fois, que cela n'est pas une reconnaissance du régime, mais la simple acceptation d'une invitation qui nous a été faite et que nous avons décidé d'accepter par un vote majoritaire.

Monsieur Lawrence, je crois que vous vouliez intervenir? Je donnerai ensuite la parole à M. Wenman.

M. Lawrence: Je voulais seulement dire, monsieur le président, qu'à la suite, notamment, de discussions qui se sont déroulées avant la réunion d'Helsinki et à Helsinki, l'attitude des deux chambres de Washington est en train de changer vis-à-vis de l'UPI. Nous avons maintenant reçu l'assurance que, en dépit des contraintes de temps qu'ils connaissent fréquemment lors des réunions d'automne et du processus électoral aux États-Unis, qui leur interdisent souvent d'envoyer une délégation complète, elles ont conscience de ne pas avoir toujours joué un rôle suffisamment actif et elles étaient représentées à Helsinki par une délégation normale, qui a été présente du début à la fin des travaux. Je pense qu'il est donc encourageant de voir cette prise de conscience, et à Helsinki les Américains nous ont donné l'assurance qu'ils allaient jouer un rôle plus grand dans ces rencontres.

[Texte]

The Chairman: May I add this, Allan? That time the delegation was led by the very famous, most well-known person throughout the United States—the 82-year old Florida politician, Claude Pepper. You should have seen for a man of his age how unbelievably active he was in every delegation. He stayed from way at the beginning to way at the end.

And on top of that, in all fairness, there has been a development. A good friend of Senator Molgat and Canada has now been elevated—I think he serves as Assistant Under-Secretary of State; it is Mr. Derwinski, who used to be a parliamentarian in Chicago and who for many years has been very active in IPU. He is now directly recommending a few things to the President, and he was personally attending Helsinki to emphasize how important now it is to them to play a role in IPU. So over the years it will be very healthy for the life of IPU to know that, and I wanted that to be on record.

Mr. Lawrence: That is a bi-partisan approach, too.

Mr. Wenman: Hopefully, Mr. Chairman, we have demonstrated that the IPU has new importance in Canada. We are upgrading it by adding to this as we go through the process we are creating today. It is from the grassroots that we will strengthen the IPU internationally.

I would like to request that the committee append the report of the IPU to the minutes of this meeting, and that the chairman circulate the minutes with appropriate explanation as to why it is possible, particularly to the Speaker, the Leaders of the Opposition, and the chairpersons of all other extra parliamentary groups—as well as to the special committee studying parliamentary reform.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel, please.

Mr. Laniel: Procedurally, could we add to your motion... that we report to the House that we have received that report; that the committee report that...

Mr. Wenman: I think we should handle them separately. Both are good ideas, and I would entertain that motion...

The Chairman: I am ready to report to the House if you would make a motion immediately at the beginning of next week's meeting, because I need a quorum to report to the House. I think it would be a very good idea. So Mr. Laniel, if you would be kind enough to remember on Tuesday and, as soon as I see a quorum I will interrupt the meeting for a minute. You can then ask the chairman to report to the House that we have received the report, and I shall table a motion to that effect in the House.

Mr. Wenman: But you may meet my request and proceed to do as I suggested?

The Chairman: Yes. But I do not need a quorum to attend. I think it is a feeling.

I want on your behalf to thank very sincerely our good friend, Senator Molgat. We can show that the two Houses can do things together; I thank the honourable Senator Rousseau, Madam Jewett, and all those who showed up this morning, for their presence.

[Traduction]

Le président: Me permettez-vous d'ajouter quelque chose, Allan? Cette fois-là, la délégation américaine était présidée par un parlementaire de très grande réputation aux États-Unis, Claude Pepper de Floride, âgé de 82 ans. Il fallait voir l'activité, incroyable pour un homme de son âge, qu'il a déployée du début à la fin.

Il y a eu aussi une autre évolution. Un bon ami du sénateur Molgat et du Canada a été promu... je crois qu'il occupe maintenant le rang de sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint; il s'agit de M. Derwinski, de Chicago, qui a été très actif au sein de l'UPI pendant de nombreuses années. Il soumet maintenant des recommandations directement au président et il s'est rendu personnellement à Helsinki pour bien montrer l'importance que les États-Unis attachent maintenant à l'UPI. Je pense donc que ce sera une très bonne chose pour l'UPI dans les années à venir et je tenais à l'indiquer.

M. Lawrence: Oui, et cela témoigne également d'une approche bi-partisane.

M. Wenman: Monsieur le président, j'espère que nous avons établi maintenant que l'UPI revêt une importance nouvelle pour le Canada. Ce processus que nous établissons aujourd'hui le confirme. C'est par la base que nous allons renforcer l'UPI sur le plan international.

J'aimerais demander au Comité d'annexer le rapport de l'UPI au procès-verbal de cette réunion, et que le président le distribue avec des explications appropriées, notamment au président de la Chambre, aux chefs de l'opposition et aux présidents de tous les autres groupes extra-parlementaires... ainsi qu'au comité spécial qui étudie la réforme parlementaire.

Le président: Monsieur Laniel, s'il vous plaît.

M. Laniel: Sur le plan de la procédure, pourrions-nous ajouter à votre motion... que nous fassions rapport à la Chambre de la réception du rapport; que le Comité fasse rapport que...

M. Wenman: Je pense qu'il faudrait le faire séparément. Les deux idées sont bonnes et je suis d'accord sur la motion...

Le président: Si vous présentez la motion tout de suite j'en ferai rapport au début de la réunion de la semaine prochaine à la Chambre, mais j'ai besoin du quorum. Cela me paraît une excellente idée. Monsieur Laniel, si vous voulez vous en souvenir mardi, dès que nous aurons le quorum, j'interromprai la discussion pour mettre la motion aux voix. Vous pouvez demander au président de faire rapport à la Chambre de la réception du rapport, et je déposerai une motion à cet effet à la Chambre.

M. Wenman: Mais vous pouvez donner suite à ma demande et faire comme je l'ai suggéré?

Le président: Oui, car je n'ai pas besoin de quorum pour cela, me semble-t-il.

Je tiens, en votre nom à tous, à remercier très sincèrement notre ami le sénateur Molgat. Nous pouvons montrer aux deux Chambres que nous savons travailler ensemble, je remercie l'honorable sénateur Rousseau, M^{me} Jewett et tous ceux qui sont venus ce matin.

[Text]

• 1105

Senator Molgat, you have the last word.

Senator Molgat: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I might just say a word. One of the great benefits, as well, of the IPU is that very fact of the mixing of the two Houses and the mixing of our parties. It leads to a much better understanding between parliamentarians, and I think that is a side benefit . . . it is not the intention of the IPU, but it does so, from a Canadian standpoint.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for this particular meeting. I think it has been most useful. I wish to say to you that I wish you the very greatest success, as well, in your position as the chairman of the IPU. I want to thank you and all my colleagues for the support in the past, and particularly the work that you did in Rome and in Lagos as the *rapporteur* on the disarmament issue, where Canada played an outstanding role.

The Chairman: Thank you. *Merci. Mardi*, Tuesday . . .

The meeting is adjourned.

[Translation]

Sénateur Molgat, je vous laisse le mot de la fin.

Le sénateur Molgat: Je vous remercie, monsieur le président.

Juste un mot. L'un des grands avantages, me semble-t-il, de l'UPI est que nos deux Chambres et tous nos partis politiques s'y retrouvent. Cela conduit à une bien meilleure compréhension entre les parlementaires, et cela m'apparaît une très bonne chose dans la perspective canadienne, même si ce n'est pas le premier objectif de l'UPI.

Monsieur le président, je vous remercie d'avoir convoqué cette réunion, qui m'a paru extrêmement utile. Je vous souhaite le plus grand succès dans votre charge de président de l'UPI. Je veux vous remercier, vous et tous mes collègues, de l'appui que vous avez donné par le passé et particulièrement du travail que vous avez effectué à Rome et à Lagos en tant que rapporteur sur la question du désarmement, dans lequel le Canada a joué un rôle très éminent.

Le président: Je vous remercie. *Thank you. Tuesday* mardi . . .

La séance est levée.

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APPENDIX "EAND-74"

**REPORT
OF THE
69TH INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE
ROME, ITALY
14-22 SEPTEMBER, 1982**

24 NOVEMBER 1982

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RESULTS OF THE 1982 AUTUMN SESSION
(Document prepared by the Interna-
tional Secretariat)

PART "A"

I. INTRODUCTION

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference was held in Rome from September 12 to 22, 1982.

The Executive Committee, on which there is currently no Canadian representative, met on September 12, 21 and 23 while the Inter-Parliamentary Council met on the mornings of September 13 and 22. The actual Conference started on the morning of the 14th, and ended late on the evening of Wednesday, September 22.

The Canadian delegation was led by Hon. Gildas Molgat, Senator, President of the Canadian Group, member of the Inter-Parliamentary Council and Vice-President of the Conference. Mr. Molgat was accompanied by his wife. The other members of the delegation were:

For the Senate

Hon. Martial Asselin, P.C., Senator and Mrs. Asselin
Hon. Péter Bosa, Senator
Hon. Yvette Rousseau, Senator

For the House of Commons

Mr. Dennis Dawson, M.P.
Mr. Benno Friesen, M.P. and Mrs. Friesen
Mr. Gérald Laniel, M.P. and Mrs. Laniel
Hon. Allan Lawrence, P.C., M.P., member of the Inter-Parliamentary Council, and Mrs. Lawrence
Hon. Bryce Mackasey, P.C., M.P., and Mrs. Mackasey
Mr. Douglas Neil, M.P. and Mrs. Neil
Mr. David Orlikow, M.P. and Mrs. Orlikow
Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P., Rapporteur of the Committee on Political Questions, International Security and Disarmament

The delegation was accompanied by Mr. Martin Lavoie, Administrative Secretary of the Canadian Group, and Mr. Roger Hill, Advisor.

Mr. Charles Lussier, Clerk of the Senate, Mr. Richard Greene, Clerk Assistant of the Senate, and Dr. C.B. Koester, Clerk of the House of Commons, participated in the meetings of the Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments. Mr. Lussier was accompanied by his wife.

II. THE 69TH CONFERENCE: ITS WORK

A. THE INAUGURAL CEREMONY

The Inaugural Ceremony of the 69th Conference took place in the Auditorium of Santa Cecilia late on the morning of September 14, 1982. Following the introduction of the members of the Executive Committee to Mr. Sandro Pertini, the Italian Head of State; the President of the Italian Group of the I.P.U., Mr. Giulio Andreotti delivered a welcoming address.

Mr. Andreotti remarks were followed by those of the outgoing President of the Inter-Parliamentary Council, Mr. Rafael Caldera (Venezuela). His address was followed by that of the Director General of the United Nations Office in Geneva, Mr. Luigi Cottafavi, who represented the Secretary General of the United Nations. The final speaker was the President of the Republic of Italy, Mr. Sandro Pertini.

Music for the Inaugural Ceremony was provided by the Philharmonic Orchestra of "l'Accademia di Santa Cecilia", directed by Gianandrea Cavazzeni. The orchestra interpreted some of the works of the great Italian composer Giuseppe Verdi for the 931 delegates and their spouses.

In his address, the President of the Italian Group, Mr. Andreotti, emphasized the fact that the Union's task is to find common ground between conflicting positions and establish the foundations for solving the major problems of today. He also indicated that if the results of these efforts sometimes appear modest or even disappointing, faith must be kept in order to succeed in establishing a new world order in which part of humanity was not struggling merely to survive while the other was striving to improve its well-being. In conclusion, Mr. Andreotti expressed the hope that the Rome Conference would make considerable progress toward this goal. The full text of Mr. Andreotti's speech will be found in Appendix A, Part A, p. 23.

The President of the Inter-Parliamentary Council, Mr. R. Caldera, took the opportunity to outline the world situation in relation to the subjects included on the agenda of the meeting and the events currently affecting the world. The full text of Mr. Caldera's speech will be found in Appendix B, Part A, p. 25.

Mr. L. Cottafavi, representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, used the first part of his speech to show that there are a large number of common principles shared by the UN organization and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the principles of peace, freedom, justice and prosperity, he then touched on the different themes on the agenda for the meeting. The full text of Mr. Cottafavi's speech will be found in Appendix C, Part A, p. 30.

It was the speech by the President of the Republic of Italy which had the greatest impact on the delegates, particularly when he dealt with the Palestinian question saying that Palestinians should also have a country and a homeland. It is with that in mind that Mr. Pertini welcomed President Reagan's latest proposals which he considers to be the foundation for a peaceful solution in the Middle East. The President of the Italian Republic took also the opportunity to demonstrate the merits and the need for democratic parliamentary institutions; he made a plea against the hunger in the World, the arms race and for peace. The full text of President Pertini's speech will be found in Appendix D, Part A, p. 34.

B. THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION

The first plenary session commenced on the afternoon of Tuesday, September 14, and ended late on the evening on September 18.

After electing by acclamation Mr. Giulio Andreotti as President of the Conference and choosing the Vice-Presidents (Item 1 on the agenda), the plenary session of the Conference turned to the following items:

1. Requests for inclusion of supplementary items in the agenda.

President Andreotti announced that the Conference had received a very large number of requests for inclusion of supplementary items covering eleven subjects. After discussion and at the suggestion of the President, it was decided to defer consideration of these requests until the third session, that of the afternoon of September 15. At the opening of the session on this question, two new requests had been submitted ...

Thus the Conference had to decide on:

- four requests for inclusion relating to the situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian question
- two requests for inclusion on the Iran-Iraq conflict
- two requests for inclusion relating to the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia
- one request for inclusion on the danger to international peace posed by the superpowers
- one request for inclusion concerning the invasion of sovereign states by foreign troops (containing a reference to Afghanistan)
- one request for inclusion on the question of the neutron bomb
- one request for inclusion on the use of chemical weapons in Vietnam
- one request for inclusion dealing with the reinforcement of U.S. troops on the borders of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic
- a request for inclusion dealing with the status of U.S. territories of Micronesia
- a request for inclusion on U.S. policy in Central America
- and finally, a request for inclusion on the human rights situation in Northern Ireland.

The Conference dealt first with a motion by the Indian delegation proposing the adjournment sine die of the consideration of all requests for the inclusion of supplementary items in the Conference agenda, with the exception of those concerning the Middle East question and the conflict between Iraq and Iran. After discussion and several votes, it was decided to include in the Indian motion two amendments: one which would permit consideration of the invasion of Afghanistan, (Irish Group). Another dealt with the Ethiopian aggression against the Somali Democratic Republic and the resulting dangers to international peace and security (Somali Group). A third amendment was rejected, i.e. that presented by the Czechoslovak Group regarding U.S. forces on the borders of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.

It is interesting to note that the Irish Group's amendment was adopted by 400 votes against 325 and 315 abstentions; that of the Somali Group was adopted by 518 votes against 224 and 214 abstentions; and that the Czechoslovak Group's amendment was rejected by 392 votes to 262 and 233 abstentions. The detailed votes appear in Part B, pp. 32-35.

The motion presented by the Indian Group was adopted as amended by 665 votes to 642, with 113 abstentions. The Canadian Group supported the motion of the Indian delegation as amended.

Thus, four supplementary items were included on the Conference agenda:

- Item 10: The situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian question
- Item 11: Proposals for a definitive peace between Iraq and Iran
- Item 12: The invasion of Afghanistan
- Item 13: The Ethiopian aggression against the Somali Democratic Republic and the dangers to international peace and security that can result from it.

All of these items were debated in the General Debate, during which no less than 90 persons spoke on the supplementary Items or on items 2 and 3 of the agenda (see below).

The Conference then referred these supplementary items to the Committee on Political Questions, International Security and Disarmament which reported at the final plenary session on Wednesday, September 22.

2. The political, economic and social situation in the world and the activities of the Union (Item 2 on the agenda)

The General Debate on this question took place on September 14 and 15 and at two night sittings held on September 15 and 18 at the same time as the debate on Item 3 of the agenda (see below).

At that time the Conference heard, at the invitation of the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, Mr. Emilio Colombo, speak on the broad outlines of his country's foreign policy. The complete summary of Mr. Colombo's speech will be found in Appendix E, Part A, p. 42. It was during this debate on the morning of September 15th, that the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO and member of the Palestine National Council, Mr. Yasser Arafat, addressed participants of the Conference. The complete summary of Mr. Arafat's speech will be found in Appendix F, Part A, p. 46.

3. The contribution of Parliaments to the urgent adoption of concrete measures, in particular nuclear disarmament, the reduction of military budgets and its effects on world economy and employment and economic and social development in the Third World (Item 3 on the agenda)

This item was discussed in plenary session during the General Debate which also dealt with Item 2 of the Agenda (see above).

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, Rapporteur for the Committee, opened the debate on this question. He provided a brief description of the work done in Lagos in April 1982 where a draft resolution was developed (see Appendix G.1, Part A, p. 50). He then invited the Conference to re-examine this draft resolution taking into account the development in this area since spring 1982. The following is the complete summary of Mr. Prud'homme's speech:

Mr. Prud'homme first indicated that the Political Committee had met in Lagos under the chairmanship of Mr. Andreotti. Forty-seven speakers had contributed their views on what parliaments could do to further disarmament. The presentations highlighted the arms race, the need for real progress at the U.N. Second Special Session, and the necessity for a shift from expenditures on armament to the provision of development funds for the Third World.

He said that the Political Committee had received fifteen draft resolutions from different countries. In order to draft a single text, the Committee had set up a group consisting of members of various delegations which had appointed him Rapporteur.

Mr. Prud'homme stated that the drafting group had produced a joint text in a day, which was a considerable achievement. The Preamble described the key issues in the field of disarmament; substantive Part A set out the views to be expressed in the U.N. Second Special Session while substantive Part B concentrated on general questions. The document called for comprehensive disarmament and negotiations and arms reductions as soon as possible, a successful outcome of the Geneva talks between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and a new Convention on the military uses of space.

A number of proposals were excluded because they did not receive unanimous support. It was agreed to defer them for consideration at the Rome Conference. The draft text so produced was adopted by the Political Committee and by the I.P.U. Council at Lagos.

On 23rd June 1982 Mr. Andreotti presented their conclusions at the U.N. He received special consideration at the Session as a representative of the I.P.U.

According to Mr. Prud'homme, the task before the present Conference was to re-examine the Lagos text in the light of subsequent events and developments in the disarmament field. He believed that the Political Committee, the drafting group and the Inter-Parliamentary Council were aiming for a general statement of disarmament issues, rather than concentrating specifically on a text to put before the U.N. He felt, therefore, that the present text should be interfered with as little as possible.

In addition to Mr. Prud'homme, who was acting as Rapporteur, two other Canadian parliamentarians took part in this debate: Hon. Allan Lawrence, who was jointly responsible for this subject for the Canadian Group with Hon. Peter Bosa. Mr. Lawrence played an active role in preparing the draft resolution in Lagos.

During the debate Mr. A. Lawrence said that since the Lagos meeting the world had seen the terrible ruthlessness and efficiency of modern conventional weapons in South America and the Middle East. From the human point of view, how could a sensible arms reduction agreement be delayed any longer? The world was in economic recession and Governments felt that they were spending and taxing too much. There had to be reductions in Government expenditure throughout the world, at least in western countries. What could not be done with the money saved by reducing expenditure on armaments?

An arms reduction agreement had to be universal in scope. It must be balanced among the competing confrontational groups of countries. It must also be verifiable. The Canadian amendment No. 2 (see Annex G.2, Part A, p. 57) which had been submitted had been brought forward as a result of the disappointing outcome of the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. The Canadian delegation felt that it would help to update the Lagos resolution of the I.P.U.

In addition, there was also disappointment in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Madrid, which had proved to be non-productive.

Finally, he appealed to parliamentarians at this Conference to put behind them their loyalties to their own Governments for a moment. Now was the opportunity to bring sense and sensibility to their respective Governments so that those Governments could succeed where so far they had failed. They must force their Governments to the realisation that disarmament was critical to the future of mankind. The challenge of this meeting was to do exactly that.

For his part, Senator P. Bosa said that all the speeches that he had heard, whether from the East, the West, or the Third World had agreed that armaments had to be reduced. He wondered why so little progress had been made with disarmament and, that in fact, nations were developing more destructive weapons than before.

Perhaps the international community was addressing itself to the wrong issue. He wondered whether they should not consider why arms expenditure remained at such a high level.

According to Senator Bosa, the quality of life could be improved if military expenditures were diverted to peaceful purposes, but arms limitation would not necessarily ensure peace. A two-thirds reduction in nuclear weapons would leave enough behind to destroy the planet. The threat posed by armaments was inextricably bound up with complex ethnic, religious and political conflicts.

Senator Bosa continued, he compared world conditions with those in Canada. In Canada, there were geographic disputes, Anglo-French linguistic difficulties, 78 ethnic groups, religious differences, and social and economic disparities. Nevertheless, Canada had never had a major war or revolution within its borders. It was possible to overcome difficulties and work for the common good. Problems such as conscription, the national flag, and patriation of the Constitution, had generated bitterness and divisions, but in the end they had been overcome.

Canadians, continued Senator Bosa, had overcome their differences without violence. There were two official languages, but they had developed a policy of multiculturalism under which all groups were treated equally. The same approach was needed internationally - a willingness to compromise and to see each others' point of view. According to Senator Bosa, this was the only hope for disarmament and Canada was a microcosm for the world.

At the end of this debate in the late evening of September 18, the draft resolution presented by Mr. Prud'homme and the amendments put forward by various national groups (including Canada) were sent for study and report to the Political Committee.

4. The development of parliamentary institutions with respect for the Constitution and their work in the sphere of international relations (Item 4 on the agenda)

Debate on this item opened on the morning of Thursday, September 16. No fewer than 45 delegates spoke, including Mr. G rard Laniel for the Canadian Group. Hon. Bryce Mackasey, who worked actively on the Canadian amendments, did not wish to add to Mr. Laniel's excellent intervention.

Mr. Laniel pointed out that although the draft resolution (see Appendix H.1 - Part A, p. 60) under consideration should win the support of the vast majority of the delegates, the Canadian Group was proposing two amendments (see Appendix H.2, Part A, p. 64) designed to improve the final resolution. The following is a summary of Mr. Laniel's speech:

Mr. Laniel said that he felt sure that the draft resolution, (unanimously adopted in Lagos) would be supported by the great majority of the delegates present. Each country was, of course, free to have its own ideas on the development of parliamentary institutions and their role in the sphere of international relations, a freedom which was indeed implied in the actual wording of the item under discussion. At the same time, the aims of the draft resolution were perfectly praiseworthy and the Canadian delegation was prepared to give the text its full support.

The Canadian Group had, nevertheless, tabled two amendments. The first referred to paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, which as it stood might constitute a threat to the traditional democratic institutions of the countries of the Union. The fact that parliaments had not always succeeded in exerting sufficient influence over international relations did not justify setting up new bodies to carry out that task and institutionalising them. Outside elections, governments were answerable for their acts to the elected representatives and to them only. Their responsibilities with respect to foreign policy should therefore be increased and not diminished, so that the Canadian delegation suggested referring to influence rather than power. It would also prefer the bodies proposed in the draft resolution not be financed directly by the state.

The second amendment was aimed at institutionalising and strengthening the participation of parliamentarians in the work of the United Nations. This seemed to be a legitimate objective for the Union in view of its representative nature. Parliamentarians should also be associated with both the Regular Sessions and Special Sessions of the United Nations so as to increase the influence of national assemblies over the activities of this Organisation.

Mr. Laniel continued explaining that as far as the Canadian parliament was concerned, its own development had led it to increase its work in the sphere of foreign policy. It was admittedly not authorised by the Constitution to sign treaties, but there was no doubt that the Canadian government had to answer to Parliament for its management of both foreign and home affairs.

Finally, Mr. Laniel stated that the Canadian delegation was aware of the considerable importance of the draft currently before the Conference. There was another question the delegation hoped could be examined in the future, which was informing governments and assemblies about the work of parliamentary associations and in particular those of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

At the conclusion of this debate, the draft resolution and amendments (including those put forward by Canada) were sent to the Committee on Political, Juridical and Human Rights Questions for study and recommendations.

5. The state of the world environment ten years after the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm. Steps to be taken, including in the area of national and international legislation (Item 5 on the agenda)

The debate on this question occurred on Thursday, September 16 in the afternoon. As no fewer than 51 speakers were already registered, the President announced to the Conference that the Steering Committee had decided to limit the speaking time allotted to each delegation to 6 minutes for a single speaker and 3 minutes per speaker if two were to speak. Thus, Mr. D. Orlikow, who was to speak together with Mrs. Y. Rousseau, kindly gave up his speaking time to her.

Senator Rousseau first invited delegates to reflect on the state of the environment and then invited her colleagues to adopt a resolution which would allow the Union to achieve concrete results. Below is a summary of Mrs. Rousseau's intervention.

Mrs. Y. Rousseau was pleased to have the opportunity to address the Conference on such an important matter as environment and to present some suggestions for amendment and comment in support of the proposed resolution. It was important that parliamentarians should prepare guidelines to facilitate the task in their respective countries.

The Senator recalled that the Conference's discussions were a continuation of preparatory meetings such as those at Lagos and Nairobi. IPU's major concern should be to determine objectives which were compatible with those of other organisations, since parliamentarians represented individuals but also acted as intermediaries.

It was above all important to reflect on the state of the world's environment ten years after the Stockholm Conference. In May 1982, the United Nations had organised a meeting to assess what progress had been achieved and to establish priorities and objectives for the next decade. Delegates should study those documents and become acquainted with the new objectives which were being proposed in order to promote them in their respective countries. It would already be an achievement if the Conference led to better knowledge of environmental problems.

Real progress had been achieved and the national and international organisations set up at the time had played a decisive role. However, much

still remained to be done. The Inter-Parliamentary Union could make a valid contribution in that respect, this was the aim of the amendments presented by the Canadian delegation.

The Union could only produce concrete results if it adopted an unsatisfactory resolution. On the whole, the proposed resolution was in keeping with the Conference's functions and responsibilities. In the present state of development of matters concerning the environment, suitable organisations should be set up to deal with them. It was also important to depoliticise discussions, if only because there was only one world and its main life resources belonged to everyone. It was quite clear that the implementation of a global policy would be the challenge of the eighties.

At the conclusion of this debate, the draft resolution (see Appendix I.1, Part A, p. 66) and the amendments put forward by the various national groups (including Canada) (see Appendix I.2, Part A, p. 71) were sent for study and report to the Committee on Education, Science, Culture and Environment.

6. Hunger in the World (Item 6, Conference Agenda)

This debate took place on the morning of Friday, September 17. Some 65 people spoke during the debate, including representatives from the United Nations, the President of the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the President of the World Food Programme and the Assistant Executive Director of the World Food Council. Mr. Benno Friesen spoke on behalf of Canada.

Mr. B. Friesen commented that the mechanisms drawn up at Lagos (see Annex J.1, Part A, p. 73) could mean the beginning of the end of world hunger. Since the Second World War much of the Third World had depended on the efforts of the industrialised nations to conquer hunger. The record of the developed nations was strewn with failure. Perhaps it was time to re-examine the strategies and to allow the developing nations to establish their own priorities and programmes. Many developing nations had shown themselves capable of so doing.

In the fight against world hunger great attention had to be paid to the role of the farmer. Essentially a creative person, the farmer was not always favoured by the activities of governments. Governments did not help the farmer in his production efforts although they were of assistance in marketing. Mr. Friesen called for a re-examination of priorities and in particular for the diversion of funds currently being used in the arms race.

Again, owing to the large number of speakers, the speaking time of the delegations was reduced. Hon. Martial Asselin, who was to speak on this subject, kindly gave up his time to Mr. Friesen.

At the conclusion of this debate, the draft resolution and the amendments put forward by the various national groups (including Canada - see Appendix J.2, Part A, p. 79) were sent to the Economic and Social Committee for study and report.

7. Elimination of colonialism and combatting of neo-colonialism, and particularly the need to take measures for the immediate and strict implementation of the UN Plan for Namibia (Item 7 on the agenda)

This debate took place on Saturday morning, September 18. Nofewer than 71 speakers participated, including Mr. Dennis Dawson. The following is a summary of the speech by the Canadian representative:

Mr. Dawson pointed out that his country, which has never been a colonizing nation and which has no ambition for hegemony, supports Namibia's goal of independence. Canada, an active member of the Contact Group, had endeavoured to find a peaceful, negotiated solution to the Namibian problem. This solution would involve the withdrawal of South Africa and the organization of free elections. It is to this end that Canada has taken significant action, in collaboration with the member states of the Contact Group and in liaison with SWAPO. Mr. Dawson subscribes to the principles which, in his view, must form the basis of any settlement: an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia, a guarantee of the right to self-determination, and negotiation.

In fact, independence can only be achieved through peaceful means and Canada does not approve of violence or armed conflict. Moreover, is not the *raison d'être* of the Union to encourage peaceful co-existence among peoples? In that spirit, we must condemn the attitude of South Africa, its apartheid policy, and repeated aggressions against Angola.

Mr Dawson made a point of asking all countries not to seek to export violence. As parliamentarians and democrats, the participants in the Conference must support parliamentary solutions and dialogue. Canada obtained its independence by peaceful means, and that is the only option. Those who promote armed conflict often speak of peace, but, as President Pertini said at the Inaugural Ceremony, Parliaments are the places where conflicts are resolved.

The paragraph in the draft resolution (see Appendix K, Part A, p. 83) dealing with Puerto Rico contains an opinion based on error. In three elections the Puerto Rican people voted in favour of maintaining their links with the United States. Mr. Dawson wondered aloud what the Afghans and Poles would say if they were allowed to freely express their views.

Mr. Dawson also made a point of refuting criticism of the Contact Group. Its role has been constructive and shows that dialogue and compromise are more effective than violence.

Finally, Mr. Dawson indicated that the Canadian Group could support the draft resolution if the amendments it was proposing were accepted. This support would flow essentially from the need to ensure the free future of the Namibian people, in keeping with UN Resolution 435, and the Settlement Plan developed by the UNO, the only body likely to bring a lasting, peaceful solution to the Namibian problem.

Owing to the large number of speakers, the Steering Committee had reduced the speaking time of the delegates. Mr. Douglas Neil who was to have spoken on the subject kindly gave up his speaking time to Mr. Dawson.

At the conclusion of the debate, the draft resolution and the amendments put forward by the various national groups were referred for consideration and report to the Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories and Ethnic Questions.

C. WORK OF THE STANDING STUDY COMMITTEES AND CONFERENCE DECISIONS

The five standing study committees met from Saturday, September 18 to noon on Tuesday, September 21.

1. Committee on Political Questions, International Security and Disarmament

The Committee was chaired by Mr. G. Andreotti (Italy). The Rapporteur was Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P., member of the Canadian delegation. In addition to studying the draft resolution on disarmament which had been prepared in Lagos (see Appendix G.1, Part A, p. 50) in spring 1982, the Committee had to consider the 4 supplementary items included in the agenda by the Conference (see p. 8).

The Canadian Group took a very great interest in the supplementary items included in the agenda. It is for that reason that at its daily meetings, the various supplementary items were analysed in detail by the delegation. As head of the delegation, Senator Molgat assumed responsibility for these subjects during the Conference.

(a) Disarmament

After examining in detail the amendments and sub-amendments to the draft resolution, the draft resolution as amended (see Appendix XVII, Part B, p. 40) was adopted by the Committee by 33 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions. The Canadian Group supported the resolution.

This draft resolution was presented to the Conference on September 22 where it received unanimous approval.

As there were several amendments dealing with the same subject or referring to the same paragraph of the draft resolution, Mr. Prud'homme had the difficult and delicate task of suggesting to the delegates which of these amendments should be dealt with first, in conformity with the Statutes and Rules of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. This was no simple matter and demanded of the Rapporteur exceptional dexterity and a thorough knowledge of the problems of disarmament confronting the Committee.

Having played a major role in preparing the original text, Mr. Lawrence stressed that the final resolution should take into account the new facts which had emerged since Spring, in particular, the results of the second UN Special Session on Disarmament. In so doing Mr Lawrence worked in close collaboration with Senator Bosa who participated in all of the working sessions of the Committee.

(b) The situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian question

As the Committee had before it seven draft resolutions and one amendment presented by the national Group of Egypt, it was agreed to form a drafting committee composed of the delegates from the national groups which had presented draft resolutions or which had a direct interest in the question to prepare a single draft resolution. Once the work was done, the drafting committee tabled a draft resolution (see Appendix XVIII, Part B, p. 47) which was adopted without amendment by 43 votes to 3, with 14 abstentions. The Canadian Group voted against the draft in Committee.

This draft resolution was presented to the Conference on September 22. It was asked to decide separately on the preamble and section A of the draft on the one hand and on section B of the draft on the other.

The preamble and section A of the terms were adopted by 586 votes to 58, with 132 abstentions. Canada voted as follows: 2 for, 4 against, 5 abstentions. The Conference then adopted section B of the terms by 677 votes to 25, with 86 abstentions. Canada voted as follows: 6 for, 1 against, 5 abstentions.

Finally, the full text presented by the Committee was adopted by 677 votes to 32, with 132 abstentions. Canada voted as follows: 2 for, 4 against, 6 abstentions (See detailed votes in Part B, pp. 50-52).

(c) Proposal for a definitive peace between Iraq and Iran

The Committee had before it three draft resolutions. After discussion, it was decided to use as the basic text the draft resolution (see Appendix XXII, Part B, p. 53) presented by the Australian Group. This draft resolution was adopted in Committee by 40 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions. Canada supported the draft. The Conference adopted the resolution without a vote.

(d) The invasion of Afghanistan

The Committee studied a draft resolution developed by the Irish Group and a draft amendment presented by the Italian Group.

The Committee accepted as a basic text the draft resolution presented by the Irish Group as amended by the Italian Group. Having approved an amendment presented orally by the Moroccan delegation, the Committee adopted the draft resolution (see Appendix XXIII, Part B, p. 54) by 35 votes to 14, with 5 abstentions. The Canadian Group supported the draft resolution.

The Conference adopted the full text submitted to it by the Committee by 439 votes to 164, with 188 abstentions. Canada supported the resolution. Detailed votes can be found in Part B, p. 55.

(e) The Ethiopian aggression against the Somali Democratic Republic

The Committee considered two draft resolutions, one presented by the Somali Group and the other by the Federal Republic of Germany. After discussion, the Committee decided to retain as the basic text the draft resolution submitted by the national Group of the Federal Republic of Germany. After approving an amendment presented orally by the Somali delegation, the Committee adopted the draft resolution (see Appendix XXV, Part B, p. 56) by 34 votes to 12, with 7 abstentions. Canada supported this draft resolution.

At its meeting of September 22, the Conference voted separately on the preamble and paragraph 1 of the draft. It adopted the preamble and paragraph 1 of the draft by 333 votes to 206, with 131 abstentions. Canada supported the text of the preamble and paragraph 1.

The full text of the draft resolution was finally adopted by 365 votes to 170, with 170 abstentions. The Canadian delegation supported the resolution as did a substantial majority of the Western Countries and several Arab and non-aligned countries. See detailed votes Part B, pp. 57-58.

2. Committee on Parliamentary, Juridical and Human Rights Questions

This Committee met on September 21. It had to consider the draft resolution (see Appendix H.1, Part A, p. 60) prepared at the Spring Session and amendments presented by various national groups, including that of the Canadian Group (see Appendix H.2, Part A, p. 64). After studying the amendments and sub-amendments, the Committee unanimously adopted a draft resolution (see Appendix XXVIII, Part B, p. 59) which it presented to the Conference on September 22. The Conference adopted without a vote the draft resolution as presented by the Committee.

Mr. Mackasey and Mr. Laniel played a prominent role in the work in Committee. A Canadian amendment regarding the work of the parliamentarians at the United Nations was adopted unanimously. In fact this was the only amendment adopted unanimously by the Committee.

3. Economic and Social Committee

The Committee met on September 20 to consider the draft resolution (see Appendix J.1, Part A, p. 73) on world hunger. The Committee also had to review 15 amendments to this draft presented by various national groups including Canada (see Appendix J.2, Part A, p. 79). After consideration and after adopting a number of amendments, the Committee unanimously adopted the draft resolution as amended (see Appendix XXIX, Part B, p. 62). At its sitting of September 22, the Conference adopted without a vote the draft resolution as presented by the Committee.

Mr. Friesen and Senator Asselin played a very significant role in the work of the Committee by presenting arguments which were realistic as well as humanitarian in nature. It will be recalled that Mr. Friesen had participated actively in the work of the Committee which met in Spring 1982 during which the original draft resolution had been developed. Mr. Peter Sallery, Canadian attache to the FAO assisted Canadian representatives in this Committee.

4. Committee on Education, Science, Culture and Environment

In addition to studying the draft resolution (see Appendix I.1, Part A, p. 66) which had been prepared in Lagos, the Committee considered several amendments, including those put forward by Canada (see Appendix I.2, Part A, p. 71). After examination, the Committee adopted by 42 votes to 0 and 1 abstention the draft resolution as amended (see Appendix XXX, Part B, p.69). Canada supported the resolution.

At its final sitting, the Conference adopted without a vote the draft resolution as presented by the Committee.

Senator Rousseau and Mr. Orlikow reviewed very carefully the amendments presented to the Committee and Senator Rousseau played a very important role in its debates. Thus all of the amendments presented by the Canadian Group were incorporated in the final text.

5. Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories and Ethnic Questions

This Committee met on September 20 to review the draft resolution (see Appendix K, Part A, p. 83) prepared at the Lagos meeting in the light of 11 amendments. After consideration, the Committee adopted the draft resolution (see Appendix XXXI, Part B, p. 74) by 35 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions. Canada abstained.

At its meeting of September 22 the Conference had to hold a separate vote on the 25th preamble paragraph and on operative paragraphs 30 and 31 dealing with the Timor question. These paragraphs were adopted by 272 votes to 102, with 278 abstentions. Canada abstained. There was then a vote on operative paragraphs 27, 28 and 29 dealing with Western Sahara. These paragraphs were adopted by 368 votes to 77, with 195 abstentions. Canada abstained. Finally, there was a separate vote on the 26th preamble paragraph and on operative paragraph 32 which dealt with the Falkland Islands. These paragraphs were adopted by 222 votes to 218, with 181 abstentions. Canada voted no.

The vote on the full resolution went as follows: 466 for, 48 against, 72 abstentions. Canada voted 2 yes, 3 no and 7 abstentions. (see detailed votes Part B, pp. 81-84).

Mr. Dawson and Mr. Neil represented the Canadian delegation on this Committee. They both wanted the Committee to prepare a text which would be more balanced and which would not advocate extreme solutions such as the use of arms. In fact, Mr. Dawson alluded to this in his speech at the first plenary sessions. They also attracted the attention of the members on the "Contact Group" on Namibia and condemned all initiatives which tended to make of this resolution a sort of one-way attack against a given group of countries.

III. MEETINGS OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL

The Inter-Parliamentary Council held three sittings in Rome, the first two on September 13 and the last on the morning of September 22. The Canadian representatives at these meetings were Senator Gildas Molgat and Mr. Allan Lawrence.

Among the important decisions taken by the Council were: approval in principle given to a series of proposals for the re-organization of the Union's sessions (see Appendix L, Part A, p. 91), the election of Mr. J. Virolainen (Finland) as President of the Inter-Parliamentary Council for a period of three years, the choice of Helsinki for the 1983 spring meetings and of Seoul for the 70th Conference, a series of resolutions pertaining to the human rights of parliamentarians and, finally, the choice of Budapest for the Vth Inter-Parliamentary Conference on European Co-operation and Security.

It was at the instigation of Mr. Lawrence that the Council finally took a decision regarding concrete ways to improve the Union's sessions. Indeed, in the initial agenda of the Council, this subject was not to be discussed until the very end of the final meeting on September 22. As a result of a forceful speech by Mr. Lawrence, the Council decided to deal with this question at the very beginning of its final session, thus avoiding having it deferred until later for lack of time.

The Canadian speeches on the choice of the host country for the 70th Conference were also decisive. In response to the Groups which opposed the offer by the Republic of Korea, the Canadian representatives argued that no invitation by a Group which was a member in good standing of the Union should be rejected merely on the basis of its ideological orientation.

The same line of argument was used by the Canadian representatives when it was time to accept the Hungarian invitation to hold the Vth Conference on European Co-operation and Security in Budapest. A summary of the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Council will be found in Part B, p. 8).

IV. MEETING OF THE GROUPS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: Vth INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN CO-OPERATION AND SECURITY

On September 16, 1982 the Groups from the European countries, Canada and the U.S.A. met to discuss the convocation of the Vth Inter-Parliamentary Conference on European Co-operation and Security and make appropriate recommendations to the Inter-Parliamentary Council with a view to their inclusion in the 1983 Programme and Budget. Mr. Molgat and Mr. Lawrence participated in this meeting.

It was unanimously recommended that such a Conference be convened in May 1983 in Budapest, Hungary at the invitation of the Hungarian Group, provided that the political situation in the member countries permits the holding of the Conference and that participation in the Conference be limited to the member countries which signed the final Act of Helsinki.

It should be recalled that these activities will be financed, as was the case for the four previously held Conferences on European Co-operation and Security, by a separate special budget to which only the national Groups of the European countries, Canada and the U.S.A. will contribute. The share of the Canadian Group will be 4,091 Swiss francs.

V. SESSIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Among the major decisions taken by the Committee at its two Rome sessions, let us mention the choice of substantive items included in the agenda of the Study Committees for 1983.

It is to be noted that one of the suggestions of the Canadian Group on subjects for discussion next year served as the case for a substantive item which will be considered by the Study Committees in 1983. That was the proposal by Senator Bosa entitled "Ways in which to strengthen the UN so that this world institution may play an effective role in resolving present and future world problems." The substantive item finally accepted (see Part B, p. 24) will be considered by the Committee on Political Questions, International Security and Disarmament and the Committee on Parliamentary, Juridical and Human Rights Questions, and reflected the strong support for the initial Canadian proposal given by the Study Committee and the Executive Committee.

A summary of the work of the Executive Committee will be found in Part B, p. 6).

VI. MEETINGS OF THE DELEGATIONS TO THE 10+

The first meeting of the delegations to the 10+ took place on Saturday, September 11. The 10+ are Western and like-minded countries. As is the custom, this meeting brought together the members of the Inter-Parliamentary Council of the member Groups, including, for Canada, Mr. Molgat and Mr. Lawrence. It was at this first meeting and at a second similar one held on Wednesday, September 21 that the election to the Presidency of the Union Council and the progress of the Conference were discussed.

In addition to these two meetings, there were a whole string of mini-meetings of the 10+ before each of the meetings of the Committees, the object of which was to discuss the positions of the various Groups and see to what extent the members of the 10+ could succeed in adopting a common position. Thus all of the members of the Canadian delegation, except for Mr. Prud'homme, who in his role as Rapporteur for a Committee, was not able to attend, participated at one time or another in these meetings.

VII. AUDIENCE WITH THE POPE

The Sovereign Pontiff, His Holiness Pope John Paul II, received the delegates and the people accompanying them on Saturday, September 18, in Vatican City. All of the members of the Canadian delegation participated in this audience. In his capacity as head of the Canadian delegation, Senator Molgat had the privilege of being introduced to His Holiness. Despite the very large number of participants, several Canadian delegates had the opportunity of shaking his hand and exchanging a few words with him.

In his address, His Holiness outlined the Vatican position on current world problems and the subjects on the Conference agenda. The full text of the Holy Father's address will be found in Appendix M, Part A, page 103).

VIII. THE WORK OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATION

The Canadian delegation was very active throughout the Conference and involved itself totally in all of the activities scheduled in the programme. Prior to its arrival in Rome, the Canadian delegation had the opportunity to prepare during 8 information sessions for the various subjects on the agenda and by actively preparing the work and amendments. During the Conference, there were daily breakfast meetings at which the members reported on the activities of the previous day and established the positions of the Group on the subjects which would be dealt with at that day's sessions.

It was at these daily meetings that the Canadian amendments were finalized. It was also at these meetings that the delegation determined its final position on the supplementary items included in the agenda.

Senator Molgat co-ordinated the work of the delegation in addition to participating in the work of the Council, assuming responsibility for the supplementary items included in the agenda and performing several other duties as head of the Canadian delegation.

In addition to sharing the dossiers, each member of the Canadian delegation had assumed responsibility for establishing personal contacts with a number of delegates from the other Groups, which contributed to a better understanding of the points of view of each and winning acceptance for some of the positions adopted by the Canadian Group.

Apart from the Conference activities some members of the Canadian delegation who are also members of the Canada-Italy Friendship Group took the opportunity to meet with their Italian counterparts to discuss various issues of common interest. This meeting was made possible at the initiative of Senator P. Bosa, Chairman of that Group in Canada and Senator Karl Mitterdorfer, Chairman of the Italian Group.

IX. SOCIAL PROGRAM AND PROGRAM FOR ACCOMPANYING PERSONS

A) SOCIAL PROGRAM

In addition to the audience with the Pope, the Italian Group had scheduled an impressive number of social activities which permitted the delegates to meet various Italian political personalities and discuss among themselves the progress of the Conference.

On the evening of the opening of the Conference, the President of the Republic of Italy, Mr. Sandro Pertini, offered a reception at the Quirinale Palace.

On September 16, the President of the Senate, Mr. Amintore Fanfani, and the President of the House of Deputies, Mrs. Nilde Iotti, offered a joint reception at the Barberini Palace.

On September 17, the President of the Italian Group, Mr. Giulio Andreotti, invited the delegates to a Gala evening at the Opera Theatre. At that time the delegates had the pleasure of attending a performance of "La Sonnambula" by Vincezo Bellini.

On September 20, it was the turn of the President of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Giovanni Spadolini, to receive the delegates at Villa Madama.

Finally, the Mayor of Rome, Mr. Uzo Vetere, offered a reception in honour of the delegates on the Capitol hill on September 21.

The hospitality of the Italian Group extended to organizing an excursion for all participants to the famous Royal Palace of Caserta (near Naples) on Sunday, September 19.

In addition to these official receptions, President Molgat, and, to a lesser extent, the other members of the Canadian delegation, were invited to a whole series of receptions offered by several national Groups at their countries' embassies. As is the custom, the Canadian Group organized a reception on September 15 in collaboration with the Embassy of Canada for the various Groups.

B) PROGRAM FOR ACCOMPANYING PERSONS

To the envy of all delegates, the Italian Group produced an impressive program for all accompanying parties. In fact, they had organized two types of activities: tourist activities, whereby the participants could appreciate the richness of the Italian heritage, and informational activities.

Among the tourist activities, the following should be mentioned: visits to the Castel of Sant'Angelo, the Basilicas of San Giovanni di Latrano and Santa Maria Maggiore, the Vatican museums, the Garibaldi exposition, and the excavations of Ostia Antia. Among the informational activities, there were

visits to the CEIS (Italian centre for young drug addicts), the Central Institute of Book Restoring, visits to the Community for Assistance to the Handicapped in Capodaro and the Primavalle Residential Community for Young Psychotic and Psychopathic Patients.

X. SUPPORT

A) IN OTTAWA

It was in part because of the support of several Public servants that the Canadian Group was able to prepare adequately for the Rome Conference.

Among those who assisted the Canadian delegation in Ottawa, we wish to mention from the Department of External Affairs: Mr. E.J. Bergbusch, African affairs (Anglophone); Mr. P.J.A. Hancock, Policy Planning Secretariat; Mr. A.R. Menzies, Ambassador for Disarmament; Mr. J.F. Tanguay, United Nations Political and Institutional Affairs Division in the Department; and Mr. G. Anderson and Mr. R. Tétu, Western European Division.

The contributions of Mr. P. Laundy, House of Commons, Ms. D. Wetherup, Intergovernmental Affairs Directorate of Environment Canada, Mr. R. Lederman of the same Department and from CIDA Mr. B.W. Ross, Mr. J. Hermens, Food Aid Co-ordination and Evaluation Centre and Mr. E. Gauvreau, Francophone Affairs were particularly appreciated by the Canadian delegation.

B) IN ROME

The Ambassador of Canada, Mr. J.E.G. Hardy, met with the delegation at the hotel on the eve of the Conference in the company of several of his colleagues in order to take stock of the various subjects on the agenda of the meeting and discuss Canado-Italian relations. Mr. Yvon Beaulne our Ambassador to the Holy See attended that meeting.

As previously mentioned, on the evening of September 15 the Ambassador and the Head of the delegation jointly presided over a reception in honour of the participants. Approximately 115 delegates attended this reception, including President Caldera.

Mr. Michael Bell, Counsellor in the Embassy of Canada, and Mr. Peter Sallery, Canadian Attaché to the FAO, played very useful roles in the delegation, particularly in relation to the dossiers on the supplementary items and world hunger.

Mrs. S. Allder, Research Assistant at the Embassy helped the delegation on administrative matters.

ANNEX "A"

69TH INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

SPEECH
OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE ITALIAN GROUP
Mr. GIULIO ANDREOTTI

OPENING CEREMONY
TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 14, 1982
SANTA CECILIA AUDITORIUM
ROME

The senators and deputies of the Italian Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union greeted with enthusiasm the decision, which was taken last year in Cuba, to hold in Rome the 69th Conference and address a warm welcome to all delegates wishing them a fruitful and serene work.

The particularity of our Union consists more and more in "unity in the variety". We arise from different political and social realities, united by alliances or not aligned, we represent Assemblies based on different models and systems; we do not lose the individuality of our Countries, but nevertheless we are united by our common quality as people's representatives, and in our meetings we always manage to bring on and to respond to the desire of peace, justice and progress that we consider the common interest of men of good will, over and above the many differences although justified.

Certainly we do not overestimate our work, in the two annual meetings and in the many bilateral exchanges, but we can assert with firm conscience that, unlike many powers that tend to divide and rend, the Inter-Parliamentary Union works silently to reconcile positions, form mutual communicativity and create the premises in order that the great problems may find, on the appropriate grounds, a less difficult solution.

At times the modest and disappointing results of some initiatives - as has happened lately during the Second Special Session devoted by the United Nations to disarmament - can embitter us, but they do not weaken our confidence in the final result of an order in the world which is different from the present one, in which one part of mankind tends to maintain and increase its wealth, while a larger part fights, not always successfully, in order to survive.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union tries to give its zealous contribution for the achievement of this inspiring aim of human promotion.

Allow me to express here the warm wish that the Rome Conference may represent, in that sense, an important progress.

ANNEX "B"

SPEECH SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT
OF INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL
MR. R. CALDERA

MR. RAFAEL CALDERA, PRESIDENT OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL, said that the Inter-Parliamentary Union was meeting at a time when observers viewed the world situation with intense concern and anxiety.

On the one hand, the violence of war continued and spread in the Middle East, with whose history and destiny mankind was so bound up. A civilized and cultured country, peace-loving and an example of living together in harmony, Lebanon, had been stricken by a bloody confrontation that was not in keeping with it, which it did not deserve and in which the appeals made in its favour by numerous countries, personalities and institutions had largely gone unheeded. The situation in Poland transcended its bounds as an internal matter and set off intense vibrations and a resonant echo in the consciences and hearts of those who held freedom and human rights to be fundamental conditions for the progress of the world towards greater justice and happiness for making. The American continent had seen fierce and venomous violence reach its shores and it was feared that what people should solve on their own, and in accordance with their own sovereignty, would become a scenario of confrontation between foreign Powers.

On the other hand, the world economy was showing signs that unsettled experts. The lending of money was conditioned by interest rates that were so high as to make it practically unbearable for the debtors, sorely in need of capital, to carry out their development programmes. The transfer of technology was restricted to that of a strictly operative nature, while creative and productive technology was jealously guarded by those who had found in it an instrument of power that had replaced that which, up to a short time ago, had been exercised by force over the colonial territories or over the populations of weak countries. Many observers found parallels between what was happening in the diverse economic areas of the world today and what had happened in the Great Depression of 1929 and 1930. It could not be denied that social security had turned out to be an efficacious palliative in the existing situation and that the industrialised countries, were it not for obligatory unemployment insurance, would be reliving episodes such as an idle labour-force selling apples on the streets, or peaceful or violent demonstrations by legions of unemployed, with the attendant political upheavals that in the most civilized areas of the old world contributed to the appearance of totalitarian systems that denied human rights even in their own countries, and led us to the hecatomb of the world war. In that situation overhung by gloomy predictions, the meeting of almost a hundred Parliaments from all over the planet in Rome, the cradle of law, civilization and art, was a shining light and a reaffirmation of faith that peoples could engage in dialogue and that, through free discussion of different themes and positions, solutions could be found so that man could continue his unrelenting march to spiritual and material progress.

Three years ago he had been unanimously elected President of the Inter-Parliamentary Council. During that time he had had the opportunity to exchange opinions with the leaders of diverse countries. He had been able to acquire a thorough knowledge of the problems that surfaced everywhere, many of which bore common characteristics and striking similarities on all continents, in countries governed by totally different régimes and in vastly differing situations as regards their development or industrial economy. Mankind everywhere was disquieted because seemingly insurmountable difficulties stood in the way of his purposes, and between men's will and the goals deemed urgent and necessary to meet the demands of the present and the future. The enemies of liberty took advantage of difficulties to try to undermine faith in democracy, and Parliament was often the victim of the most vicious attacks by being held up as a symbol of inefficiency, when it was a symbol of freedom.

In the midst of the storm, people grew in faith: their faith in the human being and in his conception as a whole. In the midst of contradictions, universal solidarity seemed to grow stronger and the periodic meetings of the representatives of the Union, with dissimilar political systems and different orientations, served to confirm the conviction that thought, word and dialogue were a formidable instrument whose power increased despite vicissitudes, and was recognized by those who tried to discredit it.

Every year a growing number of countries sought affiliation to the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Its existence seemed a miracle, considering that it was approaching its first century of life and was the oldest active international organization, interrupted only by the sombre parentheses of the world conflagrations. The increase in the number of affiliated Parliaments and the large delegations that many of those Parliaments sent to meetings had made it necessary to study the possibilities of modifying the Union's structures and systems to make its activities more fluid and ensure for all participants the possibility of expressing their ideas. It could be safely affirmed that the institution had impressive vitality and that, though helpless insofar as it lacked coercive power to impose its resolutions, it had great moral force, recognised everywhere, and respected wherever citizens of different countries met to analyse problems and to explore and point out ways to solve them.

It was a happy circumstance that the conference was being held in Italy, which, in the midst of its problems, stood for its faith in liberty, for its exaltation of spiritual values and for its tradition that had made it a beacon over the years. Rome was the crossroads, the point of exchange of all ideas and initiatives, the crucible of all ambitions of progress and change that moved the universal conscience.

There were many reasons why representatives had come from the four corners of the earth to Rome. Among them were, no doubt, the opportunity to enjoy the charm, beauty and friendliness of Rome and to be able to admire once more the great treasures that art and history had accumulated. But, above all, it was the meaning of Italy's example in the world of our time.

The Union would discuss problems related to the political, economic and social situation of the world and, in particular, the contributions of Parliaments to the adoption of concrete measures for the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and their implementation, with a view to easing the onerous burden of military expenditure on the economies of the different countries, and promoting employment and the socio-economic development of the Third World. There would also be study of the development of parliamentary institutions with respect to the Constitution and their work in the sphere of international relations. Close consideration would be given to environmental problems, to the 10 years that had elapsed since the United Nations Stockholm conference and to the steps to be taken in national and international legislation. Due attention would be given to hunger in the world, especially with regard to the production and distribution of food, and its consumption in developing countries; to food supplies to low-income countries on the international market at prices they could afford; and to food aid to developing countries until they attained an appropriate degree of self-sufficiency. The conference would devote attention to the elimination of colonialism and the fight against neo-colonialism, with special consideration of the problems posed in some countries; it would devote attention to problems that arose after the Council meeting in the dynamic and contradictory city of Lagos, in one of the most important African countries, Nigeria, the consideration of which was requested by those who had experienced most directly the consequences of confrontations still to be solved.

Over the past three years there had been many occasions when tension and the inevitable confrontation of positions had led to attitudes that had given cause for fear for continued dialogue in the World Parliament. Mr. Caldera said that he had never lost confidence that, however fervent the opposing arguments, however bitter the situations and however deep the wounds between different countries and peoples, in an institution in which the fiercest enemies could always meet and put forward their reasons and points of view, the interest of maintaining that dialogue and re-establishing it at times when it could be considered interrupted would finally prevail. He could not help saying that his delicate functions had been exceedingly beneficial to him, not only because they had increased his knowledge of the world and of peoples of varied cultures but, above all, because they had strengthened his faith in the institution of Parliament.

Mr. Caldera said that he felt deeply moved on taking the floor before the Italian Parliament, constantly riven by sharp contradictions, yet reaffirming time and again its significance, importance and orientation for the life of the Italian people in its incessant struggle to enhance freedom, strengthen laws and find fruitful ways for the welfare of the people. It was an immense honour for any free man from any country in the world to speak before such a forum, in which the eloquence of illustrious leaders had been heard. It was a great honour to be able to hold the deliberations of the institutions that constituted the World Parliament in Rome.

He could not but evoke the names of two eminent leaders whose views about the historic duty they were performing in forging the destiny of a new Italy he was able to hear personally and directly. Mr Caldera said that he was referring, first, to Alcide de Gasperi, the champion of reconstruction in a great country shaken by the tragedy of the second world war. From his lips he had received a message of faith in the future and, after he had brilliantly summarized the problems he was facing, Mr Caldera said that he had been able to gather from his voice, gestures and excellence, his unswerving faith in the destiny he wished for his country. The other name was that of Aldo Moro, a tireless explorer of all the roads that would ensure — with prior respect for and guarantee of essential values — the best chance for the harmonious functioning of that robust ideological pluralism characteristic of the Italian spirit that had special validity at present. It was not just his affinity with a current of modern thought nor personal friendship that prompted him to evoke their memories. He knew that, like them, many more might coincide in their love for Italy, their faith in Italy and in their complete confidence in the Italian people, their intelligence, their fortitude in the face of adversity, their untiring spirit of invention and work and their bonhomie spread to every corner of the plant through millions of sons.

To such leaders, such builders and tireless apostles of freedom and justice, the IPU paid the smallest homage by choosing Rome for the meeting of the Parliaments of every system, every region and every continent. From here, there could but emerge the reaffirmation of some principles that would inspire the new man to the conquest of new horizons. From here, all would take away the lighted votive lamp with the purpose of strengthening the ties of friendship and brotherhood among all men of all races and of all peoples, and reaffirming their hope in a brighter future for mankind.

ANNEX "C"

SPEECH SUMMARY OF MR. L. COTTAFVI
REPRESENTING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr LUIGI COTTAFI, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, said that it was a privilege for him to represent the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the opening of the 1982 series of meetings of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar followed with interest the activities of the Union and had requested him to convey his warm wishes for success in the Union's deliberations and progress towards the attainment of its objectives.

The United Nations and the Inter-Parliamentary Union were guided by many common principles and worked for the achievement of shared goals. Paramount among them were peace, freedom, justice and prosperity. Parliaments constituted the collective expression of the peoples' will, reflected their noblest aspirations and endeavoured to grapple with the problems facing mankind. The United Nations recognised the importance of the contribution of the Union and its moral and practical benefits.

The agenda of the Conference underscored the complementarity of preoccupations and concerns between the United Nations system and the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Prominence would be given to disarmament and its effect on development and to the contribution and role of parliaments to the adoption of concrete measures by the United Nations General Assembly and other international organs. Food matters in developing countries - an issue that a major specialised agency of the United Nations, the FAO, with its headquarters in Rome, was constantly and effectively dealing with, would also be considered as would the state of the world environment, 10 years after the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm.

With respect to the complex and critical situation in the Middle East recent developments in the Middle East underscored the urgency of accelerating and intensifying international undertakings and initiatives aiming at a peaceful solution and a just settlement. Some useful ideas to that effect were to be found in the relevant discussions and decisions of the Union. The resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly provided a detailed framework within which the principles of the United Nations Charter could be applied to what was a persistent source of strife.

Everyone agreed that human suffering in the region should be alleviated and that international assistance and relief in its various forms should be supported and encouraged. Humanitarian activities in the affected areas should be pursued with vigour, dedication and generosity of spirit.

Another problem of concern to the UN Security Council likely to be raised at the Conference was the conflict between Iran and Iraq. The collaboration between the United Nations and the IPU in seeking to promote fundamental freedoms and to combat violations of human rights was well established and continued to grow. Mr. Cottafavi said that all would be pleased to note that as a result of successful interventions

in several countries by parliamentary delegations under the aegis of IPU unlawfully detained deputies had been released. It was impressive to note that in one year the concerted efforts of the membership of IPU had obtained the liberation of 50 out of 96 parliamentarians known to be incarcerated throughout the world.

The United Nations General Assembly was about to be convened for its thirty-seventh session. Its agenda included disarmament and the review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the second special session devoted to disarmament. The second special session had heightened the awareness of the magnitude and importance of the task. In spite of well-known political constraints and lack of consensus, the emphasis that the United Nations placed on the reduction of arms had stimulated further efforts and kept the problem in the forefront of the preoccupations of the international community.

The IPU had deservedly kept under review the question of Namibia. In the United Nations a few weeks ago, the Council for Namibia had held special meetings to commemorate Namibia Day. The event was inspired and sustained by the hope that the role that the United Nations was mandated to play for Namibia would soon enter into force. An agreement appeared to have been reached on the principles of a future constitution for an independent Namibia. Discussions regarding the second phase dealing with the responsibilities and functions of the United Nations and certain operational aspects were currently in progress. The Secretary-General had recently expressed the hope that negotiations would be completed in time for elections to take place under United Nations' supervision and control in early 1983. Any impetus that the IPU could generate in that direction would be of great value.

The reciprocally supportive and enhancing action by the United Nations family of organisations and the IPU had steadily expanded in scope and extended to specific matters of mutual concern. In 1981 and 1982 the IPU had organised conferences, in cooperation with the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, on population problems in Africa, and with UNICEF on programmes and legislation concerning children in Africa. It was also proposed to cooperate with the World Health Organisation in a conference on health and development in Asia.

The Union's debates and conclusions on the subjects before it would be followed with keen attention by the United Nations and would be taken appropriately into account as a helpful element in the struggle of the international community to improve the condition of men and women everywhere, and most of all in the disadvantaged parts of the world.

ANNEX "D"

69th INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

SPEECH
OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC
MR. SANDRO PERTINI

OPENING CEREMONY
TUESDAY SEPTEMBER 14, 1982
SANTA CECILIA AUDITORIUM
ROME

Mr. President of the Inter-Parliamentary Union,
Delegates participating in the 69th Inter-Parliamentary
Conference,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

In the name of the Italian people and my own, I extend a warm welcome to all of you and to your families. I wish to express here a particular appreciation to the Secretary General of the Organization, Mr. Pio Carlo Terenzio, who has devoted so much effort and zeal to his task.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union has, for nearly a century, been pursuing the noble aim of linking all Assemblies of representatives, of facilitating the exchange of experiences and information among Parliaments and of promoting those human contacts which are so important in a world which is becoming increasingly smaller and in which the ancient barriers of racial, language and religious differences have fallen.

Even though contemporary parliaments descend directly from those great events represented by the glorious revolution in England, the American and French revolutions, its roots date back millennia to the experiences of the Greek Polis and the Roman Senate. In fact, the idea of Parliament arises from man's irrepressible need to participate in all decisions concerning his destiny in the moment in which human society is arising and growing and two alternatives appear: on one hand government by one or a few and on the other government by many, that is by democracy. This is how representative democracy was born, the only possible form of a true democratic regime from antiquity to our days. And this has been evident since Homer's time: how could we, in fact, forget the fascinating description which the poet placed in Ulysses's mouth when he speaks of the Cyclop's political government saying they are brutal men "... having no Assemblies..."?

In our times, when far-reaching changes, political, economic and social, were taking place, parliaments were being increasingly confronted with the necessity to reconcile freedom and democratic government on the one hand with speed of decision and efficiency on the other. These conflicting needs were essential if the rule of representative democracy were to survive. The proof that the idea of representation was indestructible was provided by its survival for over two thousand years.

The basic concept which had inspired the formation of the United Nations Organisation was that of a genuine world parliament, in which it would be possible to discuss and to solve the major problems of our planet. The idea of parliament had thus contributed to the setting-up of balances at supranational level.

Another example is given by the Treaties of Rome for the creation of the European Community. In these documents an elective Assembly, the European Parliament, was seen as one of the milestones in the construction of a united Europe.

Regarding this point I must underline the fact that the people of Europe have understood, to a far greater extent than their governments, the necessity to give the European Parliament greater and more influential powers, in order to transform the Economic Community into a political union. These are not times for an "empty chamber", that is to say without effective powers, either at a national or supranational level. Parliaments, whatever the philosophical and economic choices made by the different systems, must have a concrete influence on the process of political decision making in order to exist, because only thus can Parliaments become an effective instrument for a true participation of the people in the "res publica". The representative system becomes only thus an efficient instrument of democracy.

Mr. President, Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen,

These last years have happily marked the return to democracy in many countries. Many Parliaments have opened once again their doors to the representatives of the people: some of them very young, chosen in free elections, in which the plurality of parties has allowed every conscience a voice.

But we can not deny that the overall picture of the international situation is sombre. During this Rome meeting of the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, serious and menacing events are clouding the international horizon.

We cannot forget that worrying tensions have built up, lacerating and bloody conflicts have burst out and continue in many parts of the world with great danger of spreading and involving other peoples. Among the various conflicts that in this moment are causing bloodshed in nearly every continent, there is not one that escapes the logic of oppression of the weaker by the stronger, whatever the ideological pretext which attempts to justify it.

In many countries human and civil rights are still suppressed and often in a merciless manner.

Free parliaments have the duty of concretely expressing their solidarity with the persecuted.

We cannot refrain from launching our firm protest against the tragedy happening in the Middle East.

Rage has broken out, an indiscriminating rage which has decimated innocent creatures: nothing is spared in its bloody, destructive path.

We expressed our solidarity with the Hebrew peoples when they were cruelly persecuted by the Nazis. One of my brothers shared persecution and a cruel death with the Jews in the Flossenbourg concentration camp. Why stoop to this aggression censured also by a great part of the Israelian peoples?

Nahum Goldman, one of the founders of Israel, has expressed his condemnation for the Israeli aggression with harsh words. The Palestinians are now compelled to the same tragic exodus which, for centuries, has been the destiny of the people of Israel. They too, as the Hebrews of

old, have had to abandon their fatherland and wander through the world. Our human solidarity goes with them.

Israel, after the bitter exodus and the cruel persecutions, was given a fatherland and a country: a fatherland and a country must be given also to the Palestinians.

Our wish is sustained by the results of the Fez Conference.

President Reagan's latest proposal must be taken into serious consideration.

It could be the premise for a solution to the question of the peace in the Middle East.

And may peace return to that tormented region.

You, members of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, must let your voices be heard in this matter because any silence would mean tacit complicity. Free Parliaments have great responsibility in this situation in their role of guidance and control of Governments, in the exercise of their powers regarding the use of national resources.

Parliaments, if they are truly the mirror of each country, must reflect the supreme, unquenchable aspiration to peace of their people, the rejection of war as a mean of settling conflicts.

Let us not use weapons, but reason, otherwise we shall fall from civilization and return to barbarism. I hope this will be the message of this important Rome Conference.

As an old fighter for liberty and social justice, I was deeply moved on entering the parliamentary Assemblies of Greece, Spain and Portugal, nations which have contributed so much to the civilization of this old Europe.

Greece is already part of the European Community, and I want to reiterate here the wish that Spain and Portugal may also, in the near future, bring their contribution to the efforts for political unity of our continent. I had a similar emotion when addressing the Japanese Parliament, where I sensed the many common fears and ambitions that unite men of every continent. Thus I feel deeply for the people who are still fighting for representative institutions in many parts of the world, for they are aware of the fact that, with freedom and democracy, they will finally achieve social justice and the respect of man's rights.

I am deeply optimistic about the outcome of this struggle, because I consider that mankind will not be checked in its progress towards freedom. And by freedom I intend all those political and social liberties on which the dignity of man is based and which make life worth living.

Mr. President, Delegates,

For the eight years I have had the honour of presiding over the Chamber of Deputies, I have not wasted a chance for the Italian Group, to cooperate in the life of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, valuable forum of discussion and important centre for achieving the common ideal of peace. This is why I was very satisfied when informed, immediately after the Cuba Conference, of the decision of your Assembly to accept the invitation made, on behalf of our delegation, by Mr. Andreotti, President of the Italian Group, to hold the 69th Conference in Rome, after the one hosted by our city in 1972.

I wish to recall here, as a proof of the fruitfulness of your action, the successful Inter-Parliamentary Conference, held in 1974, on the fight against pollution in the Mediterranean, organized by the Italian Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and sponsored in fact by the Inter-Parliamentary Union. This Conference proposed that vital collaboration between science and politics that later initiated concrete action towards saving the Mediterranean from pollution and in 1980 led to the Treaty of Athens signed by all Mediterranean countries.

These themes, together with the fundamental ones regarding the fight for peace and against hunger in the world, are the great problems that our Parliaments, on the threshold of the 21 century, have to tackle with information, lucidity, firmness and realism.

Certainly the problems of peace and the fight against hunger in the world have to be faced. Peace must be defended in every corner of the world, because a spark could start a vast blaze: the third world war, in which nuclear arms would dominate. It would be the end of humanity.

How can we not realize that this tragedy menaces all the people of the globe, and how can we not feel the duty of controlling and influencing those on whom rests the destiny of people, so that humanity will not know the tragedy of the nuclear holocaust?

How can we remain indifferent to death from starvation of millions of human creatures?

The death of these innocents weighs like an indictment on the consciences of every man of state, and therefore also on mine.

We must and we can intervene fruitfully to save so many innocent creatures who, while I speak, are dying of malnutrition.

How can we not feel that this horrendous tragedy that each day occurs in the world, affects us all?

To remain indifferent means to be deaf to all human feeling and also means becoming morally associated with this carnage by malnutrition.

Let us stop this mad race towards rearmement which brings with it the end of humanity. Let us give life to the generous race against hunger if we want humanity to reach the luminous peak of that solidarity which unites in brotherhood all the creatures of the earth, linked together to-day by the same destiny: or we walk together on the path of progress and mutual aid, or we die together in the nuclear abyss.

During my recent journey in Japan I went to meditate in Hiroshima, the town which saw the first nuclear holocaust. I felt a profound anguish: I thought with horror of the horrible death of thousands of innocent creatures; I thought that all of humanity would see the same atrocious end if a new world war should explode.

Sometimes I have the impression that those on whom rests the destiny of people are calmly discussing on the crater of a volcano that, in its innermost recesses, prepares a nuclear eruption that would signify the end of humanity.

All heads of state should make a pilgrimage to Hiroshima: their souls would be moved by deep horror and a harsh warning.

In Hiroshima I heard in my torment - as I can hear it now - the passionate cry of a great poet of my country:

"... and I go crying: peace, peace, peace!".

And may there be peace for ever for all humanity.

10/08/82

jmb

69th INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

SUMMARY OF THE SPEECH
OF THE MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ITALY
MR. EMILIO COLOMBO

SESSION
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1982
DEPUTIES' ROOM
ROME

The President called on MR. E. COLOMBO, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

MR. E. COLOMBO, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, congratulated the Conference and wished it every success on behalf of the Italian people. Italy was a country which sincerely believed in peace and worked unceasingly in its favour. The latter was now threatened, however, as shown by the terrible attack carried out the day before on President Gemayel, a further blood-stained page in the history of Lebanon, in spite of which it was to be hoped that that disturbed country would recover peace, the foundation of its independence.

The world was now going through an international crisis, in which solidarity between men and nations was considerably weakened. The present period was not an era of peace, since peace could not rest on a balance of weapons. It meant above all the end of poverty, respect for peoples' rights and a desire for justice. Thus the balance in different parts of the world appeared fragile and uncertain. There was general mistrust, with constant regional wars or tensions, arising either from frontier problems or a desire to conquer or reconquer essential freedoms. Such conflicts were often fanned by the wind of East-West confrontation.

Italy was eager to progress along the path of peace, whilst respecting Atlantic and European solidarity. It had perhaps been the most stable country since the last war, making an effort to maintain the fundamental choices which had been made and which met with the approval of most of the political forces of the country. Thus the decision to tighten the bonds between European countries, by overcoming nationalistic tendencies, was on the way to being implemented. Europe increasingly appeared as a stable and lasting community, in which a genuine process of economic, social and political integration was taking place, taking into account the specific character of each country. That process should ensure a better standard of living for the peoples concerned, while at the same time consolidating peace in the world, and it had been on the basis of those aims that Italy had taken an active part in preparing the Helsinki Agreements.

Italy had also opted to support the Atlantic Alliance after the war, because it felt that the Alliance furthered peace. It was not a matter of ensuring protection in order to avoid having to play an active international political rôle, but on the contrary of pursuing peaceful aims as a means of furthering general détente.

That was the basis of Italian foreign policy, with regard to both East-West and North-South relations and any possible local conflicts.

Where East-West relations were concerned, the Afghan crisis had given rise to fresh concern, since it had highlighted the unilateral interpretation of détente practised in the East and the strengthening of Warsaw Pact forces. The Polish crisis had prevented the Helsinki Agreements from leading to dynamic and open relations between states. Such events were diametrically opposed to the wishes of those who sought peace and the Italian people had been particularly moved by the Polish crisis. The resumption in Poland of a dialogue which had been brutally interrupted clearly constituted one condition, amongst others, for a speedy renewal of more stable relations between East and West. In more general terms, what was needed was communication between states founded on equality and not on force.

With regard to disarmament, Italy was trying to further negotiations on missiles and on strategic nuclear forces. It was only by means of such negotiations that it would be possible to achieve a solution which was eagerly awaited by public opinion, as shown by the demonstrations and reactions occurring every day. Italy was taking an active part in the Vienna and Geneva meetings, in the belief that the disarmament process required a new approach, which could not, however, be dissociated from the East-West ideological context.

The progress of work in Madrid had been strongly hampered by events in Afghanistan and Poland. Mr. Colombo said that he was absolutely convinced, however, that further efforts should be made to give up the use of force and threats, to establish a dialogue between peoples and to promote the exchange of ideas and information. It was important to prevent the disappearance of an essential forum of communication and détente and the efforts made so far should not be reduced to nothing as a result of the tensions which had arisen in the last two years.

The Middle East remained one of the most sensitive areas of the world and it was sincerely to be hoped that the conflicts would end and that the Mediterranean would remain or become once again an area of peace. To this end, concrete measures were needed and it was worth recalling the proposals put forward in Venice in June 1980 by the European Community. The integrity and sovereignty of Israel had to be defended, like those of other states, of Lebanon in particular. Nevertheless, no lasting peace could be established unless the inalienable right of the Palestinians to exist and to have a country of their own was also respected. In recent years, Italy had taken every possible opportunity to further the cause of peace, by approving the Treaty between Israel and Egypt, contributing to the multinational force to ensure the evacuation of the Palestinians at the request of the Beirut government, and supporting the latest United States peace plan.

With the war in Lebanon, world opinion had come to understand that the Palestinian problem could not remain unsolved and that negotiations had to be extended to all interested parties. In that respect, the result of the recent Fez summit was most satisfactory and showed that peace had to be based on mutual recognition by Israel and the Arab states. There was also a need to achieve simultaneous, mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO. Other conflicts had appeared, for which in Italy's opinion a peaceful solution should still be found, particularly in the case of that between Iran and Iraq. The Falklands (Malvinas) crisis had been a matter of grave concern for the Italian government, which had been keen to reassert that unilateral acts of force could never be justified and that the only viable solution was negotiation. That crisis had created a rift between Europe and Latin America and it had to be overcome if friendly relations between those two parts of the world were to be re-established.

With regard to North-South relations, an effort had to be made to help ensure respect for human rights and justice through real and active solidarity. The statistics conveyed a clear message in that respect and showed a serious imbalance in the distribution of wealth between developed and developing countries, an imbalance which rendered any peace precarious. At the same time, the process of decolonisation had to be completed. For this purpose, Italy was supporting the efforts concerning Namibia and hoped that an African conference on security and co-operation would be held to plan a clear operational line of action. In the eighties, there had been a growing awareness of the problems of development, which should now be fostered so that such problems could be resolved whilst ensuring respect for the identity and rights of each country.

The economic crisis provided no justification for the inertia of the developed countries. Quite on the contrary, practical measures had to be taken, particularly in the fields of energy and the transfer of technology, to arrive at a consensual and a better distribution of wealth. There was no doubt that the struggle against hunger remained a priority in many parts of the world, but it could no longer be dissociated from the development programmes required by the countries concerned.

The rejection of war and respect for the sovereignty of other states were enshrined in the Italian Constitution. It was those principles which led Italy to work constantly for peace and to promote the activities of international organisations for justice and liberty. Italy believed in active solidarity. It believed in dialogue and hope, even in the period of unrest which the world was now going through.

ANNEX "F"

SPEECH SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
MR. Y. ARAFAT

THE PRESIDENT invited MR. Y. ARAFAT to speak in the name of the Palestine National Council.

MR. Y. ARAFAT (Palestine National Council) greeted the Conference in the name of the Palestinian people inside and outside its occupied territories and thanked it on behalf of the Executive Committee of the PLO for its generous invitation, which provided an important opportunity to emphasise the fact that Palestinians were fighting not only to fulfill their national duty but also to help build a world ruled by justice and freedom.

He took the occasion to greet the Italian people, with which the Palestinians shared a common Mediterranean civilisation.

The Palestinian problem and the Middle East crisis had not originated in a conflict between Arabs and Jews. The Palestinian people had lived for thousands of years as one people on a land which had been sanctified by history, without any distinction between Moslems, Christians and Jews, who had thus been brethren and citizens. The PLO considered itself to be the heir to those values.

The Zionist movement, in its handling of the Jewish question, which had arisen outside Palestine, had tried to solve the problem by establishing a pure Jewish state, with no consideration whatsoever for Palestinian Christians and Moslems.

That had led to war and slaughter and claims that Palestine was a land without a people to be given to a people without a land had met with legitimate resistance. There had then been a succession of conflicts, the last of which had been the war of genocide to which both the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples had been subjected for eighty-eight days. During that time, the most sophisticated American weapons had been used.

It was a great honour to address the Union to explain the cause of the Palestinian people in all its dimensions, since the achievement of a common viewpoint on an international problem contributed substantially to the prevention of a total war and to the opening of new horizons for peace. The banner of peace had been raised over vast regions of the globe thanks to the good will of the international community.

The policy of peace which sought to alleviate world tension and the use of political means had proved that the international community could continue to isolate areas of tension caused by racism and colonialism and to bring the forces of aggression back to their senses.

The Middle East represented an area of tension threatening world peace and security. The origins of such tension lay in the aggressive policies, which had managed for some time to portray Israel as an oasis of peace in the midst of peoples bent only on war. The massacre of women and children by Israel had revealed the ugly nature of its aggression.

Israeli leaders had declared that their objective was to change the political map of the Middle East and it had been for this purpose that Israel had sent out its armed forces. That concentration of armed power against the joint Lebanese-Palestinian forces was aimed at the annihilation of the Palestinian people and the liquidation of the PLO. It was enough to refer to the reports of the international committees to discover the crimes committed against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. Mr. Arafat called for an international parliamentary committee to be set up to investigate the war crimes perpetrated by Israel in the Lebanon.

In that war of aggression, the Israeli army had used the most modern American weapons, including those that had been prohibited internationally, with the support of the United States. Mr. Arafat expressed the gratitude and respect of the Palestinian people for the civilian and military forces in Israel which had denounced the invasion and had refused to have any part of it.

The Palestinians had finally left Beirut in order to preserve the civilian population of the city, which had become a target for the Israeli army and a means of blackmail.

It was now known that the Israeli army was preparing for a long stay in the Lebanon and was threatening to break up the country by making the South into a protectorate. The Palestinian, Lebanese and Arab generations who had endured the pains of war were more than ever convinced that their cause was just and more than ever keen to recover their rights. Those rights were constantly being infringed, as shown by the confiscation of lands and water resources, the development of new settlements, the collective arrests, the dissolution of elected municipal councils, the closure of schools, etc. Israeli leaders seemed to persist with their policy of annexing Palestinian Arab lands, despite all international decisions to the contrary, thus hindering any efforts to achieve peace. The Palestinians had taken up arms in order to set up a democratic Palestinian state. That was a humanitarian aim, which the leaders of Israel had rejected, because they wanted a pure Jewish state and denied the Palestinian people's right to life and dignity.

After the 1973 October war, the PLO had called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on any land from which the Israelis withdrew, a proposal which the latter had rejected. Israel was the only state set up by a United Nations resolution and also the only state which ignored international legitimacy, and even defied it by refusing to put an end to colonisation and to withdraw from the occupied territories.

Eight years ago, Mr. Arafat had brought before the UN Assembly a proposal for peace, which had foundered on Israeli intransigence. He now came before the Inter-Parliamentary Union with a plan adopted by the Fez summit for a number of immediate measures to achieve a political solution in the Middle East. That new plan now appeared to be the only effective framework for the solution of the problems which still divided the world. It proposed setting up a committee of seven Arab states for the purpose of contracting the permanent members of the Security Council and keeping informed of their positions and that of the United States President, who had also put forward a peace plan for the Middle East.

The international community now had a historic responsibility, which was to ensure respect for the principles of justice and the dignity of peoples, which were constantly being defied by Israel's leaders, who were in danger of leading the modern world back to the law of the jungle. The Conference, embodying the conscience of the peoples who were represented, should proclaim the right of Palestinians to live free in their homeland in order to put an end to the new genocide which was imposed on them.

In conclusion, Mr. Arafat expressed his thanks to all those who had supported and continued to support the just cause of the Palestinian people. In particular, he thanked President Pertini for the support he had expressed in his speech at the Inaugural Ceremony.

ANNEX "G. 1"

INITIAL DRAFT RESOLUTION
ON DISARMAMENT

Item 3 of the agenda

The contribution of Parliaments to the adoption of concrete measures by the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament and their implementation, in particular, the reduction of military budgets and its effects on world economy and employment and on the economic and social development of the Third World

DRAFT RESOLUTION

presented, on behalf of the Committee on Political Questions,
International Security and Disarmament,
by Mr. M. Prud'homme (Canada)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Considering that peace is the common property of mankind and that today it is also a necessary condition for the continued existence of mankind,

Expressing its satisfaction at the convening of the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, which is highly significant in view of the worsened international situation,

Recalling that the 68th Inter-Parliamentary Conference (Havana, 1981) expressed the conviction that the new Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament would do much to promote the cessation of the arms race and the initiation of the disarmament process,

Deeply concerned at the serious aggravation of the international situation hindering the development of normal relations and the strengthening of mutual confidence and co-operation among nations,

Noting that new hotbeds of crisis and conflict between States have arisen in addition to the existing ones, and that this development has had an adverse effect on progress in the field of disarmament and arms control,

Mindful of the fact that in present-day conditions a war, especially a nuclear war, threatens dire consequences for the survival of mankind and civilization,

Noting the role and the heavy responsibilities of Parliaments and parliamentarians regarding the destinies of their peoples and the urgent need to concert the efforts of peoples, Parliaments and Governments and all realistic forces so as to prevent the danger of a nuclear disaster, put an end to the policy of armaments and ensure the building of a world of peace, without weapons or wars,

Noting with anxiety the constant growth of military expenditures which place a heavy burden on the economies of all countries and jeopardize their socio-economic development,

Concerned at the quantitative and qualitative development of weapons systems which constitute grave threats to world peace and security, and *reaffirming* that any significant progress in disarmament negotiations presupposes the restoration of mutual confidence,

Realizing that the danger of nuclear war is growing as existing nuclear arsenals are enhanced qualitatively and quantitatively,

Recognizing that one of the difficulties in halting the arms race is the extremely slow pace of disarmament negotiations as compared with the rapid momentum of the qualitative improvement in weaponry,

Noting that security has deteriorated in many regions of the world and particularly in Europe, where the introduction of new systems of nuclear and conventional weapons is accelerating the arms race,

Regretting that the negotiations between the United States of America and the USSR on the questions of arms limitation and disarmament - especially nuclear disarmament - are proceeding too slowly and that some important agreements in this field have not yet been ratified,

Regarding good political will, preparedness to develop wide international co-operation in disarmament negotiations with the participation of all countries on an equal footing and readiness to subscribe to concrete disarmament obligations as fundamental prerequisites for the success of disarmament negotiations,

Considering that the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament can and must become an important stage on the road towards enduring peace and security through the preservation and further development of all the positive results achieved in restricting the arms race and promoting disarmament in the 1970s, as well as through carrying out practical measures in this area in the future,

Aware of the immediate need to take practical steps for ending the arms race and promoting disarmament, for example in the following fields:

- A complete ban on nuclear weapons tests;
- Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- The convening of a World Disarmament Conference;
- Security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States;
- Cuts in military budgets;
- Confidence-building measures;
- A comprehensive programme on disarmament,

Affirming that full commitment and strict adherence by all States to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other State and to respect the right of peoples to self-determination, are indispensable pre-conditions for promoting durable peace and genuine disarmament,

Aware of the extreme usefulness of all international negotiations, current or future, in increasing the security of States and possibly making available for the economic and social development of mankind the substantial savings effected by limiting and reducing the weapons systems covered by the aforesaid negotiations,

Convinced of the close link between disarmament and development, and of the great benefits to be derived from rechanneling the funds now being used in the arms race and those released by effective disarmament measures to alleviation of the economic and social problems at present faced by peoples, particularly in the developing countries,

Considering that the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament should critically analyze the measures undertaken in accordance with the Programme of Action on Disarmament adopted at the First Special Session, create a more favourable political climate for resumption of the disarmament negotiations and adopt the comprehensive programme on disarmament, whose implementation would gradually lead to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict international control,

Stressing that parliamentarians believe that détente, aimed at the reduction and final elimination of tensions between States and peoples, can help to shape a more secure, stable and just future for mankind,

A

1. *Calls upon* the Parliaments and Governments of all countries in the world:
 - (a) To endeavour to ensure the success of the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament so that the supreme world forum on disarmament may make a decisive contribution to ending the disturbing situation in the field of disarmament and determine concrete measures for actual disarmament directed towards strengthening international peace and security;
 - (b) To take steps to implement actions and measures adopted by the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament;
 - (c) To contribute to halting the deterioration of the international situation, to stimulate developments in the world towards universal détente and to support all efforts directed towards the solution of crises, opposing all forms of aggression, intervention, interference in the internal affairs of independent States and pressures on such States;
 - (d) To seek ways and means of channelling the enormous human, natural, scientific and technological resources now being wasted on the arms race towards improving the lot of mankind through economic and social development and the eradication of hunger, disease and other acute economic and social problems;
2. *Urges* participants in the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament to support the following specific measures:
 - (a) A comprehensive programme on disarmament;
 - (b) An early and meaningful resumption of the strategic arms limitation and reduction talks, leading to limitations and reductions as soon as possible;
 - (c) A clear endorsement of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty;
 - (d) An agreement, within the strategic arms limitation context, to stop the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles;
 - (e) A successful conclusion to the US-Soviet talks in Geneva on the limitation and reduction of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe;
 - (f) Agreements in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a ban on radiological weapons;

- (g) The adherence of all States to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;
- (h) A treaty prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for their destruction;
- (i) A further call exhorting all States which have not yet done so to adhere to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction;
- (j) New agreements which would reinforce or complement the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in the form of a treaty on the prohibition of development, testing and stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space;
- (k) Further strengthening the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the decisions of the 36th session of the UN General Assembly;
- (l) Security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States;
- (m) Other limited arms control agreements such as the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques and the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects;
- (n) Agreements leading towards a successful conclusion to the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe;

B

3. Urges all Parliaments and Governments:

- (a) To act firmly for the cessation of the arms race and for the development of genuine disarmament measures, particularly nuclear disarmament, by ensuring a military balance which does not endanger the security and peace of any country and which can be achieved not through an increase in armaments but through their gradual reduction;

- (b) To strengthen parliamentary contacts at the regional and sub-regional levels with the aim of increasing confidence and strengthening security, to support the action by the Inter-Parliamentary Union for the halting of the arms race and to work for the implementation of the resolutions of the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament;
4. *Calls upon* the Parliaments and Governments of the European countries, Canada and the United States of America to make every effort to ensure that the Madrid Meeting of the CSCE, in the further course of its work, agrees on a precise mandate for a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. This Conference should be held within the framework of the CSCE process and should deal, in its first phase, with confidence- and security-building measures which should be militarily significant, politically binding and provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content;
5. *Calls upon* Parliaments and National Inter-Parliamentary Groups to devote even greater attention to the problem of disarmament;
6. *Urges* all Parliaments and Governments to give absolute priority to nuclear disarmament.

ANNEXE "G. 2"

CANADIAN AMENDMENTS

Item 3 of the agenda

THE CONTRIBUTION OF PARLIAMENTS TO THE ADOPTION OF CONCRETE MEASURES
BY THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED
TO DISARMAMENT AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION, IN PARTICULAR, THE
REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS AND ITS EFFECTS ON WORLD
ECONOMY AND EMPLOYMENT AND ON THE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD

Amendments presented by the Canadian delegation

Preamble

1. Reverse the order of the existing second and third preambular paragraphs and reword them as follows:

"Recalling that the 68th Inter-Parliamentary Conference (Havana, 1981) expressed the conviction that a new Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament could do much to promote the cessation of the arms race and initiate the disarmament process,

"Expressing satisfaction at the intense interest of the world community in the Second Special Session on Disarmament and especially at the active participation of many Heads of Government, but disappointed with the subsequent failure of all Governments to achieve meaningful results in this session,".

2. Replace the fifteenth preambular paragraph by the following:

"Considering that the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament should have been an important stage on the road towards enduring peace and security through the preservation and further development of all the positive results achieved in restricting the arms race and promoting disarmament in the 1970s, and that the Second Special Session did not achieve the expected results in this field,".

3. Replace the twentieth preambular paragraph by the following:

"Considering that the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament did not adopt a comprehensive programme on disarmament, whose implementation would gradually lead to the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict international control,".

Operative part - section A

4. In operative paragraph 1, delete sub-paragraph (a) and reletter the subsequent three sub-paragraphs as (a), (b) and (c). Reword the new 1(a) as follows:

"To take steps to implement the measures adopted by the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament;"

5. In operative paragraph 2, replace the introductory portion by the following:

"Urges all participants to support the following specific measures:"

6. Replace paragraph 2(b) by the following:

"(b) Vigorous pursuit of the strategic arms limitation and reduction talks, leading to limitations and reductions as soon as possible;"

7. Divide paragraph 2(f) into two separate sub-paragraphs, as follows:

"(f) Agreement in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums on a comprehensive nuclear test ban;"

"(g) A multilateral treaty banning radiological weapons;"

8. Reletter all the remaining sub-paragraphs in paragraph 2, from (h) to (o) instead of (g) to (n); and replace the last three words in the new sub-paragraph (k) by the following: "... for use in outer space;"

Operative part - section B

9. In paragraph 3(b), delete all the words after the words "for the halting of the arms race."

ANNEX "H. 1"

INITIAL DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS
WITH RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION
AND THEIR WORK IN THE SPHERE
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Item 4 of the agenda

*The development of parliamentary institutions with respect
for the Constitution and their work in the sphere
of international relations*

DRAFT RESOLUTION

presented, on behalf of the Committee on Parliamentary,
Juridical and Human Rights Questions,
by Mr. O. Obi (Nigeria)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Recalling that parliamentary institutions represent a fundamental element of the balance of powers in democratic systems, that they play a significant part in guaranteeing respect for the Constitution and human rights, and that they assume an important role in the field of international relations,

Recalling the Charter of the United Nations, particularly Chapters I and II, and the commitment of member States thereto,

Considering that the development of parliamentary institutions in the spirit of respect for the Constitution and the codification of the peaceful foundations of foreign policy of States in national legislation contribute to the achievement of peaceful co-operation among States,

Stressing that since they are chosen by the people through free and fair elections held at regular intervals, parliamentarians represent, on the one hand, a very strong link between Parliaments of different countries as illustrated by the close contacts within the Inter-Parliamentary Union and constitute, on the other hand, the irreplaceable intermediaries in the permanent maintenance of the indispensable dialogue between the organs of power and the citizens,

Convinced of the need to improve and make better use of the forms and methods of action of Parliaments for influencing the foreign policy of Governments in order that it may serve the cause of peace, international security and friendship and co-operation among peoples,

1. *Invites* Parliaments, with due regard to the Constitutions and traditions of their countries, to seek appropriate methods and forms of action with a view to building up their influence over the foreign policy of their Governments so that the latter may make a greater contribution to strengthening international peace and security, to promoting détente and the disarmament process, and to developing co-operation, friendship and trust among peoples;

2. *Recommends* more particularly the following forms of parliamentary activity which help to direct the Government's foreign policy and foster its monitoring by Parliament:
 - Systematic examination, within Parliament and its specialized bodies, of major foreign policy issues with special reference to international peace and security, to cessation of the arms race and to disarmament;
 - Submission for parliamentary approval of all important international treaties and agreements to which Governments intend that their countries should become party, the harmonization of their domestic legislation with such treaties and agreements and the adoption of provisions enabling national Parliaments to monitor their effective implementation;
 - The various ways in which Parliament is informed about major negotiations conducted by the Government, about its policy in international organizations and about the activity of such organizations;
 - Inclusion in domestic legislation, by means which accord with the practice and procedures of each country, of the principles of relations between States which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and other international legal agreements;
3. *Encourages* all parliamentarians to keep themselves closely informed of their Governments' foreign policy and to endeavour to influence its course, by all the means at their disposal, in a direction favourable to world peace, respect for human rights and achievement of the objectives of the United Nations;
4. *Considers* that the strengthening of inter-parliamentary contacts, at the international level, designed to promote mutual respect and understanding is essential for that purpose;
5. *Calls on* all Parliaments to draft, in their respective countries, legislation guaranteeing political and economic freedom for all mass media to enable, *inter alia*, a free, fair and full exchange of views on relations between States and thus promote mutual understanding among them in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and the Statutes of the Inter-Parliamentary Union;
6. *Encourages* the governing bodies of all countries to foster citizens' participation in political decision-making, free of undue interference by institutionalized pressure groups, by establishing, through democratic means, decentralized representative institutions with real power and adequate financial resources, as well as other possible means in the spirit of the Constitution and traditions of each country;

7. *Calls on the Parliaments of all countries to exercise vigilant, concrete and permanent oversight of governmental action, particularly in the field of international relations, and to provide themselves for that purpose with investigatory, study and forecasting techniques which are reliable and independent of the Executive, particularly through modern means of information and including the use of appropriate parliamentary committees with wide investigatory powers;*
8. *Urges all Parliaments to guarantee the inviolability of parliamentarians' rights, including those who are in the minority, in the exercise of their mandates, particularly in respect of relations between States.*

ANNEX "H. 2 "

CANADIAN AMENDMENTS

Item 4 of the agenda

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS WITH RESPECT FOR
THE CONSTITUTION AND THEIR WORK IN THE SPHERE
OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Amendment presented by the Canadian delegation

1. Replace operative paragraph 6 by the following paragraph:

"6. Encourages the governing bodies of all countries to foster - within the spirit of the Constitution and traditions of each country - citizens' involvement in political decision-making, free of undue interference by institutionalized pressure groups, by encouraging the establishment of representative institutions with real influence on the political process;"

2. Add an operative paragraph 9, as follows:

"9. Calls on Parliaments and the Inter-Parliamentary Union to search for appropriate means of strengthening the participation of parliamentarians in the work of the United Nations;"

ANNEX "I.1"

INITIAL DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE
STATE OF THE WORLD ENVIRONMENT
10 YEARS AFTER THE UN CONFERENCE
ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT

Item 5 of the agenda

The state of the world environment ten years after the UN Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm. Steps to be taken, including in the field of national and international legislation

DRAFT RESOLUTION

presented, on behalf of the Committee on Education,
Science, Culture and Environment,
by Mr. R. McClory (United States of America)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Reaffirming responsibility of the international community for the preservation and improvement of the environment, and *considering* that, despite growing economic difficulties in all parts of the world, environmental protection should not be neglected,

Noting the early and continuing concern expressed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in environmental protection and the conservation of resources,

Mindful of the role of the Inter-Parliamentary Union as an observer at the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm,

Bearing in mind the fundamental principles and the recommendations adopted by the Stockholm Conference in June 1972,

Noting that scientific and technological progress has, since that Conference, made it possible to improve the preservation of the human environment, particularly through better management of natural resources and better monitoring of the effects of pollutants on fauna, flora, soils, the atmosphere and waters,

Aware nevertheless of the many unresolved problems, one of them being the danger of the transfer of environmentally hazardous industries and the export of pollutants from industrialized countries to developing countries,

Commending the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as a mechanism for dealing with environmental problems at the global level and for developing new methods of co-ordination throughout the UN system,

Aware of the successful efforts of UNEP in instigating and co-ordinating international programmes to assess global environmental trends, to conserve the natural heritage of mankind, to abate pollution and to improve the quality of human environment,

Aware also of the difficulties experienced by UNEP in meeting the diverse expectations of all nations and in obtaining the funds necessary to continue its programme,

Commending the co-operation carried out under the Regional Seas Programme of UNEP to preserve the marine environment in seven regions of the world,

Recognizing the seriousness of the transboundary air pollution in several regions of the world,

Recognizing the need for the further development of environmental law, and *endorsing* the Montevideo Conclusions and Recommendations of the Meeting of Senior Government Officials Expert in Environmental Law (28 October - 6 November 1981),

Emphasizing that a vital element for the preservation of the world's environment at the present time is the removal of the threat of war and the ending of the arms race,

1. *Reaffirms* its strong and continuing support of the environmental Principles and Recommendations of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment;
2. *Calls for* closer international co-operation so that the present serious problems of people, resources, environment (including desertification) and development can be better managed in the future;
3. *Calls upon* Governments to develop the capabilities of their countries to predict adequately the environmental consequences of economic activities and technological development, and to include the environmental aspect in all planning of economic activities;
4. *Emphasizes* that, in solving environmental problems, policies that are anticipatory and preventive in character should be promoted, for economic reasons as well;
5. *Calls upon* Governments to encourage the development of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of environmental problems having an international dimension, and particularly to encourage national and international efforts by the interested organizations, enterprises and firms in the development, production and improvement of equipment designed for monitoring, protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment;
6. *Calls on* Parliaments and Governments to take the necessary measures:
 - (a) To organize a broad exchange of the achievements of science and engineering in the field of environmental protection through the holding of international congresses, conferences and other meetings between scientists and political leaders;
 - (b) To intensify the popularization of environmental protection measures through the mass media;

- (c) To promote the development of environmental education through the organization of special instruction courses at all levels, including the elementary level;
7. *Calls on* the National Groups to take action with their Parliaments and Governments in order to promote:
 - (a) The ratification of the existing international treaties and agreements in the field of environment and the adoption of the necessary measures for their implementation;
 - (b) The development and harmonization of national legislation in the field of environment;
 8. *Urges* the industrialized countries to evaluate carefully, in close co-operation with the developing countries, the consequences of development aid and all international support measures, in order to promote environmentally sound development in all sectors of the developing countries;
 9. *Calls upon* the National Groups to support and strengthen the United Nations Environment Programme by urging their competent national authorities to co-operate in its activities and provide essential financial support;
 10. *Urges* Governments to participate actively in the May 1982 Session of a Special Character, to be held by UNEP in Nairobi to assess the state of the world environment and to discuss future needs and directions for UNEP;
 11. *Urges* National Groups to support the numerous efforts which are now underway in UNEP in collaboration with other competent international organizations, *inter alia*: (a) environmental monitoring and data collection programmes and world-wide dissemination of information; (b) action programmes; (c) conventions and related protocols; (d) environmental education and training programmes;
 12. *Calls upon* National Groups to encourage their competent national authorities to promote and expand co-operation in scientific research and environmental management, and *urges* that, where transboundary pollution problems occur, National Groups take every opportunity to promote agreements between nations that would solve these problems;
 13. *Urgently calls* on all Governments and Parliaments to redouble their efforts aimed at maintaining peace and security on earth as the most important condition for preserving the biosphere for present and future generations, pursuing the policy of détente, curbing and halting the arms race and bringing about genuine disarmament and a reduction in defence budgets.

ANNEX "I. 2"

CANADIAN AMENDMENTS

Item 5 of the agenda

THE STATE OF THE WORLD ENVIRONMENT TEN YEARS AFTER THE UN CONFERENCE
ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT AT STOCKHOLM. STEPS TO BE TAKEN,
INCLUDING IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION

Amendments presented by the Canadian delegation

1. Replace the first preambular paragraph by the following text:

"Reaffirming the responsibility of the international community for the preservation and improvement of the environment, and considering that sound management of the environment, as the foundation of sustained economic and social development, requires increased efforts even in time of economic difficulties,".

2. Add an operative paragraph 7 (c) as follows:

"(c) The achievement of the objectives of the World Conservation Strategy;".

3. Replace operative paragraph 10 by the following text:

"10. Urges Governments to act in full accordance with the undertakings contained in the Stockholm Declaration and Plan of Action, reaffirmed by the Nairobi Declaration adopted in May 1982 by the Governing Council at the UNEP Session of a Special Character, and to be guided by the Governing Council's resolution at that Session on the main environmental directions and priorities for the period 1982-1992;".

ANNEXE "J. 1"

INITIAL DRAFT RESOLUTION
ON HUNGER IN THE WORLD

Item 6 of the agenda

*Hunger in the world**Main topics:*

- (a) Food production and food distribution and consumption within the developing countries;
- (b) Food supplies on the international market to the low-income countries at prices they can afford;
- (c) Food aid to developing countries until they reach an appropriate degree of self-sufficiency

DRAFT RESOLUTION

presented, on behalf of the Economic and Social Committee,
by Mr. J. Béranger (France) and Mr. I. Obaro (Nigeria)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Recalling:

- (a) The Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition adopted by the World Food Conference (Rome, November 1974);
- (b) The Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, adopted by the United Nations (New York, May 1974);
- (c) The Declaration of Principles and the Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (Rome, July 1979);
- (d) The International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, adopted at the 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly (New York, December 1980);
- (e) The recommendations adopted by the World Food Council at its seventh meeting at ministerial level (Novi Sad, May 1981);
- (f) The resolutions adopted by the 36th session of the UN General Assembly on the report of the World Food Council, on food and agriculture, on the food and agriculture situation in Africa and on the convening of a World Population Conference (New York, December 1981);

- (g) The Colombo Declaration issued by the International Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development (September 1979) and the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Parliamentary Conference on Population and Development in Africa (Nairobi, July 1981);
- (h) The resolution on population trends and economic and social development adopted by the 61st Inter-Parliamentary Conference (Tokyo, October 1974) and the resolution of the 67th Inter-Parliamentary Conference on the Third United Nations Development Decade (Berlin (GDR), September 1980);
- (i) The Joint Statement by the Chairman of the North-South Summit Meeting in Cancún (October 1981),

Taking into consideration the Report by the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, chaired by Mr. Willy Brandt, of 12 February 1980,

Concerned that hundreds of millions of people in the world are experiencing hunger or suffering from malnutrition,

Aware that the developing countries are most affected by this scourge which is assuming alarming proportions,

Considering that the rational development of a country can only be undertaken if its people are first able to feed themselves,

Expressing keen anxiety at demographic pressures which, in the years to come, cannot but worsen the food deficit which the developing countries are experiencing,

Deploring the squandering on arms production and trading of huge resources which would otherwise be used to combat hunger in the world and ease the burden of the less fortunate peoples,

Recognizing that hunger and malnutrition are aspects of the general problem of under-development and that a reduction in the disparities between the industrial and the developing countries also contributes to alleviating political tension, to strengthening the independence of the developing countries and to maintaining world peace,

1. *Requests* Parliaments and Governments to make the eradication of hunger the prime objective of all national and international development strategies in the framework of the WFC recommendations, and *stresses* that the food problem must be solved first and foremost by the developing countries themselves through an increase in their long-term level of food self-sufficiency;
2. *Believes* that the main purpose of food aid should be to help the developing countries to cope with emergency situations and must not replace or impair their own efforts to reduce their food deficit;

3. *Welcomes* the agreement on replenishing the International Fund for Agriculture and Development reached at the beginning of 1982;
4. *Welcomes* the fact that the target of 500,000 tonnes established for the International Emergency Food Reserve was finally reached in 1981, *invites* the international community to renew the Food Aid Convention, with a target for 1985 of 18 million tonnes of grain or equivalent products, and *appeals* to donor countries to contribute to meeting this target;
5. *Welcomes* the International Monetary Fund's decision in 1981 to create an additional import facility for countries with high food-import requirements coupled with balance-of-payments deficits;
6. *Affirms* that protectionism, *per se*, does not develop viable, efficient and adequate farm enterprises but rather withholds from the masses the benefits from international specialization in such foodstuffs as meat, fruit, vegetables and dairy products;
7. *Calls upon* the industrialized countries and those able to afford it to take positive steps towards the improvement of international markets for food, so as to promote stability of prices through commodity agreements and similar arrangements and better access and terms of trade for the developing countries;
8. *Considers* that adequate markets should be ensured for exports of developing countries in particular, together with fair prices and protection against severe damage caused to developing economies by fluctuating supplies of exported commodities;
9. *Regrets* that the minimum amount of food aid of 10 million tonnes of grain per annum called for by the World Food Conference in 1974 has not yet been achieved;
10. *Calls on* Parliaments and Governments to work for the reduction of military expenditure and the exclusive allocation of the considerable human, financial and material resources thus released to the peaceful economic and social development of peoples, facilitating at the same time the allocation of increased funds for agricultural needs and the eradication of hunger;
11. *Calls upon* the developed and oil-exporting countries to increase their commitment to the United Nations International Fund for Agricultural Development in order to help the developing countries to increase their food production;

12. *Urges* Parliaments and Governments of all countries to intensify their efforts to adopt food grain policies, targets and objectives, to build up food security reserves and to manage them in accordance with the criteria laid down in the FAO Plan of Action on World Food Security;
13. *Calls on* the Parliaments and Governments of the industrialized countries and those able to afford it to demonstrate greater international solidarity so as to help the developing countries in their efforts to conquer hunger;
14. *Calls on* the industrialized countries to make available, within the framework of international co-operation, appropriate technology to the developing countries in order to help them to increase their agricultural production;
15. *Calls on* the developed countries to turn scientific knowledge to more benevolent use, such as ensuring water supply, in particular through the development of artificial rainfall, so that mankind may be less dependent on nature for the production of food, particularly in the developing countries;
16. *Urges* the developed, industrialized countries to adjust their aid policies so as to give the highest priorities to:
 - (a) Projects and programmes which are oriented towards production for local consumption, in a context of increasing equity of land distribution;
 - (b) Provision of accessible credit to food producers, including producer-controlled co-operatives;
 - (c) Programmes and projects which are based on an assured and reasonable market return to local producers for surplus local foods;
 - (d) "Producer-based" research into increasing the production of local food and seed crops;
 - (e) Projects and programmes which both give recognition and support to women in their role as food producers and are aimed at protecting children;
 - (f) Infrastructural development which is directed towards improving local food storage and rural transport;
 - (g) Programmes and projects which provide inputs (water, seed, draught power, etc.) that are appropriate and needed by the small producer;
17. *Recommends* to the developing countries that they increase the efforts already made with a view to modernizing their agriculture so that their production may be compatible with their rates of population growth;

18. *Calls upon* all developing countries to undertake appropriate social reforms which support the food production complex, *inter alia*, through such measures as land settlement, land redistribution and farm systems management;
19. *Calls on* all Governments concerned to ensure that in efforts to increase food production due attention is given to the need for conservation, in particular of soil, water and genetic resources, and to prevent the settlement of marginal areas unsuitable for sustained food production;
20. *Recommends* that the National Groups together with their respective Parliaments and Governments give special attention to the implementation of the resolution on the "Problem of refugees: its juridical and humanitarian aspects", adopted by the 67th Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Berlin (GDR), particularly in order to meet the food needs of refugees around the world and to reduce the difficulties faced by the countries of asylum, particularly in Africa, in supplying food for these refugees,
21. *Urges* Governments concerned to ensure that in their development efforts due care is taken to improve the social and economic position of women with a view to reducing malnutrition amongst women and small children;
22. *Calls on* Parliaments to observe 16 October of each year as World Food Day and each year to convene on that occasion special debates on national and world food and agricultural problems;
23. *Calls upon* Parliaments to study the possibility of proclaiming 1984 as International Food Year and taking steps to promote greater awareness of the seriousness of food problems and to provide greater assistance to the developing countries concerned;
24. *Urges* all National Groups to act in accordance with this resolution in their dealings with their Parliaments and Governments.

ANNEX "J. 2"

CANADIAN AMENDMENTS

Item 6 of the agenda

HUNGER IN THE WORLD

MAIN TOPICS:

- (a) FOOD PRODUCTION AND FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION WITHIN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES;
- (b) FOOD SUPPLIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET TO THE LOW INCOME COUNTRIES AT PRICES THEY CAN AFFORD;
- (c) FOOD AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES UNTIL THEY REACH AN APPROPRIATE DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

Amendments presented by the Canadian delegationPREAMBLE

1. Replace the seventh paragraph by the following:

"Deploing the utilization of vast resources - financial, material and manpower - on the production and deployment of arms, which could otherwise be used to combat hunger in the world and ease the burden of the less fortunate peoples in all countries,".

OPERATIVE PART

2. Renumber the paragraphs as follows:

| <u>Original number</u> | <u>New number</u> | <u>Original number</u> | <u>New number</u> |
|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| .1 | 1,2 (amended) | .14 | 16 |
| .2 | 5 | .15 | x (deleted) |
| .3 | 6 (amended) | .16 | 17 (amended) |
| .4 | 8,9 (amended) | .17 | 4 |
| .5 | 11 | .18 | 3 (amended) |
| .6 | 12 (amended) | 19 | 18 |
| .7 | 13 (amended) | 20 | 19 |
| .8 | x (deleted) | 21 | 20 |
| .9 | 10 | 22 | 21 |
| .10 | 15 | 23 | 22 |
| .11 | x (deleted) | 24 | 23 |
| .12 | 7 | | |
| .13 | 14 (amended) | | |

3. Make the second part of paragraph 1 into a separate paragraph, and reword as follows:

"Stresses that the solution to the food problems in developing countries and their objective of greater self-reliance in food is first and foremost the responsibility of the developing countries themselves;".

4. At the end of paragraph 3 (new paragraph 6), add the following:

"which will enable IFAD to continue assisting the developing countries to increase their food and agricultural production;".

5. Separate paragraph 4 into two paragraphs (new paragraphs 8 and 9), and reword as follows:

"Welcomes the achievement in 1981 of the annual 500,000 tonnes cereal target established for the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) and invites broader participation of the international community in the context of voluntary pledges made in concert with the World Food Programme's biennial pledging conferences, so that the target will continue to be met or exceeded;".

"Invites the international community to extend the Food Aid Convention, 1980 (FAC) due to expire on 30 June 1983, with the hope that additional commitments from existing signatories of the Convention and potential new members would be forthcoming to allow the FAC target of 10 million tonnes in cereals to be achieved;".

6. Reword paragraph 6 (new paragraph 12) as follows:

"Affirms that protectionism, per se, does not develop viable, efficient and adequate farm enterprises but rather withholds from all peoples the benefits from international specialization in all foodstuffs;".

7. In paragraph 7 (new paragraph 13), replace the first eleven words by the following:

"Calls upon all trading countries".

8. Delete paragraph 8.

9. Delete paragraph 11.

10. Reword paragraph 13 (new paragraph 14) as follows:

"Calls on the Parliaments and Governments of all countries to demonstrate greater international solidarity so as to help the developing countries in their efforts to conquer hunger,".

11. Delete paragraph 15.

12. Reword the introductory section of paragraph 16 (new paragraph 17) as follows:

"Urges donor and recipient countries and the international organizations/institutions to adjust their aid policies so as to give highest priorities to:".

13. In paragraph 18 (new paragraph 3), add the words "and structural" between the words "social" and "reforms".

ANNEX " K "

INITIAL DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM
AND COMBATING NEO-COLONIALISM
WITH REFERENCE TO NAMIBIA

Item 7 of the agenda

*Elimination of colonialism and combating of neo-colonialism,
and particularly the need to take measures for the
immediate and strict implementation
of the UN Plan for Namibia*

DRAFT RESOLUTION

presented, on behalf of the Committee on Non-Self-Governing
Territories and Ethnic Questions,
by Mr. Silva Graça (Portugal)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Recalling the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Reaffirming the right of all colonially, neo-colonially and racially oppressed peoples to self-determination, independence and national sovereignty and their right to strive for independence with all means at their disposal, including armed struggle,

Aware of the serious threat to international peace and security caused by the remaining colonies, especially those under racist régimes,

Firmly convinced that only the total elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism - a prerequisite for international peace and détente - can ensure the advent of a truly humane world,

Recalling that the peoples of Namibia and South Africa, despite the many relevant UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, continue to be subjected to the most inhuman colonialist and racist policy as a result of the refusal of the South African régime to comply with international decisions,

Recalling, in particular, the United Nations resolution by which South Africa's mandate over the territory of Namibia, including Walvis Bay, was terminated, and Security Council resolution 435 (1978) which establishes the UN Plan for Namibia,

Deeply concerned at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia, the imposition of apartheid on its people and South Africa's defiance of all resolutions of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and other international organizations on the status and rights of the Namibian people and at the intensification of the military occupation of Namibia,

Alarmed by the frequent instances of South African aggression against neighbouring independent African States,

Realizing that acquisition by the apartheid régime, with the help of some Western Powers and Israel, of a nuclear potential may have far-reaching dangerous consequences for the situation in southern Africa and international security as a whole,

Indignant at the support received by the apartheid régime from certain Western Powers and its ties with Israel,

Concerned about the persecution, arrest, imprisonment, torture and murder of South African and Namibian freedom-fighters opposing apartheid,

Strongly deploring the fact that, owing solely to the veto of the United States of America, the UN Security Council has been unable to impose full mandatory sanctions on the South African Government under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,

Recalling UN General Assembly resolution 36/121 A-F of 10 December 1981 and 36/172 A-P of 17 December 1981 on the questions of Namibia and the South African Government's policy of apartheid and, in particular, resolution 36/172 B which proclaims 1982 as the International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions against South Africa,

Bearing in mind that the people of Western Sahara are still deprived of their right to self-determination and independence, owing to the occupation of its territory by Morocco,

Bearing in mind the referendum aiming at enabling the Sahraoui people to express on a free, general and regular basis their will for self-determination of Western Sahara,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as well as other relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the Organization of African Unity and the Inter-Parliamentary Union,

Concerned at the situation in Western Sahara which causes a serious threat to the security and peace of the countries in the region,

Concerned at the aggravation of the situation in East Timor whose people is not only prevented from acceding to self-determination and independence but is also a victim of genocide,

Gravely concerned at the colonial situation still prevailing in Guam, Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Puerto Rico, the British Virgin Islands, the American Virgin Islands, Micronesia and other so-called "small territories" under British and French domination,

Bearing in mind the contribution Parliaments can make towards mobilizing world public opinion and adopting practical and effective measures against colonialism in all of its forms and manifestations,

Reaffirming the resolution on "Urgent measures for the liquidation of the vestiges of colonialism in the world and the practices of apartheid in Namibia and South Africa, and safeguarding of ethnic minorities", adopted by the 68th Inter-Parliamentary Conference which took place in Havana in September 1981,

Aware once more of the need to call on all Governments and Parliaments of the world to assume their responsibility in putting an end to colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, apartheid and zionism,

Considering that the eradication of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism is also the responsibility of Parliaments and that it is necessary and urgent to take measures to this end, particularly with regard to the immediate and strict implementation of the UN Plan for Namibia,

1. *Reaffirms* the right of all peoples to self-determination, independence, liberty and sovereignty;
2. *Recognizes* the right of all peoples under colonial, neo-colonial and racist domination to strive with all means at their disposal, including armed struggle, for their liberation;
3. *Reaffirms* the legitimate right of the people of Namibia to strive by all means at its disposal to exercise its inalienable right to self-determination and independence;
4. *Calls on* all peace-loving nations and international organizations to contribute generously to the liberation struggle of the peoples still under colonial domination;

5. *Urges* all Governments and Parliaments, international and regional organizations, public institutions and non-governmental and intergovernmental agencies to contribute to the elimination of colonialism and its consequences;
6. *Condemns* the racist South African régime for its illegal occupation of Namibia and *demands* the immediate withdrawal of South African troops and administration from Namibia, genuine independence and territorial integrity for the country, including Walvis Bay;
7. *Condemns* South Africa's defiance of UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the political status of Namibia;
8. *Urges* the international community to recognize SWAPO, in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people;
9. *Strongly urges* the Western Contact Group to exert enough pressure to induce South Africa to co-operate in the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), leading to majority rule in Namibia;
10. *Rejects* the manoeuvres by some members of the Western Contact Group aimed at subverting the provisions of that resolution, removing the Namibian problem from UN jurisdiction and solving it on a neo-colonialist basis;
11. *Deplores once more* the growing collaboration of the United States of America, Israel and other Western Powers with the racist South African Régime;
12. *Urges* the UN Security Council to fulfil its responsibility under the UN Charter by applying against South Africa the mandatory sanctions provided for in Chapter VII;
13. *Appeals* to the United States of America as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council to comply with the demands of an overwhelming majority of countries regarding the imposition on South Africa of sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter;
14. *Condemns* South Africa for its refusal to accept the decisions of the UN Plan for the Independence of Namibia;
15. *Strongly condemns* acts of military aggression and other acts of economic and political destabilization committed by South Africa against the front-line countries, namely Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Botswana;

16. *Condemns* the intensified military repression against the peoples of Namibia and South Africa practised by the racist régime, as well as the use by South Africa of the territory of Namibia as a springboard for criminal acts of aggression against the front-line countries in southern Africa, the persecution, imprisonment, torture and murder of South African and Namibian freedom-fighters;
17. *Demands* the release of freedom-fighter Nelson Mandela, as well as all South African political prisoners imprisoned for struggling for the rights of their people;
18. *Supports* SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and the South African liberation movements recognized by the OAU and the United Nations;
19. *Reaffirms* that a lasting solution of the conflict in Namibia can be achieved only with the participation of SWAPO;
20. *Urges* all Governments and Parliaments of the world to adopt urgent and effective measures to:
 - (a) Curb economic activities by their national entities in Namibia, South Africa and any other country under colonial and/or racist domination;
 - (b) Offer all possible moral and material assistance to the liberation movements of southern Africa recognized by the United Nations;
 - (c) Contribute to achievement of the goals of the International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions against South Africa;
21. *Reiterates* its support for the exercise by the people of Western Sahara of its right to self-determination and independence and therefore *recalls* the urgent need to implement the UN and OAU resolutions and decisions aiming at a fair and final settlement of the question of Western Sahara;
22. *Firmly calls upon* the OAU Implementation Committee to promote negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front for a peaceful settlement of the conflict with a view to facilitating the development of harmonious co-operation between all peoples of the region;
23. *Calls* to this end on Morocco and the Polisario Front to start negotiations for an immediate cease-fire and to conclude a peace agreement conducive to the fair implementation of a general, free and regular referendum for self-determination in Western Sahara;
24. *Reaffirms* the right of East Timor to self-determination and independence, and therefore *condemns* the use of force to prevent the people of East Timor from exercising that right;

25. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to reach a fair and final settlement of the situation of the people of East Timor;
26. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-determination, independence and sovereignty in accordance with UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
27. *Supports* the decision by which the UN General Assembly approved the report of the *Ad hoc* Committee on Decolonization in which the General Assembly was requested to include the case of Puerto Rico as a separate item on the agenda of its 37th session;
28. *Reiterates* its appeal to the United Kingdom and Spain to continue talks aimed at terminating the present political status of Gibraltar on the basis of United Nations and Inter-Parliamentary Union resolutions;
29. *Invites* all interested parties to back the decisions and resolutions of the UN General Assembly relative to the territories of Guam, Micronesia, the British Virgin Islands, the American Virgin Islands and other so-called "small territories" still under colonial domination;
30. *Condemns* the existence of military and/or naval bases in colonial territories which impede the genuine independence of the peoples concerned and are detrimental to human beings and natural resources in such territories;
31. *Condemns*, in accordance with resolutions of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the United Nations (General Assembly and Security Council), the continuation by Israel of the establishment of settlements in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, as these settlements are a new form of colonialism;
32. *Urges Parliaments:*
 - (a) To support actively the implementation by the international community of specific measures to eliminate colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism (including zionism) and apartheid in whatever countries they are practised;
 - (b) To increase support for the colonially oppressed peoples or those oppressed on racial, religious or other grounds and their legitimate representatives - the national liberation organizations recognized by the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the United Nations - in their struggle to exercise their rights to independence and self-determination;

- (c) To call for the withdrawal of foreign occupation troops and the removal of foreign military bases installed in free and sovereign countries against the will of their peoples;
 - (d) To demand the cessation of any illegal and arbitrary policy which impedes the full exercise of self-determination and sovereignty by such peoples over their entire national territory;
33. *Calls upon* Governments, Parliaments and international organizations to take measures aimed at increasing their activity for the elimination of all forms of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, recolonization, apartheid, racial discrimination, occupation, zionism, aggression or threats of aggression, to support all actions and initiatives in defence of the independence and sovereignty of all peoples and to eliminate dangers to peace and international security.

ANNEX "L"

PRACTIVAL MEANS
TO IMPROVE THE
UNION'S SESSIONS

PRACTICAL MEANS OF IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
SESSIONS OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

(Item XV of the agenda)

At the Lagos session the Executive Committee presented to the Inter-Parliamentary Council its recommendations (Annex I) on the findings of the working group entrusted with studying the functioning of the Union's sessions (Annexes II and III).

After an exchange of views on the subject the Council decided to postpone consideration of the working group's findings until the Rome session, it being understood that those National Groups which wished to present observations on these recommendations or counter-proposals should do so in writing and in advance so that the members of the Council could study them.

In response to a circular in this connection sent to them by the Secretary General on 17 May 1982, 14 National Groups stated their opinions (Annexes IV and V).

During the Rome session, the working group and Executive Committee examined the various observations of the National Groups.

Following its deliberations, the Executive Committee decided unanimously to confirm its recommendations to the Council in Lagos to approve in principle the basic proposals put forward by the working group, with the following modifications:

Recommendation No. 11 (Annex II, page 3):

"..... the number of parliaments delegated to the Conference by each National Group should in no case exceed eight, or ten for National Groups of countries with a population of 100 million or over"

Recommendation in section B (Annex II, page 4):

"The number of members appointed to a drafting committee should normally not exceed eleven, and its composition should take into account an equitable geographical distribution and political balance. Only one parliamentarian from each delegation.....".

PRACTICAL MEANS OF IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
SESSIONS OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

Report of the Executive Committee

The Executive Committee considered at its 189th session (Lagos, 12 April 1982) the findings (see Annexes) of the Working Group entrusted with studying the functioning of the Union's sessions.

On concluding its examination, the Executive Committee took the following decisions concerning the two questions studied by the Working Group :

A. PRACTICAL MEANS OF IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SESSIONS OF THE
INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

On this point, the Executive Committee unanimously endorsed the detailed findings and recommendations of the Working Group.

It recommends to the Inter-Parliamentary Council that it give its approval in principle to the 13 basic proposals set out by the Working Group in its report.

Should this happen, the Secretary General would be entrusted with preparing, on the basis of these proposals, preliminary draft Statutes and Rules that would be considered in detail by the Working Group which would meet for this purpose at the beginning of 1983. The draft texts elaborated at that time by the Working Group would be submitted to the Inter-Parliamentary Council, at its spring session and to the 70th Conference, for entry into force in 1984.

B. PREPARATION OF GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WORK OF DRAFTING
COMMITTEES

The Executive Committee unanimously recommends to the Council that it approve the proposal made on this point by the Working Group.

PRACTICAL MEANS OF IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
SESSIONS OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

Findings of the Working Group

The Working Group entrusted by the Inter-Parliamentary Council, on the recommendation of the Executive Committee, with studying the functioning of the Union's sessions met at the Union's headquarters in Geneva from 18 to 20 January 1982.

It was composed as follows : Mr. S. Ericson (Sweden), who was appointed Chairman; Mr. A.P. Chitikov (USSR); Mr. H. Edwards (Australia); Mr. J. Marko (Czechoslovakia); and El Hadj Moussa Yaya (United Republic of Cameroon).

The Findings of the Working Group will be found below.

A. PRACTICAL MEANS OF IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SESSIONS OF
THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

The Working Group began its work by studying the proposal of Mr. Ericson concerning the means of improving the functioning of the sessions of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, as well as the observations or alternative proposals communicated by 25 National Groups and the study made by the Secretary General.

After a thorough and detailed review of the situation and exchange of views, the members took note of the fact that the present situation and pattern of the Inter-Parliamentary meetings had the following difficulties:

- The welcome increase in membership of the Union was making it increasingly difficult for each delegation to avail itself of its already very limited speaking rights.

- The two-stage consideration (April and September) of items implied a certain amount of repetition.

- This situation and the trend towards the consideration of more items tended towards an increase in the length of the September meetings which were already regarded as too long by many delegates in view of their national commitments.

- The fact that, for various reasons, the composition of some delegations is not the same at the April (preparatory) meetings and at the September annual Conference has resulted in a lack of continuity and does not provide many members with the opportunity to participate in the whole process of debate, study and decision on a given item.

- The great number of participants at the sessions of the Union makes it increasingly difficult for the member Groups to bear the cost of hosting the meetings.

The Working Group then studied the ways and means of improving this situation. After examining various proposals, the members agreed to recommend a new structure for the Inter-Parliamentary meetings. This solution, largely deriving from Mr. Ericson's proposal, appeared to them, although not perfect, as the one most likely to reconcile the somewhat conflicting requirements of the Union's members and remedy the difficulties set out above.

The details of the Working Group's recommendations are as follows:

1. The Union would hold two Conferences a year, each of them being a self-contained meeting which would conclude with the adoption of final resolutions.
2. Each Conference would normally last for six days of work.
3. The regular agenda of each Conference would contain only two substantive items - selected by the Inter-Parliamentary Council at the end of the previous Conference, on the recommendation of the Executive Committee which would have considered proposals submitted to it.
4. The number of Study Committees would be reduced to four by merging the present Economic and Social Committee with the Committee on Education, Science, Culture and Environment. The new Committee would be called Committee on Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Questions.
5. The four regular substantive items dealt with during a year would be selected by the Council in such a way as to ensure that each of the four Committees would meet at least once each year by rotation.
6. The regular substantive items placed on the Conference agenda by the Council would be fully debated in plenary on the basis of memoranda and draft resolutions submitted by the National Groups. The Conference would then refer each item to the appropriate Study Committee for the preparation of draft resolutions which would be examined and voted on by the Conference at its last sitting.

7. At its first sitting each Conference would have the possibility of adding to its agenda one supplementary item from among requests - if any - submitted by National Groups at least one month before the Conference. For a request to be accepted, it would have to receive a two-thirds majority; should several requests obtain that majority, the one having received the greatest number of positive votes would be selected.

The supplementary item would be dealt with in accordance with an accelerated procedure (without debate in plenary before being examined by the appropriate Study Committee).
8. Should a new event of special international importance arise during the month before the Conference or during the Conference itself, the latter could, at the request of a National Group, place a corresponding emergency item on its agenda by a four-fifths majority vote.
9. The General Debate would be maintained and the members of the Union would therefore have the opportunity of expressing their views on international events twice a year, instead of once.
10. The existing speaking rights and procedures for debates during plenary sittings of the Conference would remain unchanged.
11. With a view to reducing costs for both the host Group and the participating National Groups, the number of parliamentarians delegated to the Conference by each National Group should be limited to requirements for effective participation and in no case exceed eight. Taking that into account, the number of votes that one single member may record according to Article 16, paragraph 3, of the Statutes should be increased from five to ten.
12. The Secretary General would present to the Council at each of its two annual sessions a report on the state and work of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. However, he would not submit to Conferences a written report on matters of international interest.
13. The Inter-Parliamentary Council, as the body which determines and guides the activities of the Union, would continue to exercise all the functions assigned to it by Article 21 of the Statutes. It would continue to study the reports and conclusions of special conferences and meetings, special committees and sub-committees and adopt resolutions in their

respect. However, as the Conference would be in session in April, the Council would no longer debate and adopt resolutions on international issues as it may currently do at that time.

For further information the members of the Executive Committee will find attached (Annex II) a time-table for the proposed new system of meetings.

B. PREPARATION OF GUIDELINES FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WORK OF DRAFTING COMMITTEES

The Working Group also considered the question of the preparation of guidelines for the conduct of the work of the drafting committees appointed by the Study Committees, a subject which had been referred to it by the Executive Committee in Havana.

After studying the matter, it came to the conclusion that much was to be left to the discretion and wisdom of the drafting committee Chairmen. It proposed to the Executive Committee that it consider suggesting to the Council that it add to the recommendations approved in Mexico City (118th session, April 1976) the following:

- The number of members appointed to a drafting committee should normally not exceed eleven and that only one parliamentarian from each delegation so chosen should participate actively and speak in a drafting committee.

PROPOSED PATTERN FOR EACH OF THE
APRIL AND SEPTEMBER MEETINGS

| | | | |
|-----------|------|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Sunday | | Executive Committee | |
| Monday | am | Inauguration/ Council | |
| | 2 pm | | |
| | 4 pm | Vote on suppl. item/ Plenary (Item A) | |
| Tuesday | am | Plenary (Item A) | Committee (Supplementary item) |
| | pm | Plenary (Item A) | Committee (Supplementary item) |
| Wednesday | am | Plenary (Item B) | Committee 1 (Item A) Drafting Committee (Supplementary item) |
| | pm | Plenary (Item B) | Drafting Committee (Item A) Drafting Committee (Supplementary item) |
| Thursday | am | Plenary (Item B) | Executive Committee Drafting Committee (Item A) |
| | pm | General Debate | Committee 2 (Item B) Drafting Committee (Item A) |
| Friday | am | General Debate | Committee 1 (Item A) Drafting Committee (Item B) |
| | pm | General Debate | Committee (Supplementary item) Drafting Committee (Item B) |
| Saturday | am | Council | Committee 2 (Item B) |
| | pm | Plenary Final vote | |
| Sunday | | (Executive Committee) | |

OBSERVATIONS COMMUNICATED BY THE NATIONAL GROUPS CONCERNING THE
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPECT OF THE MEANS
OF IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SESSIONS OF THE INTER-
PARLIAMENTARY UNION

| National Groups of | Observations |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Finland | <p>The Finnish Group :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">(1) Accepts the working group's findings as a whole and particularly the idea that the Union should hold two self-contained conferences a year;(2) Hopes that it will be possible to retain in one form or another the Secretary General's Report on matters of international interest (recommendation No. 12);(3) Wishes the verbatim record of conferences to be issued. |
| Germany (Federal Republic of) | <p>The Group of the Federal Republic of Germany regards the working group's recommendations as a considerable improvement in the structure of Inter-Parliamentary Conferences.</p> |
| Iran | <p>The Iranian Group supports recommendations Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12 and 13 of the working group.</p> |
| Japan | <p>The Japanese Group :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">(1) Thinks the working group's recommendations are good, generally speaking;(2) Considers that the number of parliamentarians delegated to the Conference by each National Group should, as a rule, be limited to <u>eight</u> but that the National Group of a country with a population of 100 million or more should be able to delegate a maximum of <u>ten</u> parliamentarians (recommendation No. 11);(3) Considers also that the Political Committee should be allowed to meet at each of the two annual conferences (recommendation No. 5). |

| National Groups of : | Observations |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Mongolia | <p>The Mongolian Group :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">(1) Endorses the working group's recommendations, generally speaking;(2) Proposes that the number of votes which a delegate may record under Article 16 (3) of the Statutes should be increased from <u>5</u> to <u>11</u> and not to 10 (recommendation No. 11);(3) Believes that the number of members of drafting committees should take account of an equitable geographical distribution and a political balance (recommendation presented in Section B). |
| Rwanda | <p>The Rwandan Group has no objections to the working group's recommendations.</p> |
| Somalia | <p>The Somali Group fully endorses the working group's recommendations.</p> |
| Spain | <p>The Spanish Group believes that the report on the state and work of the Union should be presented by the President of the Inter-Parliamentary Council and not by the Secretary General. The sole report which the latter should present would be an annual report to the Executive Committee.</p> |
| Syrian Arab Republic | <p>The Syrian Group :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">(1) Fully endorses recommendations 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 and 11 of the working group as well as the recommendation made in Section B;(2) Sees no need for the four main items to be chosen in such a way that each Study Committee would meet at least once a year, and prefers complete freedom of choice of subjects (recommendation No. 5);(3) Is opposed to the abolition of the Secretary General's Report on matters of international interest. |

National Groups of :

Observations

Yugoslavia

The Group considers it has nothing to add to the proposals it forwarded for the attention of the working group on 25 December 1981.

In that communication the Yugoslav Group :

- (1) Declared itself in favour of retaining a preparatory session and an annual Conference;
- (2) Expressed the opinion that the speaking time prescribed for the General Debate by the Rules should be maintained and that three and a half days should be devoted to the General Debate;
- (3) Expressed the opinion that the agenda should comprise a number of items equal to the number of Study Committees (5) and that requests for supplementary items should be transmitted to the Inter-Parliamentary Council;
- (4) Proposed that Committee debates be held only in spring, the Conference itself considering the topics studied in spring in accordance with an accelerated procedure to avoid repetition of the same debates;
- (5) Proposed (a) that the Committees meet for four days in spring and three days during the Conference;
(b) that the Council sit for one day in spring and a day and a half during the Conference:

Zambia

The Zambian Group has no observations or counter-proposals to make.

Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwe Group is studying the recommendations so as to present its comments thereon.

OBSERVATIONS COMMUNICATED ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1982 BY TWO NATIONAL GROUPS
CONCERNING THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPECT
OF THE MEANS OF IMPROVING THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SESSIONS
OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

| National Group of | Observations |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Congo | <p>The Congolese Group accepts the idea of two self-contained Conferences but:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">(1) Proposes that the final resolutions of each Conference should be adopted only a year later, so as to avoid taking hasty decisions on certain issues which it may be difficult for a single Conference to deal with (Recommendation No. 1);(2) Considers that the Executive Committee and Council should meet during (rather than outside) the six days devoted to each Conference (Recommendation No. 2);(3) Supports Recommendations Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13;(4) Considers that the majority required for the inclusion of a second supplementary item in the agenda should not be four-fifths but two-thirds (Recommendation No. 8);(5) Endorses the Recommendation in section B. |
| Luxembourg | <p>The Luxembourg Group fully endorses the 13 Recommendations, with the proviso that:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">(1) Recommendations No. 3 and 9 are taken as complementary and a General Debate is held at <u>each</u> Conference;(2) The Political Committee meets at <u>each</u> Conference;(3) Due attention is given in applying Recommendation No. 5 to the topical and urgent nature of certain problems;(4) The practice of adding a supplementary item to the General Debate is maintained;(5) The Secretary General's report on matters of international interest is maintained in some form or other. |

ANNEX "M"

SPEECH OF HIS HOLINESS
POPE JOHN PAUL II
AT THE 69th CONFERENCE
VATICAN CITY

Mr President,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

1. I am particularly pleased with your presence here at this important conference that your noble institution is holding in Rome, and I thank you for coming.

My venerable predecessors expressed interest in and strongly encouraged the Inter-Parliamentary Union. On September 9, 1948, for example, Pope Pius XII underscored the timeliness and permanence of such an association. Ten years later, when the Union last held its conference in Italy, Pope Paul VI paid manifest tribute to your work as parliamentarians. After discussing the relationship between political activity and executive power and the new powers of intermediary bodies and technocrats, Paul VI noted that parliaments were experiencing a minor crisis with respect to their role and identity; however, he said he hoped that this institution would develop as it must to carry out its role even more effectively, rising above partisan quarrels and unproductive political gamesmanship. In this way, parliaments would contribute to the preservation of democracy.

Does experience not show every day what a nation risks when government authorities and pressure groups deny their rightful place to the democratically elected representatives of society, who act out of conscience and free choice to respond to the legitimate aspirations of their fellow citizens, and who work toward the common good of the people, taking into account both practical realities and the fundamental rights of people and their associations?

2. Guided by the deep-felt aspirations of the people which underlie your terms of reference as representatives, you are undoubtedly very conscious of the urgent need to contribute to the security and progress of those who elected you, the need to effect change not only within each nation but on a broader scale as well, cognizant of the close bond between the common good of each people and the common good of people all over the world.

On this international level, the value of the Inter-Parliamentary Union is demonstrated by the increase in its membership by more than a third over the last ten years. The representative nature of the Union is especially great because, as in other international organizations, delegates of peoples striving to maintain or advance their often already high level of prosperity sit down beside representatives of peoples still struggling for survival, compromised by hunger, disease and a lack of essential goods.

This diversity, combined with the many political, social and ethnic differences, give the Inter-Parliamentary Union great potential for synthesis and promotion, two aspects which are evident in the themes being discussed at this Conference, which range from the link between the reduction of military spending and economic and social development in the Third World to the participation of parliamentarians in the field of international relations, from the pursuit of uniform ecological legislation aimed at maintaining a balanced environment to concrete means of combatting world hunger, and to elimination of the vestiges of old-world colonialism and preservation from all forms of neo-colonialism.

As a matter of fact, rather than dwell on your roles as parliamentarians in your own countries, I would like to address some of these world-wide problems and other problems which are of deep concern to the Catholic Church.

3. I would first like to recall to you my message of last June at the United Nations' second Special Assembly devoted to the primordial problem of arresting the senseless arms race - not only with regard to nuclear armaments, which most certainly are cause for grave concern, given their terrifying capacity for destruction, but also with regard to so-called "conventional weapons", which consume massive quantities of the world's resources - resources that could and should be used for entirely different purposes.

We must not be discouraged. Certainly, the New York meeting in the end did not bear the fruits expected by those nations and individuals truly devoted to peace. There is hope, however, of pursuing this work in greater depth. We must work relentlessly with the proper authorities so that the reduction of armaments becomes a real achievement of present generations. This calls for a stronger climate of confidence and co-operation. Opportunities are plentiful. On the European continent, for example, the imminent resumption of the Madrid Conference may provide an opportunity for considerable progress in the areas of security and mutual understanding along the lines of the Helsinki Accord. But I am also referring to meetings on other continents - that is, in America, Africa and Asia - and to the initiatives which affect the entire planet.

At the beginning of this year, in my usual message for the International Day of Peace, I defined peace as a gift of God entrusted to man. The gift of peace is therefore entrusted to you as well, and in a special way, owing to your active political roles and your vast responsibilities in this field. May you therefore help to ensure that peace is preserved, strengthened and carried to areas where it is absent.

With this in mind, how is it possible not to be especially concerned about the present situation in the Middle East? However, I am not going to elaborate on this, since you undoubtedly know that last Wednesday, at the end of the general audience, I made clear the Church's concern over this matter and its conviction as to the measures which were absolutely necessary to the establishment of true peace in the area.

In other words, ladies and gentlemen, the Church is prepared to lend its full support and encouragement to all serious peace-making efforts, and does not hesitate to proclaim that although Christians have special reasons for bearing active witness to this divine gift of peace, the actions of all those who devote themselves to this cause are part of God's mysterious design and, from a Christian point of view, are of vital concern to the kingdom of God in Jesus Christ, even if they must be distinguished from it (cf Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, No 39).

4. In speaking of disarmament, I referred to the fact that the world's resources must be preserved and developed. The context here is the problem of world hunger, and I was pleased to see that this item was included in your

agenda. The composition of your Union predisposes you to make a serious effort to deal with the crucial problem of our time. I have often addressed the issue myself, notably before delegates and members of the FAO. I shall limit myself here to an observation and an appeal. When listening to experts, are we not struck by a paradox which leaves a feeling of uneasiness in our consciences? These experts not only show us the frightening statistics of hunger, but also tell us that the world as a whole possesses the resources to feed everyone properly and that there is a certain cause and effect relationship between those who eat to satiety and those who die of hunger. For example, do those who consume so much grain for their livestock and who would themselves be better off with a more balanced diet not deprive their undernourished brothers of proteins vital for survival? And could distribution patterns not be improved? Many similar questions weigh heavily on our consciences. There must be solutions to these terrible problems: they must be found, conveyed to the public and implemented. Like me, you must feel anguish over this tragedy: together with you I am launching an urgent appeal for more effective unity in this matter, and I hope that the measures discussed at this Conference will contribute to the end.

5. Although the subject I now wish to raise goes beyond this session's program, I cannot let such an important opportunity go by without reminding you, as concerned legislators and political leaders, of the fundamental importance of family values and social duties. These values and duties should also find expression in the form of political intervention, as I pointed out in the Exhortation Familiaris consortio (No. 44). In other words, families should be the first to take steps to see that the laws and institutions of the State not only do not offend but support and positively defend the rights and duties of the family. Do not regard this important obligation of the family as interference in government, at

the risk of reducing its authority, since there would then be a lack of consistency with the repeated calls for participation and initiative.

You are aware of the extent to which the Catholic Church defends, maintains and promotes, unceasingly and in all countries, the values of the family, such as conjugal fidelity, the meaning of sexuality and requirements in the area of human interpersonal relations, the dignity of women, the gift of life and respect for life, and the right and duty of parents to educate their children. The reason the Church bears witness so energetically and takes so many initiatives in this area through its priests and lay people, is that it puts great store in the importance of the sanctity of marriage both for the lives of Christians and the progress of the Church, and for society as a whole, of which the family is the basic and vital unit. The Church hopes that all those in positions of responsibility, in particular the legislators, also understand how high the stakes are for the future of our societies.

6. I should also like to seize this opportunity to mention the problem of religious freedom. As you know, the Church does not ask for any privileges from civil authority; with a clarity which, since the Council, has even increased, the Church has defined a general position according to which religious freedom is only one of the faces of the unitary prism of freedom: it is a basic component of a truly modern and democratic society. Consequently, no state may claim to be well regarded, still less admired, solely because it appears to grant religious freedom, when in fact it isolates it from a general context of freedom. Moreover, a state cannot call itself democratic if it interferes in any way with religious freedoms - not only freedom of worship,

but also freedom of equal participation in the scholastic and educational activities and social initiatives around which modern life revolves more and more. Even the most recent history attests that civil leaders devoted to the good of their people have nothing to fear from the Church; on the contrary, by respecting its activities, they provide the people with a source of enrichment because they are using a positive means of improvement and elevation.

7. As far as the IPU is concerned, is it not your purpose at these annual meetings to strive toward this improvement and elevation with a view to creating a more humane world? You do not limit yourselves to debating and dealing with the techniques of parliamentary work and the major current political themes. Through the discussions and contacts which allow you to learn more about one other, you are also continuously seeking models which will make it possible to overcome the deep-rooted tensions born of the various violations and restrictions of human rights, such as the exploitation of labour and many other abuses that affect human dignity. On October 2, 1979, I had the honour of addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations, and made the following statement: "The fundamental criterion for comparing social, economic and political systems is not, and cannot be, the criterion of hegemony and imperialism: it can be, and indeed must be, the humanistic criterion, namely, the measure in which each system is really capable of reducing, restraining and eliminating as far as possible the various forms of exploitation of man and of ensuring for him, through work, not only the just distribution of the indispensable material goods, but also a participation, in keeping with this dignity, in the whole process of production and in the

social life that grows up around that process." I said that we must not forget that although man depends on the resources of the material world to live, he cannot be a slave to this world: he must be the master of it (No 17).

8. I should like to congratulate you, ladies and gentlemen, on the contribution you are making and will continue to make within your own individual parliaments and, on the international level, through the Inter-Parliamentary Union. May you do your part to promote human progress. Mankind, in many areas, is bending under the weight of old or new injustices. It is aspiring to equality of treatment and responsible participation, is legitimately seeking well-being and peace, and desires true and lasting freedom. All this is part of God's design for the world.

I pray that God may give you the inspiration and the strength to follow your consciences and serve this design selflessly, and I am sure that those who have the good fortune of sharing religious faith will pray to Him for assistance, as God is greater than our hearts.

May God, who is the source of all good, bestow on each of you, your families and your countries, his abundant blessings.

PART "B"



RESULTS
of the
1982 AUTUMN SESSION
of the
INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

ROME (ITALY)
12 - 23 SEPTEMBER 1982

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A. INAUGURAL CEREMONY

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference was inaugurated at a ceremony in the Auditorium Santa Cecilia, on 14 September 1982. During the ceremony, which was opened at 10.30 a.m., the delegates heard Mr. Giulio Andreotti, President of the Italian Inter-Parliamentary Group; Mr. Rafael Caldera, President of the Inter-Parliamentary Council; Mr. Luigi Cottafavi, Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva and Mr. Sandro Pertini, President of the Republic of Italy.

Summaries of the speeches delivered on that occasion will be published in the Inter-Parliamentary Bulletin (No. IV 1982).

B. PARTICIPATION

The following 91 National Groups took part in the work of the session:

Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, USSR, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

The observers at the session included representatives of the United Nations Organization - United Nations, World Food Council, United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), World Food Programme -, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the Council of Europe, the League of Arab States, the Latin American Parlia-

ment, the Andean Parliament, the Asian-Pacific Parliamentarians' Union, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the International Association of French-Speaking Parliamentarians, the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Union of African Parliaments (UAP) and the Palestine National Council.

There was a total of 931 delegates, including 615 members of Parliament.

C. 190TH AND 191ST SESSIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The Executive Committee held two sessions in the Palazzo Montecitorio.

The 190th session took place on 12 and 21 September with the President of the Inter-Parliamentary Council, Mr. R. Caldera (Venezuela), in the Chair. The following members and substitutes took part in the session: E. Cuvelier (Belgium); H. Edwards (Australie); S. Ericson (Sweden), for whom Mrs. K. Andersson substituted on 12 September; H. Fechner (German Democratic Republic); J. Marko (Czechoslovakia), who was absent on 21 September; El Hadj Moussa Yaya (United Republic of Cameroon), for whom Mr. B. Foretia substituted on 21 September; V.N. Navaratnam (Sri Lanka); I. El Sayed (Sudan). Mr. J. Roño (Philippines), who was absent from the session, was replaced by Mr. A. Pacificador on 12 September. Mr. R. Stafford (United States of America), who was also absent from the session, was replaced by Mr. C. Pepper on 12 September and by Mr. E.J. Derwinski on 21 September.

The 191st session of the Executive Committee was held on 23 September under the chairmanship of the newly-elected President of the Inter-Parliamentary Council, Mr. J. Virolainen (Finland). Moreover, the composition of the Committee had been modified by the elections held by the Conference on 22 September; the following members and substitutes took part in the session: E. Cuvelier (Belgium); I. Darvasi (Hungary); S. Ericson (Sweden); H. Fechner (German Democratic Republic); V.N. Navaratnam (Sri Lanka); J. Page (United Kingdom); I. El Sayed (Sudan); B. Foretia (United Republic of Cameroon), substituting for El Hadj Moussa Yaya; A. Pacificador (Philippines), substituting for J. Roño; I. Robinson (Australia), substituting for H. Edwards.

At the 190th session, the Executive Committee devoted its attention to matters on the agenda of the Inter-Parliamentary Council in order to present recommendations to that body; these will be found in Section D.

At the 191st session, the Executive Committee :

- Appointed the following as members of the fact-finding mission to Lebanon (see Section D 7 b): Mr. G. Andreotti (Italy);

Mr. V.N. Navaratnam (Sri Lanka), with Mr. A. Pacificador (Philippines) as his substitute; Mr. O. Obi (Nigeria), with Mr. B. Foretia (United Republic of Cameroon) as his substitute; and one member to be selected by the Hungarian Group;

- Established the guidelines for the carrying out, as soon as possible, of the mission.
- Reappointed Mr. E. Cuvelier (Belgium) to exercise the functions of President of the Council, in case of need, until the 70th Conference and renewed his mandate as the Executive Committee's representative on the Management Board of the Staff Pension Fund.
- Established the composition of the Consultative Committee of Experts of the International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation (CIDP) for the coming year as follows : Mr. A. Gwizdz (Poland), Mr. R. Jackson (Canada), Mr. P.G. Mavalankar (India), Mr. J. Owona (United Republic of Cameroon); ex officio member Mr. N. Lorch (President of the Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments). In addition the Executive Committee decided that, henceforth, members of the Consultative Committee cannot hold office for more than five years.
- Established the provisional agenda of the 132nd session of the Inter-Parliamentary Council.
- Established the 1983 work programme of the Standing Study Committees (Annex I).
- Authorized the Secretary General to undertake consultations with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) concerning the possibility of organizing in 1984 an Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Environment, and to report to the Executive Committee at its next session concerning the results of his consultations.
- Appointed Mr. P. Messerli (Switzerland) as External Auditor of the Union's accounts for a period of three years (1983-1985).

D. 131ST SESSION OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL

The Inter-Parliamentary Council held its 131st session in the Palazzo Montecitorio with its President, Mr. R. Caldera (Venezuela) in the Chair. The first two sittings took place on 13 September and the third sitting on 22 September.

At the opening of the session, the members of the Council observed one minute's silence in memory of Mr. Raul Roa, former President of the Cuban Group and President of the 68th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, and of thirty-three members of the Iranian Parliament who had been killed in an outrage.

A succinct account of the work of the Council is given below.

1. MEMBERSHIP

- On the proposal of the Executive Committee, the Council decided unanimously at its third sitting to readmit as a member of the Union the Inter-Parliamentary Group reconstituted within the National Congress of Peru.

- At its first sitting the Council unanimously decided also on the proposal of the Executive Committee to suspend the affiliation of the National Group of Sierra Leone, expressing the wish to be able to welcome it back within the Union as soon as its financial situation has been restored.

As a result of these decisions, the Union's membership remains at 98 National Groups (see Annex II).

2. ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL

Upon the expiry of the mandate of Mr. Rafael Caldera (Venezuela), the Council was called upon to elect its President.

Three candidatures had been presented for this office.

The results of the first round of voting were as follows:

| | |
|-----------------------------|-----|
| Valid votes | 159 |
| Absolute majority | 80 |
| Votes obtained: | |
| Mr. J. Virolainen (Finland) | 61 |
| Mr. E. Cuvelier (Belgium) | 55 |
| Mr. A. El Hafez (Lebanon) | 43 |

The results of the second round were as follows:

| | |
|-----------------------------|-----|
| Valid votes | 156 |
| Absolute majority | 79 |
| Votes obtained: | |
| Mr. J. Virolainen (Finland) | 76 |
| Mr. E. Cuvelier (Belgium) | 58 |
| Mr. A. El Hafez (Lebanon) | 22 |

Following the second round, Mr. A. El Hafez withdrew his candidature.

The results of the third round were as follows:

| | |
|-----------------------------|-----|
| Valid votes | 160 |
| Absolute majority | 81 |
| Votes obtained: | |
| Mr. J. Virolainen (Finland) | 98 |
| Mr. E. Cuvelier (Belgium) | 62 |

By this last vote, Mr. J. Virolainen was elected President of the Inter-Parliamentary Council for a period of 3 years.

3. PROPOSAL OF CANDIDATES FOR ELECTION TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Since the mandates of Mr. J. Marko (Czechoslovakia) and Mr. R. Stafford (United States of America) expired at the 69th Conference, two seats on the Executive Committee were to be filled.

The Council had before it two candidatures for these two seats. By acclamation, it decided to propose to the Conference the candidatures of Mr. I. Darvasi (Hungary) and Mr. J. Page (United Kingdom) for election to the Executive Committee.

4. APPOINTMENT OF TWO AUDITORS FOR THE 1982 ACCOUNTS

The Council unanimously appointed as Auditors Mr. E. Bouazo Zegbehi (Ivory Coast) and Mr. M. Raposo (Portugal).

5. ADMISSION OF THREE HONORARY MEMBERS

The Council unanimously decided to admit the following as honorary members of their National Groups: Mr. C. Kallias (Greece), Mr. I. Topaloski and Mr. B. Osolnik (Yugoslavia).

6. REAFFIRMATION OF THE ROLE OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

On the proposal of the Executive Committee, the Council unanimously adopted a resolution on this subject; the text will be found in Annex III.

7. WORK PROGRAMME AND BUDGET

(a) Work programme and budget of the Union for 1983

The Council approved, on 13 and 22 September the work programme and budget for 1983 as proposed by the Executive Committee (see Annex IV).

(b) Fact-finding mission to Lebanon

On the proposal of the Executive Committee, the Council decided to include in the work programme the carrying out of the fact-finding mission to Lebanon referred to in paragraph 7 of the resolution adopted by the 69th Conference on "The situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian question". It instructed the Executive Committee to establish, at the latter's 191st session, the guidelines for the carrying out of the mission, to be financed by a withdrawal of up to Sw.Fr. 80,000 from the Working Capital Fund. Consequently, it decided to increase by Sw.Fr. 40,000 the budget for 1983 to replenish the Working Capital Fund.

(c) Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Health and Development in the South-East Asian and Western Pacific Regions

On the proposal of the National Groups of the regions concerned, the Council unanimously decided that this Conference, financed by the World Health Organization (WHO), will be held in Manila in November 1983 and decided on the modalities for its organization.

(d) Vth Inter-Parliamentary Conference on European Co-operation and Security

On the proposal of the National Groups of the European countries, Canada and the United States of America, the Council unanimously decided that this Conference will be held in Budapest in May 1983 and decided on the modalities for its organization. It also approved the special separate budget for this Conference which is financed by the National Groups concerned.

(e) Long-term planning

The Council took note of the decision of the Executive Committee to authorize the Secretary General to prepare an assessment of the application of the previous long-term plan (1972-1980), as well as proposals for the future, to be submitted to the working group on the reorganization of the Union's sessions (see paragraph 8 below). The conclusions of the working group on this question will be brought before the Executive Committee at the Helsinki meetings.

8. REORGANIZATION OF THE UNION'S SESSIONS

Having before it the recommendations prepared by a working group and endorsed by the Executive Committee, the Council gave its approval in principle to a series of basic proposals for the reorganization of the Union's sessions.

It instructed the working group to prepare a draft version of new Statutes and Rules to be submitted to the Inter-Parliamentary Council in April 1983 and to the 70th Inter-Parliamentary Conference.

9. APPROVAL OF THE LIST OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER BODIES INVITED TO FOLLOW, AS OBSERVERS, THE WORK OF THE UNION'S STATUTORY MEETINGS IN 1983

The list approved by the Council will be found in Annex V.

10. FUTURE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY MEETINGS

The Council unanimously accepted at its last sitting the invitation of the National Group of Finland to hold the 1983 spring meetings in Helsinki from 25 to 30 April.

The Council then had before it an invitation from the National Group of the Republic of Korea to hold the 70th Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Seoul. A debate on this question was opened during which two motions for the adjournment of the discussion and one motion for the suspension of the sitting were rejected. The Council then decided to defer consideration of the question to the end of the sitting. It then decided by 82 votes to 32, with 24 abstentions, to accept the invitation of the Group of the Republic of Korea. Details of this roll-call vote will be found in Annex VI.

The list of meetings scheduled for the period from October 1982 to May 1983 will be found in Annex VII.

11. HUMAN RIGHTS OF PARLIAMENTARIANS

The Inter-Parliamentary Council, on 22 September, appointed Mr. G. Sekulovski (Yugoslavia) as a titular member of the Special Committee on Violations of the Human Rights of Parliamentarians, to replace Mr. B. Osolnik (Yugoslavia), who is no longer a member of Parliament.

The Special Committee is currently composed as follows:

Titular members

Mr. G. van Dam (Netherlands),
Chairman
Mr. C. Canache Mata (Venezuela)
Mr. Derikoye Tita Avungara (Zaire)
Mr. G. Sekulovski (Yugoslavia)
Mr. S.N. Sinha (India)

Substitutes

Mrs. J. Neiman (Canada)
Mr. C. Tattenbach (Costa Rica)
Mr. Onyango Midika (Kenya)
Mr. C. Flitan (Romania)
Mr. Chandara-Somboon (Thailand)

The Council heard the report on the work of the Special Committee, presented by Mr. G. van Dam (Netherlands).

The report covered the work of the Special Committee at its 18th session in Geneva from 28 June to 1 July, and at its 19th session in Rome from 15 to 18 September.

At those two sessions, the Special Committee considered the cases of 204 parliamentarians in 18 countries. It reported to the Council on 153 cases in 11 countries.

Since the beginning of 1982 (during which it has held a total of four sessions), the Special Committee has examined 294 cases in 26 countries, including the cases of 118 detained parliamentarians; to date, it has recorded the release of 37, 27 of which took place during the confidential stage of the "Procedure for the examination and treatment by the Inter-Parliamentary Union of communications concerning the violations of the human rights of parliamentarians".

Annexes XXXVI to XXXXI contain the texts of the resolutions adopted by the Council concerning 79 cases in Bolivia, 40 cases in Ghana, 3 in the Islamic Republic of Iran and 5 in Uruguay. In addition, the Council expressed its satisfaction to the Government of Ethiopia following the release of several former parliamentarians.

E. 69TH INTER-PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE

The 69th Conference began its work on the afternoon of 14 September when it elected by acclamation Mr. Giulio Andreotti, President of the Italian Inter-Parliamentary Group, as its President, as proposed by the Inter-Parliamentary Council. A list of the Vice-Presidents of the Conference will be found in Annex VIII.

1. DECISIONS CONCERNING THE INCLUSION OF SUPPLEMENTARY ITEMS

At the opening of its work, the Conference had before it fifteen requests for the inclusion of supplementary items relating to eleven subjects. It then decided to defer to its third sitting (afternoon of 15 September) the consideration of these requests.

When the matter was taken up, two further requests had been presented but had not yet been circulated. The Conference then had before it a motion by the Indian delegation proposing "the adjournment sine die of the consideration of all requests for the inclusion of supplementary items in the Conference agenda, with the exception of those concerning the Middle East question and the conflict between Iraq and Iran". Three amendments to that motion were presented:

- An amendment by the Irish delegation to add to the items to be considered one concerning the invasion of Afghanistan;
- An amendment by the Somali delegation to add to the items to be considered one concerning the Ethiopian aggression against the Somali Democratic Republic;
- An amendment by the Czechoslovak delegation to add to the items to be considered one concerning "The strengthening of the armed forces of the United States of America in the vicinity of the borders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and of the German Democratic Republic - the threat to peace and security in Europe";

The first amendment was adopted by 400 votes to 325, with 315 abstentions (for details, see Annex IX).

The second amendment was adopted by 518 votes to 224, with 214 abstentions (for details, see Annex X).

The third amendment was rejected by 392 votes to 262, with 233 abstentions (for details, see Annex XI).

The Indian delegation's motion, as amended, was then adopted by 665 votes to 142, with 113 abstentions (for details see Annex XII).

The Conference then moved to consideration of the requests for the inclusion of supplementary items thus selected.

On the question of the Middle East, four requests for supplementary items bearing different titles had been presented by the delegations of the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, Sudan and Iran.

The Conference decided to place on its agenda an item 10: "The situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian question". The decision was taken by 863 votes to 5, with 12 abstentions (for details, see Annex XIII).

On the question of the conflict between Iraq and Iran, the Conference had before it two requests for supplementary items bearing different titles, presented by the Groups of Iraq and Iran.

The Conference decided to place on its agenda an item 11: "Proposal for a definitive peace between Iraq and Iran". This decision was taken by 785 votes to 0, with 46 abstentions (for details, see Annex XIV).

The Conference then decided by 496 votes to 209, with 114 abstentions (for details, see Annex XV), to place on its agenda an item 12: "The invasion of Afghanistan".

Lastly, the Conference decided, by 413 votes to 198, with 134 abstentions (for details, see Annex XVI), to place on its agenda an item 13: "The Ethiopian aggression against the Somali Democratic Republic and the dangers to international peace and security that can result from it".

2. DEBATES AND DECISIONS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS PLACED ON ITS AGENDA

(a) General Debate: The political, economic and social situation of the world and the activities of the Union (Item 2)

The Conference devoted to this General Debate three ordinary sittings on 14 and 15 September, as well as two additional night sittings held on 15 and 18 September. As will be seen below, five other items were also debated in the context of the General Debate.

At the sitting on the morning of 15 September, Mr. Emilio Colombo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy, came to the Conference to make a statement on the foreign policy of his country.

During the debate that morning, the Conference also heard Mr. Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO and member of the Palestine National Council.

Moreover, in the context of the General Debate, the Conference observed one minute of silence in memory of Mr. Beshir Gemayel, President-elect of Lebanon, and of Princess Grace of Monaco.

- (b) The contribution of Parliaments to the urgent adoption of concrete measures, in particular, nuclear disarmament, the reduction of military budgets and its effects on world economy and employment and in the economic and social development of the Third World (Item 3)

This item, originally entitled "The contribution of Parliaments to the adoption of concrete measures by the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament and their implementation, in particular, the reduction of military budgets and its effects on world economy and employment and on the economic and social development of the Third World", was discussed in plenary sitting during the General Debate (see above), after which the draft resolution prepared at Lagos and the amendments submitted by the National Groups during the Conference were referred for consideration and report by the Political Committee (see Section F).

At its final plenary sitting (on the afternoon of 22 September), the Conference unanimously adopted the draft resolution as amended by the Committee. The text will be found in Annex XVII.

- (c) The situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian question (Item 10, supplementary)

This item was discussed in plenary sitting during the General Debate (see above), after which the Political Committee was entrusted with preparing a draft resolution on the basis of the various texts submitted by the National Groups (see Section F).

At its final plenary sitting, the Conference had before it the text of the draft resolution prepared by the Committee.

At the request of the United Kingdom delegation, the Conference was called upon to vote separately on the preamble and Section A of the operative part, on the one hand, and then on Section B, on the other. Its decisions were as follows:

- (i) It adopted the preamble and operative Section A by 586 votes to 58, with 132 abstentions (for details, see Annex XIX).
(ii) It adopted operative Section B by 677 votes to 25, with 86 abstentions (for details, see Annex XX).

The text of the draft resolution as a whole, as presented by the Committee, was adopted by 617 votes to 32, with 132 abstentions (for details of the vote, see Annex XXI; for text, see Annex XVIII).

- (d) Proposal for a definitive peace between Iraq and Iran (Item 11, supplementary)

This item was discussed in plenary sitting during the General Debate (see above), after which the Political Committee was entrusted with preparing a draft resolution on the basis of the various texts submitted by the National Groups (see Section F).

At its final plenary sitting, the Conference had before it the text of the draft resolution prepared by the Committee. It adopted the draft resolution without vote. The text will be found in Annex XXII.

(e) The invasion of Afghanistan (Item 12, supplementary)

This item was discussed in plenary sitting during the General Debate (see above) after which the Political Committee was entrusted with preparing a draft resolution on the basis of the texts submitted by the National Groups (see Section F).

At its final sitting, the Conference had before it the text of the draft resolution prepared by the Committee.

At the request of the Bulgarian delegation, supported by several other delegations, the Conference was called upon to vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

The text of the draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 439 votes to 164, with 88 abstentions (for details of the vote, see Annex XXIV; for text, see Annex XXIII).

(f) The Ethiopian aggression against the Somali Democratic Republic and the dangers to international peace and security that can result from it (Item 13, supplementary)

This item was discussed in plenary sitting during the General Debate (see above) after which the Political Committee was entrusted with preparing a draft resolution on the basis of the texts submitted by the National Groups (see Section F).

At its final sitting, the Conference had before it the text of the draft resolution prepared by the Committee.

At the request of the Nigerian delegation, the Conference was called upon to vote separately on the preamble and operative paragraph 1 together.

It adopted the preamble and operative paragraph 1 by 333 votes to 206, with 131 abstentions (for details, see Annex XXVI).

The text of the draft resolution as a whole was adopted by 365 votes to 170, with 170 abstentions (for details on the vote, see Annex XXVII; for text, see Annex XXV).

(g) The development of parliamentary institutions with respect for the Constitution and their work in the sphere of international relations (Item 4)

This item was considered during one plenary sitting on the morning of 16 September, after which the draft resolution prepared in Lagos and the amendments submitted by the National Groups during the Conference were referred for consideration and report to the

Committee on Parliamentary, Juridical and Human Rights Questions (see Section F).

At its final plenary sitting, the Conference adopted without a vote the draft resolution as amended by the Committee. The text will be found in Annex XXVIII.

(h) Hunger in the World (Item 6)

This item was considered during two plenary sittings on 17 September. Under this item, the Conference heard Mr. E. Saouma, Director General of the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), and Mr. A. Al Soudeary, President of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). After the debate, the draft resolution prepared in Lagos and the amendments submitted by the National Groups during the Conference were referred for consideration and report to the Economic and Social Committee (see Section F).

At its final plenary sitting, the Conference adopted without a vote the draft resolution as amended by the Committee. The text will be found in Annex XXIX.

(i) The state of the world environment ten years after the UN Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm. Steps to be taken, including in the field of national and international legislation (Item 5)

This item was discussed during one plenary sitting on 16 September. Under this item, the Conference heard Mr. M.K. Tolba, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). After the debate, the draft resolution prepared in Lagos and the amendments tabled by the National Groups during the Conference were referred for consideration and report to the Committee on Education, Science, Culture and Environment (see Section F).

At its final plenary sitting, the Conference adopted without a vote the draft resolution as amended by the Committee. The text will be found in Annex XXX.

(j) Elimination of colonialism and combating of neo-colonialism, and particularly the need to take measures for the immediate and strict implementation of the UN Plan for Namibia (Item 7)

This item was debated at the two plenary sittings of the Conference on 18 September, after which the draft resolution prepared in Lagos and the amendments tabled by the National Groups during the Conference were referred for consideration and report to the Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories and Ethnic Questions (see Section F).

At its final plenary sitting, the Conference had before it the draft resolution as amended by the Committee.

At the request of the Indonesian delegation, a separate vote was held on the 25th preambular paragraph and on operative paragraphs 30 and 31, which were adopted by 272 votes to 102, with 278 abstentions (for details, see Annex XXXII).

At the request of the Moroccan delegation, a separate vote was held on operative paragraphs 27, 28 and 29, which were adopted by 368 votes to 77, with 195 abstentions (for details, see Annex XXXIII).

At the request of the United Kingdom delegation, a separate vote was held on the 26th preambular paragraph and on operative paragraph 32, which were adopted by 222 votes to 218, with 181 abstentions (for details, see Annex XXXIV).

The Conference then adopted the draft resolution by 466 votes to 48, with 72 abstentions (for details of vote, see Annex XXXV; for text of the resolution, see Annex XXXI).

3. ELECTIONS TO THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (Item 8)

On the proposal of the Inter-Parliamentary Council (see Section D.3) the Conference elected by acclamation Mr. I. Darvasi (Hungary) and Mr. J. Page (United Kingdom) as members of the Executive Committee of the Inter-Parliamentary Union for a period of four years.

F. MEETINGS OF THE STANDING STUDY COMMITTEES

1. COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL QUESTIONS, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

The Committee met on 18, 20 and 21 September with Mr. G. Andreotti (Italy) in the Chair.

First item considered: *The contribution of Parliaments to the urgent adoption of concrete measures, in particular, nuclear disarmament, the reduction of military budgets and its effects on world economy and employment and on the economic and social development of the Third World*

(a) Documents before the Committee:

- Draft resolution prepared by the Committee at its spring session.
- Amendments submitted by the Groups of: Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, India, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, Romania, Switzerland, Thailand, USSR, United Kingdom, United States of America and jointly by the Groups of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States of America.

- (b) The Committee considered the amendments and sub-amendments to the draft resolution during the sitting on 18 September and at an additional night sitting on 20 September. It agreed to change the title of the draft resolution which originally read as follows: "The contribution of Parliaments to the adoption of concrete measures by the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament and their implementation, in particular, the reduction of military budgets and its effects on world economy and employment and on the economic and social development of the Third World."

The draft resolution, as amended, was adopted by 33 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions. Mr. M. Prud'homme (Canada), Rapporteur, presented the text to the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference on 22 September.

Second item considered: *The situation in Lebanon and the Palestinian question*

(a) Documents before the Committee:

- Seven draft resolutions: submitted by the Groups of: France, Iran, Israel, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, United States of America and

jointly by the Groups of: Algeria, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

- One amendment by the Group of Egypt.

- (b) Drafting Committee: Composed of representatives of the Groups of Algeria, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Israel, Sudan, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, USSR and United States of America. The drafting committee was chaired by Mr. C. Jelmini (Switzerland).
- (c) On 21 September, the Committee heard the report submitted, on behalf of the drafting committee, by Mr. S.L. Yadav (India) and adopted the draft resolution without amendment by 43 votes to 3, with 14 abstentions. On 22 September, the text was presented to the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference by Mr. S.L. Yadav (India), Rapporteur.

Third item considered: *Proposal for a definitive peace between Iraq and Iran*

(a) Documents before the Committee:

- Three draft resolutions submitted by the Groups of Australia, Iran and Iraq.
- (b) The Committee considered this item on 21 September. It chose the draft resolution submitted by the Group of Australia as the basic draft resolution and adopted it without amendments by 40 votes to 0, with 3 abstentions. On 22 September the text was presented to the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference by Mr. I. Robinson (Australia), Rapporteur.

Fourth item considered: *The invasion of Afghanistan*

(a) Documents before the Committee:

- One draft resolution submitted by the Group of Ireland.
- One amendment submitted by the Group of Italy.
- (b) The Committee considered this item on 21 September. It accepted as the basic draft resolution the text submitted by the Group of Ireland as amended by the Group of Italy. After having approved an amendment presented orally by the delegation of Morocco, the Committee adopted the draft resolution by 35 votes to 14, with 5 abstentions. On 22 September the text was presented to the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference by Mr. A. Deasy (Ireland), Rapporteur.

Fifth item considered: *The Ethiopian aggression against the Somali Democratic Republic and the dangers to international peace and security that can result from it*

(a) Documents before the Committee

- Two draft resolutions submitted by the Groups of the Federal Republic of Germany and Somalia.

- (b) The Committee considered this item on 21 September. It chose as the basic draft resolution the text submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany, and after having accepted an amendment submitted orally by the delegation of Somalia, adopted the draft resolution by 34 votes to 12, with 7 abstentions. On 22 September the text of the draft resolution was presented to the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference by Mr. P. Temple-Morris (United Kingdom), in replacement of Mr. O. Hennig (Federal Republic of Germany), Rapporteur.

2. COMMITTEE ON PARLIAMENTARY, JURIDICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS

The Committee met on 21 September under its Chairman, Mr. L. Jozeau-Marignat (France).

Item considered: *The development of parliamentary institutions with respect for the Constitution and their work in the sphere of international relations*

(a) Documents before the Committee:

- Draft resolution prepared by the Committee at the spring session.

- Amendments submitted by the Groups of Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Cyprus, India, the United States of America and the USSR.

- (b) After consideration of the amendments, as well as certain sub-amendments, the Committee unanimously adopted the revised draft resolution. Mr. O. Olu (Nigeria), Rapporteur, presented the draft to the 69th Conference on 22 September.

3. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE

The Committee met on 20 September under the chairmanship of Mr. P. Salolainen (Finland).

Item considered: *Hunger in the world*

Main topics:

- (a) Food production and food distribution and consumption within the developing countries;*
- (b) Food supplies on the international market to the low-income countries at prices they can afford;*
- (c) Food aid to developing countries until they reach an appropriate degree of self-sufficiency*

(a) Documents before the Committee:

- Draft resolution adopted by the Committee at the spring session.

- 15 amendments presented by the Groups of Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Egypt (Mrs. F. Hassan), Germany (Federal Republic of), India, Italy (Mr. A. Ajello), Luxembourg, Romania, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States of America, USSR and Zaire.

(b) After considering amendments and a number of sub-amendments, the Committee unanimously adopted the draft resolution as amended. The Chairman of the Committee, acting as Rapporteur, presented the draft to the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference on 22 September.

4. COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, SCIENCE, CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT

The Committee met on 21 September under the chairmanship of Mr. M. Dakroury (Egypt).

Item considered: *The state of the world environment ten years after the UN Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm. Steps to be taken, including in the field of national and international legislation*

(a) Documents before the Committee:

- Draft resolution adopted by the Committee at the spring session.

- Amendments submitted by the Groups of the following countries: Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Egypt, India, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States of America, USSR, Viet Nam, Zaire.

(b) After considering the amendments, the Committee adopted the draft resolution as amended by 42 votes to 0, with 1 abstention. In the absence of the Rapporteur, Mr. R. McClory (United States of America), the text was presented to the final plenary sitting of the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference on 22 September by the Chairman of the Committee

5. COMMITTEE ON NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES AND ETHNIC QUESTIONS

The Committee met on 20 September under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul Mshelia (Nigeria).

At the request of an Iranian delegate it firstly observed a minute of silence in memory of the victims of the massacres in the Palestinian camps in Beirut.

Item considered: *Elimination of colonialism and combating of neo-colonialism, and particularly the need to take measures for the immediate and strict implementation of the UN Plan for Namibia*

(a) Documents before the Committee:

- Draft resolution prepared at the spring session.
- Amendments to the draft resolution, presented by the National Groups of the following countries: Bulgaria, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Morocco, United Kingdom, USSR, Viet Nam, Zaire and jointly by the Groups of Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

- (b) After considering these amendments and sub-amendments presented orally at the sitting, the Committee adopted the draft resolution by 35 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions. In the absence of the Rapporteur, Mr. Silva Graça (Portugal), the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Mshelia (Nigeria), presented the text of the draft resolution to the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference on 22 September.

ANNEX I

SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS TO BE CONSIDERED BY
THE STUDY COMMITTEES IN 1983I. Committee on Political Questions, International Security and Disarmament andCommittee on Parliamentary, Juridical and Human Rights Questions

Ways and means of strengthening the United Nations so that this world institution could play a more effective role in resolving conflicts and present and future world problems, especially in the field of arms control and disarmament

II. Economic and Social Committee

The contribution of Parliaments to the adoption of concrete measures by UNCTAD VI and to their implementation, particularly with regard to trade, commodities, financial and monetary issues and technological transfers, with a view to making progress towards an equitable international economic system

III. Committee on Education, Science, Culture and Environment

The Executive Committee decided to select the subject of youth employment, particularly in the developing countries, under its various aspects : education, training, economic and social measures. It asked the Secretary General to consult the International Labour Office (ILO) and UNESCO in order to establish an appropriate title for the item.

IV. Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories and Ethnic Questions

The role of Parliaments in promoting the process of decolonization and in promoting the political, economic, social and cultural rights of ethnic groups within multi-ethnic States, particularly with a view to encouraging inter-ethnic co-operation and justice

ANNEX II

MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNION
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1982

Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Germany (Federal Republic of), Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United States of America, USSR, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

ANNEX III

REAFFIRMATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION

*(Resolution adopted unanimously by the Inter-Parliamentary Council,
at its 131st session, on 13 September 1982)*

The Inter-Parliamentary Council,

Recalling that since its foundation in 1889 the Inter-Parliamentary Union has, uninterruptedly and through contacts between qualified representatives, served the prime interests of the peoples it represents,

Welcoming the development of Inter-Parliamentary co-operation over the last ten years as is shown by an increase of some 45 per cent of the members of the Union and by the expansion and diversification of its activities,

Noting with satisfaction the growing awareness in intergovernmental circles of the important role which Parliaments can play to strengthen the effectiveness of international co-operation and the security in the world,

Noting with satisfaction the development of the co-operation between the Union and international organizations, particularly in carrying out activities in the field of the economic and social development of Third World countries,

Noting on the other hand that this awareness sometimes leads to initiatives - isolated or not co-ordinated by the Union - taken by parliamentarians with a view to promoting inter-parliamentary action in the form of meetings devoted to the study of specific problems and the search for solutions to those problems,

Considering that the effectiveness of the efforts made at the inter-parliamentary level to strengthen international co-operation and security depends to a large extent on the judicious and co-ordinated use of the means available,

1. Reaffirms the vocation of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, whose experience covers several decades and in which nearly one hundred Parliaments are represented, to be the privileged framework for inter-parliamentary action and its desire to fulfil, as far as possible, the needs which arise in that respect;
2. Hopes that this will be duly taken into account in programming the future activities of the Inter-Parliamentary Union;
3. Requests the National Groups to ensure that initiatives for inter-parliamentary action be co-ordinated in the Inter-Parliamentary Union;
4. Requests the Secretary General to continue to follow these questions, particularly in his contacts with the organizations of the United Nations system, and to report on this matter.

ANNEX IV

BUDGET OF THE UNION FOR 1983

A. Receipts

| | Budet for 1983 Sw.Fr. |
|------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Contributions of the National Groups | 3,499,900.-- |
| 2. Sale of publications | 32,500.-- |
| 3. Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments | 21,300.-- |
| 4. Miscellaneous | 2,500.-- |
| Total receipts | <u>3,556,200.--</u> |

B. Expenditure

| | Budget for 1983 Sw.Fr. |
|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Permanent staff | 1,851,000.-- |
| 2. External and temporary collaboration | 142,100.-- |
| 3. April session | 154,300.-- |
| 4. September session | 166,900.-- |
| 5. Various meetings and activities | 203,000.-- |
| 6. Travel | 18,000.-- |
| 7. Printing costs | 143,200.-- |
| 8. Purchase of books, documents and periodicals | 22,000.-- |
| 9. Office supplies and equipment; communication expenses | 229,500.-- |
| 10. Premises | 74,000.-- |
| 11. Insurance | 396,100.-- |
| 12. Council President's expenses | 12,500.-- |
| 13. Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments | 91,600.-- |
| 14. Miscellaneous | 12,000.-- |
| 15. Replenishment of the Working Capital Fund | 40,000.-- |
| Total expenditure | <u>3,556,200.--</u> |

ANNEX V

LIST OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER BODIES
INVITED BY THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL TO FOLLOW
THE WORK OF THE UNION'S STATUTORY MEETINGS IN 1983

A. United Nations

International Labour Organisation (ILO)

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

World Health Organization (WHO)

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

B. Council of Europe

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

League of Arab States

Organization of American States (OAS)

Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Latin American Parliament

Andean Parliament

Asian and Pacific Parliamentarians' Union

Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA)

International Association of French-Speaking Parliamentarians

Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union

Union of African Parliaments (UAP)

ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIPO)

Parliamentary Association for Euro Arab Cooperation

C. Palestine National Council

South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)

ANNEX VI

FUTURE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY MEETINGS

Vote on the invitation of the Group of the Republic of Korea
to hold the 70th Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Seoul in 1983

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 82
Negative votes 32
Abstentions 24

| YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|-------------------------|-------------------|-----|-------------|-------------------|--------|-----|--------------------------|-------------------|--------|-----|
| Algeria | not participating | | Hungary | - | 2 | - | Portugal | 2 | - | - |
| Australia | 2 | - | Iceland | 1 | - | - | Rep. of Korea | 2 | - | - |
| Austria | 1 | - | India | - | - | 2 | Romania | - | 2 | - |
| Belgium | 2 | - | Indonesia | 2 | - | - | Rwanda | - | - | 2 |
| Benin | - | 2 | Iran | - | 2 | - | Senegal | 2 | - | - |
| Brazil | 1 | - | Iraq | 2 | - | - | Singapore | 1 | - | - |
| Bulgaria | - | 2 | Ireland | 2 | - | - | Somalia | - | - | 2 |
| Canada | 2 | - | Israel | 2 | - | - | Spain | 1 | - | - |
| Cape Verde | - | 2 | Italy | 2 | - | - | Sri Lanka | 2 | - | - |
| Congo | absent | - | Ivory Coast | 2 | - | - | Sudan | 2 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | 1 | - | Japan | 2 | - | - | Sweden | 2 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 2 | Jordan | - | absent | - | Switzerland | 2 | - | - |
| Cyprus | absent | - | Kenya | 1 | - | - | Syrian Arab Rep. | - | 2 | - |
| Czechoslovakia | - | 2 | Kuwait | 2 | - | - | Thailand | 2 | - | - |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | - | 2 | Lebanon | - | absent | - | Togo | - | - | 2 |
| Dem. Yemen | absent | - | Luxembourg | 1 | - | - | Tunisia | - | absent | - |
| Denmark | 2 | - | Malaysia | 2 | - | - | Uganda | not participating | | |
| Djibouti | absent | - | Mali | - | - | 2 | United Arab Emirates | 2 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | 1 | - | Mexico | - | - | 1 | United Kingdom | 2 | - | - |
| Ecuador | absent | - | Monaco | - | absent | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | - | - | 2 |
| Egypt | 2 | - | Mongolia | - | 2 | - | United States of America | 2 | - | - |
| Finland | 2 | - | Morocco | 2 | - | - | USSR | - | 2 | - |
| France | - | - | Mozambique | not participating | | | Venezuela | 2 | - | - |
| Gabon | 2 | - | Nepal | - | - | 1 | Viet Nam | - | 2 | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | - | 2 | Netherlands | 2 | - | - | Yemen | - | absent | - |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | absent | - | New Zealand | - | absent | - | Yugoslavia | - | - | 2 |
| Greece | 2 | - | Nicaragua | - | - | 2 | Zaire | 2 | - | - |
| Guinea | absent | - | Nigeria | 2 | - | - | Zambia | - | - | 2 |
| Haiti | 2 | - | Norway | 2 | - | - | Zimbabwe | - | 2 | - |
| | | | Panama | 1 | - | - | | | | |
| | | | Philippines | 2 | - | - | | | | |
| | | | Poland | - | 2 | - | | | | |

ANNEX VII

LIST OF MEETINGS SCHEDULED FOR THE PERIOD
FROM OCTOBER 1982 TO MAY 1983October

| | | |
|---------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 14 | NEW YORK (United Nations) | Meeting of the Parliamentarians attending the UN General Assembly |
| 28 - 29 | GENEVA (Headquarters) | Meeting of the Consultative Committee of Experts of the CIDP (10th session) |

November

| | | |
|---------|---------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 22 - 26 | YAOUNDE | Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Policies, Programmes and Legislation for Children in Africa (organized in co-operation with UNICEF) |
|---------|---------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

January - February

| | | |
|--------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 31 - 3 | GENEVA (Headquarters) | Special Committee on Violations of the Human Rights of Parliamentarians (20th session) (<u>in camera</u>) |
|--------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

February

| | | |
|--------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dates to be set | GENEVA (Headquarters) | Meeting of the Working Group entrusted with the reorganization of the Statutes and Rules of the Inter-Parliamentary Union |
|--------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| | | |
|--------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dates to be set | MANILA | Meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Health and Development in the South- East Asian and Western Pacific Regions |
|--------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

April

| | | |
|---------|----------|------------------------------------------------|
| 25 | HELSINKI | Executive Committee (192nd session) |
| 26 - 29 | " | Study Committees |
| 30 | " | Inter-Parliamentary Council (132nd session) |

May

| | | |
|--------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dates to be set | BUDAPEST | Vth Inter-Parliamentary Conference on European Co-operation and Security |
|--------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|

ANNEX VIII

PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE

Giulio Andreotti
President of the Italian Inter-Parliamentary Group

VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

M. Lemkami (Algeria), I. Robinson (Australia), F. König (Austria), E. Cuvelier (Belgium), R. Vilon Guezo (Benin), D. Dimitrov (Bulgaria), G. Molgat (Canada), F. Correia (Cape Verde), M. Dzabatou-Babeaux (Congo), Mrs. E. García Patino (Cuba), A. Ghalanos (Cyprus), J. Marko (Czechoslovakia), Choi Su Hen (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), A.A. Alsallami (Democratic Yemen), R. Pedersen (Denmark), H. Badawi (Egypt), J. Virolainen (Finland), C. Estier (France), P.C. Divounguy (Gabon), H. Fechner, (German Democratic Republic), O. Hennig (Germany, Federal Republic of), J. Papadopoulos (Greece), M.S. Cisse (Guinea), R. Gilot (Haiti), S. Barcs (Hungary), T. Sigurjonsson (Iceland), B.R. Jakhar (India), Mrs. I.A.U. Pidada (Indonesia), S. Zanganeh (Iran), S.A.J. Al Kamal (Iraq), A. Deasy (Ireland), M. Shachal (Israel), P. Bufalini (Italy), T. Lanciné (Ivory Coast), J. Shiozaki (Japan), M.Y. Al-Adsani (Kuwait), L. Bollendorff (Luxembourg), L. Danton Rodriguez (Mexico), M. Principale (Monaco), T. Namsrai (Mongolia), D.O. Sidi Baba (Morocco), L.T. Ndelana (Mozambique), M.M. Singh (Nepal), G.C. van Dam (Netherlands), P. East (New Zealand), C. Nuñez Tellez (Nicaragua), J.W. Pam (Nigeria), L. Langlo (Norway), R. Landero (Panama), A.F. Pacificador (Philippines), J. Maciszewski (Poland), A. Arnaut (Portugal), J.D. Kwon (Republic of Korea), S. Soare (Romania), M. Ntahobari (Rwanda), M.O. Ba (Senegal), M.I. Ahmed (Somalia), F. Alvarez de Miranda (Spain), M.A. Bakeer Markar (Sri Lanka), I. El Sayed (Sudan), Mrs. I. Sundberg (Sweden), C. Jelmini (Switzerland), A. Rida (Syrian Arab Republic), H. Hongskula (Thailand), A. Apedo-Amah (Togo), M. Messaadi (Tunisia), F. Butagira (Uganda), H. Lootah (United Arab Emirates), P. Temple-Morris (United Kingdom), S. Tandeng Muna (United Republic of Cameroon), C. Pepper (United States of America), V.P. Ruben (USSR), G. Gonzalez (Venezuela), Phan Anh (Viet Nam), A. Makki (Yemen), I. Njegovan (Yugoslavia), Birere Mabano (Zaire), J.P. Chafwa (Zambia), Miss J.L. Ngwenya (Zimbabwe).

ANNEX IX

Vote on the Irish Group's amendment to add the following item to those specifically mentioned in the Indian Group's motion :
"The invasion of Afghanistan".

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 400
Negative votes 325
Abstentions 315

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|----------------------------|-------------|----|-----|-------------|-------------|----|-----|-----------------------------|-----------------|----|-----|
| Algeria | - | 13 | - | Hungary | - | 10 | - | Portugal | 2 | 2 | 8 |
| Australia | 13 | - | - | Iceland | 9 | - | - | Rep. of Korea | 15 | - | - |
| Austria | 12 | - | - | India | - | 21 | - | Romania | not participati | | |
| Belgium | 6 | - | 6 | Indonesia | - | - | 21 | Rwanda | - | - | 11 |
| Benin | - | 11 | - | Iran | - | - | 15 | Senegal | - | - | 11 |
| Brazil | 20 | - | - | Iraq | - | - | 13 | Singapore | - | - | 10 |
| Bulgaria | - | 12 | - | Ireland | 11 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Israel | 11 | - | - | Spain | 15 | - | - |
| Cape Verde | - | 9 | - | Italy | 1 | 16 | - | Sri Lanka | a b s e n t | | |
| Colombia | 10 | - | - | Ivory Coast | - | 12 | - | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | - | 10 | - | Japan | 20 | - | - | Sweden | 12 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | a b s e n t | | | Jordan | - | - | 10 | Switzerland | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Kenya | - | - | 13 | Syrian Arab Rep. | - | 12 | - |
| Cyprus | 2 | 2 | 5 | Kuwait | - | - | 10 | Thailand | a b s e n t | | |
| Czechoslovakia | - | 13 | - | Lebanon | - | - | 9 | Togo | - | - | 10 |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | - | 13 | - | Luxembourg | 9 | - | - | Tunisia | - | - | 12 |
| Dem. Yemen | - | 10 | - | Malaysia | - | - | 13 | Uganda | - | - | 13 |
| Denmark | 12 | - | - | Mali | - | 5 | - | United Arab Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| Djibouti | 9 | - | - | Mexico | 16 | - | - | United Kingdom | 17 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | 11 | - | - | Monaco | 9 | - | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | - | 12 | - |
| Ecuador | a b s e n t | | | Mongolia | - | 10 | - | United States of America | 22 | - | - |
| Egypt | - | - | 16 | Morocco | 14 | - | - | USSR | - | 22 | - |
| Finland | - | - | 11 | Mozambique | - | 13 | - | Venezuela | - | - | 13 |
| France | - | 15 | - | Nepal | a b s e n t | | | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| Gabon | - | - | 9 | Netherlands | 13 | - | - | Yemen | - | - | 12 |
| German Dem. Rep. | - | 13 | - | New Zealand | 10 | - | - | Yugoslavia | - | - | 14 |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | 18 | - | - | Nicaragua | - | 10 | - | Zaire | - | - | 12 |
| Greece | - | - | 12 | Nigeria | a b s e n t | | | Zambia | - | - | 10 |
| Guinea | - | 5 | - | Norway | 11 | - | - | Zimbabwe | - | 12 | - |
| Haiti | 11 | - | - | Panama | a b s e n t | | | | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | - | - | 16 | | | | |
| | | | | Poland | - | 15 | - | | | | |

ANNEX X

Vote on the amendment of the Somali Group to add the following item to those specifically mentioned in the Indian Group's motion : "The Ethiopian aggression against the Somali Democratic Republic and the dangers to international peace and security that can result from it".

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 518
 Negative votes 224
 Abstentions 214

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|-------------------------|-------------|----|-----|-------------|-------------------|----|-----|--------------------------|-------------|----|-----|
| Algeria | - | - | 13 | Hungary | - | 10 | - | Portugal | 2 | 2 | 8 |
| Australia | 13 | - | - | Iceland | 6 | - | 3 | Rep. of Korea | - | - | 15 |
| Austria | 12 | - | - | India | - | - | 15 | Romania | - | 14 | - |
| Belgium | 12 | - | - | Indonesia | - | - | 21 | Rwanda | - | - | 11 |
| Benin | - | - | 11 | Iran | - | - | 15 | Senegal | - | - | 11 |
| Brazil | 10 | - | - | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Singapore | 10 | - | - |
| Bulgaria | - | 12 | - | Ireland | 11 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Israel | 11 | - | - | Spain | 15 | - | - |
| Cape Verde | - | - | 9 | Italy | 10 | - | 6 | Sri Lanka | a b s e n t | - | - |
| Colombia | 10 | - | - | Ivory Coast | - | - | 10 | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | - | 10 | - | Japan | 19 | - | 1 | Sweden | 12 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | a b s e n t | - | - | Jordan | 10 | - | - | Switzerland | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Kenya | a b s e n t | - | - | Syrian Arab Rep. | - | 12 | - |
| Cyprus | - | 2 | 7 | Kuwait | 10 | - | - | Thailand | a b s e n t | - | - |
| Czechoslovakia | - | 13 | - | Lebanon | 5 | - | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | a b s e n t | - | - | Luxembourg | 9 | - | - | Tunisia | 12 | - | - |
| Dem. Yemen | - | 10 | - | Malaysia | 13 | - | - | Uganda | 5 | - | - |
| Denmark | 12 | - | - | Mali | - | - | 10 | United Arab Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| Djibouti | 9 | - | - | Mexico | 16 | - | - | United Kingdom | 17 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | - | - | 11 | Monaco | 9 | - | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | 12 | - | - |
| Ecuador | a b s e n t | - | - | Mongolia | - | 10 | - | United States of America | 10 | - | - |
| Egypt | 16 | - | - | Morocco | 14 | - | - | USSR | - | 22 | - |
| Finland | - | - | 11 | Mozambique | not participating | - | - | Venezuela | - | - | 13 |
| France | - | 15 | - | Nepal | a b s e n t | - | 13 | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| Gabon | 9 | - | - | Netherlands | - | - | - | Yemen | 12 | - | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | - | 13 | - | New Zealand | 10 | - | - | Yugoslavia | - | 14 | - |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | 18 | - | - | Nicaragua | - | 10 | - | Zaire | 12 | - | - |
| Greece | 5 | 1 | - | Nigeria | a b s e n t | - | - | Zambia | a b s e n t | - | - |
| Guinea | a b s e n t | - | - | Norway | 11 | - | - | Zimbabwe | - | 12 | - |
| Haiti | 11 | - | - | Panama | a b s e n t | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Poland | - | 15 | - | | | | |

ANNEX XI

Vote on the Czechoslovak Group's amendment to add the following item to those specifically mentioned in the Indian Group's motion :
 "The strengthening of the armed forces of the United States in the vicinity of the borders of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the German Democratic Republic - The threat to peace and security in Europe".

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 262
 Negative votes 392
 Abstentions 233

| YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|-------------------------|----|--------|----|-------------|--------|-----|--------------------------|--------|----|-----|
| Algeria | - | - | 13 | Hungary | 5 | - | Portugal | 2 | 6 | - |
| Australia | - | 13 | - | Iceland | - | 6 | Rep. of Korea | - | 15 | - |
| Austria | - | 12 | - | India | absent | 3 | Romania | 14 | - | - |
| Belgium | - | 12 | - | Indonesia | - | 21 | Rwanda | - | 11 | - |
| Benin | 11 | - | - | Iran | 10 | - | Senegal | - | - | 11 |
| Brazil | 5 | 15 | - | Iraq | absent | 5 | Singapore | - | - | 10 |
| Bulgaria | 12 | - | - | Ireland | - | 11 | Somalia | - | 11 | - |
| Canada | - | 14 | - | Israel | - | 11 | Spain | - | 15 | - |
| Cape Verde | - | absent | - | Italy | - | 17 | Sri Lanka | absent | - | - |
| Colombia | - | 5 | - | Ivory Coast | - | - | Sudan | - | - | 10 |
| Congo | 10 | - | - | Japan | - | - | Sweden | - | 12 | - |
| Costa Rica | - | absent | - | Jordan | - | - | Switzerland | - | 12 | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Kenya | absent | - | Syrian Arab Rep. | 12 | - | - |
| Cyprus | 2 | - | 7 | Kuwait | - | - | Thailand | absent | - | - |
| Czechoslovakia | 13 | - | - | Lebanon | 5 | - | Togo | - | - | 10 |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | 13 | - | - | Luxembourg | - | 9 | Tunisia | absent | - | - |
| Dem. Yemen | 10 | - | - | Malaysia | - | - | Uganda | - | - | 5 |
| Denmark | - | 10 | 2 | Mali | 10 | - | United Arab Emirates | absent | - | - |
| Djibouti | - | - | 9 | Mexico | 16 | - | United Kingdom | - | 17 | - |
| Dominican Rep. | - | absent | - | Monaco | - | 9 | United Rep. of Cameroon | - | - | 12 |
| Ecuador | - | absent | - | Mongolia | 10 | - | United States of America | - | 10 | - |
| Egypt | - | - | 16 | Morocco | - | 14 | USSR | 22 | - | - |
| Finland | - | - | 11 | Mozambique | 13 | - | Venezuela | - | - | 13 |
| France | - | 15 | - | Nepal | absent | - | Viet Nam | 15 | - | - |
| Gabon | - | - | 5 | Netherlands | - | 13 | Yemen | - | - | 12 |
| German Dem. Rep. | 13 | - | - | New Zealand | - | 10 | Yugoslavia | - | - | 14 |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | - | 18 | - | Nicaragua | 10 | - | Zaire | absent | - | - |
| Greece | 2 | 10 | - | Nigeria | absent | - | Zambia | absent | - | - |
| Guinea | - | absent | - | Norway | - | 11 | Zimbabwe | absent | - | - |
| Haiti | - | 11 | - | Panama | absent | - | | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | - | 16 | | | | |
| | | | | Poland | 15 | - | | | | |

ANNEX XII

MOTION FOR THE ADJOURNEMENT SINE DIE OF THE CONSIDERATION OF ALL REQUESTS FOR THE INCLUSION OF SUPPLEMENTARY ITEMS IN THE CONFERENCE AGENDA, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THOSE CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST, THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN, THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE ETHIOPIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA

Vote on the Indian Group's motion, as amended

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 655
 Negative votes 142
 Abstentions 113

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|-------------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|--------|-----|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|
| Algeria | 13 | - | - | Hungary | - | 5 | - | Portugal | 6 | - | 2 |
| Australia | 2 | 11 | - | Iceland | 9 | - | - | Rep. of Korea | 15 | - | - |
| Austria | 12 | - | - | India | 15 | - | - | Romania | - | - | 14 |
| Belgium | 10 | - | - | Indonesia | 21 | - | - | Rwanda | 11 | - | - |
| Benin | - | - | 11 | Iran | 15 | - | - | Senegal | 11 | - | - |
| Brazil | - | absent | - | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Singapore | 10 | - | - |
| Bulgaria | - | 12 | - | Ireland | 11 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Israel | - | 11 | - | Spain | 15 | - | - |
| Cape Verde | - | absent | - | Italy | 17 | - | - | Sri Lanka | - | absent | - |
| Colombia | - | - | 5 | Ivory Coast | 12 | - | - | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | - | 10 | - | Japan | 20 | - | - | Sweden | 12 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | - | 5 | - | Jordan | 10 | - | - | Switzerland | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | - | 12 | Kenya | - | absent | - | Syrian Arab Rep. | - | - | 12 |
| Cyprus | 6 | - | 3 | Kuwait | 10 | - | - | Thailand | - | absent | - |
| Czechoslovakia | - | 13 | - | Lebanon | - | - | 5 | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | - | - | 13 | Luxembourg | 9 | - | - | Tunisia | 12 | - | - |
| Dem. Yemen | - | - | 10 | Malaysia | 13 | - | - | Uganda | 5 | - | - |
| Denmark | 12 | - | - | Mali | 10 | - | - | United Arab Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| Djibouti | - | absent | - | Mexico | 16 | - | - | United Kingdom | 17 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | - | absent | - | Monaco | 9 | - | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | 12 | - | - |
| Ecuador | - | absent | - | Mongolia | - | 10 | - | United States of America | 10 | - | - |
| Egypt | 16 | - | - | Morocco | 14 | - | 13 | USSR | - | 22 | - |
| Finland | - | - | 11 | Mozambique | - | - | - | Venezuela | 13 | - | - |
| France | 15 | - | - | Nepal | - | absent | - | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Netherlands | 10 | - | - | Yemen | 12 | - | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | - | 13 | - | New Zealand | 10 | - | - | Yugoslavia | 14 | - | - |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | 18 | - | - | Nicaragua | 10 | - | - | Zaire | - | absent | - |
| Greece | 10 | - | 2 | Nigeria | - | absent | - | Zambia | - | absent | - |
| Guinea | - | absent | - | Norway | 11 | - | - | Zimbabwe | - | absent | - |
| Haiti | 11 | - | - | Panama | - | absent | - | | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Poland | - | 15 | - | | | | |

ANNEX XIII

THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

Vote on the request for the inclusion of this supplementary
item in the Conference agenda

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 863
Negative votes 5
Abstentions 12
Total of affirmative and negative votes 868
Two-thirds majority 579

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|----------------------------|-------------|----|-----|-------------|-------------|----|-----|-----------------------------|-------------|----|-----|
| Algeria | 13 | - | - | Hungary | 5 | - | - | Portugal | 8 | - | - |
| Australia | 10 | 3 | - | Iceland | 9 | - | - | Rep. of Korea | a b s e n t | | |
| Austria | 10 | - | - | India | 15 | - | - | Romania | 14 | - | - |
| Belgium | 12 | - | - | Indonesia | 21 | - | - | Rwanda | 11 | - | - |
| Benin | 11 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Senegal | 11 | - | - |
| Brazil | a b s e n t | | | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Singapore | 10 | - | - |
| Bulgaria | 12 | - | - | Ireland | 11 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Israel | 11 | - | - | Spain | 15 | - | - |
| Cape Verde | a b s e n t | | | Italy | 17 | - | - | Sri Lanka | a b s e n t | | |
| Colombia | 5 | - | - | Ivory Coast | 12 | - | - | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | a b s e n t | | | Japan | 20 | - | - | Sweden | 12 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | a b s e n t | | | Jordan | 10 | - | - | Switzerland | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Kenya | a b s e n t | | | Syrian Arab Rep. | 12 | - | - |
| Cyprus | 9 | - | - | Kuwait | 10 | - | - | Thailand | a b s e n t | | |
| Czechoslovakia | 13 | - | - | Lebanon | 5 | - | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | 13 | - | - | Luxembourg | 9 | - | - | Tunisia | 12 | - | - |
| Dem. Yemen | 10 | - | - | Malaysia | 13 | - | - | Uganda | a b s e n t | | |
| Denmark | 10 | 2 | - | Mali | 10 | - | - | United Arab Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| Djibouti | a b s e n t | | | Mexico | 16 | - | - | United Kingdom | 10 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | a b s e n t | | | Monaco | 9 | - | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | 12 | - | - |
| Ecuador | a b s e n t | | | Mongolia | 10 | - | - | United States of America | 10 | - | - |
| Egypt | 16 | - | - | Morocco | 14 | - | - | USSR | 22 | - | - |
| Finland | 10 | - | 1 | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Venezuela | 13 | - | - |
| France | 15 | - | - | Nepal | a b s e n t | | | Viet Nam | 15 | - | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Netherlands | 10 | - | - | Yemen | 12 | - | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | 13 | - | - | New Zealand | 10 | - | - | Yugoslavia | 14 | - | - |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | 18 | - | - | Nicaragua | 10 | - | - | Zaire | a b s e n t | | |
| Greece | 12 | - | - | Nigeria | a b s e n t | | | Zambia | a b s e n t | | |
| Guinea | a b s e n t | | | Norway | 11 | - | - | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |
| Haiti | - | - | 11 | Panama | a b s e n t | | | | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Poland | 15 | - | - | | | | |

ANNEX XIV

PROPOSAL FOR A DEFINITIVE PEACE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

Vote on the request for the inclusion of
this supplementary item in the
Conference agenda

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 785
Negative votes 0
Abstentions 46
Total of affirmative and negative votes.. 785
Two-thirds majority 524

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|----------------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-------------|----|-----|-----------------------------|-------------|----|-----|
| Algeria | - | - | 13 | Hungary | 5 | - | - | Portugal | 8 | - | - |
| Australia | 13 | - | - | Iceland | 9 | - | - | Rep. of Korea | a b s e n t | | |
| Austria | 12 | - | - | India | 15 | - | - | Romania | 14 | - | - |
| Belgium | 12 | - | - | Indonesia | 21 | - | - | Rwanda | 11 | - | - |
| Benin | 11 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Senegal | 11 | - | - |
| Brazil | | absent | | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Singapore | 10 | - | - |
| Bulgaria | 12 | - | - | Ireland | 11 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Israel | 11 | - | - | Spain | 15 | - | - |
| Cape Verde | | absent | | Italy | 17 | - | - | Sri Lanka | a b s e n t | | |
| Colombia | 5 | - | - | Ivory Coast | 12 | - | - | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | | absent | | Japan | 20 | - | - | Sweden | - | - | 12 |
| Costa Rica | | absent | | Jordan | 10 | - | - | Switzerland | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Kenya | a b s e n t | | | Syrian Arab Rep. | 12 | - | - |
| Cyprus | 9 | - | - | Kuwait | 10 | - | - | Thailand | a b s e n t | | |
| Czechoslovakia | 13 | - | - | Lebanon | 5 | - | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | | absent | | Luxembourg | a b s e n t | | | Tunisia | 10 | - | - |
| Dem. Yemen | 10 | - | - | Malaysia | 13 | - | - | Uganda | a b s e n t | | |
| Denmark | 12 | - | - | Mali | 10 | - | - | United Arab Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| Djibouti | | absent | | Mexico | a b s e n t | | | United Kingdom | 5 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | | absent | | Monaco | 9 | - | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | 12 | - | - |
| Ecuador | | absent | | Mongolia | 10 | - | - | United States of America | 10 | - | - |
| Egypt | 16 | - | - | Morocco | 14 | - | - | USSR | 22 | - | - |
| Finland | - | - | 11 | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Venezuela | 13 | - | - |
| France | 15 | - | - | Nepal | a b s e n t | | | Viet Nam | 15 | - | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Netherlands | 10 | - | - | Yemen | 12 | - | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | 13 | - | - | New Zealand | 5 | - | - | Yugoslavia | 14 | - | - |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | 18 | - | - | Nicaragua | - | - | 10 | Zaire | a b s e n t | | |
| Greece | 12 | - | - | Nigeria | a b s e n t | | | Zambia | a b s e n t | | |
| Guinea | | absent | | Norway | 11 | - | - | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |
| Haiti | 10 | - | - | Panama | a b s e n t | | | | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Poland | 15 | - | - | | | | |

ANNEX XV

THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

Vote on the request for the inclusion of this supplementary
item in the Conference agenda

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 496
Negative votes 209
Abstentions 114
Total of affirmative and negative votes 705
Two-thirds majority 470

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|----------------------------|-------------|----|-----|-------------|-------------|----|-----|-----------------------------|-------------------|----|-----|
| Algeria | - | - | 13 | Hungary | - | 5 | - | Portugal | 6 | 2 | - |
| Australia | 13 | - | - | Iceland | 9 | - | - | Rep. of Korea | 15 | - | - |
| Austria | 12 | - | - | India | A b s e n t | - | - | Romania | Not participating | - | - |
| Belgium | 6 | - | 6 | Indonesia | 21 | - | - | Rwanda | - | - | 11 |
| Benin | - | 11 | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Senegal | 11 | - | - |
| Brazil | A b s e n t | - | - | Iraq | - | - | 13 | Singapore | 10 | - | - |
| Bulgaria | - | 12 | - | Ireland | 11 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Israel | 11 | - | - | Spain | 15 | - | - |
| Cape Verde | A b s e n t | - | - | Italy | 11 | - | 6 | Sri Lanka | A b s e n t | - | - |
| Colombia | 5 | - | - | Ivory Coast | 10 | - | - | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | A b s e n t | - | - | Japan | 20 | - | - | Sweden | 12 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | A b s e n t | - | - | Jordan | A b s e n t | - | - | Switzerland | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Kenya | A b s e n t | - | - | Syrian Arab Rep. | - | 12 | - |
| Cyprus | 2 | 2 | 3 | Kuwait | A b s e n t | - | - | Thailand | A b s e n t | - | - |
| Czechoslovakia | - | 13 | - | Lebanon | - | 5 | - | Togo | - | - | 10 |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | - | 13 | - | Luxembourg | 9 | - | - | Tunisia | A b s e n t | - | - |
| Dem. Yemen | - | 10 | - | Malaysia | 13 | - | - | Uganda | A b s e n t | - | - |
| Denmark | 12 | - | - | Mali | - | - | 10 | United Arab Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| Djibouti | A b s e n t | - | - | Mexico | 10 | - | - | United Kingdom | 10 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | A b s e n t | - | - | Monaco | 9 | - | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | 12 | - | - |
| Ecuador | A b s e n t | - | - | Mongolia | - | 10 | - | United States of America | 10 | - | - |
| Egypt | 16 | - | - | Morocco | 14 | - | - | USSR | - | 22 | - |
| Finland | - | - | 11 | Mozambique | - | 13 | - | Venezuela | 13 | - | - |
| France | 5 | 10 | - | Nepal | A b s e n t | - | - | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Netherlands | 10 | - | - | Yemen | 12 | - | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | - | 13 | - | New Zealand | 5 | - | - | Yugoslavia | - | - | 14 |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | 18 | - | - | Nicaragua | - | - | 10 | Zaire | A b s e n t | - | - |
| Greece | 3 | 2 | 7 | Nigeria | A b s e n t | - | - | Zambia | A b s e n t | - | - |
| Guinea | A b s e n t | - | - | Norway | 10 | - | - | Zimbabwe | - | 12 | - |
| Haiti | 10 | - | - | Panama | A b s e n t | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Poland | - | 15 | - | | | | |

ANNEX XVI

THE ETHIOPIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC AND THE DANGERS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY THAT CAN RESULT FROM IT

Vote on the request for the inclusion of this supplementary
item in the Conference agenda

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 413
Negative votes 198
Abstentions 134
Total of affirmative and negative votes 611
Two-thirds majority 408

| YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-------------------|----|-----|------------------|-------------|----|-----|
| - | - | 13 | Hungary | - | 5 | - | Portugal | 6 | 2 | - |
| 13 | - | - | Iceland | 9 | - | - | Rep. of Korea | a b s e n t | | |
| 12 | - | - | India | a b s e n t | | | Romania | - | 14 | - |
| 5 | - | - | Indonesia | - | - | 21 | Rwanda | 11 | - | - |
| - | - | 11 | Iran | - | - | 15 | Senegal | - | - | 11 |
| - | absent | | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Singapore | 10 | - | - |
| - | 12 | - | Ireland | 11 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| 14 | - | - | Israel | 11 | - | - | Spain | 10 | - | - |
| - | absent | | Italy | 11 | - | 6 | Sri Lanka | a b s e n t | | |
| 5 | - | - | Ivory Coast | - | - | 10 | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| - | absent | | Japan | 19 | - | 1 | Sweden | 12 | - | - |
| - | absent | | Jordan | a b s e n t | | | Switzerland | 10 | - | - |
| - | 12 | - | Kenya | a b s e n t | | | Syrian Arab Rep. | - | 12 | - |
| - | absent | | Kuwait | a b s e n t | | | Thailand | a b s e n t | | |
| - | 13 | - | Lebanon | a b s e n t | | | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| - | absent | | Luxembourg | a b s e n t | | | Tunisia | a b s e n t | | |
| - | - | - | Malaysia | a b s e n t | | | Uganda | a b s e n t | | |
| - | 10 | - | Mali | - | - | 10 | United Arab | | | |
| 12 | - | - | Mexico | 5 | 5 | - | Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| - | absent | | Monaco | 9 | - | - | United Kingdom | 10 | - | - |
| - | absent | | Mongolia | - | 10 | - | United Rep. of | | | |
| - | absent | | Morocco | 14 | - | - | Cameroon | 12 | - | - |
| 16 | - | - | Mozambique | not participating | | | United States | | | |
| - | - | 11 | Nepal | a b s e n t | | | of America | 10 | - | - |
| - | - | 15 | Netherlands | 10 | - | - | USSR | - | 22 | - |
| 5 | - | - | New Zealand | 5 | - | - | Venezuela | 13 | - | - |
| - | 13 | - | Nicaragua | - | 10 | - | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| 18 | - | - | Nigeria | a b s e n t | | | Yemen | 12 | - | - |
| 10 | 2 | - | Norway | 11 | - | - | Yugoslavia | - | 14 | - |
| - | absent | | Panama | a b s e n t | | | Zaire | a b s e n t | | |
| - | - | 10 | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zambia | a b s e n t | | |
| - | - | - | Poland | - | 15 | - | Zimbabwe | - | 12 | - |

ANNEX XVII

THE CONTRIBUTION OF PARLIAMENTS TO THE URGENT ADOPTION
OF CONCRETE MEASURES, IN PARTICULAR, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT,
THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS AND ITS EFFECTS ON WORLD
ECONOMY AND EMPLOYMENT AND ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD

(Resolution adopted without a vote)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Considering that peace is the common property of mankind and that today it is also a necessary condition for the continued existence of mankind,

Deeply concerned at the fact that the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament adopted neither the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament nor another document on the main problems on the agenda, despite the urgent appeals by world public opinion and a large number of States and Governments which expected a radical turning point to be reached in respect of the cessation of the arms race and the adoption of concrete disarmament measures,

Greatly appreciating the major popular movements for peace and disarmament which have acquired an unprecedented magnitude and constitute the eloquent expression of the desire of public opinion in all countries to stop war and live in a world of peace and co-operation,

Deeply concerned at the serious aggravation of the international situation hindering the development of normal relations and the strengthening of mutual confidence and co-operation among nations,

Noting that new hotbeds of crisis and conflict between States have arisen in addition to the existing ones, and that this development has had an adverse effect on progress in the field of disarmament and arms control,

Stressing that the accentuation of the policy of force, consolidation and redivision of zones of influence, interference in internal affairs and violation of the sovereign right of peoples causes great dangers for the security and independence of peoples and threatens the very existence of mankind,

Regretting the lack of substantial results in the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament at a time when the whole of humanity wished for the adoption of concrete measures aimed at avoiding nuclear war, as well as the adoption of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the implementation of which would gradually lead to the achievement of general and complete disarmament,

Mindful of the fact that in present-day conditions a war, especially a nuclear war, threatens dire consequences for the survival of mankind and civilization,

Noting the role and the heavy responsibilities of Parliaments and parliamentarians regarding the destinies of their peoples and the urgent need to concert the efforts of peoples, Parliaments and Governments and all peace-loving forces so as to prevent the danger of a nuclear disaster, put an end to the policy of armaments and ensure the building of a world of peace, without weapons or wars,

Condemning any military doctrine that is based on starting any war, including nuclear war,

Noting with anxiety the constant growth of military expenditures which place a heavy burden on the economies of all countries and jeopardize their socio-economic development,

Concerned at the quantitative and qualitative development of weapons systems which constitute grave threats to world peace and security, and reaffirming that any significant progress in disarmament negotiations presupposes the restoration of mutual confidence,

Realizing that the danger of nuclear war is growing as existing nuclear arsenals are enhanced qualitatively and quantitatively,

Recognizing that one of the difficulties in halting the arms race is the extremely slow pace of disarmament negotiations as compared with the rapid momentum of the qualitative improvement in weaponry,

Noting that security has deteriorated in many regions of the world,

Welcoming the resumption of the preliminary negotiations between the USSR and the United States of America on the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments, and expressing its expectation that effective agreements based on equality and equal security will be achieved in that context,

Regretting that the negotiations between the United States of America and the USSR on the questions of arms limitation and disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, are proceeding too slowly and that some important agreements in this field have not yet been ratified,

Strongly urging all the nuclear Powers to seek the elimination of nuclear weapons by adopting effective international measures aimed at prohibition of the production, testing, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and, in particular, at ensuring that nuclear weapons will never again be used, so that the noble and common goal of all mankind, namely, lasting international peace and security, can be achieved,

Regarding good political will, preparedness to develop wide international co-operation in disarmament negotiations with the participation of all countries on an equal footing and readiness to subscribe to concrete disarmament obligations as fundamental prerequisites for the success of disarmament negotiations,

Considering that the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament should have been an important stage on the road towards enduring peace and security through the preservation and further development of all the positive results achieved in restricting the arms race and promoting disarmament in the 1970s, and that the Second Special Session did not fully achieve the expected results in this field, although it clearly reflected the firm determination of the overwhelming majority of States to strive for specific measures to prevent nuclear war and to achieve disarmament,

Aware of the immediate need to take practical steps for ending the worldwide military build-up and the arms race, promoting disarmament and taking urgent steps to avoid a nuclear war, for example in the following fields:

- A complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests;
- Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- A ban on chemical weapons;
- Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- The convening of a World Disarmament Conference;
- Security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States;
- Cuts in military budgets;
- Confidence-building measures;
- A comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Affirming that full commitment and strict adherence by all States to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other State and to respect the right of peoples to self-determination, must promote durable peace and genuine disarmament,

Aware of the extreme usefulness of all international negotiations, current or future, in increasing the security of States and possibly making available for the economic and social development of mankind the substantial savings effected by limiting and reducing the weapons systems covered by the aforesaid negotiations, and aware also that such negotiations need to lead to balanced and verifiable agreements,

Convinced of the close link between disarmament and development, and of the great benefits to be derived from rechannelling the funds now being used in the arms race and those released by effective disarmament measures to alleviation of the economic and social problems at present faced by peoples, particularly in the developing countries,

Stressing that parliamentarians believe that détente, aimed at the reduction and final elimination of tensions between States and peoples, can help to shape a more secure, stable and just future for mankind,

A

1. Calls upon the Parliaments and Governments of all countries in the world to take steps to implement the measures adopted by the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, to give serious consideration to the proposals made at that session, and in particular, to consider as soon as possible, in response to the appeal of the participants in the Session, appropriate proposals aimed at ensuring the prevention of war, first of all of nuclear war - and thus to ensure that the existence of mankind is not threatened - and achieving real disarmament aimed at strengthening peace and international security;
2. Urges Parliaments and Governments to support the following specific measures:
 - (a) The formulation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament that gives the highest priority to nuclear disarmament;
 - (b) An early and meaningful resumption of the strategic arms limitation and reduction talks, leading to limitations and reductions as soon as possible;
 - (c) A clear endorsement of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty;
 - (d) An agreement, within the strategic arms limitation context, to stop the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles;
 - (e) A successful conclusion to the US-Soviet talks in Geneva on the limitation and reduction of all types of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe on the basis of the principles of equality and equal security;
 - (f) Agreement in the Committee on Disarmament and other international forums on a comprehensive nuclear test ban;
 - (g) A multilateral treaty banning radiological weapons;
 - (h) The adherence of all States to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;
 - (i) The prohibition of all other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, particularly the neutron bomb, and of development of new kinds of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons;
 - (j) A treaty prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and providing for their destruction;

- (k) A further call exhorting all States which have not yet done so to adhere to the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction;
- (l) New agreements which would reinforce or complement the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in the form of a treaty on the prohibition of development, testing and stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space;
- (m) Further strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the decisions of the 36th session of the UN General Assembly, so as to ensure (i) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, both in its vertical and horizontal aspects; and (ii) full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs;
- (n) Security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States;
- (o) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (p) Other limited arms control agreements such as the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques and the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects;
- (q) The freezing of military expenditure for 1982 and its reduction by 10% - 15% by 1985;
- (r) The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the world through arrangements between the States of the respective regions, the nuclear-weapon Powers undertaking not to use nuclear weapons or force in general against the States belonging to such zones;
- (s) The withdrawal of all foreign troops to within national boundaries, the dismantling of foreign military bases and the undertaking by each State not to deploy troops or establish military bases on the territory of other States;
- (t) Agreements leading to a successful conclusion to the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reduction;
- (u) A world conference on military expenditures;

B

3. Urges all Parliaments and Governments:

- (a) To act firmly for the cessation of the arms race and for the development of genuine disarmament measures, particularly nuclear disarmament, by ensuring a military balance which does not endanger the security and peace of any country and which can be achieved not through an increase in armaments but through their gradual, effective and proportionately equitable reduction;
- (b) To reduce military expenditures on a concerted basis with the goal of reducing them to no more than 10 per cent of GNP;
- (c) To strengthen parliamentary contacts at the regional and sub-regional levels with the aim of increasing confidence and strengthening security, and to support the action by the Inter-Parliamentary Union for avoiding war, particularly nuclear war, and promoting negotiations on disarmament with the aim of achieving general and complete disarmament;
- (d) To establish adequate verification of the implementation of disarmament or arms limitation measures;
- (e) To stop arms assistance to countries committing aggression and to stop exploiting the Third World area merely for the sake of self-interest which, if they do not stop, will create a further arms race and increase the defence spending of neighbouring countries;
- (f) To give their support to the successful holding of the World Disarmament Campaign and to contribute to the implementation of specific actions aimed at mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, such as collecting signatures in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to curb the arms race and for disarmament;
- (g) To contribute to halting the deterioration of the international situation, to stimulate developments in the world towards world peace and to support all efforts directed towards the solution of crises, opposing all forms of aggression, intervention, interference in the internal affairs of independent States and pressure on such States;
- (h) To seek ways and means of channelling the enormous human, natural, scientific and technological resources now being wasted on the arms race towards improving the lot of mankind through economic and social development and the eradication of hunger, disease and other acute economic and social problems;

4. Calls upon the Parliaments and Governments of the European countries, Canada and the United States of America to make every effort to ensure that the Madrid Meeting of the CSCE, in the further course of its work, agrees on the adoption of a substantial and balanced final document including, in particular, a precise mandate for a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe; this Conference should be held within the framework of the CSCE process and should deal, in its first phase, with confidence- and security-building measures which should be militarily significant, politically binding and provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content;
5. Calls for the cessation of the stationing and development of medium-range missiles in Europe, the withdrawal and destruction of existing missiles, and the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the continent;
6. Advocates the reduction of military activities of all the blocs and their termination, and the establishment between the two major blocs and, in general, between the two parties, of a maximum ceiling for the main weapons;
7. Calls upon Parliaments, National Groups and Governments to devote even greater attention and priority to the problems of disarmament, including nuclear weapons;
8. Advocates the establishment, within the framework of the United Nations, of an international body empowered to monitor and inspect the implementation of the disarmament measures adopted, full support being accorded to it by Governments;
9. Calls on Parliaments and Governments to work firmly for the settlement of all conflicts between States solely by peaceful means, for the elimination of present conflicts and their settlement by political means and by talks, and for the prevention of the emergence of any new military conflict or confrontation;

C

10. Requests the Executive Committee of the Inter-Parliamentary Union to set up a working group to study and report to the Council on the feasibility of creating a permanent committee to which parliamentarians from member Groups could appeal if their country should become involved or likely to become involved in a conflict with the country of another member Group.

ANNEX XVIII

THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND
THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

(Resolution adopted by 617 votes to 32, with 132 abstentions)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Faithful to its principles and to those of the United Nations Charter,

Considering with grief that, on 6 June 1982, after launching savage air raids against Beirut and dozens of towns, villages and Lebanese and Palestinian refugee camps, Israel invaded Lebanon by land, sea and air, employing vast quantities of deadly weapons, including weapons prohibited by international law,

Recalling the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and specifically Security Council resolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 520 (1982) and 521 (1982) concerning Israeli aggression in Lebanon,

Recalling, in particular, Security Council resolutions 512 (1982) and 513 (1982) which call for respect for the rights of the civilian populations without any discrimination and condemn all acts of violence against those populations,

Recalling also the resolutions adopted on the Middle East problem and the Palestinian question by Inter-Parliamentary Conferences and the Inter-Parliamentary Council, particularly those concerning the condemnation of Israel's violations of the rights of the Palestinian people, its occupation of Arab territories following the June 1967 aggression, its illegal decision to annex Jerusalem which it considers as Israel's eternal capital, the annexation of the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, the bombing of the Iraqi reactor devoted to scientific and peaceful purposes, the establishment of settlements and the modification of the demographic structure of the occupied territories,

Declaring that all the pretexts put forward by Israel to justify its present and past aggressions against Lebanon are inadmissible and baseless, as is the justification of its conception of Israeli security and peace, all of which are merely a cover for its policy of aggression, expansion and usurpation of Arab and Palestinian lands and rights, and affirming that the recent aggression against Lebanon represents a dangerous escalation which imperils the security of neighbouring States and seriously threatens security and peace in the region and in the world,

Reaffirming the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland, to self-determination and to the creation of an independent State on their national soil, and affirming that the PLO is the legitimate and sole representative of the Palestinian people and that any negotiations regarding the Palestinian question, which is at the heart of the Middle East conflict, requires the full and entire participation of the PLO on an equal footing,

Noting with profound regret that one of the permanent members of the Security Council (United States of America) used its veto to prevent the Security Council from taking effective measures which could have dissuaded Israel from pursuing its aggression,

Expressing its deep indignation at the massacres carried out by the invading forces in Lebanon on 17 September - while this Conference was being held - in the Palestinian refugee centres at Chatila and Sabra in Beirut, costing the lives of thousands of unarmed innocent people,

Considering that this dreadful act constitutes the height of collective atrocity against innocent people and against all mankind,

A.

1. Firmly condemns Israeli aggression against Lebanese territory and the violation of Lebanese sovereignty, just as it condemns the Israeli forces of aggression for the massacre of innocent citizens of the Lebanese and Palestinian nations, the destruction of dwellings, villages and towns, the siege and subsequent occupation of Beirut and the uninterrupted bombing of residential areas with all kinds of weapons prohibited by international law;
2. Calls for the immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces of aggression from all Lebanese territories and demands that the legitimate Lebanese authorities should have the possibility of extending their sovereignty throughout the Lebanese national territory, as well as the implementation of Security Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982);
3. Calls for the release by Israel of all detained Palestinians and Lebanese, and demands that Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners should be treated as prisoners of war in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention;
4. Vigorously denounces the attitude of the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) which, by a large majority, decided to support its Government's aggression against Lebanon, and asserts that this and other previous decisions regarding the annexation of Jerusalem and of the Golan and support for aggressive and expansionist acts are in violation of the commitments of the members of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, whose first concern must be for the safeguard of peace, disarmament, the liberation of peoples and respect for human rights and international legitimacy, and calls for a re-evaluation by the Inter-Parliamentary Union of the Israeli Parliament's behaviour with regard to the principles of the Union;
5. Invites the Parliaments of the world to exert pressure on their respective Governments to apply the resolution adopted at the 9th Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 5 February 1981 and the resolution adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Council at its meeting in Lagos on 17 April 1982, which called upon all UN member States:
 - (a) To refrain from supplying Israel with any weapons and related equipment and to suspend any military assistance which Israel receives from them;

- (b) To refrain from acquiring any weapons or military equipment from Israel;
 - (c) To suspend economic, financial and technological assistance to and co-operation with Israel;
 - (d) To sever diplomatic, trade and cultural relations with Israel;
6. Demands that the United States of America put an end to military and economic aid to Israel which has enabled it to commit its criminal aggression against Lebanon;
7. Requests the establishment by the Inter-Parliamentary Council of a committee to investigate the following points:
- (a) The indiscriminate bombing of residential areas, schools and hospitals and the massacre of the sick and of women and children;
 - (b) The weapons employed in the course of Israel's aggression against Lebanon;
 - (c) The conditions of detention of imprisoned Lebanese and Palestinian combatants;

on the understanding that the committee will present a report on its activities to the Executive Committee, for submission to the next meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Council in April 1983;

B.

1. Once again calls upon Israel to withdraw immediately from all Arab territories occupied since 1967, to abandon the settlements, to refrain from establishing any new settlements, to facilitate the return of displaced and expelled Palestinians and to put an end to all its acts of oppression against persons resisting Israeli occupation;
2. Considers that the principles embodied in the decision of the Twelfth Arab Summit in Fez concerning the invasion of Lebanon by Israel and the Palestinian question constitute a basis for a just and permanent solution of the Middle East problem and of the Palestinian question, and affirms that international legitimacy must be the essential basis of any settlement of the Palestinian question;
3. Appeals to all the parties concerned to undertake, as soon as conditions permit, within the framework of the United Nations, negotiation for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, taking into consideration all the relevant United Nations resolutions;

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Requests the Secretary General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union to include in the annual Report that he will present to the 70th Inter-Parliamentary Conference information on Israel's implementation of this resolution and of United Nations Security Council and General Assembly resolutions demanding an immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon.

ANNEX XIX

THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

Vote on the preamble and section A

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 586
 Negative votes 58
 Abstentions 132

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|-------------------------|--------|----|-----|-------------|--------|----|-----|--------------------------|--------|----|-----|
| Algeria | 13 | - | - | Hungary | 10 | - | - | Portugal | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Australia | - | 11 | 2 | Iceland | absent | - | - | Rep. of Korea | absent | - | - |
| Austria | 7 | 5 | - | India | 10 | - | - | Romania | 14 | - | - |
| Belgium | - | 5 | 5 | Indonesia | 21 | - | - | Rwanda | 11 | - | - |
| Benin | 11 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Senegal | absent | - | - |
| Brazil | absent | - | - | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Singapore | absent | - | - |
| Bulgaria | 12 | - | - | Ireland | 11 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 2 | 4 | 6 | Israel | - | 11 | - | Spain | absent | - | - |
| Cape Verde | 9 | - | - | Italy | 5 | - | 7 | Sri Lanka | absent | - | - |
| Congo | absent | - | - | Ivory Coast | absent | - | - | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | absent | - | - | Japan | 1 | - | 19 | Sweden | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Jordan | 10 | - | - | Switzerland | - | - | 10 |
| Cyprus | 9 | - | - | Kenya | 13 | - | - | Syrian Arab Rep. | 12 | - | - |
| Czechoslovakia | 13 | - | - | Kuwait | 10 | - | - | Thailand | 16 | - | - |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | absent | - | - | Lebanon | absent | - | - | Togo | 5 | - | - |
| Dem. Yemen | 10 | - | - | Luxembourg | absent | - | - | Tunisia | 5 | - | - |
| Denmark | 3 | 3 | 6 | Malaysia | absent | - | - | Uganda | 13 | - | - |
| Djibouti | absent | - | - | Mali | 10 | - | - | United Arab Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | absent | - | - | Mexico | 5 | - | - | United Kingdom | - | - | 17 |
| Ecuador | 5 | - | - | Monaco | absent | - | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | 12 | - | - |
| Egypt | 16 | - | - | Mongolia | 10 | - | - | United States of America | - | 10 | 10 |
| Finland | 10 | 1 | - | Morocco | 14 | - | - | USSR | 22 | - | - |
| France | 2 | 4 | 9 | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Venezuela | - | - | 5 |
| Gabon | - | - | 5 | Nepal | - | - | 5 | Viet Nam | absent | - | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | 13 | - | - | Netherlands | - | - | 13 | Yemen | 10 | - | - |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | absent | - | - | New Zealand | absent | - | - | Yugoslavia | 14 | - | - |
| Greece | 12 | - | - | Nicaragua | 10 | - | - | Zaire | absent | - | - |
| Guinea | absent | - | - | Nigeria | 10 | - | - | Zambia | 10 | - | - |
| Haiti | absent | - | - | Norway | 2 | 2 | 6 | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |
| | | | | Panama | - | - | 5 | | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Poland | 15 | - | - | | | | |

ANNEX XX

THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

Vote on Section B

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 677
 Negative votes 25
 Abstentions 86

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|----------------------------|--------|----|-----|-------------|--------|--------|-----|-----------------------------|--------|----|-----|
| Algeria | 13 | - | - | Hungary | 10 | - | - | Portugal | 2 | - | 5 |
| Australia | 10 | 3 | - | Iceland | - | - | 5 | Rep. of Korea | absent | - | - |
| Austria | 7 | - | 5 | India | 10 | - | - | Romania | 14 | - | - |
| Belgium | - | - | 10 | Indonesia | 21 | - | - | Rwanda | 10 | - | - |
| Benin | 5 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Senegal | absent | - | - |
| Brazil | absent | - | - | Iraq | - | - | 13 | Singapore | absent | - | - |
| Bulgaria | 12 | - | - | Ireland | 11 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 6 | 1 | 5 | Israel | - | 11 | - | Spain | absent | - | - |
| Cape Verde | 5 | - | - | Italy | 14 | - | 1 | Sri Lanka | absent | - | - |
| Congo | absent | - | - | Ivory Coast | 5 | - | - | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | absent | - | - | Japan | 1 | - | 19 | Sweden | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Jordan | 10 | - | - | Switzerland | 10 | - | - |
| Cyprus | 9 | - | - | Kenya | 13 | - | - | Syrian Arab Rep. | 12 | - | - |
| Czechoslovakia | 13 | - | - | Kuwait | 10 | - | - | Thailand | 15 | - | - |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | absent | - | - | Lebanon | - | absent | - | Togo | 5 | - | - |
| Dem. Yemen | 10 | - | - | Luxembourg | - | - | 5 | Tunisia | 5 | - | - |
| Denmark | 3 | 3 | 6 | Malaysia | absent | - | - | Uganda | 13 | - | - |
| Djibouti | absent | - | - | Mali | 10 | - | - | United Arab Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | absent | - | - | Mexico | 10 | - | - | United Kingdom | 17 | - | - |
| Ecuador | absent | - | - | Monaco | absent | - | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | 12 | - | - |
| Egypt | 16 | - | - | Mongolia | 10 | - | - | United States of America | 15 | 5 | - |
| Finland | 10 | - | 1 | Morocco | 14 | - | - | USSR | 22 | - | - |
| France | 15 | - | - | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Venezuela | - | - | 5 |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Nepal | absent | - | - | Viet Nam | 15 | - | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | 13 | - | - | Netherlands | 13 | - | - | Yemen | 10 | - | - |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | absent | - | - | New Zealand | absent | - | - | Yugoslavia | 14 | - | - |
| Greece | 12 | - | - | Nicaragua | 10 | - | - | Zaire | absent | - | - |
| Guinea | absent | - | - | Nigeria | 10 | - | - | Zambia | 10 | - | - |
| Haiti | absent | - | - | Norway | 2 | 2 | 6 | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |
| | | | | Panama | absent | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Poland | 15 | - | - | | | | |

ANNEX XXI

THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

Vote on the resolution

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 617
 Negative votes 32
 Abstentions 132

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|------------------|-------------|----|-----|-------------|-------------|----|-----|------------------|-------------|----|-----|
| Algeria | 13 | - | - | Hungary | 10 | - | - | Portugal | 5 | - | - |
| Australia | - | 7 | 6 | Iceland | - | - | 5 | Rep. of Korea | a b s e n t | | |
| Austria | 7 | 5 | - | India | 10 | - | - | Romania | 14 | - | - |
| Belgium | - | 5 | - | Indonesia | 21 | - | - | Rwanda | 10 | - | - |
| Benin | 5 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Senegal | a b s e n t | | |
| Brazil | a b s e n t | | | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Singapore | a b s e n t | | |
| Bulgaria | 12 | - | - | Ireland | 11 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 2 | 4 | 6 | Israel | - | - | 11 | Spain | a b s e n t | | |
| Cape Verde | 5 | - | - | Italy | 14 | - | 1 | Sri Lanka | a b s e n t | | |
| Congo | a b s e n t | | | Ivory Coast | a b s e n t | | | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | a b s e n t | | | Japan | 1 | - | 19 | Sweden | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Jordan | 10 | - | - | Switzerland | - | - | 10 |
| Cyprus | 9 | - | - | Kenya | 13 | - | - | Syrian Arab Rep. | 12 | - | - |
| Czechoslovakia | 13 | - | - | Kuwait | 10 | - | - | Thailand | 15 | - | - |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. | | | | Lebanon | a b s e n t | | | Togo | 5 | - | - |
| of Korea | a b s e n t | | | Luxembourg | - | - | 5 | Tunisia | 5 | - | - |
| Dem. Yemen | 10 | - | - | Malaysia | a b s e n t | | | Uganda | 13 | - | - |
| Denmark | 3 | 3 | 6 | Mali | 5 | - | - | United Arab | | | |
| Djibouti | a b s e n t | | | Mexico | 10 | - | - | Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | a b s e n t | | | Monaco | a b s e n t | | | United Kingdom | - | - | 17 |
| Ecuador | 5 | - | - | Mongolia | 10 | - | - | United Rep. of | | | |
| Egypt | 16 | - | - | Morocco | 14 | - | - | Cameroon | 12 | - | - |
| Finland | 10 | 1 | - | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | United States | | | |
| France | - | - | 10 | Nepal | a b s e n t | | | of America | - | 5 | 15 |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Netherlands | 13 | - | - | USSR | 22 | - | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | 13 | - | - | New Zealand | a b s e n t | | | Venezuela | - | - | 10 |
| Germany (Fed. | | | | Nicaragua | 10 | - | - | Viet Nam | 15 | - | - |
| Rep. of) | a b s e n t | | | Nigeria | 10 | - | - | Yemen | 10 | - | - |
| Greece | 12 | - | - | Norway | 2 | 2 | 6 | Yugoslavia | 14 | - | - |
| Guinea | a b s e n t | | | Panama | a b s e n t | | | Zaire | a b s e n t | | |
| Haiti | a b s e n t | | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zambia | 10 | - | - |
| | | | | Poland | 15 | - | - | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |

ANNEX XXII

PROPOSAL FOR A DEFINITE PEACE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

(Resolution adopted without a vote)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Reaffirming its conviction that the only viable way of settling controversial issues between States is by means of negotiation, and stressing the necessity to renounce completely the threat or use of force in the settlement of differences between States or peoples,

Recalling United Nations Security Council resolutions 479 (1980) and 514 (1982),

Deeply concerned at the prolongation of the conflict between the two countries, resulting in heavy losses of human life and considerable material damage and endangering peace and security,

Taking note of the efforts at mediation pursued notably by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his representative, as well as by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Organization of the Islamic Conference,

1. Calls for an immediate cease-fire and an end to all military operations, as well as for the withdrawal of all forces to within their internationally recognized boundaries;
2. Calls upon all parties to the conflict to co-operate fully with the mediation efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations with a view to establishing a basis for negotiations aimed at the achievement of a comprehensive, just and honourable settlement of the conflict.

ANNEX XXIII

THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

(Resolution adopted by 439 votes to 164, with 88 abstentions)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Having considered in general the search for a political solution to the problem of invasion and occupation by foreign troops, and taking into account in particular the situation in Afghanistan,

1. Urges the implementation of the resolutions of the Inter-Parliamentary Council of 12 April 1980 and of the 67th Inter-Parliamentary Conference of 23 September 1980, the resolution of the Third Islamic Conference held from 25 to 28 January 1981 and the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 18 November 1981 calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever and appealing to all States to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan;
2. Calls therefore upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan at the earliest possible date, inviting the parties concerned to agree to the urgent achievement of a political solution in accordance with the provisions of the resolution referred to above.

ANNEX XXIV

THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

Vote on the resolution

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 439

Negative votes 164

Abstentions 88

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|-------------------------|--------|----|-----|-------------|--------|----|-----|--------------------------|-------------------|----|-----|
| Algeria | - | - | 13 | Hungary | - | 10 | - | Portugal | 6 | 2 | - |
| Australia | 13 | - | - | Iceland | 5 | - | - | Rep. of Korea | 15 | - | - |
| Austria | 12 | - | - | India | absent | - | - | Romania | not participating | - | - |
| Belgium | 10 | - | - | Indonesia | 21 | - | - | Rwanda | - | - | 10 |
| Benin | absent | - | - | Iran | 10 | - | 5 | Senegal | absent | - | - |
| Brazil | absent | - | - | Iraq | absent | - | - | Singapore | absent | - | - |
| Bulgaria | - | 12 | - | Ireland | 11 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Israel | absent | - | - | Spain | absent | - | - |
| Cape Verde | absent | - | - | Italy | 13 | - | - | Sri Lanka | absent | - | - |
| Congo | absent | - | - | Ivory Coast | 5 | - | - | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | absent | - | - | Japan | 20 | - | - | Sweden | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Jordan | absent | - | - | Switzerland | 5 | - | - |
| Cyprus | 5 | 3 | - | Kenya | 13 | - | - | Syrian Arab Rep. | - | 12 | - |
| Czechoslovakia | - | 13 | - | Kuwait | 10 | - | - | Thailand | 16 | - | - |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | absent | - | - | Lebanon | absent | - | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Dem. Yemen | - | 10 | - | Luxembourg | 5 | - | - | Tunisia | absent | - | - |
| Denmark | 12 | - | - | Malaysia | absent | - | - | Uganda | - | - | 5 |
| Djibouti | absent | - | - | Mali | absent | - | - | United Arab Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | absent | - | - | Mexico | 10 | - | - | United Kingdom | 17 | - | - |
| Ecuador | 5 | - | - | Monaco | absent | - | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | 12 | - | - |
| Egypt | 16 | - | - | Mongolia | - | 10 | - | United States of America | 20 | - | - |
| Finland | - | - | 11 | Morocco | 14 | - | - | USSR | - | 22 | - |
| France | 10 | - | - | Mozambique | - | 13 | - | Venezuela | 5 | - | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Nepal | absent | - | - | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | - | 13 | - | Netherlands | 13 | - | - | Yemen | absent | - | - |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | absent | - | - | New Zealand | absent | - | - | Yugoslavia | - | - | 14 |
| Greece | 10 | 2 | - | Nicaragua | - | - | 5 | Zaire | absent | - | - |
| Guinea | absent | - | - | Nigeria | - | - | 15 | Zambia | - | - | 10 |
| Haiti | absent | - | - | Norway | 10 | - | - | Zimbabwe | not participating | - | - |
| | | | | Panama | absent | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Poland | - | 15 | - | | | | |

ANNEX XXV

THE ETHIOPIAN AGRESSION AGAINST THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC AND THE DANGERS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY THAT CAN RESULT FROM IT

(Resolution adopted by 365 votes to 170, with 170 abstentions)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Mindful of the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State, or from acting in any manner inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations,

Aware that the Ethiopian invasion tends to destabilize the whole region and presents a threat to international peace and security,

1. Strongly condemns the military invasion carried out by Ethiopia and its allies and directed against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Somali Democratic Republic;
2. Deplores the continuing conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities, urges all parties to the conflict to negotiate a political solution in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, and also requests the immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the Somali Democratic Republic.

ANNEX XXVI

THE ETHIOPIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
AND THE DANGERS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
THAT CAN RESULT FROM IT

Vote on the preamble and on operative paragraph 1

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 333
Negative votes 206
Abstentions 131

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|----------------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-------------------|--------|-----|-----------------------------|-----|--------|-----|
| Algeria | - | - | 13 | Hungary | - | 10 | - | Portugal | 6 | 2 | - |
| Australia | 13 | - | - | Iceland | | absent | - | Rep. of Korea | | absent | - |
| Austria | 12 | - | - | India | | absent | - | Romania | - | 14 | - |
| Belgium | 10 | - | - | Indonesia | 21 | - | - | Rwanda | - | - | 10 |
| Benin | - | 5 | - | Iran | 5 | - | 10 | Senegal | | absent | - |
| Brazil | | absent | - | Iraq | | absent | - | Singapore | | absent | - |
| Bulgaria | - | 12 | - | Ireland | 10 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Israel | - | - | 11 | Spain | 5 | - | - |
| Cape Verde | - | 5 | - | Italy | 8 | - | 5 | Sri Lanka | | absent | - |
| Congo | | absent | - | Ivory Coast | - | - | 5 | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | | absent | - | Japan | 14 | - | 1 | Sweden | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Jordan | | absent | - | Switzerland | 5 | - | - |
| Cyprus | 2 | 2 | 2 | Kenya | - | - | 13 | Syrian Arab Rep. | | 12 | - |
| Czechoslovakia | - | 13 | - | Kuwait | 10 | - | - | Thailand | 10 | - | 6 |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | | absent | - | Lebanon | | absent | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Dem. Yemen | - | 10 | - | Luxembourg | 5 | - | - | Tunisia | | absent | - |
| Denmark | 12 | - | - | Malaysia | | absent | - | Uganda | - | - | 13 |
| Djibouti | | absent | - | Mali | | absent | - | United Arab Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | | absent | - | Mexico | - | - | 5 | United Kingdom | 17 | - | - |
| Ecuador | 5 | - | - | Monaco | | absent | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | - | - | 12 |
| Egypt | 16 | - | - | Mongolia | - | 10 | - | United States of America | | absent | - |
| Finland | - | - | 11 | Morocco | 14 | - | - | USSR | - | 22 | - |
| France | 10 | - | - | Mozambique | not participating | | | Venezuela | 5 | - | - |
| Gabon | | absent | - | Nepal | | absent | - | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | - | 13 | - | Netherlands | 13 | - | - | Yemen | | absent | - |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | | absent | - | New Zealand | | absent | - | Yugoslavia | - | - | 14 |
| Greece | 10 | 2 | - | Nicaragua | - | 5 | - | Zaire | | absent | - |
| Guinea | | absent | - | Nigeria | - | 15 | - | Zambia | | absent | - |
| Haiti | | absent | - | Norway | 10 | - | - | Zimbabwe | - | 12 | - |
| | | | | Panama | | absent | - | | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Poland | - | 15 | - | | | | |

ANNEX XXVII

THE ETHIOPIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
AND THE DANGERS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
THAT CAN RESULT FROM IT

Vote on the resolution

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 365
Negative votes 170
Abstentions 170

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|-------------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|-------------------|-----|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|
| Algeria | - | - | 13 | Hungary | - | 10 | - | Portugal | 6 | 2 | - |
| Australia | 13 | - | - | Iceland | 5 | - | - | Rep. of Korea | - | absent | - |
| Austria | 10 | - | - | India | - | - | 10 | Romania | - | 14 | - |
| Belgium | 10 | - | - | Indonesia | 21 | - | - | Rwanda | 10 | - | - |
| Benin | - | - | 10 | Iran | 5 | - | 10 | Senegal | - | absent | - |
| Brazil | - | absent | - | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Singapore | - | absent | - |
| Bulgaria | - | 12 | - | Ireland | 10 | - | - | Somalia | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Israel | - | - | 11 | Spain | 5 | - | - |
| Cape Verde | - | absent | - | Italy | 8 | - | 5 | Sri Lanka | - | absent | - |
| Congo | - | absent | - | Ivory Coast | - | - | 5 | Sudan | 13 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | - | absent | - | Japan | 14 | - | 1 | Sweden | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Jordan | - | absent | - | Switzerland | 5 | - | - |
| Cyprus | 2 | 3 | - | Kenya | - | - | 13 | Syrian Arab Rep. | - | 12 | - |
| Czechoslovakia | - | 13 | - | Kuwait | 10 | - | - | Thailand | 16 | - | - |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | - | absent | - | Lebanon | - | absent | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Dem. Yemen | - | 10 | - | Luxembourg | 5 | - | - | Tunisia | - | absent | - |
| Denmark | 12 | - | - | Malaysia | - | absent | - | Uganda | - | - | 13 |
| Djibouti | - | absent | - | Mali | - | absent | - | United Arab Emirates | 9 | - | - |
| Dominican Rep. | - | absent | - | Mexico | - | - | 5 | United Kingdom | 17 | - | - |
| Ecuador | 5 | - | - | Monaco | - | absent | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | - | - | 12 |
| Egypt | 16 | - | - | Mongolia | - | 10 | - | United States of America | - | absent | - |
| Finland | - | - | 11 | Morocco | 14 | - | - | USSR | - | 22 | - |
| France | 10 | - | - | Mozambique | - | not participating | - | Venezuela | 5 | - | - |
| Gabon | - | - | 5 | Nepal | - | absent | - | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | - | 13 | - | Netherlands | 13 | - | - | Yemen | - | absent | - |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | - | absent | - | New Zealand | - | absent | - | Yugoslavia | - | - | 14 |
| Greece | 10 | 2 | - | Nicaragua | - | 5 | - | Zaire | - | absent | - |
| Guinea | - | absent | - | Nigeria | - | - | 10 | Zambia | - | - | 10 |
| Haiti | - | absent | - | Norway | 10 | - | - | Zimbabwe | - | - | 12 |
| | | | | Panama | - | absent | - | | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | | | | |
| | | | | Poland | - | 15 | - | | | | |

ANNEX XXVIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS WITH
RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND THEIR WORK IN THE
SPHERE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

(Resolution adopted without a vote)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Recalling that parliamentary institutions represent a fundamental element of the balance of powers in democratic systems, that they play a significant part in guaranteeing respect for the Constitution and human rights, and that they assume an important role in the field of international relations,

Recalling the Charter of the United Nations, particularly Chapters I and II, and the commitment of member States thereto,

Considering that the development of parliamentary institutions in the spirit of respect for the Constitution and the codification of the peaceful foundations of foreign policy of States in national legislation contribute to the achievement of peaceful co-operation among States,

Stressing that since they are chosen by the people through free and fair elections held at regular intervals, parliamentarians represent, on the one hand, a very strong link between Parliaments of different countries as illustrated by the close contacts within the Inter-Parliamentary Union and constitute, on the other hand, the irreplaceable intermediaries in the permanent maintenance of the indispensable dialogue between the organs of power and the citizens, including on the problems of international relations,

Convinced of the need to improve and make better use of the forms and methods of action of Parliaments for influencing the foreign policy of Governments in order that it may serve the cause of peace, international security, friendship and co-operation among peoples;

1. Invites Parliaments, with due regard to the Constitutions and traditions of their countries, to seek appropriate methods and forms of action with a view to building up their influence over the foreign policy of their Governments so that the latter may make a greater contribution to strengthening international peace and security, to promoting détente and the disarmament process, and to developing co-operation, friendship and trust among peoples;
2. Recommends more particularly the following forms of parliamentary activity which help to direct the Government's foreign policy and foster its monitoring by Parliament :

- Systematic and public examination, within Parliament and its specialized bodies, of major foreign policy issues with special reference to international peace and security, cessation of the arms race and disarmament;
 - Submission for parliamentary approval of all important international treaties and agreements to which Governments intend that their countries should become party, the harmonization of their domestic legislation with such treaties and agreements and the adoption of provisions enabling national Parliaments to monitor their effective implementation;
 - The various ways in which Parliament is informed about major negotiations conducted by the Government, its policy in international organizations and the activity of such organizations;
 - Inclusion in domestic legislation, by means which accord with the democratic practices and procedures of each country, of the principles of relations between States which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and other international legal instruments;
3. Encourages all parliamentarians to keep themselves closely informed of their Governments' foreign policy and to endeavour to influence its course, by all the means at their disposal, in a direction favourable to world peace, respect for human rights and achievement of the objectives of the United Nations;
 4. Considers that the strengthening of inter-parliamentary contacts, at the international level, designed to promote mutual respect and understanding is essential for that purpose;
 5. Calls on all Parliaments to draft and to enact, in their respective countries, legislation guaranteeing political and economic freedom for all mass media to enable, inter alia, a free, fair and full exchange of views on relations between States and thus promote mutual understanding among them in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and the Statutes of the Inter-Parliamentary Union;
 6. Encourages the governing bodies of all countries to foster citizens' participation in political decision-making, free of undue interference by institutionalized pressure groups, by establishing, through democratic means, decentralized representative institutions with real power and adequate financial resources, as well as other possible means in the spirit of the Constitution and traditions of each country;
 7. Calls on the Parliaments of all countries to exercise vigilant, concrete and permanent oversight of governmental action, particularly in the field of international relations, and to provide themselves for that purpose with investigatory, study and forecasting techniques which are reliable and independent of the Executive, particularly through modern means of information and including the use of appropriate parliamentary committees with wide investigatory powers;

8. Urges all Parliaments to guarantee the inviolability of parliamentarians' rights, including those who are in the minority, in the exercise of their mandates, particularly in respect of relations between States;
9. Calls on Parliaments and the Inter-Parliamentary Union to seek appropriate means of strengthening the participation of parliamentarians in the work of the United Nations;
10. Calls on Parliaments to consider the concept of human rights as one and indivisible, including political, economic and social rights, the rights of individuals and peoples, freedom of opinion, expression and association and the right to life;
11. Encourages Parliaments to inform each other, including through the Inter-Parliamentary Union, of their activities in the international field;
12. Invites Parliaments and Governments to take into consideration the resolutions adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Conferences and brought to their attention, in conformity with the Statutes of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, by the respective National Groups.

ANNEX XXIX

HUNGER IN THE WORLD

MAIN TOPICS:

- (a) FOOD PRODUCTION AND FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND CONSUMPTION WITHIN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES;
- (b) FOOD SUPPLIES ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET TO THE LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES AT PRICES THEY CAN AFFORD;
- (c) FOOD AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES UNTIL THEY REACH AN APPROPRIATE DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

(Resolution adopted without a vote)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Recalling:

- (a) The Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition adopted by the World Food Conference (Rome, November 1974);
- (b) The Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order adopted by the United Nations (New York, May 1974);
- (c) The Declaration of Principles and the Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (Rome, July 1979);
- (d) The recommendations adopted by the World Food Council at its eighth meeting at ministerial level (Acapulco, June 1982);
- (e) The resolutions adopted by the 36th session of the UN General Assembly on the report of the World Food Council, on food and agriculture, on the food and agriculture situation in Africa and on the convening of a World Population Conference (New York, December 1981);
- (f) The World Conservation Strategy (1980) and its emphasis on the need to monitor essential ecological processes and life-support systems, and the need to preserve genetic diversity and to ensure the sustainable utilization of species and ecosystems,
- (g) The Colombo Declaration issued by the International Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development (September 1979) and the Conclusions and Recommendations of the Parliamentary Conference on Population and Development in Africa (Nairobi, July 1981);

- (h) The resolution on population trends and economic and social development adopted by the 61st Inter-Parliamentary Conference (Tokyo, October 1974) and the resolution of the 67th Inter-Parliamentary Conference on the Third United Nations Development Decade (Berlin (GDR), September 1980);
- (i) The Joint Statement by the Chairmen of the North-South Summit Meeting in Cancún (October 1981),

Also recalling the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, adopted at the 35th session of the UN General Assembly in December 1980, and reiterating the urgent need to adopt comprehensive measures, both on a national and an international scale, directed to attaining the purposes and aims of the IDS with respect to promoting agricultural and food development in developing countries,

Taking into consideration the Report by the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, chaired by Mr. Willy Brandt, of 12 February 1980,

Taking also into consideration the appeal of 24 June 1981 against carnage by hunger, signed by 79 Nobel Prize Winners and supported by many Heads of State and Government, Ministers, members of Parliament, heads of international organizations, local administrators, intellectuals, churchmen and ordinary citizens of different countries,

Aware that hundreds of millions of people, especially women and young children, suffer from hunger and that, if present trends continue, the number of hungry will be much higher by the end of the century,

Aware that hunger and malnutrition are usually not due to lack of food per se but rather to a state of poverty of the ill-nourished groups, denying them access to supplies that are available in the market, and that in general efforts to increase food production cannot solve the food problem unless simultaneous action is taken to reduce poverty,

Considering that the rational development of a country can only be undertaken if its people are first able to feed themselves,

Highlighting the importance of international co-operation in matters pertaining to food, financing, trade, science and technology as a means of contributing to agricultural and food development in developing countries and of increasing these nations' food production, storage and distribution capacities, leading to maximum food self-sufficiency,

Realizing that the food situation is particularly disturbing in certain low-income countries where food production has been lagging behind population growth and demand, resulting in rapid increases in food imports which further weaken their balance of payments, and exposing the population concerned to the risks of relying on volatile markets,

Expressing keen anxiety at demographic pressures which, in the years to come, cannot but worsen the food deficit which the developing countries are experiencing, especially if no definite structural solution is found to the pressing food problems facing them,

Deploing the squandering of vast resources - financial, material and manpower - on the production and deployment of arms, which could otherwise be used to combat hunger in the world and ease the burden of the less fortunate peoples in all countries,

Recognizing that hunger and malnutrition are aspects of the general problem of under-development and that a reduction in the disparities between the industrial and the developing countries also contributes to alleviating political tension, to strengthening the independence of the developing countries and to maintaining world peace,

Recognizing that in numerous developing countries hunger and malnutrition are, historically speaking, due to the fact that these countries have experienced a period of colonial oppression during which, for a long time, single-crop agriculture in the interest of the colonialists prevented the development of agriculture and food products,

Also recognizing the global and interrelated nature of international economic negotiations and, consequently, that food forms an indivisible part of the set of topics to be taken up in negotiations, with the aim of contributing to an urgent and lasting solution to the food problems affecting insufficiently developed countries,

1. Solemnly declares that access to food constitutes a fundamental human necessity and a universal human right;
2. Requests Parliaments and Governments to consider the solution of the problem of the eradication of hunger in the world as one of the principal objectives of the national and international development strategies within the framework of the World Food Council recommendations;
3. Stresses that the solution to the food problems in developing countries and their objective of greater self-reliance in food are first and foremost the responsibility of the developing countries themselves;
4. Stresses the fact that the solution to food problems in developing countries is linked to the overall development of these nations, and emphasizes that a more equitable distribution of incomes and wealth represents an essential prerequisite for ensuring everyone's access to food;
5. Believes that the main purpose of food aid should be to help the developing countries to cope with emergency situations arising in particular from a difficult economic climate or a disaster, and must not replace or impair their own efforts to reduce their food deficit;
6. Expresses its deep concern at the perpetuation and deepening of the phenomena of crisis and instability in the world economy and international economic relations, in view of the grave dangers which these represent for the economic and social development of all countries, particularly for that of the developing countries, and in view of their impact on hunger and malnutrition;

7. Believes also that, if adequate steps are taken so that it loses its disincentive effect on food production, food aid can serve as an important development resource for use in the fight against hunger;
8. Draws attention to the fact that food aid and food trade should not be used for exerting political and economic pressure on the countries receiving food aid;
9. Also considers, nevertheless, that developing countries require an additional massive flow of real financial resources, the transfer of technology and technological know-how, as well as technical assistance in keeping with the strategies adopted by receiver countries in the food sector and in the strictest respect for national sovereignty and self-determination, enabling progress in the direction of food-production structures aimed at eliminating hunger and malnutrition and promoting all-round development;
10. Welcomes the agreement on replenishing the International Fund for Agriculture and Development reached at the beginning of 1982;
11. Welcomes the achievement in 1981 of the annual 500,000 tonnes cereal target established for the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) and invites broader participation by the international community in the context of voluntary pledges made in concert with the World Food Programme's biennial pledging conferences, so that the target will continue to be met or exceeded;
12. Invites the international community to extend the Food Aid Convention, 1980 (FAC) due to expire on 30 June 1983, with the hope that additional commitments from existing signatories of the Convention and potential new members will be forthcoming to allow the FAC target of 10 million tonnes of cereals to be achieved;
13. Welcomes the International Monetary Fund's decision in 1981 to create an additional import facility for countries with high food-import requirements coupled with balance-of-payments deficits;
14. Affirms likewise that protectionism in all its forms is harmful to the aims of liberalizing world trade and ensuring access to the markets of developed countries for products of developing countries, thus depriving the latter of continuous resources capable of expediting the modernization of their agriculture and an increase in food production and productivity;
15. Affirms that protectionism per se does not develop viable, efficient and adequate farm enterprises but rather withholds from all peoples the benefits of international specialization in all foodstuffs;
16. Calls upon the industrialized countries to take positive steps towards the improvement of international markets for food, so as to promote stability of prices through commodity agreements and similar arrangements and better access and terms of trade for the developing countries;

17. Considers that adequate markets should be ensured for exports of developing countries in particular, together with fair prices and protection against any damage caused to developing economies by fluctuating supplies of exported commodities and to health;
18. Calls upon all developing countries, while securing adequate markets for artificial, processed and preserved foodstuffs, especially children's powdered milk and other dairy products, to undertake all appropriate measures to prevent any damage caused to the health of their peoples;
19. Regrets that the minimum amount of food aid of 10 million tonnes of grain per annum called for by the World Food Conference in 1974 has not yet been achieved, and calls upon new donors to come forward and shoulder their fair share of the international community's obligations;
20. Calls on Parliaments and Governments to work for the reduction of military expenditure and the exclusive allocation of the considerable human, financial and material resources thus released to the peaceful economic and social development of peoples, facilitating at the same time the allocation of increased funds for agricultural needs and the eradication of hunger;
21. Urges all member States of the International Fund for Agricultural Development, particularly countries able to afford it, to take all legislative and other appropriate measures to ensure the timely, adequate and continuous flow of resources to the Fund under the first replenishment, and to increase their financial commitments in real terms under the second replenishment for the period 1984-1986 so that the Fund can continue its task of increasing food production, improving nutritional standards and increasing the incomes of small farmers and share-croppers;
22. Urges Parliaments and Governments of all countries to intensify their efforts to adopt food grain policies, targets and objectives, and to build up food security reserves consistent with the guidelines of the FAO Plan of Action on World Food Security;
23. Calls on the Parliaments and Governments of all countries to demonstrate greater international solidarity in their efforts to conquer hunger;
24. Calls on the industrialized countries - those with market economies as well as those with centrally planned economies - to make available, within the framework of international co-operation, appropriate technology to the developing countries in order to help them to increase their agricultural production;
25. Calls on all countries, especially the developed countries, to put scientific knowledge to more benevolent use, such as ensuring water supply, in particular through the development of artificial rainfall, so that mankind may be less dependent on nature for the production of food, particularly in the developing countries;

26. Urges the industrialized countries to adjust their aid policies so as to give the highest priority, in so far as they are consistent with the perceived and stated priorities of individual recipient Governments, to:
- (a) Projects and programmes which are oriented towards production for local consumption, in a context of increasing equity in access to land, water and other productive resources and inputs;
 - (b) Provision of accessible credit to food producers, including producer-controlled co-operatives;
 - (c) Programmes and projects which are aimed at helping local producers to obtain reasonable market return for surplus local foods;
 - (d) "Producer-based" research into increasing the production of local food and seed crops;
 - (e) Projects and programmes which both give recognition and support to women in their role as food producers and are aimed at protecting children;
 - (f) Infrastructural development which is directed towards improving local food storage and rural transport;
 - (g) Programmes and projects which provide inputs (water, seed, draught power, etc.) that are appropriate and needed by the small producer;
 - (h) The marketing of food products;
27. Recommends to the developing countries that they increase the efforts already made with a view to improving their agriculture so that their production may be compatible with their rates of population growth in order that benefits of this modernization be equitably distributed;
28. Urges all Governments to consider population growth as an important variable in the fight against hunger and for development;
29. Calls on all developing countries to undertake appropriate economic and social reforms which support the food production complex, inter alia, through such measures as a policy of remunerative agricultural prices for the producer, cultivation of new land, land redistribution and improvement of farm systems ;

30. Calls on all Governments concerned to ensure that in efforts to increase food production due attention is given to the need for conservation, in particular of soil, water and genetic resources, and to prevent the settlement of marginal areas unsuitable for sustained food production;
31. Recommends that the National Groups together with their respective Parliaments and Governments give special attention to the implementation of the resolution on the "Problem of refugees: its juridical and humanitarian aspects", adopted by the 67th Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Berlin (GDR), particularly in order to meet the food needs of refugees around the world and to reduce the difficulties faced by the countries of asylum, particularly in Africa and Asia, in supplying food for these refugees;
32. Urges Governments concerned to ensure that in their development efforts due care is taken to improve the social and economic position of women with a view to reducing malnutrition amongst women and small children;
33. Calls on Parliaments to observe 16 October of each year as World Food Day and each year to organize on that occasion special activities related to national and world food and agricultural problems;
34. Calls upon Parliaments to study the possibility of proclaiming 1984 as International Food Year and taking steps to promote greater awareness of the seriousness of food problems and to provide greater assistance to the developing countries concerned, bearing in mind that the World Food Council has been requested to prepare a progress report on the 10th anniversary of the World Food Conference;
35. Urges all National Groups to act in accordance with this resolution in their dealings with their Parliaments and Governments.

ANNEX XXX

THE STATE OF THE WORLD ENVIRONMENT TEN YEARS AFTER THE
UN CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT AT STOCKHOLM,
STEPS TO BE TAKEN, INCLUDING IN THE FIELD OF
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION

(Résolution adopted without a vote)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the international community for the preservation and improvement of the environment, and considering that, despite growing economic difficulties in all parts of the world, particularly in the least developed countries, environmental protection should not be neglected,

Considering that sound management of the environment, as the foundation of sustained economic and social development, requires increased efforts even in time of economic difficulties,

Bearing in mind the main features of the International Development Strategy of the Third United Nations Development Decade adopted in December 1980 by the 35th session of the UN General Assembly with regard to the environment and human settlements,

Noting the early and continuing concern expressed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in environmental protection and the conservation of resources,

Mindful of the role of the Inter-Parliamentary Union as an observer at the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm,

Noting with satisfaction the presence at the Session of a Special Character of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) held at Nairobi in May 1982 of a representative of the Committee on Education, Science, Culture and Environment of the Inter-Parliamentary Union,

Noting the significance and the importance of principle of the decisions of the 35th and 36th sessions of the UN General Assembly on the historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations,

Bearing in mind the fundamental principles and the recommendations adopted by the Stockholm Conference in June 1972, as well as principles adopted in Nairobi at the Session of a Special Character convened by the UNEP in May 1982,

Noting that scientific and technological progress has, since that Conference, made it possible to improve the preservation of the human environment, particularly through better management of natural resources and better monitoring of the effects of pollutants on fauna, flora, soils, the atmosphere and waters,

Concerned nevertheless at the consensus that the Action Plan adopted in Stockholm has been fulfilled only partially and that its results cannot be considered satisfactory owing, among other reasons, to inadequate co-ordination of approaches and efforts, a lack of resource availability and unequal distribution of the same,

Bearing in mind that the manner of considering problems by sectors - within the framework of global protection of the environment - is too narrow and that the awareness of the interdependence of resources, environment, population and development must be strengthened in all countries,

Wishing account to be taken of environmental protection requirements during the planning and implementation of industrial projects, particularly in the developing countries,

Aware of the fact that poverty and over-consumption increase the dangers facing the environment and that one of the main instruments for reversing the process of environmental degradation resides in the establishment of a New International Economic Order,

Commending UNEP as the world institution for dealing with environmental problems and for co-ordination of environmental activities throughout the UN system,

Aware of the successful efforts of UNEP in instigating and co-ordinating international programmes to assess global environmental trends, to conserve the natural heritage of mankind, to abate pollution and to improve the quality of human environment,

Aware also of the difficulties experienced by UNEP in meeting the diverse expectations of all nations and in obtaining the funds necessary to implement its programme,

Commending the co-operation carried out under the Regional Seas Programme of UNEP to preserve the marine environment in ten regions of the world,

Recognizing the seriousness of transboundary air pollution in several regions of the world,

Recognizing the need for the further development of environmental law, and endorsing the Montevideo Conclusions and Recommendations of the Meeting of Senior Government Officials Expert in Environmental Law (28 October - 6 November 1981),

Deploing the fact that the nuclear and chemical weapons used in the past will continue to have disastrous effects on the environment for decades and on several successive generations,

Emphasizing that a vital element for the preservation of the world's environment at the present time is the removal of the threat of war, more especially nuclear war, and the ending of the arms race,

1. Reaffirms its strong and continuing support of the environmental Principles and Recommendations of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment;
2. Calls for closer international co-operation so that the present serious problems of people, resources, environment (including desertification) and development can be better managed in the future;
3. Calls for international co-operation to bring about the improvement of sanitary conditions in human settlements and to arrange for the supply of clean drinking water to people in developing and under-developed countries;
4. Calls upon Parliaments and Governments to develop the capabilities of their countries to predict adequately the environmental consequences of economic activities and technological development, and to include the environmental aspect in all planning of economic activities;
5. Emphasizes that, in solving environmental problems, policies that are anticipatory and preventive in character should be promoted, for economic reasons as well;
6. Calls upon Parliaments and Governments to constitute ministries, departments, agencies, authorities, commissions or bureaus in accordance with the administrative system of each country to deal specifically with environment;
7. Calls upon Governments to encourage the development of an interdisciplinary approach to the study of environmental problems having an international dimension, and particularly to encourage national and international efforts by the interested organizations, enterprises and firms in the development, production and improvement of equipment designed for monitoring, protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment;
8. Calls on Parliaments and Governments to take the necessary measures:
 - (a) To create forums comprising interested members of Parliament for promoting the cause of the environment;

- (b) To organize a broad exchange of the achievements of science and engineering in the field of environmental protection through the holding of international congresses, conferences and other meetings between scientists and political leaders;
 - (c) To intensify the popularization of environmental protection measures through the mass media;
 - (d) To promote the development of environmental education through the organization of special instruction courses at all levels, including the elementary level;
 - (e) To make public opinion aware of the idea that preventive and integrated environmental protection will not be possible in the long run unless the industrial society rethinks and modifies its present consumer habits;
9. Calls on the National Groups to take action directed towards their Parliaments and Governments in order to promote :
- (a) The ratification of the existing international treaties and agreements in the field of environment and the adoption of the necessary measures for their implementation;
 - (b) The development and harmonization of national legislation in the field of environment, and to promote to that end co-operation between countries with a view to a better knowledge of national environmental legislation;
 - (c) The adoption of State plans and the implementation of measures aimed at safeguarding and improving the environment and at the rational utilization of natural resources;
 - (d) Support for the International Development Strategy of the Third United Nations Development Decade and the establishment of a New International Economic Order;
 - (e) The achievement of the objectives of the World Conservation Strategy;
10. Urges the industrialized countries to evaluate carefully, in close co-operation with the developing countries, the consequences of development aid and all international support measures, as well as the scope thereof, in order to promote environmentally sound development in all sectors of the developing countries;

11. Calls for the establishment of a system for the mobilization of international funding for implementing specific environmental projects in the developing countries;
12. Calls upon the National Groups to support and strengthen UNEP by urging their competent national authorities to co-operate in its activities and provide essential financial support;
13. Urges Governments to act in full accordance with the undertakings contained in the Stockholm Declaration and Plan of Action, reaffirmed by the Nairobi Declaration adopted in May 1982 by the Governing Council at the UNEP Session of a Special Character, and to be guided by the Governing Council's resolution at that Session on the main environmental directions and priorities for the period 1982-1992;
14. Urges National Groups to support the numerous efforts of UNEP in collaboration with other competent international organizations;
15. Endorses the resolutions of the 35th and 36th sessions of the UN General Assembly on the historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present and future generations;
16. Calls upon National Groups to encourage their competent national authorities to promote and expand co-operation in scientific research and environment management, and urges that, where transboundary pollution problems occur, National Groups take every opportunity to promote, for example, within the framework of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, activity to ameliorate these problems;
17. Urgently calls on all Governments and Parliaments to redouble their efforts aimed at maintaining peace and security on earth as the most important condition for preserving the biosphere for present and future generations, pursuing the policy of détente, curbing and halting the arms race and bringing about genuine disarmament and a reduction in defence budgets, thus avoiding the squandering of intellectual and material resources used in the production of arms.

ANNEX XXXI

ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM AND COMBATING OF NEO-COLONIALISM,
AND PARTICULARLY THE NEED TO TAKE MEASURES FOR THE IMMEDIATE
AND STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA

(Resolution adopted by 466 votes to 48, with 72 abstentions)

The 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference,

Recalling the historic Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all colonially, neo-colonially and racially oppressed peoples to self-determination, independence and national sovereignty and their right to strive for independence by all means at their disposal, including armed struggle,

Aware of the serious threat to international peace and security caused by the continuing policies of colonialism and racism of certain colonial Powers, especially the racist régimes,

Aware that, faced with peoples' movements and the breakdown of colonialism, imperialism has had to resort to a masked colonialist policy at both the economic and the cultural level so as to maintain its domination and exploitation, in violation of peoples' sovereignty over their countries' resources and natural wealth and over their national cultural heritage,

Firmly convinced that only the total elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism - a prerequisite for international peace and détente - can ensure the advent of a truly humane world,

Recalling that despite the many relevant UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, the peoples of Namibia and South Africa continue to be subjected to the most inhuman colonialist and racist policy as a result of the refusal of the South African régime to comply with international decisions,

Recalling, in particular, the United Nations resolution by which South Africa's mandate over the territory of Namibia, including Walvis Bay, was terminated and Security Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) which contain the basis for a political settlement in Namibia,

Deeply concerned at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia, the imposition of apartheid on its people and South Africa's defiance of all resolutions of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and other international organizations on the status and rights of the Namibian people, and at the intensification of the military occupation of Namibia,

Rejecting the linkage that some countries wish to establish between the negotiations for the independence of Namibia and the question of the Cuban troops in Angola,

Alarmed by the frequent cases of South African aggression against neighbouring independent African States,

Deeply concerned at the actions of destabilization perpetrated by the racist South African régime which recruits, trains, arms, finances and infiltrates bandits and mercenaries into Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Angola and the Seychelles,

Profoundly concerned at the occupation of the southern part of Angola by troops of the racist South African régime,

Concerned at the so-called "independent homelands" under the bantustanization policy created by the racist South African régime for the maintenance of the apartheid philosophy and system,

Further concerned at the facilities and encouragements given by the United Kingdom to these so-called "independent homelands" in the name of cultural and other activities,

Aware that any action whatever which may lead to the recognition, de facto or de jure, directly or indirectly, of the Bantustans created by the Pretoria régime constitutes approval of the system and doctrine of apartheid and treason with regard to the people of South Africa,

Realizing that acquisition by the apartheid régime, with the help of some Western Powers and Israel, of a nuclear potential may have far-reaching dangerous consequences for the situation in southern Africa and international security as a whole,

Indignant at the support received by the apartheid régime from certain Western Powers and at its ties with Israel,

Concerned at the persecution, arrest, imprisonment, torture and murder of South African and Namibian freedom-fighters opposing apartheid, particularly the death sentences passed on South African patriots and recently carried out,

Strongly deploring the fact that despite the unanimity of the international community regarding the application of mandatory sanctions against the South African Government under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the United States of America deliberately opposed this by its veto,

Recalling UN General Assembly resolution 36/121 A-F of 10 December 1981 and 36/172 A-P of 17 December 1981 on the questions of Namibia and the South African Government's policy of apartheid, and, in particular, resolution 36/172 B which proclaims 1982 as the "International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions against South Africa",

Bearing in mind that the people of Western Sahara are still deprived of their right to self-determination and independence, owing to the occupation of their territory by Morocco,

Bearing in mind the referendum aimed at enabling the Sahraoui people to express on a free, general and regular basis their will for self-determination of Western Sahara,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as well as other relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the Organization of African Unity and the Inter-Parliamentary Union,

Concerned at the situation in Western Sahara which causes a serious threat to the security and peace of the countries in the region,

Concerned at the aggravation of the situation in East Timor whose people are not only prevented from acceding to self-determination and independence but are also a victim of genocide,

Concerned at the invasion of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) by the United Kingdom in May 1982, with the open support of the Government of the United States of America, and likewise concerned to find ways and means of restoring the sovereign rights of the Republic of Argentina over the Falklands Islands (Malvinas), under the present illegal occupation by the United Kingdom,

Gravely concerned at the colonial situation still prevailing in Guam, the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Gibraltar, Puerto Rico, the British Virgin Islands, the American Virgin Islands, Micronesia and other so-called "small territories" under British and French domination,

Bearing in mind the contribution which Parliaments can make to mobilizing world public opinion and adopting practical and effective measures against colonialism in all of its forms and manifestations,

Reaffirming the resolution on "Urgent measures for the liquidation of the vestiges of colonialism in the world and the practices of apartheid in Namibia and South Africa, and safeguarding of ethnic minorities", adopted by the 68th Inter-Parliamentary Conference which took place at Havana in September 1981,

Aware once more of the need to call on all Governments and Parliaments of the world to assume their responsibility for putting an end to colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, apartheid and zionism,

Considering that the eradication of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism is also the responsibility of Parliaments and that it is necessary and urgent to take measures to this end, particularly with regard to the immediate and strict implementation of the resolutions on Namibia adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council,

1. Reaffirms the right of all peoples to self-determination, independence, liberty and sovereignty;
2. Recognizes the right of all peoples under colonial, neo-colonial and racist domination to strive by all means at their disposal, including armed struggle, for their liberation;
3. Asserts that the struggle to liquidate colonialism and neo-colonialism is closely bound up with the struggle of peoples to establish a new, just and equitable international economic order, to gain sovereignty over their countries' resources and natural wealth and to defend their national cultural heritage;
4. Reaffirms the legitimate right of the people of Namibia to strive by all means at their disposal to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination and independence;
5. Calls on all peace-loving nations and international organizations to contribute generously to the liberation struggle of the peoples still under colonial domination;

6. Urges all Governments and Parliaments, international and regional organizations, public institutions and non-governmental and intergovernmental agencies to contribute to the elimination of colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and all their consequences;
7. Condemns the racist South African régime for its illegal occupation of Namibia and demands the immediate withdrawal of South African troops and administration from Namibia, genuine independence and respect for the territorial integrity of the country, including Walvis Bay;
8. Condemns South Africa's defiance of UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Namibia;
9. Reaffirms the separation of the decolonization process of Namibia from the question of the Cuban troops in Angola;
10. Urges the international community to render every support to SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people, in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;
11. Strongly urges the Western Contact Group to exert enough pressure to induce South Africa to co-operate in the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), leading to majority rule in Namibia;
12. Rejects the manoeuvres by some members of the Contact Group aimed at subverting the provisions of that resolution, removing the Namibian problem from UN jurisdiction and solving it on a neo-colonialist basis;
13. Deplores once more the growing collaboration of the United States of America, Israel and other Western Powers with the racist South African régime;
14. Urges the UN Security Council to fulfil its responsibility under the UN Charter by applying against South Africa the mandatory sanctions provided for in Chapter VII;
15. Appeals to the United States of America as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council to comply with the demands of an overwhelming majority of countries regarding the imposition on South Africa of sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter;
16. Condemns South Africa for its refusal to accept the decisions taken within the framework of the UN Plan for the Independence of Namibia;

17. Strongly condemns acts of military aggression and other acts of economic and political destabilization committed by South Africa against the front-line countries, i.e. Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Botswana;
18. Strongly condemns the acts of aggression, destabilization, and State terrorism perpetrated against Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, the Seychelles and Angola by the racist South African régime which recruits, trains, arms, supplies and finances bandits and mercenaries;
19. Demands that the racist South African régime immediately cease all aggressive acts and withdraw its troops from Angola;
20. Strongly condemns the South African racist régime for its policy of bantustanization in South Africa with a view to the maintenance of the apartheid system;
21. Condemns any action whatever which may lead, directly or indirectly, to the granting of de facto or de jure recognition of the Bantustans created by the racist South African régime;
22. Condemns the intensified military repression of the peoples of Namibia and South Africa practised by the racist régime, as well as the use by South Africa of the territory of Namibia as a springboard for criminal acts of aggression against the front-line countries in southern Africa, and the persecution, imprisonment, torture and murder of South African and Namibian freedom-fighters;
23. Demands the release of freedom-fighter Nelson Mandela, as well as all other South African political prisoners imprisoned for struggling for the rights of their people;
24. Supports SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and the South African liberation movements recognized by the OAU and the United Nations;
25. Reaffirms that a lasting solution of the conflict in Namibia can be achieved only with the participation of SWAPO;
26. Urges all Governments and Parliaments of the world to adopt urgent and effective measures to:
 - (a) Terminate economic activities by their national entities in Namibia, South Africa and any other country under colonial and/or racist domination;

- (b) Offer all possible moral and material assistance to the liberation movements of southern Africa recognized by the United Nations;
 - (c) Contribute to the achievement of the goals of the "International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions against South Africa";
27. Reiterates its support for the exercise by the people of Western Sahara of their right to self-determination and independence, and therefore recalls the urgent need to implement the UN and OAU resolutions and decisions aimed at a fair and final settlement of the question of Western Sahara;
 28. Firmly calls upon the OAU Implementation Committee to promote negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front for a peaceful settlement of the conflict with a view to facilitating the development of harmonious co-operation between all peoples of the region;
 29. Calls to this end on Morocco and the Polisario Front to start negotiations for an immediate cease-fire and the conclusion of a peace agreement conducive to the fair implementation of the general, free and regular referendum for self-determination in Western Sahara;
 30. Reaffirms the right of East Timor to self-determination and independence, and therefore condemns the use of force to prevent the people of East Timor from exercising that right;
 31. Calls upon all parties concerned to reach a fair and final settlement of the situation of the people of East Timor;
 32. Condemns the British aggression against the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) actively supported by the United States of America and reiterates its solidarity with the Republic of Argentina;
 33. Supports the request made by twenty Latin American States for the inclusion of "The future of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)" as a supplementary item on the agenda of the 37th session of the United Nations General Assembly;
 34. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-determination, independence and sovereignty in accordance with UN General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
 35. Supports the decision by which the UN General Assembly approved the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Decolonization in which the General Assembly was requested to include the case of Puerto Rico as a separate item on the agenda of its 37th session;
 36. Reiterates its appeal to the United Kingdom and Spain to continue talks aimed at terminating the present political status of Gibraltar on the basis of United Nations and Inter-Parliamentary Union resolutions;

37. Invites all interested parties to support the decisions and resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Security Council relating to the territories of Guam, the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), Micronesia, the British Virgin Islands, the American Virgin Islands and other so-called "small territories" still under colonial domination;
38. Condemns the existence of military and/or naval bases in colonial territories which impede the genuine independence of the peoples concerned, are detrimental to them and their sovereign right to their natural resources, and adversely affect the social and economic development of those territories;
39. Condemns, in accordance with the resolutions of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the United Nations (General Assembly and Security Council), the continuation by Israel of the establishment of settlements in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, as these settlements are a new form of colonialism;
40. Urges Parliaments:
 - (a) To support actively the implementation by the international community of specific measures to eliminate the last vestiges of colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism (including zionism) and apartheid in whatever countries they are practised;
 - (b) To increase support for the colonially oppressed peoples or those oppressed on racial, religious or other grounds and their legitimate representatives - the national liberation organizations recognized by the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the United Nations - in their struggle to exercise their right to independence and self-determination;
 - (c) To call for the withdrawal of foreign occupation troops and the removal of foreign military bases installed in free and sovereign countries against the will of their peoples;
 - (d) To demand the cessation of any illegal and arbitrary policy which impedes the full exercise of self-determination and sovereignty by those peoples over their entire national territory;
41. Calls upon Governments, Parliaments and international organizations to take measures aimed at increasing their activity for the elimination of all forms of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, recolonization, apartheid, racial discrimination, occupation, zionism and aggression or threats of aggression, to support all actions and initiatives in defence of the independence and sovereignty of all peoples, and to eliminate dangers to international peace and security.

ANNEX XXXII

ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM AND COMBATING OF NEO-COLONIALISM,
AND PARTICULARLY THE NEED TO TAKE MEASURES FOR THE IMMEDIATE
AND STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA

Vote on the 25th preambular paragraph
and on operative paragraphs 30 and 31

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 272
Negative votes 102
Abstentions 278

| YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|----------------------------|----|--------|----|-------------|----|--------|---------------|-----------------------------|----|--------|
| Algeria | - | - | 13 | Hungary | 10 | - | Portugal | 12 | - | - |
| Australia | 6 | 7 | - | Iceland | - | absent | Rep. of Korea | - | 15 | - |
| Austria | - | - | 10 | India | - | absent | Romania | - | - | 14 |
| Belgium | - | absent | - | Indonesia | - | 21 | Rwanda | 10 | - | - |
| Benin | - | - | 10 | Iran | - | - | 15 | Senegal | - | absent |
| Brazil | - | absent | - | Iraq | - | 5 | - | Singapore | - | absent |
| Bulgaria | 10 | - | - | Ireland | - | - | 10 | Somalia | - | 11 |
| Canada | - | - | 14 | Israel | - | absent | - | Spain | 5 | - |
| Cape Verde | 5 | - | - | Italy | 5 | 1 | 7 | Sri Lanka | - | absent |
| Congo | - | absent | - | Ivory Coast | 12 | - | - | Sudan | - | absent |
| Costa Rica | - | absent | - | Japan | 1 | - | 19 | Sweden | 6 | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Jordan | - | absent | - | Switzerland | - | absent |
| Cyprus | 5 | - | - | Kenya | - | - | 5 | Syrian Arab Rep. | - | - |
| Czechoslovakia | 13 | - | - | Kuwait | - | absent | - | Thailand | - | 16 |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. of Korea | - | - | 13 | Lebanon | - | absent | - | Togo | 5 | - |
| Dem. Yemen | 5 | - | - | Luxembourg | - | absent | - | Tunisia | - | absent |
| Denmark | 3 | - | 9 | Malaysia | - | absent | - | Uganda | 10 | - |
| Djibouti | - | absent | - | Mali | - | - | 10 | United Arab Emirates | - | absent |
| Dominican Rep. | - | absent | - | Mexico | - | - | 10 | United Kingdom | - | - |
| Ecuador | 5 | - | - | Monaco | - | absent | - | United Rep. of Cameroon | - | - |
| Egypt | - | - | 16 | Mongolia | 10 | - | - | United States of America | - | absent |
| Finland | - | - | 11 | Morocco | - | - | 14 | USSR | 20 | - |
| France | - | - | 10 | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Venezuela | 10 | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Nepal | - | absent | - | Viet Nam | - | absent |
| German Dem. Rep. | 13 | - | - | Netherlands | - | 10 | - | Yemen | - | absent |
| Germany (Fed. Rep. of) | - | absent | - | New Zealand | - | absent | - | Yugoslavia | - | - |
| Greece | 9 | - | 3 | Nicaragua | 5 | - | - | Zaire | - | absent |
| Guinea | - | absent | - | Nigeria | 10 | - | - | Zambia | 10 | - |
| Haiti | - | absent | - | Norway | - | - | 10 | Zimbabwe | 12 | - |
| | | | | Panama | - | absent | - | | | |
| | | | | Philippines | - | 16 | - | | | |
| | | | | Poland | 15 | - | - | | | |

ANNEX XXXIII

ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM AND COMBATING OF NEO-COLONIALISM,
AND PARTICULARLY THE NEED TO TAKE MEASURES FOR THE IMMEDIATE
AND STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA

Vote on operative paragraphs 27, 28 and 29

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 368
Negative votes 77
Abstentions 195

| YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|------------------|----|--------|-------------|-----|--------|-----|------------------|-----|-----------------|-----|
| Algeria | 13 | - | Hungary | 10 | - | - | Portugal | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Australia | 2 | - | Iceland | | Absent | | Rep. of Korea | | Absent | |
| Austria | 5 | - | India | | Absent | | Romania | | not participati | |
| Belgium | | Absent | Indonesia | - | - | 21 | Rwanda | 10 | - | - |
| Benin | 10 | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Senegal | | Absent | |
| Brazil | | Absent | Iraq | | Absent | | Singapore | | Absent | |
| Bulgaria | 12 | - | Ireland | - | - | 10 | Somalia | - | 11 | - |
| Canada | - | - | Israel | | Absent | | Spain | - | - | 5 |
| Cape Verde | 5 | - | Italy | 5 | - | 8 | Sri Lanka | | Absent | |
| Congo | | Absent | Ivory Coast | - | - | 12 | Sudan | | Absent | |
| Costa Rica | | Absent | Japan | - | - | 15 | Sweden | 9 | - | 3 |
| Cuba | 12 | - | Jordan | | Absent | | Switzerland | - | - | 5 |
| Cyprus | 5 | - | Kenya | 13 | - | - | Syrian Arab Rep. | 12 | - | - |
| Czechoslovakia | 13 | - | Kuwait | | Absent | | Thailand | - | - | 16 |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. | | | Lebanon | | Absent | | Togo | 5 | - | - |
| of Korea | 13 | - | Luxembourg | | Absent | | Tunisia | | Absent | |
| Dem. Yemen | 10 | - | Malaysia | | Absent | | Uganda | 10 | - | - |
| Denmark | 5 | 5 | Mali | 10 | - | - | United Arab | | | |
| Djibouti | | Absent | Mexico | 10 | - | - | Emirates | | Absent | |
| Dominican Rep. | | Absent | Monaco | | Absent | | United Kingdom | - | - | 17 |
| Ecuador | 5 | - | Mongolia | 10 | - | - | United Rep. of | | | |
| Egypt | - | 16 | Morocco | - | 14 | - | Cameroon | - | 12 | - |
| Finland | - | - | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | United States | | | |
| France | - | - | Nepal | | Absent | | of America | | Absent | |
| Gabon | 5 | - | Netherlands | - | - | 13 | USSR | 20 | - | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | 13 | - | New Zealand | | Absent | | Venezuela | 10 | - | - |
| Germany (Fed. | | | Nicaragua | 5 | - | - | Viet Nam | 15 | - | - |
| Rep. of) | | | Nigeria | 10 | - | - | Yemen | | Absent | |
| Greece | 9 | - | Norway | - | - | 10 | Yugoslavia | - | - | 10 |
| Guinea | | Absent | Panama | | Absent | | Zaire | | Absent | |
| Haiti | | Absent | Philippines | - | 16 | - | Zambia | 10 | - | - |
| | | | Poland | 15 | - | - | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |

ANNEX XXXIV

ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM AND COMBATING OF NEO-COLONIALISM,
AND PARTICULARLY THE NEED TO TAKE MEASURES FOR THE IMMEDIATE
AND STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA

Vote on the 26th preambular paragraph
and on operative paragraph 32

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 222

Negative votes 218

Abstentions 181

| | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------|-----|--------|-----|------------------|-------------------|--------|-----|
| Algeria | 13 | - | - | Hungary | 10 | - | - | Portugal | 2 | - | 6 |
| Australia | - | 11 | 2 | Iceland | - | 5 | - | Rep. of Korea | | Absent | |
| Austria | - | 10 | - | India | | Absent | | Romania | - | - | 14 |
| Belgium | | Absent | | Indonesia | - | - | 21 | Rwanda | - | - | 10 |
| Benin | 10 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Senegal | | Absent | |
| Brazil | | Absent | | Iraq | | Absent | | Singapore | | Absent | |
| Bulgaria | 12 | - | - | Ireland | - | 10 | - | Somalia | - | 11 | - |
| Canada | - | 14 | - | Israel | | Absent | | Spain | 5 | - | - |
| Cape Verde | - | - | 9 | Italy | 1 | 5 | 5 | Sri Lanka | | Absent | |
| Congo | | Absent | | Ivory Coast | - | - | 12 | Sudan | | Absent | |
| Costa Rica | | Absent | | Japan | 1 | 19 | - | Sweden | - | 12 | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Jordan | | Absent | | Switzerland | | Absent | |
| Cyprus | | Absent | | Kenya | - | 10 | - | Syrian Arab Rep. | 10 | - | - |
| Czechoslovakia | 13 | - | - | Kuwait | | Absent | | Thailand | - | - | 16 |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. | | | | Lebanon | | Absent | | Togo | - | - | 10 |
| of Korea | 10 | - | - | Luxembourg | | Absent | | Tunisia | | Absent | |
| Dem. Yemen | 10 | - | - | Malaysia | | Absent | | Uganda | | Absent | |
| Denmark | - | 12 | - | Mali | - | - | 10 | United Arab | | | |
| Djibouti | | Absent | | Mexico | 10 | - | - | Emirates | | Absent | |
| Dominican Rep. | | Absent | | Monaco | | Absent | | United Kingdom | - | 17 | - |
| Ecuador | 5 | - | - | Mongolia | 10 | - | - | United Rep. of | | | |
| Egypt | - | 16 | - | Morocco | - | - | 10 | Cameroon | - | 12 | - |
| Finland | - | 11 | - | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | United States | | | |
| France | - | 10 | - | Nepal | | Absent | | of America | | Absent | |
| Gabon | - | - | 5 | Netherlands | - | 13 | - | USSR | 20 | - | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | 13 | - | - | New Zealand | | Absent | | Venezuela | 10 | - | - |
| Germany (Fed. | | | | Nicaragua | 5 | - | - | Viet Nam | | Absent | |
| Rep. of) | | Absent | | Nigeria | - | - | 10 | Yemen | | Absent | |
| Greece | 2 | 10 | 0 | Norway | - | 10 | - | Yugoslavia | - | - | 10 |
| Guinea | | Absent | | Panama | | Absent | | Zaire | | Absent | |
| Haiti | | Absent | | Philippines | - | - | 16 | Zambia | - | - | 10 |
| | | | | Poland | 10 | - | 5 | Zimbabwe | not participating | | |

ANNEX XXXV

ELIMINATION OF COLONIALISM AND COMBATING OF NEO-COLONIALISM,
AND PARTICULARLY THE NEED TO TAKE MEASURES FOR THE IMMEDIATE
AND STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA

Vote on the resolution

Results of the vote

Affirmative votes 466
Negative votes 48
Abstentions 72

| YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS | | YES | NO | ABS |
|------------------|--------|-----|----|-------------|-------------------|-----|----|------------------|--------|-----|
| Algeria | 13 | - | | Hungary | 10 | - | | Portugal | 8 | - |
| Australia | - | 9 | 4 | Iceland | 5 | - | | Rep. of Korea | absent | - |
| Austria | - | 5 | 5 | India | absent | - | | Romania | 14 | - |
| Belgium | absent | - | | Indonesia | 21 | - | | Rwanda | 10 | - |
| Benin | 10 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | | Senegal | absent | - |
| Brazil | absent | - | | Iraq | absent | - | | Singapore | absent | - |
| Bulgaria | 12 | - | - | Ireland | - | 11 | - | Somalia | 11 | - |
| Canada | 2 | 3 | 7 | Israel | absent | - | | Spain | 5 | - |
| Cape Verde | 9 | - | - | Italy | 5 | - | 8 | Sri Lanka | absent | - |
| Congo | absent | - | | Ivory Coast | 12 | - | - | Sudan | absent | - |
| Costa Rica | absent | - | | Japan | 20 | - | - | Sweden | 6 | 6 |
| Cuba | 2 | - | - | Jordan | absent | - | | Switzerland | absent | - |
| Cyprus | absent | - | | Kenya | 10 | - | - | Syrian Arab Rep. | 10 | - |
| Czechoslovakia | 13 | - | - | Kuwait | absent | - | | Thailand | absent | - |
| Dem. Peo. Rep. | 13 | - | - | Lebanon | absent | - | | Togo | absent | - |
| of Korea | - | - | | Luxembourg | absent | - | | Tunisia | absent | - |
| Dem. Yemen | 10 | - | - | Malaysia | absent | - | | Uganda | absent | - |
| Denmark | - | 3 | 9 | Mali | 10 | - | - | United Arab | - | - |
| Djibouti | absent | - | | Mexico | 10 | - | - | Emirates | absent | - |
| Dominican Rep. | absent | - | | Monaco | absent | - | | United Kingdom | - | 17 |
| Ecuador | 5 | - | - | Mongolia | 10 | - | - | United Rep. of | - | - |
| Egypt | 16 | - | - | Morocco | not participating | - | | Cameroon | 12 | - |
| Finland | absent | - | | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | United States | - | - |
| France | - | - | 10 | Nepal | absent | - | | of America | absent | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Netherlands | - | - | 13 | USSR | 22 | - |
| German Dem. Rep. | 13 | - | - | New Zealand | absent | - | | Venezuela | 10 | - |
| Germany (Fed. | - | - | | Nicaragua | 5 | - | - | Viet Nam | absent | - |
| Rep. of) | absent | - | | Nigeria | 10 | - | - | Yemen | absent | - |
| Greece | 12 | - | - | Norway | - | - | 10 | Yugoslavia | 14 | - |
| Guinea | absent | - | | Panama | absent | - | | Zaire | absent | - |
| Haiti | absent | - | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zambia | 10 | - |
| | | | | Poland | 15 | - | - | Zimbabwe | 12 | - |

ANNEX XXXVI

B O L I V I A

Case No. BL/01 - LYDIA GUEILER TEJADA, BL/02 - WALTER GUEVARA ARZE, BL/03 - BENJAMIN MIGUEL, BL/04 - WILLIAM BLUSKE, BL/05 - JOSE LUIS ROCA, BL/06 - JULIO TUNIRI APAZA, BL/07 - DULFREDO RUA, BL/08 - CARLOS FLORES BEDREGAL, BL/09 - JAIME PAZ ZAMORA, BL/11 - HECTOR BOYRDA LEANO, BL/12 - CARLOS QUIROGA, BL/13 - LUIS PELAEZ RIOJA, BL/14 - MARCELO QUIROGA SANTA CRUZ, BL/15 - ALCIDES ALVARADO DAZA, BL/16 - MARCOS DOMIC RUIZ, BL/17 - MANUEL CARDENAS MALLO, BL/18 - SIMON REYES, BL/19 - GUILLERMO CAPOBIANCO, BL/20 - CAYETANO LLOBET TABOLARA, BL/21 - JAIME TABORGA TORRICO, BL/22 - JOSE MARIO PALACIOS, BL/23 - ALDO FLORES, BL/24 - JUVENAL CASTRO, BL/25 - ANTONIO ARANIBAR QUIROGA, BL/26 - JUAN RODRIGUEZ, BL/27 - LEOPOLDO LOPEZ COSIO, BL/28 - JOSE VARGAS, BL/29 - ALFONSO CAMACHO, BL/30 - ALFONSO FERRUFINO, BL/31 - GASTON ENCINAS, BL/32 - ABRAHAM SALAS, BL/33 - GREGORIO ANDRADE, BL/34 - SEVERO TORRES, BL/35 - JOSE REYES CARVAJAL, BL/36 ADALBERTO KUAJARA, BL/37 - AMALIA DECKER, BL/38 - JORGE KOLLE CUETO, BL/39 - ABELARDO VILLALPANDO, BL/40 - CARLOS BARRAGAN VARGAS, BL/41 - CARLOS CARVAJAL NAVA, BL/42 - EDGAR RAMIREZ, BL/43 - OSCAR SALAS MOYA, BL/44 - RAMIRO BARRENECHEA, BL/45 - WALTER MORALES UGARTE, BL/46 - HORACIO TORRES, BL/47 - MARIO RONCAL, BL/48 - FELIX ROSPIGLIOSI, BL/49 - OSCAR ZAMORA, BL/50 - FEDERICO ALVAREZ PLATA, BL/51 - FEDERICO ALVAREZ PINTO, BL/52 - RAMIRO VELASCO RAMIRO, BL/53 - GUIDO CAPRA, BL/54 - OSCAR VEGA LOPEZ, BL/55 - GLORIA ARDAYA, BL/56 - JORGE VALDIVIESO MENACHO, BL/57 - ARCIL MENACHO, BL/58 - LUIS FERNANDEZ, BL/59 - CASAMIO AMURRIO, BL/60 - MACABEO CHILA P., BL/61 - FLORENCIA GABRIEL MAMANI, BL/62 - JUSTO PEREZ GARCIA, BL/63 - ZENON BARRIENTOS MAMANI, BL/64 - PANFILO YAPU, BL/65 - FERNANDO BAPTISTA, BL/66 - JORGE SELUM VACA DIEZ, BL/67 - MARIO CALDERON, BL/68 - ANGEL GEMIO ERQUETA, BL/69 - HERNAN MELGAR J., BL/70 - JUSTINIANO NINAVIA, BL/71 - ARMANDO RONCAL FERNANDEZ, BL/72 - LUIS ANAES ALVAREZ, BL/73 - CLAURE GUALBERTO, BL/74 - GUILLERMO RICHTER, BL/75 - JUAN JOSE SALAZAR T., BL/76 - MARIO VELARDE DORADO, BL/77 - WALTER VASQUEZ MICHEL, BL/78 - AGUSTIN AMELLER, BL/79 - FLAVIO MACHICADO SARAVIO, BL/80 - CONSTANTINO LIMA CHAVEZ, BL/81 - ENRIQUE BACHINELLO

(Resolution adopted without a vote by the Inter-Parliamentary Council at its 131st session, on 22 September 1982)

The Inter-Parliamentary Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions on the above-mentioned Bolivian parliamentarians,

Taking note of the report of the Special Committee (CL/131/82/5 and 5 Add. 1),

Recalling that the right to life and security of person is a fundamental right enunciated in the Bolivian Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, and stressing that States have a duty to ensure the safety of their nationals,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the fact that a number of the above-mentioned Bolivian parliamentarians, taking advantage of the general amnesty of May 1982, have been able to return home;

2. Expresses its concern, however, at the breaches of the personal security of two of these former parliamentarians and urges the Bolivian Government to ensure and guarantee conditions of safety for those parliamentarians who have returned to Bolivia and for those still in exile who would like to return to their country;
3. Reiterates its urgent request that those responsible for the murder of Deputies Carlos Flores Bedregal, Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, Florencio Mamani, José Reyes Carvajal, Jorge Valdivieso Menacho and Arcil Menacho be tried as soon as possible;
4. Requests the Secretary General to ask the Bolivian Government whether it is true that Mr. Juan Rodriguez G. was arrested and is in detention and, if so, to request information from the Government regarding:
 - (a) the circumstances and conditions of Mr. Rodriguez' s arrest;
 - (b) the legal provisions under which he was arrested;
 - (c) the place and conditions of his detention;
 - (d) the exact nature of the charges against him and the concrete facts relied on in support of those charges; such penalties as may have been called for or imposed on him;
 - (e) the nature of such proceedings as may have been instituted against him and the court seized of his case; the present status of the proceedings;
 - (f) the defence guarantees which he enjoys and, in particular, the opportunities available to him to communicate freely with a lawyer of his choice;
 - (g) such remedies as are available to him and such use as he may have made thereof;
 - (h) the prospects for his release;
 - (i) his state of health.
5. Requests the Special Committee to continue examination of the cases of Carlos Flores Bedregal, Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, Florencio Mamani, José Reyes Carvajal, Jorge Valdivieso Menacho, Arcil Menacho and of Juan Rodriguez G., and to report to it at its 132nd session (April 1983).

ANNEX XXXVII

GHANA

Case No. GH/01 - C.C. FITIH, GH/02 - ROWLAND ATTA-KESSON, GH/03 - JOE HYDE, GH/04 - ALHADJI MOHAMMED FARAL, GH/05 - ALHADJI AMADU SULEMANA, GH/06 - K.D. ODJIDJATOR, GH/07 - M.A. ADAM, GH/08 - ALHADJI SEIDU ZAKARIAH, GH/09 - JAWU MAHAMA, GH/10 - AMETOR WILLIAMS, GH/11 - AGATHA AWUAH, GH/12 - MONICA TINKA, GH/13 - HARRY GANDAA, GH/14 - KWESI AKOTO, GH/15 - C. NARH, GH/16 - REV. KUMASAH, GH/17 - OBUADE, GH/18 - KAPPI, GH/19 - NYAMASIKPOR, GH/20 - NYAME, GH/21 - TOGBE ZUKAH, GH/22 - DJILA, GH/23 - ALHADJI ABDULRAHMAN, GH/24 - DJEBU, GH/25 - C. COMMODORE, GH/26 - ALEX ADJEI, GH/27 - OSEI ASIBEZ, GH/28 - F.A. MENSAH, GH/29 - NANA ADARKWA YIADOM, GH/31 - ANTI, GH/32 - AGGREY, GH/33 - TETTEY, GH/34 - ATTEFAH, GH/35 - NANA AMOAKO, GH/36 - AYISI, GH/37 - MIKE ATSUTSE, GH/38 - TAWIAH, GH/39 - OHENE BAMFOE, GH/40 - ALHAJI SHANI MAHAMA

*(Resolution adopted without a vote by the Inter-Parliamentary Council
at its 131st session, on 22 September 1982)*

The Inter-Parliamentary Council,

Referring to the decision adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Council at its 130th session (April 1982) regarding 39 Ghanaian parliamentarians (Nos. GH/01 to GH/39);

Taking note of the report of the Special Committee (CL/131/82/5 and 5 Add. 1) on 40 cases of former Ghanaian parliamentarians,

Considering that current information indicates that:

- (i) Mrs. Ametor-Williams, Mrs. Agatha Awuah, Mrs. Monica Atenkah (Tinka) and Mr. Samuel Dzebu have been released;
- (ii) Mr. Joseph Gyewu Mahama, Mr. Harry Gandaa, Mr. Togbe Zukah and Mr. Peter Atsu Djila live abroad;
- (iii) The 32 other parliamentarians are detained and are to be tried shortly by special tribunals;

Referring to the provisions of Articles 7, 10 and 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 9, 10 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 7 of the African Charter on Human Rights and People's Rights,

Taking note of the information provided by the National Groups of Austria and Nigeria,

1. Thanks those National Groups for their action; expresses particular satisfaction with the initiative taken by the Nigerian Group to send three of its members to Ghana and hopes it will continue its efforts successfully;
2. Welcomes the co-operation and good will of the Government of Ghana during the Nigerian delegation's visit to Accra;
3. Urges the Government of Ghana, in this spirit, not to proceed with its intention of bringing the 32 former parliamentarians still detained before special tribunals, and asks it to bring them before ordinary courts, applying the ordinary legal procedures;
4. Also asks the Government of Ghana to guarantee the 32 former parliamentarians conditions for a fair trial and in particular the possibility for each of them to be assisted by the lawyer of his choice;
5. Requests the Secretary General to obtain information from the Ghanaian Authorities concerning:
 - (i) the date on which the 32 parliamentarians still detained will be put on trial;
 - (ii) the charges against them and the exact facts relied on in support of those charges;
 - (iii) the body before which they will finally be brought and the procedures applied by it;
 - (iv) the remedies open to them;
 - (v) the actual defence guarantees which they enjoy;
6. Hopes that when it next goes to Ghana, the Nigerian delegation will be able to visit the 32 detained former parliamentarians;
7. Takes note with satisfaction of the release of Mrs. Ametor-Williams, Mrs. Agatha Awuah, Mrs. Monica Atenkah (Tinka) and Mr. Samuel Dzebu;
8. Decides to close the file concerning Mr. Joseph Gyewu Mahama, Mr. Harry Gandaa, Mr. Togbe Zukah and Mr. Peter Atsu Djila;
9. Requests the Special Committee to report to it at its 132nd session (April 1983) on the situation of the 32 former parliamentarians still detained.

ANNEX XXXVIII

Case No. IR/07 - ABOL-FAZL GHASSEMI - ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

(Resolution adopted without a vote^{} by the Inter-Parliamentary Council at its 131st session, on 22 September 1982)*

The Inter-Parliamentary Council,

Referring to the resolution adopted at its 130th session (April 1982) regarding Mr. Abolfazl Ghassemi, of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

Taking note of the report of the Special Committee (CL/131/82/5),

Considering that the evidence reveals that Mr. Abolfazl Ghassemi was elected to the Majlis at elections whose regularity is uncontested; that his election was invalidated by the Ministry of the Interior; that the cogency of the reasons for the invalidation and the regularity of the invalidation procedures, which are the first subject of the complaints, are not established; that Mr. Ghassemi was sentenced on 12 November 1981 to life imprisonment on four main charges; that it is not established that the conditions in which the trial took place were consistent with the provisions of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was ratified by Iran on 24 June 1975; that the state of health of Mr. Abolfazl Ghassemi, who is of advanced age, is said to be worrying; that he is still detained at Qizelhisar Prison,

1. Takes note of the further explanations concerning the case communicated by the Iranian National Group and thanks it for its co-operation and efforts;
2. Regrets that despite the Council's urgent request, Mr. Ghassemi has not yet been released, and reiterates its request that he be released for humanitarian reasons;
3. Requests the Special Committee to continue examination of the case and to report to it at its next session.

* The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran expressed its opposition.

ANNEX XXXIX

Case No. IR/10 - HOSSEIN KHATIBI - ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

*(Resolution adopted by 63 votes to 2, with 9 abstentions, by
the Inter-Parliamentary Council at its 131st session,
on 22 September 1982)*

The Inter-Parliamentary Council,

Referring to the resolution adopted at its 130th session (April 1982)
regarding Mr. Hossein Khatibi, of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

Taking note of the report of the Special Committee (CL/131/82/5),

Considering that the evidence reveals that Deputy Hossein Khatibi,
elected to the Majlis in 1975 for a four-year term, was arrested on 17 February
1979; that he was sentenced by an Islamic Revolutionary Court on 8 November
1979 to six years' imprisonment on eight counts and that he is currently
serving his sentence,

Referring to the provisions of Articles 9, 10 and 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratified by Iran on 24 June 1975,

1. Takes note of further explanations and information communicated by the
Iranian National Group and thanks it for its co-operation and efforts;
2. Requests the Special Committee to further analyse the material provided
by the Iranian Group, and to inform it, as appropriate, of its
observations;
3. Requests the Secretary General to communicate again with the Iranian
National Group and governmental authorities in order to obtain further
information, particularly on:
 - (a) The state of health of Mr. Khatibi;
 - (b) The prospects for his release or for a reduction of sentence;
4. Requests further the Secretary General to ask again the Iranian
authorities to forward the text of the verdict delivered by the
Islamic Revolutionary Court;
5. Urges the National Group of the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue
to co-operate actively in the settlement of this case.

Case No. IR/11 - ABBAS ARAM - ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

*(Resolution adopted without a vote by the Inter-Parliamentary Council
at its 131st session, on 22 September 1982)*

The Inter-Parliamentary Council,

Taking note of the report of the Special Committee (CL/131/82/5 and
5 Add. 1),

Having studied the information communicated by the Iranian National
Group which reveals that Mr. Abbas Aram is currently free,

Takes note with satisfaction of this information and decides to
close the file on him.

ANNEX XLI

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Case No. URG/02 - JOSE LUIS MASSERA LERENA | } URUGUAY |
| Case No. URG/03 - JAIME GERSCHUNI PEREZ | |
| Case No. URG/05 - VLADIMIR ILITCH TURIANSKY VLADIMERSKY | |
| Case No. URG/06 - ALBERTO ALTESOR GONZALES | |
| Case No. URG/08 - ROSARIO PIETRAROIA ZAPALA | |

Telegram addressed by the Inter-Parliamentary Council
to the Uruguayan Authorities

The Inter-Parliamentary Council, deeply concerned at alarming news regarding the state of health of José Luis Massera Lerena and Rosario Pietrarroia Zapala, urges that adequate medical treatment be given at once and their families be informed of their condition and the treatment provided, and be able to visit them. The Council reiterates its urgent request that Massera, Perez, Turiansky, Altesor and Pietrarroia be released immediately.

*(Resolutions adopted without a vote by the Inter-Parliamentary Council
at its 131st session, on 22 September 1982)*

A. Alberto Altesor Gonzales

The Inter-Parliamentary Council,

Referring to its previous resolutions on Mr. Alberto Altesor Gonzales, of Uruguay, and in particular the resolutions adopted at its 129th and 130th sessions in which, after concluding that this former parliamentarian was a victim of violation of his human rights and after noting that he was in a serious state of health, it requested that he be released immediately,

Considering that, as it had already done in the cases of José Luis Massera Lerena and of Rosario Pietrarroia Zapala, the United Nations Human Rights Committee reached the conclusion that Mr. Alberto Altesor Gonzales is also the victim of a violation of human rights under several provisions of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and that Uruguay is required to remedy the harm done to the victims, indemnify him for the violations he suffered and ensure that they do not occur again, and to provide him with the medical care which his state of health requires,

Taking note of the report of the Special Committee (CL/131/82/5),

Regretting that the Uruguayan Authorities have ceased to answer the communications addressed to them on behalf of the Council and the Special Committee,

1. Takes note with satisfaction that, according to a source of communication, the Uruguayan Authorities authorized the personal doctor of Mr. Altesor Gonzales to examine him in a civilian cardiological institute at Montevideo and to carry out on 3 July 1982 the heart surgery which his state of health required;
2. Urges again that Mr. Alberto Altesor Gonzales be released;
3. Requests the Secretary General to contact the Organization of American States in order to obtain any information it may possess on this case as well as the content of any decision it may have taken in this respect;
4. Appeals again to the National Groups to approach the Uruguayan Authorities by all appropriate means on behalf of Mr. Alberto Altesor Gonzales.

B. José Luis Massera Lerena, Jaime Gerschuni Perez, Vladimir Ilitch Turiansky Vladimersky, Rosario Pietrarroia Zapala

The Inter-Parliamentary Council,

Referring to its previous resolutions on Mr. José Luis Massera Lerena, Mr. Jaime Gerschuni Perez, Mr. Vladimir Ilitch Turiansky Vladimersky and Mr. Rosario Pietrarroia Zapala, of Uruguay, and in particular the resolution adopted at its 129th and 130th sessions in which, after concluding that all these former parliamentarians were victims of violation of their human rights and after noting that they were in a serious state of health, it requested that they be released immediately,

Taking note of the report of the Special Committee (CL/131/82/5 and 5 Add.1)

Regretting that the Uruguayan Authorities have ceased to answer the communications addressed to them on behalf of the Council and the Special Committee,

Considering that Mr. Perez's 8-year prison sentence is due to expire at the end of October or the beginning of November 1982,

Recalling that in the cases of José Luis Massera Lerena and Rosario Pietrarroia Zapala the United Nations Human Rights Committee, like the Inter Parliamentary Council, reached the conclusion that they are victims of violation of their human rights under the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and that Uruguay is required to apply the necessary remedies,

1. Deplores that the situation of the four former parliamentarians has remained unchanged since the 129 session of the Inter-Parliamentary Council (September 1981);
2. Urges again that José Luis Massera Lerena, Jaime Gerschuni Perez, Vladimir Ilitch Turiansky Vladimersky and Rosario Pietrarroia Zapala be released at the earliest possible date and, in Mr. Perez's case, on no account later than the date of the expiry of his sentence;
3. Requests the Secretary General to contact the Organization of American States in order to obtain any information it may possess on these cases as well as the content of any decision it may have taken in this respect;
4. Appeals again to the National Groups to approach the Uruguayan Authorities by all appropriate means on behalf of José Luis Massera Lerena, Jaime Gerschuni Perez, Vladimir Ilitch Turiansky Vladimersky and Rosario Pietrarroia Zapala.

APPENDICE "EAND-74"

Canadian Group
Box 950
Parliament Buildings
Ottawa, Canada



Groupe canadien
C.P. 950
Edifices du Parlement
Ottawa, Canada

**RAPPORT
DE LA**

**69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE
ROME, ITALIE
14-22 SEPTEMBRE 1982**

24 NOVEMBRE 1982

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PARTIE B

RESULTATS DE LA SESSION D'AUTOMNE 1982,
(document préparé par le Secrétariat international)

PARTIE "A"

I. INTRODUCTION

Les assises de la 69e Conférence interparlementaire se sont tenues à Rome du 12 au 22 septembre 1982.

Le Comité exécutif, dont aucun parlementaire canadien est membre pour le moment, s'est réuni les 12, 21 et 23 septembre alors que le Conseil interparlementaire s'est réuni le 13 et le 22 septembre en matinée. La 69e Conférence proprement dite a commencé les travaux dans la matinée du 14 pour terminer le mercredi 22 septembre en fin de soirée.

La délégation canadienne était dirigée par l'hon. Gildas Molgat, sénateur, Président du Groupe canadien, membre du Conseil interparlementaire et Vice-Président de la Conférence. M. Molgat était accompagné de son épouse. Faisaient de plus partie de la délégation:

Pour le Sénat

L'hon. Martial Asselin, c.p., sénateur et madame

L'hon. Peter Bosa, sénateur

L'hon. Yvette Rousseau, sénateur

Pour la Chambre des communes

M. Dennis Dawson, député

M. Benno Friesen, député et madame

M. Gérald Laniel, député et madame

L'hon. Allan Lawrence, c.p., député,

membre du Conseil interparlementaire et madame

L'hon. Bryce Mackasey, c.p., député et madame

M. Douglas Neil, député et madame

M. David Orlikow, député et madame

M. Marcel Prud'homme, député, Rapporteur de la Commission pour l'étude des questions politiques, de la sécurité internationale et du désarmement.

La délégation était accompagnée de M. Martin Lavoie, Secrétaire administratif du Groupe canadien et de M. Roger Hill, Conseiller.

M.M. Charles Lussier et Richard Greene, respectivement Greffier et Greffier adjoint du Sénat et le Dr. C.B. Koester, Greffier de la Chambre des communes ont participé aux réunions de l'Association des Secrétaires généraux des Parlements. M. Lussier était accompagné de son épouse.

II. LA 69e CONFERENCE: SON DEROULEMENT

A. LA CEREMONIE INAUGURALE

La Cérémonie inaugurale de la 69e Conférence a eu lieu à l'Auditorium de Santa Cecilia en fin de matinée le 14 septembre 1982. Après que les membres du Comité exécutif eurent été présentés à M. Sandro Pertini, chef de l'Etat italien, le Président du Groupe italien de l'Union interparlementaire, M. Giulio Andreotti a prononcé une allocution de bienvenue; ensuite ce fut au tour du Président sortant du Conseil interparlementaire, M. Rafael Caldera (Venezuela). Son allocution fut suivie de celle du Directeur général de l'Office des Nations Unies à Genève, M. Luigi Cottafavi qui représentait le Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies. Finalement, le Président de la République Italienne, M. Sandro Pertini, a pris la parole.

La Cérémonie inaugurale fut agrémentée d'un concert de l'Orchestre Philharmonique de "l'Accademia de Santa Cecilia" dirigée par Gianandrea Cavazzeni. L'orchestre interpréta pour les quelques 931 délégués et leur conjoint, quelques-unes des oeuvres du grand compositeur italien Guiseppe Verdi.

Dans son allocution, le Président du Groupe italien, M. Andreotti, a fait ressortir le fait que l'Union s'attache à rapprocher les positions et à établir les prémisses nécessaires aux solutions des grands problèmes actuels. Il a indiqué de plus que si parfois les résultats de ces efforts apparaissent modestes ou même décevants, il convenait de garder la foi afin d'aboutir à un nouvel ordre mondial où une partie de l'humanité ne lutterait plus uniquement pour survivre, tandis qu'une autre chercherait à augmenter son bien-être. En conclusion, M. Andreotti a exprimé le voeu que la Conférence de Rome puisse marquer un progrès considérable dans ce sens. On trouvera le texte intégral du discours de M. Andreotti à l'Annexe A, Partie A, p. 29.

Le Président du Conseil interparlementaire M. R. Caldera a profité de l'occasion pour brosser un tableau de la situation mondiale par rapport aux sujets inscrits à l'ordre du jour de la rencontre et aux événements de l'heure qui marquent le monde. On trouvera le texte intégral du discours de M. Caldera à l'Annexe B, Partie A, p. 31.

M. L. Cottafavi, représentant du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies, s'est premièrement attardé à démontrer qu'il y a un grand nombre de principes communs partagés par l'Organisation des Nations Unies et l'Union interparlementaire, principes de

paix, de liberté, de justice et de prospérité, pour ensuite effleurer les différents thèmes à l'ordre du jour de la rencontre. On trouvera le texte intégral du discours de M.Cottafavi à l'Annexe C, Partie A, p. 36.

C'est le discours du Président de la République Italienne qui a le plus marqué les délégués et ce surtout lorsqu'il a traité du problème palestinien se disant d'avis que les palestiniens devraient eux aussi avoir une terre et une patrie. C'est en ce sens que M. Pertini a salué la dernière proposition du Président Reagan qu'il considère être la prémisse d'une solution pacifique au Moyen-Orient. Le Président de la République Italienne a aussi profité de l'occasion pour faire ressortir les mérites et la nécessité des institutions parlementaires démocratiques et fait un vibrant plaidoyer contre la faim dans le monde, la course aux armements et pour la paix dans le monde. On trouvera le texte intégral du discours du Président Pertini à l'Annexe D, Partie A, p. 39.

B. LES PREMIERES SEANCES PLENIERES

Les premières séances plénières ont débuté l'après-midi, le mardi 14 septembre pour se terminer en fin de soirée le 18 septembre.

Après avoir élu à l'unanimité, M. Giulio Andreotti, Président de la Conférence et choisi les Vice-Présidents (Point 1 de l'ordre du jour), la Conférence a abordé en séance plénière les points suivants:

1. Les demandes d'inscription de points supplémentaires à l'ordre du jour.

Le Président Andreotti annonce que la Conférence a été saisie d'un très grand nombre de demandes d'inscription de points supplémentaires portant sur onze sujets. Après discussion et à la suggestion du Président, il a été décidé de reporter à la troisième séance, celle du 15 septembre en après-midi, la prise en considération de ces demandes. A l'ouverture de la séance sur cette question, deux nouvelles demandes avaient été déposées...

Ainsi la Conférence avait à trancher sur:

- quatre projets d'inscription portant sur la situation au Liban et la question palestinienne
- deux projets d'inscription ayant trait au conflit Iran-Iraq
- deux projets d'inscription au sujet de l'invasion de la Somalie par l'Ethiopie

- un projet d'inscription au sujet du danger que cause pour la paix internationale les super puissances
- un projet d'inscription concernant l'invasion d'Etats souverains par des troupes étrangères (avec mention de l'Afghanistan)
- un projet d'inscription sur la question de la bombe à neutron
- un projet d'inscription au sujet de l'utilisation des armes chimiques au Vietnam
- un projet d'inscription traitant du renforcement des troupes américaines aux frontières de la Tchécoslovaquie et de la République démocratique Allemande
- un projet d'inscription portant sur le statut des territoires américains de la Micronésie
- un projet d'inscription portant sur la politique américaine en Amérique Centrale
- et finalement, un projet d'inscription ayant trait à la situation des droits de l'homme en Irlande du Nord.

La Conférence s'est d'abord prononcée sur une motion indienne proposant le renvoi sine die de toutes les demandes d'inscription de points supplémentaires à l'ordre du jour de la Conférence à l'exception de celles concernant la question du Moyen-Orient et le conflit entre l'Iraq et l'Iran. Après discussion et plusieurs votes, il fut décidé d'inclure à la motion indienne deux amendements: l'un qui permettrait de prendre en considération la question de l'invasion de l'Afghanistan (Groupe irlandais), l'autre qui traiterait de l'agression éthiopienne contre la République Démocratique de Somalie et les dangers qui peuvent en résulter pour la paix et la sécurité internationale (Groupe somalien). Un troisième amendement fut repoussé, soit celui présenté par le Groupe tchécoslovaque au sujet des troupes américaines aux frontières de la Tchécoslovaquie et de la République Démocratique Allemande.

Il est intéressant de noter que l'amendement du Groupe irlandais fut adopté par 400 voix contre 325 et 315 abstentions, que l'amendement du Groupe somalien le fut par 518 voix contre 224 et 214 abstentions alors que l'Amendement du Groupe Tchécoslovaque fut repoussé par 392 voix contre 262 et 233 abstentions. Voir le détail de ces votes à la Partie B, pp. 34-37.

La motion du Groupe indien fut adoptée telle qu'amendée par 665 voies contre 642 et 113 abstentions. Le Groupe canadien a favorisé la motion de la délégation indienne telle qu'amendée.

Ainsi quatre points supplémentaires furent portés à l'ordre du jour de la Conférence:

- Point 10: La situation au Liban et la question palestinienne
- Point 11: Propositions pour une paix définitive entre l'Iraq et l'Iran
- Point 12: L'invasion de l'Afghanistan
- Point 13: L'agression éthiopienne contre la République Démocratique de Somalie et les dangers qui peuvent en résulter pour la paix et la sécurité internationale.

Ces différents points ont tous été débatus à l'occasion du débat général au cours duquel pas moins de 90 intervenants ont pris la parole, soit pour discuter des points supplémentaires ou pour aborder les points 2 et 3 de l'ordre du jour (voir ci-dessous).

La Conférence a par la suite référé ces points supplémentaires à la Commission pour l'étude des questions politiques, de la sécurité internationale et du désarmement qui a fait rapport à l'occasion de la dernière séance plénière du mercredi 22 septembre.

2. La situation politique, économique et sociale du monde ainsi que les activités de l'Union. (Point 2 de l'ordre du jour)

Le débat général sur cette question a eu lieu les 14 et 15 septembre ainsi que lors de deux séances de nuit tenues les 15 et 18 septembre en même temps que le débat sur le Point 3 de l'ordre du jour (voir ci-dessous).

A cette occasion, la Conférence a entendu, à l'invitation de la Présidence, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères d'Italie, M. Emilio Colombo, qui a fait un exposé sur les grandes lignes de la politique extérieure de son pays. On trouvera le résumé complet de l'intervention de M. Colombo à l'Annexe E, Partie A, p. 47. C'est dans le cadre de ce débat que le Président du Comité exécutif de l'OLP et Membre du Conseil national palestinien, M. Yasser Arafat, a pris la parole dans la matinée du 15 septembre. On trouvera à l'Annexe F, Partie A, p. 51, le résumé complet du discours de M. Arafat.

3. La contribution des Parlements à l'adoption urgente de mesures concrètes, notamment le désarmement nucléaire, la réduction des budgets militaires et ses effets sur l'économie et l'emploi dans le monde ainsi que sur le développement économique et social du Tiers-Monde. (Point 3 de l'ordre du jour)

Ce sujet a fait l'objet d'une discussion en séance plénière dans le cadre du débat général où l'on a aussi discuté du Point 2 de l'ordre du jour (voir ci-dessus).

M. Marcel Prud'homme, Rapporteur de la Commission, a ouvert le débat sur cette question. Il a premièrement donné un aperçu du travail qui s'est fait à Lagos en avril 1982 où l'on a élaboré un projet de résolution (voir Annexe G.1, Partie A, p. 59). Il invite ensuite la Conférence à réexaminer ce projet de résolution en tenant compte de l'évolution intervenue à ce sujet depuis le printemps 1982. Ci-dessous le résumé complet de l'intervention de M. Prud'homme:

Il indique premièrement que la Commission pour l'étude des questions politiques s'est réunie à Lagos sous la présidence de M. G. Andreotti. Quarante-sept orateurs ont indiqué comment les Parlements pourraient selon eux concourir au désarmement. Durant ces débats, la course aux armements, la nécessité de progrès réels à la Deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies et la nécessité de réduire les dépenses d'armements pour consacrer davantage de fonds de développement pour le Tiers-Monde, ont tout particulièrement retenu l'attention.

Il poursuit en expliquant que la Commission politique avait reçu quinze projets de résolution provenant de différents pays et qu'en conséquence un comité de rédaction avait été constitué, dont il était le Président.

M. Prud'homme rapporte que les membres du comité de rédaction ont élaboré un texte commun en l'espace d'un jour, ce qui est un résultat remarquable. Le préambule indique que les problèmes clés en matière de désarmement, la partie A du dispositif expose les vues qui pourraient être exprimées à la Deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies et la partie B est axée sur les questions de caractère général. Le document préconise l'établissement d'un programme global de désarmement, la reprise des négociations et la réduction des armes dans un délai aussi rapproché que possible, l'heureuse conclusion des pourparlers entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et l'URSS à Genève, ainsi que la conclusion d'un nouvel accord sur l'utilisation de l'espace à des fins militaires.

Un certain nombre de propositions ont été écartées parce qu'elles ne faisaient pas l'objet d'un accord unanime. Il a été décidé de les renvoyer pour examen à la 69e Conférence. Le projet de résolution ainsi rédigé a été adopté par la Commission politique et par le Conseil interparlementaire à Lagos.

Le 23 juin 1982, M. G. Andreotti a présenté les conclusions de ces deux organes à l'Organisation des Nations Unies. Il a bénéficié d'une attention toute particulière en sa qualité de représentant de l'Union interparlementaire.

D'après M. Prud'homme, il appartenait maintenant à la Conférence de réexaminer le texte adopté à Lagos compte tenu des faits et de l'évolution intervenus en matière de désarmement. M. Prud'homme s'est dit persuadé que la Commission politique, le comité de rédaction et le Conseil interparlementaire ont plutôt cherché à élaborer une déclaration générale sur les problèmes de désarmement et ne se sont pas spécialement attachés à rédiger un texte susceptible d'être présenté à L'ONU. C'est pourquoi il estime que le texte actuel doit être modifié aussi peu que possible.

En plus de M. Prud'homme, qui agissait à titre de Rapporteur, deux autres parlementaires canadiens sont intervenus dans ce débat, ce sont M. Allan Lawrence, qui était responsable de ce dossier pour le Groupe canadien avec l'hon. Peter Bosa. M. Lawrence a participé activement à la rédaction du projet de résolution à Lagos.

Au cours du débat, M. Lawrence a dit que depuis la réunion de Lagos, le monde a constaté la terrible brutalité des armes classiques nouvellement mises au point et leur effroyable efficacité en Amérique du Sud et au Moyen-Orient. Du point de vue humain, comment dit-il peut-on retarder davantage la conclusion d'un accord raisonnable sur la réduction des armements? Le monde entier est en récession économique et les Gouvernements sont d'avis que leurs dépenses et leur niveau d'imposition sont excessifs. D'après M. Lawrence, il faut que les dépenses publiques soient réduites dans le monde entier, et en tout cas dans les pays occidentaux. On pourrait faire tant de choses a-t-il dit avec l'argent économisé grâce à la réduction des dépenses d'armement!

M. Lawrence s'est dit d'avis qu'un accord sur la réduction des armements doit avoir une portée universelle. Il faut également qu'on puisse la contrôler. L'amendement no. 2 (voir Annexe G.2, Partie A, p. 66) soumis par le Groupe canadien résulte de la déception causée par la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement. Cet amendement devrait permettre de mettre à jour la résolution adoptée par l'Union à Lagos.

La Réunion de Madrid sur la sécurité et la coopération européenne, qui est pour le moment restée sans effet, est, selon M. Lawrence, une autre cause de déception.

Finalement, M. Lawrence a fait appel aux parlementaires qui participaient à la Conférence pour qu'ils fassent provisoirement abstraction de leur loyalisme à l'égard de leurs Gouvernements respectifs. C'est le moment pour eux a-t-il dit de ramener ceux-ci à la raison et à la sagesse afin qu'ils

réussissent là où ils ont échoué. Ils se doivent d'amener leurs Gouvernements à prendre conscience du fait que le désarmement est crucial pour l'avenir de l'humanité. Tel est précisément selon M. Lawrence l'objectif de la présente Conférence.

Pour sa part le sénateur Bosa a indiqué que tous les délégués qu'il a entendu jusqu'à maintenant, qu'ils soient de l'Est ou de l'Ouest ou encore du Tiers-Monde, s'entendent pour dire que l'arsenal militaire doit être réduit. Il se demande pourquoi très peu de progrès ont été accomplis jusqu'à ce jour alors qu'au contraire les pays développent des armes encore plus destructives.

Le sénateur Bosa se demande si la communauté internationale ne vise pas le mauvais objectif et si elle ne devrait pas plutôt considérer pourquoi les dépenses en armement demeurent à un si haut niveau.

D'après le sénateur Bosa, la qualité de la vie pourrait être améliorée si les dépenses militaires étaient réorientées dans un but pacifique; mais la réduction des arsenaux n'assurerait pas nécessairement la paix. Même si les deux-tiers des armes nucléaires disparaissaient du jour au lendemain, le tiers restant serait suffisant pour détruire la planète entière. La course aux armements n'est pas ralentie par les conflits ethniques, religieux et politiques qui divisent le monde.

Le sénateur Bosa poursuit en faisant un parallèle entre les conditions mondiales et celles qui prévalent au Canada. Au Canada mentionne-t-il, il y a des disputes entre les régions, entre les anglophones et les francophones, il y a 78 groupes ethniques, des religions différentes, des coutumes différentes en plus des disparités régionales et économiques. Même à cela, le Canada n'a jamais eu de guerres majeures ou de révolution à l'intérieur de ses frontières. Il a été possible de vaincre ces difficultés et de travailler pour le bien commun. Les problèmes tels que la conscription, le drapeau national, le rapatriement de la Constitution ont généré des déchirements et de l'amertume au Canada, mais ils ont été surmontés.

Les Canadiens de poursuivre M. Bosa, ont aplané leurs différences sans violence. Il y a deux langues officielles au Canada mais nous avons développé aussi une politique de multiculturalisme grâce auquel les groupes de différentes nationalités peuvent s'épanouir. La même approche pourrait être appliquée au niveau international - une volonté de faire des compromis et de comprendre le point de vue des autres. D'après le sénateur Bosa, c'est le seul espoir pour le désarmement et le Canada est un microcosme du monde.

A l'issue de ce débat, qui s'est terminé en fin de soirée le 18 septembre, le projet de résolution présenté par M. Prud'homme et les amendements déposés par différents Groupes nationaux (dont le Canada) ont été renvoyés pour examen et rapport à la Commission politique.

4. L'évolution des institutions parlementaires dans le respect de la Constitution et leurs activités dans le domaine des relations internationales. (Point 4 de l'ordre du jour)

Le débat sur ce point s'est ouvert le jeudi 16 septembre en matinée. Pas moins de 45 délégués ont fait des interventions dont pour le Groupe canadien, M. Gérald Laniel. L'hon. Bryce Mackasey, qui a travaillé activement à l'élaboration des Amendements canadiens, a préféré ne pas ajouter à l'excellente intervention de M. Laniel.

M. Laniel s'est attardé à indiquer que bien que le projet de résolution (voir Annexe H.1 - Partie A, p. 69) qui est à l'étude devrait rallier la grande majorité des délégués, le Groupe canadien propose deux amendements (voir Annexe H.2 - Partie A, p. 73) lesquelles seraient susceptibles d'améliorer la portée de la résolution finale. Ci-dessous un résumé de l'intervention de M. Laniel:

M. Laniel se déclare convaincu que le projet de résolution, adopté à l'unanimité à Lagos, ralliera la grande majorité des délégués. Certes, chaque pays est libre d'avoir sa propre façon de concevoir l'évolution de ses institutions parlementaires et leur rôle en matière de relations internationales, liberté que marque l'intitulé même du point en discussion, mais les objectifs du projet de résolution sont éminemment louables. En conséquence, M. Laniel indique que la délégation canadienne appuie pleinement le texte.

Le Groupe canadien a néanmoins déposé deux amendements. Le premier vise le point 6 du projet de résolution dont la formulation peut présenter un danger pour les structures démocratiques traditionnelles des pays de l'Union. Ce n'est en effet pas parce que les Parlements n'ont pas toujours réussi à exercer l'influence souhaitable sur les relations internationales qu'il faille ajouter de nouveaux organismes chargés de cette tâche et vouloir les institutionnaliser. C'est aux élus que les Gouvernements doivent, en dehors des périodes électorales, rendre compte de leurs actes et à eux seuls. Il convient donc, selon M. Laniel, d'accroître leurs responsabilités en matière de politique étrangère et non de les amoindrir; c'est pourquoi la délégation canadienne propose de parler d'influence et non de compétence. Elle souhaite en outre que les organismes, dont la création est suggérée par le projet de résolution, ne soient pas financés directement par l'Etat.

Le second amendement canadien vise à institutionnaliser et à renforcer la participation des parlementaires aux travaux des Nations Unies et l'on peut penser, de dire M. Laniel, que la représentativité même de l'Union l'autorise à poursuivre un tel objectif. Il conviendrait ainsi que les parlementaires soient associés aux Assemblées régulières et aux Sessions spéciales de l'ONU, de façon à favoriser l'influence des Assemblées Nationales sur les activités de cette organisation.

M. Laniel poursuit en expliquant que pour ce qui est du Parlement canadien, son évolution l'a conduit à accentuer son rôle en matière de politique extérieure. Certes, le Parlement n'est pas autorisé constitutionnellement à signer les traités, mais les dirigeants du Canada doivent répondre devant lui de leur gestion des affaires tant étrangères qu'intérieures.

Finalement, M. Laniel indique que la délégation canadienne est consciente de la grande importance du projet soumis à la Conférence mais souhaite néanmoins qu'une autre question soit examinée dans l'avenir à savoir: l'information des Gouvernements et des Assemblées sur les travaux des Associations parlementaires, notamment ceux de l'Union interparlementaire.

Au terme de ce débat, le projet de résolution et les amendements (dont ceux du Canada) ont été renvoyés à la Commission pour l'étude des questions parlementaires et des droits de l'homme pour étude et recommandation.

5. L'état de l'environnement mondial dix ans après la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le milieu humain qui s'est tenue à Stockholm. Mesures à prendre y compris dans le domaine de la législation, aux niveaux national et international. (Point 5 de l'ordre du jour)

Le débat sur cette question s'est tenu le jeudi 16 septembre en après-midi. Comme pas moins de 51 orateurs étaient déjà inscrits, le Président a annoncé à la Conférence que le Bureau restreint avait décidé de limiter le temps de parole accordé à chaque délégation à 6 minutes pour un seul intervenant, et à 3 minutes par orateur s'ils sont deux à prendre la parole. C'est ainsi que M. D. Orlikow, qui devait prendre la parole avec Madame Y. Rousseau, a aimablement cédé son temps de parole à celle-ci.

La sénatrice Rousseau a d'abord invité les délégués à réfléchir à l'état de l'environnement mondial pour amener par la suite ses collègues à adopter une résolution qui permettrait à

l'Union d'arriver à des résultats concrets. Ci-dessous un résumé de l'allocation de Mme Rousseau.

Mme Rousseau s'est premièrement réjoui de revenir à la tribune pour parler d'un sujet aussi important que l'environnement et présenter quelques suggestions d'amendement et d'appui à la résolution proposée. Selon Mme Rousseau, il est important pour les parlementaires d'arriver à élaborer des lignes directrices qui faciliteront la tâche dans leurs pays respectifs.

La sénatrice rappelle que les débats de la Conférence ne font que donner suite à des réunions préparatoires comme celles de Lagos et de Nairobi. La préoccupation majeure de l'Union doit être de fixer des objectifs en accord avec ceux des autres organismes, car les parlementaires représentent des individus mais agissent aussi en tant qu'intermédiaires.

Il importe d'abord de réfléchir sur l'état de l'environnement mondial dix après la Conférence de Stockholm. En mai 1982, les Nations Unies ont organisé une réunion afin d'évaluer les progrès accomplis et de fixer pour la prochaine décennie des priorités et des objectifs. Les délégués se doivent d'étudier ces documents et de prendre connaissance des nouveaux objectifs proposés afin de les promouvoir dans leurs pays respectifs. Ce serait déjà un succès si la Conférence permettait une meilleure connaissance des problèmes de l'environnement.

Des progrès réels ont été réalisés et les organismes internationaux et nationaux mis en place à l'époque ont joué un rôle déterminant, mais beaucoup reste à accomplir. L'Union interparlementaire peut apporter une contribution valable. Les amendements de la délégation canadienne visent cet objectif.

Seule l'adoption d'une résolution satisfaisante permettra à l'Union d'arriver à des réalisations concrètes. Dans l'ensemble, la résolution proposée est à la hauteur des fonctions et des responsabilités de la Conférence. Dans le contexte actuel de l'évolution des questions relatives à l'environnement, il faut mettre en place des organismes adéquats pour les prendre en charge. Il faut aussi dépolitiser les débats ne serait-ce que parce qu'il n'y a qu'une planète et que ses principales ressources appartiennent à tous. Il est évident que la mise en oeuvre d'une politique globale sera le défi des années 1980.

A l'issue de ce débat, le projet de résolution (voir Annexe I.1, Partie A, p. 75) et les amendements déposés par les différents Groupes nationaux (dont le Canada voir Annexe I.2, Partie A, p. 80) ont été renvoyés pour examen et rapport à la Commission pour l'éducation, la science, la culture et l'environnement.

6. La faim dans le monde
(Point 6 de l'ordre du jour)

Ce débat a eu lieu le vendredi 17 septembre en matinée. Environ 65 personnes sont intervenues dans ce débat dont des représentants de l'organisation des Nations Unies, le Président du fond international de développement agricole, le Directeur exécutif du programme alimentaire mondial et le Directeur exécutif adjoint du Conseil mondial de l'alimentation. M. Benno Friesen a pris la parole au nom du Groupe canadien.

M. Friesen a dit que le mécanisme prévu à Lagos (voir Annexe J.1, Partie A, p. 82) pourrait être l'amorce d'un règlement du problème de la faim. Depuis la seconde guerre mondiale a-t-il indiqué, une grande partie du Tiers-Monde est tributaire de l'action entreprise par les pays industrialisés pour lutter contre la faim. Ces pays ont subi de nombreux échecs en la matière. Il est peut-être temps de reconsidérer les stratégies et de laisser les pays en développement fixer eux-mêmes leurs priorités et leurs programmes. Beaucoup d'entre eux se sont montrés capable de le faire.

Dans la lutte contre la faim dans le monde, on devrait porté une plus grande attention au rôle du fermier. Le fermier, essentiellement un être créateur, n'a pas toujours été favorisé par les activités gouvernementales. Les gouvernements ne l'ont pas aidé dans ses efforts pour produire même s'ils l'ont aidé pour la mise en marche de ses produits. M. Friesen invite à la réévaluation des priorités qui meneraient à une réorientation des fonds utilisés présentement dans la course aux armements.

Ici encore, en raison du grand nombre d'intervenants le temps de parole des délégations a été réduit. L'hon. Martial Asselin qui devait prendre la parole sur ce sujet a aimablement cédé son temps à M. Friesen.

A l'issue de ce débat, le projet de résolution et les amendements déposés par les différents groupes nationaux (dont le Canada - voir Annexe J.2, Partie A, p. 89) ont été renvoyés pour examen et rapport à la Commission pour l'étude des questions économiques et sociales.

7. La liquidation du colonialisme et la lutte contre le néo-colonialisme, notamment la nécessité de prendre des mesures pour la réalisation immédiate et stricte du plan des Nations Unies sur la Namibie. (Point 7 de l'ordre du jour)

Ce débat a eu lieu le samedi 18 septembre en matinée. Pas moins de 71 intervenants ont pris la parole au cours de cette séance dont M. Dennis Dawson. Ci-dessous un résumé de l'intervention du représentant canadien:

M. Dawson souligne tout d'abord que son pays, qui n'a jamais été colonisateur et qui n'a aucune ambition d'hégémonie, soutient la volonté d'indépendance de la Namibie. Le Canada, membre actif du Groupe de contact, s'est efforcé de trouver une solution négociée et pacifique au problème namibien. Cette solution passe par le retrait de l'Afrique du Sud et l'organisation d'élections libres. C'est dans ce sens que le Canada a mené des actions significatives, en collaboration avec les Etats membres du "Groupe de contact" et en liaison avec la SWAPO. M. Dawson souscrit aux principes qui, selon lui, doivent être à la base de tout règlement: fin de l'occupation illégale de la Namibie, garantie du droit à l'autodétermination et négociation.

De fait, l'accès à l'indépendance ne peut se faire que par la voie pacifique et le Canada n'a jamais approuvé la violence ni la lutte armée. D'ailleurs, la raison d'être de l'Union n'est-elle pas d'encourager la co-existence harmonieuse entre les peuples? Dans cet esprit, il faut condamner l'attitude de l'Afrique du Sud, ses agressions répétées contre l'Angola et sa politique d'apartheid.

M. Dawson a tenu à demander à tous les pays de ne pas chercher à exporter la violence. En tant que parlementaires et démocrates, les participants à la Conférence doivent être partisans des solutions parlementaires et du dialogue. Le Canada a obtenu son indépendance par la voie pacifique, et c'est la seule possible. Ceux qui préconisent la lutte armée parlent souvent de paix mais, comme l'a dit le Président Pertini à la cérémonie inaugurale, les Parlements sont les lieux où les conflits trouvent leur solution.

Le paragraphe qui, dans le projet de résolution (voir Annexe K, Partie A, p. 93), a trait à Porto Rico, contient une opinion fausse. Le peuple portoricain s'est par trois élections prononcé en faveur du maintien de ses liens avec les Etats-Unis. M. Dawson se demande ce que diraient les Afghans et les Polonais s'ils avaient la possibilité d'exprimer librement leurs vues.

M. Dawson tient également à réfuter la critique dont fait l'objet le "Groupe de contact". Son rôle a été constructif et montre que le dialogue et le compromis obtiennent plus que la violence.

Finalement, M. Dawson indique que le Groupe canadien pourrait appuyer le projet de résolution si les modifications qu'il propose étaient apportées. Cet appui sera inspiré essentiellement par la nécessité d'assurer l'avenir libre du

peuple namibien, dans le respect de la résolution 435 des Nations Unies et du Plan de règlement élaboré par l'ONU, seul cadre susceptible d'apporter une solution durable et pacifique au problème namibien.

En raison du grand nombre d'intervenants, le Bureau restreint avait réduit le temps de parole des délégations. M. Douglas Neil qui devait parler sur le sujet a aimablement cédé son temps de parole à M. Dawson.

A l'issue de ce débat, le projet de résolution et les amendements déposés par les différents Groupes nationaux ont été renvoyés pour examen et rapport à la Commission pour les territoires non autonomes et l'étude des questions ethniques.

C. LE TRAVAIL DES COMMISSIONS PERMANENTES D'ÉTUDE ET LES DECISIONS DE LA CONFÉRENCE.

Les cinq commissions permanentes d'études se sont réunies à partir du samedi 18 septembre jusqu'au mardi 21 septembre à midi.

1. Commission pour l'étude des questions politiques, de la sécurité internationale et du désarmement.

La Commission était présidée par M. G. Andreotti (Italie). Le rapporteur était M. Marcel Prud'homme, député, membre de la délégation canadienne. Outre l'étude du projet de résolution sur le désarmement qui avait été préparée à Lagos (voir Annexe G.1, Partie A, p. 59) au printemps 1982, la Commission a dû se pencher sur les 4 points supplémentaires qui ont été inscrits par la Conférence à l'ordre du jour (voir p. 9).

Le Groupe canadien a pris un très grand intérêt dans les sujets supplémentaires qui ont été inscrits à l'ordre du jour. C'est ainsi qu'à ses réunions journalières, les différents points supplémentaires ont été analysés dans le détail par la délégation. A titre de chef de la délégation, le sénateur Molgat a pris la responsabilité de ces sujets au cours de la Conférence.

(a) Désarmement

Après avoir examiné en détail les amendements au projet de résolution ainsi que les sous-amendements, le projet de résolution tel qu'amendé (voir Annexe XVII, Partie B, p. 42) a été adopté par la Commission par 33 voix sans opposition et 3 abstentions. Le Groupe canadien a appuyé la résolution.

Ce projet de résolution a été présenté à la Conférence le 2 septembre où on l'a approuvé à l'unanimité.

Comme il y avait plusieurs amendements traitant d'un même sujet ou se référant à un même paragraphe du projet de résolution, M. Prud'homme avait la difficile et délicate tâche de suggérer aux délégués lesquels de ces amendements devraient être traités en premier lieu et ce en accord avec les Règlements et Statuts de l'Union interparlementaire. Ce n'était pas chose facile et cet exercice a exigé du rapporteur une connaissance approfondie des problèmes du désarmement auquel était confronté la Commission et une très grande dextérité.

Ayant joué un rôle important dans la rédaction du texte original, M. Lawrence a tenu à ce que la résolution finale tienne compte des faits nouveaux qui sont intervenus depuis le printemps, en particulier des résultats de la deuxième Session spéciale des Nations Unies sur le désarmement. M. Lawrence a fait ce travail en étroite collaboration avec le Sénateur Bosa qui a participé à toutes les sessions de travail de la Commission.

(b) La situation au Liban et la question palestinienne.

Comme la Commission se trouvait saisie de sept projets de résolution et d'un amendement présenté par le Groupe national de l'Egypte, il fut convenu de former un comité de rédaction composé des délégués des Groupes nationaux qui avaient présenté des projets de résolution ou qui avaient un intérêt direct dans la question afin de rédiger un projet de résolution unique. Une fois que le travail fut fait, le comité de rédaction a déposé un projet de résolution (voir Annexe XVIII, Partie B, p. 49) qui a été adopté sans amendement par 43 voix contre 3 et 14 abstentions. Le Groupe canadien a voté contre le projet en Commission.

Ce projet de résolution a été présenté à la Conférence le 22 septembre. Celle-ci a été appelée à se prononcer séparément sur le préambule et la section A du dispositif d'un côté et sur la section B du dispositif du projet de résolution de l'autre.

Le préambule et la section A du dispositif ont été adoptés par 586 voix contre 58 et 132 abstentions. Le Canada a voté comme suit: 2 pour, 4 contre et 5 abstentions.

Par la suite la Conférence a adopté la section B du dispositif par 677 voix contre 25 et 86 abstentions. Le Canada a voté comme suit: 6 pour, 1 contre et 5 abstentions.

Finalement, l'ensemble du texte qui a été présenté par la Commission a été adopté par 677 voix contre 32 et 132 abstentions. Le Canada a voté comme suit: 2 pour, 4 contre et 6 abstentions. On trouvera à la Partie B, pp. 53-55, le détail des votes sur cette question.

(c) Proposition pour une paix définitive entre l'Iraq et l'Iran.

La Commission était saisie de trois projets de résolution. Après discussion, il fut décidé d'utiliser comme texte de base le projet de résolution (voir Annexe XXII, Partie B, p. 56) présenté par le Groupe australien. Ce projet de résolution a été adopté en Commission par 40 voix pour contre 0 et 3 abstentions. Le Canada a appuyé le projet. La Conférence a adopté la résolution sans procéder à un vote.

(d) L'invasion de l'Afghanistan.

La Commission a étudié un projet de résolution élaboré par le Groupe national irlandais et un projet d'amendement présenté par le Groupe national italien.

La Commission a accepté comme texte de base le projet de résolution présenté par le Groupe irlandais tel qu'amendé par le Groupe italien. Ayant approuvé un amendement présenté oralement par la délégation marocaine, la Commission a adopté le projet de résolution (voir Annexe XXIII, Partie B, p. 57) par 35 voix contre 14 et 5 abstentions. Le Groupe canadien a appuyé le projet de résolution.

La Conférence a adopté le texte complet qui lui a été soumis par la Commission par 439 voix contre 164 et 188 abstentions. Le Canada a appuyé la résolution. On trouvera le détail du vote sur cette question à la Partie B, p. 58.

(e) L'agression éthiopienne contre la République démocratique de Somalie.

La Commission a examiné deux projets de résolution. L'un présenté par le Groupe national de Somalie et l'autre par celui de la République fédérale d'Allemagne. Après discussion, la Commission a décidé de retenir comme texte de base le projet de résolution soumis par le Groupe national de la République fédérale d'Allemagne. Après avoir approuvé un amendement présenté oralement par la délégation de la Somalie, la Commission a adopté le projet de résolution (voir Annexe XXV, Partie B, p. 59) par 34 voix contre 12 et 7 abstentions. Le Canada a appuyé ce projet de résolution.

A sa réunion du 22 septembre, la Conférence a procédé à un vote séparé sur le préambule et le paragraphe 1 du dispositif. Elle a adopté le préambule et le paragraphe 1 du dispositif par 133 voix contre 206 et 131 abstentions. Le Canada a appuyé le texte du préambule et du paragraphe 1.

Le texte complet du projet de résolution a finalement été adopté par 365 voies contre 170 et 170 abstentions. La délégation canadienne s'est prononcée en faveur de la résolution comme l'a fait la grande majorité des états occidentaux et un grand nombre de pays arabes et non-alignés. (Voir le détail des votes à la Partie B, pp. 60-61).

2. Commission pour l'étude des questions parlementaires juridiques et des droits de l'homme.

Cette Commission s'est réunie le 21 septembre. Celle-ci avait à étudier le projet de résolution (voir Annexe H.1, Partie A, p. 69) préparé à l'occasion de la Session de printemps et des amendements présentés par différents Groupes nationaux notamment par le Groupe canadien (voir Annexe H.2, Partie A, p. 73). Après examen des amendements et des sous-amendements, la Commission a adopté à l'unanimité un projet de résolution (voir Annexe XXVIII, Partie B, p. 62) qu'elle présente à la Conférence le 22 septembre. Celle-ci a adopté sans vote le projet de résolution tel que présenté par la Commission.

M.M. Mackasey et Laniel ont joué un rôle important à l'occasion du travail en Commission. Un amendement canadien au sujet du travail des parlementaires aux Nations Unies a été adopté à l'unanimité. Ce fut d'ailleurs le seul amendement accepté de cette façon par la Commission.

3. Commission pour l'étude des questions économiques et sociales.

La Commission s'est réunie le 20 septembre pour étudier le projet de résolution (voir Annexe J.1, Partie A, p. 82) portant sur la faim dans le monde. La Commission avait en outre à revoir 15 amendements à ce projet présenté par différents Groupes nationaux dont le Groupe canadien (voir Annexe J.2, Partie A, p. 89). Après étude et après avoir adopté un certain nombre d'amendements, la Commission a été unanime à adopter le projet de résolution ainsi amendé (voir Annexe XXIX, Partie B, p. 65). A sa séance du 22 septembre, la Conférence a adopté sans vote le projet de résolution tel que présenté par la Commission.

Monsieur Friesen et le sénateur Asselin ont joué un rôle très significatif dans le cadre du travail de la Commission en présentant des arguments en faveur de positions qui étaient réalistes et humanitaires par nature. On se souviendra que Monsieur Friesen avait participé activement aux travaux de la Commission qui s'est réunie au printemps 1982 et au cours duquel le projet de résolution original avait été élaboré. M. Peter Sallery, Attaché canadien près la FAO a assisté les représentants canadiens sur cette question.

4. Commission pour l'éducation, la science, la culture et l'environnement.

En plus de se pencher sur le projet de résolution (voir Annexe I.1, Partie A, p. 75) qui avait été préparé à Lagos, la Commission s'est penchée sur plusieurs amendements dont ceux du Canada (voir Annexe I.2, Partie A, p. 80). Après étude, la Commission a adopté par 42 voies contre 0 et 1 abstention le projet de résolution tel qu'amendé (voir Annexe XXX, Partie B, p. 73). Le Canada a appuyé la résolution.

A l'occasion de sa dernière séance, la Conférence a adopté sans vote le projet de résolution tel que présenté par la Commission.

La sénatrice Rousseau et Monsieur Orlikow ont revu de façon très attentive les amendements dont a été saisi la Commission et Mme Rousseau a joué un rôle significatif dans les débats de cette Commission. Ainsi tous les amendements présentés par le Groupe canadien ont été incorporés au texte final.

5. Commission pour les territoires non-autonomes et l'étude des questions ethniques.

Cette Commission s'est réunie le 20 septembre pour revoir le projet de résolution (voir Annexe K, Partie A, p. 93) préparé à l'occasion de la réunion de Lagos à la lumière de 11 amendements. Après examen, la Commission a adopté le projet de résolution (voir Annexe XXXI, Partie B, p. 78) par 35 voies contre 5 et 7 abstentions. Le Canada s'est abstenu.

A sa réunion du 22 septembre la Conférence a dû procéder à un vote séparé sur le 25^{ème} paragraphe du préambule et les 30^{ème} et 31^{ème} du dispositif qui traitaient de la question timorienne. Ces paragraphes ont été adoptés par 272 voies contre 102 et 278 abstentions. Le Canada s'est abstenu. Par la suite il y eu vote sur les paragraphes 27, 28 et 29 du dispositif dans lesquels on traitait du Sahara occidental. Ces paragraphes ont été adoptés par 368 voies contre 77 et 195 abstentions. Le Canada s'est abstenu. Finalement, il y eu un vote séparé portant le paragraphe 26 du préambule et le paragraphe 32 du dispositif lesquels traitaient des Falklands. Ces paragraphes ont été adoptés par 222 voies contre 218 et 181 abstentions. Le Canada a voté non.

Le vote sur l'ensemble de la résolution a été comme suit: 466 pour, 48 contre et 72 abstentions. Le Groupe canadien a voté comme suit: 2 oui, 3 non et 7 abstentions. Voir les détails des votes à la Partie B, pp. 86-89.

M.M. Dawson et Neil représentaient la délégation canadienne au sein de cette Commission. Ils ont tous deux souhaité que la Commission prépare un texte qui serait plus équilibré et où l'on n'opérerait pas pour des solutions extrêmes tel l'utilisation des armes. M. Dawson a d'ailleurs fait allusion à ceci dans son discours à l'occasion des premières séances plénières. Ils ont aussi attiré l'attention des membres sur le "Groupe de contact" sur la Namibie et ils ont condamné les initiatives tendant à faire de la résolution une sorte d'attaque à sens unique contre certains pays.

III. REUNIONS DU CONSEIL INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

Le Conseil interparlementaire a tenu trois séances à Rome, les deux premières le 13 septembre et la dernière dans la matinée du 22 septembre. Les représentants canadiens à ces réunions étaient le Sénateur Gildas Molgat et M. Allan Lawrence.

Parmi les décisions importantes prises par le Conseil, mentionnons: l'accord de principe donné à une série de propositions pour la restructuration des Sessions de l'Union (voir Annexe L, Partie A, p. 102), l'élection de M.J.J. Virolainen (Finlande), au poste de Président du Conseil interparlementaire avec un mandat de trois ans, le choix de Helsinki pour tenir les Sessions de printemps 1983 et de Seoul pour la 70e Conférence, une série de résolutions ayant trait aux droits de l'homme des parlementaires et finalement la tenue de la Ve Conférence interparlementaire sur la Coopération et la Sécurité européennes à Budapest.

C'est à l'instigation de M. Lawrence que le Conseil en est finalement venu à prendre une décision au sujet des moyens concrets en vue d'améliorer les Sessions de l'Union. En effet, dans l'ordre du jour initial de la réunion, ce sujet ne devait être discuté qu'à la toute fin de la dernière séance du 22 septembre. Suite à une intervention vigoureuse de M. Lawrence, le Conseil a décidé d'aborder cette question au tout début de sa dernière séance, évitant ainsi qu'elle soit reportée à plus tard faute de temps.

Les interventions canadiennes quant au choix du pays hôte de la 70e Conférence furent aussi déterminantes. En réponse aux Groupes qui s'opposaient à l'offre de la République de Corée, les représentants canadiens ont fait valoir qu'aucune invitation d'un Groupe, membre en bonne et due forme de l'Union, ne devait être rejeté sur la simple base de son orientation idéologique.

La même argumentation fut utilisée par les représentants canadiens lorsqu'il fut le temps d'accepter l'invitation hongroise à l'effet de tenir la Ve Conférence sur la coopération et la sécurité européennes à Budapest.

On trouvera un résumé des travaux du Conseil interparlementaire à la Partie B, p. 8.

IV. REUNION DES GROUPES DE PAYS EUROPEENS, DU CANADA ET DES ETATS-UNIS: CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE SUR LA COOPERATION ET LA SECURITE EUROPEENNES.

Le 16 septembre 1982, les Groupes des pays européens, du Canada et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique se sont réunis pour discuter de la convocation de la Ve Conférence interparlementaire sur la coopération et la sécurité européennes et faire des recommandations appropriées au Conseil interparlementaire en vue de leur inclusion dans le Programme et le Budget de 1983. M.M. Molgat et Lawrence ont participé à cette réunion.

Il a été recommandé à l'unanimité qu'une telle Conférence soit convoquée en mai 1983 à Budapest (Hongrie) à l'invitation du Groupe hongrois, à condition que la situation politique dans les pays membres permette la tenue de la Conférence et que la participation à cette Conférence soit limitée aux pays membres signataires de l'Acte final d'Helsinki.

Il convient de rappeler que ces activités seront financées, comme ce fut le cas pour les quatre Conférences sur la coopération et la sécurité européennes tenues précédemment, par un budget spécial distinct auquel seuls les Groupes nationaux des pays européens, du Canada et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique contribueront. La part du Groupe canadien s'élèvera à 4,091 Francs Suisses.

V. SESSIONS DU COMITE EXECUTIF

Parmi les décisions importantes prises par le Comité à l'occasion de ses deux sessions à Rome, mentionnons le choix des points de substances inscrits à l'ordre du jour des Commissions d'étude pour 1983.

A noter qu'une des suggestions du Groupe canadien sur les sujets pour la prochaine année a servi de base à l'élaboration d'un point de substance pour la prochaine année. Il s'agit de la proposition du Sénateur Bosa intitulée: "Les moyens de renforcer les Nations Unies de manière que cette institution mondiale puisse jouer un rôle efficace dans les problèmes mondiaux actuels et à venir". Le thème finalement retenu (voir Partie B, p. 25), sera étudié tant par la Commission pour l'étude des questions politiques, de la sécurité internationale et du désarmement que par la Commission pour l'étude des questions parlementaires, juridiques et des droits de l'homme; ce qui démontre le large appui qu'a reçu la proposition initial canadienne tant en Commission qu'au Comité exécutif.

On trouvera à la Partie B, p. 6, un résumé des travaux du Comité exécutif.

VI. REUNIONS DES DELEGATIONS DES 10+

La première réunion des délégations des 10+ a eu lieu le samedi 11 septembre. Les délégations des 10+ regroupent les pays de l'Ouest et certains pays dont le système s'apparente à ceux des pays de l'Ouest. Comme le veut la coutume, cette réunion regroupait les membres du Conseil interparlementaire des Groupes membres dont M.M. Molgat et Lawrence pour le Canada. C'est à cette première réunion et à une seconde du même genre qui s'est tenue le mercredi 21 septembre qu'on a discuté de l'élection à la Présidence du Conseil de l'Union et du déroulement de la Conférence.

Il y a eu aussi toute une kyrielle de mini-réunions des 10+ avant chacune des réunions des Commissions et dont l'objet était de discuter des positions des différents Groupes et de voir dans quelle mesure les membres des 10+ ne pourraient pas en arriver à adopter une position commune. Ainsi tous les membres de la délégation canadienne, sauf M. Prud'homme qui en sa qualité de Rapporteur de Commission devait être neutre, ont participé à un moment ou à un autre à ces réunions.

VII. AUDIENCE PONTIFICALE

Le Souverain Pontifie, Sa Sainteté Le Pape Jean-Paul II, a reçu les délégués et les personnes les accompagnant, le samedi 18 septembre dans la Cité du Vatican. Tous les membres de la délégation canadienne ont participé à cette audience. En sa qualité de chef de la délégation canadienne, le sénateur Molgat a eu le privilège d'être présenté à Sa Sainteté. Malgré le très grand nombre de participants, plusieurs délégués canadiens ont eu l'occasion de lui serrer la main et de lui adresser quelques mots.

Dans son allocution, Sa Sainteté a brossé un tableau de la position du Vatican face aux problèmes actuels du monde et aux sujets qui étaient à l'ordre du jour de la Conférence. On trouvera à l'Annexe M, Partie A, p. 114 le texte intégral de l'allocution du Saint-Père.

VIII. LE TRAVAIL DE LA DELEGATION CANADIENNE

La délégation canadienne a été très active tout au long de la Conférence et s'est impliquée totalement dans toutes les activités prévues au programme. Préalablement à son arrivée à Rome, la délégation canadienne a eu l'occasion de se préparer en ayant au moins 8 sessions d'information sur les différents sujets à l'ordre du jour et en préparant activement les travaux et les amendements. Au cours de la Conférence, il y avait ces réunions quotidiennes au petit déjeuner où les membres faisaient rapport sur les activités du jour précédant et établissaient les positions du Groupe sur les sujets qui seraient abordés au cours de la journée qui commençait.

C'est à ces réunions journalières que furent finalisés les amendements canadiens. C'est aussi à ces réunions que la délégation a arrêté sa position définitive sur les points supplémentaires qui étaient inscrits à l'ordre du jour.

Le Sénateur Molgat a coordonné le travail de la délégation en plus de participer aux travaux du Conseil, d'assumer la responsabilité pour les points supplémentaires inscrits à l'ordre du jour et de remplir plusieurs autres fonctions en tant que chef de la délégation canadienne.

En plus de se partager les dossiers, chacun des membres de la délégation canadienne avait pris la responsabilité d'établir des contacts personnels avec un certain nombre de délégués des autres Groupes, ce qui a contribué à une meilleure compréhension des points de vue de chacun et à faire accepter certaines des positions adoptées par le Groupe canadien.

Certains membres de la délégation canadienne, qui sont aussi membres du Groupe d'Amitié Canada-Italie, ont profité de l'occasion pour rencontrer certains de leurs collègues Italiens afin de discuter des sujets d'intérêts commun. Cette réunion a eu lieu à l'initiative du Sénateur P. Bosa, président du Groupe au Canada et du Sénateur Karl Mitterdorfer, son homologue du Groupe italien.

IX. PROGRAMME SOCIAL ET PROGRAMME A L'INTENTION DES ACCOMPAGNATEURS

A) PROGRAMME SOCIAL

Outre l'Audience Papale, le Groupe italien avait prévu un très grand nombre d'activités sociales qui ont permis aux délégués de rencontrer différentes personnalités politiques italiennes et d'échanger entre eux sur l'évolution des travaux de la Conférence.

Le soir de l'ouverture de la Conférence, le Président de la République Italienne, M. Sandro Pertini, a offert une réception au Palais Quirinale.

Le 16 septembre, le Président du Sénat, M. Amintore Fanfani et le Président de la Chambre des Députés, Mme Nilde Iotti offrirent une réception conjointe au Palais Barberini.

Le 17 septembre, le Président du Groupe italien, M. Giulio Andreotti conviait les délégués à une soirée de Gala au Théâtre de l'Opéra. Les délégués ont eu à cette occasion le plaisir d'assister à une représentation de "La Sonnambula" de Vincenzo Bellini.

Le 20 septembre, c'était au tour du Président du Conseil des Ministres, M. Giovanni Spadolini à recevoir les délégués à Villa Madama.

Finalement le Maire de Rome, M. Ugo Vetere a tenu à offrir une réception en l'honneur des délégués sur le Capitole le 21 septembre.

Le Groupe italien a même poussé l'hospitalité jusqu'à organiser pour les participants une excursion au fameux Palais Royal de Caserta (près de Naples) le dimanche 19 septembre.

En plus de ces réceptions officielles, le Président Molgat, et dans une moindre mesure, les autres membres de la délégation canadienne ont été invités à toute une série de réceptions offertes par plusieurs Groupes nationaux aux Ambassades de leur pays. Comme le veut la coutume, le Groupe canadien a organisé une réception le 15 septembre en collaboration avec l'Ambassade du Canada, à l'intention des différents Groupes.

B) PROGRAMME A L'INTENTION DES ACCOMPAGNATEURS

Le Groupe italien avait organisé à l'intention des accompagnateurs un programme qui a fait l'envie des délégués. En fait, on avait organisé deux types d'activités.

Des activités à caractère touristique, où les participants ont pu apprécier la richesse du patrimoine italien, et des activités à caractère informatif.

Au nombre des activités touristiques, il convient de mentionner des visites au Château Saint-Ange, aux Basiliques Saint Jean de Latran et Sainte Marie Majeure, aux Musées Vaticans, à l'exposition Garibaldi et aux fouilles de Ostia Antia. Parmi les activités de caractère informatif, il a eu des visites au CEIS (Centre italien des jeunes drogués), à l'Institut central de pathologie du livre, de la Communauté d'assistance aux handicapés de Capodareo et de la Communauté thérapeutique d'assistance aux jeunes malades mentaux de Primavalle.

X. COLLABORATEURS

A) A OTTAWA

C'est en partie grâce à la collaboration de plusieurs fonctionnaires canadiens que le Groupe canadien a pu se préparer adéquatement en vue de la Conférence de Rome.

Au nombre de ceux qui ont assisté la délégation canadienne à Ottawa, mentionnons du Ministère des Affaires extérieures: M. E.J. Bergbusch, de la Direction de l'Afrique anglophone, M. P.J.A. Hancock, du Secrétariat de la politique étrangère, M. A.R. Menzies, Ambassadeur pour le désarmement, M. J.F. Tanguay, de la Division des Affaires politiques et institutionnelles des Nations Unies au Ministère, Messieurs G. Anderson et R. Tétu de la Direction de l'Europe de l'Ouest.

Les contributions de M. P. Laundy de la Chambre des communes, Mme D. Wetherup de la Direction des affaires intergouvernementales à Environnement Canada, M. R. Lederman du même Ministère, M.M. B.W. Ross et M. J. Hermens du Centre de co-ordination et d'évaluation de l'aide alimentaire à l'ACDI et E. Gauvreau de la direction des Affaires francophones à l'Agence ont été aussi très appréciées de la délégation canadienne.

B) A ROME

L'Ambassadeur du Canada, la veille de la Conférence M. J.E.G. Hardy a accepté de rencontrer la délégation à l'hôtel en compagnie de plusieurs de ses collaborateurs afin de faire le point sur les différents sujets à l'ordre du jour de la rencontre et de discuter des relations canado-italiennes. M. Yvon Beaulne, notre Ambassadeur au Saint Siège, était également présent à cette rencontre.

Comme mentionné précédemment, dans la soirée du 15 septembre, l'Ambassadeur et le chef de la délégation canadienne ont présidé conjointement une réception offerte en l'honneur des participants. Environ 115 délégués ont participé à cette réception dont le Président Caldera.

M.M. Michael Bell, Conseiller à l'Ambassade du Canada et Peter Sallery, Attaché canadien près la FAO, ont assisté la délégation particulièrement en ce qui a trait aux dossiers des points supplémentaires et de la faim dans le monde.

Mme S. Alder, assistante à la recherche à l'Ambassade, a assisté la délégation pour ce qui a trait aux questions administratives.

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

DISCOURS
DU PRESIDENT
DU GROUPE ITALIEN
M. GIULIO ANDREOTTI

CEREMONIE D'INAUGURATION
MARDI 14 SEPTEMBRE 1982
AUDITORIUM DE SANTA CECILIA
ROME

Les sénateurs et les députés du Groupe Italien de l'Union Interparlementaire ont appris avec satisfaction la décision, prise à Cuba l'année dernière, de tenir à Rome la 69^e Conférence et adressent aux délégations participantes leur chaleureuse bienvenue en leur souhaitant un travail constructif et serein.

Le propre de notre Union est, toujours plus, représenté par "l'union dans la variété". Nous venons de réalités politiques et sociales différentes, groupées dans des alliances ou bien non alignées; nous sommes l'expression d'Assemblées fondées sur des modèles et des systèmes différents; nous ne perdons jamais les caractères spécifiques de nos Nations et pourtant nous sommes unis par notre qualité commune de représentants du peuple; et dans nos débats nous réussissons à placer au premier plan les désirs de paix, de justice et de progrès dont nous constatons de plus en plus qu'ils sont communs aux hommes de bonne volonté, au delà de leurs nombreuses différences, légitimes qu'elles soient.

Certes, nous ne surestimons pas le travail que nous accomplissons lors de nos deux rencontres annuelles et des nombreux rapports bilatéraux; mais nous pouvons quand même affirmer en toute conscience que, à différence de tant de forces qui visent à détruire et diviser, l'Union Interparlementaire travaille en silence à rapprocher les positions, à susciter une communication réciproque et à établir les prémisses nécessaires en vue d'aider à trouver les solutions des grands problèmes avec moins de difficultés, chacun dans le contexte qui lui est propre.

Parfois, les résultats modestes et décevants de quelques initiatives - comme il est arrivé dernièrement lors de la Seconde Session Spéciale dédiée par les Nations Unies au désarmement - peuvent nous attrister, mais cela ne peut affaiblir notre foi dans le résultat final qui aboutisse à un nouvel ordre mondial, qui soit différent de celui d'aujourd'hui dans lequel une partie de l'humanité cherche à maintenir et augmenter son "bien-être", tandis qu'une autre partie, plus nombreuse, lutte, sans toujours y réussir, uniquement pour survivre.

L'Union Interparlementaire cherche donc avec passion de contribuer à ce qu'on puisse atteindre ce but si significatif de promotion humaine.

Permettez-moi d'exprimer mes vœux chaleureux pour que la Conférence de Rome puisse marquer dans ce sens un progrès considérable.

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

RESUME DU DISCOURS
DU PRESIDENT
DU CONSEIL DE L'UNION
M. R. CALDERA

CEREMONIE D'INAUGURATION
MARDI 14 SEPTEMBRE 1982
AUDITORIUM DE SANTA CECILIA
ROME

M. R. Caldera, Président du Conseil interparlementaire, dit que la Conférence interparlementaire se réunit à un moment où les observateurs considèrent la situation mondiale avec une préoccupation et une anxiété intenses.

D'un côté, la guerre continue de faire rage et de se répandre au Moyen-Orient, région à l'histoire et au destin de laquelle l'humanité est étroitement liée. Le Liban, pays de culture et de civilisation, pays épris de paix qui est un exemple de convivialité dans l'harmonie, a été victime d'une confrontation sanglante qu'il ne méritait pas, et les appels lancés en sa faveur par de nombreux pays, personnalités et institutions sont demeurés en grande partie sans écho. La situation en Pologne est un problème qui déborde le cadre des frontières; elle ébranle les consciences et fait vibrer les coeurs de ceux pour qui la liberté et les droits de l'homme sont des conditions fondamentales pour faire progresser le monde dans le sens d'une plus grande justice et d'un plus grand bonheur pour l'humanité. Une violence brutale et venimeuse a aussi atteint les rives du continent américain et il est à craindre que ce que chaque peuple devrait résoudre par lui-même et dans le cadre de sa propre souveraineté ne devienne un sujet d'affrontement entre puissances étrangères.

D'un autre côté, l'économie mondiale montre des signes qui déroutent les experts. Les prêts sont accordés à des taux si élevés qu'il deviennent pratiquement insupportables pour les débiteurs, désespérément à la recherche de capitaux pour mener à bien leurs programmes de développement. Le transfert de technologie est limité à un niveau purement pratique tandis que la technologie créative et productive est jalousement gardée par ceux qui voient en elle un instrument de pouvoir remplaçant celui qui, il n'y a pas si longtemps, était exercé par la force sur les territoires coloniaux ou sur les populations des pays faibles. Nombreux sont les observateurs qui établissent un parallèle entre ce qui se passe aujourd'hui dans les divers domaines de l'économie mondiale et ce qui s'est passé en 1929 et 1930 au moment de la grande crise. L'on ne peut nier que la sécurité sociale s'est révélée un remède efficace dans la situation actuelle et que dans les pays industrialisés, si l'assurance obligatoire contre le chômage n'existait pas, nous verrions à nouveau des gens sans travail vendre des pommes dans la rue et des foules de chômeurs se livrer à des manifestations pacifiques ou violentes, tandis que se produiraient des soulèvements politiques analogues à ceux qui, dans les zones les plus civilisées du vieux continent, ont contribué à l'apparition de systèmes totalitaires qui déniaient les droits de l'homme dans leurs propres pays, et nous ont conduits à l'hécatombe de la guerre mondiale. Dans la situation actuelle obscurcie par de sombres prédictions, la réunion de près d'une centaine de Parlements de tous les pays de la planète à Rome, berceau du droit, de la civilisation et de l'art, est une source de lumière et témoigne de la conviction que les peuples peuvent engager le dialogue et grâce à la libre discussion de thèses et de positions divergentes peuvent trouver des solutions pour que l'homme poursuive son inlassable marche vers le progrès spirituel et matériel.

M. R. Caldera rappelle qu'il y a trois ans il a été élu à l'unanimité Président du Conseil de l'Union interparlementaire. Durant cette période il a eu l'occasion d'échanger des vues avec les dirigeants de divers pays du monde. Il a pu acquérir une connaissance profonde des problèmes qui se font

jour de partout et dont nombre présentent des caractéristiques communes et des similarités frappantes sur tous les continents, dans des pays soumis à des régimes totalement différents et qui doivent faire face à des situations extrêmement diverses en matière de développement ou d'économie industrielle.

Partout l'humanité est préoccupée par le fait que des difficultés apparemment insurmontables l'empêchent d'atteindre ses objectifs et s'interposent entre la volonté de l'homme et les buts considérés comme urgents et nécessaires pour faire face aux exigences du présent et du futur. Les ennemis de la liberté profitent de ces difficultés pour tenter de saper la foi en la démocratie, et le Parlement qui est bien souvent la victime des attaques les plus perfides est tenu pour le symbole de l'inefficacité alors qu'il est le symbole de la liberté.

Au milieu de la tourmente, la foi des peuples croît: foi en l'être humain, foi aussi dans le fait qui forme un tout. Au milieu des contradictions, la solidarité universelle semble se fortifier et ces rencontres périodiques des représentants des peuples, en dépit des systèmes politiques divergents et des orientations différentes, servent à renforcer la conviction que la pensée, le verbe et le dialogue, sont un formidable instrument dont la puissance ne cesse de croître malgré les vicissitudes et qui est reconnue par ceux-là mêmes qui tentent de le discréditer.

Chaque année, un nombre croissant de pays demandent leur affiliation à l'Union. Son existence même semble tenir du miracle si l'on considère qu'elle aura bientôt cent ans d'existence et que, mise à part la sombre parenthèse des conflagrations mondiales, c'est la plus ancienne des organisations internationales actives à ce jour. L'accroissement même du nombre des Parlements membres et l'importance des délégations qu'un grand nombre d'entre eux envoient aux réunions de l'Union ont amené à étudier la possibilité de modifier ses structures et ses systèmes pour assurer plus de souplesse à ses activités et faire en sorte que tous les participants puissent s'exprimer. On peut affirmer sans crainte que cette institution a une vitalité impressionnante et que, bien qu'elle ne dispose pas du pouvoir coercitif d'imposer ses résolutions, elle rayonne d'une grande force morale reconnue et respectée partout où des citoyens de différents pays se rencontrent pour étudier des problèmes et tenter de trouver les moyens de les résoudre.

Il est heureux que la présente Conférence se tienne en Italie pays qui, face à ses problèmes, réaffirme sa foi en la liberté, son exaltation des valeurs spirituelles, sa tradition qui, avec le temps, en a fait une tête de proue. Il est heureux que la présente Conférence se tienne dans Rome, carrefour du monde, centre d'échange des idées et des initiatives de toutes sortes, lieu de convergence de toutes les aspirations au progrès et au changement qui animent la conscience universelle.

Nombreuses sont les raisons qui ont conduit les représentants à converger de tous les coins de la terre vers Rome. On ne saurait assurément exclure le charme, la beauté et la chaleur accueillante de Rome, ainsi que l'occasion d'ad-

mirer une fois encore les trésors prestigieux que l'art et l'histoire y ont accumulés. Mais la raison majeure, c'est la signification de l'exemple italien dans le monde d'aujourd'hui.

L'Union débatera des problèmes politiques, économiques et sociaux du monde et plus particulièrement de la contribution des Parlements à l'adoption de mesures concrètes par la deuxième session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement et à leur mise en oeuvre, notamment la réduction des budgets militaires et ses effets sur l'économie et l'emploi dans le monde ainsi que sur le développement économique et social du Tiers-Monde. La Conférence étudiera aussi l'évolution des institutions parlementaires dans le respect de la Constitution et leur activité dans le domaine des relations internationales. Elle examinera attentivement l'état de l'environnement mondial

dix ans après la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le milieu humain qui s'est tenue à Stockholm et les mesures à prendre, y compris dans le domaine de la législation, aux niveaux national et international. Elle étudiera le problème de la faim dans le monde, notamment la production, la distribution et la consommation alimentaires dans les pays en développement, les possibilités d'obtention à des prix abordables par les pays à faible revenu de fournitures alimentaires sur le marché international, ainsi que l'aide alimentaire aux pays en développement jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient atteint un stade approprié d'autosuffisance. La Conférence portera son attention sur la question de la liquidation du colonialisme et de la lutte contre le néo-colonialisme, notamment les problèmes qui se posent dans certains pays. Enfin elle se penchera sur les problèmes qui se sont fait jour après la réunion du Conseil qui s'est tenue dans la ville dynamique et riche en contradictions qu'est Lagos, capitale de l'un des pays les plus importants de l'Afrique, le Nigéria - étude demandée par ceux qui ont eu à subir le plus directement les conséquences des affrontements qui persistent.

Au cours de ces trois dernières années, nombreux ont été les moments où des tensions et d'inévitables confrontations de positions ont suscité des attitudes qui ont fait craindre pour le maintien du dialogue au sein de ce Parlement mondial. M. R. Caldera dit qu'il n'a cependant jamais douté que, quelle que soit la ferveur qui animait les tenants d'arguments opposés, si amère que soit la situation, si profondes que soient les blessures des pays et des peuples, dans une institution au sein de laquelle les ennemis les plus acharnés ont toujours pu se rencontrer et exposer leurs raisons et leurs vues, l'intérêt qu'il y a à maintenir le dialogue et à le rétablir dans les occasions où l'on pouvait le considérer comme interrompu finirait par l'emporter. Il se sentait obligé de dire à quel point ses délicates fonctions lui ont été un enseignement; non seulement elles lui ont permis d'approfondir ses connaissances du monde et des peuples de diverses cultures mais surtout elles ont contribué à renforcer sa foi en l'institution parlementaire.

M. R. Caldera est profondément ému de prendre la parole à la tribune de ce Parlement italien sans cesse agité par de vives contradictions mais qui ne cesse de réaffirmer son importance et son rôle pour la vie de son peuple, et qui lutte sans relâche pour renforcer la liberté, consolider les lois et trouver des moyens féconds d'assurer le bien-être de son peuple. C'est un honneur immense pour tout

homme libre de quelque pays du monde qu'il soit, de parler devant cet hémicycle où les accents d'éloquence de tant d'illustres dirigeants ont été entendus. C'est un grand honneur de pouvoir tenir à Rome les délibérations des institutions qui constituent le Parlement mondial.

M. R. Caldera se doit de rappeler les noms de deux éminentes personnalités qu'il a eu le privilège d'entendre personnellement et directement exposer comment ils concevaient la tâche historique qu'ils accomplissaient en modelant le destin d'une Italie nouvelle. Il évoque en premier Alcide de Gasperi, champion de la reconstruction d'un grand pays secoué par la tragédie de la seconde guerre mondiale. L'ayant entendu exprimer sa foi en l'avenir, et faire une brillante synthèse des problèmes auxquels il était confronté, il a compris à travers sa voix, sa mimique et son talent combien était inébranlable sa foi dans la destinée qu'il souhaitait pour son pays. La seconde figure est celle d'Aldo Moro. Inlassable explorateur de toutes les voies susceptibles d'assurer - en respectant et garantissant avant tout les valeurs essentielles - les meilleures chances d'un fonctionnement harmonieux de ce robuste pluralisme idéologique qui est caractéristique de l'esprit italien et qui se manifeste tout particulièrement à notre époque.

Ce qui le pousse aujourd'hui à évoquer leur mémoire n'est pas une simple affinité avec un courant de pensées modernes ni une amitié personnelle. Il sait que beaucoup d'autres partagent leur amour de l'Italie, leur foi en l'Italie, leur confiance totale dans le peuple italien, leur intelligence, leur détermination face à l'adversité, leur inlassable esprit d'invention et leur travail acharné, leurs qualités humaines que des millions de fils ont porté à tous les coins de la planète.

A ces dirigeants, à ces bâtisseurs, à ces inlassables propagateurs de la liberté et de la justice, l'Union interparlementaire a rendu le moindre des hommages en choisissant Rome comme lieu de réunion des Parlements de tous les systèmes de toutes les régions, de tous les continents. Ici, on ne pourrait pas ne pas réaffirmer certains principes qui inciteront l'homme nouveau à conquérir des horizons nouveaux. D'ici, chacun emporterait la lampe votive allumée pour renforcer les liens d'amitié et de fraternité entre les hommes de toutes les races et de tous les peuples, et réaffirmer leur espoir en un avenir meilleur pour l'humanité.

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

DISCOURS
DU REPRESENTANT DU
SECRETAIRE GENERAL DES NATIONS UNIES
M. LUIGI COTTAFVI

CEREMONIE D'INAUGURATION
MARDI 14 SEPTEMBRE 1982
AUDITORIUM DE SANTA CECILIA
ROME

M. Luigi COTTAFI, Directeur général de l'Office des Nations Unies à Genève dit que c'est pour lui un privilège de représenter le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies à l'ouverture de la session d'automne 1982 de l'Union interparlementaire. M. Javier Perez de Quellar suit avec intérêt les activités de l'Union et lui a demandé de vous transmettre ses vœux chaleureux de succès dans vos travaux et de progrès dans la réalisation de vos objectifs.

L'Organisation des Nations Unies et l'Union interparlementaire s'inspirent d'un grand nombre de principes communs et oeuvrent à la réalisation de mêmes objectifs dont les primordiaux sont la paix, la liberté, la justice et la prospérité. Les Parlements sont l'expression collective de la volonté des peuples, reflètent les plus nobles aspirations de ceux-ci et s'efforcent de résoudre les problèmes auxquels l'humanité est confrontée. L'Organisation des Nations Unies reconnaît l'importance de la contribution de l'Union et des avantages d'ordre moral et pratique de ses travaux. L'ordre du jour de la Conférence souligne la complémentarité des préoccupations des Nations Unies et de l'Union interparlementaire.

La priorité sera accordée au désarmement et à ses effets sur le développement ainsi qu'à la contribution des Parlements à l'adoption de mesures concrètes par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies et d'autres organisations internationales. Les problèmes alimentaires des pays en développement, question dont s'occupe avec constance et efficacité la FAO, importante institution spécialisée des Nations Unies ayant son siège à Rome, sont également à l'ordre du jour, de même que l'état de l'environnement mondial dix ans après la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le milieu humain qui s'est tenue à Stockholm.

En ce qui concerne la situation complexe et critique au Moyen-Orient, les récents développements attestent qu'il est urgent d'accélérer et d'intensifier l'action et les initiatives entreprises au niveau international en vue d'un règlement pacifique et juste. Des suggestions utiles se dégagent des délibérations et des décisions de l'Union. Les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et de l'Assemblée générale constituent un cadre bien structuré dans lequel les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies pourraient être appliqués à cette source persistante de conflit.

Tous sont d'accord qu'il est nécessaire d'alléger les souffrances dans la région et de soutenir et encourager les secours internationaux sous leurs diverses formes. L'action humanitaire menée dans les zones touchées devrait se poursuivre avec ardeur, dévouement et générosité d'esprit.

Autre problème qui préoccupe le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies et qui sera vraisemblablement soumis à la Conférence: celui du conflit entre l'Iran et l'Iraq. La coopération entre les Nations Unies et l'Union interparlementaire dans leurs efforts pour promouvoir les libertés fondamentales et lutter contre les violations des droits de l'homme, est bien assise et continue à se développer. M. Cottafavi dit que tous ont noté avec plaisir que grâce à l'intervention efficace, dans plusieurs pays, de délégations parlementaires agissant sous les auspices de l'Union, des parlementaires détenus arbitrairement ont été libérés. Il est

impressionnant de constater qu'en un an les efforts concertés des membres de l'Union ont abouti à la libération de cinquante des quatre vingt seize parlementaires incarcérés de par le monde.

La trente septième session de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies va se tenir sous peu. A son ordre du jour figurent la question du désarmement et l'examen de la mise en oeuvre des recommandations et décisions adoptées par la deuxième session extraordinaire consacrée au désarmement. Cette deuxième session a fait prendre davantage conscience de l'ampleur et de l'importance de la tâche. En dépit de contraintes politiques connues de tous et d'une absence de consensus, l'accent que l'Organisation des Nations Unies met sur la réduction des armements stimule les efforts et fait que ce problème demeure la préoccupation primordiale de la communauté internationale.

L'Union interparlementaire a eu le mérite de maintenir la question de la Namibie à l'étude. Aux Nations Unies, le Conseil pour la Namibie s'est spécialement réuni il y a quelques semaines pour célébrer la Journée de la Namibie, son espoir étant que l'Organisation des Nations Unies pourra bientôt jouer en faveur de la Namibie le rôle dont elle a été chargée. Il semble qu'un accord ait pu se dégager sur les principes d'une constitution pour une Namibie indépendante. Des négociations concernant la deuxième phase relative aux responsabilités et fonctions des Nations Unies ainsi qu'à certains aspects opérationnels sont en cours. Le Secrétaire général a récemment exprimé l'espoir que ces négociations se termineraient assez tôt pour que des élections puissent être organisées sous le contrôle des Nations Unies au début de 1983. Tout ce que pourra faire l'Union pour donner une impulsion dans ce sens sera d'une grande importance.

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

DISCOURS
DU PRESIDENT
DE LA REPUBLIQUE ITALIENNE
M. SANDRO PERTINI

CEREMONIE D'INAUGURATION
MARDI 14 SEPTEMBRE 1982
AUDITORIUM DE SANTA CECILIA
ROME

Monsieur le Président de l'Union Interparlementaire
Mesdames et Messieurs qui participez à la 69ème Conférence
Interparlementaire

Au nom du peuple italien et en mon propre nom, notre
chaleureuse bienvenue à vous tous et à vos familles.

J'adresse un mot de particulière gratitude à M. Pio
Carlo Terenzio, Secrétaire Général de l'Organisation, qui
dédie tant de passion à son travail.

L'Union Interparlementaire poursuit, depuis près d'un
siècle, le noble but de réunir les Assemblées représenta-
tives du monde entier, de faciliter l'échange d'expériences
et d'informations entre les Parlements et d'encourager les
contacts humains si importants dans un monde toujours plus
petit où les anciennes barrières des différences de race,
de langue et de religion sont tombées. Bien que l'insti-
tution parlementaire moderne soit issue directement des
grands évènements que furent la glorieuse révolution en
Angleterre, la révolution Américaine et la Révolution
Française, ses racines millénaires remontent à l'expérience
de la Polis Grecque et du Sénat Romain.

L'idée du Parlement est, en effet, née du besoin per-
sistant qu'à l'homme de prendre part aux décisions se rappor-
tant à son destin, au moment même où la société humaine
surgit, s'agrandit et où deux alternatives s'annoncent:
d'une part celle du gouvernement d'un seul ou de quelques
hommes, de l'autre celle du gouvernement du grand nombre,
c'est-à-dire de la démocratie.

Ainsi est née la démocratie représentative, la seule
forme possible de régime vraiment démocratique, de l'anti-
quité à nos jours. Et cela était déjà évident au temps
d'Homère: comment oublier en effet la fascinante description
que le poète prête à Ulysse quand ce dernier parle du régime
politique des Cyclopes, de ces hommes brutaux qui "n'ont
pas d'Assemblée"?

A notre époque de grandes transformations politiques, économiques et sociales, les Parlements se trouvent toujours plus fréquemment confrontés à la nécessité de concilier liberté et contrôle démocratique d'une part, rapidité de décision et efficacité, d'autre part. Ces exigences opposées sont vitales pour la survie des régimes de démocratie représentative et la preuve de la force indestructible de l'idée de représentation est fournie par sa survie pendant plus de 2000 ans.

L'idée de base qui inspira le projet de l'Organisation des Nations Unies fut celle d'un vrai Parlement mondial où il serait possible de discuter et de résoudre les grands problèmes de la planète. L'idée parlementaire a donc contribué à la réalisation des équilibres transnationaux.

Un autre exemple nous est donné par les Traités de Rome en vue de la création de la Communauté Européenne. Ces textes prévoient qu'une Assemblée électorale, le Parlement Européen, soit le fondement même de la construction unitaire de l'Europe.

A ce sujet je dois dire que les peuples européens ont ressenti plus intensément que leurs gouvernements la nécessité de voir le Parlement Européen muni de pouvoirs plus vastes et plus efficaces pour pouvoir transformer la Communauté Economique en une union politique. Notre époque n'est pas de celles qui peuvent avoir une "chambre vide", autrement dit dénuée de tout véritable pouvoir tant au niveau national qu'à celui international. Les Parlements, quel que soient les choix philosophiques ou économiques des différents systèmes, doivent, pour exister réellement, influencer concrètement le processus des décisions politiques, car c'est seulement ainsi que le parlementarisme devient le moyen expressif d'une concrète participation populaire à la "Res Publica". Ainsi seulement le système représentatif devient instrument efficace de la démocratie.

Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs,

ces dernières années ont vu le retour à la démocratie d'un grand nombre de nations de notre planète. De nombreux Parlements ont réouvert leurs portes aux représentants

de leur peuple: certains très jeunes, élus par de libres élections, où la pluralité des partis a permis à toutes les consciences de s'exprimer.

Mais nous ne pouvons pas nier que le cadre général de la situation internationale est sombre. En ces jours où la 69ème Conférence Interparlementaire se réunit ici à Rome, de graves et menaçant évènements offusquent l'horizon international. Nous ne pouvons oublier que de graves tensions se sont multipliées et que de lacérants et sanglants conflits ont éclatés et sont en cours dans de nombreux pays et risquent de s'élargir et d'impliquer d'autres peuples. De tous les conflits qui ensanglantent presque tous les continents aucun n'échappe à la logique de l'oppression du plus faible par le plus fort, quel que soit le prétexte idéologique qui voudrait le justifier.

Dans beaucoup de pays les droits humains et civils sont encore opprimés et parfois aussi d'une façon impitoyable.

Les libres Parlements ont le devoir d'exprimer concrètement leur solidarité envers les persécutés.

Nous ne pouvons pas ne pas élever notre ferme protestation à l'égard de la tragédie du Moyen Orient.

La rage s'est déchaînée, la rage aveugle qui entraîne et jette d'innocentes créatures dans l'abîme de la destruction, d'une horrible mort: elle n'a rien épargné sur son chemin de sang et de destruction.

Au peuple hébreu nous exprimâmes notre solidarité fraternelle quand il était cruellement persécuté par le nazisme. Un de mes frères, dans le lager de Flossenbourg, a souffert avec les Juifs les persécutions et une mort cruelle. Pourquoi donc parvenir à cette agression, réprouvée aussi par une grande partie du peuple Israélien?

Nahum Goldman un des fondateurs d'Israël a durement condamné l'aggression israélienne. Les Palestiniens sont contraints aujourd'hui au même triste exode que les Hébreux connaissent depuis des siècles. Eux aussi, comme les Hébreux d'antan, doivent quitter la terre de leurs pères et errer à travers le monde. Que notre humaine solidarité les accompagne.

Israël, après l'amer exode et les cruelles persécutions a reçu une terre et une patrie: le peuple palestinien aura lui aussi une terre et une patrie. Nos auspices sont soutenus par les résultats de la Conférence de Fez.

La dernière proposition du Président Reagan doit être prise en sérieuse considération. Elle peut devenir la prémisses d'une solution coopérant à la paix au Moyen Orient.

Et que la paix retourne dans cette région tourmentée.

Vous autres membres de l'Union Interparlementaire devez manifester vos sentiments à ce sujet, car tout silence deviendrait tacite complicité.

Grande est, dans cette situation, la responsabilité des Parlements libres dans leurs fonctions d'inspiration et de contrôle des gouvernements, dans l'expression de leurs pouvoirs sur les choix d'utilisation des ressources nationales. S'ils sont vraiment le miroir de chaque pays, les Parlements doivent exprimer le suprême inextinguible désir de paix de leurs peuples, le refus du recours à la guerre comme solution des conflits.

Ne donnons pas la parole aux armes, mais à la raison, sinon de la civilisation nous retournerons à la barbarie.

J'espère que ce sera là le message que cette grande Conférence de Rome lancera au monde.

En tant que vieux combattant pour la liberté et la justice sociale, c'est avec profonde émotion que je suis entré dans les Assemblées parlementaires de Grèce, d'Espagne, du Portugal, nations qui ont tant donné à la civilisation de notre vieille Europe. La Grèce fait déjà partie de la Communauté Européenne, et je renouvelle ici le souhait que l'Espagne et le Portugal puissent aussi bientôt apporter leur contribution à l'effort d'unification politique de notre continent. J'ai eu la même émotion en prenant la parole devant la Diète Japonaise, où j'ai senti combien les nombreuses craintes et aspirations qui unissent les hommes de tous les continents sont communes. Et je me sens aussi profondément solidaire des peuples qui luttent encore pour les institutions représentatives de nombreux pays conscients qu'avec la liberté et la démocratie ils atteindront enfin la justice sociale et le respect des droits de l'homme.

Je suis profondément optimiste sur le résultat de cette lutte, car je crois que le chemin de l'humanité vers la liberté est inexorable. Et par liberté j'entends toutes ces libertés politiques et sociales qui sont la base de la dignité humaine et rendent la vie digne d'être vécue.

Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs,

depuis que j'ai eu l'honneur de présider, pendant huit ans, la Chambre des Députés, je n'ai délaissé aucune occasion pour que le groupe italien coopère intensément à la vie de l'Union Interparlementaire, forum précieux de discussions et siège important pour la poursuite de l'engagement commun vers la paix.

C'est pourquoi au lendemain de la Conférence de Cuba, j'ai appris avec grande satisfaction la décision de votre Assemblée d'accueillir l'invitation formulée au nom de notre délégation par M. Andreotti, Président du Groupe Italien pour que la 69ème Conférence soit tenue à Rome après celle qui fut organisée elle aussi à Rome en 1972.

Je désire encore rappeler ici, en témoignage de la fécondité de votre oeuvre, l'heureuse initiative de la Conférence Interparlementaire de 1974 des pays côtiers sur la lutte contre la pollution de la Méditerranée, organisée par

la Chambre des Députés et par le Sénat italien sous les auspices justement de l'Union Interparlementaire. Cette Conférence proposa en effet ce contact vital et la politique qui a par la suite mené à une action concrète pour sauver la Méditerranée de la pollution et a ensuite donné naissance aux Traités d'Athènes de 1980 signés par tous les pays riverains.

Ces thèmes et ceux fondamentaux de la défense de la paix et de la lutte contre la faim dans le monde sont les grands problèmes que nos parlements, désormais au seuil des années deux mille, doivent affronter avec information, décision, lucidité et réalisme.

Certes, les problèmes de la paix et de la lutte contre la faim dans le monde doivent être affrontés. Nous devons défendre la paix dans tous les coins de la terre, parce que d'une étincelle pourrait naître un incendie: la troisième guerre mondiale où dominerait l'arme atomique.

Ce serait la fin de l'humanité.

Comment ignorer que cette tragédie menace tous les peuples de la terre, et comment ne pas sentir le devoir de veiller et d'intervenir sur ceux qui tiennent en main le destin des peuples, pour que l'humanité ne subisse pas la tragédie de l'holocauste nucléaire?

Comment peut-on rester indifférent devant la mort par famine de million de créatures humaines?

La mort de ces innocents pèse comme une condamnation sur la conscience de tout homme d'Etat et donc aussi sur ma conscience.

Nous devons et pouvons intervenir concrètement pour sauver tant de créatures innocentes, qui sont en train de mourir de dénutrition pendant que je parle.

Comment ne pas sentir que cette tragédie qui se consomme quotidiennement dans le monde nous appartient, qu'elle appartient à chacun de nous?

Rester indifférents signifie être sourds à tout sentiment humain et signifie aussi devenir moralement complices de ce massacre par famine.

Arrêtons cette folle course au réarmement qui porte en soi la fin de l'humanité. Donnons vie à la généreuse course contre la faim, si nous désirons vraiment que l'humanité atteigne le sommet lumineux d'une solidarité qui fait en sorte que toutes les créatures de la terre, liées aujourd'hui au même destin, se sentent frères: ou bien marcher ensemble sur le chemin du progrès et de l'aide réciproque ou mourir ensemble dans l'abîme nucléaire.

Au cours de mon récent voyage au Japon je me suis rendu à Hiroshima, la ville qui a connu le premier holocauste nucléaire. J'ai été saisi par une angoisse profonde: j'ai pensé avec horreur à l'horrible fin de milliers de créatures innocentes; et j'ai pensé que toute l'humanité risquerait de connaître cette même atroce fin, si une nouvelle guerre explosait.

J'ai parfois l'impression que ceux qui tiennent en main le destin des peuples discutent avec indifférence sur le cratère d'un volcan qui prépare dans ses entrailles une éruption nucléaire qui marquerait la fin de l'humanité.

Tous les hommes d'Etat devraient se rendre en pèlerinage à Hiroshima: leur âme serait en proie à une profonde angoisse et à une sévère admonition.

A Hiroshima, en mon âme bouleversée j'ai senti résonner - comme je le sens résonner en ce moment - le cri passionné d'un grand poète de ma terre d'Italie:

"... et je crie paix, paix, paix!"

Et que la paix règne à tout jamais pour l'humanité toute entière.

ANNEXE "E"

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

COMPTE-RENDU DU DISCOURS
DU MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES
ETRANGERES D'ITALIE
M. EMILIO COLOMBO

SEANCE
DU MERCREDI 15 SEPTEMBRE 1982
CHAMBRE DES DEPUTES
ROME

Le PRESIDENT donne la parole à M. Emilio Colombo, ministre des Affaires étrangères d'Italie.

M. E. COLOMBO, ministre des Affaires étrangères d'Italie, adresse, au nom du peuple italien, ses félicitations et ses vœux de succès à la Conférence. L'Italie est un pays qui croit profondément en la paix et travaille sans relâche pour elle. Cette paix est pourtant aujourd'hui menacée, comme en témoigne l'horrible attentat perpétré hier contre le Président Gemayel, nouvelle page de sang écrite dans l'histoire du Liban et malgré laquelle l'on doit espérer que ce pays tourmenté retrouvera la paix qui est la base de son indépendance.

Le monde connaît aujourd'hui une crise internationale où la solidarité entre les hommes et les nations se trouve fortement affaiblie. La période actuelle n'est pas une ère de paix, car la paix ne saurait reposer sur l'équilibre des armes : elle signifie avant tout la fin de la misère, le respect des droits des peuples et la volonté de justice. Ainsi les équilibres internationaux apparaissent-ils fragiles et incertains. La méfiance règne et l'on assiste en permanence à des guerres ou à des tensions régionales, que celles-ci soient dues à des problèmes frontaliers ou à la volonté de conquérir ou de reconquérir des libertés essentielles. Souvent, sur ces conflits, souffle le vent de l'affrontement East-Ouest.

L'Italie, pour sa part, veut avancer sur le chemin de la paix en respectant les solidarités atlantique et européenne. Elle est peut-être le pays le plus stable depuis la dernière guerre, s'efforçant de se tenir aux choix fondamentaux qui ont été faits et auxquels adhèrent la plupart des forces politiques nationales. Ainsi la décision de resserrer les liens entre les pays européens, en dépassant les sursauts nationalistes, devient-elle une réalité. L'Europe constitue de plus en plus une communauté stable, durable, au sein de laquelle s'est engagé un véritable processus d'intégration économique, sociale et politique, dans le respect de la spécificité de chacun des Etats. Ce processus doit permettre de garantir un meilleur niveau de vie aux populations concernées mais aussi de consolider la paix dans le monde, et c'est dans cette optique que l'Italie avait activement participé à l'élaboration des Accords d'Helsinki.

L'Italie a également choisi d'être partie prenante de l'Alliance atlantique après la guerre, car elle estime que cette alliance sert la paix : il s'agit non pas de s'assurer une protection qui éviterait d'avoir à jouer un rôle politique international actif, mais bien au contraire d'affirmer une vocation pacifique afin de favoriser un processus général de détente.

C'est sur ces prémisses qu'est basée la politique étrangère italienne tant à propos des rapports Est-Ouest ou Nord-Sud qu'en ce qui concerne d'éventuelles tensions locales.

Pour ce qui est des rapports Est-Ouest, la crise afghane a fait naître de nouvelles préoccupations, car elle a mis en lumière l'interprétation unilatérale de la détente pratiquée à l'Est et le renforcement des forces du

Pacte de Varsovie. Quant à la crise polonaise, elle a empêché que les Accords conclus à Helsinki ne débouchent sur des relations dynamiques et ouvertes entre les Etats. De tels événements heurtent profondément la volonté de ceux qui souhaitent la paix, et les Italiens ont notamment vécu le drame polonais avec une émotion intense. Il est clair que la reprise d'un dialogue brutalement interrompu en Pologne constitue, entre autres, la condition d'un rétablissement rapide de relations plus stables entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Plus généralement, il faut que s'instaure une communication entre Etats, fondée sur la parité et non sur des rapports de force.

En ce qui concerne le désarmement, l'Italie s'efforce de faire avancer les négociations sur les missiles et sur les forces nucléaires stratégiques. C'est grâce à de telles négociations que l'on pourra déboucher sur une solution à laquelle est vivement attachée l'opinion publique, comme en témoignent les manifestations et réactions que l'on peut observer chaque jour. L'Italie participe activement aux réunions de Vienne et de Genève, estimant que le processus de désarmement exige une nouvelle approche, indissociable cependant du contexte idéologique Est-Ouest.

Le déroulement des travaux de Madrid a, lui, été fortement entravé par les événements en Afghanistan et en Pologne. Le ministre se dit toutefois intimement convaincu qu'il faut continuer d'avancer sur la voie du renoncement à la force et à la menace, pour que s'établisse le dialogue entre les peuples et que s'amplifie la circulation des idées et des informations. Il ne faut pas que disparaisse un forum essentiel à la communication et à la détente et les efforts entrepris ne doivent pas être annihilés à la suite des tensions nées au cours des dernières années.

Le Moyen-Orient reste l'un des points les plus sensibles du monde et l'on ne peut que souhaiter que les conflits s'apaisent, que la Méditerranée demeure ou redevienne une aire de paix. Pour cela, il faut des initiatives concrètes et l'on peut ici rappeler les propositions faites à Venise en juin 1980 par la Communauté européenne. L'intégrité et la souveraineté d'Israël doivent être défendues comme celles des autres Etats et notamment du Liban. Cela étant, une paix durable ne pourra être établie si le droit inaliénable des Palestiniens à exister et à disposer d'une patrie n'est pas, lui aussi, respecté. L'Italie a su, au cours des dernières années, saisir toutes les occasions offertes pour avancer vers la paix : approbation du Traité entre Israël et l'Egypte, participation à la force multinationale pour assurer l'évacuation des Palestiniens à la requête du Gouvernement de Beyrouth, soutien au récent plan de paix américain.

L'opinion mondiale a compris, avec la guerre du Liban, que le problème palestinien ne peut rester sans solution et que les négociations doivent être élargies à toutes les parties intéressées. Le résultat du récent sommet de Fez est à cet égard très satisfaisant et indique que la paix doit avoir pour base la reconnaissance réciproque d'Israël et des Etats arabes. Il convient également d'aboutir à une reconnaissance simultanée et réciproque d'Israël et de l'OLP.

D'autres conflits sont apparus, auxquels l'Italie estime qu'il faut toujours trouver une solution pacifique, notamment celui entre l'Iran et l'Iraq. Quant à la crise malouine, elle a fait naître de graves préoccupations pour le Gouvernement italien qui a tenu cependant à réaffirmer que rien ne peut justifier les actes de force unilatéraux et que la négociation est toujours la seule voie viable. Cette crise a provoqué une fracture entre l'Europe et l'Amérique latine; elle devra être effacée afin que soient rétablies les relations amicales entre ces deux parties du monde.

En ce qui concerne les relations Nord-Sud, il est nécessaire de contribuer à assurer le respect des droits de l'homme et celui de la justice par une solidarité réelle et active. Les chiffres sont ici éloquentes qui traduisent un grave déséquilibre dans la répartition des richesses entre pays développés et pays en voie de développement, déséquilibre qui rend toute paix précaire. De plus, il faut que soit achevé le processus de décolonisation, et c'est dans cette optique que l'Italie soutient les efforts au sujet de la Namibie et souhaite la tenue d'une conférence africaine sur la sécurité et la coopération afin que soient définies des lignes opérationnelles précises. Les années 1980 ont marqué une prise de conscience des problèmes du développement, qu'il convient désormais de renforcer afin que ces problèmes soient résolus dans le respect de l'identité et des droits de chaque pays.

La crise économique ne saurait justifier l'inertie des pays développés et il faut au contraire mettre en oeuvre des actions concrètes, notamment dans les domaines de l'énergie et des transferts de technologie pour aboutir à un consensus et à une meilleure répartition des richesses. Certes, la lutte contre la faim reste prioritaire dans de nombreuses parties du globe, mais on ne peut plus la dissocier des programmes de développement nécessaires aux pays concernés.

La Constitution italienne affirme le refus de la guerre et le respect de la souveraineté des autres Etats. Ce sont ces valeurs qui ont amené l'Italie à oeuvrer toujours pour la paix, à promouvoir l'action des organismes internationaux dans un sens de justice et de liberté. L'Italie croit à la solidarité active, elle croit au dialogue et à l'espoir, même dans cette époque tourmentée que connaît aujourd'hui le monde.

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

RESUME DE L'INTERVENTION
DU PRESIDENT
DU COMITE EXECUTIF DE L'OLP

M. YASSER ARAFAT

CEREMONIE D'INAUGURATION
MARDI 14 SEPTEMBRE 1982
AUDITORIUM DE SANTA CECILIA

ROME

M. Arafat salue la Conférence au nom du peuple palestinien, à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur de sa patrie occupée, et la remercie au nom du Comité exécutif de l'OLP pour cette généreuse invitation à une importante tribune, ce qui lui permet de réaffirmer que les Palestiniens ne luttent pas uniquement par patriotisme, mais aussi dans le souci de participer à la création d'un monde régi par la justice et la liberté.

Il salue à cette occasion le peuple italien avec lequel les Palestiniens ont en commun la civilisation méditerranéenne.

Il souligne que la question de la Palestine et la crise du Moyen-Orient n'ont pas leur source dans un conflit entre Arabes et Juifs. Le peuple palestinien a vécu des millénaires comme un peuple unique sur cette terre sanctifiée par l'Histoire, sans discrimination entre musulmans, chrétiens et juifs, qui ont vécu ainsi entre frères et concitoyens. L'OLP se considère l'héritière de ces valeurs.

Le mouvement sioniste, qui prit naissance hors de la Palestine, en réponse à la question juive cherche à la

résoudre par la création d'un Etat juif, racialement pur, sans considération aucune pour les Palestiniens chrétiens et musulmans.

Des guerres et des massacres en ont découlé et la prétention que la Palestine était une terre sans peuple pour un peuple sans patrie fut confrontée à une résistance légitime. Ce fut alors une succession de conflits dont le dernier en date est la guerre d'extermination dont ont été victimes les peuples libanais et palestinien et durant lesquels furent utilisées les armes américaines les plus sophistiquées. C'est pour l'orateur un grand honneur que de s'adresser à cette tribune pour exposer le problème du peuple palestinien dans toute son ampleur, car selon lui, parvenir à une vision commune d'un problème international contribue à éloigner le spectre de la guerre totale et à ouvrir de nouvelles perspectives de paix.

C'est grâce à la volonté constructive de la communauté internationale que flottent les bannières de la paix sur de nombreuses régions du monde.

La politique de paix qui recherche l'atténuation de la tension mondiale et le choix de la voie politique a prouvé que la communauté internationale pouvait poursuivre ce chemin pour isoler les foyers de tension provoqués par le racisme et le colonialisme et ramener à la raison les forces d'agression.

Le Moyen-Orient constitue un foyer de tension qui menace la paix et la sécurité mondiale. Ces tensions découlent d'une politique d'agression qui a réussi à présenter Israël comme un oasis de paix au milieu de peuples ne rêvant que de guerres. Le massacre commis par Israël contre femmes et enfants a révélé la laideur de son agression.

Les dirigeants israéliens ont déclaré que leur objectif était de modifier la carte politique du Moyen-Orient et c'est pour l'atteindre qu'Israël encore une fois a lancé son armée. Une telle concentration de feu contre les forces communes libano-palestiniennes vise l'anéantissement du peuple palestinien et la liquidation de l'OLP. Il suffit de

se référer au rapport des commissions internationales pour prendre connaissance des crimes perpétrés à l'encontre des peuples libanais et palestinien. M. Arafat souhaite la création d'une commission parlementaire internationale pour enquêter sur les crimes de guerre commis par Israël au Liban.

Dans cette guerre d'agression, l'armée israélienne a utilisé les armes américaines les plus modernes y compris celles dont l'utilisation est prohibée par le droit international, et ceci avec le soutien des Etats-Unis. L'orateur exprime la reconnaissance et l'estime du peuple palestinien à l'égard des forces civiles et militaires qui, à l'intérieur même d'Israël, ont dénoncé cette agression et refusé d'y prendre part.

Si les Palestiniens ont finalement quitté Beyrouth, c'est pour assurer la sauvegarde des habitants de cette ville qui était devenue la cible des tirs israéliens en même temps que l'enjeu d'un chantage.

On sait maintenant que l'armée israélienne se prépare à un long séjour au Liban et menace même de faire éclater ce pays pour faire du sud son protectorat. Les générations palestinienne, libanaise et arabe qui ont vécu le calvaire de

la guerre n'en sont que plus convaincues de la justesse de leur cause et plus attachées à la récupération de leurs droits. Ces droits sont constamment bafoués, comme en témoignant la confiscation des terres et des sources d'eau, le développement des colonies de peuplement, les arrestations collectives, la dissolution des conseils municipaux élus, la fermeture des établissements scolaires ... Les dirigeants israéliens semblent vouloir poursuivre leur politique d'annexion des territoires arabes palestiniens, au mépris de toutes les résolutions internationales et faisant ainsi obstacle à tous les efforts de paix. Les Palestiniens, eux, ont pris les armes avec pour but la création d'un Etat palestinien démocratique, ce qui en soi constitue un objectif humaniste que les dirigeants d'Israël ont rejeté car ils veulent un Etat exclusivement juif et refusent au peuple palestinien le droit d'exister dignement.

Après la guerre d'octobre 1973, l'OLP a proposé l'établissement d'un Etat palestinien indépendant sur toutes terres dont se retireraient les Israéliens. Ceux-ci n'ont pas accepté cette proposition et Israël, seul Etat créé par une résolution des Nations Unies, est également le seul Etat à ignorer la légalité internationale et même à la défier en refusant de cesser la colonisation et de se retirer des territoires occupés.

Il y a huit ans, M. Arafat avait proposé devant l'Assemblée des Nations Unies un projet de paix qui n'a pu aboutir en raison de l'intransigeance d'Israël. Aujourd'hui devant l'Union interparlementaire, il est porteur du projet adopté par le sommet de Fez qui envisage un certain nombre d'actions immédiates en vue de parvenir à une solution politique au Moyen-Orient. Ce nouveau projet apparaît aujourd'hui comme l'unique cadre efficace pour la solution de problèmes qui déchirent le monde. Il propose la création d'une commission de sept Etats arabes mandatés pour prendre contact avec les membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité afin de connaître leur position ainsi que celle du Président des Etats-Unis, qui a lui-même proposé un plan de paix pour le Moyen-Orient.

La communauté internationale a aujourd'hui une responsabilité historique: consacrer les principes de justice et de dignité des peuples, principes que les dirigeants d'Israël bafouent chaque jour, risquant ainsi de faire régner sur le monde contemporain la loi de la jungle. Cette Conférence, reflet de la conscience des peuples ici représentés, doit affirmer le droit des Palestiniens à vivre libres dans leur patrie afin que cesse le nouvel holocauste qui leur est imposé.

M. Arafat tient, pour conclure, à exprimer sa gratitude envers tous ceux qui ont appuyé et appuient encore la juste cause du peuple palestinien. Il remercie tout particulièrement M. le Président Pertini d'avoir défendu cette cause dans l'allocution qu'il a prononcée au cours de la cérémonie inaugurale de cette Conférence.

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

PROJET DE RESOLUTION INITIAL
SUR LE DESARMEMENT

Point 3 de l'ordre du jour

La contribution des Parlements à l'adoption de mesures concrètes par la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement et à leur mise en oeuvre, notamment la réduction des budgets militaires et ses effets sur l'économie et l'emploi dans le monde ainsi que sur le développement économique et social du Tiers-Monde

PROJET DE RESOLUTION

présenté, au nom de la Commission pour l'étude des questions politiques, de la sécurité internationale et du désarmement, par M. M. Prud'homme (Canada)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

considérant que la paix est le bien commun de l'humanité et que, de nos jours, elle est également une condition nécessaire à sa survie,

se félicitant de la convocation de la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement, qui revêt une importance particulière étant donné l'aggravation de la situation internationale,

rappelant que la 68e Conférence interparlementaire (La Havane, 1981) a exprimé sa conviction que la nouvelle Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement contribuerait dans une large mesure à l'arrêt de la course aux armements et à l'engagement du processus du désarmement,

profondément inquiète de la sérieuse aggravation de la situation internationale qui empêche le développement de relations normales et le renforcement de la confiance mutuelle et de la coopération entre les nations,

prenant acte de ce que de nouveaux foyers de crise et de conflit entre les Etats sont venus s'ajouter à ceux qui existent déjà de plus longue date et que ce développement a eu une incidence défavorable sur les progrès dans le domaine du désarmement et du contrôle des armements,

inquiète du fait que, dans les conditions actuelles, une guerre - et particulièrement une guerre nucléaire - risque d'avoir des conséquences désastreuses pour la survie de l'humanité et de la civilisation,

relevant le rôle et les hautes responsabilités qui incombent aux Parlements et aux parlementaires touchant la destinée de leurs peuples, la nécessité impérieuse de concerter les efforts des peuples, des Parlements, des Gouvernements et de toutes les forces réalistes afin de prévenir le danger d'un désastre nucléaire, de mettre fin à la politique des armements, et d'assurer l'édification d'un monde de paix, sans armes ni guerre,

notant avec inquiétude l'accroissement constant des dépenses militaires qui impose une lourde charge à l'économie de tous les pays et compromet leur développement socio-économique,

préoccupée par le développement quantitatif et qualitatif des systèmes d'armement qui constituent de graves menaces pour la paix et la sécurité du monde, et *réaffirmant* que tout progrès significatif des négociations sur le désarmement suppose une restauration de la confiance mutuelle,

consciente de ce que le danger d'une guerre nucléaire s'accroît avec le renforcement qualitatif et quantitatif des arsenaux nucléaires existants,

reconnaissant qu'une des difficultés de l'arrêt de la course aux armements réside dans la lenteur extrême des progrès dans les négociations sur le désarmement par rapport au rythme accéléré du perfectionnement des armements,

constatant une détérioration de la sécurité dans de nombreuses régions du monde et notamment en Europe où l'adoption de nouveaux systèmes d'armes nucléaires et classiques accélère la course aux armements,

déplorant que les négociations entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et l'URSS sur les questions de la limitation des armements et le désarmement - particulièrement le désarmement nucléaire - traînent en longueur et que certaines conventions importantes dans ce domaine n'aient pas encore été ratifiées,

considérant que la bonne volonté politique, la disposition à développer largement la coopération internationale en matière de négociations sur le désarmement avec la participation de tous les pays sur un pied d'égalité et la volonté de se soumettre à des obligations concrètes touchant au désarmement sont les conditions fondamentales du succès de négociations sur le désarmement.

considérant que la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement peut et doit être une étape importante sur la voie d'une paix et d'une sécurité durables grâce à la préservation et à l'amplification de tous les résultats positifs obtenus dans la limitation de la course aux armements et la promotion du désarmement dans les années 1970 ainsi que grâce à l'application future de mesures pratiques dans ce domaine,

consciente de ce qu'il est urgent de prendre des mesures pratiques pour mettre un terme à la course aux armements et promouvoir le désarmement, par exemple dans les domaines suivants :

- interdiction complète des essais d'armes nucléaires;
- non-prolifération des armes nucléaires;
- convocation d'une Conférence mondiale du désarmement;
- garanties en matière de sécurité pour les Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires;
- compressions des budgets militaires;
- mesures propres à accroître la confiance;
- programme global de désarmement;

affirmant que le plein respect des principes et objectifs de la Charte des Nations Unies et l'entière adhésion de tous les Etats à ces principes et objectifs, notamment l'obligation de s'abstenir de la menace ou de l'emploi de la force contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de tout autre Etat et de respecter le droit à l'autodétermination des peuples, sont les conditions nécessaires à la promotion d'une paix durable et d'un désarmement effectif,

consciente de l'extrême utilité que toutes les négociations internationales, en cours ou à venir, revêtent dans la perspective d'un accroissement de la sécurité des Etats ainsi que d'une éventuelle mise à la disposition du développement économique et social de l'humanité des économies importantes réalisées en limitant et en réduisant les systèmes d'armes faisant l'objet desdites négociations,

convaincue qu'il existe un lien étroit entre le désarmement et le développement et que des avantages substantiels peuvent résulter de l'utilisation des ressources actuellement affectées à la course aux armements et de celles qui seront libérées par l'adoption de mesures de désarmement efficaces pour atténuer les difficultés économiques et sociales auxquelles les peuples doivent actuellement faire face, en particulier dans les pays en développement,

considérant que la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement devrait procéder à une analyse critique des mesures prises conformément au Programme d'action sur le désarmement adopté à

la première Session extraordinaire, créer un climat politique plus favorable pour la reprise des négociations sur le désarmement et adopter un programme global de désarmement dont l'application conduirait progressivement au désarmement général et complet sous un contrôle international rigoureux,

soulignant que les parlementaires estiment que la détente, destinée à la réduction et à l'élimination définitive des tensions entre les Etats et les peuples, peut contribuer à construire un avenir plus sûr, plus stable et plus juste pour l'humanité,

A

1. *invite* les Parlements et les Gouvernements de tous les pays du monde :

- a) à s'efforcer d'assurer le succès de la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement et de permettre ainsi à ce forum international suprême pour le désarmement de contribuer de façon décisive à régler la situation préoccupante qui prévaut dans le domaine du désarmement et de définir des mesures concrètes en vue d'un désarmement effectif visant à renforcer la paix et la sécurité mondiales;
- b) à agir en vue d'assurer la mise en oeuvre des mesures qui seront adoptées par la deuxième Session extraordinaire sur le désarmement;
- c) à contribuer à arrêter la détérioration de la situation internationale, à encourager l'orientation vers la détente universelle partout dans le monde et à appuyer tous les efforts visant à résoudre les crises, en s'opposant à toutes les formes d'agression, d'intervention, d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des Etats indépendants et de pression sur ces Etats;
- d) à rechercher les moyens permettant d'utiliser les vastes ressources humaines, naturelles, scientifiques et technologiques gaspillées à l'heure actuelle dans la course aux armements pour améliorer le sort de l'humanité grâce au développement économique et social, à l'élimination de la famine, des maladies ainsi que des autres graves problèmes économiques et sociaux;

2. *demande instamment* aux participants à la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement d'approuver les mesures suivantes :

- a) un programme global de désarmement;
- b) la reprise rapide et effective des négociations sur la limitation et la réduction des armes stratégiques,

conduisant à une limitation et une réduction de ces armes aussi rapidement que possible;

- c) l'approbation sans équivoque du Traité concernant les missiles anti-missiles (ABM);
- d) la conclusion d'un accord, dans le cadre de la limitation des armes stratégiques, afin de mettre un terme aux essais en vol de tous les nouveaux vecteurs stratégiques;
- e) l'heureuse conclusion des pourparlers entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et l'URSS à Genève sur la limitation et la réduction des armes nucléaires à portée intermédiaire en Europe;
- f) des accords au sein du Comité du désarmement et d'autres organismes internationaux sur l'interdiction totale des essais nucléaires et sur l'interdiction des armes radiologiques;
- g) l'adhésion de tous les Etats au Protocole concernant la prohibition d'emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires et de moyens bactériologiques (Genève, 1925);
- h) un traité sur l'interdiction de l'élaboration, de la production et du stockage des armes chimiques et prévoyant leur destruction;
- i) un nouvel appel pour exhorter tous les Etats qui ne l'ont pas encore fait à adhérer à la Convention de 1972 sur l'interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication et du stockage des armes bactériologiques (biologiques) ou à toxines et sur leur destruction;
- j) de nouveaux accords de nature à renforcer ou compléter le Traité de 1967 sur les principes régissant les activités des Etats en matière d'exploration et d'utilisation de l'espace extra-atmosphérique, y compris la lune et les autres corps célestes sous forme d'un traité interdisant la mise au point, l'essai et la mise en place des armes de tous types dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique;
- k) le renforcement du dispositif de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires, conformément aux décisions adoptées par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies à sa 36e session;
- l) des garanties en matière de sécurité pour les Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires;
- m) d'autres accords limités de contrôle des armements comme le Traité de 1971 interdisant de placer des armes nucléaires et d'autres armes de destruction massive sur le fond des mers et des océans ainsi que dans leur sous-sol,

la Convention de 1977 sur l'interdiction d'utiliser des techniques de modification de l'environnement à des fins militaires ou toutes autres fins hostiles et la Convention de 1981 sur l'interdiction et la limitation de l'emploi de certaines armes classiques qui peuvent être considérées comme produisant des effets traumatiques excessifs ou comme frappant sans discrimination;

- n) des accords en vue d'assurer une heureuse conclusion des négociations de Vienne sur la réduction des forces armées et des armements en Europe centrale;

B

3. *demande instamment* à tous les Parlements et Gouvernements :

- a) d'agir résolument en faveur de l'arrêt de la course aux armements et de la mise au point de mesures réelles de désarmement, notamment de désarmement nucléaire, en assurant un équilibre militaire qui ne mette en danger la sécurité et la paix d'aucun pays et qui soit réalisé non par l'accroissement des armements mais par leur réduction graduelle;
- b) d'intensifier les contacts parlementaires aux niveaux régional et sub-régional ayant comme objectif l'accroissement de la confiance et le renforcement de la sécurité, de soutenir les actions entreprises par l'Union interparlementaire en vue de l'arrêt de la course aux armements et d'agir pour la mise en oeuvre des résolutions de la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement;

4. *invite* les Gouvernements et les Parlements des pays européens, du Canada et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique à faire tout leur possible pour que la réunion de Madrid de la CSCE puisse, au cours de ses travaux, se mettre d'accord sur un mandat précis d'une conférence sur les mesures visant à instaurer un climat de confiance, la sécurité et le désarmement en Europe. Cette conférence devrait se tenir dans le cadre du processus de la CSCE et être consacrée dans sa première phase à des mesures de confiance et de sécurité revêtant une importance sur le plan militaire, ayant un caractère obligatoire du point de vue politique et assorties de moyens adéquats de contrôle en rapport avec leur contenu;

5. *appelle* les Parlements et les Groupes interparlementaires nationaux à consacrer une attention accrue au problème du désarmement;

6. *demande instamment* à tous les Parlements et Gouvernements d'accorder une priorité absolue au désarmement nucléaire.

ANNEXE "G.2"

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

AMENDEMENTS CANADIENS AU
PROJET DE RESOLUTION
SUR LE DESARMEMENT

Point 3 de l'ordre du jour

LA CONTRIBUTION DES PARLEMENTS A L'ADOPTION DE MESURES CONCRETES PAR
LA 2e SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DE L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DES NATIONS
UNIES CONSACREE AU DESARMEMENT ET A LEUR MISE EN OEUVRE,
NOTAMMENT LA REDUCTION DES BUDGETS MILITAIRES ET SES
EFFETS SUR L'ECONOMIE ET L'EMPLOI DANS LE MONDE
AINSI QUE SUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT ECONOMIQUE
ET SOCIAL DU TIERS-MONDE

Amendements présentés par la délégation canadienne

Préambule

1. Inverser l'ordre des deuxième et troisième paragraphes du préambule et les libeller comme suit :

"rappelant que la 68e Conférence interparlementaire (La Havane, 1981) a exprimé sa conviction que la nouvelle session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement pourrait contribuer dans une large mesure à promouvoir l'arrêt de la course aux armements et à engager le processus du désarmement,

exprimant sa satisfaction devant le vif intérêt de la communauté mondiale pour la deuxième session extraordinaire consacrée au désarmement et, en particulier, devant la participation active de beaucoup de chefs de Gouvernement, mais décue de ce que l'ensemble des Gouvernements ne soient pas parvenus à des résultats significatifs à cette session,".

2. Remplacer le quinzième paragraphe du préambule par le suivant :

"considérant que la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement aurait dû être une étape importante sur la voie d'une paix et d'une sécurité durables grâce à la préservation et à l'amplification de tous les résultats positifs obtenus dans la limitation de la course aux armements et la promotion du désarmement dans les années 1970, et que la deuxième Session extraordinaire n'a pas donné les résultats attendus à cet égard,".

3. Remplacer le vingtième paragraphe du préambule par le suivant :

"considérant que la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement n'a pas adopté un programme global de désarmement dont l'application conduirait progressivement au désarmement général et complet sous un contrôle international rigoureux,".

Dispositif - section A

4. Supprimer l'alinéa a) du paragraphe 1 du dispositif et faire précéder les trois alinéas suivants des lettres a), b) et c). Modifier le nouveau paragraphe 1.a) comme suit :

"à prendre des dispositions pour mettre en oeuvre les mesures adoptées par la deuxième Session extraordinaire consacrée au désarmement;".

5. Remplacer la partie introductive du paragraphe 2 du dispositif par ce qui suit :

"demande instamment à tous les participants de soutenir les mesures spécifiques suivantes:".

6. Remplacer le paragraphe 2 b) par le suivant :

" b) la poursuite acharnée des entretiens sur la limitation et la réduction des armes stratégiques, conduisant à des limitations et des réductions de ces armes aussi rapidement que possible;".

7. Diviser le paragraphe 2 f) en deux alinéas séparés, comme suit :

" f) un accord au sein du Comité du désarmement et d'autres instances internationales sur l'interdiction totale des essais nucléaires;

g) un traité multilatéral sur l'interdiction des armes radiologiques;".

8. Faire précéder à nouveau tous les alinéas restants du paragraphe 2 des lettres h) à o) au lieu des lettres g) à n); et remplacer, dans le nouvel alinéa k) les mots "dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique" par les mots suivants : "... pour utilisation dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique;".

Dispositif - section B

9. Supprimer au paragraphe 3 b) toute la partie venant après les mots "en vue de l'arrêt de la course aux armements".

ANNEXE "H.1"

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

PROJET DE RESOLUTION INITIAL SUR
L'EVOLUTION DES INSTITUTIONS
PARLEMENTAIRES DANS LE RESPECT
DE LA CONSTITUTION ET LEUR
ACTIVITE DANS LE DOMAINE DES
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Point 4 de l'ordre du jour

*L'évolution des institutions parlementaires dans le respect
de la Constitution et leur activité dans le domaine des
relations internationales*

PROJET DE RESOLUTION

présenté, au nom de la Commission pour l'étude des questions
parlementaires, juridiques et des droits de l'homme,
par M. O. Obi (Nigeria)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

rappelant que l'institution parlementaire représente un élément fondamental d'équilibre des pouvoirs dans les régimes démocratiques, qu'elle joue un rôle significatif pour garantir le respect de la Constitution et des droits de l'homme, et qu'elle assume une fonction essentielle dans le domaine des relations internationales,

rappelant les dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies, en particulier celles des chapitres I et II, et l'engagement des Etats membres de les respecter,

estimant que l'évolution des institutions parlementaires dans le respect de la Constitution et la consécration des fondements pacifiques de la politique étrangère des Etats dans leur législation nationale contribuent à la réalisation de la coopération pacifique entre les Etats,

soulignant que les parlementaires, dès lors qu'ils sont choisis par le peuple au moyen d'élections libres et équitables, tenues à intervalles réguliers, d'une part constituent un lien très fort entre les Parlements des différents pays, bien illustré par les contacts étroits qu'ils entretiennent au sein de l'Union interparlementaire et, d'autre part, sont un intermédiaire irremplaçable pour entretenir la permanence de l'indispensable dialogue entre les organes du pouvoir et les citoyens,

convaincue de la nécessité de perfectionner et de mieux utiliser les formes et les méthodes d'action des Parlements tendant à influencer la politique extérieure des Gouvernements afin qu'elle serve la cause de la paix, de la sécurité internationale, de l'amitié et de la coopération entre les peuples,

1. *invite* les Parlements, compte tenu de la Constitution et des traditions de leurs pays, à trouver des méthodes et des formes d'action appropriées en vue de renforcer leur influence sur la politique extérieure de leurs Gouvernements de façon à ce que ceux-ci contribuent de façon accrue à la consolidation de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, à la promotion de la détente et du processus de désarmement, au développement de la coopération, de l'amitié et de la confiance entre les peuples;
2. *recommande* plus spécialement les formes suivantes de l'activité parlementaire qui concourent à l'orientation de la politique extérieure du Gouvernement et au contrôle exercé sur elle par le Parlement :
 - l'examen systématique, au sein du Parlement et de ses organes spécialisés, des principales questions de la politique étrangère et plus particulièrement des problèmes de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, de la cessation de la course aux armements et du désarmement;
 - la soumission au Parlement pour approbation de tous les traités et accords internationaux importants auxquels les Gouvernements entendent que leur pays soit partie, l'harmonisation de leur législation nationale avec ceux-ci et la prise de dispositions permettant aux Parlements nationaux d'en contrôler la mise en oeuvre effective;
 - l'information du Parlement, sous les diverses formes existantes, au sujet des principales négociations menées par le Gouvernement, de la politique du Gouvernement dans les organisations internationales, ainsi que de l'activité de ces organisations;
 - l'inclusion dans la législation interne, d'une façon qui corresponde à la pratique et aux procédures nationales, des principes régissant les relations entre Etats qui sont énoncés dans la Charte des Nations Unies et d'autres instruments juridiques internationaux;
3. *encourage* tous les parlementaires à se tenir étroitement informés de la politique étrangère de leur Gouvernement et à tenter d'en infléchir le cours par tous les moyens à leur disposition dans un sens favorable à la paix dans le monde, au respect des droits de l'homme et à la réalisation des objectifs des Nations Unies;
4. *estime* indispensable à cet effet l'approfondissement des contacts interparlementaires au niveau international destinés à favoriser le respect et la compréhension mutuels;
5. *demande* à tous les Parlements d'élaborer dans leurs pays respectifs une législation garantissant la liberté politique et économique en faveur de tous les medias afin de permettre,

notamment, un échange de vues libre, équitable et complet touchant les relations entre Etats et, partant, de promouvoir une compréhension mutuelle dans l'esprit de la Charte des Nations Unies et des Statuts de l'Union interparlementaire;

6. *encourage* les instances dirigeantes de tous les pays à favoriser la participation des populations aux prises de décisions politiques, indépendamment de toute intervention de groupes de pression institutionnalisés, en mettant en place, par les voies démocratiques, des institutions représentatives décentralisées dotées de réelles compétences et de ressources financières suffisantes, ainsi que d'autres moyens éventuels dans l'esprit de la Constitution et des traditions de chaque pays;
7. *invite* les Parlements de tous les pays à exercer un contrôle vigilant, concret et permanent de l'action gouvernementale, notamment dans le domaine des relations internationales, et à se doter à cet effet de moyens d'investigation, d'étude et de prévision fiables et indépendants de l'Exécutif grâce, notamment, aux moyens d'information modernes, y compris la mise en oeuvre de commissions parlementaires appropriées, dotées de larges pouvoirs d'investigation;
8. *invite instamment* tous les Parlements à garantir l'inviolabilité des droits des parlementaires, y compris de ceux de la minorité, dans l'exercice de leur mandat, notamment en ce qui concerne les relations entre Etats.

ANNEXE "H. 2"

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

AMENDEMENTS CANADIENS AU PROJET
DE RESOLUTION SUR L'EVOLUTION
DES INSTITUTIONS PARLEMENTAIRES

Point 4 de l'ordre du jour

L'EVOLUTION DES INSTITUTIONS PARLEMENTAIRES DANS LE RESPECT
DE LA CONSTITUTION ET LEUR ACTIVITE DANS LE
DOMAINE DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

Amendements présentés par la délégation canadienne

Dispositif

1. Remplacer le paragraphe 6 par le paragraphe suivant :

"6. encourage les instances dirigeantes de tous les pays à favoriser dans l'esprit de la Constitution et des traditions de chaque pays - la participation des populations aux prises de décisions politiques, indépendamment de toute intervention de groupes de pression institutionnalisés, en encourageant la mise en place d'institutions représentatives dotées d'une réelle influence sur le processus politique;"

2. Ajouter un paragraphe 9 de la teneur suivante :

"9. appelle les Parlements et l'Union interparlementaire à rechercher les moyens appropriés de renforcer la participation des parlementaires au travail des Nations Unies."

ANNEXE "I. 1"

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

PROJET DE RESOLUTION INITIAL SUR
L'ETAT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT MONDIAL
DIX ANS APRES LA CONFERENCE DES
NATIONS UNIES SUR LE MILIEU HUMAIN

Point 5 de l'ordre du jour

L'état de l'environnement mondial dix ans après la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le milieu humain qui s'est tenue à Stockholm. Mesures à prendre, y compris dans le domaine de la législation, aux niveaux national et international

PROJET DE RESOLUTION

présenté, au nom de la Commission pour l'éducation,
la science, la culture et l'environnement,
par M. R. McClory (Etats-Unis d'Amérique)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

réaffirmant la responsabilité de la communauté internationale concernant la préservation et l'amélioration de l'environnement, et *considérant* que, en dépit des difficultés économiques croissantes qui surgissent dans toutes les parties du monde, la protection de l'environnement ne devrait pas être négligée,

* *notant* que l'Union interparlementaire s'est intéressée depuis de nombreuses années et de façon permanente à la protection de l'environnement et à la conservation des ressources,

consciente du rôle joué par l'Union interparlementaire en qualité d'observateur à la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le milieu humain, tenue à Stockholm en 1972,

ayant à l'esprit les principes fondamentaux ainsi que les recommandations adoptées au mois de juin 1972 par la Conférence de Stockholm,

constatant que les progrès de la science et de la technologie ont, depuis la tenue de cette Conférence, permis de mieux préserver le milieu humain, notamment par une meilleure gestion des ressources naturelles et par un meilleur contrôle des effets des polluants sur la faune, la flore, les sols, l'atmosphère et les eaux,

consciente néanmoins de ce que beaucoup de problèmes restent à résoudre, parmi lesquels celui du danger que comportent le transfert d'industries dangereuses pour l'environnement ainsi que l'exportation des produits polluants de pays industrialisés vers des pays en développement,

se félicitant des activités du Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement (PNUE), instrument propre à traiter des problèmes de l'environnement à l'échelle globale et à mettre au point de nouvelles méthodes de coordination dans le système des Nations Unies,

consciente des efforts efficaces du PNUE afin d'élaborer et coordonner des programmes internationaux en vue d'évaluer les tendances globales en matière d'environnement, de conserver le patrimoine naturel de l'humanité, de réduire la pollution et d'améliorer la qualité du milieu humain,

consciente également des difficultés rencontrées par le PNUE pour répondre à l'attente de tous les pays et obtenir les fonds nécessaires afin de poursuivre l'application de ses programmes,

se félicitant de la coopération instaurée dans le cadre du Programme pour les mers régionales du PNUE visant à la préservation du milieu marin dans sept régions du monde,

reconnaissant la gravité du problème que pose la pollution atmosphérique transfrontières dans plusieurs régions du monde,

reconnaissant le besoin de développer davantage le droit de l'environnement et *faisant siennes* les conclusions et recommandations de la Réunion spéciale de hauts fonctionnaires d'administrations nationales spécialistes du droit de l'environnement, tenue à Montevideo du 28 octobre au 6 novembre 1981,

soulignant qu'à l'heure actuelle un élément essentiel pour préserver la nature sur la terre est l'élimination de la menace de guerre et la cessation de la course aux armements,

1. *réaffirme* son soutien énergique et permanent aux principes et recommandations en matière d'environnement de la Conférence de Stockholm sur le milieu humain;
2. *demande* l'établissement d'une coopération internationale plus étroite, afin que les graves problèmes qui se posent actuellement en matière de population, de ressources, d'environnement (y compris la désertification) et de développement puissent être mieux traités à l'avenir;
3. *invite* les Gouvernements à accroître la capacité de leurs pays de prévoir efficacement les conséquences pour l'environnement des activités économiques et du développement technologique, et à inclure le facteur de l'environnement dans toute planification des activités économiques;
4. *souligne* que la solution des problèmes de l'environnement devrait passer par la promotion de politiques de prévision et de prévention, également sur le plan économique;

5. *invite* les Gouvernements à encourager le développement d'une approche interdisciplinaire de l'étude des problèmes d'environnement qui présentent une dimension internationale, et notamment à encourager les efforts déployés sur le plan national et international par les organisations, entreprises et firmes intéressées en vue de la mise au point, de la production et du perfectionnement de l'équipement destiné au contrôle, à la protection et à l'amélioration de la qualité de l'environnement;
6. *invite* les Parlements et les Gouvernements à prendre des mesures adéquates pour :
 - a) organiser un vaste échange de réalisations scientifiques et techniques dans le domaine de la protection de l'environnement en convoquant des congrès, conférences et autres réunions de caractère international entre des scientifiques et des hommes politiques;
 - b) intensifier la diffusion de l'information sur les mesures de protection de l'environnement par les médias;
 - c) promouvoir le développement de l'enseignement relatif à l'environnement au moyen de programmes spéciaux à tous les niveaux, y compris au niveau primaire;
7. *demande* aux Groupes nationaux d'agir auprès de leurs Parlements et de leurs Gouvernements respectifs afin de promouvoir :
 - a) la ratification des traités et accords internationaux existant en matière d'environnement et l'adoption des mesures nécessaires pour leur mise en oeuvre;
 - b) le développement et l'harmonisation des législations nationales en matière d'environnement;
8. *invite instamment* les pays industrialisés à évaluer avec soin, en collaboration étroite avec les pays en développement, les conséquences de l'aide au développement et de toutes les mesures internationales de soutien afin de promouvoir un développement rationnel de l'environnement dans tous les secteurs des pays en développement;
9. *invite* les Groupes nationaux à soutenir et renforcer le Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement en priant instamment les autorités nationales compétentes de coopérer à ses activités et de fournir l'appui financier essentiel;
10. *prie instamment* les Gouvernements de participer activement à la session spéciale de 1982 que le PNUE doit tenir à Nairobi pour évaluer l'état de l'environnement mondial et examiner les futurs besoins et orientations du PNUE;

11. *invite instamment* les Groupes nationaux à soutenir les efforts actuellement en cours dans le cadre des programmes du PNUE en collaboration avec d'autres organisations internationales compétentes, à savoir : a) les programmes de contrôle de l'environnement et de recueil des données ainsi que de diffusion des données au niveau mondial; b) les programmes d'action; c) les conventions et protocoles y relatifs; d) les programmes d'éducation et de formation en matière d'environnement;
12. *invite* les Groupes nationaux à encourager les autorités nationales compétentes à promouvoir et élargir la coopération en matière de recherche scientifique et de gestion de l'environnement, et *insiste* pour que, en cas de problèmes de pollution transfrontières, les Groupes nationaux saisissent toute occasion de promouvoir des accords entre les pays en vue de régler ces problèmes;
13. *invite instamment* tous les Gouvernements et les Parlements à intensifier leurs efforts tendant au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité sur la terre, qui est la condition essentielle de la préservation de la biosphère pour les générations présentes et futures, à la poursuite de la politique de détente, à la limitation et à la cessation de la course aux armements, à la réalisation d'un désarmement véritable et à la réduction des budgets militaires.

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

AMENDEMENTS CANADIENS
AU PROJET DE RESOLUTION
SUR L'ENVIRONNEMENT

Point 5 de l'ordre du jour

L'ETAT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT MONDIAL DIX ANS APRES LA CONFERENCE DES
NATIONS UNIES SUR LE MILIEU HUMAIN QUI S'EST TENUE A STOCKHOLM.

MESURES A PRENDRE, Y COMPRIS DANS LE DOMAINE DE LA
LEGISLATION, AUX NIVEAUX NATIONAL ET INTERNATIONAL

Amendements présentés par la délégation canadienne

1. Remplacer le premier paragraphe du préambule par le
paragraphe suivant :

"réaffirmant la responsabilité de la communauté inter-
nationale en ce qui concerne la préservation et l'amélioration de
l'environnement et considérant qu'une saine gestion de l'environnement,
en tant que fondement d'un développement économique et social soutenu,
requiert des efforts accrus même en temps de difficultés économiques,".

2. Ajouter, après le paragraphe 7, alinéas a) et b) du dispositif,
l'alinéa suivant :

"c) la réalisation des objectifs de la stratégie mondiale de
conservation;".

3. Remplacer le paragraphe 10 du dispositif par le paragraphe suivant :

"presse les Gouvernements d'agir en plein accord avec les engage-
ments de la Déclaration et du Plan d'action de Stockholm,
réaffirmés par la Déclaration de Nairobi adoptée en mai 1982
par le Conseil d'Administration lors de la Session d'un caractère
particulier du PNUE et de se laisser guider par la résolution
du Conseil adoptée à cette Session sur les principales
orientations et priorités environnementales pour la période
1982-1992;".

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

PROJET DE RESOLUTION INITIAL
PORTANT SUR
LA FAIM DANS LE MONDE

Point 6 de l'ordre du jour

La faim dans le monde

Thèmes principaux :

- a) production, distribution et consommation alimentaires dans les pays en développement;
- b) obtention à des prix abordables par les pays à faible revenu de fournitures alimentaires sur le marché international;
- c) aide alimentaire aux pays en développement jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient atteint un stade approprié d'auto-suffisance

PROJET DE RESOLUTION

présenté, au nom de la Commission pour l'étude des questions économiques et sociales,
par MM. J. Béranger (France) et I. Obaro (Nigeria)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

rappelant

- a) la Déclaration universelle pour l'élimination définitive de la faim et de la malnutrition adoptée par la Conférence mondiale de l'alimentation (Rome, novembre 1974),
- b) la Déclaration et le Programme d'action concernant l'instauration d'un nouvel ordre économique international adoptés par les Nations Unies (New York, mai 1974),
- c) la Déclaration de principes et le Programme d'action de la Conférence mondiale sur la réforme agraire et le développement rural (Rome, juillet 1979),
- d) la Stratégie internationale du développement de la troisième Décennie des Nations Unies pour le développement adoptée par la 35e session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies (New York, décembre 1980),
- e) les recommandations adoptées par le Conseil mondial de l'alimentation, lors de la 7e réunion des ministres (Novi Sad, mai 1981),

- f) les résolutions faisant suite au rapport du Conseil mondial de l'alimentation adoptées par la 36e session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, relatives à l'alimentation et l'agriculture, la situation de l'alimentation et de l'agriculture en Afrique et la convocation d'une conférence mondiale de la population (New York, décembre 1981),
- g) la Déclaration de Colombo, adoptée par la Conférence internationale de parlementaires sur la population et le développement (septembre 1979) ainsi que les Conclusions et Recommandations de la Conférence parlementaire sur la population et le développement en Afrique (Nairobi, juillet 1981),
- h) la résolution sur les tendances démographiques et le développement économique et social adoptée par la 61e Conférence interparlementaire (Tokyo, octobre 1974) ainsi que la résolution de la 67e Conférence interparlementaire sur la troisième Décennie des Nations Unies pour le développement (Berlin (RDA), septembre 1980),
- i) la Déclaration conjointe des Présidents de la Rencontre au sommet Nord-Sud, tenue à Cancún en octobre 1981),

prenant note du rapport en date du 12 février 1980 de la Commission indépendante sur les problèmes internationaux du développement, présidée par M. Willy Brandt,

préoccupée par le fait que des centaines de millions de personnes dans le monde connaissent la faim ou souffrent de malnutrition,

consciente du fait que les pays en développement sont les plus affectés par ce fléau qui prend des proportions inquiétantes,

considérant que le développement rationnel d'un pays ne peut être entrepris que dans la mesure où son peuple peut d'abord se nourrir,

exprimant sa vive inquiétude devant une poussée démographique qui, dans les années à venir, ne fera qu'aggraver le déficit alimentaire que connaissent les pays en développement,

déplorant le gaspillage des vastes ressources affectées aux dépenses d'armement et au commerce des armes qui pourraient être utilisées à combattre la faim dans le monde et à soulager les déshérités,

reconnaissant que la faim et la malnutrition constituent des aspects du problème général du sous-développement et que la réduction de l'écart entre les pays industrialisés et les pays en développement contribue aussi à l'élimination des tensions politiques, au renforcement de l'indépendance des pays en développement et au maintien de la paix dans le monde,

1. *demande* aux Parlements et aux Gouvernements de faire de l'éradication de la famine l'objectif majeur de toutes les stratégies nationales et internationales du développement dans le cadre des recommandations du Conseil mondial de l'alimentation et *souligne* que le problème de l'alimentation doit être résolu en priorité par les pays en développement eux-mêmes grâce à un accroissement de leur autosuffisance alimentaire à long terme;
2. *estime* que le but premier de l'aide alimentaire devrait être d'aider les pays en développement à affronter les situations d'urgence sans se substituer aux efforts déployés par ceux-ci pour réduire leur déficit vivrier ni compromettre ces efforts;
3. *se félicite* de l'accord intervenu au début de 1982 sur la reconstitution des ressources du Fonds international de développement agricole;
4. *se félicite* de ce que l'objectif des 500.000 tonnes fixé pour la Réserve alimentaire internationale d'urgence ait enfin été atteint en 1981, *invite* la communauté internationale à renouveler la Convention relative à l'aide alimentaire en fixant à 18 millions de tonnes de céréales ou de produits équivalents l'objectif pour 1985 et *fait appel* à tous les pays donateurs pour qu'ils aident à atteindre cet objectif;
5. *se réjouit* de la décision prise en 1981 par le Fonds monétaire international de créer des facilités supplémentaires pour l'importation en faveur des pays ayant des besoins d'importation de denrées alimentaires très élevés et dont, de surcroît, la balance des paiements est déficitaire;
6. *affirme* que le protectionnisme ne favorise pas en soi le développement d'exploitations agricoles viables, efficaces et adéquates et qu'il a plutôt pour effet de priver les masses des profits tirés de la spécialisation internationale dans la production de produits alimentaires tels que la viande, les fruits, les légumes et les produits laitiers.
7. *invite* les pays industrialisés ou les pays qui en ont les moyens à prendre des mesures positives en vue d'améliorer les marchés internationaux de produits alimentaires de façon à promouvoir la stabilité des prix au moyen d'accords et d'arrangements similaires sur les produits de base et à assurer un meilleur accès et des termes de l'échange plus favorables aux pays en développement;
8. *considère* qu'il faudrait offrir des débouchés suffisants aux exportations des pays en développement, en particulier,

et assurer des prix équitables ainsi qu'une protection contre les notables dommages causés aux économies en développement par les fluctuations de l'offre des produits de base exportés;

9. *regrette* que le volume minimum de l'aide alimentaire fixé à 10 millions de tonnes de céréales par an par la Conférence mondiale de l'alimentation en 1974 n'ait pas encore été atteint;
10. *invite* les Parlements et les Gouvernements à oeuvrer pour la réduction des dépenses militaires et l'affectation exclusive des importantes ressources humaines, financières et matérielles ainsi épargnées au développement économique et social pacifique des peuples en facilitant l'allocation de fonds accrus à l'agriculture et à l'éradication de la famine;
11. *appelle* les pays développés et les pays exportateurs de pétrole à accroître leurs engagements envers le Fonds international de développement agricole des Nations Unies pour aider les pays en développement à augmenter leur production alimentaire;
12. *demande instamment* aux parlementaires et aux Gouvernements de tous les pays d'intensifier leurs efforts en vue d'adopter des politiques et des objectifs céréaliers, de constituer des réserves alimentaires de sécurité et de gérer ces réserves conformément aux critères énoncés dans le Plan d'action de la FAO concernant la sécurité alimentaire mondiale;
13. *invite* les Parlements et les Gouvernements des pays industrialisés ou des pays qui en ont les moyens à faire preuve d'une plus grande solidarité internationale afin d'aider les pays en développement dans leurs efforts pour vaincre la faim;
14. *invite* les pays industrialisés à mettre, dans le cadre d'une coopération internationale, une technologie appropriée à la disposition des pays en développement pour aider ces derniers à augmenter leur production agricole;
15. *invite* les pays développés à appliquer les connaissances scientifiques à des fins plus altruistes, telles que l'approvisionnement en eau, notamment par la réalisation de pluies artificielles, de sorte que l'humanité dépende moins étroitement de la nature pour la production alimentaire, particulièrement dans les pays en développement;

16. *demande instamment* aux pays développés et industrialisés d'adapter leurs politiques d'aide de façon à accorder la plus haute priorité :
- a) aux projets et programmes axés sur la production destinée à la consommation locale, dans le contexte d'une distribution des terres de plus en plus équitable;
 - b) à la fourniture de crédits accessibles aux producteurs alimentaires, notamment aux coopératives de production;
 - c) aux programmes et projets fondés sur un rendement commercial assuré et raisonnable pour les producteurs locaux de produits alimentaires locaux excédentaires;
 - d) à la recherche effectuée "dans l'optique du producteur" en vue d'accroître la production des cultures vivrières et des semences;
 - e) aux projets et programmes qui, d'une part, reconnaissent et soutiennent les femmes dans leur rôle de producteurs alimentaires et, d'autre part, visent à protéger les enfants;
 - f) au développement de l'infrastructure destinée à améliorer le stockage des produits alimentaires locaux et le transport rural;
 - g) aux programmes et projets destinés à fournir des dotations agricoles (eau, semences, traction, etc.) qui sont appropriées et nécessaires aux petits producteurs;
17. *recommande* aux pays en développement d'intensifier les efforts déjà entrepris en vue de moderniser leur agriculture afin que leur production soit compatible avec leurs taux de croissance démographique;
18. *invite* tous les pays en développement à entreprendre des réformes sociales appropriées pour soutenir le processus de production alimentaire, notamment par des mesures telles que la colonisation rurale, la redistribution des terres et la gestion des systèmes agricoles;
19. *invite* tous les Gouvernements intéressés à faire en sorte que, dans l'action visant à augmenter la production alimentaire, il soit tenu dûment compte de la nécessité de conserver notamment le sol, l'eau et les ressources génétiques et à empêcher la mise en valeur de superficies non intégrées impropres à la production suivie de denrées alimentaires;
20. *recommande* que les Groupes nationaux ainsi que leurs Parlements et Gouvernements respectifs accordent une attention particulière à la mise en oeuvre de la résolution sur "Le problème des réfugiés : ses aspects juridiques et humanitaires", adoptée par la 67e Conférence interparlementaire

à Berlin (RDA), notamment pour pourvoir aux besoins alimentaires des réfugiés dans le monde et pour atténuer les difficultés qu'éprouvent les pays d'accueil à nourrir ces réfugiés, surtout en Afrique;

21. *demande instamment* aux Gouvernements intéressés de veiller à ce qu'à l'action entreprise en faveur du développement soit dûment intégrée l'amélioration de la situation économique et sociale des femmes pour diminuer la malnutrition chez les femmes et les enfants;
22. *invite* les Parlements à célébrer chaque année, le 16 octobre, la Journée mondiale de l'alimentation et à organiser chaque année à cette occasion des débats spécialement consacrés aux problèmes alimentaires et agricoles nationaux et mondiaux;
23. *invite* les Parlements à examiner la possibilité de proclamer 1984 Année internationale de l'alimentation et de prendre, à cette occasion, des mesures visant à renforcer la prise de conscience eu égard à la gravité des problèmes alimentaires et à fournir une aide accrue aux pays en développement intéressés;
24. *invite* tous les Groupes nationaux à promouvoir la présente résolution auprès de leurs Parlements et de leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

AMENDEMENTS CANADIENS AU
PROJET DE RESOLUTION
SUR LA FAIM DANS LE MONDE

LA FAIM DANS LE MONDE

THEMES PRINCIPAUX:

- a) PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION ET CONSOMMATION ALIMENTAIRES DANS LES PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT;
- b) OBTENTION A DES PRIX ABORDABLES PAR LES PAYS A FAIBLE REVENU DE FOURNITURES ALIMENTAIRES SUR LE MARCHE INTERNATIONAL ;
- c) AIDE ALIMENTAIRE AUX PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT JUSQU'A CE QU'ILS AIENT ATTEINT UN STADE APPROPRIE D'AUTO-SUFFISANCE.

Amendements présentés par la délégation canadiennePREAMBULE

1. Remplacer le septième paragraphe par le paragraphe suivant :

"déplorant l'utilisation de vastes ressources - financières, matérielles et humaines - à la production et au déploiement des armes, ressources qui pourraient être utilisées à combattre la faim dans le monde et à soulager les déshérités de tous les pays,"

DISPOSITIF

2. Renommer les paragraphes comme suit :

| <u>Numéro original</u> | <u>Nouveau numéro</u> | <u>Numéro original</u> | <u>Nouveau numéro</u> |
|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| .1 | 1,2 (modifié) | .14 | 16 |
| .2 | 5 | .15 | x (supprimé) |
| .3 | 6 (modifié) | .16 | 17 (modifié) |
| .4 | 8,9 (modifié) | .17 | 4 |
| .5 | 11 | .18 | 3 (modifié) |
| .6 | 12 (modifié) | .19 | 18 |
| .7 | 13 (modifié) | .20 | 19 |
| .8 | x (supprimé) | .21 | 20 |
| .9 | 10 | .22 | 21 |
| .10 | 15 | .23 | 22 |
| .11 | x (supprimé) | .24 | 23 |
| .12 | 7 | | |
| .13 | 14 (modifié) | | |

3. Détacher la deuxième partie du paragraphe 1 pour en faire un paragraphe séparé de la teneur suivante :

"souligne que la solution des problèmes alimentaires dans les pays en développement et leur objectif visant à accroître leur autonomie en matière d'alimentation relève en premier lieu et avant tout de la responsabilité des pays en développement eux-mêmes;"

4. Ajouter, à la fin du paragraphe 3 (nouveau paragraphe 6), les termes suivants :

", qui permettra au FIDA de continuer à aider les pays en développement à accroître leur production alimentaire et agricole;"

5. Séparer le paragraphe 4 en deux paragraphes (nouveaux paragraphes 8 et 9) de la teneur suivante :

"se félicite de ce que l'objectif annuel des 500.000 tonnes de céréales fixé pour la Réserve alimentaire internationale d'urgence ait été atteint en 1981, et invite la communauté internationale à intensifier sa participation dans le contexte des engagements volontaires effectués de concert avec les Conférences biennales du Programme alimentaire mondial, afin que l'objectif continue à être atteint ou dépassé;"

"invite la communauté internationale à reconduire la Convention relative à l'aide alimentaire, 1980 (FAC), qui vient à expiration le 30 juin 1983, dans l'espoir que des engagements supplémentaires des signataires actuels de la Convention et de nouveaux membres potentiels seront souscrits pour permettre d'atteindre l'objectif de 10 millions de tonnes de céréales fixé par la FAC;"

6. Remanier le paragraphe 6 (nouveau paragraphe 12) comme suit :

"affirme que le protectionnisme ne favorise pas en soi le développement d'exploitations agricoles viables, efficaces et adéquates et qu'il a plutôt pour effet de priver toutes les populations des profits tirés de la spécialisation internationale dans la production de tous les produits alimentaires;"

7. Remplacer, au paragraphe 7 (nouveau paragraphe 13), les douze premiers mots par les mots suivants : "invite tous les pays qui font du commerce".

8. Supprimer le paragraphe 8.

9. Supprimer le paragraphe 11.

10. Remanier le paragraphe 13 (nouveau paragraphe 14) comme suit :

"invite les Parlements et les Gouvernements de tous les pays à faire preuve d'une plus grande solidarité internationale afin d'aider les pays en développement dans leurs efforts pour vaincre la faim;"

11. Supprimer le paragraphe 15.

12. Remanier l'introduction au paragraphe 16 (nouveau paragraphe 17) de la manière suivante :

"demande instamment aux pays donateurs et aux pays bénéficiaires, ainsi qu'aux organisations et institutions internationales, d'adapter leurs politiques d'aide de façon à accorder la plus haute priorité :".

13. Ajouter, au paragraphe 18 (nouveau paragraphe 3) les mots "et structurelles" après le mot "sociales".

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

PROJET DE RESOLUTION SUR LA LIQUIDATION
DU COLONIALISME ET LA LUTTE
CONTRE LE NEOCOLONIALISME

Point 7 de l'ordre du jour

*Liquidation du colonialisme et lutte contre le néo-colonialisme,
notamment la nécessité de prendre des mesures pour la
réalisation immédiate et stricte du Plan des
Nations Unies sur la Namibie*

PROJET DE RESOLUTION

présenté, au nom de la Commission pour les territoires
non autonomes et l'étude des questions ethniques,
par M. Silva Graça (Portugal)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

rappelant la Déclaration historique sur l'octroi de l'indépendance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux contenue dans la résolution 1514 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies du 14 décembre 1960,

réaffirmant le droit de tous les peuples victimes de l'oppression coloniale, néo-coloniale et raciale à l'autodétermination, à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté nationale, et leur droit de lutter pour l'indépendance par tous les moyens à leur disposition, y compris la lutte armée,

consciente de la menace sérieuse à la paix et à la sécurité internationales que constituent les colonies restantes, en particulier celles qui sont sous la domination de régimes racistes,

fermement convaincue de ce que seule la liquidation totale du colonialisme et du néo-colonialisme - condition préalable à l'instauration de la paix et de la détente internationales - peut assurer l'avènement d'un monde vraiment humain,

rappelant que les peuples de Namibie et d'Afrique du Sud, en dépit des nombreuses résolutions pertinentes de l'Assemblée générale et du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, continuent à être soumis à la politique colonialiste et raciste la plus inhumaine en raison du refus du régime de l'Afrique du Sud de se conformer aux décisions internationales,

rappelant, en particulier, la résolution des Nations Unies mettant fin au mandat de l'Afrique du Sud sur le territoire de

la Namibie, y compris Walvis Bay, et la résolution du Conseil de sécurité 435 (1978) qui établit un Plan des Nations Unies sur la Namibie,

profondément inquiète de la poursuite de l'occupation illégale de la Namibie par l'Afrique du Sud, de l'imposition de l'apartheid au peuple namibien, et du mépris de l'Afrique du Sud pour toutes les résolutions des Nations Unies, de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine, de l'Union interparlementaire, du Mouvement des pays non alignés et d'autres organisations internationales sur le statut et les droits du peuple namibien, et de l'intensification de l'occupation militaire de la Namibie,

alarmée par les exemples fréquents d'agression de l'Afrique du Sud contre les Etats africains indépendants voisins,

consciente de ce que la constitution d'un potentiel nucléaire par le régime d'apartheid, avec l'aide de certaines puissances occidentales et d'Israël, risque d'avoir des conséquences dangereuses pour la situation en Afrique australe et la sécurité internationale en général,

indignée de l'appui accordé au régime d'apartheid par certaines puissances occidentales et des liens de celui-ci avec Israël,

préoccupée par la persécution, l'arrestation, l'emprisonnement, la torture et l'assassinat de combattants de la liberté sud-africains et namibiens opposés à l'apartheid,

déplorant fortement que, du seul fait du veto des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies n'ait pas pu imposer des sanctions obligatoires au Gouvernement sud-africain aux termes du chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies,

rappelant les résolutions de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies 36/121 A-F du 10 décembre 1981, et 36/172 A-P du 17 décembre 1981 sur les questions de la Namibie et de la politique d'apartheid du Gouvernement sud-africain et, notamment, la résolution 36/172 B qui proclame l'année 1982 Année internationale de la mobilisation pour des sanctions contre l'Afrique du Sud,

ayant à l'esprit le fait que le peuple du Sahara occidental est toujours privé de son droit à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance du fait de l'occupation de son territoire par le Maroc,

ayant à l'esprit le référendum tendant à permettre au peuple sahraoui d'exprimer en toute liberté, dans sa totalité et dans des conditions régulières, sa volonté d'autodétermination au Sahara occidental,

réaffirmant le droit inaliénable du peuple du Sahara occidental à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance, conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies, à la Charte de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine, à la résolution 1514 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, ainsi qu'aux autres résolutions pertinentes de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine et de l'Union interparlementaire,

préoccupée par l'aggravation de la situation au Sahara occidental qui fait peser une grave menace sur la sécurité et la paix des pays de la région,

préoccupée par l'aggravation de la situation au Timor oriental dont le peuple est non seulement empêché d'accéder à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance, mais est également victime de génocide,

gravement inquiète de la situation coloniale qui continue à régner à Guam, à Gibraltar, aux îles Falkland (Malvinas), à Porto Rico, aux îles Vierges britanniques, aux îles Vierges américaines, en Micronésie et dans d'autres "petits territoires" sous domination britannique et française,

ayant à l'esprit la contribution que les Parlements peuvent apporter pour la mobilisation de l'opinion publique mondiale et l'adoption de mesures pratiques et efficaces contre le colonialisme sous toutes ses formes et dans toutes ses manifestations,

réaffirmant la résolution sur les "Mesures urgentes pour la liquidation des vestiges du colonialisme dans le monde et des pratiques d'apartheid en Namibie ainsi qu'en Afrique du Sud, et protection des minorités ethniques", adoptée par la 68e Conférence interparlementaire à La Havane, en septembre 1981,

consciente, une fois de plus, de la nécessité d'appeler tous les Gouvernements et Parlements du monde à assumer leur responsabilité en mettant fin au colonialisme, au néo-colonialisme, au racisme, à l'apartheid et au sionisme,

considérant que la liquidation du colonialisme, du néo-colonialisme et du racisme relève également de la responsabilité des Parlements et qu'il est nécessaire et urgent de prendre des mesures à cette fin, notamment en ce qui concerne l'application immédiate et rigoureuse du Plan des Nations Unies sur la Namibie,

1. *réaffirme* le droit de tous les peuples à l'autodétermination, à l'indépendance, à la liberté et à la souveraineté;
2. *reconnait* le droit de tous les peuples soumis à la domination coloniale, néo-coloniale et raciste de lutter par tous

- les moyens à leur disposition, y compris la lutte armée, pour leur libération;
3. *réaffirme* le droit légitime du peuple namibien de lutter, par tous les moyens à sa disposition, pour exercer son droit inaliénable à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance;
 4. *invite* toutes les nations éprises de paix et toutes les organisations internationales à contribuer généreusement à la lutte pour la libération des peuples qui sont encore sous domination coloniale;
 5. *prie instamment* tous les Gouvernements et Parlements, les organisations internationales et régionales, les institutions publiques et les organisations non gouvernementales et intergouvernementales de contribuer à l'élimination du colonialisme et de ses conséquences;
 6. *condamne* le régime raciste de l'Afrique du Sud pour son occupation illégale de la Namibie et *exige* le retrait immédiat des troupes et de l'administration sud-africaines, une indépendance véritable et le respect de l'intégrité territoriale du pays, y compris Walvis Bay;
 7. *condamne* le mépris de l'Afrique du Sud à l'égard des résolutions de l'Assemblée générale et du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies sur le statut politique de la Namibie;
 8. *prie instamment* la communauté internationale de reconnaître la SWAPO comme le seul représentant authentique du peuple namibien, conformément aux décisions de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine;
 9. *exhorte* le Groupe de contact des cinq pays occidentaux à exercer suffisamment de pression sur l'Afrique du Sud pour qu'elle coopère à la mise en oeuvre rapide de la résolution 435 (1978) du Conseil de sécurité, conduisant à l'instauration de la règle de la majorité en Namibie;
 10. *désapprouve* les manoeuvres de certains membres du Groupe de contact occidental visant à neutraliser les dispositions de cette résolution du Conseil de sécurité, à dessaisir l'Organisation des Nations Unies du problème de la Namibie et à le résoudre dans un esprit néo-colonialiste;
 11. *déplore une fois de plus* la collaboration croissante des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, d'Israël et d'autres puissances occidentales avec le régime raciste d'Afrique du Sud;
 12. *invite instamment* le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies à assumer la responsabilité qui lui incombe aux termes de la

Charte des Nations Unies en appliquant les sanctions obligatoires prévues par le chapitre VII contre l'Afrique du Sud;

13. *lance un appel* aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique, en tant que membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, pour qu'ils fassent droit aux demandes d'une immense majorité de pays concernant l'application contre l'Afrique du Sud des sanctions prévues par le chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies;
14. *condamne* l'Afrique du Sud pour son refus d'accepter les décisions du Plan des Nations Unies pour l'indépendance de la Namibie;
15. *condamne énergiquement* les actes d'agression militaire et d'autres actes de déstabilisation économique et politique perpétrés par l'Afrique du Sud contre les pays voisins, notamment l'Angola, le Mozambique, la Zambie, le Zimbabwe, le Lesotho et le Botswana;
16. *condamne* l'intensification de la répression militaire exercée contre les peuples de Namibie et d'Afrique du Sud par le régime raciste, ainsi que l'utilisation du territoire de la Namibie comme tremplin pour perpétrer des actes d'agression criminels contre les pays de la ligne de front en Afrique australe, la persécution, l'emprisonnement, la torture et le meurtre des combattants de la liberté sud-africains et namubiens;
17. *exige* la libération du combattant de la liberté Nelson Mandela, ainsi que de tous les prisonniers politiques sud-africains incarcérés parce qu'ils luttent pour les droits de leur peuple;
18. *soutient* la SWAPO, seul représentant légitime du peuple namibien, et les mouvements de libération d'Afrique du Sud reconnus par l'OUA et l'ONU;
19. *réaffirme* qu'aucune solution durable au conflit sévissant en Namibie ne peut être obtenue qu'avec la participation de la SWAPO;
20. *invite instamment* tous les Gouvernements et tous les Parlements du monde à adopter des mesures urgentes et efficaces en vue de :
 - a) freiner les activités économiques de leurs organismes nationaux en Namibie, en Afrique du Sud et dans tout autre pays soumis à la domination coloniale et/ou raciste;

- b) offrir toute l'assistance morale et matérielle possible aux mouvements de libération d'Afrique du Sud reconnus par l'Organisation des Nations Unies;
 - c) contribuer à la réalisation des buts de l'Année internationale de la mobilisation pour des sanctions contre l'Afrique du Sud;
21. *réitère* son soutien à l'exercice du droit du peuple du Sahara occidental à l'autodétermination et l'indépendance et *rappelle*, en conséquence, l'urgence et la nécessité impérieuse de l'application des résolutions et décisions prises aussi bien par l'ONU que l'OUA, qui visent à un règlement juste et définitif du conflit du Sahara occidental;
22. *lance un appel ferme* au Comité de mise en oeuvre de l'OUA pour qu'il fasse engager des négociations entre le Maroc et le Front Polisario pour le règlement pacifique du conflit en vue de favoriser le développement d'une coopération harmonieuse entre tous les peuples de la région;
23. *appelle* à cet effet le Maroc et le Front Polisario à engager des négociations en vue d'établir un cessez-le-feu immédiat et de conclure un accord de paix permettant une juste application du référendum d'autodétermination général, libre et régulier, au Sahara occidental;
24. *réaffirme* le droit du Timor oriental à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance et, par conséquent, *condamne* le recours à la force comme moyen d'empêcher le peuple du Timor oriental d'y accéder;
25. *appelle* les parties concernées à rechercher un règlement juste et définitif de la situation du peuple du Timor oriental;
26. *réaffirme* le droit inaliénable du peuple de Porto Rico à l'autodétermination, à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté conformément à la résolution 1514 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies;
27. *appuie* la décision de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies d'approuver le rapport du Comité *ad hoc* sur la décolonisation dans lequel il lui était demandé d'inscrire le cas de Porto Rico en tant que point séparé de l'ordre du jour de sa 37e session;
28. *réitère* son appel au Royaume-Uni et à l'Espagne pour qu'ils poursuivent leurs pourparlers en vue de mettre fin au statut politique actuel de Gibraltar sur la base des résolutions des Nations Unies et de l'Union interparlementaire;

29. *invite* toutes les parties intéressées à appuyer les décisions et résolutions de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies concernant les territoires de Guam, de la Micronésie, des îles Vierges britanniques, des îles Vierges américaines, et des autres "petits territoires" qui se trouvent encore sous la domination coloniale;
30. *condamne* l'existence de bases militaires et/ou navales dans les territoires coloniaux, qui font obstacle à l'indépendance des peuples intéressés et sont préjudiciables tant aux êtres humains qu'aux ressources naturelles de ces territoires;
31. *condamne*, conformément aux résolutions de l'Union interparlementaire et des Nations Unies (Assemblée générale et Conseil de sécurité), la poursuite par Israël de l'implantation de colonies de peuplement dans les territoires palestiniens et arabes occupés, ces colonies constituant une nouvelle forme de colonialisme;
32. *prie instamment* les Parlements :
 - a) de soutenir activement la mise en oeuvre par la communauté internationale de mesures spécifiques propres à éliminer le colonialisme, le néo-colonialisme, le racisme (y compris le sionisme) et l'apartheid dans tous les pays où ils sont pratiqués;
 - b) d'accroître l'aide aux peuples victimes de l'oppression coloniale ou aux peuples opprimés pour des raisons raciales, religieuses ou autres, et à leurs représentants légitimes - les organisations de libération nationale reconnues par l'OUA, la Ligue des Etats arabes, le Mouvement des pays non alignés, l'Organisation de la Conférence islamique et les Nations Unies - dans leur lutte pour l'exercice de leurs droits à l'indépendance et à l'autodétermination;
 - c) de lancer un appel en vue du retrait des troupes d'occupation étrangères et de la suppression des bases militaires étrangères installées dans des pays libres et souverains contre la volonté de leurs peuples;
 - d) d'exiger la cessation de toute politique illégale et arbitraire susceptible d'empêcher le plein exercice par ces peuples de leur droit à leur autodétermination et de souveraineté sur l'ensemble de leur territoire national;
33. *invite* les Gouvernements, les Parlements et les organisations internationales à prendre des mesures visant à accroître leur activité en vue de l'élimination de toutes les formes d'impérialisme, de colonialisme, de néo-colonialisme, de recolonisation, d'apartheid, de discrimination raciale, d'occupation, de sionisme, d'agression ou de menaces d'agression, à soutenir toutes les actions et initiatives tendant à la défense de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté de tous les peuples, et à éliminer les dangers pour la paix et la sécurité internationales.

69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

MOYENS PRATIQUES D'AMELIORER
LES FONCTIONS DE SESSIONS
DE L'UNION

MOYENS PRATIQUES D'AMELIORER LE FONCTIONNEMENT DES
SESSIONS DE L'UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

(Point XV de l'ordre du jour)

Lors de la session de Lagos, le Comité exécutif a présenté au Conseil interparlementaire ses recommandations (Annexe I) relatives aux conclusions du Groupe de travail qui avait été chargé d'étudier le fonctionnement des sessions de l'Union (Annexes II et III).

Le Conseil, après un échange de vues sur la question, a décidé de renvoyer à la session de Rome l'examen des conclusions du Groupe de travail, étant entendu que les Groupes nationaux qui souhaiteraient présenter des observations concernant ces recommandations ou des contre-propositions devraient le faire par écrit et à l'avance afin que les membres du Conseil puissent les étudier.

En réponse à une lettre circulaire qui leur a été adressée à cet effet le 17 mai 1982 par le Secrétaire général, 14 Groupes nationaux ont fait connaître leur opinion (Annexes IV et V).

Le Groupe de travail et le Comité exécutif ont examiné, lors de la session de Rome, les observations formulées par les Groupes nationaux.

A l'issue de cet examen le Comité exécutif, unanime, a décidé de confirmer la recommandation qu'il avait faite au Conseil, à Lagos, de donner son accord de principe aux propositions fondamentales du Groupe de travail, auxquelles sont apportées les modifications suivantes :

Recommandation No 11 (Annexe II, page 3) :

"...le nombre de parlementaires délégués à la Conférence par chaque Groupe national ... ne devrait en aucun cas être supérieur à huit et à dix pour les Groupes nationaux des pays dont la population est égale ou supérieure à 100 millions".

Recommandation figurant à la section B (Annexe II, page 4) :

"Le nombre de membres d'un comité de rédaction ne devrait normalement pas être supérieur à onze et sa composition devrait tenir compte d'une équitable répartition géographique et d'un équilibre politique. Seul un parlementaire de chaque délégation ..."

ANNEXE I

MOYENS PRATIQUES D'AMELIORER LE FONCTIONNEMENT
DES SESSIONS DE L'UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRERapport du Comité exécutif

Le Comité exécutif a examiné, lors de sa 189e session (Lagos, 12 avril 1982), les conclusions (voir Annexes) du Groupe de travail qui a été chargé d'étudier le fonctionnement des sessions de l'Union.

Au terme de cet examen, le Comité exécutif a pris les décisions suivantes concernant les deux questions étudiées par le Groupe de travail :

A. MOYENS PRATIQUES D'AMELIORER LE FONCTIONNEMENT DES SESSIONS DE
L'UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

Sur ce point, le Comité exécutif, unanime, a fait siennes les conclusions et les recommandations détaillées du Groupe de travail.

Il recommande au Conseil interparlementaire de donner son accord de principe aux 13 propositions fondamentales énoncées par le Groupe de travail dans son rapport.

Si tel était le cas, le Secrétaire général serait chargé de préparer, sur la base de ces propositions, des avant-projets de Statuts et Règlement, lesquels seraient examinés en détail par le Groupe de travail qui siégerait pour ce faire au début de l'année 1983. Les projets de textes alors établis par le Groupe de travail seraient soumis au Conseil interparlementaire, lors de sa session de printemps et à la 70e Conférence, pour entrée en vigueur en 1984.

B. ETABLISSEMENT DE DIRECTIVES POUR LA CONDUITE DES TRAVAUX DES
COMITES DE REDACTION

Le Comité exécutif, unanime, recommande au Conseil d'approuver la proposition faite sur ce point par le Groupe de travail.

- Cette situation et la tendance à l'examen d'un plus grand nombre de points poussent à une prolongation de la durée des réunions que beaucoup de délégués considèrent déjà comme trop longue en raison de leurs obligations nationales.

- Le fait que, pour diverses raisons, certaines délégations ne sont pas toujours composées des mêmes membres à la session (préparatoire) d'avril et à la Conférence annuelle de septembre résulte en une absence de continuité et ne permet pas à bien des membres de participer à l'ensemble du processus de débat et d'examen d'un point donné et de prise de décision à son sujet.

- Le grand nombre de participants aux sessions de l'Union fait qu'il est de plus en plus difficile pour les Groupes hôtes de faire face aux frais d'organisation des réunions.

Le groupe de travail a étudié ensuite les voies et moyens d'améliorer la situation. Après examen de diverses propositions, il a décidé de recommander une nouvelle structure pour les réunions interparlementaires. Cette solution, qui reprend largement la proposition de M. Ericson, lui a semblé être, bien qu'imparfaite, la plus susceptible de concilier les exigences quelque peu divergentes des membres de l'Union et de parer aux inconvénients énoncés ci-dessus.

Les recommandations détaillées du groupe de travail sont les suivantes :

1. L'Union tiendrait deux conférences par an, chacune étant indépendante de l'autre et se terminant par l'adoption de résolutions définitives.
2. Chaque conférence compterait normalement six jours de travail.
3. L'ordre du jour ordinaire de chaque conférence comprendrait seulement deux points de substance choisis par le Conseil interparlementaire à l'issue de la Conférence précédente, sur la recommandation du Comité exécutif qui aurait examiné, au préalable, les propositions qui lui seraient soumises.
4. Le nombre des commissions d'étude serait réduit à quatre par la fusion de la Commission pour l'étude des questions économiques et sociales et de la Commission pour l'éducation, la science, la culture et l'environnement. La nouvelle Commission ainsi créée s'appellerait Commission pour l'étude des questions économiques, sociales, culturelles et de l'environnement.
5. Les quatre points de substance traités durant l'année seraient choisis par le Conseil de manière à ce que chacune des quatre Commissions se réunisse au moins une fois par an suivant un système de rotation.
6. Les points de substance ordinaires inscrits à l'ordre du jour de la Conférence par le Conseil feraient l'objet d'un débat complet en plénière sur la base des mémoires et projets de résolution présentés par les Groupes nationaux. La Conférence renverrait ensuite chaque point débattu à la Commission compétente pour la préparation de projets de résolution qui seraient examinés et votés par la Conférence lors de la séance finale de celle-ci.

MOYENS PRATIQUES D'AMELIORER LE FONCTIONNEMENT
DES SESSIONS DE L'UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

Conclusions du groupe de travail

Le groupe de travail que le Conseil interparlementaire avait chargé, sur proposition du Comité exécutif, d'étudier le fonctionnement des sessions de l'Union s'est réuni au siège de l'Union à Genève, du 18 au 20 janvier 1982.

Le groupe de travail était ainsi composé : M. S. Ericson (Suède) qui en a présidé les débats; MM. A.P. Chitikov (URSS); H. Edwards (Australie); J. Marko (Tchécoslovaquie) et El Hadj Moussa Yaya (République unie du Cameroun).

Les conclusions du groupe de travail sont les suivantes :

A. MOYENS PRATIQUES D'AMELIORER LE FONCTIONNEMENT DES SESSIONS DE
L'UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

Le groupe de travail a commencé ses travaux le 18 janvier 1982 par l'examen de la proposition de M. Ericson concernant les moyens d'améliorer le fonctionnement des sessions de l'Union interparlementaire, ainsi que des observations ou propositions alternatives communiquées par 25 Groupes nationaux et de l'étude faite par le Secrétaire général.

Après un examen de la situation et un échange de vues approfondis, les membres du groupe de travail ont constaté les inconvénients suivants liés à la structure actuelle des sessions de l'Union :

- L'heureux accroissement du nombre de membres de l'Union fait qu'il est de plus en plus difficile pour chaque délégation de mettre à profit son droit de parole déjà très limité.

- L'examen en deux phases (avril et septembre) des points à l'ordre du jour conduit à une certaine répétition.

7. Chaque conférence aurait, lors de sa première séance, la possibilité d'ajouter à son ordre du jour un point supplémentaire parmi ceux dont l'inscription serait éventuellement demandée par les Groupes nationaux au moins un mois avant la Conférence. Pour être acceptée, une demande d'inscription d'un point supplémentaire devrait recueillir la majorité de deux tiers; dans le cas où plusieurs demandes satisferaient à cette condition, le point ayant reçu le plus grand nombre de suffrages positifs serait choisi.

Le point supplémentaire serait traité suivant une procédure accélérée (sans débat en plénière avant d'être examiné par la Commission d'étude compétente).
8. Si un événement d'une importance internationale particulière se produisait au cours du mois précédant la Conférence ou durant celle-ci, la Conférence pourrait, à la demande d'un Groupe national, inscrire un point correspondant à son ordre du jour par vote à la majorité de quatre-cinquièmes.
9. Le débat général serait maintenu et les membres de l'Union auraient ainsi l'occasion d'exprimer, deux fois par an au lieu d'une, leurs points de vue sur les événements internationaux.
10. Le droit de parole et les procédures actuels pour les débats en séance plénière de la Conférence resteraient inchangés.
11. En vue de réduire les frais du Groupe hôte aussi bien que des Groupes nationaux participants, le nombre de parlementaires délégués à la Conférence par chaque Groupe national devrait être limité aux exigences d'une participation efficace et ne devrait en aucun cas être supérieur à huit. Compte tenu de cela, le nombre de voix qu'un membre pourrait exprimer suivant l'article 16, paragraphe 3, des Statuts devrait passer de cinq à dix.
12. Le Secrétaire général présenterait au Conseil, à chacune de ses deux sessions annuelles un rapport sur l'état et les activités de l'Union interparlementaire. Cependant, il ne présenterait pas aux Conférences de rapport écrit sur les questions d'intérêt international.
13. Le Conseil interparlementaire, en tant qu'organe qui détermine et oriente les activités de l'Union, continuerait d'exercer toutes les fonctions qui lui sont assignées aux termes de l'article 21 des Statuts. Il continuerait d'examiner les rapports et conclusions de Conférences et réunions spéciales, de comités ad hoc et de sous-Commissions et d'adopter des résolutions à cet égard. Cependant, étant donné que la Conférence siégerait en avril, le Conseil ne débattrait et n'adopterait plus à ce moment-là de résolutions sur des questions internationales comme c'est le cas actuellement.

Pour plus ample information, les membres du Comité exécutif trouveront en Annexe II le calendrier modèle du système proposé.

B. ETABLISSEMENT DE DIRECTIVES POUR LA CONDUITE DES TRAVAUX DES COMITES DE REDACTION

Le groupe de travail a également examiné la question de la préparation de directives pour la conduite des travaux des comités de rédaction désignés par les Commissions d'étude, question dont il avait été saisi par le Comité exécutif à La Havane.

A l'issue de cet examen, il a conclu qu'il fallait s'en remettre largement à la discrétion et à la sagesse des présidents des comités de rédaction. Il a proposé au Comité exécutif de suggérer au Conseil d'ajouter aux recommandations approuvées par celui-ci à Mexico (118e session, avril 1976), la recommandation suivante :

Le nombre de membres d'un comité de rédaction ne devrait normalement pas être supérieur à onze et seul un parlementaire de chaque délégation ainsi choisie devrait participer activement et prendre la parole lors des réunions d'un comité de rédaction.

Calendrier modèle proposé pour chacune des
réunions d'avril et de septembre

| | | | |
|---------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Dimanche | | Comité exécutif | |
| matin | Inauguration | | |
| Lundi | | | |
| après-m. 14h. | Conseil | | |
| 16h. | Vote sur point suppl. Plénière (Point A) | | |
| matin | Plénière (Point A) | Commission (Point supplémentaire) | |
| Mardi | | | |
| après-m. | Plénière (Point A) | Commission (Point supplémentaire) | |
| matin | Plénière (Point B) | Commission 1 (Point A) | Comité rédaction (Point supplémentaire) |
| Mercredi | | | |
| après-m. | Plénière (Point B) | | Comité rédaction (Point A) Comité rédaction (Point supplémentaire) |
| matin | Plénière (Point B) | Comité exécutif | Comité rédaction (Point A) |
| Jeudi | | | |
| après-m. | Débat général | Commission 2 (Point B) | Comité rédaction (Point A) |
| matin | Débat général | Commission 1 (Point A) | Comité rédaction (Point B) |
| Vendredi | | | |
| après-m. | Débat général | Commission (Point supplémentaire) | Comité rédaction (Point B) |
| matin | Conseil | Commission 2 (Point B) | |
| Samedi | | | |
| après-m. | Plénière Vote final | | |
| Dimanche | | (Comité exécutif) | |

| Groupes nationaux de: | Observations |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Japon | <p>Le Groupe japonais :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) d'une façon générale juge bonnes les recommandations du groupe de travail;2) estime que le nombre de parlementaires délégués à la Conférence par chaque Groupe national devrait être en règle générale limité à <u>huit</u> mais que le Groupe national d'un pays dont la population est égale ou supérieure à 100 millions devrait pouvoir déléguer <u>dix</u> parlementaires au maximum (recommandation No 11);3) estime en outre que la Commission politique devrait pouvoir se réunir à chacune des deux conférences annuelles (recommandation No 5) |
| Mongolie | <p>Le Groupe mongol :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) approuve d'une façon générale les recommandations du groupe de travail;2) propose que le nombre de voix qu'un délégué peut exprimer aux termes de l'article 16, alinéa 3, des Statuts soit porté de <u>5</u> à <u>11</u> et non pas à 10 (recommandation No 11)3) estime que le nombre de membres des comités de rédaction tiennne compte d'une équitable répartition géographique et d'un équilibre politique (recommandation présentée sous la section B). |
| République arabe syrienne | <p>Le Groupe syrien :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) approuve pleinement les recommandations 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 et 11 du groupe de travail ainsi que la recommandation faite à la section B;2) ne voit aucune nécessité à ce que les quatre points principaux soient choisis de manière que chaque Commission d'étude se réunisse au moins une fois par an et préfère une entière liberté de choix des sujets (recommandation No 5)3) s'oppose à la suppression du Rapport du Secrétaire général sur les questions d'intérêt international. |
| Rwanda | <p>Le Groupe rwandais n'a pas d'objection à formuler aux recommandations du groupe de travail.</p> |

OBSERVATIONS COMMUNIQUEES PAR LES GROUPES NATIONAUX RELATIVEMENT
AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITE EXECUTIF CONCERNANT LES MOYENS
D'AMELIORER LE FONCTIONNEMENT DES SESSIONS DE L'UNION
INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

| Groupes nationaux de : | Observations |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Allemagne (République fédérale d') | Le Groupe de la République fédérale d'Allemagne considère les recommandations du Groupe de travail comme une amélioration considérable de la structure des Conférences interparlementaires. |
| Espagne | Le Groupe espagnol estime que le rapport sur l'état et les activités de l'Union devrait être présenté par le Président du Conseil interparlementaire et non par le Secrétaire général. Le seul rapport que ce dernier devrait présenter serait pour rendre des comptes annuellement au Comité exécutif. |
| Finlande | <p>Le Groupe finlandais :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) accepte dans leur généralité les conclusions du groupe de travail et en particulier le fait que l'Union tienne deux conférences indépendantes par an;2) espère qu'il sera possible de conserver sous une forme ou une autre le Rapport du Secrétaire général sur les questions d'intérêt international (recommandation No 12);3) souhaite que le procès-verbal des conférences soit publié <u>in extenso</u>. |
| Iran | Le Groupe iranien appuie les recommandations No 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12 et 13 du groupe de travail |

OBSERVATIONS COMMUNIQUEES LE 15 SEPTEMBRE 1982 PAR DEUX GROUPES
NATIONAUX RELATIVEMENT AUX RECOMMANDATIONS DU COMITE EXECUTIF
CONCERNANT LES MOYENS D'AMELIORER LE FONCTIONNEMENT DES
SESSIONS DE L'UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

| Groupe national de | Observations |
|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Congo | <p>Ce Groupe accepte l'idée de deux Conférences indépendantes mais :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) propose que les résolutions définitives de chaque Conférence ne soient adoptées qu'un an plus tard, ce qui permettrait d'éviter la précipitation lors de la prise de décisions concernant certaines questions difficiles à traiter au cours de la même Conférence (Recommandation No.1);2) estime que le Comité exécutif et le Conseil devraient se réunir durant (et non en dehors) des 6 jours consacrés à chaque Conférence (Recommandation No. 2);3) approuve les Recommandations 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 et 13;4) estime que la majorité requise pour l'inscription d'un 2e point supplémentaire ne devrait pas être de 4/5e mais des 2/3 (Recommandation No. 8);5) approuve la Recommandation présentée à la section B. |
| Luxembourg | <p>Souscrit pleinement aux 13 Recommandations sous réserve :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) que les Recommandations 3 et 9 se complètent et que le débat général ait lieu à <u>chaque</u> Conférence;2) que la Commission politique se réunisse à <u>chaque</u> Conférence;3) que l'on tienne compte dans l'application de la Recommandation No.5 du caractère actuel et urgent de certains problèmes;4) que la pratique d'ajouter un point supplémentaire au débat général soit maintenue;5) que le rapport du Secrétaire général sur des questions d'intérêt international soit maintenu sous une forme ou une autre. |

| Groupes nationaux de : | Observations |
|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Somalie | Le Groupe somalien approuve pleinement les recommandations du groupe de travail. |
| Yougoslavie | <p>Le Groupe estime n'avoir rien à ajouter aux propositions qu'il avait communiquées en date du 25 décembre 1981 à l'intention du groupe de travail.</p> <p>Dans cette communication, le Groupe yougoslave :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1) se prononçait en faveur du maintien d'une session préparatoire et d'une Conférence annuelle;2) estimait que le temps de parole établi dans le Règlement pour le débat général devait être maintenu et que trois jours et demi devraient être consacrés à ce débat général;3) estimait que l'ordre du jour devrait comporter un nombre de points égal à celui des Commissions d'étude (5) et que les demandes de points supplémentaires devraient être transmises au Conseil interparlementaire;4) proposait que les débats en Commission n'aient lieu qu'au printemps, la Conférence examinant elle-même les questions étudiées au printemps selon une procédure accélérée pour éviter la répétition de mêmes débats;5) proposait a) que les Commissions se réunissent durant quatre jours au printemps et trois jours lors de la Conférence; b) que le Conseil siège une journée au printemps et une journée et demi lors de la Conférence. |
| Zambie | Le Groupe zambien n'a pas d'observation ni de contre-proposition à formuler. |
| Zimbabwe | Le Groupe du Zimbabwe étudie les recommandations afin de faire connaître ses commentaires. |

ANNEXE "M"

ALLOCUTION
DE SA
SAINTETE LE PAPE
JEAN PAUL II
LORS DE LA 69^e CONFERENCE
CITE DU VATICAN

Monsieur le Président,
Excellences,
Mesdames, Messieurs,

1. J'apprécie d'une façon particulière votre présence ici, à l'occasion de l'importante Conférence que tient à Rome la noble Institution dont vous êtes membres. Et je vous remercie de votre visite.

Mes vénérés prédécesseurs n'ont pas manqué de manifester leur intérêt à l'Union Interparlementaire et même à lui prodiguer leurs encouragements. Par exemple le Pape Pie XII, le 9 septembre 1948, soulignait la permanence et l'opportunité d'une telle Association. Et voilà dix ans, lorsque l'Union tint sa précédente Conférence en Italie, le Pape Paul VI voulut rendre un hommage manifeste à votre travail de parlementaires. Après avoir situé votre action politique au regard du pouvoir exécutif, des nouveaux "pouvoirs" des corps intermédiaires et des technocrates, Paul VI diagnostiquait une certaine crise de fonction et d'identité du Parlement, mais il souhaitait justement, dans le cadre d'une évolution nécessaire, que cette institution remplisse encore plus efficacement son rôle, au-delà des querelles partisans et d'un certain jeu politique stérile. Le Parlement ainsi compris contribue en effet à la sauvegarde de la démocratie.

L'expérience ne montre-t-elle pas tous les jours ce que risque une nation lorsque les Autorités gouvernementales d'une part et les groupes de pression d'autre part ne laissent plus leur juste place aux représentants de la société, élus démocratiquement et agissant librement, en conscience, pour répondre aux aspirations légitimes de leurs compatriotes, en envisageant le bien commun de l'ensemble du peuple et en tenant compte des réalités concrètes ainsi que des droits fondamentaux des personnes et de leurs associations?

2. Guidés par les profondes aspirations populaires qui sont à la base de votre mandat de représentants, vous êtes certainement très conscients de l'urgence de contribuer à la sécurité et au progrès de ceux qui vous ont mandatés, non seulement au plan intérieur de chaque nation, mais dans un cadre toujours plus vaste, sachant le lien étroit qui existe entre le bien commun de chaque population et sa réalisation à l'échelle mondiale.

À ce plan international, la valeur de l'Union Interparlementaire est d'ailleurs attestée par l'augmentation des adhésions : plus d'un tiers au cours des dix dernières années. La représentativité de l'Union est d'autant plus grande que, en son sein, comme d'ailleurs en d'autres Organisations internationales, siègent côte à côte des délégués de peuples qui s'efforcent de maintenir ou d'augmenter leur niveau de prospérité, souvent élevé, et des représentants de peuples qui en sont encore à lutter pour leur survivance, compromise par la faim, par les maladies, par le manque de biens essentiels.

Cette diversité de positions, aussi bien que les multiples différences politiques, sociales et ethniques, confèrent à l'Union inter-parlementaire une remarquable capacité de synthèse et de promotion, qui manifestent du reste les thèmes que vous discutez ces jours-ci : depuis le lien entre la réduction des dépenses militaires et le développement économique et social du tiers-monde jusqu'à la participation des parlementaires dans le domaine des relations internationales; depuis l'uniformité souhaitée des législations écologiques destinées à sauvegarder l'équilibre de l'environnement jusqu'aux moyens concrets de combattre la faim dans le monde; et encore la liquidation des restes du vieux colonialisme ou la préservation de toute forme de néocolonialisme.

Précisément, plutôt que de revenir sur votre fonction de parlementaires au sein de vos pays, je voudrais aborder quelques-uns de ces problèmes mondiaux, et d'autres qui tiennent à coeur à l'Eglise catholique.

3. Je désire d'abord rappeler mon message de juin dernier à la deuxième Assemblée extraordinaire des Nations Unies consacrée au problème primordial de l'arrêt des courses folles aux armements : non seulement des armes nucléaires, qui bien sûr suscitent une profonde inquiétude, vu leur terrifiante capacité de destruction, mais aussi de ce que l'on appelle les armes conventionnelles, qui absorbent des ressources immenses de l'humanité alors que celles-ci peuvent et doivent être destinées à de tout autres buts.

Ne nous décourageons pas. Certes, la réunion de New York n'a
lement pas donné tous les fruits qu'en attendaient les peuples et les
es vraiment attachés à la paix. Elle laisse cependant l'espoir de
suivre ce travail en profondeur. Travaillons sans relâche auprès des
ances compétentes, afin que la réduction des armements devienne une
quête effective des générations actuelles. Il faut pour cela renforcer
climat de confiance et de collaboration. Les occasions ne manquent
Citons par exemple, pour le continent européen, la reprise imminente
la Conférence de Madrid qui peut offrir l'occasion de progrès
éciables dans la sécurité et dans la compréhension mutuelle, dans
ligne de l'Acte final d'Helsinki. Mais je pense aussi à des réunions
niveau des autres continents, américain, africain, asiatique, et
initiatives qui touchent l'ensemble de la planète.

A l'aube de cette année, dans mon message habituel pour la Journée
iale de la paix, j'ai défini celle-ci : "un don de Dieu confié aux
es". La paix vous est donc confiée à vous aussi, et cela d'une
on particulière, en raison de votre vocation politique active et de
responsabilités majeures en ce domaine: puissiez-vous contribuer à
que la paix soit sauvegardée, fortifiée et instaurée là où elle fait
auti

À ce sujet, comment ne pas avoir en ce moment-ci une préoccupation
iale pour le Proche-Orient? Mais je ne m'y étends pas, car vous
z sans doute que mercredi dernier, à la fin de l'audience générale,
clairement exposé là-dessus la sollicitude de l'Eglise et sa
ction sur les moyens indispensables d'y établir une véritable paix.

C'est vous dire, Mesdames et Messieurs, à quel point l'Eglise est prête à donner son appui et son encouragement à tous les efforts sérieux qui visent à la paix, et elle n'hésite pas à proclamer que, si les chrétiens ont des raisons particulières d'être les témoins actifs de ce don divin de la paix, il n'est pas moins vrai que l'action de tous ceux qui consacrent leurs meilleures énergies à cette cause s'inscrit dans le dessein mystérieux de Dieu et, à nos yeux de chrétiens, importe beaucoup pour le Royaume de Dieu inauguré en Jésus-Christ, même s'il se distingue (cf. Constitution pastorale du Concile Vatican II sur l'Eglise dans le monde de ce temps, n° 39).

4. En parlant du désarmement, je faisais allusion aux ressources de l'humanité à préserver et à développer. C'est tout le problème de la faim dans le monde qui est ici en cause, et j'ai noté avec satisfaction qu'il faisait aussi partie de votre ordre du jour. La composition de votre Union vous prédispose à traiter avec sérieux cette question cruciale de notre temps. Je l'ai moi-même souvent abordée, notamment auprès des délégués et membres de la F.A.O. Je me contente ici d'une constatation et d'un appel. Lorsque nous écoutons les experts, ne sommes-nous pas frappés par un paradoxe, qui laisse un malaise dans notre conscience? Non seulement ils nous mettent devant les yeux les effrayantes statistiques de la faim, mais ils nous révèlent que l'ensemble du monde a de quoi nourrir correctement tous les hommes et qu'il existe un certain lien de causalité entre ceux qui mangent à satiété et ceux qui meurent de faim. Par exemple, l'alimentation désordonnée des uns,

ni consomment tant de céréales pour leur bétail, alors qu'ils engendreraient eux-mêmes à se ménager une nourriture plus équilibrée, ne les amène-t-elle pas à priver leurs frères sous-alimentés des protéines strictement nécessaires à leur survie? Et les circuits de distribution ne pourraient-ils pas être améliorés? Bien d'autres questions semblables assaillent notre conscience. Oui, des solutions doivent exister pour enrayer cette plaie de l'humanité: il faut les chercher, il faut en rendre consciente l'opinion publique, il faut les faire mettre en oeuvre. Comme moi, vous ne pouvez pas ne pas être agacés par cette tragédie: avec vous je lance un appel urgent pour que notre solidarité en ce domaine gagne en efficacité, et je souhaite que les moyens envisagés à cette Conférence y contribuent.

Par ailleurs, même si cela déborde le programme de la présente session, je ne peux pas laisser passer une occasion aussi importante pour rappeler à votre sensibilité de législateurs et de guides politiques l'importance fondamentale des valeurs de la famille et de ses richesses sociales. Celles-ci doivent aussi trouver leur expression sous la forme d'interventions politiques, comme je le rappelai dans l'Exhortation Familiaris consortio (n. 44). Autrement dit, les familles doivent être les premières à veiller à ce que les lois et les institutions de l'Etat s'abstiennent de blesser, et même soutiennent et défendent positivement les droits et les devoirs de la famille. Ne considérez pas cette tâche primordiale des foyers comme une interférence avec le pouvoir public, au risque de diminuer son autorité, car il y aurait alors un manque de cohérence avec les appels répétés à la participation et à l'initiative.

Vous savez à quel point l'Eglise catholique, pour sa part, défend maintient et promeut, sans cesse et dans tous les pays, les valeurs de la famille, telles que la fidélité conjugale, le sens de la sexualité et les exigences des rapports humains interpersonnels, la dignité de la femme, le don et le respect de la vie, le droit et le devoir.

d'éducation incombant aux parents. Si l'Eglise consacre tant d'énergie à en témoigner et déploie tant d'initiatives en ce domaine par l'entremise de ses membres prêtres et laïcs, c'est qu'elle fait grand cas de la sainteté du mariage pour la vie des chrétiens et le progrès de l'Eglise, et elle est convaincue que c'est également capital pour la société, dont la famille est la cellule première et vitale. Elle souhaite que les divers responsables, surtout les législateurs, comprennent avec elle la grandeur de cet enjeu pour l'avenir des sociétés.

6. Il est opportun encore de mentionner le problème de la liberté religieuse. Vous le savez, l'Eglise ne demande aucun privilège au pouvoir civil; avec une clarté qui, depuis le Concile, ressort encore mieux que par le passé, elle a défini une position globale selon laquelle la liberté religieuse n'est que l'une des faces du prisme unitaire de la liberté: celle-ci est un élément constitutif essentiel d'une société authentiquement moderne et démocratique. En conséquence, aucun Etat ne peut prétendre bénéficier d'une estime positive et à plus forte raison être considéré comme méritant par le seul fait qu'il semble accorder la liberté religieuse, alors qu'il l'isole en fait d'un contexte général de liberté; et un Etat ne peut se définir "démocratique" s'il fait obstacle de quelque façon que ce soit aux libertés religieuses.

seulement pour ce qui est de l'exercice et de la pratique du culte, s'encore pour la participation sur un pied d'égalité aux activités laïques et éducatives, comme aux initiatives sociales, dans lesquelles la vie de l'homme moderne s'articule toujours davantage. L'histoire, même la plus récente, atteste que les responsables civils occupés du bien de leur peuple n'ont rien à craindre de l'Eglise; au plus, en respectant les activités, ils procurent au peuple lui-même un enrichissement, car ils utilisent un moyen sûr d'amélioration et d'élévation.

Pour vous-mêmes, le sens de vos réunions annuelles n'est-il pas de rechercher ensemble cette amélioration et cette élévation pour préparer un monde plus humain? Vous ne vous contentez pas en effet de débattre et de confronter les techniques du travail parlementaire et les grands thèmes de l'actualité politique. A travers les discussions et les contacts qui vous permettent de bien vous connaître mutuellement, vous êtes aussi continuellement à la recherche de modèles permettant de surmonter les tensions profondes qui naissent des diverses violations et limitations des droits de l'homme, comme par exemple l'exploitation dans le domaine du travail et les multiples abus affectant la dignité humaine. Le 2 octobre 1979, ayant l'honneur de parler à l'Assemblée des Nations Unies, j'affirmai que "le critère fondamental qui permet d'établir une comparaison entre les systèmes socio-économiques et politiques n'est pas et ne peut pas être le critère de nature hégémonique ou impérialiste, mais peut et même doit être celui de nature humaniste, c'est-à-dire la véritable capacité de chacun d'eux, de

réduire, de freiner et d'éliminer au maximum les différentes formes d'exploitation de l'homme et d'assurer à celui-ci, par le travail, non seulement la juste distribution des biens matériels indispensable mais aussi une participation qui corresponde à sa dignité, à l'ensemble du processus de production et à la vie sociale elle-même qui se forme autour de ce processus. N'oublions pas que l'homme, même s'il dépend pour vivre des ressources du monde matériel, ne saurait en être l'esclave, mais le maître" (n.17).

8. Soyez remerciés et félicités, Mesdames et Messieurs les parlementaires, pour la contribution que vous apportez et continuer d'apporter, au sein de chacun de vos Parlements et, au plan international, dans le cadre de votre Union interparlementaire. Puissiez-vous aider, pour votre part, au progrès humain de l'humanité qui en maints secteurs ploie sous le poids des injustices du passé ou des nouvelles injustices qui surgissent, qui aspire à une égalité de traitement et à une participation responsable, qui cherche un légitime bien-être dans la paix, sans renoncer à une authentique et forte liberté! Tout cela rejoint le dessein de Dieu sur le monde.

Je prie le Seigneur de donner à votre conscience la lumière et la force de servir ce dessein, avec désintéressement, et je suis sûr que ceux qui ont le bonheur de partager une foi religieuse ne manqueront pas de L'implorer dans ce but, car Dieu est plus grand que notre cœur.

Sur chacun de vous, sur vos familles, sur vos pays, j'invoque moi-même les Bénédictiones abondantes de Dieu, qui est la source de tout bien.

P A R T I E "B"



RESULTATS
de la
SESSION D'AUTOMNE 1982
de
L'UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

ROME (ITALIE)
12 - 23 SEPTEMBRE 1982

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- b) obtention à des prix abordables par les pays à faible revenu de fournitures alimentaires sur le marché international;

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A. CEREMONIE INAUGURALE

La 6^{te} Conférence interparlementaire a été inaugurée lors d'une cérémonie qui s'est déroulée à l'Auditorium Santa Cecilia, le 14 septembre 1982. Au cours de cette cérémonie, ouverte à 10 h. 30, les délégués ont entendu M. Giulio Andreotti, Président du Groupe interparlementaire italien; M. Rafael Caldera, Président du Conseil interparlementaire; M. Luigi Cottafavi, Directeur général de l'Office des Nations Unies à Genève, et M. Sandro Pertini, Président de la République italienne.

Les résumés des discours prononcés à cette occasion seront publiés dans le Bulletin interparlementaire (No IV, 1982).

B. PARTICIPATION

Les 91 Groupes nationaux suivants ont participé aux travaux de la session :

Algérie, Allemagne (République fédérale d'), Australie, Autriche, Belgique, Bénin, Brésil, Bulgarie, Canada, Cap Vert, Chypre, Colombie, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Danemark, Djibouti, Egypte, Emirats arabes unis, Equateur, Espagne, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Finlande, France, Gabon, Grèce, Guinée, Haïti, Hongrie, Inde, Indonésie, Iran, Iraq, Irlande, Islande, Israël, Italie, Japon, Jordanie, Kenya, Koweït, Liban, Luxembourg, Malaisie, Mali, Maroc, Mexique, Monaco, Mongolie, Mozambique, Népal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norvège, Nouvelle-Zélande, Ouganda, Panama, Pays-Bas, Philippines, Pologne, Portugal, République arabe syrienne, République de Corée, République démocratique allemande, République dominicaine, République populaire démocratique de Corée, République unie du Cameroun, Roumanie, Royaume-Uni, Rwanda, Sénégal, Singapour, Somalie, Soudan, Sri Lanka, Suède, Suisse, Tchécoslovaquie, Thaïlande, Togo, Tunisie, URSS, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yémen, Yémen démocratique, Yougoslavie, Zaïre, Zambie, Zimbabwe.

Les observateurs à la session comprenaient des représentants de l'Organisation des Nations Unies - Nations Unies, Conseil mondial de l'alimentation, Fonds des Nations Unies pour les activités en matière de population (FNUAP), Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement (PNUE), Programme alimentaire mondial -, de l'Organisation internationale du travail (OIT), de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO), de l'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS), de la Banque internationale pour la reconstruction et le développement (BIRD), du Fonds international de développement agricole (FIDA), de l'Accord général sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce (GATT), du Conseil de l'Europe, de la Ligue des Etats arabes, du Parlement latino-américain, du Parlement andin, de l'Union de parlementaires asiatiques et du Pacifique, de l'Association parlementaire du Commonwealth,

de l'Association internationale des parlementaires de langue française (AIPLF), de l'Union interparlementaire arabe, de l'Union des Parlements africains (UPA) et du Conseil national palestinien.

On a dénombré au total 931 délégués dont 615 membres de Parlement.

C. 190E ET 191E SESSIONS DU COMITE EXECUTIF

Le Comité exécutif a tenu deux sessions au Palais Montecitorio.

La 190e session a eu lieu les 12 et 21 septembre sous la présidence de M. R. Caldera (Venezuela), Président du Conseil interparlementaire. Ont participé aux travaux de cette session les membres et remplaçants suivants : MM. C. Cuvelier (Belgique); H. Edwards (Australie); S. Ericson (Suède), remplacé le 12 septembre par Mme K. Andersson; MM. H. Fechner (République démocratique allemande); J. Marko (Tchécoslovaquie), absent le 21 septembre; El Hadj Moussa Yaya (République unie du Cameroun), remplacé le 21 septembre par M. B. Foretia; MM. V.N. Navaratnam (Sri Lanka); I. El Sayed (Soudan); J. Rõno (Philippines), absent lors de la session, a été remplacé par A. Pacificador le 12 septembre; R. Stafford (Etats-Unis d'Amérique), également absent lors de la session, a été remplacé le 12 septembre par C. Pepper et le 21 septembre par E.J. Derwinski.

La 191e session du Comité exécutif a eu lieu le 23 septembre sous la présidence du Président nouvellement élu du Conseil interparlementaire, M. J. Virolainen (Finlande). La composition du Comité avait été modifiée à la suite de l'élection de nouveaux membres par la Conférence, le 22 septembre. Ont participé aux travaux de cette session les membres et suppléants suivants : MM. E. Cuvelier (Belgique); I. Darvasi (Hongrie); S. Ericson (Suède); H. Fechner (République démocratique allemande); V.N. Navaratnam (Sri Lanka); J. Page (Royaume-Uni); I. El Sayed (Soudan); B. Foretia (République unie du Cameroun) remplaçant El Hadj Moussa Yaya; MM. A. Pacificador (Philippines) remplaçant J. Roffo; I. Robinson (Australie) remplaçant H. Edwards.

A sa 190e session, le Comité exécutif a examiné des questions inscrites à l'ordre du jour du Conseil interparlementaire en vue de faire des recommandations à celui-ci; ces recommandations figurent à la section D. de ce document.

A sa 191e session, le Comité exécutif a :

- désigné pour faire partie de la mission d'enquête au Liban (voir section D., point 7b) : MM. G. Andreotti (Italie); V.N. Navaratnam (Sri Lanka) avec A. Pacificador comme

suppléant; O. Obi (Nigeria) avec B. Foretia (République unie du Cameroun) comme suppléant; et un membre à choisir par le Groupe hongrois en son sein;

- établi les directives pour la réalisation, le plus tôt possible, de cette mission;
- désigné à nouveau M. E. Cuvelier (Belgique) pour exercer les fonctions de Président du Conseil, en cas de besoin, cela jusqu'à la 70e Conférence, et a renouvelé son mandat en qualité de représentant du Comité exécutif au Comité de gestion de la Caisse de prévoyance en faveur du personnel;
- désigné comme suit les membres du Comité consultatif d'experts du Centre international de documentation parlementaire (CIDP) pour l'année prochaine : MM. A. Gwizdz (Pologne), R. Jackson (Canada), P.G. Mavalankar (Inde), J. Owona (République unie du Cameroun); membre ex officio : M. N. Lorch (Président de l'Association des Secrétaires généraux des Parlements). En outre, le Comité exécutif a décidé que désormais les membres du Comité consultatif ne pourront pas demeurer en fonction plus de cinq ans;
- établi l'ordre du jour provisoire de la 132e session du Conseil interparlementaire;
- établi le programme de travail des Commissions pour 1983 (Annexe I);
- autorisé le Secrétaire général à entreprendre des consultations avec le Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement (PNUE) sur la possibilité d'organiser en 1984 une Conférence interparlementaire sur l'environnement et à faire rapport sur les résultats de ces consultations à sa prochaine session;
- désigné M. P. Messerli (Suisse) aux fonctions de Vérificateur extérieur des comptes de l'Union avec un mandat de trois ans (1983-1985).

D. 131E SESSION DU CONSEIL INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

Le Conseil interparlementaire a tenu sa 131e session au Palais Montecitorio sous la présidence de M. R. Caldera (Venezuela). Les deux premières séances de cette session ont eu lieu le 13 septembre 1982 et la troisième séance a eu lieu le 22 septembre.

A l'ouverture de la session, les membres du Conseil ont observé une minute de silence à la mémoire de M. Raul Roa, ancien Président du Groupe cubain et de la 68e Conférence interparlementaire, et de trente-trois parlements iraniens victimes d'attentats.

On trouvera ci-après un compte rendu succinct de ses travaux.

1. ETAT DES MEMBRES

- Sur la proposition du Comité exécutif, le Conseil a décidé à l'unanimité, lors de sa troisième séance, de réadmettre au sein de l'Union le Groupe national formé au sein du Parlement du Pérou.

- Lors de sa première séance, le Conseil a décidé à l'unanimité, sur proposition du Comité exécutif, de suspendre l'affiliation du Groupe national du Sierra Leone, tout en exprimant le voeu de pouvoir l'accueillir à nouveau au sein de l'Union dès que sa situation financière sera rétablie.

Au terme de ces deux décisions les membres de l'Union demeurent 98 (voir Annexe II).

2. ELECTION DU PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

A l'échéance du mandat de M. Rafael Caldera (Venezuela), le Conseil a été appelé à élire son Président.

Trois candidatures avaient été présentées pour ce poste.

Les résultats du premier tour de scrutin ont été les suivants :

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| nombre de suffrages valables : | 159 |
| majorité absolue : | 80 |
| ont obtenu : | |
| M. J. Virolainen (Finlande): | 61 |
| M. E. Cuvelier (Belgique) : | 55 |
| M. A. El Hafez (Liban) : | 43 |

Les résultats du deuxième tour ont été les suivants :

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| nombre de suffrages valables : | 156 |
| majorité absolue : | 79 |
| ont obtenu : | |
| M. J. Virolainen (Finlande) : | 76 |
| M. E. Cuvelier (Belgique) : | 58 |
| M. A. El Hafez (Liban) : | 22 |

A l'issue de ce deuxième tour, M. A. El Hafez a retiré sa candidature.

Les résultats du troisième tour de scrutin ont été les suivants :

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| nombre de suffrages valables : | 160 |
| majorité absolue : | 81 |
| ont obtenu : | |
| M. J. Virolainen (Finlande) : | 98 |
| M. E. Cuvelier (Belgique) : | 62 |

Par ce dernier scrutin, M. J. Virolainen a été élu Président du Conseil interparlementaire avec un mandat de trois ans.

3. PROPOSITIONS DE CANDIDATS POUR LES ELECTIONS AU COMITE EXECUTIF

A l'échéance du mandat de MM. J. Marko (Tchécoslovaquie) et R. Stafford (Etats-Unis d'Amérique), deux sièges étaient à pourvoir au Comité exécutif.

Le Conseil était saisi de deux candidatures pour ces deux postes. Par acclamation il a décidé de proposer à la Conférence les candidatures de MM. I. Darvasi (Hongrie) et J. Page (Royaume-Uni).

4. NOMINATION DES VERIFICATEURS DES COMPTES POUR 1982

Le Conseil, unanime, a désigné à ces fonctions MM. E. Bouazo Zegbehi (Côte d'Ivoire) et M. Raposo (Portugal).

5. ADMISSION DE TROIS MEMBRES HONORAIRES

Le Conseil, unanime, a décidé d'admettre comme membres honoraires de leur Groupe national MM. C. Kallias (Grèce), I. Topaloski et B. Osolnik (Yougoslavie).

6. REAFFIRMATION DU ROLE DE L'UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

Sur la proposition du Comité exécutif, le Conseil, unanime, a adopté sur ce sujet une résolution que l'on trouvera en Annexe III.

7. PROGRAMME ET BUDGET

a) Programme et budget pour 1983

Le Conseil a approuvé, les 13 et 22 septembre, le programme de travail et le budget pour 1983 tels que proposés par le Comité exécutif (voir Annexe IV).

b) Mission d'enquête au Liban

Sur proposition du Comité exécutif, le Conseil a porté au programme de travail de l'Union la réalisation de cette mission prévue au paragraphe 7 du dispositif de la résolution approuvée par la 69e Conférence sur "la situation au Liban et la question palestinienne". Il a chargé le Comité exécutif d'établir lors de sa 191e session des directives pour la réalisation de la mission financée par un prélèvement sur le Fonds de roulement pouvant atteindre Fr.s. 80.000,--. Il a en conséquence décidé d'accroître de Fr.s. 40.000,-- le budget pour 1983 pour réapprovisionner le Fonds de roulement.

c) Conférence interparlementaire sur la santé et le développement dans les régions de l'Asie du Sud-Est et du Pacifique occidental

Sur proposition des Groupes nationaux des régions concernées, le Conseil, unanime, a décidé que cette Conférence, financée par l'Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS), aura lieu à Manille, en novembre 1983, et a arrêté les modalités de son organisation.

d) Ve Conférence interparlementaire sur la coopération et la sécurité européennes

Sur proposition des Groupes nationaux des pays européens, du Canada et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, le Conseil, unanime, a décidé que cette Conférence aura lieu à Budapest en mai 1983 et il a arrêté les modalités de son organisation.

Il a également arrêté le budget de cette Conférence financée par les Groupes nationaux concernés.

e) Programmation à long terme

Le Conseil a pris acte de la décision du Comité exécutif d'autoriser le Secrétaire général à préparer une évaluation de l'application du précédent plan d'action et de financement à long terme (1972-1980) ainsi que des propositions pour l'avenir, à l'intention du groupe de travail sur la restructuration des sessions de l'Union (voir paragraphe 8 ci-dessous). Les conclusions du groupe de travail sur cette question seront soumises au Comité exécutif lors des réunions d'Helsinki.

8. RESTRUCTURATION DES SESSIONS DE L'UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

Saisi de recommandations élaborées par le groupe de travail et endossées par le Comité exécutif, le Conseil a donné son accord de principe à une série de propositions fondamentales pour la restructuration des sessions de l'Union.

Il a chargé le groupe de travail d'élaborer, sur la base de ces propositions fondamentales, des projets de nouveaux Statuts et Règlement qui seraient soumis au Conseil interparlementaire en avril 1983 et à la 70e Conférence interparlementaire.

9. APPROBATION DE LA LISTE DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET AUTRES ENTITES A SUIVRE, EN QUALITE D'OBSERVATEURS, LES TRAVAUX DES REUNIONS STATUTAIRES DE L'UNION EN 1983

On trouvera en Annexe V la liste approuvée par le Conseil.

10. PROCHAINES REUNIONS INTERPARLEMENTAIRES

Le Conseil, unanime, a accepté, lors de sa dernière séance, l'invitation du Groupe finlandais à tenir les réunions de printemps 1983 à Helsinki, du 25 au 30 avril.

Le Conseil a ensuite été saisi d'une invitation du Groupe de la République de Corée à tenir la 70e Conférence interparlementaire à Seoul.

Un débat sur cette question a été ouvert, au cours duquel deux motions tendant à l'ajournement de la discussion et une motion de suspension de séance ont été rejetées. Le Conseil a ensuite décidé de reporter l'examen de la question à la fin de la séance. Il a alors décidé par 82 voix contre 32 et 24 abstentions d'accepter l'invitation du Groupe de la République de Corée. On trouvera en Annexe VI le détail de ce vote par appel nominal.

Le calendrier des réunions prévues pour la période allant d'octobre 1982 à mai 1983 figure en Annexe VII.

11. DROITS DE L'HOMME DES PARLEMENTAIRES

Le Conseil interparlementaire a désigné, le 22 septembre, le député G. Sekulovski (Yougoslavie) en qualité de membre titulaire du Comité spécial, en remplacement de M. B. Osolnik (Yougoslavie), qui n'est plus parlementaire.

E. 69^e CONFERENCE INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

La 69^e Conférence a commencé ses travaux l'après-midi du 14 septembre en élisant, par acclamation, à sa présidence M. Giulio Andreotti, Président du Groupe interparlementaire italien, sur la recommandation du Conseil interparlementaire. On trouvera en Annexe VIII la liste des vice-Présidents de la Conférence.

1. DECISIONS RELATIVES A L'INSCRIPTION DE POINTS SUPPLEMENTAIRES

A l'ouverture de ses travaux, la Conférence était saisie de quinze demandes d'inscription de points supplémentaires portant sur onze sujets. Elle a alors décidé de reporter à sa troisième séance (15 septembre après-midi) la prise en considération de ces demandes.

Lorsque cette question a été abordée à la troisième séance, deux nouvelles demandes avaient été déposées mais n'avaient pas encore été distribuées. La Conférence a alors été saisie par la délégation de l'Inde d'une motion proposant "le renvoi sine die de la prise en considération de toutes les demandes d'inscription de points supplémentaires à l'ordre du jour de la Conférence à l'exception de celles concernant la question du Moyen-Orient et le conflit entre l'Iraq et l'Iran".

Trois amendements à cette motion ont été présentés :

- Un amendement, présenté par la délégation irlandaise, tendant à ajouter aux demandes à prendre en considération, celle relative à l'invasion de l'Afghanistan;
- Un amendement, présenté par la délégation somalie, tendant à ajouter aux demandes à prendre en considération, celle relative à l'agression éthiopienne contre la République démocratique Somalie;
- Un amendement, présenté par la délégation tchécoslovaque, tendant à ajouter aux demandes à prendre en considération, celle relative à un point intitulé : "le renforcement des forces armées des Etats-Unis d'Amérique au voisinage des frontières de la République socialiste de Tchécoslovaquie et de la République démocratique allemande - menace à la paix et à la sécurité en Europe".

Le premier amendement a été adopté par 400 voix contre 325 et 315 abstentions (voir détails de ce vote en Annexe IX).

Le second amendement a été adopté par 518 voix contre 224 et 214 abstentions (voir détails de ce vote en Annexe X).

Le troisième amendement a été repoussé par 392 voix contre 262 et 233 abstentions (voir détails de ce vote en Annexe XI).

La motion de la délégation indienne, telle qu'amendée, a été adoptée par 665 voix contre 142 et 113 abstentions (voir détails de ce vote en Annexe XII).

La Conférence a ensuite passé à la prise en considération des demandes d'inscription de points supplémentaires relatives aux questions ainsi retenues.

Sur la question du Moyen-Orient, quatre demandes d'inscription de points supplémentaires ayant chacun un intitulé différent avaient été présentées respectivement par les Groupes de la République arabe syrienne, de l'Iraq, du Soudan et de l'Iran.

La Conférence a alors décidé de porter à son ordre du jour un point 10 : "La situation au Liban et la question palestinienne". Cette décision a été prise par 863 voix contre 5 et 12 abstentions (voir détails de ce vote en Annexe XIII).

Sur la question du conflit entre l'Iraq et l'Iran, deux demandes d'inscription de points supplémentaires ayant chacun un intitulé différent avaient été déposées respectivement par les Groupes de l'Iraq et de l'Iran.

La Conférence a alors décidé de porter à son ordre du jour un point 11 : "Propositions pour une paix définitive entre l'Iraq et l'Iran". Cette décision a été prise par 785 voix contre 0 et 46 abstentions (voir détails de ce vote en Annexe XIV).

La Conférence a ensuite décidé, par 496 voix contre 209 et 114 abstentions de porter à son ordre du jour un point 12 : "L'invasion de l'Afghanistan" (voir détails de ce vote en Annexe XV).

Enfin, la Conférence a décidé, par 413 voix contre 198 et 134 abstentions, d'inscrire à son ordre du jour un point 13 : "L'agression éthiopienne contre la République démocratique somalie et les dangers qui peuvent en résulter pour la paix et la sécurité internationales" (voir détails de ce vote en Annexe XVI).

2. DEBATS ET DECISIONS DE LA CONFERENCE RELATIFS AUX POINTS DE SUBSTANCE INSCRITS A SON ORDRE DU JOUR

a) Débat général sur la situation politique, économique et sociale du monde ainsi que les activités de l'Union (point 2)

La Conférence a consacré à ce débat général trois séances ordinaires, les 14 et 15 septembre, ainsi que deux séances supplémentaires de nuit tenues l'une le 15 septembre, l'autre le 18 septembre. Comme indiqué plus loin, cinq autres points ont également été débattus dans le cadre de ce débat général.

Lors de la séance de la matinée du 15 septembre, M. Emilio Colombo, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Italie, est venu présenter à la Conférence les grandes lignes de la politique extérieure de son pays.

Dans le cadre du débat durant cette même matinée, la Conférence a entendu M. Yasser Arafat, Président du Comité exécutif de l'OLP et membre du Conseil national palestinien.

En outre, durant le débat général, la Conférence a observé une minute de silence à la mémoire de M. Bechir Gemayel, Président élu du Liban, et de la Princesse Grace de Monaco.

- b) La contribution des Parlements à l'adoption urgente de mesures concrètes, notamment le désarmement nucléaire, la réduction des budgets militaires et ses effets sur l'économie et l'emploi dans le monde ainsi que sur le développement économique et social du Tiers-Monde (point 3)

Ce point, intitulé à l'origine "La contribution des Parlements à l'adoption de mesures concrètes par la 2e session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement et à leur mise en oeuvre, notamment la réduction des budgets militaires et ses effets sur l'économie et l'emploi dans le monde ainsi que sur le développement économique et social du Tiers-Monde", a fait l'objet d'une discussion préalable en séance plénière de la Conférence, dans le cadre du Débat général (voir ci-dessus). A l'issue de ce débat, le projet de résolution préparé à Lagos et les amendements déposés par des Groupes nationaux lors de la Conférence ont été renvoyés pour examen et rapport à la Commission politique (voir section F).

Lors de sa dernière séance (22 septembre après-midi), la Conférence a adopté à l'unanimité le projet de résolution tel que modifié par la Commission. On trouvera le texte de cette résolution à l'Annexe XVII.

- c) La situation au Liban et la question palestinienne (point 10 supplémentaire)

Cette question a fait l'objet d'une discussion préalable en séance plénière de la Conférence dans le cadre du Débat général (voir ci-dessus). A l'issue de ce débat, la Commission politique a été chargée de préparer un projet de résolution sur la base des différents textes soumis par les Groupes nationaux (voir section F).

Lors de sa dernière séance, la Conférence était saisie d'un projet de résolution préparé par la Commission.

A la demande de la délégation du Royaume-Uni, la Conférence a été appelée à se prononcer séparément sur le préambule et la section A du dispositif, d'un côté, et sur la section B du dispositif de ce projet de résolution, de l'autre. Ses décisions ont été les suivantes :

- i) la Conférence a adopté le préambule et la section A du dispositif, par 586 voix contre 58 et 132 abstentions (voir détails du vote en Annexe XIX);
- ii) la Conférence a adopté la section B du dispositif par 677 voix contre 25 et 86 abstentions (voir détails du vote en Annexe XX).

La Conférence a ensuite adopté l'ensemble du texte, tel que présenté par la Commission, par 617 voix contre 32 et 132 abstentions (voir détails du vote en Annexe XXI; voir texte de la résolution en Annexe XVIII).

- d) Propositions pour une paix définitive entre l'Iraq et l'Iran (point 11 supplémentaire)

Cette question a fait l'objet d'une discussion préalable en séance plénière de la Conférence dans le cadre du Débat général (voir ci-dessus). A l'issue de ce débat, la Commission politique a été chargée de préparer un projet de résolution sur la base des différents textes soumis par les Groupes nationaux (voir section F).

Lors de sa dernière séance, la Conférence était saisie d'un projet de résolution préparé par la Commission. Elle l'a adopté sans procéder à un vote (Voir texte de la résolution en Annexe XXII).

- e) L'invasion de l'Afghanistan (point 12 supplémentaire)

Cette question a fait l'objet d'un débat préalable en séance plénière de la Conférence, dans le cadre du Débat général (voir ci-dessus). A l'issue de ce débat, la Commission politique a été chargée de préparer un projet de résolution sur la base des textes soumis par les Groupes nationaux (voir section F).

Lors de sa dernière séance plénière, la Conférence était saisie d'un projet de résolution préparé par la Commission.

A la demande de la délégation bulgare, appuyée par plusieurs autres délégations, la Conférence a procédé à un vote par appel nominal sur l'ensemble du texte du projet de résolution.

Le texte complet a été adopté par 439 voix contre 164 et 88 abstentions (voir détails du vote en Annexe XXIV; voir texte de la résolution à l'Annexe XXIII).

- f) L'agression éthiopienne contre la République démocratique somalie et les dangers qui peuvent en résulter pour la paix et la sécurité internationales (point 13 supplémentaire)

Cette question a fait l'objet d'une discussion préalable en séance plénière de la Conférence dans le cadre du Débat général (voir ci-dessus). A l'issue de ce débat, la Commission politique a été chargée de préparer un projet de résolution sur la base des textes soumis par les Groupes nationaux (voir section F).

Lors de sa dernière séance, la Conférence était saisie d'un projet de résolution préparé par la Commission.

A la demande de la délégation du Nigeria, la Conférence a procédé à un vote séparé conjoint sur le préambule et le paragraphe 1 du dispositif.

Elle a adopté le préambule et le paragraphe 1 du dispositif par 333 voix contre 206 et 131 abstentions (voir détails du vote en Annexe XXVI).

Le texte complet du projet de résolution a été adopté par 365 voix contre 170 et 170 abstentions (voir détails du vote en Annexe XXVII; voir texte de la résolution en Annexe XXV).

- g) L'évolution des institutions parlementaires dans le respect de la Constitution et leur activité dans le domaine des relations internationales (point 4)

Ce point a fait l'objet d'un débat en séance plénière de la Conférence le 16 septembre au matin. A l'issue du débat, le projet de résolution préparé lors de la session de Lagos et les amendements proposés par les Groupes nationaux lors de la Conférence ont été renvoyés pour examen et rapport à la Commission pour l'étude des questions parlementaires, juridiques et des droits de l'homme (voir section F).

Lors de sa dernière séance, la Conférence a adopté sans vote le projet de résolution tel qu'amendé par la Commission. On trouvera le texte de la résolution à l'Annexe XXVIII.

- h) La faim dans le monde (point 6)

Ce point a fait l'objet d'un débat lors de deux séances plénières tenues par la Conférence le 17 septembre. Sous ce point, la Conférence a entendu M. E. Saouma, Directeur général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO), et M. A. Al Soudeary, Président du Fonds international de développement agricole (FIDA).

A l'issue du débat, le projet de résolution préparé lors de la session de Lagos et les amendements proposés par les Groupes nationaux lors de la Conférence ont été renvoyés pour examen et rapport à la Commission pour l'étude des questions économiques et sociales (voir section F).

Lors de sa dernière séance, la Conférence a adopté sans vote le projet de résolution tel qu'amendé par la Commission. On trouvera le texte de la résolution à l'Annexe XXIX.

- i) L'état de l'environnement mondial dix ans après la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le milieu humain qui s'est tenue à Stockholm. Mesures à prendre, y compris dans le domaine de la législation, aux niveaux national et international (point 5)

Ce point a fait l'objet d'un débat en séance plénière de la Conférence le 16 septembre. Sous ce point, la Conférence a entendu M. M. K. Tolba, Directeur exécutif du Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement (PNUE). A l'issue du débat, le projet de résolution préparé lors de la session de Lagos et les amendements proposés par les Groupes nationaux durant la Conférence ont été renvoyés pour examen et rapport à la Commission pour l'éducation, la science, la culture et l'environnement (voir section F).

Lors de sa dernière séance, la Conférence a adopté sans vote le projet de résolution tel qu'amendé par la Commission. On trouvera le texte de la résolution à l'Annexe XXX.

- j) Liquidation du colonialisme et lutte contre le néo-colonialisme, notamment la nécessité de prendre des mesures pour la réalisation immédiate et stricte du Plan des Nations Unies sur la Namibie (point 7)

Cette question a fait l'objet d'un débat préalable lors de deux séances plénières de la Conférence (18 septembre). A l'issue du débat, la Conférence a renvoyé, pour étude et rapport, à la Commission pour les territoires non autonomes et l'étude des questions ethniques, le projet de résolution préparé à Lagos et les amendements présentés à ce projet par les Groupes nationaux lors de la Conférence (voir Section F).

Lors de sa dernière séance, la Conférence était saisie du projet de résolution tel qu'amendé par la Commission.

A la demande de la délégation indonésienne, un vote séparé a eu lieu sur le 25e paragraphe du préambule et les paragraphes 30 et 31 du dispositif qui ont été adoptés par 272 voix contre 102 et 278 abstentions (pour les détails du vote voir Annexe XXXII).

A la demande de la délégation marocaine, un vote séparé a eu lieu sur les paragraphes 27, 28 et 29 du dispositif qui ont été adoptés par 368 voix contre 77 et 195 abstentions (pour les détails du vote voir Annexe XXXIII).

A la demande de la délégation du Royaume-Uni, un vote séparé a eu lieu sur le 26e paragraphe du préambule et le paragraphe 32 du dispositif qui ont été adoptés par 222 voix contre 218 et 181 abstentions (pour les détails du vote, voir Annexe XXXIV).

La Conférence a ensuite adopté le projet de résolution par 466 voix contre 48 et 72 abstentions (pour les détails du vote, voir Annexe XXXV; pour le texte de la résolution, voir Annexe XXXI).

3. ELECTIONS AU COMITE EXECUTIF (point 8)

Sur la recommandation du Conseil interparlementaire (voir Section D, paragraphe 3), la Conférence a élu, par acclamation, M. I. Darvasi (Hongrie) et M. J. Page (Royaume-Uni) en qualité de membres du Comité exécutif de l'Union interparlementaire, avec un mandat de quatre ans.

F. REUNIONS DES COMMISSIONS PERMANENTES D'ETUDE

1. COMMISSION POUR L'ETUDE DES QUESTIONS POLITIQUES, DE LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALE ET DU DESARMEMENT

La Commission s'est réunie les 18, 20 et 21 septembre sous la présidence de M. G. Andreotti (Italie).

Premier point examiné :

La contribution des Parlements à l'adoption urgente de mesures concrètes, notamment le désarmement nucléaire, la réduction des budgets militaires et ses effets sur l'économie et l'emploi dans le monde ainsi que sur le développement économique et social du Tiers-Monde

a) Documents dont la Commission se trouvait saisie

- Le projet de résolution adopté par la Commission lors de la session dite de printemps.
- Des amendements à ce projet présentés par les Groupes nationaux des pays suivants : Bulgarie, Canada, Cuba, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Inde, Israël, Japon, Pays-Bas, République démocratique allemande, Roumanie, Royaume-Uni, Suisse, Tchécoslovaquie, Thaïlande, URSS; et conjointement par les Groupes des pays suivants : Allemagne (République fédérale d') Australie, Autriche, Belgique, Danemark, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, France, Grèce, Irlande, Luxembourg, Norvège, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni et Suisse.

- b) La Commission a examiné les amendements au projet de résolution ainsi que des sous-amendements au cours de la séance du 18 septembre et d'une séance supplémentaire, de nuit, le 20 septembre. Elle a approuvé une modification du titre du projet de résolution dont le libellé original était : "La contribution des Parlements à l'adoption de mesures concrètes par la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement et à leur mise en oeuvre, notamment la réduction des budgets militaires et ses effets sur l'économie et l'emploi dans le monde ainsi que sur le développement économique et social du Tiers-Monde".

Le projet de résolution, tel qu'amendé, a été adopté par 33 voix sans opposition et 3 abstentions. M. M. Prud'homme (Canada), Rapporteur, a présenté le projet de résolution devant la 69e Conférence interparlementaire, le 22 septembre.

Deuxième Pointexaminé :*La situation au Liban et la question palestinienne*a) Documents dont la Commission se trouvait saisie :

- Sept projets de résolution présentés par les Groupes nationaux des pays suivants : Etats-Unis d'Amérique, France, Iran, Israël, République arabe syrienne, Soudan; et conjointement par les Groupes nationaux de l'Algérie, de Djibouti, des Emirats arabes unis, de l'Iraq, de la Jordanie, du Koweït, du Liban, du Maroc, de la République arabe syrienne, de la Somalie, du Soudan, de la Tunisie, du Yémen et du Yémen démocratique.

- Un amendement présenté par le Groupe national de l'Egypte

b) Comité de rédaction : Il a été composé de délégués des Groupes nationaux des pays suivants : Algérie, Egypte, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, France, Inde, Iran, Israël, République arabe syrienne, Soudan, Suisse et URSS. Il a siégé sous la présidence de M. C. Jelmini (Suisse).c) La Commission a entendu le rapport présenté au nom du comité de rédaction par M. S.L. Yadav (Inde), le 21 septembre. Elle a adopté le projet de résolution, sans amendement, par 43 voix contre 3 et 14 abstentions. Le texte du projet de résolution a été présenté devant la 69e Conférence interparlementaire le 22 septembre par M. S.L. Yadav (Inde), Rapporteur.Troisième pointexaminé :*Propositions pour une paix définitive entre l'Iraq et l'Iran*a) Documents dont la Commission se trouvait saisie :

- Trois projets de résolution présentés par les Groupes nationaux de l'Australie, de l'Iran et de l'Iraq.

b) La Commission a examiné ce point le 21 septembre. Elle a choisi comme texte de base le projet de résolution présenté par le Groupe national de l'Australie. Elle l'a adopté, sans amendement, par 40 voix contre 0 et 3 abstentions. Le texte du projet de résolution a été présenté devant la 69e Conférence interparlementaire le 22 septembre par M. I. Robinson (Australie), Rapporteur.Quatrième pointexaminé :*L'invasion de l'Afghanistan*a) Documents dont la Commission se trouvait saisie :

- Un projet de résolution présenté par le Groupe national de l'Irlande.

- Un amendement présenté par le Groupe national de l'Italie.

- b) La Commission a examiné ce point le 21 septembre. Elle a accepté comme texte de base le projet de résolution présenté par le Groupe national de l'Irlande tel qu'amendé par le Groupe national de l'Italie. Ayant approuvé un amendement présenté oralement par la délégation marocaine, la Commission a adopté le projet de résolution par 35 voix contre 14 et 5 abstentions. Le texte du projet de résolution a été présenté devant la 69e Conférence interparlementaire le 22 septembre par M. A. Deasy (Irlande), Rapporteur.

Cinquième point
examiné :

L'agression éthiopienne contre la République démocratique somalie et les dangers qui peuvent en résulter pour la paix et la sécurité internationales

a) Documents dont la Commission se trouvait saisie :

- Deux projets de résolution présentés par les Groupes nationaux de la Somalie et de la République fédérale d'Allemagne.

- b) La Commission a examiné ce point le 21 septembre. Elle a choisi comme texte de base le projet de résolution soumis par le Groupe national de la République fédérale d'Allemagne. Ayant approuvé un amendement présenté oralement par la délégation de la Somalie, la Commission a adopté le projet de résolution par 34 voix contre 12 et 7 abstentions. Le texte du projet de résolution a été présenté devant la 69e Conférence interparlementaire le 22 septembre par M. P. Temple-Morris (Royaume-Uni), en remplacement de M. O. Hennig (République fédérale d'Allemagne), Rapporteur.

2. COMMISSION POUR L'ETUDE DES QUESTIONS PARLEMENTAIRES, JURIDIQUES ET DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

Cette Commission s'est réunie le 21 septembre sous la présidence de M. L. Jozeau-Marigné (France).

Point examiné : *L'évolution des institutions parlementaires dans le respect de la Constitution et leur activité dans le domaine des relations internationales*

a) Documents dont la Commission se trouvait saisie :

- Le projet de résolution préparé par la Commission lors de la session dite de printemps.
- Des amendements à ce projet présentés par les Groupes nationaux des pays suivants : Bulgarie, Canada, Chypre, Cuba, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Inde et URSS.

- b) Après examen de ces amendements, ainsi que de sous-amendements, la Commission, unanime, a adopté le projet de résolution ainsi modifié. Le texte du projet de résolution a été présenté devant la 69e Conférence interparlementaire le 22 septembre par M. O. Obi (Nigeria), Rapporteur.

3. COMMISSION POUR L'ETUDE DES QUESTIONS ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES

Cette Commission s'est réunie le 20 septembre sous la présidence de M. P. Salolainen (Finlande).

Point examiné : *La faim dans le monde*

Thèmes principaux :

- a) *Production, distribution et consommation alimentaires dans les pays en développement;*
- b) *Obtention à des prix abordables par les pays à faible revenu de fournitures alimentaires sur le marché international;*
- c) *Aide alimentaire aux pays en développement jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient atteint un stade approprié d'auto-suffisance*

a) Documents dont la Commission se trouvait saisie :

- Le projet de résolution adopté par la Commission lors de la session dite de printemps.
- 15 amendements à ce projet présentés par les Groupes nationaux de l'Allemagne (Rép. féd. d'), de la Bulgarie, du Canada, de Cuba, de l'Egypte (Mme J. Hassan), des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, de l'Inde, de l'Italie (M. A. Ajello), du Luxembourg, de la Roumanie, de la Suisse, de la Thaïlande, du Royaume-Uni, de l'URSS et du Zaïre.

- b) Après examen de ces amendements, ainsi que d'un certain nombre de sous-amendements, la Commission, unanime, a adopté le projet de résolution ainsi amendé. Le Président de la Commission, agissant en qualité de Rapporteur, a présenté le texte du projet de résolution devant la 69e Conférence interparlementaire, le 22 septembre.

4. COMMISSION POUR L'EDUCATION, LA SCIENCE, LA CULTURE ET L'ENVIRONNEMENT

La Commission s'est réunie le 21 septembre sous la présidence de M. M. Dakroury (Egypte).

Point examiné : *L'état de l'environnement mondial dix ans après la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le milieu humain qui s'est tenue à Stockholm. Mesures à prendre, y compris dans le domaine de la législation, aux niveaux national et international*

a) Documents dont la Commission se trouvait saisie :

- Le projet de résolution adopté par la Commission lors de la session dite de printemps.
- Des amendements à ce projet présentés par les Groupes nationaux des pays suivants : Bulgarie, Canada, Cuba, Egypte, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Inde, Luxembourg, Royaume-Uni, Suisse, Thaïlande, URSS, Viet Nam et Zaïre.

b) Après examen des amendements, la Commission a adopté, par 42 voix contre 0 et 1 abstention, le projet de résolution tel qu'amendé. En l'absence du Rapporteur, M. R. McClory (Etats-Unis d'Amérique), le Président de la Commission a présenté le texte devant la 69e Conférence interparlementaire, le 22 septembre.

5. COMMISSION POUR LES TERRITOIRES NON AUTONOMES ET L'ETUDE DES QUESTIONS ETHNIQUES

Cette Commission s'est réunie le 20 septembre sous la présidence de M. P. Mshelia (Nigeria).

A la demande du délégué iranien, elle a tout d'abord observé une minute de silence à la mémoire des victimes des massacres qui ont eu lieu dans les camps palestiniens à Beyrouth.

Point examiné : *Liquidation du colonialisme et lutte contre le néo-colonialisme, notamment la nécessité de prendre des mesures pour la réalisation immédiate et stricte du Plan des Nations Unies sur la Namibie*

a) Documents dont la Commission se trouvait saisie :

- Le projet de résolution préparé lors de la session dite de printemps.
- Des amendements à ce projet présentés par les Groupes nationaux des pays suivants : Bulgarie, Cuba, Egypte, Inde, Indonésie, Maroc, Royaume-Uni, URSS, Viet Nam, Zaïre et, conjointement, par les Groupes du Mozambique et du Zimbabwe.

b) Après examen de ces amendements et de sous-amendements présentés oralement en séance, la Commission a adopté le projet de résolution par 35 voix contre 5 et 7 abstentions. En l'absence du Rapporteur, M. Silva Graça (Portugal), le Président de la Commission, M. P. Mshelia (Nigeria), a présenté le texte du projet de résolution devant la 69e Conférence interparlementaire, le 22 septembre.

ANNEXE I

POINTS DE SUBSTANCE INSCRITS A L'ORDRE DU JOUR
DES COMMISSIONS D'ETUDE EN 1983I. Commission pour l'étude des questions politiques, de la sécurité internationale et du désarmement etCommission pour l'étude des questions parlementaires, juridiques et des droits de l'homme

Les moyens de renforcer les Nations Unies de manière que cette institution puisse jouer un rôle plus efficace dans le règlement des conflits et des problèmes mondiaux présents et à venir, particulièrement dans le domaine de la limitation des armements et du désarmement

II. Commission pour l'étude des questions économiques et sociales

La contribution des Parlements à l'adoption de mesures concrètes par la CNUCED VI et à leur mise en oeuvre, notamment en ce qui concerne le commerce, les produits de base, les questions financières et monétaires et les transferts de technologie en vue de progresser dans la voie de l'établissement d'un système économique international équitable

III. Commission pour l'éducation, la science, la culture et l'environnement

Le Comité exécutif a décidé de retenir la question de l'emploi des jeunes, notamment dans les pays en développement, sous ses divers aspects : éducation, formation, mesures économiques et sociales. Il a chargé le Secrétaire général de consulter le Bureau international du travail (BIT) et l'UNESCO pour la rédaction d'un titre approprié.

IV. Commission pour les territoires non autonomes et l'étude des questions ethniques

Le rôle des Parlements dans la promotion du processus de décolonisation et dans la promotion des droits politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels des groupes ethniques dans les Etats multi-raciaux en vue particulièrement d'encourager la coopération et la justice entre les ethnies

ANNEXE II

ETAT DES MEMBRES DE L'UNION
AU 1er OCTOBRE 1982

Albanie, Algérie, Allemagne (République fédérale d'), Australie, Autriche, Belgique, Bénin, Brésil, Bulgarie, Canada, Cap Vert, Chypre, Colombie, Comores, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Danemark, Djibouti, Egypte, Emirats arabes unis, Equateur, Espagne, Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Finlande, France, Gabon, Grèce, Guinée, Guyane, Haïti, Hongrie, Inde, Indonésie, Iran, Iraq, Irlande, Islande, Israël, Italie, Japon, Jordanie, Kenya, Koweït, Liban, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaisie, Malawi, Mali, Maroc, Mexique, Monaco, Mongolie, Mozambique, Népal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norvège, Nouvelle-Zélande, Ouganda, Panama, Paraguay, Pays-Bas, Pérou, Philippines, Pologne, Portugal, République arabe syrienne, République de Corée, République démocratique allemande, République dominicaine, République populaire démocratique de Corée, République unie du Cameroun, Roumanie, Royaume-Uni, Rwanda, Sénégal, Singapour, Somalie, Soudan, Sri Lanka, Suède, Suisse, Tchécoslovaquie, Thaïlande, Togo, Tunisie, URSS, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yémen, Yémen démocratique, Yougoslavie, Zaïre, Zambie, Zimbabwe.

ANNEXE III

RÉAFFIRMATION DU RÔLE DE L'UNION INTERPARLEMENTAIRE

*(Résolution adoptée à l'unanimité par le Conseil interparlementaire,
lors de sa 131e session, le 13 septembre 1982)*

Le Conseil interparlementaire,

rappelant que, depuis sa fondation en 1889, l'Union interparlementaire a, de façon ininterrompue et grâce aux contacts entre représentants qualifiés, servi les intérêts primordiaux des peuples qu'elle représente,

se réjouissant du développement de la coopération interparlementaire au cours des dix dernières années, qui s'est manifestée par un accroissement de quelque 45 pour cent des membres de l'Union et par l'amplification et la diversification de ses activités,

notant avec satisfaction la prise de conscience croissante dans les milieux inter-gouvernementaux, du rôle important que peuvent jouer les Parlements pour renforcer l'efficacité de la coopération internationale et la sécurité dans le monde,

notant avec satisfaction le développement de la coopération entre l'Union et les organisations internationales, notamment dans la réalisation d'activités dans le domaine du développement économique et social des pays du Tiers-Monde,

notant d'autre part que cette prise de conscience se traduit parfois par des initiatives prises - de façon isolée ou non coordonnée par l'Union - par des parlementaires en vue de susciter une action interparlementaire sous forme de réunions consacrées à l'étude de problèmes spécifiques et à la recherche de solutions à ceux-ci,

considérant que l'efficacité des efforts déployés au niveau interparlementaire pour renforcer la coopération internationale et la sécurité dépend dans une large mesure d'un emploi judicieux et coordonné des moyens disponibles,

1. réaffirme la vocation de l'Union interparlementaire, dont l'expérience s'étend sur plusieurs décennies et au sein de laquelle sont représentés près de cent Parlements, d'être le cadre privilégié de l'action interparlementaire et son souci de répondre, dans toute la mesure du possible, aux besoins qui se manifestent à cet égard;
2. souhaite qu'il en soit dûment tenu compte dans la programmation des futures activités de l'Union interparlementaire;
3. demande aux Groupes nationaux de veiller à ce que toute initiative d'action interparlementaire soit coordonnée au sein de l'Union interparlementaire;
4. prie le Secrétaire général de continuer à suivre ces questions notamment dans ses contacts avec les organisations du système des Nations Unies et de faire rapport à ce sujet.

ANNEXE IV

BUDGET DE L'UNION POUR 1983

A. Recettes

| | Budget pour 1983 Fr.s. |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Contributions des Groupes nationaux | 3.499.900,-- |
| 2. Vente de publications | 32.500,-- |
| 3. Association des Secrétaires généraux des Parlements | 21.300,-- |
| 4. Divers | 2.500,-- |
| Total des recettes | 3.556.200,-- ===== |

B. Dépenses

| | Budget pour 1983 Fr.s. |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Personnel permanent | 1.851.000,-- |
| 2. Collaborations extérieures et temporaires | 142.100,-- |
| 3. Session d'avril | 154.300,-- |
| 4. Session de septembre | 166.900,-- |
| 5. Réunions et activités diverses | 203.000,-- |
| 6. Voyages | 18.000,-- |
| 7. Frais d'impression | 143.200,-- |
| 8. Achats de livres, documents et périodiques | 22.000,-- |
| 9. Fournitures et matériel de bureau, Frais de communication | 229.500,-- |
| 10. Locaux | 74.000,-- |
| 11. Assurances | 396.100,-- |
| 12. Frais du Président du Conseil | 12.500,-- |
| 13. Association des Secrétaires généraux des Parlements | 91.600,-- |
| 14. Divers | 12.000,-- |
| 15. Réapprovisionnement du Fonds de roulement | 40.000,-- |
| Total des dépenses | 3.556.200,-- ===== |

ANNEXE V

LISTE DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET AUTRES ENTITES
INVITEES PAR LE CONSEIL INTERPARLEMENTAIRE A SUIVRE LES
TRAVAUX DES REUNIONS STATUTAIRES DE L'UNION EN 1983

A. Organisation des Nations Unies

Organisation internationale du travail (OIT)

Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture (FAO)

Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'éducation, la science et la culture (UNESCO)

Organisation mondiale de la santé (OMS)

Banque internationale pour la reconstruction et le développement (BIRD)

Fonds monétaire international (FMI)

Fonds international de développement agricole (FIDA)

Accord général sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce (GATT)

Conférence des Nations Unies pour le commerce et le développement

B. Conseil de l'Europe

Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe

Ligue des Etats arabes

Organisation des Etats américains (OEA)

Organisation de l'unité africaine (OUA)

Parlement latino-américain

Parlement andin

Union de parlementaires asiatiques et du Pacifique

Association parlementaire du Commonwealth

Association internationale des parlementaires de langue française (AIPLF)

Union interparlementaire arabe

Union des Parlements africains (UPA)

Organisation interparlementaire de l'ASEAN

Association parlementaire pour la coopération euro-arabe

C. Conseil national palestinien

South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)

ANNEXE VI

PROCHAINES REUNIONS INTERPARLEMENTAIRES

Vote sur l'invitation du Groupe de la République de Corée
à tenir la 70e Conférence interparlementaire à Seoul en 1983

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 82
Voix négatives 32
Abstentions 24

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|---------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-------------------------|--------|-----|-----|
| Algérie | n'a pas participé | | | Iran | - | 2 | - | Rép. de Corée | 2 | - | - |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | absent | | | Iraq | 2 | - | - | Rép. dém. allemande | - | 2 | - |
| Australie | 2 | - | - | Irlande | 2 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | 1 | - | 1 |
| Autriche | 1 | - | 1 | Israël | 2 | - | - | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | - | 2 | - |
| Belgique | 2 | - | - | Italie | 2 | - | - | Rép. unie du Cameroun | - | - | 2 |
| Bénin | - | 2 | - | Japon | 2 | - | - | Roumanie | - | 2 | - |
| Brésil | 1 | - | - | Jordanie | absent | | | Royaume-Uni | 2 | - | - |
| Bulgarie | - | 2 | - | Kenya | 1 | - | - | Rwanda | - | - | 2 |
| Canada | 2 | - | - | Koweït | 2 | - | - | Sénégal | 2 | - | - |
| Cap Vert | - | 2 | - | Liban | absent | | | Singapour | 1 | - | - |
| Chypre | absent | | | Luxembourg | 1 | - | - | Somalie | - | - | 2 |
| Congo | absent | | | Malaisie | 2 | - | - | Soudan | 2 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | 1 | - | - | Mali | - | - | 2 | Sri Lanka | 2 | - | - |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 2 | - | - | Maroc | 2 | - | - | Suède | 2 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 2 | - | Mexique | - | - | 1 | Suisse | 2 | - | - |
| Danemark | 2 | - | - | Monaco | absent | | | Tchécoslovaquie | - | 2 | - |
| Djibouti | absent | | | Mongolie | - | 2 | - | Thaïlande | 2 | - | - |
| Egypte | 2 | - | - | Mozambique | n'a pas participé | | | Togo | - | - | 2 |
| Emirats arabes unis | 2 | - | - | Népal | - | - | 1 | Tunisie | absent | | |
| Equateur | absent | | | Nicaragua | - | - | 2 | URSS | - | 2 | - |
| Espagne | 1 | - | - | Nigeria | 2 | - | - | Venezuela | 2 | - | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | 2 | - | - | Norvège | 2 | - | - | Viet Nam | - | 2 | - |
| Finlande | 2 | - | - | Nouvelle-Zélande | absent | | | Yemen | absent | | |
| France | - | - | 2 | Ouganda | n'a pas participé | | | Yemen démocratique | absent | | |
| Gabon | 2 | - | - | Panama | 1 | - | - | Yougoslavie | - | - | 2 |
| Grèce | 2 | - | - | Pays-Bas | 2 | - | - | Zaïre | 2 | - | - |
| Guinée | absent | | | Philippines | 2 | - | - | Zambie | - | - | 2 |
| Haïti | 2 | - | - | Pologne | - | 2 | - | Zimbabwe | - | 2 | - |
| Hongrie | - | 2 | - | Portugal | 2 | - | - | | | | |
| Inde | - | - | 2 | Rép. arabe syrienne | - | 2 | - | | | | |
| Indonésie | 2 | - | - | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE VII

LISTE DES REUNIONS PREVUES POUR LA PERIODE
ALLANT D'OCTOBRE 1982 A MAI 1983Octobre

| | | |
|---------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 14 | NEW YORK (Nations Unies) | Réunion de parlementaires assistant à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies |
| 28 - 29 | GENEVE (Siège) | Réunion du Comité consultatif d'experts du CIDP (10e session) |

Novembre

| | | |
|---------|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 22 - 26 | YAOUNDE | Conférence interparlementaire sur les politiques, les programmes et la légis- lation concernant les enfants en Afrique (organisée en coopération avec l'UNICEF) |
|---------|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Janvier - Février

| | | |
|--------|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 31 - 3 | GENEVE (Siège) | Comité spécial sur les violations des droits des parlementaires (20e session) (huis clos) |
|--------|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Février

| | | |
|---------------------|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| dates à préciser | GENEVE (Siège) | Réunion du Groupe de travail chargé de la refonte des Statuts de l'Union inter- parlementaire |
| dates à préciser | MANILLE | Réunion du Comité préparatoire de la Conférence interparlementaire sur la santé et le développement dans les régions de l' Asie du Sud-Est et du Pacifique occidental |

Avril

| | | |
|---------|----------|-------------------------------------------|
| 25 | HELSINKI | Comité exécutif (192e session) |
| 26 - 29 | " | Commissions d'étude |
| 30 | " | Conseil interparlementaire (132e session) |

Mai

| | | |
|---------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| dates à préciser | BUDAPEST | Ve Conférence interparlementaire sur la coopération et la sécurité européennes |
|---------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

ANNEXE VIII

PRESIDENT DE LA CONFERENCE

Giulio Andreotti
Président du Groupe interparlementaire italien

VICE-PRESIDENTS DE LA CONFERENCE

M. Lemkani (Algérie), O. Hennig (Allemagne, République fédérale d'), I. Robinson (Australie), F. König (Autriche), E. Cuvelier (Belgique), R. Vilon Guezo (Bénin), D. Dimitrov (Bulgarie), G. Molgat (Canada), F. Correia (Cap Vert), A. Ghalanos (Chypre), M. Dzabatou-Babeaux (Congo), T. Lanciné (Côte d'Ivoire), Mme E. García Patino (Cuba), R. Pedersen (Danemark), H. Badawi (Egypte), H. Lootah (Emirats arabes unis), F. Alvarez de Miranda (Espagne), C. Pepper (Etats-Unis d'Amérique), J. Virolainen (Finlande), C. Estier (France), P.C. Divounguy (Gabon), J. Papadopoulos (Grèce), M.S. Cisse (Guinée), R. Gilot (Haïti), S. Barcs (Hongrie), B.R. Jakhar (Inde), Mme I.A.U. Pidada (Indonésie), S. Zanganeh (Iran), S.A.J. Al Kamal (Iraq), A. Deasy (Irlande), T. Sigurdjonsson (Islande), M. Shachal (Israël), P. Bufalini (Italie), J. Shiozaki (Japon), M.Y. Al-Adsani (Koweït), L. Bollendorff (Luxembourg), D.O. Sidi Baba (Maroc), L. Danton Rodriguez (Mexique), M. Principale (Monaco), T. Namsrai (Mongolie), L.T. Ndelana (Mozambique), M.M. Singh (Népal), C. Nuñez Tellez (Nicaragua), J.W. Pam (Nigéria), L. Langlo (Norvège), P. East (Nouvelle-Zélande), F. Butagira (Ouganda), R. Landero (Panama), G.C. van Dam (Pays-Bas), A.F. Pacificador (Philippines), J. Maciszewski (Pologne), A. Arnaut (Portugal), A. Rida (République arabe syrienne), J.D. Kwon (République de Corée), H. Fechner (République démocratique allemande), Choi Su Hen (République populaire démocratique de Corée), S. Tandeng Muna (République unie du Cameroun), S. Soare (Roumanie), P. Temple-Morris (Royaume-Uni), M. Ntahobari (Rwanda), M. O. Ba (Sénégal), M. I. Ahmed (Somalie), I. El Sayed (Soudan), M.A. Bakeer Markar (Sri Lanka), Mme I. Sundberg (Suède), C. Jelmini (Suisse), J. Marko (Tchécoslovaquie), H. Hongskula (Thaïlande), A. Apedo-Amah (Togo), M. Messaadi (Tunisie), V.P. Ruben (URSS), J. Gonzalez (Venezuela), Phan Anh (Viet Nam), A. Makki (Yémen), A.A. Alsallami (Yémen démocratique), I. Njegovan (Yougoslavie), Birere Mabano (Zaïre), J.P. Chafwa (Zambie), Mlle J.L. Ngwenya (Zimbabwe).

ANNEXE IX

Vote sur l'amendement du Groupe irlandais tendant à ajouter le point suivant à ceux spécifiquement mentionnés dans la motion du Groupe indien : "L'invasion de l'Afghanistan".

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 400
Voix négatives 325
Abstentions 315

| | OUI | NON | ABS. | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|------|---------------------|--------|-----|-----|-------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|
| Algérie | - | 13 | - | Iran | - | - | 15 | Rép. de Corée | 15 | - | - |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | 18 | - | - | Iraq | - | - | 13 | Rép. dém. allemande | - | 13 | - |
| Australie | 13 | - | - | Irlande | 11 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | 11 | - | - |
| Autriche | 12 | - | - | Islande | 9 | - | - | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | - | 13 | - |
| Belgique | 6 | - | 6 | Israël | 11 | - | - | Rép. unie du Cameroun | - | 12 | - |
| Bénin | - | 11 | - | Italie | 1 | 16 | - | Roumanie | n'a pas participé | - | - |
| Brésil | 20 | - | - | Japon | 20 | - | - | Royaume-Uni | 17 | - | - |
| Bulgarie | - | 12 | - | Jordanie | - | - | 10 | Rwanda | - | - | 11 |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Kenya | - | - | 13 | Sénégal | - | - | 11 |
| Cap Vert | - | 9 | - | Koweït | - | - | 10 | Singapour | - | - | 10 |
| Chypre | 2 | 2 | 5 | Liban | - | - | 9 | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Colombie | 10 | - | - | Luxembourg | 9 | - | - | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | - | 10 | - | Malaisie | - | - | 13 | Sri Lanka | absent | - | - |
| Costa Rica | - | absent | - | Mali | - | 5 | - | Suède | 12 | - | - |
| Côte d'Ivoire | - | 12 | - | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suisse | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Mexique | 16 | - | - | Tchécoslovaquie | - | 13 | - |
| Danemark | 12 | - | - | Monaco | 9 | - | - | Thaïlande | absent | - | - |
| Djibouti | 9 | - | - | Mongolie | - | 10 | - | Togo | - | - | 10 |
| Egypte | - | - | 16 | Mozambique | - | 13 | - | Tunisie | - | - | 12 |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Népal | absent | - | - | URSS | - | 22 | - |
| Equateur | - | absent | - | Nicaragua | - | 10 | - | Venezuela | - | - | 13 |
| Espagne | 15 | - | - | Nigeria | absent | - | - | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | 22 | - | - | Norvège | 11 | - | - | Yemen | - | - | 12 |
| Finlande | - | - | 11 | Nouvelle-Zélande | 10 | - | - | Yemen démocratique | - | 10 | - |
| France | - | 15 | - | Ouganda | - | - | 13 | Yougoslavie | - | - | 14 |
| Gabon | - | - | 9 | Panama | absent | - | - | Zaïre | - | - | 12 |
| Grèce | - | - | 12 | Pays-Bas | 13 | - | - | Zambie | - | - | 10 |
| Guinée | - | 5 | - | Philippines | - | - | 16 | Zimbabwe | - | 12 | - |
| Haïti | 11 | - | - | Pologne | - | 15 | - | | | | |
| Hongrie | - | 10 | - | Portugal | 2 | 2 | 8 | | | | |
| Inde | - | 21 | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | - | 12 | - | | | | |
| Indonésie | - | - | 21 | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE X

Vote sur l'amendement du Groupe somali tendant à ajouter le point suivant à ceux spécifiquement mentionnés dans la motion du Groupe indien : "L'agression éthiopienne contre la République démocratique somalie et les dangers qui peuvent en résulter pour la paix et la sécurité internationales".

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 518
Voix négatives 224
Abstentions 214

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|-----|---------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-------------------------|--------|-----|-----|
| Algérie | - | - | 13 | Iran | - | - | 15 | Rép. de Corée | - | - | 15 |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | 18 | - | - | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Rép. dém. allemande | - | 13 | - |
| Australie | 13 | - | - | Irlande | 11 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | - | - | 11 |
| Autriche | 12 | - | - | Israël | 6 | - | 3 | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | absent | - | - |
| Belgique | 12 | - | - | Italie | 11 | - | - | Rép. unie du Cameroun | 12 | - | - |
| Bénin | - | - | 11 | Japon | 10 | - | 6 | Roumanie | - | 14 | - |
| Brésil | 10 | - | - | Jordanie | 19 | - | 1 | Royaume-Uni | 17 | - | - |
| Bulgarie | - | 12 | - | Kenya | 10 | - | - | Rwanda | - | - | 11 |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Koweït | absent | - | - | Sénégal | - | - | 11 |
| Cap Vert | - | - | 9 | Liban | 5 | - | - | Singapour | 10 | - | - |
| Chypre | - | 2 | 7 | Luxembourg | 9 | - | - | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Colombie | 10 | - | - | Malaisie | 13 | - | - | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | - | 10 | - | Mali | - | - | 10 | Sri Lanka | absent | - | - |
| Costa Rica | - | absent | - | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suède | 12 | - | - |
| Côte d'Ivoire | - | - | 10 | Mexique | 16 | - | - | Suisse | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Monaco | 9 | - | - | Tchécoslovaquie | - | 13 | - |
| Danemark | 12 | - | - | Mongolie | - | 10 | - | Thaïlande | absent | - | - |
| Djibouti | 9 | - | - | Mozambique | n'a pas participé | - | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Népal | absent | - | - | Tunisie | 12 | - | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Nicaragua | - | 10 | - | URSS | - | 22 | - |
| Equateur | absent | - | - | Nigeria | absent | - | - | Venezuela | - | - | 13 |
| Espagne | 15 | - | - | Norvège | 11 | - | - | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | 10 | - | - | Nouvelle-Zélande | 10 | - | - | Yemen | 12 | - | - |
| Finlande | - | - | 11 | Ouganda | 5 | - | - | Yemen démocratique | - | 10 | - |
| France | - | 15 | - | Panama | absent | - | - | Yougoslavie | - | 14 | - |
| Gabon | 9 | - | - | Pays-Bas | - | - | 13 | Zaïre | 12 | - | - |
| Grèce | 5 | 1 | - | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zambie | absent | - | - |
| Guinée | absent | - | - | Pologne | - | 15 | - | Zimbabwe | - | 12 | - |
| Haiti | 11 | - | - | Portugal | 2 | 2 | 8 | | | | |
| Hongrie | - | 10 | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | - | 12 | - | | | | |
| Inde | - | - | 15 | | | | | | | | |
| Indonésie | - | - | 21 | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE XI

Vote sur l'amendement du Groupe tchécoslovaque tendant à ajouter le point suivant à ceux spécifiquement mentionnés dans la motion du Groupe indien : "Le renforcement des forces armées des Etats-Unis d'Amérique au voisinage des frontières de la République socialiste de Tchécoslovaquie et de la République démocratique allemande - menace à la paix et la sécurité en Europe".

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 262
Voix négatives 392
Abstentions 233

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------------------|--------|--------|-----|
| Algérie | - | - | 13 | Iran | 10 | - | 5 | Rép. de Corée | - | 15 | - |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | - | 18 | - | Iraq | - | absent | - | Rép. dém. allemande | 13 | - | - |
| Australie | - | 13 | - | Irlande | - | 11 | - | Rép. | - | - | - |
| Autriche | - | 12 | - | Islande | - | 6 | 3 | dominicaine | absent | - | - |
| Belgique | - | 12 | - | Israël | - | 11 | - | Rép. pop. dém. | - | - | - |
| Bénin | 11 | - | - | Italie | - | 17 | - | de Corée | 13 | - | - |
| Brésil | 5 | 15 | - | Japon | - | - | 20 | Rép. unie du | - | - | - |
| Bulgarie | 12 | - | - | Jordanie | - | - | 10 | Cameroun | - | - | 12 |
| Canada | - | 14 | - | Kenya | - | absent | - | Roumanie | 14 | - | - |
| Cap Vert | - | absent | - | Koweït | - | - | 10 | Royaume-Uni | - | 17 | - |
| Chypre | 2 | - | 7 | Liban | 5 | - | - | Rwanda | - | 11 | - |
| Colombie | - | 5 | - | Luxembourg | - | 9 | - | Sénégal | - | - | 11 |
| Congo | 10 | - | - | Malaisie | - | - | 13 | Singapour | - | - | 10 |
| Costa Rica | - | absent | - | Mali | 10 | - | - | Somalie | - | 11 | - |
| Côte d'Ivoire | - | - | 12 | Maroc | - | 14 | - | Soudan | - | - | 10 |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Mexique | 16 | - | - | Sri Lanka | - | absent | - |
| Danemark | - | 10 | 2 | Monaco | - | 9 | - | Suède | - | 12 | - |
| Djibouti | - | - | 9 | Mongolie | 10 | - | - | Suisse | - | 12 | - |
| Egypte | - | - | 16 | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Tchécoslovaquie | 13 | - | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | - | absent | - | Népal | - | absent | - | Thaïlande | - | absent | - |
| Equateur | - | absent | - | Nicaragua | 10 | - | - | Togo | - | - | 10 |
| Espagne | - | 15 | - | Nigeria | - | absent | - | Tunisie | - | absent | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | - | 10 | - | Norvège | - | 11 | - | URSS | 22 | - | - |
| Finlande | - | - | 11 | Nouvelle-Zélande | - | 10 | - | Venezuela | - | - | 13 |
| France | - | 15 | - | Ouganda | - | - | 5 | Viet Nam | 15 | - | - |
| Gabon | - | - | 5 | Panama | - | absent | - | Yemen | - | - | 12 |
| Grèce | 2 | 10 | - | Pays-Bas | - | 13 | - | Yemen démo- | 10 | - | - |
| Guinée | - | absent | - | Philippines | - | 16 | - | cratique | - | - | - |
| Haïti | - | 11 | - | Pologne | 15 | - | - | Yugoslavie | - | - | 14 |
| Hongrie | 5 | - | - | Portugal | 2 | 6 | - | Zaïre | - | absent | - |
| Inde | - | absent | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | 12 | - | - | Zambie | - | absent | - |
| Indonésie | - | 21 | - | | | | | Zimbabwe | - | absent | - |

ANNEXE XII

MOTION TENDANT A AJOURNER SINE DIE LA PRISE EN CONSIDERATION
DE TOUTES LES DEMANDES D'INSCRIPTION DE POINTS SUPPLEMENTAIRES
A L'ORDRE DU JOUR DE LA CONFERENCE, A L'EXCEPTION DE
CELLES CONCERNANT LE MOYEN-ORIENT, LE CONFLIT ENTRE
L'IRAQ ET L'IRAN, L'INVASION DE L'AFGHANISTAN ET
L'AGRESSION DE L'ETHIOPIE CONTRE LA SOMALIE

Vote sur la motion du Groupe indien, telle qu'amendée

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 655

Voix négatives 142

Abstentions 113

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|--------|-----|-----|---------------------|--------|-----|-----|-------------------------|--------|-----|-----|
| Algérie | 13 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Rép. de Corée | 15 | - | - |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | 18 | - | - | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Rép. dém. allemande | - | 13 | - |
| Australie | 2 | 11 | - | Irlande | 11 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | Absent | - | - |
| Autriche | 12 | - | - | Islande | 9 | - | - | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | - | - | 13 |
| Belgique | 10 | - | - | Israël | - | 11 | - | Rép. unie du Cameroun | 12 | - | - |
| Bénin | - | - | 11 | Italie | 17 | - | - | Roumanie | - | - | 14 |
| Brésil | Absent | - | - | Japon | 20 | - | - | Royaume-Uni | 17 | - | - |
| Bulgarie | - | 12 | - | Jordanie | 10 | - | - | Rwanda | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Kenya | Absent | - | - | Sénégal | 11 | - | - |
| Cap Vert | Absent | - | - | Koweït | 10 | - | - | Singapour | 10 | - | - |
| Chypre | 6 | - | 3 | Liban | - | - | 5 | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Colombie | - | - | 5 | Luxembourg | 9 | - | - | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | - | 10 | - | Malaisie | 13 | - | - | Sri Lanka | Absent | - | - |
| Costa Rica | - | 5 | - | Mali | 10 | - | - | Suède | 12 | - | - |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 12 | - | - | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suisse | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | - | 12 | Mexique | 16 | - | - | Tchécoslovaquie | - | 13 | - |
| Danemark | 12 | - | - | Monaco | 9 | - | - | Thaïlande | Absent | - | - |
| Djibouti | Absent | - | - | Mongolie | - | 10 | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Mozambique | - | - | 13 | Tunisie | 12 | - | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Népal | Absent | - | - | URSS | - | 22 | - |
| Equateur | Absent | - | - | Nicaragua | 10 | - | - | Venezuela | 13 | - | - |
| Espagne | 15 | - | - | Nigeria | Absent | - | - | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | 10 | - | - | Norvège | 11 | - | - | Yemen | 12 | - | - |
| Finlande | - | - | 11 | Nouvelle-Zélande | 10 | - | - | Yemen démocratique | - | - | 10 |
| France | 15 | - | - | Ouganda | 5 | - | - | Yougoslavie | 14 | - | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Panama | Absent | - | - | Zaïre | Absent | - | - |
| Grèce | 10 | - | 2 | Pays-Bas | 10 | - | - | Zambie | Absent | - | - |
| Guinée | Absent | - | - | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zimbabwe | Absent | - | - |
| Haïti | 11 | - | - | Pologne | - | 15 | - | | | | |
| Hongrie | - | - | - | Portugal | 6 | - | 2 | | | | |
| Inde | 15 | - | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | - | - | 12 | | | | |
| Indonésie | 21 | - | - | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE XIII

LA SITUATION AU LIBAN ET LA QUESTION PALESTINIENNE

Vote sur la demande d'inscription de ce point supplémentaire
à l'ordre du jour de la Conférence

Résultats du vote

| | |
|---------------------------------------|-----|
| Voix positives | 863 |
| Voix négatives | 5 |
| Abstentions | 12 |
| Total des voix positives et négatives | 868 |
| Majorité des deux-tiers | 579 |

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-------------|-----|-----|---------------------|-------------|-----|-----|-------------------------|-------------|-----|-----|
| Algérie | 13 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Rép. de Corée | A b s e n t | | |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | 18 | - | - | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Rép. dém. allemande | 13 | - | - |
| Australie | 10 | 3 | - | Irlande | 11 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | A b s e n t | | |
| Autriche | 10 | - | - | Israël | 11 | - | - | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | 13 | - | - |
| Belgique | 12 | - | - | Italie | 17 | - | - | Rép. unie du Cameroun | 12 | - | - |
| Bénin | 11 | - | - | Japon | 20 | - | - | Roumanie | 14 | - | - |
| Brésil | A b s e n t | | | Jordanie | 10 | - | - | Royaume-Uni | 10 | - | - |
| Bulgarie | 12 | - | - | Kenya | A b s e n t | | | Rwanda | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Koweït | 10 | - | - | Sénégal | 11 | - | - |
| Cap Vert | A b s e n t | | | Liban | 5 | - | - | Singapour | 10 | - | - |
| Chypre | 9 | - | - | Luxembourg | 9 | - | - | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Colombie | 5 | - | - | Malaisie | 13 | - | - | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | A b s e n t | | | Mali | 10 | - | - | Sri Lanka | A b s e n t | | |
| Costa Rica | A b s e n t | | | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suède | 12 | - | - |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 12 | - | - | Mexique | 16 | - | - | Suisse | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Monaco | 9 | - | - | Tchécoslovaquie | 13 | - | - |
| Danemark | 10 | - | - | Mongolie | 10 | - | - | Thaïlande | A b s e n t | | |
| Djibouti | A b s e n t | | | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Népal | A b s e n t | | | Tunisie | 12 | - | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Nicaragua | 10 | - | - | URSS | 22 | - | - |
| Equateur | A b s e n t | | | Nigeria | A b s e n t | | | Venezuela | 13 | - | - |
| Espagne | 15 | - | - | Norvège | 11 | - | - | Viet Nam | 15 | - | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | 10 | - | - | Nouvelle-Zélande | 10 | - | - | Yemen | 12 | - | - |
| Finlande | 10 | - | 1 | Ouganda | A b s e n t | | | Yemen démocratique | 10 | - | - |
| France | 15 | - | - | Panama | A b s e n t | | | Yugoslavie | 14 | - | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Pays-Bas | 10 | - | - | Zaïre | A b s e n t | | |
| Grèce | 12 | - | - | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zambie | A b s e n t | | |
| Guinée | A b s e n t | | | Pologne | 15 | - | - | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |
| Haïti | - | - | 11 | Portugal | 8 | - | - | | | | |
| Hongrie | 5 | - | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | 12 | - | - | | | | |
| Inde | 15 | - | - | | | | | | | | |
| Indonésie | 21 | - | - | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE XIV

PROPOSITION POUR UNE PAIX DEFINITIVE ENTRE L'IRAQ ET L'IRAN

Vote sur la demande d'inscription de
ce point supplémentaire à l'ordre du jour
de la Conférence

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 785
Voix négatives 0
Abstentions 46
Total des voix positives et négatives 785
Majorité des deux-tiers 524

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|--------|-----|-----|---------------------|--------|-----|-----|-------------------------|--------|-----|-----|
| Algérie | - | - | 13 | Iran | 15 | - | - | Rép. de Corée | absent | | |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | 18 | - | - | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Rép. dém. allemande | 13 | - | - |
| Australie | 13 | - | - | Irlande | 11 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | absent | | |
| Autriche | 12 | - | - | Islande | 9 | - | - | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | absent | | |
| Belgique | 12 | - | - | Israël | 11 | - | - | Rép. unie du Cameroun | 12 | - | - |
| Bénin | 11 | - | - | Italie | 17 | - | - | Roumanie | 14 | - | - |
| Brésil | absent | - | - | Japon | 20 | - | - | Royaume-Uni | 5 | - | - |
| Bulgarie | 12 | - | - | Jordanie | 10 | - | - | Rwanda | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Kenya | absent | - | - | Sénégal | 11 | - | - |
| Cap Vert | absent | - | - | Koweït | 10 | - | - | Singapour | 10 | - | - |
| Chypre | 9 | - | - | Liban | 5 | - | - | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Colombie | 5 | - | - | Luxembourg | absent | - | - | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | absent | - | - | Malaisie | 13 | - | - | Sri Lanka | absent | | |
| Costa Rica | absent | - | - | Mali | 10 | - | - | Suède | - | - | 12 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 12 | - | - | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suisse | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Mexique | absent | - | - | Tchécoslovaquie | 13 | - | - |
| Danemark | 12 | - | - | Monaco | 9 | - | - | Thaïlande | absent | | |
| Djibouti | absent | - | - | Mongolie | 10 | - | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Tunisie | 10 | - | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Népal | absent | - | 10 | URSS | 22 | - | - |
| Equateur | absent | - | - | Nicaragua | - | - | - | Venezuela | 13 | - | - |
| Espagne | 15 | - | - | Nigeria | absent | - | - | Viet Nam | 15 | - | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | 10 | - | - | Norvège | 11 | - | - | Yemen | 12 | - | - |
| Finlande | - | - | 11 | Nouvelle-Zélande | 5 | - | - | Yemen démocratique | 10 | - | - |
| France | 15 | - | - | Ouganda | absent | - | - | Yugoslavie | 14 | - | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Panama | absent | - | - | Zaïre | absent | | |
| Grèce | 12 | - | - | Pays-Bas | 10 | - | - | Zambie | absent | | |
| Guinée | absent | - | - | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |
| Haïti | 10 | - | - | Pologne | 15 | - | - | | | | |
| Hongrie | 5 | - | - | Portugal | 8 | - | - | | | | |
| Inde | 15 | - | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | 12 | - | - | | | | |
| Indonésie | 21 | - | - | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE XV

L'INVASION DE L'AFGHANISTAN

Vote sur la demande d'inscription de ce point supplémentaire
à l'ordre du jour de la Conférence

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 496
Voix négatives 209
Abstentions 114
Total des voix positives et négatives 705
Majorité des deux-tiers 470

| | OUI | NON | AB ^s | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-------------|-----|-----------------|---------------------|-------------|-----|-----|-------------------------|-------------------|-----|-----|
| Algérie | - | - | 13 | Iran | 15 | - | - | Rép. de Corée | 15 | - | - |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | 18 | - | - | Iraq | - | - | 13 | Rép. dém. allemande | - | 13 | - |
| Australie | 13 | - | - | Irlande | 11 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | a b s e n t | | |
| Autriche | 12 | - | - | Islande | 9 | - | - | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | - | 13 | - |
| Belgique | 6 | - | 6 | Israël | 11 | - | - | Rép. unie du Cameroun | 12 | - | - |
| Bénin | - | 11 | - | Italie | 11 | - | 6 | Roumanie | n'a pas participé | | |
| Brésil | a b s e n t | | | Japon | 20 | - | - | Royaume-Uni | 10 | - | - |
| Bulgarie | - | 12 | - | Jordanie | a b s e n t | | | Rwanda | - | - | 11 |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Kenya | a b s e n t | | | Sénégal | 11 | - | - |
| Cap Vert | a b s e n t | | | Koweït | a b s e n t | | | Singapour | 10 | - | - |
| Chypre | 2 | 2 | 3 | Liban | - | 5 | - | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Colombie | 5 | - | - | Luxembourg | 9 | - | - | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | a b s e n t | | | Malaisie | 13 | - | - | Sri Lanka | a b s e n t | | |
| Costa Rica | a b s e n t | | | Mali | - | - | 10 | Suède | 12 | - | - |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 10 | - | - | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suisse | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Mexique | 10 | - | - | Tchécoslovaquie | - | 13 | - |
| Danemark | 12 | - | - | Monaco | 9 | - | - | Thaïlande | a b s e n t | | |
| Djibouti | a b s e n t | | | Mongolie | - | 10 | - | Togo | - | - | 10 |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Mozambique | - | 13 | - | Tunisie | a b s e n t | | |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Népal | a b s e n t | | | URSS | - | 22 | - |
| Equateur | a b s e n t | | | Nicaragua | - | - | 10 | Venezuela | 13 | - | - |
| Espagne | 15 | - | - | Nigeria | a b s e n t | | | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | 10 | - | - | Norvège | 10 | - | - | Yemen | 12 | - | - |
| Finlande | - | - | 11 | Nouvelle-Zélande | 5 | - | - | Yemen démocratique | - | 10 | - |
| France | 5 | 10 | - | Ouganda | a b s e n t | | | Yugoslavie | - | - | 14 |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Panama | a b s e n t | | | Zaïre | a b s e n t | | |
| Grèce | 3 | 2 | 7 | Pays-Bas | 10 | - | - | Zambie | a b s e n t | | |
| Guinée | a b s e n t | | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zimbabwe | - | 12 | - |
| Haïti | 10 | - | - | Pologne | - | 15 | - | | | | |
| Hongrie | - | 5 | - | Portugal | 6 | 2 | - | | | | |
| Inde | a b s e n t | | | Rép. arabe syrienne | - | 12 | - | | | | |
| Indonésie | 21 | - | - | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE XVI

L'AGRESSION ETHIOPIENNE CONTRE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE SOMALIE
ET LES DANGERS QUI PEUVENT EN RESULTER POUR LA PAIX
ET LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALES

Vote sur la demande d'inscription de ce point supplémentaire
à l'ordre du jour de la Conférence

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 413
Voix négatives 198
Abstentions 134
Total des voix positives et négatives 611
Majorité des deux-tiers 408

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------------------|-------------------|--------|-----|-------------------------|--------|--------|-----|
| Algérie | - | - | 13 | Iran | - | - | 15 | Rép. de Corée | absent | | |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | 18 | - | - | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Rép. dém. allemande | - | 13 | - |
| Australie | 13 | - | - | Irlande | 11 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | absent | | |
| Autriche | 12 | - | - | Islande | 9 | - | - | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | absent | | |
| Belgique | 5 | - | - | Israël | 11 | - | - | Rép. unie du Cameroun | 12 | - | - |
| Bénin | - | - | 11 | Italie | 11 | - | 6 | Roumanie | - | 14 | - |
| Brésil | - | absent | - | Japon | 19 | - | 1 | Royaume-Uni | 10 | - | - |
| Bulgarie | - | 12 | - | Jordanie | - | absent | - | Rwanda | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Kenya | - | absent | - | Sénégal | - | - | 11 |
| Cap Vert | - | absent | - | Koweït | - | absent | - | Singapour | 10 | - | - |
| Chypre | - | absent | - | Liban | - | absent | - | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Colombie | 5 | - | - | Luxembourg | - | absent | - | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Congo | - | absent | - | Malaisie | - | absent | - | Sri Lanka | absent | | |
| Costa Rica | - | absent | - | Mali | - | - | 10 | Suède | 12 | - | - |
| Côte d'Ivoire | - | - | 10 | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suisse | 10 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Mexique | 5 | 5 | - | Tchécoslovaquie | - | 13 | - |
| Danemark | 12 | - | - | Monaco | 9 | - | - | Thaïlande | absent | | |
| Djibouti | - | absent | - | Mongolie | - | 10 | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Mozambique | n'a pas participé | - | - | Tunisie | absent | | |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Népal | - | absent | - | URSS | - | 22 | - |
| Equateur | - | absent | - | Nicaragua | - | 10 | - | Venezuela | 13 | - | - |
| Espagne | 10 | - | - | Nigeria | - | absent | - | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | 10 | - | - | Norvège | 11 | - | - | Yemen | 12 | - | - |
| Finlande | - | - | 11 | Nouvelle-Zélande | 5 | - | - | Yemen démo- | - | 10 | - |
| France | - | - | 15 | Ouganda | - | absent | - | cratique | - | 14 | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Panama | - | absent | - | Yougoslavie | - | absent | |
| Grèce | 10 | 2 | - | Pays-Bas | 10 | - | - | Zaire | absent | | |
| Guinée | - | absent | - | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zambie | absent | | |
| Haiti | - | - | 10 | Pologne | - | 15 | - | Zimbabwe | - | 12 | - |
| Hongrie | - | 5 | - | Portugal | 6 | 2 | - | | | | |
| Inde | - | absent | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | - | 12 | - | | | | |
| Indonésie | - | - | 21 | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE XVII

LA CONTRIBUTION DES PARLEMENTS À L'ADOPTION URGENTE DE MESURES CONCRÈTES,
NOTAMMENT LE DÉSARMEMENT NUCLÉAIRE, LA RÉDUCTION DES BUDGETS
MILITAIRES ET SES EFFETS SUR L'ÉCONOMIE ET L'EMPLOI DANS
LE MONDE AINSI QUE SUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE ET
SOCIAL DU TIERS-MONDE

(Résolution adoptée sans vote)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

considérant que la paix est le bien commun de l'humanité et que, de nos jours, elle est également une condition nécessaire à sa survie,

profondément inquiète devant le fait que la deuxième session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU consacrée au désarmement n'a adopté ni le Programme global de désarmement ni un autre document sur les principaux problèmes figurant à l'ordre du jour, malgré les demandes insistantes de l'opinion publique mondiale, d'un grand nombre d'Etats et de Gouvernements qui ont attendu qu'un tournant radical soit réalisé dans le sens de l'arrêt de la course aux armements et du passage à des mesures concrètes de désarmement,

appréciant hautement les grands mouvements populaires en faveur de la paix et du désarmement, qui ont acquis une ampleur sans précédent et sont l'expression éloquente de la volonté de l'opinion publique de tous les pays d'arrêter la guerre, de vivre dans un monde de paix et de coopération,

profondément inquiète de la sérieuse aggravation de la situation internationale qui empêche le développement de relations normales et le renforcement de la confiance mutuelle et de la coopération entre les nations,

prenant acte de ce que de nouveaux foyers de crise et de conflit entre les Etats sont venus s'ajouter à ceux qui existent déjà de plus longue date et que ce développement a eu une incidence défavorable sur les progrès dans le domaine du désarmement et du contrôle des armements,

soulignant que l'accentuation de la politique de force, de consolidation et de redivision des zones d'influence, d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures et de violation du droit souverain des peuples fait courir de grands dangers à la sécurité et à l'indépendance des peuples et menace l'existence même de l'humanité,

déplorant le manque de résultats positifs de la deuxième session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement à une époque où l'humanité entière aspirait à l'adoption de mesures concrètes visant à éviter la guerre nucléaire, ainsi qu'à l'adoption d'un programme global de désarmement, dont la mise en oeuvre conduirait graduellement à la réalisation d'un désarmement général et total,

inquiète du fait que, dans les conditions actuelles, une guerre - et particulièrement une guerre nucléaire - pourrait avoir des conséquences désastreuses pour la survie de l'humanité et de la civilisation,

relevant le rôle et les hautes responsabilités qui incombent aux Parlements et aux parlementaires touchant la destinée de leurs peuples, la nécessité impérieuse de concerter les efforts des peuples, des Parlements, des Gouvernements et de toutes les forces pacifistes afin de prévenir le danger d'un désastre nucléaire, de mettre fin à la politique des armements, et d'assurer l'édification d'un monde de paix, sans armes ni guerre,

condamnant toute doctrine militaire se fondant sur l'idée de déclencher une guerre, y compris la guerre nucléaire,

notant avec inquiétude l'accroissement constant des dépenses militaires qui impose une lourde charge à l'économie de tous les pays et compromet leur développement socio-économique,

préoccupée par le développement quantitatif et qualitatif des systèmes d'armement qui constituent de graves menaces pour la paix et la sécurité du monde, et réaffirmant que tout progrès significatif des négociations sur le désarmement suppose une restauration de la confiance mutuelle,

consciente de ce que le danger d'une guerre nucléaire s'accroît avec le renforcement qualitatif et quantitatif des arsenaux nucléaires existants,

reconnaissant qu'une des difficultés de l'arrêt de la course aux armements réside dans la lenteur extrême des progrès dans les négociations sur le désarmement par rapport au rythme accéléré du perfectionnement des armements,

notant que la sécurité s'est détériorée dans plusieurs régions du monde,

se félicitant de la reprise des négociations préliminaires entre l'URSS et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique sur la limitation et la réduction des armes stratégiques, et exprimant l'espoir que des conventions effectives fondées sur l'égalité et une sécurité égale seront conclues dans ce contexte,

déplorant que les négociations entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et l'URSS sur les questions de la limitation des armements et le désarmement - particulièrement le désarmement nucléaire - traînent en longueur et que certaines conventions importantes dans ce domaine n'aient pas encore été ratifiées,

invitant instamment toutes les puissances nucléaires à rechercher l'élimination des armes nucléaires en adoptant des mesures internationales efficaces destinées à interdire la production, les essais, le stockage et l'utilisation des armes nucléaires et, en particulier, à assurer que les armes nucléaires ne seront plus jamais utilisées de nouveau, afin de pouvoir réaliser le noble but commun à l'humanité tout entière, à savoir l'établissement d'une paix et d'une sécurité internationales durables,

considérant que la bonne volonté politique, la disposition à développer largement la coopération internationale en matière de négociations sur le désarmement avec la participation de tous les pays sur un pied d'égalité et la volonté de se soumettre à des obligations concrètes touchant au désarmement sont les conditions fondamentales du succès de négociations sur le désarmement,

considérant que la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement aurait dû être une étape importante sur la voie d'une paix et d'une sécurité durables grâce à la préservation et à l'amplification de tous les résultats positifs obtenus dans la limitation de la course aux armements et la promotion du désarmement dans les années 1970, et que la deuxième Session extraordinaire n'a pas entièrement donné les résultats attendus à cet égard mais a, néanmoins, reflété clairement la ferme volonté d'une majorité écrasante d'Etats de prendre des mesures concrètes en vue d'empêcher une guerre nucléaire et de promouvoir le désarmement,

consciente de ce qu'il est urgent de prendre des mesures pratiques pour mettre un terme à l'accumulation des armes et à la course aux armements et pour promouvoir le désarmement et des mesures urgentes en vue d'éviter une guerre nucléaire, notamment dans les domaines suivants :

- interdiction complète des essais d'armes nucléaires;
- non-prolifération des armes nucléaires;
- interdiction des armes chimiques;
- établissement de zones exemptes d'armes nucléaires;
- convocation d'une Conférence mondiale du désarmement;
- garanties en matière de sécurité pour les Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires;
- compressions des budgets militaires;
- mesures propres à accroître la confiance;
- programme global de désarmement;

affirmant que le plein respect des principes et objectifs de la Charte des Nations Unies et l'entière adhésion de tous les Etats à ces principes et objectifs, notamment l'obligation de s'abstenir de la menace ou de l'emploi de la force contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de tout

autre Etat et de respecter le droit à l'autodétermination des peuples, doivent promouvoir une paix durable et un désarmement effectif,

consciente de l'extrême utilité que toutes les négociations internationales, en cours ou à venir, revêtent dans la perspective d'un accroissement de la sécurité des Etats ainsi que d'une éventuelle mise à la disposition du développement économique et social de l'humanité des économies importantes réalisées en limitant et en réduisant les systèmes d'armes faisant l'objet desdites négociations, et consciente également de ce que celles-ci doivent conduire à des accords équilibrés et vérifiables,

convaincue de ce qu'il existe un lien étroit entre le désarmement et le développement et que des avantages substantiels peuvent résulter de l'utilisation des ressources actuellement affectées à la course aux armements et de celles qui seront libérées par l'adoption de mesures de désarmement efficaces pour atténuer les difficultés économiques et sociales auxquelles les peuples doivent actuellement faire face, en particulier dans les pays en développement,

soulignant que les parlementaires estiment que la détente, destinée à la réduction et à l'élimination définitive des tensions entre les Etats et les peuples, peut contribuer à construire un avenir plus sûr, plus stable et plus juste pour l'humanité,

A

1. invite les Parlements et les Gouvernements de tous les pays du monde à prendre des dispositions pour mettre en oeuvre les mesures adoptées par la deuxième Session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement, à examiner sérieusement les propositions faites lors de la même session, et en particulier à répondre à l'appel des participants à cette Session, en examinant aussitôt que possible toutes propositions appropriées visant à empêcher la guerre, en premier lieu la guerre nucléaire et, de ce fait, assurer que la survie de l'humanité ne soit pas menacée, et à réaliser un désarmement effectif visant à renforcer la paix et la sécurité internationales;
2. demande instamment aux Parlements et aux Gouvernements d'appuyer les mesures suivantes :
 - a) la formulation d'un programme global de désarmement accordant la plus haute priorité au désarmement nucléaire;
 - b) la reprise rapide et effective des négociations sur la limitation et la réduction des armes stratégiques, conduisant à une limitation et une réduction de ces armes aussi rapidement que possible;
 - c) l'approbation sans équivoque du Traité concernant les missiles anti-missiles (ABM);
 - d) la conclusion d'un accord, dans le cadre de la limitation des armes stratégiques, afin de mettre un terme aux essais en vol de tous les nouveaux vecteurs stratégiques;
 - e) l'heureuse conclusion des pourparlers entre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et l'URSS à Genève sur la limitation et la réduction de tous les types d'armes nucléaires à portée intermédiaire en Europe sur la base des principes d'égalité et de sécurité égale;

- f) un accord au sein du Comité du désarmement et d'autres instances internationales sur l'interdiction totale des essais nucléaires;
- g) un traité multilatéral sur l'interdiction des armes radiologiques;
- h) l'adhésion de tous les Etats au Protocole concernant la prohibition d'emploi à la guerre de gaz asphyxiants, toxiques ou similaires et de moyens bactériologiques (Genève, 1925);
- i) l'interdiction de tous autres types d'armes de destruction massive, notamment la bombe à neutrons, et de la mise au point de nouveaux types d'armes de destruction massive et de nouveaux systèmes d'armes de ce type;
- j) un traité sur l'interdiction de l'élaboration, de la production et du stockage des armes chimiques et prévoyant leur destruction;
- k) un nouvel appel pour exhorter tous les Etats qui ne l'ont pas encore fait à adhérer à la Convention de 1972 sur l'interdiction de la mise au point, de la fabrication et du stockage des armes bactériologiques (biologiques) ou à toxines et sur leur destruction;
- l) de nouveaux accords de nature à renforcer ou compléter le Traité de 1967 sur les principes régissant les activités des Etats en matière d'exploration et d'utilisation de l'espace extra-atmosphérique, y compris la lune et les autres corps célestes sous forme d'un traité interdisant la mise au point, l'essai et la mise en place des armes de tous types dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique;
- m) le renforcement du régime de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires, conformément aux décisions adoptées par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies à sa 36e session, ce afin d'assurer i) la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires tant verticale qu'horizontale et ii) le plein exercice, par tous les Etats, de leur droit inaliénable d'appliquer et poursuivre leurs progrès aux fins d'utilisations pacifiques de l'énergie nucléaire en vue du développement économique et social, conformément à leurs priorités, intérêts et besoins;
- n) des garanties en matière de sécurité pour les Etats non dotés d'armes nucléaires;
- o) établissement de zones exemptes d'armes nucléaires;
- p) d'autres accords limités de contrôle des armements comme le Traité de 1971 interdisant de placer des armes nucléaires et d'autres armes de destruction massive sur le fond des mers et des océans ainsi que dans leur sous-sol, la Convention de 1977 sur l'interdiction d'utiliser des techniques de modification de l'environnement à des fins militaires ou toutes autres fins hostiles et la Convention de 1981 sur l'interdiction et la limitation de l'emploi de certaines armes classiques qui peuvent être considérées comme produisant des effets traumatiques excessifs ou comme frappant sans discrimination;
- q) le gel des dépenses militaires pour l'année 1982 et le passage à leur réduction de 10 à 15 % d'ici 1985;
- r) la création de zones dénucléarisées dans différentes régions du monde, par des arrangements entre les Etats des régions respectives, les puissances nucléaires s'engageant à ne pas utili-

ser l'arme atomique et, en général, la force contre les Etats qui appartiendraient à de telles zones;

- s) le retrait de toutes les troupes étrangères à l'intérieur des frontières nationales, le démantèlement de bases militaires étrangères, l'engagement de chaque Etat de ne pas déployer de troupes et de ne pas installer de bases militaires sur le territoire d'autres Etats;
- t) des accords en vue d'assurer une heureuse conclusion des négociations de Vienne sur la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces;
- u) une conférence mondiale sur les dépenses militaires;

B

3. demande instamment à tous les Parlements et à tous les Gouvernements :

- a) d'agir résolument en faveur de l'arrêt de la course aux armements et de la mise au point de mesures réelles de désarmement, notamment de désarmement nucléaire, en assurant un équilibre militaire qui ne mette en danger la sécurité et la paix d'aucun pays et qui soit réalisé non par l'accroissement des armements mais par leur réduction graduelle, efficace et proportionnellement équitable;
- b) de réduire les dépenses militaires de façon concertée dans le but de les réduire à 10 pour cent du PNB au maximum;
- c) d'intensifier les contacts parlementaires aux niveaux régional et sub-régional avec pour objectif l'accroissement de la confiance et le renforcement de la sécurité, et de soutenir les actions entreprises par l'Union interparlementaire en vue d'éviter la guerre, notamment la guerre nucléaire, et de promouvoir des négociations sur le désarmement en vue d'un désarmement général et complet;
- d) d'instaurer une vérification adéquate de l'application des mesures de désarmement ou de limitation des armements;
- e) de cesser toute aide en armements aux pays commettant des agressions et de mettre un terme à l'exploitation du Tiers-Monde en vue de la satisfaction d'intérêts personnels qui, s'il n'y était pas mis fin, entraîneraient une escalade de la course aux armements et un accroissement des dépenses des pays voisins pour leur défense;
- f) d'accorder leur soutien à la Campagne mondiale pour le désarmement en vue de son succès et de contribuer à la mise en oeuvre d'actions spécifiques visant à mobiliser l'opinion publique en faveur du désarmement, telles que le recueil de signatures à l'appui de mesures destinées à prévenir la guerre nucléaire, à freiner la course aux armements et en faveur du désarmement;
- g) de contribuer à mettre fin à la détérioration de la situation internationale, d'encourager la tendance à la paix universelle partout dans le monde et d'appuyer tous les efforts visant à résoudre les crises, en s'opposant à toutes les formes d'agression, d'intervention, d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des Etats indépendants et de pression sur ces Etats;
- h) de rechercher les moyens permettant d'utiliser les vastes ressources humaines, naturelles, scientifiques et technologiques gaspillées à

l'heure actuelle dans la course aux armements pour améliorer le sort de l'humanité grâce au développement économique et social, à l'élimination de la famine, des maladies ainsi que des autres graves problèmes économiques et sociaux;

4. invite les Gouvernements et les Parlements des pays européens, du Canada et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique à faire tout leur possible pour que la Réunion de Madrid de la CSCE puisse, au cours de ses travaux ultérieurs se mettre d'accord sur l'adoption d'un document final substantiel et équilibré, définissant en particulier, un mandat précis pour une conférence sur les mesures visant à instaurer un climat de confiance, la sécurité et le désarmement en Europe; cette conférence devrait se tenir dans le cadre du processus de la CSCE et être consacrée dans sa première phase à des mesures de confiance et de sécurité revêtant une importance sur le plan militaire, ayant un caractère obligatoire du point de vue politique et assorties de moyens adéquats de contrôle en rapport avec leur contenu;
5. demande l'arrêt de l'implantation et du développement des missiles à moyenne portée en Europe, le retrait et la destruction des missiles existants, la liquidation de toute arme nucléaire du continent;
6. préconise la réduction des activités militaires de tous les blocs et leur suppression; la fixation entre les deux blocs principaux et, en général, entre les deux parties, d'un plafond maximum pour les principaux armements;
7. invite les Parlements, les Groupes nationaux et les Gouvernements à accorder une attention et une priorité accrues aux problèmes du désarmement, et notamment à celui des armes nucléaires;
8. préconise la création, dans le cadre de l'ONU, d'un organisme international investi du droit de contrôler et d'inspecter la réalisation des mesures de désarmement adoptées, les Gouvernements devant lui accorder tout leur appui;
9. appelle les Parlements et les Gouvernements à oeuvrer fermement pour le règlement de tous les conflits entre les Etats, par des moyens pacifiques exclusivement, pour la liquidation des actuels conflits et leur règlement par la voie politique et par des pourparlers, pour la prévention de l'apparition de tout nouveau conflit ou confrontation militaire;

C

10. demande au Comité exécutif de l'Union interparlementaire de désigner un groupe de travail chargé d'étudier la possibilité de créer une commission permanente à laquelle les parlementaires des Groupes membres pourraient faire appel si leur pays entrerait en conflit ou risquait d'entrer en conflit avec le pays d'un autre Groupe membre, et chargé de faire rapport au Conseil interparlementaire à ce sujet.

ANNEXE XVIII

LA SITUATION AU LIBAN ET LA
QUESTION PALESTINIENNE

(Résolution adoptée par 617 voix contre 32 et 132 abstentions)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

fidèle à ses principes et à ceux énoncés dans la Charte des Nations Unies,

considérant avec une profonde douleur qu'Israël, après des raids aériens sauvages lancés contre Beyrouth et des dizaines de villes, villages et camps de réfugiés libanais et palestiniens a, le 6 juin 1982, envahi le Liban, par voie terrestre, maritime et aérienne, utilisant pour cela d'énormes quantités d'armes meurtrières, y compris des armes prohibées par les lois internationales,

rappelant les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, et tout particulièrement les résolutions 508 (1982), 509 (1982), 520 (1982) et 521 (1982) du Conseil de sécurité relatives à l'agression israélienne au Liban,

rappelant, en particulier, les résolutions 512 (1982) et 513 (1982) par lesquelles le Conseil de sécurité demande que soient respectés les droits des populations civiles sans aucune discrimination et réproouve tous actes de violence contre ces populations,

rappelant aussi les résolutions de la Conférence et du Conseil de l'Union interparlementaire relatives au problème du Moyen-Orient et à la question palestinienne, spécialement celles concernant la condamnation des violations par Israël des droits du peuple palestinien, son occupation des territoires arabes après l'agression de juin 1967, sa décision illégale d'annexer Jérusalem considérée comme capitale éternelle d'Israël, l'annexion des hauteurs syriennes occupées, le bombardement du réacteur irakien consacré à des fins scientifiques et pacifiques, l'implantation de colonies de peuplement et le changement de la structure démographique des territoires occupés,

déclarant que tous les prétextes avancés par Israël pour justifier son agression présente et ses agressions antérieures contre le Liban sont inadmissibles et dénués de fondement, comme le sont ses justifications de la conception de la sécurité et de la paix israéliennes, justifications qui ne sont rien d'autre qu'une couverture de sa politique d'agression, d'expansion et d'usurpation des terres et des droits arabes et palestiniens, affirmant que la récente agression contre le Liban constitue une escalade dangereuse qui met en péril la sécurité des Etats voisins et menace sérieusement la sécurité et la paix dans la région et dans le monde,

réaffirmant le droit du peuple palestinien au retour dans sa patrie, à l'autodétermination et à la création de son Etat indépendant sur son sol national, affirmant que l'OLP est le représentant légitime et unique du peuple palestinien, que toute négociation relative à la question palestinienne, noeud du conflit au Moyen-Orient, exige la participation pleine et entière de l'OLP sur un pied d'égalité,

constatant avec un profond regret que l'un des membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité (les Etats-Unis d'Amérique) a utilisé son droit de veto pour empêcher le Conseil de sécurité de prendre des mesures efficaces propres à dissuader Israël de poursuivre ses agressions,

exprimant sa profonde indignation devant les massacres perpétrés par les forces envahissantes au Liban le 17 septembre - au moment même de la tenue de cette Conférence - dans les centres de réfugiés palestiniens de Chatila et de Sabra, à Beyrouth, coûtant la vie à des milliers d'innocents sans armes,

considérant que cet effroyable acte est l'apogée de l'atrocité collective contre des innocents et contre toute l'humanité,

A.

1. condamne fermement l'agression israélienne contre le territoire libanais et la violation de la souveraineté libanaise au même titre qu'il condamne les forces d'agression israéliennes pour les massacres perpétrés sur la personne de citoyens innocents appartenant aux peuples libanais et palestinien, la destruction d'habitations, de villages et de villes, le siège puis l'occupation de Beyrouth et les bombardements continus des quartiers d'habitation par toutes les armes dont l'usage est prohibé par la loi internationale;
2. réclame le retrait immédiat, total et inconditionnel des forces d'agression israéliennes de tous les territoires libanais, comme elle exige que les autorités légitimes libanaises aient la possibilité d'étendre leur souveraineté sur la totalité du territoire national libanais, et l'application des résolutions 508 (1982) et 509 (1982) du Conseil de sécurité;
3. demande la libération par Israël de tous les détenus palestiniens et libanais et exige que les Palestiniens et Libanais faits prisonniers soient traités en tant que prisonniers de guerre, conformément aux stipulations de la Convention de Genève;
4. dénonce vigoureusement l'attitude du Parlement israélien (Knesset), qui a décidé à une forte majorité d'appuyer l'agression de son Gouvernement contre le Liban, et affirme que cette décision et d'autres décisions antérieures relatives à l'annexion de Jérusalem et du Golan ainsi qu'au soutien des actions agressives et expansionnistes, sont contraires aux obligations des membres de l'Union interparlementaire

qui doivent avoir pour première préoccupation la sauvegarde de la paix, le désarmement, la libération des peuples, le respect des droits de l'homme et la légitimité internationale, et invite l'Union interparlementaire à réévaluer le comportement du Parlement israélien au regard des principes de l'Union;

5. invite les Parlements du monde à faire pression sur leurs Gouvernements respectifs pour assurer l'application de la résolution adoptée lors de la 9e session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies en date du 5 février 1981, et celle de la résolution du Conseil interparlementaire, réuni à Lagos le 17 avril 1982, qui demandent :
 - a) de s'abstenir de fournir à Israël des armes et du matériel connexe et suspendre toute assistance militaire qu'Israël reçoit d'eux;
 - b) de s'abstenir d'acquérir des armes et du matériel militaire provenant d'Israël;
 - c) de suspendre toute leur assistance à Israël et leur coopération avec lui dans les domaines économique, financier et technique;
 - d) de rompre les relations diplomatiques, commerciales et culturelles avec Israël;
6. exige des Etats-Unis d'Amérique qu'ils mettent fin à l'aide militaire et économique à Israël, aide qui a permis à celui-ci de commettre son agression criminelle contre le Liban;
7. demande la constitution par le Conseil interparlementaire d'une commission chargée d'enquêter sur les points suivants :
 - a) le bombardement aveugle des zones d'habitation, des écoles et des hôpitaux, et le massacre de malades, de femmes et d'enfants;
 - b) les armes utilisées au cours de l'agression israélienne contre le Liban;
 - c) les conditions de détention des combattants libanais et palestiniens faits prisonniers.

Cette commission présentera un rapport sur ses activités au Comité exécutif qui le soumettra au Conseil interparlementaire en avril 1983;

B.

1. demande à nouveau à Israël de se retirer immédiatement de tous les territoires arabes occupés depuis 1967, d'abandonner les colonies,

de s'abstenir d'en implanter de nouvelles, de faciliter le retour des Palestiniens déplacés et expulsés et de mettre un terme à tous les actes d'oppression dirigés contre les résistants à l'occupation israélienne;

2. considère que les principes contenus dans la décision du douzième sommet arabe à Fez concernant l'invasion du Liban par Israël et la question palestinienne constituent une base pour une solution juste et permanente du problème du Moyen-Orient et de la question palestinienne, et affirme que la légitimité internationale devra constituer la base essentielle de tout règlement de la question palestinienne;
3. fait appel à toutes les parties concernées pour qu'elles engagent dans le cadre des Nations Unies, dès que les conditions le permettront, des négociations pour une paix juste et durable au Moyen-Orient, en prenant en considération toutes les résolutions pertinentes des Nations Unies;

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charge le Secrétaire général de l'Union interparlementaire de faire figurer dans le Rapport annuel qu'il présentera à la 70e Conférence interparlementaire des informations sur l'exécution par Israël de cette résolution ainsi que des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité et de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies exigeant le retrait immédiat, total et inconditionnel du Liban.

ANNEXE XIX

LA SITUATION AU LIBAN ET LA QUESTION PALESTINIENNE

Vote sur le préambule et la section A

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 586
 Voix négatives 58
 Abstentions 132

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------------------|--------|-----|-----|
| Algérie | 13 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Rép. de Corée | absent | | |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | | absent | | Irak | 13 | - | - | Rép. dém. allemande | 13 | - | - |
| Australie | - | 11 | 2 | Irlande | 11 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | absent | | |
| Autriche | 7 | 5 | - | Islande | | absent | | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | absent | | |
| Belgique | - | 5 | 5 | Israël | - | 11 | - | Rép. unie du Cameroun | 12 | - | - |
| Bénin | 11 | - | - | Italie | 5 | - | 7 | Roumanie | 14 | - | - |
| Brésil | | absent | | Japon | 1 | - | 19 | Royaume-Uni | - | - | 17 |
| Bulgarie | 12 | - | - | Jordanie | 10 | - | - | Rwanda | 11 | - | - |
| Canada | 2 | 4 | 5 | Kenya | 13 | - | - | Sénégal | absent | | |
| Cap Vert | 9 | - | - | Koweït | 10 | - | - | Singapour | absent | | |
| Chypre | 9 | - | - | Liban | | absent | | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Congo | | absent | | Luxembourg | | absent | | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | | absent | | Malaisie | | absent | | Sri Lanka | absent | | |
| Côte d'Ivoire | | absent | | Mali | 10 | - | - | Suède | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suisse | - | - | 10 |
| Danemark | 3 | 3 | 6 | Mexique | 5 | - | - | Tchécoslovaquie | 13 | - | - |
| Djibouti | | absent | | Monaco | | absent | | Thaïlande | 16 | - | - |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Mongolie | 10 | - | - | Togo | 5 | - | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Mozambique | 13 | - | 5 | Tunisie | 5 | - | - |
| Equateur | 5 | - | - | Népal | - | - | - | URSS | 22 | - | - |
| Espagne | | absent | | Nicaragua | 10 | - | - | Venezuela | - | - | 5 |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | - | 10 | 10 | Nigeria | 10 | - | - | Viet Nam | absent | | |
| Finlande | 10 | 1 | - | Norvège | 2 | 2 | 6 | Yemen | 10 | - | - |
| France | 2 | 4 | 9 | Nouvelle-Zélande | | absent | | Yemen démo-cratique | 10 | - | - |
| Gabon | - | - | 5 | Ouganda | 13 | - | - | Yougoslavie | 14 | - | - |
| Grèce | 12 | - | - | Panama | - | - | 5 | Zaïre | absent | | |
| Guinée | | absent | | Pays-Bas | - | - | 13 | Zambie | 10 | - | - |
| Haïti | | absent | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |
| Hongrie | 10 | - | - | Pologne | 15 | - | - | | | | |
| Inde | 10 | - | - | Portugal | 2 | 2 | 3 | | | | |
| Indonésie | 21 | - | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | 12 | - | - | | | | |

ANNEXE XX

LA SITUATION AU LIBAN ET LA QUESTION PALESTINIENNE

Vote sur la section B

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 677
 Voix négatives 25
 Abstentions 86

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------------------|-----|--------|-----|
| Algérie | 13 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Rép. de Corée | | absent | |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | | absent | | Iraq | - | - | 13 | Rép. dém. allemande | 13 | - | - |
| Australie | 10 | 3 | - | Irlande | 11 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | | absent | |
| Autriche | 7 | - | 5 | Israël | - | 11 | - | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | | absent | |
| Belgique | - | - | 10 | Italie | 14 | - | 1 | Rép. unie du Cameroun | 12 | - | - |
| Bénin | 5 | - | - | Japon | 1 | - | 19 | Roumanie | 14 | - | - |
| Brésil | | absent | | Jordanie | 10 | - | - | Royaume-Uni | 17 | - | - |
| Bulgarie | 12 | - | - | Kenya | 13 | - | - | Rwanda | 10 | - | - |
| Canada | 6 | 1 | 5 | Koweït | 10 | - | - | Sénégal | | absent | |
| Cap Vert | 5 | - | - | Liban | | absent | | Singapour | | absent | |
| Chypre | 9 | - | - | Luxembourg | - | - | 5 | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Congo | | absent | | Malaisie | | absent | | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | | absent | | Mali | 10 | - | - | Sri Lanka | | absent | |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 5 | - | - | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suède | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Mexique | 10 | - | - | Suisse | 10 | - | - |
| Danemark | 3 | 3 | 6 | Monaco | | absent | | Tchécoslovaquie | 13 | - | - |
| Djibouti | | absent | | Mongolie | 10 | - | - | Thaïlande | 15 | - | - |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Togo | 5 | - | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Népal | | absent | | Tunisie | 5 | - | - |
| Equateur | | absent | | Nicaragua | 10 | - | - | URSS | 22 | - | - |
| Espagne | | absent | | Nigeria | 10 | - | - | Venezuela | - | - | 5 |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | 15 | 5 | - | Norvège | 2 | 2 | 6 | Viet Nam | 15 | - | - |
| Finlande | 10 | - | 1 | Nouvelle-Zélande | | absent | | Yemen | 10 | - | - |
| France | 15 | - | - | Ouganda | 13 | - | - | Yemen démocratique | 10 | - | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Panama | | absent | | Yougoslavie | 14 | - | - |
| Grèce | 12 | - | - | Pays-Bas | 13 | - | - | Zaïre | | absent | |
| Guinée | | absent | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zambie | 10 | - | - |
| Haïti | | absent | | Pologne | 15 | - | - | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |
| Hongrie | 10 | - | - | Portugal | 2 | - | 5 | | | | |
| Inde | 10 | - | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | 12 | - | - | | | | |
| Indonésie | 21 | - | - | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE XXI

LA SITUATION AU LIBAN ET LA
QUESTION PALESTINIENNE

Vote sur la résolution

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 617
 Voix négatives 32
 Abstentions 132

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------------------|-----|--------|-----|
| Algérie | 13 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Rép. de Corée | | absent | |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | | absent | | Irak | 13 | - | - | Rép. dém. allemande | 13 | - | - |
| Australie | - | 7 | 6 | Irlande | 11 | - | 5 | Rép. dominicaine | | absent | |
| Autriche | 7 | 5 | - | Israël | - | - | 11 | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | | absent | |
| Belgique | - | 5 | - | Italie | 14 | - | 1 | Rép. unie du Cameroun | 12 | - | - |
| Bénin | 5 | - | - | Japon | 1 | - | 19 | Roumanie | 14 | - | - |
| Brésil | | absent | | Jordanie | 10 | - | - | Royaume-Uni | - | - | 17 |
| Bulgarie | 12 | - | | Kenya | 13 | - | - | Rwanda | 10 | - | - |
| Canada | 2 | 4 | 6 | Koweït | 10 | - | - | Sénégal | | absent | |
| Cap Vert | 5 | - | - | Liban | | absent | | Singapour | | absent | |
| Chypre | 9 | - | - | Luxembourg | - | - | 5 | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Congo | | absent | | Malaisie | | absent | | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | | absent | | Mali | 5 | - | - | Sri Lanka | | absent | |
| Côte d'Ivoire | | absent | | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suède | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Mexique | 10 | - | - | Suisse | - | - | 10 |
| Danemark | 3 | 3 | 6 | Monaco | | absent | | Tchécoslovaquie | 13 | - | - |
| Djibouti | | absent | | Mongolie | 10 | - | - | Thaïlande | 15 | - | - |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Togo | 5 | - | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Népal | | absent | | Tunisie | 5 | - | - |
| Equateur | 5 | - | - | Nicaragua | 10 | - | - | URSS | 22 | - | - |
| Espagne | | absent | | Nigeria | 10 | - | - | Venezuela | - | - | 10 |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | - | 5 | 15 | Norvège | 2 | 2 | 6 | Viet Nam | 15 | - | - |
| Finlande | 10 | 1 | - | Nouvelle-Zélande | | absent | | Yemen | 10 | - | - |
| France | - | - | 10 | Ouganda | 13 | - | - | Yemen démocratique | 10 | - | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Panama | | absent | | Yougoslavie | 14 | - | - |
| Grèce | 12 | - | - | Pays-Bas | 13 | - | - | Zaire | | absent | |
| Guinée | | absent | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zambie | 10 | - | - |
| Haïti | | absent | | Pologne | 15 | - | - | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |
| Hongrie | 10 | - | - | Portugal | 5 | - | - | | | | |
| Inde | 10 | - | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | 12 | - | - | | | | |
| Indonésie | 21 | - | - | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE XXII

PROPOSITION POUR UNE PAIX DÉFINITIVE ENTRE L'IRAQ ET L'IRAN

(Résolution adoptée sans vote)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

réaffirmant sa conviction que le seul moyen viable de régler les questions controversées entre Etats est le recours à la négociation, et soulignant la nécessité de renoncer complètement à la menace de recours à la force ou à l'usage de la force pour le règlement des différends entre Etats ou peuples,

rappelant les résolutions 479 (1980) et 514 (1982) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies,

profondément inquiète de la prolongation du conflit entre les deux pays, qui a entraîné de lourdes pertes en vies humaines et des dommages matériels considérables, mettant en danger la paix et la sécurité,

prenant note des efforts de médiation déployés, notamment, par le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies et son représentant, aussi bien que par le Mouvement des pays non alignés et l'Organisation de la Conférence islamique,

1. appelle à un cessez-le-feu immédiat et à la fin de toutes les opérations militaires, ainsi qu'au retrait de toutes les forces jusque dans leurs frontières internationalement reconnues;
2. appelle toutes les parties au conflit à coopérer entièrement aux efforts de médiation du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies en vue d'établir une base de négociations destinées à aboutir à un règlement global, juste et honorable du conflit.

ANNEXE XXIII

L'INVASION DE L'AFGHANISTAN

(Résolution adoptée par 439 voix contre 164 et 88 abstentions)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

considérant en général la question de la recherche d'une solution politique au problème de l'invasion et de l'occupation par des troupes étrangères et tenant compte en particulier de la situation en Afghanistan,

1. demande instantement la mise en oeuvre de la résolution adoptée le 12 avril 1980 par le Conseil interparlementaire, de celle adoptée le 23 septembre 1980 par la 67e Conférence interparlementaire, de la résolution de la troisième Conférence islamique réunie du 25 au 28 janvier 1981 et de la résolution de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies en date du 18 novembre 1981, qui demandent le retrait immédiat des troupes étrangères de l'Afghanistan en vue de permettre à son peuple de décider de la forme de son Gouvernement et de choisir son système économique, politique et social sans ingérence, subversion, coercition ou contrainte de l'extérieur, sous quelque forme que ce soit, et invitent tous les Etats à respecter la souveraineté, l'intégrité territoriale, l'indépendance politique et la qualité de non-aligné de l'Afghanistan;
2. demande en conséquence à l'Union soviétique de retirer ses troupes de l'Afghanistan dans les meilleurs délais, en invitant les parties concernées à se mettre d'accord pour la réalisation urgente d'une solution politique conformément aux dispositions des résolutions mentionnées ci-dessus.

ANNEXE XXIV

L'INVASION DE L'AFGHANISTAN

Vote sur la résolution

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 439
 Voix négatives 164
 Abstentions 88

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------------------|--------|--------|-----|-------------------------|-------------------|--------|-----|
| Algérie | - | - | 13 | Iran | 10 | - | 5 | Rép. de Corée | 15 | - | - |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | | absent | | Irak | absent | | | Rép. dém. allemande | - | 13 | - |
| Australie | 13 | - | - | Irlande | 11 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | | absent | |
| Autriche | 12 | - | - | Islande | 5 | - | - | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | | absent | |
| Belgique | 10 | - | - | Israël | absent | | | Rép. unie du Cameroun | 12 | - | - |
| Bénin | | absent | | Italie | 13 | - | - | Roumanie | n'a pas participé | | |
| Brésil | | absent | | Japon | 20 | - | - | Royaume-Uni | 17 | - | - |
| Bulgarie | - | 12 | - | Jordanie | absent | | | Rwanda | - | - | 10 |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Kenya | 13 | - | - | Sénégal | | absent | |
| Cap Vert | | absent | | Koweït | 10 | - | - | Singapour | | absent | |
| Chypre | 5 | 3 | - | Liban | absent | | | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Congo | | absent | | Luxembourg | 5 | - | - | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | | absent | | Malaisie | absent | | | Sri Lanka | | absent | |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 5 | - | - | Mali | absent | | | Suède | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suisse | 5 | - | - |
| Danemark | 12 | - | - | Mexique | 10 | - | - | Tchécoslovaquie | - | 13 | - |
| Djibouti | | absent | | Monaco | absent | | | Thaïlande | 16 | - | - |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Mongolie | - | 10 | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Mozambique | - | 13 | - | Tunisie | | absent | |
| Equateur | 5 | - | - | Népal | absent | | 5 | URSS | - | 22 | - |
| Espagne | | absent | | Nicaragua | - | - | 15 | Venezuela | 5 | - | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | 20 | - | - | Nigeria | - | - | | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| Finlande | - | - | 11 | Norvège | 10 | - | - | Yemen | | absent | |
| France | 10 | - | - | Nouvelle-Zélande | | absent | 5 | Yemen démocratique | - | 10 | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Ouganda | - | - | | Yougoslavie | - | - | 14 |
| Grèce | 10 | 2 | - | Panama | absent | | | Zaïre | | absent | |
| Guinée | | absent | | Pays-Bas | 13 | - | - | Zambie | - | - | 10 |
| Haïti | | absent | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zimbabwe | n'a pas participé | | |
| Hongrie | - | 10 | - | Pologne | - | 15 | - | | | | |
| Inde | | absent | | Portugal | 6 | 2 | - | | | | |
| Indonésie | 21 | - | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | - | 12 | - | | | | |

ANNEXE XXV

L'AGRESSION ÉTHIOPIENNE CONTRE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE
SOMALIE ET LES DANGERS QUI PEUVENT EN RÉSULTER POUR LA
PAIX ET LA SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALES

(Résolution adoptée par 365 voix contre 170 et 170 abstentions)

La 69e Conférence,

consciente de l'obligation qu'ont tous les Etats de s'abstenir, dans leurs relations internationales, de la menace de recours à la force ou de l'usage de la force contre la souveraineté, l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique d'un Etat quelconque ou d'agir d'une manière incompatible avec les principes et les buts énoncés dans la Charte des Nations Unies,

consciente du fait que l'invasion éthiopienne tend à déstabiliser la région tout entière et constitue une menace pour la paix et la sécurité internationales,

1. condamne énergiquement l'invasion militaire effectuée par l'Ethiopie et ses alliés et dirigée contre la souveraineté, l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique de la République démocratique somalie;
2. déplore la poursuite du conflit entre la Somalie et l'Ethiopie, appelle à la cessation immédiate des hostilités, demande instamment à toutes les parties au conflit de négocier une solution politique conforme aux principes de la Charte de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine, et demande aussi le retrait immédiat, total et inconditionnel de toutes forces étrangères du territoire de la République démocratique somalie.

ANNEXE XXVI

L'AGRESSION ETHIOPIENNE CONTRE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE SOMALIE
ET LES DANGERS QUI PEUVENT EN RESULTER POUR LA PAIX
ET LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALES

Vote sur le préambule et le paragraphe 1 du dispositif

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 333
Voix négatives 206
Abstentions 131

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------------------|-----|-------------------|-----|-------------------------|-----|--------|-----|
| Algérie | - | - | 13 | Iran | 5 | - | 10 | Rép. de Corée | - | absent | - |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | - | absent | - | Irak | - | absent | - | Rép. dém. allemande | - | 13 | - |
| Australie | 13 | - | - | Irlande | 10 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | - | absent | - |
| Autriche | 12 | - | - | Islande | - | absent | - | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | - | absent | - |
| Belgique | 10 | - | - | Israël | - | - | 11 | Rép. unie du Cameroun | - | - | 12 |
| Bénin | - | 5 | - | Italie | 8 | - | 5 | Roumanie | - | 14 | - |
| Brésil | - | absent | - | Japon | 14 | - | 1 | Royaume-Uni | 17 | - | - |
| Bulgarie | - | 12 | - | Jordanie | - | absent | - | Rwanda | - | - | 10 |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Kenya | - | - | 13 | Sénégal | - | absent | - |
| Cap Vert | - | 5 | - | Koweït | 10 | - | - | Singapour | - | absent | - |
| Chypre | 2 | 2 | 2 | Liban | - | absent | - | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Congo | - | absent | - | Luxembourg | 5 | - | - | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | - | absent | - | Malaisie | - | absent | - | Sri Lanka | - | absent | - |
| Côte d'Ivoire | - | - | 5 | Mali | - | absent | - | Suède | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suisse | 5 | - | - |
| Danemark | 12 | - | - | Mexique | - | - | 5 | Tchécoslovaquie | - | 13 | - |
| Djibouti | - | absent | - | Monaco | - | absent | - | Thaïlande | 10 | - | 6 |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Mongolie | - | 10 | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Mozambique | - | n'a pas participé | - | Tunisie | - | absent | - |
| Equateur | 5 | - | - | Népal | - | absent | - | URSS | - | 22 | - |
| Espagne | 5 | - | - | Nicaragua | - | 5 | - | Venezuela | 5 | - | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | - | - | - | Nigeria | - | 15 | - | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| Finlande | - | - | 11 | Norvège | 10 | - | - | Yemen | - | absent | - |
| France | 10 | - | - | Nouvelle-Zélande | - | absent | - | Yemen démocratique | - | 10 | - |
| Gabon | - | absent | - | Ouganda | - | - | 13 | Yougoslavie | - | - | 14 |
| Grèce | 10 | 2 | - | Panama | - | absent | - | Zaïre | - | absent | - |
| Guinée | - | absent | - | Pays-Bas | 13 | - | - | Zambie | - | absent | - |
| Haïti | - | absent | - | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zimbabwe | - | 12 | - |
| Hongrie | - | 10 | - | Pologne | - | 15 | - | | | | |
| Inde | - | absent | - | Portugal | 6 | 2 | - | | | | |
| Indonésie | 21 | - | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | - | 12 | - | | | | |

ANNEXE XXVII

L'AGRESSION ETHIOPIENNE CONTRE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE
SOMALIE ET LES DANGERS QUI PEUVENT EN RESULTER POUR
LA PAIX ET LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALES

Vote sur la résolution

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 365
Voix négatives 170
Abstentions 170

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------------------|-------------------|--------|-----|-------------------------|-----|--------|-----|
| Algérie | - | - | 13 | Iran | 5 | - | 10 | Rép. de Corée | - | absent | - |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | - | absent | - | Iraq | 13 | - | - | Rép. dém. allemande | - | 13 | - |
| Australie | 13 | - | - | Irlande | 10 | - | - | Rép. dominicaine | - | absent | - |
| Autriche | 10 | - | - | Islande | 5 | - | - | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | - | absent | - |
| Belgique | 10 | - | - | Israël | - | - | 11 | Rép. unie du Cameroun | - | - | 12 |
| Bénin | - | - | 10 | Italie | 8 | - | 5 | Roumanie | - | 14 | - |
| Brésil | - | absent | - | Japon | 14 | - | 1 | Royaume-Uni | 17 | - | - |
| Bulgarie | - | 12 | - | Jordanie | - | absent | - | Rwanda | 10 | - | - |
| Canada | 14 | - | - | Kenya | - | - | 13 | Sénégal | - | absent | - |
| Cap Vert | - | absent | - | Koweït | 10 | - | - | Singapour | - | absent | - |
| Chypre | 2 | 3 | - | Liban | - | absent | - | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Congo | - | absent | - | Luxembourg | 5 | - | - | Soudan | 13 | - | - |
| Costa Rica | - | absent | - | Malaisie | - | absent | - | Sri Lanka | - | absent | - |
| Côte d'Ivoire | - | - | 5 | Mali | - | absent | - | Suède | 12 | - | - |
| Cuba | - | 12 | - | Maroc | 14 | - | - | Suisse | 5 | - | - |
| Danemark | 12 | - | - | Mexique | - | - | 5 | Tchécoslovaquie | - | 13 | - |
| Djibouti | - | absent | - | Monaco | - | absent | - | Thaïlande | 16 | - | - |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Mongolie | - | 10 | - | Togo | 10 | - | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | 9 | - | - | Mozambique | n'a pas participé | - | - | Tunisie | - | absent | - |
| Equateur | 5 | - | - | Népal | - | absent | - | URSS | - | 22 | - |
| Espagne | 5 | - | - | Nicaragua | - | 5 | - | Venezuela | 5 | - | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | - | - | - | Nigeria | - | - | 10 | Viet Nam | - | 15 | - |
| Finlande | - | - | 11 | Norvège | 10 | - | - | Yemen | - | absent | - |
| France | 10 | - | - | Nouvelle-Zélande | - | absent | - | Yemen démocratique | - | 10 | - |
| Gabon | - | - | 5 | Ouganda | - | - | 13 | Yugoslavie | - | - | 14 |
| Grèce | 10 | 2 | - | Panama | - | absent | - | Zaire | - | absent | - |
| Guinée | - | absent | - | Pays-Bas | 13 | - | - | Zambie | - | - | 10 |
| Haïti | - | absent | - | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zimbabwe | - | - | 12 |
| Hongrie | - | 10 | - | Pologne | - | 15 | - | | | | |
| Inde | - | - | 10 | Portugal | 6 | 2 | - | | | | |
| Indonésie | 21 | - | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | - | 12 | - | | | | |

ANNEXE XXVIII

L'ÉVOLUTION DES INSTITUTIONS PARLEMENTAIRES DANS LE RESPECT
DE LA CONSTITUTION ET LEUR ACTIVITÉ DANS LE
DOMAINE DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES

(Résolution adoptée sans vote)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

rappelant que l'institution parlementaire représente un élément fondamental d'équilibre des pouvoirs dans les régimes démocratiques, qu'elle joue un rôle significatif dans la garantie du respect de la Constitution et des droits de l'homme, et qu'elle assume une fonction essentielle dans le domaine des relations internationales,

rappelant les dispositions de la Charte des Nations Unies, en particulier celles des chapitres I et II, et l'engagement des Etats membres de les respecter,

estimant que l'évolution des institutions parlementaires dans le respect de la Constitution et la consécration des fondements pacifiques de la politique étrangère des Etats dans leur législation nationale contribuent à la réalisation de la coopération pacifique entre les Etats,

soulignant que les parlementaires, dès lors qu'ils sont choisis par le peuple au moyen d'élections libres et équitables, tenues à intervalles réguliers, d'une part constituent un lien très fort entre les Parlements des différents pays, bien illustré par les contacts étroits qu'ils entretiennent au sein de l'Union interparlementaire et, d'autre part, sont un intermédiaire irremplaçable pour assurer la permanence de l'indispensable dialogue entre les organes du pouvoir et les citoyens, y compris sur les problèmes des relations internationales,

convaincue de la nécessité de perfectionner et de mieux utiliser les formes et les méthodes d'action des Parlements tendant à influencer la politique extérieure des Gouvernements afin qu'elle serve la cause de la paix, de la sécurité internationale, de l'amitié et de la coopération entre les peuples,

1. invite les Parlements, compte tenu de la Constitution et des traditions de leurs pays, à trouver des méthodes et des formes d'action appropriées en vue de renforcer leur influence sur la politique extérieure de leurs Gouvernements de façon à ce que ceux-ci contribuent de façon accrue à la consolidation de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, à la promotion de la détente et du processus de désarmement, et au développement de la coopération, de l'amitié et de la confiance entre les peuples;
2. recommande plus spécialement les formes suivantes de l'activité parlementaire qui concourent à l'orientation de la politique extérieure du Gouvernement et au contrôle exercé sur elle par le Parlement :
 - l'examen systématique et public, au sein du Parlement et de ses organes spécialisés, des principales questions de politique étrangère et plus particulièrement des problèmes de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, de l'arrêt de la course aux armements et du désarmement;
 - la soumission au Parlement, pour approbation de tous les traités et accords internationaux importants auxquels les Gouvernements entendent que leur pays soit partie, l'harmonisation de leur législation nationale avec ceux-ci et la prise de dispositions permettant aux Parlements nationaux d'en contrôler la mise en oeuvre effective;
 - l'information du Parlement, sous les diverses formes existantes, au sujet des principales négociations menées par le Gouvernement, de la politique de celui-ci au sein des organisations internationales, ainsi que de l'activité de ces organisations;
 - l'inclusion dans la législation nationale, d'une façon qui corresponde aux pratiques et aux procédures démocratiques nationales, des principes régissant les relations entre Etats qui sont énoncés dans la Charte des Nations Unies et d'autres instruments juridiques internationaux;
3. encourage tous les parlementaires à se tenir étroitement informés de la politique étrangère de leur Gouvernement et à tenter d'en infléchir le cours par tous les moyens à leur disposition dans un sens favorable à la paix dans le monde, au respect des droits de l'homme et à la réalisation des objectifs des Nations Unies;
4. estime indispensable à cet effet de renforcer les contacts interparlementaires au niveau international, destinés à favoriser le respect et la compréhension mutuels;
5. demande à tous les Parlements d'élaborer et d'adopter dans leurs pays respectifs une législation garantissant la liberté politique et économique en faveur de tous les médias afin de permettre, notamment, un échange de vues libre, équitable et complet touchant les relations entre Etats et, partant, de promouvoir une compréhension mutuelle dans l'esprit de la Charte des Nations Unies et des Statuts de l'Union interparlementaire;

6. encourage les instances dirigeantes de tous les pays à favoriser la participation des populations aux prises de décisions politiques, sans ingérence induite de groupes de pression institutionnalisés, en mettant en place, par les voies démocratiques, des institutions représentatives décentralisées dotées de compétences réelles et de ressources financières suffisantes, ainsi que d'autres moyens éventuels dans l'esprit de la Constitution et des traditions de chaque pays;
7. invite les Parlements de tous les pays à exercer un contrôle vigilant, concret et permanent de l'action gouvernementale, notamment dans le domaine des relations internationales, et à se doter à cet effet de moyens d'investigation, d'étude et de prévision fiables et indépendants de l'Exécutif grâce, notamment, aux moyens d'information modernes, y compris la mise en oeuvre de commissions parlementaires appropriées, dotées de larges pouvoirs d'investigation;
8. invite instamment tous les Parlements à garantir l'inviolabilité des droits des parlementaires, y compris de ceux de la minorité, dans l'exercice de leur mandat, notamment en ce qui concerne les relations entre Etats;
9. appelle les Parlements et l'Union interparlementaire à rechercher les moyens appropriés de renforcer la participation des parlementaires à l'action des Nations Unies;
10. appelle les Parlements à considérer le concept des droits de l'homme comme un et indivisible, notamment les droits de caractère politique, économique et social, les droits des individus et des peuples, la liberté d'opinion, d'expression et d'association, ainsi que le droit à la vie;
11. encourage les Parlements à s'informer mutuellement, y compris par l'entremise de l'Union interparlementaire, de leurs activités dans le domaine international;
12. invite les Parlements et les Gouvernements à prendre en considération les résolutions adoptées par les Conférences interparlementaires et portées à leur attention, conformément aux Statuts de l'Union, par les Groupes nationaux respectifs.

ANNEXE XXIX

LA FAIM DANS LE MONDE

THEMES PRINCIPAUX :

- a) PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION ET CONSOMMATION ALIMENTAIRES DANS LES PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT;
- b) OBTENTION A DES PRIX ABORDABLES PAR LES PAYS A FAIBLE REVENU DE FOURNITURES ALIMENTAIRES SUR LE MARCHE INTERNATIONAL;
- c) AIDE ALIMENTAIRE AUX PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT JUSQU'A CE QU'ILS AIENT ATTEINT UN STADE APPROPRIE D'AUTO-SUFFISANCE

(Résolution adoptée sans vote)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

rappelant

- a) la Déclaration universelle pour l'élimination définitive de la faim et de la malnutrition adoptée par la Conférence mondiale de l'alimentation (Rome, novembre 1974),
- b) la Déclaration et le Programme d'action concernant l'instauration d'un nouvel ordre économique international adoptés par les Nations Unies (New York, mai 1974),
- c) la Déclaration de principes et le Programme d'action de la Conférence mondiale sur la réforme agraire et le développement rural (Rome, juillet 1979),
- d) les recommandations adoptées par le Conseil mondial de l'alimentation, lors de la 8e réunion des ministres (Acapulco, juin 1982),
- e) les résolutions faisant suite au rapport du Conseil mondial de l'alimentation adoptées par la 36e session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, relatives à l'alimentation et l'agriculture, la situation de l'alimentation et de l'agriculture en Afrique et la convocation d'une conférence mondiale de la population (New York, décembre 1981),

- f) la Stratégie mondiale de la conservation (1980) qui met l'accent sur la nécessité de contrôler les processus écologiques essentiels et les systèmes entretenant la vie, de préserver la diversité génétique et de veiller à l'utilisation durable des espèces et des écosystèmes,
- g) la Déclaration de Colombo, adoptée par la Conférence internationale de parlementaires sur la population et le développement (septembre 1979) ainsi que les Conclusions et Recommandations de la Conférence parlementaire sur la population et le développement en Afrique (Nairobi, juillet 1981),
- h) la résolution sur les tendances démographiques et le développement économique et social adoptée par la 61e Conférence interparlementaire (Tokyo, octobre 1974) ainsi que la résolution de la 67e Conférence interparlementaire sur la troisième Décennie des Nations Unies pour le développement (Berlin (RDA), septembre 1980),
- i) la Déclaration conjointe des Présidents de la Rencontre au sommet Nord-Sud, tenue à Cancún en octobre 1981,

rappeant également la Stratégie internationale du développement pour la troisième Décennie des Nations Unies pour le développement, adoptée à la 35e session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies en décembre 1980, et réaffirmant la nécessité d'adopter d'urgence des mesures globales, à l'échelle tant nationale qu'internationale, destinées à réaliser les objectifs de la Stratégie internationale du développement en ce qui concerne la promotion du développement agricole et alimentaire dans les pays en développement,

prenant en considération le rapport en date du 12 février 1980 de la Commission indépendante sur les problèmes internationaux du développement, présidée par M. Willy Brandt,

prenant également en considération l'appel du 24 juin 1981 contre les ravages causés par la faim, signé de 79 Prix Nobel et approuvé par de nombreux chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement, ministres, membres de Parlement, directeurs d'organisations internationales, administrateurs locaux, intellectuels, ecclésiastiques et simples citoyens de différents pays,

consciente du fait que des centaines de millions de personnes souffrent de la faim, notamment des femmes et des jeunes enfants, et du fait que, si la tendance actuelle se poursuit, le nombre des affamés sera beaucoup plus élevé à la fin du siècle,

consciente du fait que la faim et la malnutrition ne sont habituellement pas dues à un manque de nourriture en soi mais plutôt à l'état de pauvreté des groupes mal nourris, qui les empêche d'accéder aux approvisionnements disponibles sur le marché, et consciente en outre du fait que, d'une manière générale, les efforts déployés pour accroître la production alimentaire seront impuissants à régler le problème alimentaire si une action simultanée n'intervient pas pour réduire la pauvreté,

considérant que le développement rationnel d'un pays ne peut être entrepris que dans la mesure où son peuple peut d'abord se nourrir,

soulignant l'importance de la coopération internationale en matière d'alimentation, de financement, de commerce, de science et de technologie en tant que moyen de contribuer au développement agricole et alimentaire dans les pays en développement et d'accroître la production alimentaire de ces pays, le stockage et les capacités de distribution, en vue d'aboutir à l'auto-suffisance alimentaire au maximum,

reconnaissant que la situation alimentaire est particulièrement préoccupante dans certains pays à bas revenu où la production alimentaire a pris du retard sur la croissance démographique et la demande, provoquant ainsi un accroissement rapide des importations alimentaires qui affaiblit encore leur balance des paiements, et exposant la population concernée aux risques du recours à des marchés fluctuants,

exprimant sa vive inquiétude devant une poussée démographique qui, dans les années à venir, ne fera qu'aggraver le déficit alimentaire que connaissent les pays en développement, en particulier si aucune solution structurelle précise n'est trouvée pour régler les problèmes alimentaires urgents auxquels ils sont confrontés,

déplorant le gaspillage de vastes ressources - financières, matérielles et humaines - à la production et au déploiement des armes, ressources qui pourraient être utilisées à combattre la faim dans le monde et à soulager les déshérités de tous les pays,

reconnaissant que la faim et la malnutrition constituent des aspects du problème général du sous-développement et que la réduction de l'écart entre les pays industrialisés et les pays en développement contribue aussi à l'élimination des tensions politiques, au renforcement de l'indépendance des pays en développement et au maintien de la paix dans le monde,

reconnaissant que la faim et la malnutrition qui règnent dans nombre de pays en développement sont dues historiquement au fait que ces pays ont connu une période d'oppression coloniale au cours de laquelle le système de la monoculture a longtemps empêché, au profit des colonialistes, le développement de l'agriculture et des produits alimentaires,

reconnaissant également le caractère global et corrélatif des négociations économiques internationales et, partant, que l'alimentation constitue une partie indivisible de la série de sujets qui doivent être abordés lors des négociations, en vue de contribuer à une solution urgente et durable des problèmes alimentaires qui intéressent les pays insuffisamment développés,

1. déclare solennellement que l'accès à la nourriture constitue une nécessité humaine fondamentale et l'un des droits de l'homme universels;
2. demande aux Parlements et aux Gouvernements de considérer la solution du problème de l'éradication de la famine comme l'un des objectifs les plus importants des stratégies nationales et internationales du développement dans le cadre des recommandations du Conseil mondial de l'alimentation;
3. souligne que la solution des problèmes alimentaires dans les pays en développement et l'objectif d'accroître leur autonomie en matière d'alimentation relèvent en premier lieu et avant tout de la responsabilité des pays en développement eux-mêmes;

4. souligne le fait que la solution aux problèmes alimentaires dans les pays en développement est liée au développement global de ces pays, et qu'une distribution plus équitable des revenus et de la richesse est l'une des conditions préalables essentielles pour assurer l'accès de chacun à la nourriture;
5. estime que le but premier de l'aide alimentaire devrait être d'aider les pays en développement à affronter les situations d'urgence résultant notamment d'une conjoncture difficile ou d'une calamité, sans pour autant se substituer aux efforts déployés par ceux-ci pour réduire leur déficit vivrier ni compromettre ces efforts;
6. exprime sa profonde inquiétude face à la perpétuation et l'approfondissement des phénomènes de crise et d'instabilité dans l'économie mondiale et dans les relations économiques internationales, face aux graves dangers que ceux-ci représentent pour le développement économique et social de tous les pays, en premier lieu celui des pays en développement, et face à leurs conséquences sur la faim et la malnutrition;
7. est également convaincue de ce que, si des mesures adéquates sont prises afin qu'elle perde son effet dissuasif sur la production alimentaire, l'aide alimentaire peut constituer une source de développement importante dans la lutte contre la faim;
8. attire l'attention sur le fait que l'aide alimentaire et le commerce des produits alimentaires ne doivent pas être utilisés pour exercer une pression politique et économique sur les pays bénéficiaires de cette aide;
9. considère également, néanmoins, que les pays en développement ont besoin d'un afflux massif supplémentaire de ressources financières effectives, du transfert de technologie et de savoir-faire technologique, ainsi que d'une assistance technique conformément aux stratégies adoptées par les pays bénéficiaires dans le secteur alimentaire et dans le respect le plus strict de la souveraineté nationale et de l'autodétermination, en vue de progresser dans la voie de structures de production alimentaire visant à éliminer la faim et la malnutrition et à promouvoir un développement général;
10. se félicite de l'accord intervenu au début de 1982 sur la reconstitution des ressources du Fonds international de développement agricole;
11. se félicite de ce que l'objectif annuel des 500.000 tonnes de céréales fixé pour la Réserve alimentaire internationale d'urgence ait été atteint en 1981, et invite la communauté internationale à intensifier sa participation dans le contexte des engagements volontaires effectués de concert avec les Conférences biennales du Programme alimentaire mondial, afin que l'objectif continue d'être atteint ou qu'il soit dépassé;

12. invite la communauté internationale à reconduire la Convention relative à l'aide alimentaire adoptée en 1980 et qui vient à expiration le 30 juin 1983, dans l'espoir que des engagements supplémentaires seront souscrits par les signataires actuels de la Convention et par de nouveaux membres potentiels pour permettre d'atteindre l'objectif de 10 millions de tonnes de céréales fixé par celle-ci;
13. se réjouit de la décision prise en 1981 par le Fonds monétaire international de créer des facilités supplémentaires pour l'importation en faveur des pays ayant des besoins d'importation de denrées alimentaires très élevés et dont, de surcroît, la balance des paiements est déficitaire;
14. affirme également que le protectionnisme sous toutes ses formes est nuisible aux objectifs visant à la libéralisation des échanges mondiaux et à l'accès aux marchés des pays développés des produits des pays en développement, privant ces derniers des ressources continues propres à accélérer la modernisation de leur agriculture et à accroître la production et la productivité alimentaires;
15. affirme que le protectionnisme ne favorise pas en soi le développement d'exploitations agricoles viables, efficaces et adéquates et qu'il a plutôt pour effet de priver toutes les populations des profits tirés de la spécialisation internationale dans la production de tous les produits alimentaires;
16. invite les pays industrialisés à prendre des mesures positives en vue d'améliorer les marchés internationaux de produits alimentaires de façon à promouvoir la stabilité des prix au moyen d'accords et d'arrangements similaires sur les produits de base et à assurer un meilleur accès et des termes de l'échange plus favorables aux pays en développement;
17. considère qu'il faudrait offrir des débouchés suffisants aux exportations des pays en développement, en particulier, et assurer des prix équitables ainsi qu'une protection contre tous dommages causés aux économies en développement par les fluctuations de l'offre des produits de base exportés et à la santé;
18. appelle tous les pays en développement à prendre toutes mesures utiles afin de prévenir tout dommage causé à la santé de leurs populations, tout en assurant des marchés adéquats pour les produits alimentaires artificiels, transformés et en conserve, notamment le lait en poudre destiné aux enfants et d'autres produits laitiers;
19. regrette que le volume minimum de l'aide alimentaire fixé à 10 millions de tonnes de céréales par an par la Conférence mondiale de l'alimentation en 1974 n'ait pas encore été atteint et lance un appel pour que de nouveaux donateurs se manifestent et remplissent leur juste part des obligations de la communauté internationale;

20. invite les Parlements et les Gouvernements à oeuvrer pour la réduction des dépenses militaires et l'affectation exclusive des importantes ressources humaines, financières et matérielles ainsi épargnées au développement économique et social pacifique des peuples en facilitant l'allocation de fonds accrus à l'agriculture et à l'éradication de la famine;
21. demande instamment à tous les Etats membres du Fonds international de développement agricole, notamment les pays qui sont en mesure de le faire, de prendre toutes mesures législatives et autres propres à assurer en temps opportun un afflux de ressources adéquat et continu au titre du premier réapprovisionnement du Fonds, et d'accroître leurs engagements financiers en valeur réelle au titre du deuxième réapprovisionnement pour la période 1984-1986, de sorte que le Fonds puisse poursuivre sa tâche consistant à accroître la production alimentaire, à améliorer les normes nutritionnelles et à augmenter le revenu des petits exploitants et des métayers;
22. demande instamment aux parlementaires et aux Gouvernements de tous les pays d'intensifier leurs efforts en vue d'adopter des politiques et des objectifs céréaliers et de constituer des réserves alimentaires de sécurité conformément aux directives du Plan d'action de la FAO concernant la sécurité alimentaire mondiale;
23. invite les Parlements et les Gouvernements de tous les pays à faire preuve d'une plus grande solidarité internationale dans leurs efforts pour vaincre la faim;
24. invite les pays industrialisés, qu'il s'agisse des pays à économie de marché aussi bien que des pays à économie à planification centrale, à mettre, dans le cadre d'une coopération internationale, une technologie appropriée à la disposition des pays en développement pour aider ces derniers à augmenter leur production agricole;
25. invite tous les pays, en particulier les pays développés, à appliquer les connaissances scientifiques à des fins plus altruistes telles que l'approvisionnement en eau, notamment par la réalisation de pluies artificielles, de sorte que l'humanité dépende moins étroitement de la nature pour la production alimentaire, particulièrement dans les pays en développement;
26. demande instamment aux pays industrialisés d'adapter leurs politiques d'aide de façon à accorder la plus haute priorité, dans la mesure où cela est conforme aux priorités perçues et déclarées des Gouvernements bénéficiaires pris individuellement;
 - a) aux projets et programmes axés sur la production destinée à la consommation locale, dans le contexte d'une égalité croissante à l'accès aux terres, à l'eau et aux autres ressources productives et apports;

- b) à la fourniture de crédits accessibles aux producteurs alimentaires, notamment aux coopératives de production;
 - c) aux programmes et projets visant à aider les producteurs locaux à obtenir un rendement commercial raisonnable pour les produits locaux excédentaires;
 - d) à la recherche effectuée "dans l'optique du producteur" en vue d'accroître la production des cultures vivrières et des semences;
 - e) aux projets et programmes qui, d'une part, reconnaissent et soutiennent les femmes dans leur rôle de producteurs alimentaires et, d'autre part, visent à protéger les enfants;
 - f) au développement de l'infrastructure destinée à améliorer le stockage des produits alimentaires locaux et le transport rural;
 - g) aux programmes et projets destinés à fournir les moyens agricoles (eau, semences, traction, etc.) appropriés et nécessaires aux petits producteurs;
 - h) à la commercialisation des produits agricoles;
27. recommande aux pays en développement d'intensifier les efforts déjà entrepris en vue d'améliorer leur agriculture afin que leur production soit compatible avec leurs taux de croissance démographique de façon que les bénéfices de cette modernisation soient équitablement répartis;
28. prie instamment les Gouvernements de considérer la croissance démographique comme une variable importante dans la lutte contre la faim et pour le développement;
29. invite tous les pays en développement à entreprendre les réformes économiques et sociales appropriées pour soutenir le processus de production alimentaire, notamment par des mesures telles qu'une politique de prix agricoles rémunérateurs pour le producteur, la mise en valeur de nouvelles terres, la redistribution des terres et l'amélioration des systèmes agricoles;
30. invite tous les Gouvernements intéressés à faire en sorte que, dans l'action visant à augmenter la production alimentaire, il soit tenu dûment compte de la nécessité de conserver notamment le sol, l'eau et les ressources génétiques et à empêcher la mise en valeur de superficies non intégrées impropres à la production suivie de denrées alimentaires;
31. recommande que les Groupes nationaux ainsi que leurs Parlements et leurs Gouvernements respectifs accordent une attention particulière à la mise en oeuvre de la résolution sur "Le problème des réfugiés: ses aspects juridiques et humanitaires", adoptée par la 67e Conférence interparlementaire, à Berlin (RDA), notamment pour pouvoir

aux besoins alimentaires des réfugiés dans le monde et pour atténuer les difficultés qu'éprouvent les pays d'accueil à nourrir ces réfugiés, surtout en Afrique et en Asie;

32. demande instamment aux Gouvernements intéressés de veiller à ce qu'à l'action entreprise en faveur du développement soit dûment intégrée l'amélioration de la situation économique et sociale des femmes pour diminuer la malnutrition chez les femmes et les enfants;
33. invite les Parlements à célébrer chaque année, le 16 octobre, la "Journée mondiale de l'alimentation" et à organiser chaque année à cette occasion des activités spécialement consacrées aux problèmes alimentaires et agricoles nationaux et mondiaux;
34. invite les Parlements à examiner la possibilité de proclamer 1984 "Année internationale de l'alimentation" et de prendre à cette occasion des mesures visant à renforcer la prise de conscience eu égard à la gravité des problèmes alimentaires et à fournir une aide accrue aux pays en développement intéressés en ayant à l'esprit le fait que le Conseil mondial de l'alimentation a été invité à préparer un rapport sur l'avancement des travaux à l'occasion du 10e anniversaire de la Conférence mondiale de l'alimentation;
35. invite tous les Groupes nationaux à promouvoir la présente résolution auprès de leurs Parlements et de leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

ANNEXE XXX

L'ETAT DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT MONDIAL DIX ANS APRES LA CONFERENCE DES
NATIONS UNIES SUR LE MILIEU HUMAIN QUI S'EST TENUE A STOCKHOLM,
MESURES A PRENDRE, Y COMPRIS DANS LE DOMAINE DE LA
LEGISLATION, AUX NIVEAUX NATIONAL ET INTERNATIONAL

(Résolution adoptée sans vote)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

réaffirmant la responsabilité de la communauté internationale concernant la préservation et l'amélioration de l'environnement, et considérant que, en dépit des difficultés économiques croissantes qui surgissent dans toutes les parties du monde et, en particulier, les pays les moins développés, la protection de l'environnement ne devrait pas être négligée,

considérant qu'une saine gestion de l'environnement, en tant que fondement d'un développement économique et social soutenu, requiert des efforts accrus même en temps de difficultés économiques,

ayant à l'esprit les éléments de la stratégie internationale du développement de la troisième Décennie des Nations Unies pour le développement, adoptée en décembre 1980 par la 35e Session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, relatifs à l'environnement et aux établissements humains,

notant que l'Union interparlementaire s'est intéressée depuis de nombreuses années et de façon permanente à la protection de l'environnement et à la conservation des ressources,

consciente du rôle joué par l'Union interparlementaire en qualité d'observateur à la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le milieu humain, tenue à Stockholm en 1972,

notant avec satisfaction la présence à la Session de caractère spécial du Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement (PNUE), tenue à Nairobi en mai 1982, d'un représentant de la Commission de l'Union interparlementaire pour l'éducation, la science, la culture et l'environnement,

notant l'importance et la signification de principe des résolutions des 35e et 36e sessions de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies sur la responsabilité historique des Etats en ce qui concerne la préservation de l'environnement humain pour les générations présentes et futures,

ayant à l'esprit les principes fondamentaux ainsi que les recommandations adoptées en juin 1982 par la Conférence de Stockholm, ainsi que les principes adoptés à Nairobi lors de la session de caractère spécial convoquée par le PNUE en mai 1982,

constatant que les progrès de la science et de la technologie ont, depuis la tenue de cette Conférence, permis de mieux préserver le milieu humain, notamment par une meilleure gestion des ressources naturelles et par un meilleur contrôle des effets des polluants sur la faune, la flore, les sols, l'atmosphère et les eaux,

inquiète néanmoins de ce que, de l'avis général, le Plan d'action adopté à Stockholm n'a été réalisé que partiellement, et du fait que ses résultats ne peuvent être considérés comme satisfaisants en raison, notamment, de la coordination inadéquate des méthodes et des efforts, d'un manque de ressources disponibles et d'une distribution inégale de ces ressources,

sachant que la manière de considérer les problèmes par secteurs - dans le cadre de la protection globale de l'environnement - est trop étroite, et que la prise de conscience de l'interdépendance des ressources, de l'environnement, de la population et du développement est à renforcer dans tous les pays,

souhaitant que l'on tienne compte des exigences de la protection de l'environnement au moment de la conception et de l'exécution des projets industriels, en particulier dans les pays en développement,

consciente du fait que la pauvreté et la sur-consommation accroissent les dangers qui menacent l'environnement et de ce que l'établissement d'un nouvel ordre économique international est l'un des principaux instruments propres à inverser le processus de la dégradation de l'environnement,

se félicitant des efforts du PNUE en tant qu'institution mondiale propre à traiter des problèmes de l'environnement et à coordonner les activités en matière d'environnement dans le système des Nations Unies,

consciente de l'efficacité des efforts du PNUE visant à l'élaboration et à la coordination des programmes internationaux d'évaluation des tendances globales en matière d'environnement, à la conservation du patrimoine naturel de l'humanité, à la réduction de la pollution et à l'amélioration de la qualité du milieu humain,

consciente également des difficultés rencontrées par le PNUE pour répondre à l'attente de tous les pays et obtenir les fonds nécessaires afin d'appliquer ses programmes,

se félicitant de la coopération instaurée dans le cadre du Programme pour les mers régionales du PNUE visant à la préservation du milieu marin dans dix régions du monde,

reconnaissant la gravité du problème que pose la pollution atmosphérique transfrontières dans plusieurs régions du monde,

reconnaissant le besoin de développer encore le droit de l'environnement et faisant siennes les conclusions et recommandations de la Réunion spéciale de hauts fonctionnaires d'administrations nationales spécialistes du droit de l'environnement, tenue à Montevideo du 28 octobre au 6 novembre 1981,

déplorant le fait que l'utilisation des armes nucléaires et chimiques dans le passé continuera d'avoir des effets désastreux sur l'environnement durant des décennies et sur plusieurs générations humaines successives,

soulignant qu'à l'heure actuelle l'élimination de la menace de guerre, et plus particulièrement d'une guerre nucléaire, et la cessation de la course aux armements, sont un élément essentiel pour assurer la préservation de la nature,

1. réaffirme son soutien énergique et permanent aux principes et recommandations en matière d'environnement énoncés par le Conférence de Stockholm sur le milieu humain;
2. demande l'établissement d'une coopération internationale plus étroite, afin que les graves problèmes qui se posent actuellement en matière de population, de ressources, d'environnement (y compris la désertification) et de développement puissent être mieux traités à l'avenir;
3. préconise la coopération internationale afin d'assurer une amélioration de l'état sanitaire des établissements humains et l'approvisionnement en eau potable des habitants des pays en développement et des pays sous-développés;
4. invite les Parlements et les Gouvernements à accroître la capacité de leurs pays de prévoir efficacement les conséquences pour l'environnement des activités économiques et du développement technologique, et à tenir compte du facteur environnement dans toute planification des activités économiques;
5. souligne que la solution des problèmes de l'environnement devrait passer par la promotion de politiques de prévision et de prévention, également sur le plan économique;
6. appelle les Parlements et les Gouvernements à constituer des ministères, départements, organismes, autorités, Commissions ou bureaux selon les structures administratives de leur pays en vue de traiter spécifiquement de l'environnement;
7. invite les Gouvernements à encourager le recours à une approche interdisciplinaire pour l'étude des problèmes d'environnement ayant une dimension internationale, et notamment à encourager les efforts déployés sur le plan national et international par les organisations, entreprises et firmes intéressées en vue de la mise au point, de la production et du perfectionnement de l'équipement destiné au contrôle, à la protection et à l'amélioration de la qualité de l'environnement;

8. invite les Parlements et les Gouvernements à prendre des mesures adéquates pour :
- a) créer des instances composées de parlementaires intéressés, en vue de promouvoir la cause de l'environnement;
 - b) organiser un vaste échange de réalisations scientifiques et techniques dans le domaine de la protection de l'environnement en convoquant des congrès, conférences et autres réunions de caractère international entre des scientifiques et des hommes politiques;
 - c) intensifier la diffusion de l'information sur les mesures de protection de l'environnement par les medias;
 - d) promouvoir le développement de l'enseignement relatif à l'environnement au moyen de programmes spéciaux à tous les niveaux, y compris au niveau primaire;
 - e) sensibiliser l'opinion publique à l'idée que la protection préventive et intégrée de l'environnement ne sera possible en fin de compte que si la société industrielle repense et modifie ses habitudes de consommation actuelles;
9. demande aux Groupes nationaux d'agir auprès de leurs Parlements et de leurs Gouvernements respectifs afin de promouvoir :
- a) la ratification des traités et accords internationaux existant en matière d'environnement et l'adoption des mesures nécessaires pour leur mise en oeuvre;
 - b) le développement et l'harmonisation des législations nationales en matière d'environnement et, à cette fin, la coopération entre les pays en vue de mieux connaître les législations nationales en matière d'environnement;
 - c) l'adoption de plans d'Etat et l'application de mesures visant à préserver et à améliorer l'environnement et à utiliser d'une manière rationnelle les ressources naturelles;
 - d) le soutien de la Stratégie internationale du développement de la troisième Décennie des Nations Unies pour le développement et l'établissement d'un nouvel ordre économique international;
 - e) la réalisation des objectifs de la Stratégie mondiale de conservation;
10. invite instamment les pays industrialisés à évaluer avec soin, en collaboration étroite avec les pays en développement, les conséquences

de l'aide au développement et de toutes les mesures internationales de soutien, ainsi que la portée de ces mesures, afin de promouvoir un développement rationnel de l'environnement dans tous les secteurs des pays en développement;

11. appelle à la création d'un système propre à mobiliser des fonds internationaux en vue de la mise en oeuvre de projets spécifiques relatifs à l'environnement dans les pays en développement;
12. invite les Groupes nationaux à soutenir et renforcer le PNUE en priant instamment les autorités nationales compétentes de coopérer à ses activités et de fournir l'appui financier essentiel;
13. prie instamment les Gouvernements d'agir en plein accord avec les engagements contractés aux termes de la Déclaration et du Plan d'action de Stockholm, réaffirmés dans la Déclaration de Nairobi adoptée en mai 1982 par le Conseil d'administration du PNUE lors de la Session de caractère spécial de cette institution, et de suivre les principales orientations et priorités en matière d'environnement pour la période 1982-1992 énoncées dans la résolution adoptée lors de cette session par le Conseil;
14. invite instamment les Groupes nationaux à soutenir les efforts entrepris par le PNUE en collaboration avec d'autres organisations internationales compétentes;
15. fait siennes les résolutions des 35e et 36e sessions de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies sur la responsabilité historique des Etats en ce qui concerne la préservation de l'environnement humain pour les générations présentes et futures;
16. invite les Groupes nationaux à encourager les autorités nationales compétentes à promouvoir et renforcer la coopération en matière de recherche scientifique et de gestion de l'environnement, et insiste pour que, en cas de problèmes de pollution transfrontières, les Groupes nationaux saisissent toute occasion de promouvoir des mesures visant à réduire ces problèmes, par exemple dans le cadre de la Convention sur la pollution atmosphérique transfrontières à longue distance;
17. invite instamment tous les Gouvernements et les Parlements à intensifier leurs efforts tendant au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité sur la terre, qui est la condition essentielle de la préservation de la biosphère pour les générations présentes et futures, à la poursuite de la politique de détente, à la limitation et à la cessation de la course aux armements, à la réalisation d'un désarmement véritable et à la réduction des budgets militaires en vue d'éviter le gaspillage des ressources intellectuelles et matérielles qu'implique la production des armes.

ANNEXE XXXI

LIQUIDATION DU COLONIALISME ET LUTTE CONTRE LE NÉO-COLONIALISME, NOTAMMENT LA NÉCESSITÉ DE PRENDRE DES MESURES POUR LA RÉALISATION IMMÉDIATE ET STRICTE DU PLAN DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LA NAMIBIE

(Résolution adoptée par 466 voix contre 48 et 72 abstentions)

La 69e Conférence interparlementaire,

rappelant la Déclaration historique sur l'octroi de l'indépendance aux pays et aux peuples coloniaux contenue dans la résolution 1514 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies du 14 décembre 1960,

réaffirmant le droit inaliénable de tous les peuples victimes de l'oppression coloniale, néo-coloniale et raciale à l'autodétermination, à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté nationale, et leur droit de lutter pour l'indépendance par tous les moyens à leur disposition, y compris la lutte armée,

consciente de la menace sérieuse à la paix et à la sécurité internationales que constitue la poursuite des politiques colonialistes et racistes de certaines puissances coloniales, notamment des régimes racistes,

consciente de ce que, face aux mouvements de libération nationale des peuples et devant la faillite du colonialisme, l'impérialisme a dû recourir à une politique colonialiste larvée tant sur le plan économique que sur le plan culturel, afin de maintenir sa domination et son exploitation, en violation de la souveraineté des peuples sur les ressources et les richesses naturelles de leur pays ainsi que sur leur patrimoine culturel national,

fermement convaincue de ce que seule la liquidation totale du colonialisme et du néo-colonialisme - condition préalable à l'instauration de la paix et de la détente internationales - peut assurer l'avènement d'un monde vraiment humain,

rappelant qu'en dépit des nombreuses résolutions pertinentes de l'Assemblée générale et du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies les peuples de Namibie et d'Afrique du Sud continuent d'être soumis à la politique colonialiste et raciste la plus inhumaine en raison du refus du régime de l'Afrique du Sud de se conformer aux décisions internationales,

rappelant, en particulier, la résolution des Nations Unies mettant fin au mandat de l'Afrique du Sud sur le territoire de la Namibie, y compris Walvis Bay, et les résolutions 385 (1976) et 435 (1978) du Conseil de sécurité qui établissent la base d'un règlement politique en Namibie,

profondément inquiète devant la poursuite de l'occupation illégale de la Namibie par l'Afrique du Sud, de l'imposition de l'apartheid au peuple namibien, et du mépris de l'Afrique du Sud pour toutes les résolutions des

Nations Unies, de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine, de l'Union inter-parlementaire, du Mouvement des pays non alignés et d'autres organisations internationales, relatives au statut et aux droits du peuple namibien, et devant l'intensification de l'occupation militaire de la Namibie,

refusant de lier - ainsi que le souhaitent certains pays - les négociations relatives à l'indépendance de la Namibie et la question de la présence des troupes cubaines en Angola,

alarmée par les cas fréquents d'agression de l'Afrique du Sud contre les Etats africains indépendants voisins,

profondément inquiète devant les actions de déstabilisation menées par le régime raciste d'Afrique du Sud qui recrute, entraîne, arme, finance et infiltre des troupes de bandits et de mercenaires au Mozambique, au Zimbabwe, en Zambie, au Botswana, au Lesotho, en Angola et aux Seychelles,

sérieusement préoccupée devant l'occupation de la partie méridionale de l'Angola par des troupes du régime raciste d'Afrique du Sud,

inquiète devant la création de prétendus "homelands indépendants" dans le cadre de la politique de bantoustanisisation instituée par le régime raciste d'Afrique du Sud en vue du maintien de la doctrine et du système de l'apartheid,

inquiète en outre devant les facilités et les encouragements accordés par le Royaume-Uni à ces prétendus "homelands indépendants", sous prétexte d'activités culturelles et autres,

consciente du fait que toute action, quelle qu'elle soit, susceptible de conduire à la reconnaissance de facto ou de jure, directe ou indirecte, des bantoustans créés par le régime de Pretoria, constitue une approbation du système et de la doctrine de l'apartheid et une trahison à l'égard du peuple de l'Afrique du Sud,

consciente de ce que la constitution d'un potentiel nucléaire par le régime d'apartheid, avec l'aide de certaines puissances occidentales et d'Israël, risque d'avoir des conséquences dangereuses pour la situation en Afrique australe et la sécurité internationale en général,

indignée de l'appui accordé au régime d'apartheid par certaines puissances occidentales et des liens de celui-ci avec Israël,

préoccupée par la persécution, l'arrestation, l'emprisonnement, la torture et l'assassinat de combattants de la liberté sud-africains et namubiens opposés à l'apartheid, et en particulier par les condamnations à mort prononcées contre des patriotes sud-africains et récemment mises à exécution,

déplorant fortement que, malgré l'unanimité de la communauté internationale sur l'application de sanctions obligatoires au Gouvernement sud-africain aux termes du chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique se soient, par leur veto, délibérément opposés à l'application de telles sanctions,

rappelant les résolutions de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies 36/121 A-F du 10 décembre 1981, et 36/172 A-P du 17 décembre 1981 sur les questions de la Namibie et de la politique d'apartheid du Gouvernement sud-africain et, notamment, la résolution 36/172 B qui proclame l'année 1982 "Année internationale de la mobilisation pour des sanctions contre l'Afrique du Sud",

ayant à l'esprit le fait que le peuple du Sahara occidental est toujours privé de son droit à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance du fait de l'occupation de son territoire par le Maroc,

ayant à l'esprit le référendum tendant à permettre au peuple sahraoui d'exprimer en toute liberté, dans sa totalité et dans des conditions régulières, sa volonté d'autodétermination au Sahara occidental,

réaffirmant le droit inaliénable du peuple du Sahara occidental à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies, à la Charte de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine, à la résolution 1514 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, ainsi qu'aux autres résolutions pertinentes de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine et de l'Union interparlementaire,

préoccupée par l'aggravation de la situation au Sahara occidental qui fait peser une grave menace sur la sécurité et la paix des pays de la région,

préoccupée par l'aggravation de la situation au Timor oriental dont le peuple est non seulement empêché d'accéder à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance, mais est également victime de génocide,

inquiète de l'invasion des îles Falkland (Malvinas) par le Royaume-Uni en mai 1982 avec l'appui déclaré du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, et également soucieuse de trouver les moyens de restaurer les droits souverains de la République argentine sur les îles Falkland (Malvinas), actuellement occupées de façon illégale par le Royaume-Uni,

sérieusement inquiète devant la situation coloniale qui continue de régner à Guam, aux îles Falkland (Malvinas), à Gibraltar, à Porto Rico, aux îles Vierges britanniques, aux îles Vierges américaines, en Micronésie et dans d'autres "petits territoires" sous domination britannique et française,

ayant à l'esprit la contribution que les Parlements peuvent apporter à la mobilisation de l'opinion publique mondiale et l'adoption de mesures pratiques et efficaces contre le colonialisme, sous toutes ses formes et dans toutes ses manifestations,

réaffirmant la résolution intitulée "Mesures urgentes pour la liquidation des vestiges du colonialisme dans le monde et des pratiques d'apartheid en Namibie ainsi qu'en Afrique du Sud, et protection des minorités ethniques", adoptée par la 68e Conférence interparlementaire à La Havane, en septembre 1981,

consciente, une fois de plus, de la nécessité d'appeler tous les Gouvernements et tous les Parlements du monde à assumer leur responsabilité de mettre fin au colonialisme, au néo-colonialisme, au racisme, à l'apartheid et au sionisme,

considérant que la liquidation du colonialisme, du néo-colonialisme et du racisme relève également de la responsabilité des Parlements et qu'il est nécessaire et urgent de prendre des mesures à cette fin, notamment en ce qui concerne l'application immédiate et rigoureuse des résolutions sur la Namibie, adoptées par l'Assemblée générale et le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies,

1. réaffirme le droit de tous les peuples à l'autodétermination, à l'indépendance, à la liberté et à la souveraineté;
2. reconnaît le droit de tous les peuples soumis à la domination coloniale, néo-coloniale et raciste de lutter par tous les moyens à leur disposition, y compris la lutte armée, pour leur libération;
3. affirme que la lutte pour la liquidation du colonialisme et du néo-colonialisme est étroitement liée à la lutte des peuples pour l'instauration d'un nouvel ordre économique international juste et équitable, pour la souveraineté sur les ressources et les richesses naturelles de leur pays, et pour la défense de leur patrimoine culturel national;
4. réaffirme le droit légitime du peuple namibien de lutter, par tous les moyens à sa disposition, pour exercer son droit inaliénable à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance;
5. invite toutes les nations éprises de paix et toutes les organisations internationales à contribuer généreusement à la lutte pour la libération des peuples qui sont encore sous domination coloniale;
6. prie instamment tous les Gouvernements et tous les Parlements, les organisations internationales et régionales, les institutions publiques et les organisations non gouvernementales et intergouvernementales de contribuer à l'élimination du colonialisme, du néo-colonialisme, du racisme et de toutes leurs conséquences;
7. condamne le régime raciste de l'Afrique du Sud pour son occupation illégale de la Namibie et exige le retrait immédiat des troupes et de l'administration sud-africaines, une indépendance véritable et le respect de l'intégrité territoriale du pays, y compris Walvis Bay;
8. condamne le mépris de l'Afrique du Sud à l'égard des résolutions de l'Assemblée générale et du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies sur la Namibie;
9. réaffirme que le processus de décolonisation de la Namibie et la question de la présence des troupes cubaines en Angola sont séparés;

10. prie instamment la communauté internationale d'accorder toute l'aide possible à la SWAPO en tant que seul représentant authentique du peuple namibien, conformément aux décisions de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine;
11. exhorte le Groupe de contact des cinq pays occidentaux à exercer suffisamment de pression sur l'Afrique du Sud pour qu'elle coopère à la mise en oeuvre rapide de la résolution 435 (1978) du Conseil de sécurité, conduisant à l'instauration de la règle de la majorité en Namibie;
12. désapprouve les manoeuvres de certains membres du Groupe de contact occidental visant à rendre sans effet les dispositions de cette résolution du Conseil de sécurité, à dessaisir l'Organisation des Nations Unies du problème de la Namibie et à le résoudre dans un esprit néo-colonialiste;
13. déplore une fois de plus la collaboration croissante des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, d'Israël et d'autres puissances occidentales avec le régime raciste d'Afrique du Sud;
14. invite instamment le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies à assumer la responsabilité qui lui incombe aux termes de la Charte des Nations Unies en appliquant les sanctions obligatoires prévues par le chapitre VII contre l'Afrique du Sud;
15. lance un appel aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique, en tant que membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, pour qu'ils fassent droit à la demande instante d'une immense majorité de pays que soient appliquées contre l'Afrique du Sud les sanctions prévues au chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies;
16. condamne l'Afrique du Sud pour son refus d'accepter les décisions prises dans le cadre du Plan des Nations Unies pour l'indépendance de la Namibie;
17. condamne énergiquement les actes d'agression militaire et d'autres actes de déstabilisation économique et politique perpétrés par l'Afrique du Sud contre les pays de la ligne de front, à savoir l'Angola, le Mozambique, la Zambie, le Zimbabwe, le Lesotho et le Botswana;
18. condamne vigoureusement les actes d'agression, de déstabilisation et de terrorisme d'Etat perpétrés contre le Mozambique, le Zimbabwe, la Zambie, le Botswana, le Lesotho, les Seychelles et l'Angola par le régime raciste d'Afrique du Sud, qui recrute, entraîne, arme, équipe et finance des bandits et des mercenaires;
19. exige que le régime raciste d'Afrique du Sud cesse immédiatement tous ses actes d'agression et retire ses troupes d'Angola;

20. condamne vigoureusement la politique de bantoustanisation menée en Afrique du Sud par le régime raciste d'Afrique du Sud en vue du maintien du système de l'apartheid;
21. condamne toute action quelle qu'elle soit susceptible de conduire, directement ou indirectement, à la reconnaissance de facto ou de jure des bantoustans créés par le régime raciste d'Afrique du Sud;
22. condamne l'intensification de la répression militaire exercée contre les peuples de Namibie et d'Afrique du Sud par le régime raciste, ainsi que l'utilisation du territoire de la Namibie comme tremplin pour perpétrer des actes d'agression criminels contre les pays de la ligne de front en Afrique australe, la persécution, l'emprisonnement, la torture et le meurtre des combattants de la liberté sud-africains et namibiens;
23. exige la libération du combattant de la liberté Nelson Mandela, ainsi que de tous les prisonniers politiques sud-africains incarcérés parce qu'ils luttent pour les droits de leur peuple;
24. soutient la SWAPO, seul représentant légitime du peuple namibien, et les mouvements de libération d'Afrique du Sud reconnus par l'OUA et l'ONU;
25. réaffirme qu'aucune solution durable au conflit sévissant en Namibie ne peut être obtenue qu'avec la participation de la SWAPO;
26. invite instamment tous les Gouvernements et tous les Parlements du monde à adopter, de toute urgence, des mesures efficaces en vue de :
 - a) mettre fin aux activités économiques de leurs organismes nationaux en Namibie, en Afrique du Sud et dans tout autre pays soumis à la domination coloniale et/ou raciste;
 - b) offrir toute l'assistance morale et matérielle possible aux mouvements de libération d'Afrique australe reconnus par l'Organisation des Nations Unies;
 - c) contribuer à la réalisation des buts de l'"Année internationale de la mobilisation pour des sanctions contre l'Afrique du Sud";
27. réitère son soutien au peuple du Sahara occidental pour l'exercice de son droit à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance, et rappelle en conséquence l'urgence et la nécessité impérieuse d'appliquer les résolutions et les décisions prises aussi bien par l'ONU que l'OUA, qui visent à un règlement juste et définitif du conflit du Sahara occidental;

28. lance un appel ferme au Comité de mise en oeuvre de l'OUA pour qu'il fasse engager des négociations entre le Maroc et le Front Polisario pour le règlement pacifique du conflit en vue de favoriser le développement d'une coopération harmonieuse entre tous les peuples de la région;
29. appelle à cet effet le Maroc et le Front Polisario à engager des négociations en vue d'établir un cessez-le-feu immédiat et de conclure un accord de paix permettant une juste application du référendum d'autodétermination général, libre et régulier, au Sahara occidental;
30. réaffirme le droit du Timor oriental à l'autodétermination et à l'indépendance et, par conséquent, condamne le recours à la force comme moyen d'empêcher le peuple du Timor oriental d'y accéder;
31. appelle les parties concernées à rechercher un règlement juste et définitif de la situation du peuple du Timor oriental;
32. condamne l'agression britannique contre les îles Falkland (Malvinas), activement soutenue par les Etats-Unis d'Amérique et réitère sa solidarité avec la République argentine;
33. approuve la demande présentée par vingt Etats d'Amérique latine tendant à inscrire "l'avenir des îles Falkland (Malvinas)" comme point supplémentaire à l'ordre du jour de la 37e session de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies;
34. réaffirme le droit inaliénable du peuple de Porto Rico à l'autodétermination, à l'indépendance et à la souveraineté, conformément à la résolution 1514(XV) de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies;
35. appuie la décision de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies d'approuver le rapport du Comité ad hoc sur la décolonisation dans lequel il lui était demandé d'inscrire le cas de Porto Rico, en tant que point séparé, à l'ordre du jour de sa 37e session;
36. réitère son appel au Royaume-Uni et à l'Espagne pour qu'ils poursuivent leurs pourparlers en vue de mettre fin au statut politique actuel de Gibraltar sur la base des résolutions des Nations Unies et de l'Union interparlementaire;
37. invite toutes les parties intéressées à appuyer les décisions et résolutions de l'Assemblée générale et du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies concernant les territoires de Guam, des îles Falkland (Malvinas), de la Micronésie, des îles Vierges britanniques, des îles Vierges américaines, et des autres "petits territoires" qui se trouvent encore sous domination coloniale;

38. condamne l'existence de bases militaires et/ou navales dans les territoires coloniaux, qui font obstacle à l'indépendance des peuples intéressés et sont préjudiciables tant à ceux-ci qu'à leur droit souverain de disposer des ressources naturelles et au développement social et économique de ces territoires;
39. condamne, conformément aux résolutions de l'Union interparlementaire et des Nations Unies (Assemblée générale et Conseil de sécurité), la poursuite par Israël de l'implantation de colonies de peuplement dans les territoires palestiniens et arabes occupés, ces colonies constituant une nouvelle forme de colonialisme;
40. prie instamment les Parlements :
- a) de soutenir activement la mise en oeuvre, par la communauté internationale, de mesures spécifiques propres à éliminer les derniers vestiges du colonialisme, le néo-colonialisme, le racisme (y compris le sionisme) et l'apartheid dans tous les pays où ils sont pratiqués;
 - b) d'accroître l'aide aux peuples victimes de l'oppression coloniale ou aux peuples opprimés pour des raisons raciales, religieuses ou autres, et à leurs représentants légitimes - les organisations de libération nationale reconnues par l'OUA, la Ligue des Etats arabes, le Mouvement des pays non alignés, l'Organisation de la Conférence islamique et les Nations Unies - dans leur lutte pour l'exercice de leur droit à l'indépendance et à l'autodétermination;
 - c) de lancer un appel en vue du retrait des troupes d'occupation étrangères et de la suppression des bases militaires étrangères installées dans des pays libres et souverains contre la volonté de leurs peuples;
 - d) d'exiger la cessation de toute politique illégale et arbitraire qui empêche le plein exercice par ces peuples de leur droit à l'autodétermination et à la souveraineté sur l'ensemble de leur territoire national;
- 41 invite les Gouvernements, les Parlements et les organisations internationales à prendre des mesures visant à accroître leur activité en vue de l'élimination de toutes les formes d'impérialisme, de colonialisme, de néo-colonialisme, de recolonisation, d'apartheid, de discrimination raciale, d'occupation, de sionisme, d'agression ou de menaces d'agression, à soutenir toutes les actions et initiatives tendant à la défense de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté de tous les peuples, et à éliminer les dangers pour la paix et la sécurité internationales.

ANNEXE XXXII

LIQUIDATION DU COLONIALISME ET LUTTE CONTRE LE NEO-COLONIALISME.
NOTAMMENT LA NECESSITE DE PRENDRE DES MESURES POUR LA REALISATION
IMMEDIATE ET STRICTE DU PLAN DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LA NAMIBIE

Vote sur le 25e paragraphe du préambule et
sur les paragraphes 30 et 31 du dispositif

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 272
Voix négatives 102
Abstentions 278

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------------------|-----|--------|-----|
| Algérie | - | - | 13 | Iran | - | - | 15 | Rép. de Corée | - | 15 | - |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | - | absent | - | Irak | - | 5 | - | Rép. dém. allemande | 13 | - | - |
| Australie | 6 | 7 | - | Irlande | - | - | 10 | Rép. dominicaine | - | absent | - |
| Autriche | - | - | 10 | Israël | - | absent | - | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | - | - | 13 |
| Belgique | - | absent | - | Italie | 5 | 1 | 7 | Rép. unie du Cameroun | - | - | 12 |
| Bénin | - | - | 10 | Japon | 1 | - | 19 | Roumanie | - | - | 14 |
| Brésil | - | absent | - | Jordanie | - | absent | - | Royaume-Uni | - | - | 17 |
| Bulgarie | 10 | - | - | Kenya | - | - | 5 | Rwanda | 10 | - | - |
| Canada | - | - | 14 | Koweït | - | absent | - | Sénégal | - | absent | - |
| Cap Vert | 5 | - | - | Liban | - | absent | - | Singapour | - | absent | - |
| Chypre | 5 | - | - | Luxembourg | - | absent | - | Somalie | - | 11 | - |
| Congo | - | absent | - | Malaisie | - | absent | - | Soudan | - | absent | - |
| Costa Rica | - | absent | - | Mali | - | - | 10 | Sri Lanka | - | absent | - |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 12 | - | - | Maroc | - | - | 14 | Suède | 6 | - | 6 |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Mexique | - | - | 10 | Suisse | - | absent | - |
| Danemark | 3 | - | 9 | Monaco | - | absent | - | Tchécoslovaquie | 13 | - | - |
| Djibouti | - | absent | - | Mongolie | 10 | - | - | Thaïlande | - | 16 | - |
| Egypte | - | - | 16 | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Togo | 5 | - | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | - | absent | - | Népal | - | absent | - | Tunisie | - | absent | - |
| Equateur | 5 | - | - | Nicaragua | 5 | - | - | URSS | 20 | - | - |
| Espagne | 5 | - | - | Nigeria | 10 | - | - | Venezuela | 10 | - | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | - | absent | - | Norvège | - | - | 10 | Viet Nam | - | absent | - |
| Finlande | - | - | 11 | Nouvelle-Zélande | - | absent | - | Yemen | - | absent | - |
| France | - | - | 10 | Ouganda | 10 | - | - | Yemen démocratique | 5 | - | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Panama | - | absent | - | Yougoslavie | - | - | 10 |
| Grèce | 9 | - | 3 | Pays-Bas | - | 10 | - | Zaire | - | absent | - |
| Guinée | - | absent | - | Philippines | - | 16 | - | Zambie | 10 | - | - |
| Haïti | - | absent | - | Pologne | 15 | - | - | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |
| Hongrie | 10 | - | - | Portugal | 12 | - | - | | | | |
| Inde | - | absent | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | - | - | 10 | | | | |
| Indonésie | - | 21 | - | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE XXXIII

LIQUIDATION DU COLONIALISME ET LUTTE CONTRE LE NEO-COLONIALISME, NOTAMMENT LA NECESSITE DE PRENDRE DES MESURES POUR LA REALISATION IMMEDIATE ET STRICTE DU PLAN DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LA NAMIBIE

Vote sur les paragraphes 27, 28 et 29
du dispositif

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 368
Voix négatives 77
Abstentions 195

| OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|----|---------------------|-----|--------|----|-------------------------|-------------------|--------|
| Algérie | 13 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Rép. de Corée | | Absent |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | | Absent | | Irak | | Absent | | Rép. dém. allemande | 13 | - |
| Australie | 2 | - | 11 | Irlande | - | - | 10 | Rép. dominicaine | | Absent |
| Autriche | 5 | - | - | Israël | | Absent | | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | 13 | - |
| Belgique | | Absent | | Italie | 5 | - | 8 | Rép. unie du Cameroun | - | 12 |
| Bénin | 10 | - | - | Japon | - | - | 15 | Roumanie | n'a pas participé | |
| Bразил | | Absent | | Jordanie | | Absent | | Royaume-Uni | - | 17 |
| Bulgarie | 12 | - | - | Koweït | 13 | - | - | Rwanda | 10 | - |
| Canada | - | - | 12 | Liban | | Absent | | Sénégal | | Absent |
| Cap Vert | 5 | - | - | Luxembourg | | Absent | | Singapour | | Absent |
| Chypre | 5 | - | - | Malaisie | | Absent | | Somalie | - | 11 |
| Comores | | Absent | | Mali | 10 | - | - | Soudan | | Absent |
| Costa Rica | | Absent | | Maroc | - | 14 | - | Sri Lanka | | Absent |
| Côte d'Ivoire | - | - | 12 | Mexique | 10 | - | - | Suède | 9 | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Monaco | | Absent | | Suisse | - | 5 |
| Danemark | 5 | 5 | - | Mongolie | 10 | - | - | Tchécoslovaquie | 13 | - |
| Djibouti | | Absent | | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Thaïlande | - | 16 |
| Egypte | - | 16 | - | Népal | | Absent | | Togo | 5 | - |
| Emirats arabes unis | | Absent | | Nicaragua | 5 | - | - | Tunisie | | Absent |
| Equateur | 5 | - | - | Nigeria | 10 | - | - | URSS | 20 | - |
| Espagne | - | - | 5 | Norvège | - | - | 10 | Venezuela | 10 | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | | Absent | | Nouvelle-Zélande | | Absent | | Viet Nam | 15 | - |
| Finlande | - | - | 11 | Ouganda | 10 | - | - | Yemen | | Absent |
| France | - | - | 10 | Panama | | Absent | | Yemen démocratique | 10 | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Pays-Bas | - | - | 13 | Yougoslavie | - | 10 |
| Grèce | 9 | - | 3 | Philippines | - | 16 | - | Zaire | | Absent |
| Guinée | | Absent | | Pologne | 15 | - | - | Zambie | 10 | - |
| Haïti | | Absent | | Portugal | 2 | 3 | 3 | Zimbabwe | 12 | - |
| Hongrie | 10 | - | - | Rép. arabe syrienne | 12 | - | - | | | |
| Inde | | Absent | | | | | | | | |
| Indonésie | - | - | 21 | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE XXXIV

LIQUIDATION DU COLONIALISME ET LUTTE CONTRE LE NEO-COLONIALISME, NOTAMMENT LA NECESSITE DE PRENDRE DES MESURES POUR LA REALISATION IMMEDIATE ET STRICTE DU PLAN DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LA NAMIBIE

Vote sur le 26e paragraphe du préambule
et sur le paragraphe 32 du dispositif

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 222
Voix négatives 218
Abstentions 181

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------------------|-----|--------|-----|-------------------------|-------------------|--------|-----|
| Algérie | 13 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Rép. de Corée | | absent | |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | | absent | | Irak | | absent | | Rép. dém. allemande | 13 | - | - |
| Australie | - | 11 | 2 | Irlande | - | 10 | - | Rép. dominicaine | | absent | |
| Autriche | - | 10 | - | Israël | | absent | | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | 10 | - | - |
| Belgique | | absent | | Italie | 1 | 5 | 5 | Rép. unie du Cameroun | - | 12 | - |
| Bénin | 10 | - | - | Japon | 1 | 19 | - | Roumanie | - | - | 14 |
| Brésil | | absent | | Jordanie | | absent | | Royaume-Uni | - | 17 | - |
| Bulgarie | 12 | - | - | Kenya | - | 10 | - | Rwanda | - | - | 10 |
| Canada | - | 14 | - | Koweït | | absent | | Sénégal | | absent | |
| Cap Vert | - | - | 9 | Liban | | absent | | Singapour | | absent | |
| Chypre | | absent | | Luxembourg | | absent | | Somalie | - | 11 | - |
| Congo | | absent | | Malaisie | | absent | | Soudan | | absent | |
| Costa Rica | | absent | | Mali | - | - | 10 | Sri Lanka | | absent | |
| Côte d'Ivoire | - | - | 12 | Maroc | - | - | 10 | Suède | - | 12 | - |
| Cuba | 12 | - | - | Mexique | 10 | - | - | Suisse | | absent | |
| Danemark | - | 12 | - | Monaco | | absent | | Tchécoslovaquie | 13 | - | - |
| Djibouti | | absent | | Mongolie | 10 | - | - | Thaïlande | - | - | 16 |
| Egypte | - | 16 | - | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Togo | - | - | 10 |
| Emirats arabes unis | | absent | | Népal | | absent | | Tunisie | | absent | |
| Equateur | 5 | - | - | Nicaragua | 5 | - | - | URSS | 20 | - | - |
| Espagne | 5 | - | - | Nigeria | - | - | 10 | Venezuela | 10 | - | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | | absent | | Norvège | - | 10 | - | Viet Nam | | absent | |
| Finlande | - | 11 | - | Nouvelle-Zélande | | absent | | Yemen | | absent | |
| France | - | 10 | - | Ouganda | | absent | | Yemen démocratique | 10 | - | - |
| Gabon | - | - | 5 | Panama | | absent | | Yougoslavie | - | - | 10 |
| Grèce | 2 | 10 | - | Pays-Bas | - | 13 | - | Zaire | | absent | |
| Guinée | | absent | | Philippines | - | - | 16 | Zambie | - | - | 10 |
| Haïti | | absent | | Pologne | 10 | - | 5 | Zimbabwe | n'a pas participé | | |
| Hongrie | 10 | - | - | Portugal | 2 | - | 6 | | | | |
| Inde | | absent | | Rép. arabe syrienne | 10 | - | - | | | | |
| Indonésie | - | - | 21 | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE XXXV

LIQUIDATION DU COLONIALISME ET LUTTE CONTRE LE NEO-COLONIALISME, NOTAMMENT LA NECESSITE DE PRENDRE DES MESURES POUR LA REALISATION IMMEDIATE ET STRICTE DU PLAN DES NATIONS UNIES SUR LA NAMIBIE

Vote sur la résolution

Résultats du vote

Voix positives 466
Voix négatives 48
Abstentions 72

| | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS | | OUI | NON | ABS |
|--------------------------|-----|--------|-----|---------------------|-------------------|--------|-----|-------------------------|--------|-----|-----|
| Algérie | 13 | - | - | Iran | 15 | - | - | Rép. de Corée | absent | | |
| Allemagne (Rép. féd. d') | | absent | | Iraq | | absent | | Rép. dém. allemande | 13 | - | - |
| Australie | - | 9 | 4 | Irlande | - | 11 | - | Rép. dominicaine | absent | | |
| Autriche | - | 5 | 5 | Israël | | absent | | Rép. pop. dém. de Corée | 13 | - | - |
| Belgique | | absent | | Italie | 5 | - | 8 | Rép. unie du Cameroun | 12 | - | - |
| Bénin | 10 | - | - | Japon | 20 | - | - | Roumanie | 14 | - | - |
| Brésil | | absent | | Jordanie | | absent | | Royaume-Uni | - | 17 | - |
| Bulgarie | 12 | - | - | Kenya | 10 | - | - | Rwanda | 10 | - | - |
| Canada | 2 | 3 | 7 | Koweït | | absent | | Sénégal | absent | | |
| Cap Vert | 9 | - | - | Liban | | absent | | Singapour | absent | | |
| Chypre | | absent | | Luxembourg | | absent | | Somalie | 11 | - | - |
| Congo | | absent | | Malaisie | | absent | | Soudan | absent | | |
| Costa Rica | | absent | | Mali | 10 | - | - | Sri Lanka | absent | | |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 12 | - | - | Maroc | n'a pas participé | | | Suède | 6 | - | 6 |
| Cuba | 2 | - | - | Mexique | 10 | - | - | Suisse | absent | | |
| Danemark | - | 3 | 9 | Monaco | | absent | | Tchécoslovaquie | 13 | - | - |
| Djibouti | | absent | | Mongolie | 10 | - | - | Thaïlande | absent | | |
| Egypte | 16 | - | - | Mozambique | 13 | - | - | Togo | absent | | |
| Emirats arabes unis | | absent | | Népal | | absent | | Tunisie | absent | | |
| Equateur | 5 | - | - | Nicaragua | 5 | - | - | URSS | 22 | - | - |
| Espagne | 5 | - | - | Nigeria | 10 | - | - | Venezuela | 10 | - | - |
| Etats-Unis d'Amérique | | absent | | Norvège | - | - | 10 | Viet Nam | absent | | |
| Finlande | | absent | | Nouvelle-Zélande | | absent | | Yemen | absent | | |
| France | - | - | 10 | Ouganda | | absent | | Yemen démocratique | 10 | - | - |
| Gabon | 5 | - | - | Panama | | absent | | Yugoslavie | 14 | - | - |
| Grèce | 12 | - | - | Pays-Bas | - | - | 13 | Zaire | absent | | |
| Guinée | | absent | | Philippines | 16 | - | - | Zambie | 10 | - | - |
| Haïti | | absent | | Pologne | 15 | - | - | Zimbabwe | 12 | - | - |
| Hongrie | 10 | - | - | Portugal | 8 | - | - | | | | |
| Inde | | absent | | Rép. arabe syrienne | 10 | - | - | | | | |
| Indonésie | 21 | - | - | | | | | | | | |

ANNEXE XXXVI

BOLIVIE

Cas No BL/01 - LYDIA GUEILER TEJADA, BL/02 - WALTER GUEVARA ARZE, BL/03 - BENJAMIN MIGUEL, BL/04 - WILLIAM BLUSKE, BL/05 - JOSE LUIS ROCA, BL/06 - JULIO TUMIRI APAZA, BL/07 - DULFREDO RUA, BL/08 - CARLOS FLORES BEDREGAL, BL/09 - JAIME PAZ ZAMORA, BL/11 - HECTOR BOYRDA LEANO, BL/12 - CARLOS QUIROGA, BL/13 - LUIS PELAEZ RIOJA, BL/14 - MARCELO QUIROGA SANTA CRUZ, BL/15 - ALCIDES ALVARADO DAZA, BL/16 - MARCOS DOMIC RUIZ, BL/17 - MANUEL CARDENAS MALLO, BL/18 - SIMON REYES, BL/19 - GUILLERMO CAPOBIANCO, BL/20 - CAYETANO LLOBET TABOLARA, BL/21 - JAIME TABORGA TORRICO, BL/22 - JOSE MARIO PALACIOS, BL/23 - ALDO FLORES, BL/24 - JUVENAL CASTRO, BL/25 - ANTONIO ARANIBAR QUIROGA, BL/26 - JUAN RODRIGUEZ, BL/27 - LEOPOLDO LOPEZ COSIO, BL/28 - JOSE VARGAS, BL/29 - ALFONSO CAMACHO, BL/30 - ALFONSO FERRUFFINO, BL/31 - GASTON ENCINAS, BL/32 - ABRAHAM SALAS, BL/33 - GREGORIO ANDRADE, BL/34 - SEVERO TORRES, BL/35 - JOSE REYES CARVAJAL, BL/36 ADALBERTO KUAJARA, BL/37 - AMALIA DECKER, BL/38 - JORGE KOLLE CUETO, BL/39 - ABELARDO VILLALPANDO, BL/40 - CARLOS BARRAGAN VARGAS, BL/41 - CARLOS CARVAJAL NAVA, BL/42 - EDGAR RAMIREZ, BL/43 - OSCAR SALAS MOYA, BL/44 - RAMIRO BARRENECHEA, BL/45 - WALTER MORALES UGARTE, BL/46 - HORACIO TORRES, BL/47 - MARIO RONCAL, BL/48 - FELIX ROSPIGLIOSI, BL/49 - OSCAR ZAMORA, BL/50 - FEDERICO ALVAREZ PLATA, BL/51 - FEDERICO ALVAREZ PINTO, BL/52 - RAMIRO VELASCO RAMIRO, BL/53 - GUIDO CAPRA, BL/54 - OSCAR VEGA LOPEZ, BL/55 - GLORIA ARDAYA, BL/56 - JORGE VALDIVIESO MENACHO, BL/57 - ARCIL MENACHO, BL/58 - LUIS FERNANDEZ, BL/59 - CASAMIO AMURRIO, BL/60 - MACABEO CHILA P., BL/61 - FLORENCIO GABRIEL MAMANI, BL/62 - JUSTO PEREZ GARCIA, BL/63 - ZENON BARRIENTOS MAMANI, BL/64 - PANFILO YAPU, BL/65 - FERNANDO BAPTISTA, BL/66 - JORGE SELUM VACA DIEZ, BL/67 - MARIO CALDERON, BL/68 - ANGEL GEMIO ERQUETA, BL/69 - HERNAN MELGAR J., BL/70 - JUSTINIANO NINAVIA, BL/71 - ARMANDO RONCAL FERNANDEZ, BL/72 - LUIS ANAES ALVAREZ, BL/73 - CLAURE GUALBERTO, BL/74 - GUILLERMO RICHTER, BL/75 - JUAN JOSE SALAZAR T., BL/76 - MARIO VELARDE DORADO, BL/77 - WALTER VASQUEZ MICHEL, BL/78 - AGUSTIN AMELLER, BL/79 - FLAVIO MACHICADO SARAVIO, BL/80 - CONSTANTINO LIMA CHAVEZ, BL/81 - ENRIQUE BACHINELLO

*(Résolution adoptée sans vote par le Conseil interparlementaire,
lors de sa 131e session, le 22 septembre 1982)*

Le Conseil interparlementaire,

rappelant ses résolutions antérieures au sujet des parlementaires boliviens nommés ci-dessus,

prenant acte acte du rapport du Comité spécial (CL/131/82/5 et 5 Add. 1),

rappelant que le droit à la vie et à la sécurité de la personne est un droit fondamental qui est inscrit dans la Constitution bolivienne et dans la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme, les Pactes internationaux relatifs aux droits de l'homme et la Convention américaine relative aux droits de l'homme, et soulignant que les Etats ont le devoir d'assurer la sécurité de leurs ressortissants,

1. prend acte avec satisfaction du fait qu'un certain nombre des parlementaires boliviens, bénéficiant de l'amnistie générale de mai 1982, ont pu rentrer dans leur patrie;
2. exprime cependant sa préoccupation devant les atteintes à leur sécurité personnelle dont deux de ces anciens parlementaires ont été victimes et demande instamment au Gouvernement bolivien d'assurer et garantir des conditions de sécurité pour les parlementaires qui sont retournés en Bolivie et pour ceux qui, étant encore en exil, souhaiteraient retourner dans leur pays;
3. réitère sa demande instante que les responsables de l'assassinat des députés Carlos Flores Bedregal, Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, Florencio Mamani, José Reyes Carvajal, Jorge Valdivieso Menacho et Arcil Menacho soient jugés dans les plus brefs délais;
4. prie le Secrétaire général de demander au Gouvernement bolivien s'il est exact que M. Juan Rodriguez G. a été arrêté et est en détention et, dans l'affirmative, de solliciter de ce Gouvernement des informations concernant :
 - a) les circonstances et les conditions de l'arrestation de M. Rodriguez;
 - b) les dispositions légales en vertu desquelles il a été arrêté;
 - c) le lieu et les conditions de sa détention;
 - d) la nature exacte des charges retenues contre lui et les faits concrets invoqués à l'appui de ces charges; les peines éventuellement requises ou prononcées contre lui;
 - e) la nature des procédures éventuellement engagées contre lui et le tribunal saisi de son cas; l'état actuel de la procédure engagée;
 - f) les garanties de défense dont il bénéficie et notamment les possibilités qui lui sont offertes de communiquer librement avec un défenseur de son choix;
 - g) les possibilités de recours qui lui sont éventuellement offertes et l'utilisation qu'il en a éventuellement faite;
 - h) les perspectives de sa libération;
 - i) son état de santé;
5. charge le Comité spécial de poursuivre l'examen des cas de MM. Carlos Flores Bedregal, Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, Florencio Mamani, José Reyes Carvajal, Jorge Valdivieso Menacho, Arcil Menacho et de M. Juan Rodriguez G., et de lui faire rapport à sa 132e session (avril 1983).

ANNEXE XXXVII

GHANA

Cas No GH/01 - C.C. FITIH, GH/02 - ROWLAND ATTA-KESSON, GH/03 - JOE HYDE, GH/04 - ALHADJI MOHAMMED FARAL, GH/05 - ALHADJI AMADU SULEMANA, GH/06 - K.D. ODJIDJATOR, GH/07 - M.A. ADAM, GH/08 - ALHADJI SEIDU ZAKARIAH, GH/09 - JAWU MAHAMA, GH/10 - AMETOR WILLIAMS, GH/11 - AGATHA AWUAH, GH/12 - MONICA TINKA, GH/13 - HARRY GANDAA, GH/14 - KWESI AKOTO, GH/15 - C. NARH, GH/16 - REV. KUMASAH, GH/17 - OBUADE, GH/18 - KAPPI, GH/19 - NYAMASIKPOR, GH/20 - NYAME, GH/21 - TOGBE ZUKAH, GH/22 - DJILA, GH/23 - ALHADJI ABDULRAHMAN, GH/24 - DJEBU, GH/25 - C. COMMODE, GH/26 - ALEX ADJEI, GH/27 - OSEI ASIBEZ, GH/28 - F.A. MENSAH, GH/29 - NANA ADARKWA YIADOM, GH/31 - ANTI, GH/32 - AGGREY, GH/33 - TETTEY, GH/34 - ATTEFAH, GH/35 - NANA AMOAKO, GH/36 - AYISI, GH/37 - MIKE ATSUTSE, GH/38 - TAWIAH, GH/39 - OHENE BAMFOE, GH/40 - ALHAJI SHANI MAHAMA

(Résolution adoptée sans vote par le Conseil interparlementaire, lors de sa 131e session, le 22 septembre 1982)

Le Conseil interparlementaire,

se référant à la résolution adoptée par le Conseil interparlementaire lors de sa 130e session (avril 1982) au sujet de 39 parlementaires du Ghana (Nos GH/01 à GH/39),

prenant acte du rapport du Comité spécial (CL/131/82/5 et 5 Add.1) relatif à 40 cas d'anciens parlementaires ghanéens,

considérant qu'il ressort du dossier dans son état actuel que :

- i) Mmes Ametor-Williams, Agatha Awuah, Monica Atenkah (Tinka) et M. Samuel Dzebu auraient été élargis;
- ii) MM. Joseph Gyewu Mahama, Harry Gandaa, Togbe Zukah et Peter Atsu Djila résideraient hors du Ghana;
- iii) les 32 autres parlementaires seraient détenus et devraient être traduits prochainement devant des juridictions d'exception;

se référant aux dispositions des articles 7, 10 et 12 de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme, des articles 9, 10 et 14 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques et de l'article 7 de la Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples,

prenant acte des informations communiquées par les Groupes nationaux de l'Autriche et du Nigeria,

1. remercie ces Groupes nationaux de leur action; se félicite tout particulièrement de l'initiative prise par le Groupe du Nigeria de déléguer trois de ses membres au Ghana et espère qu'il poursuivra ses démarches avec succès;

2. se réjouit de la coopération et de la bonne volonté que le Gouvernement du Ghana a manifestées à l'occasion de la visite à Accra de la délégation nigériane;
3. prie instamment le Gouvernement du Ghana, dans cet esprit, de ne pas donner suite à son intention de traduire les 32 anciens parlementaires encore détenus devant des tribunaux spéciaux et lui demande de les traduire devant des instances ordinaires, appliquant les procédures ordinaires;
4. demande en outre au Gouvernement du Ghana de garantir aux 32 anciens parlementaires les conditions d'un procès équitable et notamment la possibilité pour chacun d'eux d'être assisté par le défenseur de son choix;
5. prie le Secrétaire général de recueillir auprès des Autorités ghanéennes des informations concernant :
 - i) la date à laquelle les 32 anciens parlementaires encore détenus seront traduits en jugement;
 - ii) les charges retenues contre chacun d'eux et les faits précis invoqués à l'appui de ces charges;
 - iii) l'instance devant laquelle ils seront en définitive traduits et les procédures appliquées par cette instance;
 - iv) les possibilités de recours dont ils disposent;
 - v) les garanties effectives de défense dont ils bénéficient;
6. espère que, lors de sa prochaine visite au Ghana, la délégation nigériane pourra visiter les 32 anciens parlementaires détenus;
7. prend acte avec satisfaction de l'élargissement de Mmes Ametor-Williams, Agatha Awuah, Monica Atenkah (Tinka) et de M. Samuel Dzebu;
8. décide de clore le dossier en ce qui concerne MM. Joseph Gyewu Mahama, Harry Gandaa, Togbe Zukah et Peter Atsu Djila;
9. prie le Comité spécial de lui faire rapport à sa 132e session (avril 1983) au sujet de la situation de 32 anciens parlementaires encore détenus.

ANNEXE XXXVIII

Cas No IR/07 - ABOL-FAZL GHASSEMI - REPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D'IRAN

(Résolution adoptée sans vote par le Conseil interparlementaire, lors de sa 131e session, le 22 septembre 1982)*

Le Conseil interparlementaire,

se référant à la résolution adoptée lors de sa 130e session (avril 1982) au sujet de M. Abol-Fazl Ghassemi, de la République islamique d'Iran,

prenant acte du rapport du Comité spécial (CL/131/82/5),

considérant qu'il ressort du dossier que M. Abol-Fazl Ghassemi a été élu au Majlis lors d'élections dont la régularité n'est pas contestée; que cette élection a été invalidée par le Ministère de l'Intérieur; que le bien-fondé des motifs et la régularité des procédures d'invalidation, qui constituent le premier objet des plaintes, ne sont pas établis; que M. Ghassemi a été condamné le 12 novembre 1981 à la prison à perpétuité au titre de quatre principaux chefs d'inculpation; qu'il n'est pas établi que les conditions de déroulement du procès aient été conformes aux dispositions de l'article 14 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, qui a été ratifié par l'Iran le 24 juin 1975; que l'état de santé de M. Ghassemi, qui est âgé, serait préoccupant; que M. Ghassemi est toujours détenu à la prison de Qizelhisar,

1. prend note des explications complémentaires communiquées par le Groupe national iranien concernant le cas et remercie ce Groupe de sa coopération et de ses efforts;
2. regrette qu'en dépit de la demande instante du Conseil interparlementaire, M. Ghassemi n'ait pas encore été libéré et réitère sa demande qu'il soit mis en liberté pour des raisons humanitaires;
3. prie le Comité spécial de poursuivre l'examen de ce cas et de lui faire rapport à sa prochaine session.

* La délégation de la République islamique d'Iran a exprimé son opposition.

ANNEXE XXXIX

Cas No IR/10 - HOSSEIN KHATIBI - REPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D'IRAN

*(Résolution adoptée par 63 voix contre 2 et 9 abstentions par
le Conseil interparlementaire, lors de sa 131e session,
le 22 septembre 1982)*

Le Conseil interparlementaire,

se référant à la résolution adoptée lors de sa 130e session
(avril 1982) au sujet de M. Hossein Khatibi, de la République islamique
d'Iran,

prenant acte du rapport du Comité spécial (CL/131/82/5),

considérant qu'il ressort du dossier que le député Hossein Khatibi,
élu au Majlis en 1975 avec un mandat de quatre ans, a été arrêté le 17 février
1979; qu'il a été condamné par un Tribunal révolutionnaire islamique le
8 novembre 1979, pour huit chefs d'inculpation, à six ans de prison correction-
nelle et qu'il purge actuellement sa peine,

se référant aux dispositions des articles 9, 10 et 14 du Pacte
international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, ratifié par l'Iran
le 24 juin 1975,

1. prend note d'explications et informations complémentaires communi-
quées par le Groupe national iranien et remercie ce Groupe de sa
coopération et de ses efforts;
2. prie le Comité spécial de poursuivre son analyse des éléments
soumis par le Groupe iranien et de lui faire part, selon que de
nécessaire, de ses observations;
3. prie le Secrétaire général de s'adresser à nouveau au Groupe
national et aux Autorités gouvernementales iraniens pour obtenir
des précisions notamment sur :
 - a) l'état de santé de M. Hossein Khatibi;
 - b) les perspectives de sa libération ou de réduction de sa peine;
4. prie en outre le Secrétaire général de demander aux Autorités ira-
niennes le texte du jugement rendu par le Tribunal islamique révo-
lutionnaire;
5. prie instamment le Groupe national de la République islamique d'Iran
de continuer de coopérer activement au règlement de ce cas.

ANNEXE XL

Cas No IR/11 - ABBAS ARAM - REPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE D'IRAN

*(Résolution adoptée sans vote par le Conseil interparlementaire,
lors de sa 131e session, le 22 septembre 1982)*

Le Conseil interparlementaire,

prenant acte du rapport du Comité spécial (CL/131/82/5 et 5 Add.1),

ayant pris connaissance des informations communiquées par le
Groupe national iranien dont il ressort que M. Abbas Aram est actuellement
en liberté,

prend acte avec satisfaction de ces informations et décide de
clôre le dossier le concernant.

ANNEXE XLI

Cas No URG/02 - JOSE LUIS MASSERA LERENA)
Cas No URG/03 - JAIME GERSCHUNI PEREZ)
Cas No URG/05 - VLADIMIR ILITCH TURIANSKY VLADIMERSKY) URUGUAY
Cas No URG/06 - ALBERTO ALTESOR GONZALES)
Cas No URG/08 - ROSARIO PIETRAROIA ZAPALA)

Télégramme adressé par le Conseil interparlementaire
aux Autorités uruguayennes

Le Conseil interparlementaire, profondément préoccupé devant les nouvelles alarmantes relatives à l'état de santé de José Luis Massera Lerena et de Rosario Pietraroia Zapala, demande instamment que des soins médicaux adéquats leur soient dispensés d'urgence et que leurs familles soient informées de leur état et des soins dispensés et qu'elles aient la possibilité de leur rendre visite - stop - le Conseil réitère sa demande urgente que Massera, Perez, Turiansky, Altesor et Pietraroia soient remis en liberté immédiatement.

*(Résolutions adoptées sans vote par le Conseil interparlementaire,
lors de sa 131e session, le 22 septembre 1982)*

A. Alberto Altesor Gonzales

Le Conseil interparlementaire,

se référant à ses résolutions antérieures au sujet de M. Alberto Altesor Gonzales, de l'Uruguay, et notamment aux résolutions adoptées lors de ses 129e et 130e sessions par lesquelles, après avoir conclu que cet ancien parlementaire était victime d'une violation de ses droits de l'homme et avoir relevé qu'il était dans un état de santé préoccupant, il demandait qu'il soit remis en liberté immédiatement,

considérant que, ainsi qu'il l'avait déjà fait antérieurement dans les cas de MM. José Luis Massera Lerena et Rosario Pietrarroia Zapala, le Comité des droits de l'homme des Nations Unies est, à son tour, parvenu à la conclusion que M. Alberto Altesor Gonzales est victime d'une violation de ses droits de l'homme au titre de plusieurs articles du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, et que l'Uruguay est tenu de réparer les préjudices causés à la victime, de l'indemniser pour les violations qu'elle a subies et veiller à ce qu'elles ne se reproduisent plus, et de lui assurer les soins médicaux que son état de santé nécessite,

prenant acte du rapport du Comité spécial (CL/131/82/5),

regrettant que les Autorités uruguayennes aient cessé de répondre aux communications qui leur sont adressées au nom du Conseil interparlementaire et du Comité spécial,

1. prend acte avec satisfaction du fait que, selon l'une des sources de communication, les Autorités uruguayennes ont autorisé le médecin personnel de M. Alberto Altesor Gonzales à examiner celui-ci dans un institut cardiologique civil de Montevideo et à pratiquer le 3 juillet 1982 l'intervention chirurgicale cardiologique que son état de santé requérait;
2. insiste à nouveau pour que M. Alberto Altesor Gonzales soit remis en liberté;
3. prie le Secrétaire général de solliciter de l'Organisation des Etats américains toute information dont cette Organisation pourrait disposer ainsi que le texte de toute décision qu'elle aurait pu prendre concernant ce cas;
4. fait appel à nouveau aux Groupes nationaux pour qu'ils interviennent, par tous les moyens appropriés, auprès des Autorités uruguayennes en faveur de M. Alberto Altesor Gonzales.

B. José Luis Massera Lerena, Jaime Gerschuni Perez, Vladimir Ilitch Turiansky Vladimersky, Rosario Pietrarroia Zapala

Le Conseil interparlementaire,

se référant à ses résolutions antérieures au sujet de MM. José Luis Massera Lerena, Jaime Gerschuni Perez, Vladimir Ilitch Turiansky Vladimersky et Rosario Pietrarroia Zapala, de l'Uruguay, et notamment aux résolutions adoptées lors de ses 129e et 130e sessions par lesquelles, après avoir conclu que tous ces anciens parlementaires étaient victimes d'une violation de leurs droits de l'homme et avoir relevé qu'ils étaient dans un état de santé préoccupant, il demandait qu'ils soient remis en liberté immédiatement,

prenant acte du rapport du Comité spécial (CL/131/82/5 et 5 Add.1),

regrettant que les Autorités uruguayennes aient cessé de répondre aux communications qui leur sont adressées au nom du Conseil interparlementaire et du Comité spécial,

considérant que la peine de huit ans d'emprisonnement de M. Jaime Gerschuni Perez viendra à échéance fin octobre - début novembre 1982,

rappelant que dans les cas de José Luis Massera Lerena et Rosario Pietraroia Zapala, le Comité des droits de l'homme des Nations Unies est parvenu, comme le Conseil interparlementaire, à la conclusion qu'ils sont victimes de violations de leurs droits de l'homme au regard des dispositions du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques et que l'Uruguay est tenu d'apporter les remèdes qui s'imposent,

1. déplore que la situation des quatre anciens parlementaires soit néanmoins demeurée inchangée depuis la 129e session du Conseil interparlementaire (septembre 1981);
2. insiste à nouveau pour que MM. José Luis Massera Lerena, Jaime Gerschuni Perez, Vladimir Ilitch Turiansky Vladimersky et Rosario Pietraroia Zapala soient remis en liberté dans les plus brefs délais et, en ce qui concerne Jaime Gerschuni Perez, au plus tard à la date d'échéance de sa peine;
3. prie le Secrétaire général de solliciter de l'Organisation des Etats américains toute information dont cette Organisation pourrait disposer ainsi que le texte de toute décision qu'elle aurait pu prendre concernant ces cas;
4. fait appel à nouveau aux Groupes nationaux pour qu'ils interviennent, par tous les moyens appropriés, auprès des Autorités uruguayennes en faveur de MM. José Luis Massera Lerena, Jaime Gerschuni Perez, Vladimir Ilitch Turiansky Vladimersky et Rosario Pietraroia Zapala.



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WITNESSES—TÉMOINS

The Honourable Senator G.L. Molgat, Former Chairman of
the Inter-Parliamentary Union—Canadian Group;

Mr. Charles Lussier, Clerk of the Senate.

L'honorable Sénateur G.L. Molgat, Ex-président de l'Union
interparlementaire—Groupe canadien;

M. Charles Lussier, Greffier du Sénat.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 94

Tuesday, May 17, 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 94

Le mardi 17 mai 1983

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

External Affairs and National Defence

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

Main Estimates 1983-84: Vote 1—Operating
Expenditures under EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INCLUDING:

Sixteenth Report (Report of the 69th Inter-
Parliamentary Conference, Rome, Italy, 14-22
September, 1982)

CONCERNANT:

Budget principal 1983-1984: crédit 1—dépenses
d'opération sous la rubrique AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES

Y COMPRIS:

Le Seizième rapport (Rapport de la 69^e Conférence
interparlementaire, Rome, Italie, 14-22 septembre
1982)

WITNESSES:

(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:

(Voir à l'endos)



First Session of the
Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la
trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

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Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appolloni

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(Quorum 8)

Le greffier du Comité

Peter Hucal

Clerk of the Committee

REPORT TO THE HOUSE

May 20, 1983

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence has the honour to present its

SIXTEENTH REPORT

In accordance with its Order of Reference of Friday, May 23, 1980, your Committee, empowered to receive and examine reports from official Canadian Parliamentary delegations which have met with delegations from foreign Parliaments or attended inter-parliamentary meetings, has examined the report of the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference—Rome, Italy, 14-22 September, 1982 which it received on Friday, April 29, 1983 and has agreed to report thereon.

A copy of the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*Issues Nos. 93, and 94 which includes the present report*) is tabled.

Respectfully submitted,

Le président

MARCEL PRUD'HOMME

Chairman

RAPPORT À LA CHAMBRE

Le 20 mai 1983

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale a l'honneur de présenter son

SEIZIÈME RAPPORT

Conformément à son ordre de renvoi du vendredi 23 mai 1980, votre Comité, habilité à recevoir et examiner les rapports des délégations officielles du Parlement canadien qui ont rencontré des délégations de Parlements étrangers ou ont assisté à des réunions interparlementaires, a étudié le rapport de la 69^e Conférence interparlementaire tenue à Rome, en Italie, du 14 au 22 septembre 1982. Votre Comité a reçu un exemplaire du rapport le vendredi 29 avril 1983 et a convenu de faire rapport à ce sujet.

Un exemplaire des Procès-verbaux et témoignages pertinents (*fascicules nos 93, et 94 qui comprend le présent rapport*) est déposé.

Respectueusement soumis,

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, MAY 17, 1983

[Text]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9:32 o'clock a.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Dupras, Hudecki, Laniel, Lapierre, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Prud'homme and Roche.

Alternates present: Messrs. McLean, Ogle, Stewart and Watson.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Mr. Roger Hill, Assistant Director.

Witnesses: From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. Marchand, Deputy Minister, Foreign Policy; Mr. D. Molgat, Assistant Under-Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs; Mr. R. Johnstone, Deputy Minister, International Trade and Coordinator, International Economic Relations; Mr. J.A. Malone, Director, Caribbean and Central American Division; Mr. J.P. Schioler, Director Middle Eastern Division.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated Wednesday, February 23, 1983 relating to the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984. (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Tuesday, March 15, 1983, Issue No. 83*).

The Committee resumed consideration of Vote 1—Operational Expenditures under EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

On motion of Mr. Laniel, seconded by Mr. Munro,—*Ordered*—That the Chairman report to the House that the Committee in accordance with its Order of Reference of Friday, May 23, 1980 has examined the Report of the 69th Inter-Parliamentary Conference—Rome, Italy, 14-22 September 1982 which it received on Friday, April 29, 1983 and that the relevant Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence be tabled.

The witnesses answered questions.

At 10:05 o'clock a.m., the Vice-Chairman took the Chair.

Questioning of the witnesses continued.

At 10:31 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE MARDI 17 MAI 1983

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale se réunit aujourd'hui à 9h32 sous la présidence de M. Marcel Prud'homme, (président).

Membres du Comité présents: M^{me} Appolloni, MM. Dupras, Hudecki, Laniel, Lapierre, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Prud'homme et Roche.

Substituts présents: MM. McLean, Ogle, Stewart et Watson.

Aussi présent: Du Centre parlementaire des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur: M. Roger Hill, directeur adjoint.

Témoins: Du ministère des Affaires extérieures: M. Marchand, sous-ministre, Politique étrangère; M. D. Molgat, sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint, Bureau des affaires de l'Europe; M. R. Johnstone, sous-ministre, Commerce international et coordonnateur des Relations économiques internationales; M. J.A. Malone, directeur, Direction des Antilles et de l'Amérique centrale; M. J.P. Schioler, directeur, Direction du Moyen-Orient.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 23 février 1983 portant sur le Budget principal pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984. (*Voir procès-verbal du mardi 15 mars, 1983, fascicule n° 83*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude du crédit 1—Dépenses d'opération sous la rubrique AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES.

Sur motion de M. Laniel, appuyée par M. Munro, *il est ordonné*.—Que le président fasse rapport à la Chambre que, conformément à son ordre de renvoi du vendredi 23 mai 1980, le Comité a étudié le rapport de la soixante-neuvième conférence interparlementaire tenue à Rome, en Italie, du 14 au 22 septembre 1982, qu'il a reçu le vendredi 29 avril 1983 et dont les procès-verbaux et témoignages pertinents ont été déposés.

Les témoins répondent aux questions.

A 10h05, le vice-président prend place au fauteuil.

L'audition des témoins se poursuit.

A 10h31, le Comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le greffier du Comité

Peter N. Hucal

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

*(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)**[Texte]*

Tuesday, May 17, 1983

• 0931

The Chairman: For once we will start at 9.30 a.m. sharp. *S'il vous plaît*, Mrs. Appolloni, gentlemen. I would ask you, please, as you know this is a heavy morning, for your kind attention. I put to you a request which I hope you will agree to, which is that there is a distinct protocol for some of us to follow this morning with respect to our visitor—let us call him a visitor, if not a guest or a witness—for security reasons. Mr. Mikhail S. Gorbachev will be in attendance with both Mr. Speaker of the Senate and Madam Speaker of the House, and will be directed from Madam Speaker's office to the Railway Committee Room. Therefore, I would think at least for members who intend to be there, and I hope all members will be there for our usual tough but distinguished questioning, it will be urgent for me to suggest to you that we adjourn at 10.20 a.m., or 10.25 a.m. at the latest. I hope that you will kindly agree to my request because we will all have to go to the Railway Committee Room.

In any case, I may ask Madam Appolloni to take the Chair because I still am not satisfied with my own notes of presentation. I still do not know how I am going to start, and would like time to finalize that in 10 minutes.

I will now ask if there is any statement or answer to questions. If we have answers to questions they will be distributed, and I will proceed in the usual fashion for questioning by recognizing one person of the Official Opposition which will be directed to me by the critic, the Hon. Mr. Allan McKinnon.

Before we start . . . *s'il vous plaît*, Monsieur Laniel?

Mr. Laniel: On a point of order.

Monsieur le président, lors de la réunion de ce Comité, jeudi dernier, nous avons étudié le Rapport de l'Union interparlementaire. Cette mission interparlementaire s'est rendue à Rome pour la 70^e Conférence internationale et il avait été suggéré, à la fin de la séance de notre Comité, qu'on adopte une proposition formelle dans le but de faire rapport de cette réunion à la Chambre des communes. Lorsque le quorum sera atteint . . .

Le président: Nous avons déjà quorum.

M. Laniel: . . . j'aimerais pouvoir faire cette proposition.

The Chairman: I recognize you now because there is a quorum and, as you know, on Friday we are meeting on IPU for the first time ever, as suggested for so many years by Mr. Wenman. We had a long meeting Friday, studying the report of the IPU meeting to Canadians and to members of Parliament, and the suggestion was very well received Friday. Eight members were present Friday—eight to nine. So I will receive that proposal and the usual report to the House that this committee, according to its order of reference has . . .

TÉMOIGNAGES

*(Enregistrement électronique)**[Traduction]*

Le mardi 17 mai 1983

Le président: Pour une fois, nous allons commencer à 9h30 précises. *Please*, madame Appolloni, messieurs. Étant donné que nous avons une matinée plutôt chargée, j'aimerais avoir votre attention sans tarder. Je vais vous faire une demande à laquelle, je l'espère, vous allez agréer, au sujet du visiteur, faute de le qualifier d'invité ou de témoin, pour des raisons de sécurité, que certains d'entre nous vont rencontrer ce matin. M. Mikhail S. Gorbachev va rencontrer le président du Sénat et le président de la Chambre et se rendra ensuite du bureau du président de la Chambre à la salle des chemins de fer. En conséquence, à l'intention de ceux qui désirent s'y rendre, et j'espère que vous irez tous pour poser les questions intelligentes que vous avez l'habitude de poser, je vous propose de lever la séance à 10h20, ou 10h25 au plus tard. J'espère que vous serez d'accord, car il faut nous rendre jusqu'à la salle des chemins de fer.

Quoi qu'il en soit, je vais demander à M^{me} Appolloni d'assumer la présidence afin que je puisse mettre la dernière main à la déclaration que je vais faire. Je ne sais toujours pas comment je vais commencer et je vous demanderai donc la permission de m'absenter dans une dizaine de minutes.

Je vais maintenant demander s'il y a des déclarations ou des réponses à donner à des questions antérieures. S'il y a des réponses par écrit, elles seront distribuées aux membres du Comité; nous allons suivre la procédure habituelle en ce qui concerne les questions et je vais donner la parole au représentant de l'Opposition officielle, M. Allan McKinnon.

Avant de commencer . . . Monsieur Laniel?

M. Laniel: J'aimerais invoquer le Règlement.

Mr. Chairman, when this committee met last Thursday, we studied the report of the Interparliamentary Union. Our Interparliamentary delegation went to Rome for the 70th International Conference, and it had been suggested, at the end of our committee meeting, that an official proposal be adopted in order to make a report to the House of Commons about this meeting. When we have the quorum . . .

The Chairman: We already have the quorum.

Mr. Laniel: . . . I would like to move this motion.

Le président: Vous pouvez le faire dès maintenant puisque nous avons le quorum; comme vous le savez, vendredi dernier, nous avons eu une première réunion sur l'Union parlementaire internationale, chose que M. Wenman suggérait depuis fort longtemps. Pendant cette réunion, qui a d'ailleurs duré assez longtemps, nous avons étudié le rapport de la délégation canadienne à cette conférence, rapport qui sera soumis aux Canadiens et aux députés; la suggestion a été très bien accueillie vendredi dernier. Huit députés étaient présents, huit

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Mr. Laniel: I would move that this committee report to the House that, according to its order of reference, it has received such and such a day the report of the Canadian delegation to the 69th Interparliamentary Conference in Rome, Italy, on September 12 and 13, 1982. Can we attach to our report the proceedings of that?

The Chairman: Yes, of course.

Mr. Laniel: And we want to bring to the attention of the House the proceedings that took place.

The Chairman: I think it is agreed. No problem. We have a quorum. Moved by Mr. Laniel; seconded by Mr. Munro.

Motion agreed to.

The Chairman: Shall I report to the House the said presentation?

Mr. Laniel: I think it is a precedent. It is a first. Maybe we did not do as much as we could in the meat of the report because we were praising ourselves to have achieved just the fact of receiving the report and commenting in general. Maybe next report we will go further.

The Chairman: Agreed? Thank you.

I now recognize, at the request of the Hon. Mr. McKinnon, Mr. Munro first, the hon. member for Esquimalt—Saanich, followed by Father Ogle and Mr. Dupras, and then I will adjourn.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): We are having a short meeting this morning and I do not intend to . . .

An hon. Member: Then you will adjourn, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: No, no. My colleague will take over.

An hon. Member: Mr. McLean will follow?

The Chairman: Mr. McLean will be number two.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): We are not going to have too long a meeting; therefore, I will just confine myself to one particular subject if I can. It is not always easy. It is about our visitors today. There are two or three questions about it that I would like to ask. One has to do with timing, one has to do with the host and one has to do with the purpose of their visit here. I will expand on those three elements in a moment.

We did have a briefing the other day on the matter, but I do feel it here of some interest to determine why it is called a visit of parliamentarians because the leader of the delegation, while he is a prominent member in the hierarchy in the Soviet Union—and I assume he sits up at the top table during the meetings of the Supreme Soviet, which I think is the proper term to use for their institution which parallels as closely as we can the Parliament of this country—he is not one of those, if I understand correctly, who is elected as a member of that

[Translation]

ou neuf, je ne me souviens plus très bien. Je suis donc prêt à entendre la motion selon laquelle notre Comité, conformément au mandat dont il a été saisi, fera rapport à la Chambre . . .

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M. Laniel: Je propose que le Comité fasse rapport à la Chambre des communes que, conformément au mandat dont il a été saisi, il a reçu tel jour le rapport de la délégation canadienne à la 69^e Conférence interparlementaire qui s'est tenue à Rome en Italie, les 12 et 13 septembre 1982. Pouvons-nous annexer à notre rapport le compte rendu en question?

Le président: Bien sûr.

M. Laniel: Nous voulons donc également soumettre à la Chambre le compte rendu de cette conférence.

Le président: Je pense que cela ne pose pas de problèmes. Nous avons le quorum. La motion a donc été proposée par M. Laniel et appuyée par M. Munro.

La motion est adoptée.

Le président: Dois-je faire rapport à la Chambre du document en question?

M. Laniel: Je pense que cela constitue un précédent. Nous n'avons peut-être pas assez insisté sur le contenu du rapport, mais le simple fait que nous en ayons pris officiellement connaissance et que nous fassions des commentaires généraux à son sujet est déjà un pas dans la bonne direction. Nous irons peut-être plus loin avec le prochain rapport.

Le président: Vous êtes d'accord? Merci.

Maintenant, à la demande de M. McKinnon, je vais d'abord donner la parole à M. Munro, député d'Esquimalt—Saanich, qui sera suivi de M. Ogle et de M. Dupras. Ensuite, nous lèverons la séance.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Notre réunion de ce matin sera brève et je n'ai pas l'intention de . . .

Une voix: Vous allez lever la séance, monsieur le président?

Le président: Non, ma collègue va me remplacer.

Une voix: M. McLean va prendre la parole?

Le président: Tout à l'heure, oui.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Étant donné que notre réunion de ce matin sera brève, je vais me limiter à un sujet en particulier. Ce n'est pas toujours facile. J'aimerais donc poser deux ou trois questions au sujet de ceux qui nous rendent visite aujourd'hui. La première concerne l'opportunité de cette visite, la deuxième l'hôte des visiteurs et la troisième, leur objectif. Je vais revenir sur ces trois éléments.

Nous avons eu une séance d'information l'autre jour sur ce sujet, mais j'estime qu'il serait bon aujourd'hui de savoir pourquoi l'on parle de visite de parlementaires étant donné que le chef de la délégation, même si c'est un membre important dans la hiérarchie soviétique, puisqu'il occupe une place de choix lors des réunions du Soviet suprême, si c'est bien là l'équivalent de notre Parlement . . . Quoi qu'il en soit, le chef de cette délégation, tout en jouant un rôle important en Union soviétique, n'est pas membre élu du Soviet suprême. Il l'a peut-

[Texte]

Supreme Soviet. He may have been at one time, but I do not know whether he is or not now. Therefore, I wonder why it is called a parliamentary delegation.

The second question, and related to that: If it is a parliamentary delegation and it can be explained that it is, then I can understand, perhaps, that it is the speakers of the two chambers who are acting as hosts. On the other hand, if the leader of this delegation is, as I understand him to be, one of the executive directors of the Soviet Union, I am wondering why the host is not the Prime Minister because it looks to me more like a Cabinet delegation attended by officials and a few members from the Supreme Soviet.

The other question I wanted to ask related to timing. I wonder if someone can tell me when it was decided, exactly, that the delegation would be coming this particular weekend, this particular week? I know the delegation has been on the back burner for two or three years as a result of Mr. Whelan's visit to the Soviet Union, but that was some time ago.

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That leads me into the third area. They are basically here, as I understand it, to do some wheeling and dealing, trading and assuring supplies of wheat. But I am sure all the details have been completed by the Department of External Affairs in collaboration with the Department of Agriculture.

So why is it called a parliamentary delegation? What about the timing? Should it perhaps not more properly have been called a purchasing delegation, if you like, headed by whoever it might be? Did Mr. Whelan, for example, go as a parliamentary delegation to the Soviet Union?

The Chairman: Mr. de Montigny Marchand.

Mr. de Montigny Marchand (Deputy Minister, Foreign Policy, Department of External Affairs): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, why is this mission called a parliamentary mission? The reason is simply, Mr. Chairman, that Mr. Gorbachev is heading a group of Soviet parliamentarians; and the exercise was, by mutual consent, agreed to be best described and managed for what it is; that is, a group of parliamentarians headed by a senior member of the Politburo.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): How many parliamentarians?

Mr. Marchand: I cannot answer that. I believe Mr. Molgat can.

M. D. Molgat (sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint, Bureau des Affaires de l'Europe): Monsieur le président, je peux fournir des renseignements plus précis, si vous le désirez.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Please.

Mr. Molgat: Mr. Gorbachev, who is the leader of the delegation, is in fact himself a parliamentarian. He is Chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet. In his delegation there is Mr. Gitalov, who is a member of the Supreme Soviet; Mr.

[Traduction]

être déjà été, mais je ne sais pas s'il l'est encore. En conséquence, je me demande pourquoi on qualifie cette délégation de délégation parlementaire.

Deuxièmement, et toujours sur le même sujet, j'aimerais savoir, s'il s'agit bien d'une délégation parlementaire, pourquoi ce sont les présidents des deux Chambres qui accueillent nos visiteurs. En effet, si le chef de la délégation en question est bien l'un des principaux dirigeants de l'Union soviétique, je ne comprends pas pourquoi ce n'est pas le premier ministre qui l'accueille car sa délégation ressemble donc davantage à une délégation du Cabinet dont font partie des représentants soviétiques et quelques membres du Soviet suprême.

La troisième question concerne l'opportunité de la visite. J'aimerais savoir quand il a été décidé que cette visite aurait lieu cette semaine? Je sais qu'il est plus ou moins question de cette visite depuis deux ou trois ans, à la suite du voyage de M. Whelan en Union soviétique; mais ça remonte à quelque temps déjà.

Cela m'amène à la troisième question. D'après ce qu'on m'a dit, cette délégation a essentiellement une mission commerciale, afin d'assurer à l'Union soviétique des approvisionnements en blé. Je suis sûr que tous les détails de cette visite ont été mis au point par le ministère des Affaires extérieures en collaboration avec le ministère de l'Agriculture.

En conséquence, pourquoi dit-on qu'il s'agit d'une délégation parlementaire? Qu'en est-il de l'opportunité de cette visite? Ne pensez-vous pas qu'il aurait mieux valu qualifier cette délégation de délégation commerciale, dirigée par qui de droit? Par exemple, M. Whelan s'est-il rendu en Union soviétique avec une délégation parlementaire, lui aussi?

Le président: Monsieur de Montigny Marchand.

M. de Montigny Marchand (sous-ministre, Politique étrangère, ministère des Affaires extérieures): Merci, monsieur le président. Vous me demandez tout d'abord pourquoi cette mission est qualifiée de mission parlementaire? La raison en est bien simple, monsieur le président, puisque M. Gorbachev dirige un groupe de parlementaires soviétiques; cette mission a été qualifiée comme telle par consentement mutuel. Il s'agit donc d'un groupe de parlementaires dirigé par un membre important du Politburo.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Cette délégation comprend combien de parlementaires?

M. Marchand: Je ne peux pas vous le dire, mais M. Molgat le sait sans doute.

Mr. D. Molgat (Assistant Under-Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs): Mr. Chairman, I can give you more information, if you wish.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je vous en prie.

M. Molgat: M. Gorbachev, qui dirige la délégation, est lui-même parlementaire. Il préside en effet la Commission des propositions législatives du Conseil de l'Union du Soviet suprême. Sa délégation est composée de M. Gitalov, membre du Soviet suprême; de M. Ezhevsky, également membre du

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Ezhevsky, who is a member of the Supreme Soviet and Minister of Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Industry; Mr. Manyakin, who is a member of the Planning and Budgetary Commission of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet; Mr. Kuanyshhev, who is a member of the Agricultural Commission of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet; and Mr. Zhuchenko, who is a member of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): There are six, then.

Mr. Molgat: Yes, six.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): And the others are staff.

Mr. Molgat: The others are members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, or government officials, such as the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): But given the distinction of the leader, why was it decided that it should be called a parliamentary delegation rather than an official visit to Canada, with perhaps the Prime Minister as the host?

Mr. Molgat: If I may go on, Mr. Chairman, in fact, the Soviet Union—the organizers, Mr. Gorbachev's own people—consider it to be a parliamentary delegation. They are coming as a group of parliamentarians for purposes of learning about Canada and the opportunities it offers. It seemed to us, in fact, given the composition of the group they were envisaging, that it was predominantly a parliamentary group and should be considered as such.

As for why it should not be received at the invitation of the Prime Minister, the question of level arises. In my own view and I think in that of the department—I could not speak for the Prime Minister—it really would be inappropriate for the Prime Minister to be his host. Mr. Gorbachev is not his opposite number. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Tikhonov, who was, for example, the visitor to Greece a few months ago, would in fact be the Prime Minister's opposite number at the administrative level. Mr. Gorbachev is not; he is a member of the Politburo. That makes him one of the 12 most influential people in the Soviet Union; but it makes him influential on policy, not on implementation of program.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Then why not Mr. Whelan?

Mr. Molgat: I cannot speak for Mr. Whelan, but there is a minister of agriculture in the Soviet Union who is, indeed, Mr. Whelan's direct opposite number, and who came here to Canada as Mr. Whelan's guest last year, I believe, October or November. Mr. Gorbachev does not really fit as Mr. Whelan's opposite number in any real sense.

[Translation]

Soviet suprême et ministre du Matériel agricole; de M. Manyakin, membre de la Commission de planification budgétaire du Conseil de l'Union du Soviet suprême; de M. Kuanyshhev, membre de la Commission agricole du Conseil des nationalités du Soviet suprême; et de M. Zhuchenko, membre du Conseil des nationalités du Soviet suprême.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Ils sont donc six.

M. Molgat: C'est exact.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Les autres membres de la délégation font donc partie du personnel.

M. Molgat: Les autres sont membres du Secrétariat du Comité central ou sont membres du gouvernement, comme c'est le cas du sous-ministre du Commerce extérieur et du ministère des Affaires étrangères.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Toutefois, étant donné la fonction élevée du chef de cette délégation, j'aimerais savoir pourquoi l'on a décidé d'en faire une délégation parlementaire plutôt que de lui donner le statut de visite officielle au Canada, dont le premier ministre serait éventuellement l'hôte?

M. Molgat: Permettez-moi de vous dire, monsieur le président, que les organisateurs soviétiques de cette visite ont jugé eux-mêmes qu'il s'agissait d'une délégation parlementaire. Il s'agit donc d'un groupe de parlementaires qui viennent au Canada se rendre compte par eux-mêmes du potentiel que nous pouvons leur offrir. Étant donné la composition de cette délégation, nous avons pensé qu'il s'agissait essentiellement d'un groupe de parlementaires qui devait donc être considéré comme tel.

Quant à savoir pourquoi ce n'est pas le premier ministre qui reçoit nos visiteurs, c'est une question de protocole. Personnellement, j'estime, mais je ne parle qu'au nom du ministère, et pas au nom du premier ministre, qu'il serait inapproprié que le premier ministre soit l'hôte de nos visiteurs. En effet, M. Gorbachev n'est pas son homologue soviétique. Le président du Conseil des ministres, M. Tikhonov, qui s'est notamment rendu en Grèce, il y a quelques mois, serait en quelque sorte l'homologue du premier ministre au niveau administratif. M. Gorbachev ne l'est pas, il est simplement membre du Politburo. Certes, il compte parmi les 12 dirigeants soviétiques qui ont le plus d'influence, mais son influence s'exerce au niveau de l'élaboration des politiques, et non pas de la réalisation des programmes.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Dans ce cas, pourquoi pas M. Whelan?

M. Molgat: Je ne peux pas vous répondre à la place de M. Whelan, mais je sais que son homologue soviétique direct est venu au Canada à titre d'invité de M. Whelan l'année dernière, en octobre ou en novembre. M. Gorbachev n'est pas l'homologue de M. Whelan.

[Texte]

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I sympathize with the problems you had.

The Chairman: Timing?

Mr. Molgat: On timing, I am afraid I could not give an exact date, Mr. Chairman, as to when it was decided that the visit take place this particular week.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Could that be determined?

Mr. Molgat: Subject to correction—and if this is wrong, I will correct it—I believe the decision was taken in the very last weeks of 1982 or in the course of January 1983 on precise timing. I will check that.

Mr. Marchand: I can add to this, if I may, Mr. Chairman, that by the time I was in the Soviet Union and Mr. Molgat was with me, at the end of 1982 the dates were not specified and precise. That visit was very much discussed, but at the insistence of the Soviet side, certainly not at ours, the date and the precise moment was left open. So it must have been early in 1983 that this particular time was set.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): What you are saying is that the initiative for this visit came from the Soviet Union in response to the . . .

Mr. Marchand: The specific proposal of dates was the Soviet initiative.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): But also of the visit itself.

Mr. Marchand: Of the visit itself? I think, yes; the idea first originated with the Soviet side.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Then there is the purchasing aspect of it.

Mr. Molgat: Mr. Chairman, the delegation is not coming here specifically as a purchasing delegation. Their purpose is to develop more understanding of, and familiarity with, the country, its agricultural production methods—they recognize the success of Canadian agriculture, and they recognize the problems of their own—and the industrial base which underlies it, such as machinery and farm implements; also, the marketing procedures which we apply to our agricultural production. I think their purpose is essentially that. I do not want to make that too technical, because I think one of their purposes is to get more of a feel for a country like Canada.

The purchasing aspect is not, may I say, a hard-nosed and precise perception or effort on our part. What we do know is that the Soviet Union has a five-year plan at the moment, running from 1981 to 1985, in which agriculture is given one of the two highest priorities, together with the oil and gas sector.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has launched a food plan, the purpose of which will be to improve the food production on the Soviet Union. That will attract a good deal of resources into that sector in the Soviet Union, opening up,

[Traduction]

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je comprends les problèmes que vous avez eus.

Le président: Et l'opportunité de cette visite?

M. Molgat: À ce sujet, je ne pense pas pouvoir vous dire, monsieur le président, quand exactement il a été décidé que cette visite aurait lieu cette semaine.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Pourrait-on le savoir?

M. Molgat: Si je me souviens bien, mais il faudrait que je vérifie, la décision a été prise au cours des dernières semaines de 1982 ou des premières semaines de janvier 1983. Toutefois, je vérifierai.

M. Marchand: Permettez-moi d'ajouter, monsieur le président, que lorsque M. Molgat et moi-même nous sommes rendus en Union soviétique, à la fin de 1982, la date de cette visite n'avait pas encore été déterminée. Certes, il en a été beaucoup question, à l'insistance des Soviétiques, et certainement pas de la nôtre, mais la date n'a pas été fixée à ce moment-là. C'est donc sans doute au début de 1983 qu'elle l'a été.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Vous voulez donc dire que c'est l'Union soviétique qui a pris l'initiative de cette visite en réponse à . . .

M. Marchand: C'est l'Union soviétique qui a proposé des dates précises.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Mais également la visite elle-même.

M. Marchand: La visite elle-même? Oui, je crois que c'est l'Union soviétique qui en a eu l'idée la première.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Parlons maintenant de l'aspect commercial de cette mission.

M. Molgat: Monsieur le président, la délégation n'a pas une mission spécifiquement commerciale. Son objectif est de mieux comprendre les méthodes de production agricole de notre pays compte tenu des succès que nous connaissons dans ce domaine. Il ne faut pas oublier non plus que l'Union soviétique a des problèmes à cet égard. La délégation s'intéressera également aux structures industrielles de notre secteur agricole, notamment le matériel et les machines agricoles, ainsi qu'aux techniques de commercialisation que nous utilisons pour notre production agricole. Je pense donc que c'est là l'objectif essentiel de la délégation. Je ne crois pas que leur mission soit tellement technique, car il s'agit davantage, pour eux, de mieux comprendre comment nous fonctionnons.

Pour nous, l'aspect commercial n'est pas très précis. Nous savons que l'Union soviétique a un plan quinquennal jusqu'en 1985, plan qui donne à l'agriculture l'une des deux priorités essentielles, l'autre étant le secteur du pétrole et du gaz naturel.

Parallèlement, l'Union soviétique a mis sur pied un plan alimentaire dont l'objectif est d'améliorer la production alimentaire dans ce pays. Grâce à ce plan, nous pensons que le secteur agricole soviétique va accaparer un grand nombre des

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we believe, opportunities for Canadian exports in such fields as agricultural machinery and implements, agricultural technology, seed strains, embryo transplants, and so on. So it is seen by us as an opportunity, rather than as a purchasing mission that will come here to sign any deals. We do not expect that.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I see. That being so, this is my final question, Mr. Chairman. Is there any interpretation that can be put on what I think we considered to be an unprovoked outburst at the airport yesterday by the leader of the delegation, to leave agriculture aside and to turn to matters of missiles soon . . . in an attack on a third country; a verbal attack?

Mr. Molgat: You mean, whether there is an explanation for this, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): If there is any interpretation by the department of this particular thing. If agriculture was the main thrust, it does not seem to have been an agricultural outburst.

Mr. Molgat: At the moment, Mr. Chairman, the department I believe is placing no interpretation on his comments, because we have not had an opportunity of discussing them with Mr. Gorbachev. The hon. member may wish to do that in his contacts with Mr. Gorbachev who I expect would be willing to discuss that kind of thing quite openly. The fact is that while his responsibilities in the Politburo concentrate on agriculture, the Politburo is a group of 12 people who are the policy decision-makers in the Soviet Union and, therefore, Mr. Gorbachev participates in policy decisions on all subjects . . .

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Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Oh, sure.

Mr. Molgat: —including disarmament, and therefore presumably has both functional and personal views on it.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): But these were his words of welcome to Canada—which were unusual.

Mr. Molgat: I could not place an interpretation on them.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I do hope that we do not repeat performances of that sort when we send visitors abroad. Thank you.

The Chairman: *Merci.* Mr. Ogle.

Mr. Ogle: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This morning, I would like to ask just a few questions, if I could, about the funding practices of the International Monetary Fund. This month, on May 5, the House Banking Subcommittee in the United States Congress, I think for the first time, voted against the United States' backing a loan from the International Monetary Fund to South Africa. The reason given was that it was because of the apartheid policies of South Africa. Although it is linked in a sense, I know, to economic features, it would seem that it is a question that has been addressed by that subcommittee, at least, on a moral basis. I feel that many

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ressources de ce pays, ce qui devrait ouvrir des débouchés pour les exportations canadiennes dans des domaines comme le matériel agricole, la technologie agricole, les semences, et cetera. Nous voyons donc dans cette visite la possibilité de trouver des débouchés pour les exportations canadiennes, car le rôle de cette délégation ne se limite pas à signer une transaction quelconque.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je comprends. Permettez-moi, monsieur le président, de poser une dernière question. Comment interprétez-vous les déclarations intempestives qu'a faites spontanément le chef de cette délégation, hier, à l'aéroport, lorsqu'il a annoncé que la question des missiles aurait priorité sur celle de l'agriculture?

M. Molgat: Vous voulez savoir comment expliquer cette intervention, monsieur le président?

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): J'aimerais savoir si le ministère a déjà donné une interprétation à ces déclarations. Les déclarations en question sont loin de concerner le secteur agricole, alors que c'était là la mission de cette délégation.

M. Molgat: Pour l'instant, monsieur le président, le ministère n'a donné aucune interprétation de cet incident, car nous n'avons pas eu l'occasion d'en discuter avec M. Gorbachev. Le député pourra, s'il le désire, en parler directement à M. Gorbachev qui, j'en suis sûr, sera prêt à lui donner des explications directes. Certes, ses responsabilités au Politburo concernent essentiellement l'agriculture, mais les 12 membres du Politburo sont les principaux décideurs de l'Union soviétique et, en quelque sorte, M. Gorbachev participe aux grandes décisions prises dans tous les domaines . . .

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Bien sûr.

M. Molgat: . . . y compris le désarmement, et c'est pour cela que ses déclarations peuvent s'expliquer de par sa fonction et de par ses opinions personnelles.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Toutefois, il est un peu étrange que ce soit les premières paroles qu'il ait prononcées à son arrivée au Canada.

M. Molgat: Je ne saurais dire comment les interpréter.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): J'espère en tout cas que nous n'en ferons pas autant lorsque nous enverrons des visiteurs à l'étranger. Merci.

Le président: *Thank you.* Monsieur Ogle.

M. Ogle: Merci, monsieur le président. Ce matin, j'aimerais simplement poser quelques questions au sujet des pratiques de financement du Fonds monétaire international. Le 5 mai dernier, le Sous-comité sur les banques du Congrès américain a refusé, et c'est la première fois, que les États-Unis appuient un prêt du Fonds monétaire international à l'Afrique du Sud. La raison invoquée par le Sous-comité en question est la politique d'apartheid de l'Afrique du Sud. Certes, cette décision a des dimensions économiques, mais je pense qu'elle a également été prise pour des raisons morales. J'estime qu'un grand nombre des prêts consentis par le Fonds monétaire

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of the loans the International Monetary Fund makes sidestep moral questions that some of the countries who put money into the fund are addressing in a different way in their own countries. I think, for example, El Salvador is a case in point in which Canada, as far as I know, is not funding the government directly, but the International Monetary Fund, which would have Canadian funds in it, is.

My question to our guests this morning would be, first of all, what was the final result of that decision made by the banking subcommittee? Did it have any effect on the International Monetary Fund, and is Canada looking at ways in which that fund, by their members, can make some decisions in the future, economic ones but also ones made on a moral basis on the question of human rights or the lack of them?

Mr. R. Johnstone (Deputy Minister, International Trade and Co-ordinator, International Economic Relations, Department of External Affairs): The decision on the question by the subcommittee of the U.S. Congress has not, to my knowledge, affected the official U.S. position as reflected by the votes of its executive director on the board of the IMF. The International Monetary Fund, like other international institutions—and let me just speak of the IMF—has, over many many years, established and guarded a policy of acting on technical and economic grounds as opposed to political grounds. The concern has always been that if the door is open to political decisions—the member has referred to the moral character, if you like, of countries that are dealing with the fund, which means assistance from the fund—once one opens that door it will seriously, if not fatally, undermine the capacity of the fund to do the job for which it was set up, which is to provide balance of payments support and surveillance of the international monetary system.

There have been on a number of occasions in the U.S. Congress—and this, presumably, is one of them—attempts made to inject into fund decisions political concerns of one kind or another, whether human rights or straight foreign policy views of the U.S. or of some members of Congress vis-à-vis another country. The administration, to my knowledge, has consistently rejected that kind of indication of view from Congress and has stuck by its position of acting, as a member of the fund and in the board of the fund, in light of the economic requirements, economic realities, and the mandate of the fund to review those. Indeed, I think the articles of the fund themselves, though I may not be precisely accurate on that, speak to this point and enjoin the fund to carry out its activities in light of the economic requirements of the situation.

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Certainly insofar as Canada is concerned, we have consistently resisted the view that matters other than those which fall to the mandate of the fund as an international balance of payments and economic organization—we have always resisted the view that these other considerations should be fed into and should risk becoming dominant in fund decisions, because of

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international font fi des objections que soulèvent certains des pays qui cotisent à ce Fonds. Par exemple, dans le cas du Salvador, le Canada ne finance pas directement le gouvernement de ce pays, mais le Fonds monétaire international accorde des prêts à ce gouvernement, et le Canada participe à ce Fonds.

J'aimerais donc tout d'abord savoir quel a été le résultat final de la décision du Sous-comité des banques. A-t-elle eu un impact sur le Fonds monétaire international, et le Canada étudie-t-il les moyens par lesquels les membres du Fonds pourraient influencer les décisions de cet organisme non seulement en fonction de critères économiques, mais aussi en fonction de critères moraux, comme le respect des droits de la personne?

M. R. Johnstone (sous-ministre du commerce extérieur et coordonnateur des relations économiques extérieures, ministère des Affaires extérieures): La décision du Sous-comité du Congrès américain n'a pas, que je sache, influé sur la position officielle américaine lors des votes des principaux administrateurs du Conseil du FMI. Comme les autres organismes internationaux, le FMI a, depuis fort longtemps, établi une politique basée rigoureusement sur des critères techniques et économiques, par opposition à des critères politiques. En effet, on a toujours pensé qu'en laissant intervenir des critères politiques, et le député a parlé de la moralité de certains pays qui reçoivent une aide financière du Fonds, l'efficacité de cet organisme s'en trouverait considérablement amoindrie, étant donné que son rôle consiste à surveiller le système monétaire international et à aider certains pays à équilibrer leur balance des paiements.

Outre le cas que vous avez mentionné, le Congrès américain a, à plusieurs reprises, essayé de faire intervenir des critères politiques dans les décisions prises par le Fonds, qu'il s'agisse du respect des droits de la personne, des opinions directes du gouvernement américain en matière de politique étrangère ou de l'opinion de certains représentants du Congrès à l'égard d'un autre pays. Que je sache, l'administration américaine a toujours refusé ce genre de suggestion du Congrès et a continué d'arrêter ses positions, à titre d'État-membre du Fonds et de membre du Conseil, en tenant compte des critères et des réalités économiques ainsi que du mandat du Fonds. En fait, les statuts du Fonds, si je me souviens bien, portent justement sur cette question et exigent des États-membres qu'ils prennent leurs décisions en fonction des critères économiques de tel ou tel cas.

En ce qui concerne le Canada, il est certain que nous nous sommes toujours opposés à l'idée que des questions autres que celles qui relèvent du mandat du Fonds en sa qualité d'organisme international s'intéressant aux questions de balance des paiements et d'économie—nous nous sommes toujours opposés à l'opinion que ces autres considérations devaient entrer en ligne de compte menaçant ainsi de prédominer dans les

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the danger that it would undermine, as I say, if not destroy, the capacity of the fund to do the job for which it was set up.

Mr. Ogle: Mr. Chairman, I will give a couple of minutes to my colleague, if I can get them back again.

The Chairman: You do not have to do that. You have the floor now, and then I will go back to . . .

Mr. Ogle: But may I come back?

The Chairman: Oh, yes, of course.

Mr. Dupras: Is it not true that in some instances the U.S. government vetoed loans to some countries because of ideology?

A Witness: I would have to check the record on that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dupras: And Nicaragua would be one victim of that. Nicaragua a few times was a victim of that. When they sought funds for their literacy campaign, loans were turned down; they were vetoed by the U.S.A.

Mr. Johnstone: Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I would have to check the record on that. I asserted a moment ago that I thought the administration had consistently opposed this . . .

Mr. Dupras: I can assure you they have vetoed loans to Nicaragua.

Mr. Johnstone: I know there were some cases indeed when I sat on the executive board of the IMF, some long years ago—more than a decade ago—there were occasions when this kind of issue came up. I recall one occasion when the executive director of the IMF—I cannot remember the country or the precise circumstance—recorded a view, but made no attempt to block the fund decision.

The Chairman: Back to Mr. Ogle.

Mr. Ogle: I would have to agree with Mr. Dupras on that point, because I do think the American administration frequently decides how the funds are going to be used and frequently it is not done basically on economics; it is done for lots of other reasons as well.

Last week—and I think he is still in Canada . . . Donald Woods, an exiled South African journalist of status, addressed the Amnesty International people in Ottawa, as well as Parliamentarians for World Order in the House. He was telling us in general about how Africa is responding to the way that Canada, in the group of five here—Namibia is being looked at by the rest of black Africa. It is only his appraisal, but I put his appraisal at a high level. He feels that Canada is losing a lot of goodwill throughout Africa because of its general foot-dragging in Namibia in solving that situation. He also went on to say that in his view black Africa has had a long-standing tradition of goodwill to Canada, but that is disappearing—plus the fact that he sees Africa becoming more closely united all the time with the Arab countries and he sees a whole new power block developing in which a vast percent-

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décisions du Fonds, car cela risquerait de miner, comme je l'ai dit, sinon de détruire la capacité du Fonds de remplir la tâche pour laquelle il a été constitué.

M. Ogle: Monsieur le président, je vais accorder quelques minutes à mon collègue, si on veut bien me les redonner.

Le président: Vous n'avez pas à le faire. Vous avez maintenant la parole, et ensuite nous retournerons à . . .

M. Ogle: Puis-je reparler?

Le président: Oui, certainement.

M. Dupras: N'est-il pas vrai que dans certains cas, le gouvernement américain a imposé son veto à des prêts à certains pays à cause de l'idéologie de ceux-ci?

Un témoin: Il faudrait que je vérifie, monsieur le président.

M. Dupras: Le Nicaragua serait l'une des victimes de ce veto. Le Nicaragua, à quelques reprises, en a été victime. Lorsque ce pays a cherché à obtenir des fonds pour sa campagne d'alphabétisation, les prêts ont été refusés; ce sont les États-Unis qui y ont imposé leur veto.

M. Johnstone: Monsieur le président, je crains que je devrai vérifier. J'ai affirmé il y a un instant que je pensais que l'administration s'était toujours opposée à ce . . .

M. Dupras: Je puis vous certifier qu'ils ont imposé leur veto à des prêts au Nicaragua.

M. Johnstone: Je sais qu'il s'est certainement présenté des cas lorsque je faisais partie du Conseil d'administration du FMI, il y a de nombreuses années—plus d'une décennie—il y a eu des occasions où ce genre de question s'est posée. Je me souviens d'une occasion où le directeur général du FMI—je ne me souviens plus du pays ni des circonstances précises—avait inscrit une opinion, mais sans la moindre tentative en vue de contrer la décision du Fonds.

Le président: Revenons à M. Ogle.

M. Ogle: Je dois me dire d'accord avec M. Dupras à ce sujet, car j'estime en effet que l'administration américaine décide fréquemment comment l'argent sera utilisé et fréquemment, on ne se fonde pas essentiellement sur des questions économiques; on agit pour un grand nombre d'autres raisons aussi.

La semaine dernière—et je crois qu'il est toujours au Canada, Donald Woods, un journaliste sud-africain en exil, a adressé la parole aux membres d'Amnistie internationale à Ottawa, ainsi qu'aux Parlementaires pour un ordre mondial à la Chambre. Il nous expliquait comment d'une façon générale l'Afrique réagit à la façon dont le Canada, au sein du groupe des cinq, comment le reste de l'Afrique noire surveille la Namibie. Il ne s'agit que de son évaluation, mais j'y accorde le plus grand poids. Il estime que le Canada perd beaucoup de crédibilité à travers l'Afrique à cause de la façon dont il traîne d'une façon générale dans le règlement de cette situation en Namibie. Il a également ajouté, qu'à son avis, l'Afrique noire a depuis toujours une tradition de bienveillance envers le Canada, mais que celle-ci disparaît—et en plus, il voit l'Afrique s'unissant de plus en plus étroitement, constamment,

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age of the world population, in which the energy resources of the world are tied into that one group, and which the mineral resources and land area . . .

Does the department feel what Mr. Woods was saying is more or less true? Are we losing faith and goodwill in Africa because of our foot-dragging about Namibia?

The Chairman: Mr. Marchand.

Mr. Marchand: Mr. Chairman, the process itself, the process of the Contact Group, is long-drawn and carries its own idiosyncrasies, one of which is very laborious and patient diplomacy. Indeed, the calendar has regularly and consistently slipped. But it would not be my judgment, nor would I say that of the department, that because of that, the process, the method, the instrument of the Contact Group, is losing credit amongst its principal interlocutors: of course, the front-line states and the principal players in the region and the periphery of the region. It would be my judgment that the group itself is not losing credence and that, within the group, Canada is certainly not losing credence. The various members of the Contact Group, for historical reasons and for reasons of political or economic affinities, have special relationships with the various countries in that area and are using various diplomatic means at their disposal to try to nudge along that process.

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So to recapitulate, Mr. Chairman, the short answer to Father Ogle's question is, no, it is not our impression that we are losing credit in that process.

Mr. Ogle: Thank you.

The Chairman: Last question, Father Ogle.

Mr. Ogle: Thank you. Mr. Woods also said . . . This is something I just do not know; I believe what he said, but I just wonder if we can say the same thing. Regarding the price of gold and diamonds, both of which resources are to the greatest part within the Soviet Union and within South Africa, he says that even though South Africa has an open total hostility to the Soviet Union, it is South Africa working with the Soviet Union that establishes the international price of diamonds and gold. Is that true? He related this from his own facts, but he also said the BBC has now covered this in a story.

Mr. Marchand: I would not comment on that, Mr. Chairman, but we can certainly undertake to gather some information. Indeed, it will be very difficult to have factual and absolutely objective information on that. It is bound to be opinionated and rather subjective. But whatever we can gather, Mr. Chairman, we can make available to the committee.

Mr. Johnstone: Mr. Chairman, if I could just add, I think there is a bit of a difference between diamonds and gold. I am

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aux pays arabes et il voit se constituer tout un nouveau bloc de puissances au sein duquel un grand pourcentage de la population mondiale, au sein duquel les ressources énergétiques du monde se retrouveront dans ce groupe, et si l'on considère également les ressources minérales et le territoire . . .

Le ministère estime-t-il que ce que disait M. Woods est plus ou moins juste? Perdons-nous la confiance et la bienveillance des Africains parce que nous traînons au sujet de la Namibie?

Le président: Monsieur Marchand.

M. Marchand: Monsieur le président, le processus même, le processus du groupe de contact est long et comporte ses propres idiosyncrasies, notamment une diplomatie très laborieuse et très patiente. En fait, on prend régulièrement du retard sur l'échéancier, mais à mon avis, et de l'avis du ministère, je ne dirais pas que pour cette raison, le processus, la méthode, l'instrument du groupe de contact perdent crédibilité parmi ses principaux interlocuteurs: il s'agit bien sûr des États de la ligne du front et des principaux protagonistes de la région et de la région périphérique. À mon avis, le groupe lui-même ne perd pas sa crédibilité et, au sein du groupe, le Canada ne perd certes pas la sienne. Les divers membres du groupe de contact, pour des raisons historiques et des raisons d'affinités politiques ou économiques, jouissent de relations spéciales avec les divers pays de la région et utilisent divers moyens diplomatiques à leur disposition pour tenter d'encourager le processus.

Donc, pour récapituler, monsieur le président, la réponse brève à la question de M. Ogle, c'est non, nous n'avons pas l'impression que nous perdons notre crédibilité dans ce processus.

M. Ogle: Merci.

Le président: Dernière question, monsieur Ogle.

M. Ogle: Merci. M. Woods a également déclaré . . . Je ne sais vraiment pas; je crois ce qu'il a dit, mais je me demande simplement si nous pouvons dire la même chose. Au sujet du prix de l'or et des diamants, deux ressources se trouvant surtout en Union soviétique et en Afrique du Sud, il a dit que même si l'Afrique du Sud démontre une hostilité ouverte totale à l'Union soviétique, c'est l'Afrique du Sud travaillant en collaboration avec l'Union soviétique qui fixe le prix international des diamants et de l'or. Est-ce vrai? Il tire cette conclusion à partir de ses propres faits, mais il a également déclaré que la BBC a maintenant fait un reportage à ce sujet.

M. Marchand: Je n'ai aucun commentaire à faire à ce sujet, monsieur le président, mais nous pouvons certainement nous engager à recueillir des renseignements à ce sujet. En fait, il sera très difficile d'obtenir des renseignements parfaitement justes et absolument objectifs. Nécessairement, il s'agira d'opinions et de renseignements assez subjectifs. Toutefois, tout ce que nous pourrions recueillir, monsieur le président, nous le mettrons à la disposition du Comité.

M. Johnstone: Monsieur le président, si vous me permettez d'ajouter quelque chose, je crois qu'il y a une certaine diffé-

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certainly not an expert on the markets for either; but in the gold market, the price of gold can be moved and moved very dramatically by a variety of forces, including speculation, strength or weakness of major currencies, and particularly, the U.S. dollar. This can throw around the world market price of gold very, very substantially. But at the same time, I have no doubt at all that on occasion sales decisions by South Africa and by the Soviet Union—obviously, they are major suppliers in the market—can have an influence on the price. But a dominant and determining influence, that I would doubt.

Diamonds I will not even speak to. That is a quite different kind of market, but as Mr. Marchand has said, I doubt one would be able to go beyond collecting what is the well known information on the dominant position of a limited number of suppliers in that market.

Mr. Ogle: Thank you.

Le président: Monsieur Dupras, s'il vous plaît, *followed by Mr. McLean* et M. Laniel.

M. Dupras: Monsieur le président, je voudrais tout d'abord poursuivre cette question de la politique du Fonds monétaire international quant à la considération des projets ou des demandes de fonds par certains pays, et savoir si le Canada a déjà exercé un veto, comme les Américains le font à l'occasion, à la suite de demandes de fonds par des pays en voie de développement.

Mr. Johnstone: Mr. Chairman, even if we wished, we are not in a position because of our relative size in the fund to exercise a veto, Mr. Dupras, over the activities of the fund. If I could just in a few sentences elaborate on my earlier answer, on occasion, when the fund faces situations in countries where there is severe disorder or unrest... I recall one or two occasions of this kind, which is human rights written very, very large to the extent that the government was really beginning to lose its capacity to control the situation.

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I think I can recall one or two occasions—and I can correct the record if I am wrong on this—when the fund in effect decided, not directly, not focusing on the moral grounds, but on the consequences of the disorder, that the country in question simply would not be in a position to fulfil the requirements of an appropriate fund program and in those circumstances decided not to provide the support. I think that was true in Uganda towards the end of Idi Amin's time. But the attempt was made in the board—rightly or wrongly, the attempt was made—to draw a line between a purely political act and a judgment as to the internal order and stability and capacity of the country to pursue a reasonable economic policy.

M. Dupras: Et les conséquences que cela pourrait amener, sur le plan économique, dans chacun des pays.

M. Johnstone: Oui, c'est cela.

[Translation]

rence entre les diamants et l'or. Je ne suis certes pas expert sur les marchés de l'un ou de l'autre; toutefois, en ce qui concerne le marché de l'or, le prix peut être influencé, et ce de façon très marquée, par une variété de forces, y compris la spéculation, la force ou la faiblesse des grandes devises, et particulièrement du dollar américain. Le prix de l'or sur le marché international peut s'en trouver très considérablement influencé. Toutefois, par la même occasion, je n'ai pas le moindre doute qu'à l'occasion les décisions de ventes prises par l'Afrique du Sud et par l'Union soviétique... manifestement, ils sont les grands fournisseurs du marché... peuvent influencer le prix. Quant à savoir s'il s'agit d'une influence dominante et déterminante, j'en doute.

Des diamants, je n'en parlerai même pas. Il s'agit d'un marché très différent, mais, comme l'a dit M. Marchand, je doute fort que l'on puisse faire plus que réunir les renseignements déjà bien connus sur la position dominante d'un nombre limité de fournisseurs de ce marché.

M. Ogle: Merci.

The Chairman: Mr. Dupras, if you please, *suivi par M. McLean* and Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Dupras: Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to pursue this matter of the policy of the International Monetary Fund in considering projects or requests for funds from certain countries, and I would like to know if Canada has ever used a veto, as the Americans sometimes do, when developing countries have requested funds.

M. Johnstone: Monsieur le président, même si nous le voulions, nous ne pourrions pas exercer de veto sur les activités du fond, M. Dupras, puisque nous représentons une partie trop peu importante du fond. Si je peux ajouter à ma réponse précédente, à l'occasion, quand le fond connaît des difficultés dans des pays où il y a de l'agitation... Je me souviens d'une ou deux occasions semblables, où une vision très vaste des droits de la personne faisait perdre au gouvernement sa capacité de contrôler la situation.

Je crois pouvoir me souvenir d'un cas ou deux—et je pourrai apporter les corrections nécessaires si je fais erreur et—ou le Fonds a en fait décidé, non pas directement, non en mettant l'accent sur les raisons morales, mais sur les conséquences du désordre, que le pays en question ne se trouverait tout simplement pas en mesure de remplir les conditions du programme du Fonds approprié et dans ces circonstances, il a été décidé de ne pas l'appuyer. Je crois que ce fut le cas en Ouganda vers la fin du régime d'Idi Amin. Toutefois cette tentative a été faite d'une façon générale—à raison ou à tort, la tentative a été faite—de départager entre un geste purement politique et un jugement sur l'ordre interne, la stabilité et la capacité du pays de suivre une politique économique raisonnable.

Mr. Dupras: And the consequences that that could bring about, at an economic level in each of the countries.

Mr. Johnstone: Yes, that is it.

[Texte]

Mr. Dupras: Est-ce que chaque pays qui souscrit au Fonds monétaire international et à la Banque mondiale ne devrait pas avoir, tout de même, un droit de regard sur certaines questions de morale comme celles que vous illustrez? Un prêt à certains pays — celui que vous avez mentionné tout à l'heure en est un exemple — constitue un risque trop grand. Est-ce que chaque gouvernement n'a pas un droit de regard sur les décisions qui sont prises par les officiers des banques et du Fonds monétaire international?

Mr. Johnstone: Ah oui, certainement! Les décisions sont prises par les *executive boards*, par les directeurs de chaque institution, et ces directeurs n'agissent pas à titre privé. Ils suivent les directives, les conseils de leur gouvernement. Dans notre cas, il y en a 8 ou 9, je crois, qui ne représentaient pas un Canadien dans des conseils.

Mr. Dupras: And if the Americans can exercise a veto on a certain loan application, why cannot we?

Mr. Johnstone: Relative size. It is a technical matter in the fund articles. The decisions can be bought by a vote carrying a voting weight of more than 20%. The U.S. has that blocking power; we do not. We are much smaller in the fund.

Mr. Dupras: I have been told oftentimes that in terms of image maybe our contribution to some of these international institutions is more important than that of others with a heavier contribution. I think in terms of image we owe it to Canadians to be a little more vocal and to have a say as much as the largest contributor to these institutions.

Mr. Johnstone: Mr. Dupras, it is a difficult question. The ones that I recall when I was on the board where considerations of this kind came up—I guess all I can say is in repetition of what I said earlier. We have always tried, while taking account of all the circumstances, all the relevant circumstances in the country concerned, to maintain this line and look towards the economics and the capacity of the country to rectify the situation—because of a fundamental and deep-seated concern, that once one begins to cross that line, then one exposes oneself to political domination of the fund.

I would not like to see a fund in which other members gave to those members that do have major and dominant power in the fund the encouragement to express in the decisions of the fund their pure political views. Not to be critical of the U.S., there is a country which does have a capacity, because of its sheer size in the fund, to block, and a major capacity to press its views. I am not sure what the political views of the U.S. administration might be over the next decade, but I would be very worried about a situation in which the U.S. or any other major group of countries was in a position to press its political views in the decisions of the IMF, as opposed to technical, economic, capacity-to-perform kinds of views.

Mr. Dupras: I do not think Canada can be accused of having abused its political weight. But in these cases I think Canada and smaller contributing nations should have as much say as

[Traduction]

Mr. Dupras: Do you not feel that each country member of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank should not have, just the same, the right to look at certain moral questions such as the ones you have illustrated? A loan to some countries—the one you mentioned a moment ago is an example—constitutes too great a risk. Does each government not have the right to examine the decisions taken by the officers of the banks, and of the International Monetary Fund?

Mr. Johnstone: Yes, certainly. The decisions are taken by the executive boards, by the directors of each institution, and these directors are not acting privately. They are following guidelines, advice from their government. In our case, there are eight or nine, I think, not a Canadian amongst them.

Mr. Dupras: Et si les Américains peuvent exercer un veto dans le cas de certaines demandes de prêt, pourquoi pas nous?

Mr. Johnstone: Notre poids relatif. C'est une question technique dans les articles du Fonds. Les décisions peuvent être bloquées par un vote dont le poids est de plus de 20 p. 100. Les États-Unis ont ce pouvoir de blocage; nous pas. Notre poids est beaucoup plus modeste.

Mr. Dupras: On m'a souvent dit que notre contribution à certaines de ces institutions internationales était perçue comme plus importante que celle de pays à participation plus élevée. Je crois que du point de vue de notre image, nous devons aux Canadiens de parler un peu plus fort et d'en dire autant que les membres le plus importants financièrement de ces institutions.

Mr. Johnstone: Monsieur Dupras, c'est là une question difficile. Ce dont je me souviens, lorsque je faisais partie du conseil d'administration et de telles considérations étaient abordées—je suppose que je ne puis que répéter ce que j'ai dit précédemment. Nous avons toujours essayé, tout en tenant compte de toutes les circonstances, de toutes les circonstances pertinentes existant dans le pays en cause, de maintenir cette ligne de pensée et de juger des questions économiques et de la capacité du pays à rectifier la situation—à cause d'une préoccupation fondamentale et bien ancrée qui nous fait craindre qu'une fois qu'on commencera à franchir cette limite, alors on s'expose à la domination politique du Fonds.

Je ne voudrais pas voir un fonds dans lequel les autres membres encourageraient ceux qui détiennent le pouvoir principal et dominant à exprimer dans les décisions du Fonds purement leurs opinions politiques. Sans vouloir critiquer les États-Unis, voilà un pays qui possède cette capacité, à cause tout simplement de son poids au sein du Fonds, de bloquer, et une grande capacité à exprimer ses opinions. Je ne sais pas au juste quelles seront les opinions politiques de l'administration américaine au cours de la prochaine décennie, mais je serai très inquiet si les États-Unis ou tout autre grand groupe de pays était en mesure de faire valoir ses opinions politiques dans les décisions du F.M.I., plutôt que des opinions d'un genre technique, économique, possibilité de rendement.

Mr. Dupras: Je ne crois pas que le Canada puisse être accusé d'avoir abusé de son poids politique. Toutefois, j'estime que dans de tels cas, le Canada et les plus petits cotisants devraient

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the largest of the contributors. Otherwise it tends to deny the same rights to the lesser donors.

I want to turn to another question, Madam Chairman, on our support to the Cantadora group, as expressed by the minister last May 11. I would like to know whether Canada has gone beyond its support to the group. Has it made any offers to contribute to the reaching of a solution to the serious problems of Central America?

• 1010

Mr. Masse: I would like Mr. Malone to answer, please.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Malone, would you take a seat, please?

Mr. J.A. Malone (Director, Caribbean and Central American Division, Department of External Affairs): Thank you, Madam Chairman. The Government of Canada through its embassies has been in discussion with the members of a research group with regard to ways to promote their efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of differences in Central America. To date, three countries have made a request of the Government of Canada, an identical request, namely that the Government of Canada state publicly its support for the Cantadora group's efforts. These governments were those of Mexico, El Salvador and Costa Rica.

The minister's statement on May 11 was a response to these requests, and the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on May 3 and May 11 reiterated the support of the Government of Canada for the group's efforts.

Mr. Dupras: My question is really, have we offered to go beyond this vocal support and offered ways we could contribute in helping the group?

Mr. J. Malone: Madam Chairman, we have on several occasions stated our readiness to play a role that would be viewed by the countries most directly concerned as useful. We have not to date found with our friends in Central and Latin America a specific role for Canada. Recently officials of the department had consultations in a number of European capitals to determine whether the Europeans had in mind initiatives which countries outside the region could undertake to expedite or help the efforts of the Cantadora group. Their view and experience was the same as ours; namely that the countries in the region had not yet formulated a role for countries outside the region.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Dupras. Mr. McLean, please, followed by Mr. Laniel; then Mr. Hudecki, if we have time.

Mr. McLean: I wonder, Madam Chairman, following on Mr. Dupras' comments regarding the minister's statement, if I could pursue that matter just a little. I wonder, first of all, whether this is an indication in the release of an acceptance of the recommendations of the subcommittee regarding a policy

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avoir le droit d'en dire autant que les cotisants les plus importants. Si non, il y a une tendance à refuser les mêmes droits aux donateurs moins généreux.

Je veux passer à une autre question, madame le président, à notre appui au groupe Cantadora, tel que l'expliquait le ministre le 11 mai dernier. J'aimerais savoir si le Canada est allé plus loin que son appui au groupe. Avons-nous fait la moindre offre en vue de contribuer à parvenir à une solution des graves problèmes de l'Amérique centrale?

M. Masse: Permettez-moi de demander à M. Malone de répondre.

Le vice-président: Monsieur Malone, veuillez prendre place à la table.

M. J.A. Malone (directeur de la Direction des Caraïbes et de l'Amérique centrale, ministère des Affaires extérieures): Merci, madame le président. Par l'intermédiaire de ses ambassades, le gouvernement canadien entretient des contacts avec les membres du groupe de recherche dans le but de parvenir à un règlement pacifique des différends en Amérique centrale. Jusqu'à présent, trois pays ont demandé au gouvernement du Canada de déclarer publiquement son soutien à l'égard du groupe Cantadora. Ces pays sont le Mexique, le Salvador et Costa Rica.

C'est en réponse à ces demandes que le ministre a fait sa déclaration du 11 mai et que le premier ministre a réitéré en Chambre, les 3 et 11 mai, l'appui de son gouvernement à l'égard des efforts de ce groupe.

M. Dupras: En fait, j'aimerais savoir si nous avons été plus loin qu'un simple soutien oral et si nous avons offert à ce groupe une aide précise.

M. J. Malone: Madame le président, à plusieurs reprises, nous nous sommes dits prêts à intervenir de la façon dont les pays les plus directement touchés le jugeraient le plus utile. Jusqu'à présent, nous n'avons pas encore réussi à déterminer, avec nos amis d'Amérique centrale et d'Amérique latine, le rôle spécifique que devrait jouer le Canada. Récemment, des fonctionnaires du ministère se sont rendus dans un certain nombre de capitales européennes pour savoir si les Européens avaient des suggestions à faire quant aux initiatives que des pays extérieurs à cette région pourraient prendre afin d'aider le groupe Cantadora. Leurs opinions et leurs expériences étaient les mêmes que les nôtres, à savoir que les pays de cette région n'ont pas encore défini le rôle que des pays extérieurs à cette région pourraient jouer.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Dupras. Je vais maintenant donner la parole à M. McLean, qui sera suivi de M. Laniel, et ensuite M. Hudecki, s'il nous reste du temps.

M. McLean: Madame le président, j'aimerais poursuivre sur le même sujet que celui qu'a abordé M. Dupras. En ce qui concerne la déclaration du ministre, j'aimerais tout d'abord savoir s'il s'agit d'une acceptation des recommandations du sous-comité qui avait été faite pour étudier les problèmes de

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in Central America. The minister seems to be moving in the direction of the recommendations of the subcommittee. Will we be expecting that there will be a formal response? Or how should we read this in relation to the report which is before the government now?

Mr. J. Malone: Madam Chairman, officials have in consultation with the minister, Mr. MacEachen, prepared a draft reply or commentary to the three reports of the subcommittee, the July report on the Caribbean and Central America, and the November reports on South America and the final report. It is our understanding that Mr. MacEachen is anxious to convey this commentary to the standing committee and that he will do so in the next few days. Each recommendation of the subcommittee will receive comment by the government.

Mr. McLean: Just one more item in relation to this area, there have been a number of representations, at least to me, in relation to more visible government action. A moment ago—through you, Madam Chairman—you made mention of support of the Cantadora group's proposals for a negotiated settlement in the area.

• 1015

You mentioned the Government of Mexico, which is firmly on the record, and the Government of Costa Rica, which to my knowledge is, and you mentioned the Government of El Salvador. This would seem at the moment, when they are pursuing a military solution, to be a change. Could you give some explanation for their request to us to be a part of seeking a negotiated settlement in the area?

Mr. J. Malone: Madam Chairman, the Government of El Salvador, despite its internal situation has been very active through its Foreign Minister, Mr. Chavez Mena, in attempting to promote multilateral discussion among the countries of Central America. In fact, the Foreign Minister of El Salvador was one of the initiators of the suggestion, which the hon. member may recall, that the five Central American countries meet in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. McLean: Thank you. One other question on this subject. Mr. Dupras mentioned the matter of Canadian initiatives that may be pursued. A number of the representations I have received from groups and individuals concerned in Central America, including many church representations, have called for a more active Canadian position. I am wondering if you could share with us the tone of representations that either the minister or the department has received from the public and what has been generally the public response in regards to this area?

Mr. J. Malone: Madam Chairman, the representations received have been numerous indeed. Most of them suggest that the Government of Canada should attempt to exercise some influence over the Government of the United States with regard, for example, to issues such as what was clandestine or covert participation in the current insurgency in Nicaragua. Briefly, what ministers have done recently, first, Mr. Mac-

[Traduction]

l'Amérique centrale. J'ai l'impression que le ministre s'oriente dans la direction recommandée par le sous-comité. Devons-nous attendre une réponse officielle, ou bien devons-nous considérer ces déclarations dans le contexte du rapport qui a été soumis au gouvernement?

M. J. Malone: Madame le président, les fonctionnaires ont préparé, en collaboration avec le ministre, monsieur MacEachen, un projet de réponse aux trois rapports du sous-comité, c'est-à-dire le rapport de juillet sur les Caraïbes et l'Amérique centrale, le rapport de novembre sur l'Amérique du Sud et le rapport final. Je crois savoir que M. MacEachen a hâte de faire connaître sa réaction au comité permanent et qu'il devrait le faire au cours des prochains jours. Le gouvernement a une réponse à donner à chacune des recommandations du sous-comité.

M. MacLean: Permettez-moi de vous poser une autre question sur ce sujet. D'aucuns réclament, tout au moins un certain nombre de personnes se sont adressées à moi, que le gouvernement joue un rôle plus visible. Il y a quelques instants, madame le président, vous avez parlé d'appuyer les propositions du groupe Cantadora en faveur d'un règlement négocié dans la région.

Vous avez mentionné le gouvernement du Mexique, dont la position est déjà connue, le gouvernement de Costa Rica, dont la position est également connue, ainsi que le gouvernement du Salvador. Celui-ci, qui recherche une solution militaire semble avoir changé de position. Pourriez-vous nous expliquer pourquoi il nous a demandé de participer au règlement négocié du conflit dans cette région?

M. J. Malone: Madame le président, malgré la situation interne du Salvador, son gouvernement déploie des efforts, par l'entremise de son ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Chavez Mena, pour promouvoir la tenue de discussions multilatérales réunissant tous les pays de l'Amérique centrale. En fait, comme l'honorable député s'en souviendra, c'est le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Salvador qui a été le premier à suggérer que les cinq pays d'Amérique centrale se réunissent en République Dominicaine.

M. McLean: Merci. Une autre question sur le même sujet. M. Dupras a parlé des initiatives canadiennes qui pourraient être prises. Certaines des démarches que j'ai reçues de groupes et de particuliers qui s'intéressent aux problèmes de l'Amérique centrale, y compris des représentants de groupes ecclésiastiques, demandent que le Canada prenne une position plus active à cet égard. Je me demande si vous pourriez nous donner une idée du ton des démarches reçues du public par le ministre ou le ministère et nous dire quelle est la réaction générale du public face aux problèmes de cette région?

M. J. Malone: Madame le président, il est vrai que beaucoup de groupes et de particuliers ont fait des démarches auprès de notre ministère. La plupart d'entre eux proposent que le gouvernement du Canada essaie d'exercer son influence sur le gouvernement américain en ce qui concerne certaines questions, par exemple, la participation clandestine à l'insurrection actuellement en cours au Nicaragua. Pour vous

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Eachen received Foreign Minister D'Escoto Brockman of Nicaragua in Ottawa in February, and shortly thereafter received the Foreign Minister of Mexico, Mr. Bernardo Sepulveda Amor. Mr. MacEachen subsequently made representations to Vice-President Bush and Secretary of State Shultz and emphasized his view that the use of military means to seek political objectives in Central America was not in the Canadian view appropriate.

The Prime Minister then, on April 28, had discussions with President Reagan about the United States-Central American policy in which the Prime Minister also indicated his disagreement with aspects of that policy.

Mr. McLean: Madam Chairman, just one further supplementary on the matter of the discussion a moment ago on the IMF. As I understand it, there is a request for a doubling of the IMF quotas planned for this fiscal year and that the creation of an ad hoc loan fund has been proposed to member countries. Fulfilment of these quotas and contributions will require legislative consent of all IMF countries who are governed democratically. Coming at a time of budget stringency, this will require considerable political support here in Canada, as I would perceive it.

We have, it seems to me, to follow on the line of earlier discussion in the committee, a very useful opportunity before us—an opportunity to condition our future contributions. We had a discussion, as I was hearing it, about the present situation of the IMF in relation to the standards, but we will have with this special opportunity an opportunity for the adoption of a minimum human rights standard that would become co-determinate of Canada's voting decisions in the IMF executive board. I am wondering if the under-secretary and the officials could comment on this, because officials from the Department of Finance tell me that the augmentation of the IMF quota requires that an amendment to the Bretton Woods Agreements Act be passed by November 7, 1983. I am wondering at this point, between the department and the Ministry of Finance, what is the government doing to safeguard Canada's humanitarian concerns which we have been touching on through the IMF. Are recommendations forthcoming from the department that will reflect the importance of augmenting the Canadian IMF quota only in conjunction with a policy standard that requires the adoption of a minimum human rights standard to govern voting decisions?

• 1020

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Johnstone, please.

Mr. Johnstone: Madam Chairman, following the line of comment and answer to earlier questions that I was giving, the answer, speaking for myself as an official, would be in the negative. I think it would be, as I said before, extraordinarily difficult and dangerous to attach conditions, because it opens the door to other people attaching conditions. There have been occasions when Canada has found itself in a position in which

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résumer ce que les ministres ont fait récemment: d'abord M. MacEachen a reçu le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Nicaragua, M. D'Escoto Brockman, à Ottawa en février dernier, et peu de temps après il a reçu le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Mexique, M. Bernardo Sepulveda Amor. M. MacEachen a ensuite fait des démarches auprès du vice-président Bush et du secrétaire d'État Shultz en soulignant que le Canada réprouvait le recours aux moyens militaires pour atteindre les objectifs politiques en Amérique centrale.

Le 28 avril, le Premier ministre a eu des entretiens avec le président Reagan au sujet de la politique américaine en ce qui concerne l'Amérique centrale, et a exprimé son désaccord quant à certains aspects de cette politique.

M. McLean: Madame le président, j'aimerais poser une question supplémentaire au sujet de la discussion qui vient de porter sur le FMI. Je crois comprendre qu'on a demandé le doublement des quotas du FMI prévus pour cette année financière ainsi que la création d'un fonds spécial de prêts aux pays membres. Pour respecter ces quotas et ces contributions, il faudra le consentement législatif de tous les pays du FMI qui ont un système démocratique. Étant donné que nous traversons une période de restrictions budgétaires, il faudrait que cette mesure reçoive un appui politique très considérable au Canada pour être adoptée, il me semble.

Pour poursuivre une discussion qui a eu lieu tout à l'heure au sein du Comité, je crois que nous avons maintenant l'occasion rêvée d'assortir nos contributions futures de certaines conditions. Au cours de cette discussion, je crois qu'on a parlé de la position du FMI en ce qui concerne des normes, mais nous avons maintenant l'occasion de préconiser une norme minimale de respect des droits de la personne, et le respect de cette norme pourrait déterminer de quelle façon le Canada voterait au conseil exécutif du FMI. J'aimerais savoir ce que le sous-secrétaire et ses collaborateurs pensent de tout cela, car certains fonctionnaires du ministère des Finances m'ont dit que l'augmentation du quota du FMI exige une modification de la Loi sur les accords de Bretton Woods avant le 7 novembre 1983. Donc, j'aimerais savoir ce que fait le gouvernement, par l'entremise de votre ministère et du ministère des Finances, pour défendre la position du Canada sur les questions humanitaires qui nous intéressent du côté du FMI. Le ministère a-t-il l'intention de faire des recommandations qui refléteraient l'importance d'une augmentation de la souscription canadienne, mais uniquement si elle est assortie d'une politique exigeant l'adoption d'une norme minimale de respect des droits de la personne en vue d'orienter les décisions prises lors des votes?

Le vice-président: Monsieur Johnstone, s'il vous plaît.

M. Johnstone: Madame le président, compte tenu de mes commentaires précédents et des réponses que j'ai données aux questions qui m'ont été posées, je dois dire, en tant que fonctionnaire ministériel, que ma réponse doit être négative. Comme je l'ai dit un peu plus tôt, je crois qu'il serait extrêmement difficile et dangereux d'exiger le respect de certaines conditions, car cela permettrait à d'autres personnes de faire la

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it needed support... balance of payment support from the IMF. I think, as a Canadian, and certainly as an adviser to the Canadian government, I would feel extremely uncomfortable if we, as a member of the fund, found ourselves faced with non-economic but essentially political conditions which that institution was trying to extract from Canada in exchange for its willingness to provide us support in conformity with the articles of agreement of the fund. I simply do not think, Madam Chairman, through you to the hon. member, it would be useful or wise to attempt to attach conditions of that kind to contributions to the fund. Canada has a variety of ways of making its views known on human rights issues. I do not think this is... I think the cost, the potential cost to the world system and to us as a player in the world system, is potentially too large.

Mr. McLean: How then would we interpret the action of the House of Representatives?

Mr. Johnstone: Well, that would be for the U.S. administration to decide. They have had an expression of view of the subcommittee in Congress. My understanding is that officials of the administration appeared before that committee and expressed, in strong terms, their concern about the views being expressed in that committee. But that would be up to the U.S. administration in its interpretation of good policy and its interpretation of the articles of agreement, as to how they would play it. But so far as my own view and the view I would put to ministers here, if the matter were raised, is just as I have expressed it.

Mr. McLean: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: I would remind colleagues that the chairman asked us to complete this meeting at 10.25 a.m. so we could be over in the railway committee room in time. Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: That will depend on the answer, Madam Chairman.

J'ai deux courtes questions à poser... enfin, je tenterai de les rendre courtes. La première a trait à la Namibie et l'autre porte sur la situation au Liban.

Un peu plus tôt, M. Ogle a parlé de l'image du Canada qui semble se détériorer, dans certains pays africains, suite à l'inaction ou au non-progrès du groupe de contact. A Helsinki, où l'Union interparlementaire a traité de tous ces sujets, il appert qu'il y avait unanimité... et la délégation canadienne s'y serait ralliée si le langage n'avait pas été aussi excessif... il semblait y avoir unanimité, dis-je, condamnant ou du moins demandant aux États-Unis de ne pas relâcher la solution de la Namibie au départ des troupes cubaines de l'Angola ou à la garantie des frontières des pays voisins.

Est-ce que le Canada, comme tel, ou le groupe de contact avec lequel nous participons, partagent la même opinion que les États-Unis? Avons-nous pris une position officielle sur cette question? Faisons-nous pression à cet égard? Je suis persuadé

[*Traduction*]

même chose. Il est déjà arrivé par le passé que le Canada ait eu besoin d'appui financier du FMI pour la balance des paiements. A titre de Canadien, et surtout de conseiller du gouvernement canadien, je crois que le Canada, en tant que membre du Fonds, se trouverait très mal pris si le FMI exigeait que nous respections certaines conditions politiques, et non économiques, avant qu'il accepte de nous accorder une aide financière, et ce conformément aux articles qui régissent le Fonds. Madame le président et monsieur le député, je ne crois pas qu'il soit utile ou prudent d'essayer de rattacher des conditions de ce genre aux souscriptions au Fonds. Le Canada peut faire connaître ses vues sur les questions de respect des droits de la personne de plusieurs façons. Je ne crois pas... Je crois que cela pourrait finir par coûter trop cher non seulement au système mondial mais à nous-mêmes, en tant que participants au système mondial.

M. McLean: Comment devons-nous, donc, interpréter l'action de la Chambre de représentants?

M. Johnstone: Et bien, c'est à l'administration américaine de l'interpréter. Elle a reçu l'opinion d'un sous-comité du Congrès. Je crois comprendre que les fonctionnaires de l'administration ont comparu devant le comité et ont exprimé, en termes énergiques, leur désaccord en ce qui concerne les vues de ce comité. Mais c'est à l'administration américaine, par suite de son interprétation de ce que c'est qu'une bonne politique ainsi que des articles de l'entente, de décider des démarches qu'elle veut faire. Mais si cette question était soulevée, ma réaction serait celle que je viens de vous expliquer et les conseils que je donnerais au ministre refléteraient cette réaction.

M. McLean: Merci, madame le président.

Le vice-président: Je tiens à rappeler à mes collègues que le président nous a demandé de lever la séance à 10h25 afin de nous permettre d'arriver à l'autre salle de comité à l'heure. Monsieur Laniel.

M. Laniel: Ca dépendra de la réponse que'on me donnera, madame le président.

I have two brief questions to ask—at least I will try to make them as brief as possible. The first one has to do with Namibia, and the second with the situation in Lebanon.

Earlier, Mr. Ogle spoke of the fact that Canada's image seems to be deteriorating in certain African countries through the inaction or the lack of progress made by the contact group. In Helsinki, where the Interparliamentary Union discussed all these problems, there seems to have been unanimity—and the Canadian delegation would have rallied to the common view if the language used had not been so harsh—in condemning, or at least, asking the United States not to link the solution in Namibia to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola or a guarantee as far as the borders of neighbouring countries are concerned.

Does Canada, as such, or the contact group to which we participate, share the opinion of the United States in this regard? Have we adopted an official position on this question? Are we carrying out any lobbying efforts? I am convinced that

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que si nous sommes d'accord avec la position américaine, il sera normal que nous en perdions des plumes.

M. Marchand: Madame le président, effectivement, le Canada a pris une position très claire à ce sujet et elle a été exprimée à plusieurs reprises. Nous n'avons jamais et nous continuons de ne pas lier le départ des troupes cubaines d'Angola à l'évacuation de la Namibie.

• 1025

C'est la position officielle du gouvernement canadien. Nous maintenons cependant que si les Angolais ou les Cubains manifestaient un certain mouvement dans la direction de l'évacuation, ce mouvement constituerait un important apport et une importante contribution au processus qui risque d'impatisser tous les participants.

Donc, pour couper court, c'est non, nous ne lions pas l'un à l'autre et nous ne l'avons jamais fait, mais nous estimons que le départ des Cubains ou d'un certain nombre de Cubains d'Angola serait un encouragement aux Sud-Africains pour accélérer le processus.

M. Laniel: J'ai une question directe: est-ce qu'on peut espérer la participation américaine au groupe de contact, ce qui pourrait atténuer sa position?

M. Marchand: Encore une fois, c'est oui, nous pouvons l'espérer.

Mr. Laniel: Madam Chairman, the other question on the Middle East,

la raison pour laquelle je voudrais la poser, c'est que ce matin, nous avons M. Gorbachev au Comité. Face à ce qu'on a appelé l'entente conditionnelle qui vient d'être signée entre Israël et le Liban, est-ce que M. de Montigny Marchand pourrait nous brosser un court tableau sur la position russe? On nous dit que les Soviétiques n'encouragent pas le retrait des troupes syriennes du Liban. On a vu la réaction: la Libye a dit non, on ne veut pas se retirer, le P.L.O., la même chose, Arafat a fait une déclaration enflammante appelant les Arabes à la guerre contre Israël face à tout ça, mais pensez-vous qu'on peut espérer convaincre la Russie d'être réaliste et d'appuyer avec nous ce qu'on peut appeler les modérés, ceux qui veulent réellement une solution dans cette partie du monde, appuyer justement cette décision bilatérale qui a été prise entre les deux pays?

M. Marchand: Madame le président, j'aimerais demander à John Schioler de répondre à la question de l'honorable député.

Mr. J.P. Schioler (Director, Middle Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs): Madam Chairman, first of all, the Canadian position is quite clear in that we have strongly supported Lebanese sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and we have called consistently for the withdrawal of Israeli and all other armed forces from Lebanon. Therefore, we welcome the agreement that has just been signed, with the invaluable assistance of the United States. We hope that this first and vital step will be followed up in the shortest possible time by agreement involving all the parties.

[Translation]

if we associate ourselves with the American position, it will come as no surprise if our image suffers somewhat.

Mr. Marchand: Madam Chairman, Canada has indeed adopted a very clear position in this regard, and has expressed this position on several occasions. We have never, and will continue not to link the departure of Cuban troops from Angola to the evacuation of Namibia.

That is the official position of the Canadian government, however, we do feel that if the Angolans or the Cubans showed that they were moving in the direction of evacuation, this would be an important contribution to the process which runs the risk of making all the players impatient.

Very briefly, then, the answer is no, we do not link one to the other and we have never done so; we do feel, however, that the departure of the Cubans, or at least, some of the Cubans from Angola, would encourage the South Africans to expedite to process.

Mr. Laniel: I have a direct question to put to you: is there reason to hope that American participation in the contact group will lead it to soften its position.

Mr. Marchand: Again, I would say, yes, we can certainly hope that this will happen.

M. Laniel: Madame le président, l'autre question porte sur le Moyen-Orient...

The reason I would like to ask this question is that this morning, the committee is going to be meeting Mr. Gorbachev. In the light of what has been called a conditional agreement which has just been signed between Israel and Lebanon, could Mr. de Montigny Marchand sketch for us a brief picture of what the Soviet position is? We have been told that the Soviets are not encouraging a withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. We have seen what the reaction to this has been: Libya has said no, we do not want a withdrawal, and the PLO has done the same. Arafat made an extremely inflammatory statement calling on the Arabs to go to war against Israel on the basis of all this; but do you think we can hope to convince the USSR to be realistic and follow our lead in supporting the moderates, in other words, those who really wish to find a solution to the problem in that part of the world, by supporting the bilateral decision which has been made by the two countries?

Mr. Marchand: Madam Chairman, I would like to ask John Schioler to answer the honourable member's question.

M. J.P. Schioler (directeur, Direction du Moyen-Orient, ministère des Affaires extérieures): Madame le président, d'abord, la position du Canada est très claire en ce sens que nous nous sommes vigoureusement prononcés pour la souveraineté, l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale du Liban, et nous avons toujours revendiqué le retrait des forces armées israéliennes ainsi que de toutes les autres forces armées du Liban. Donc, nous nous réjouissons de l'entente qui vient d'être signée, grâce à l'aide inestimable des États-Unis. Nous espérons que cette première mesure essentielle sera suivie, dans

[Texte]

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, if we take this point of view, obviously, we would hope that they too would see the benefit in terms of peace and stability in the region, and that they too would rally to the agreement which has just been signed.

Mr. Laniel: Does the agreement also provide for the withdrawal of the American troops, the United Nations presence at the same time?

Mr. Schioler: No.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Laniel. I believe Mr. Roche wants the shortest supplementary in history.

Mr. McLean: Madam Chairman, I would like a brief question. I can put it very briefly to Mr. Masse or Mr. Johnstone. What material can be provided to the committee to inform us on the issues at Williamsburg and the various petitions of the Canadian government? I am not asking for the briefing book for the Prime Minister, although that would be interesting to have, but rather whatever material that in your judgment could be made available to us to update our information, from a Canadian point of view, with respect to the issues at Williamsburg. I would like that; whatever is available at the earliest time, if possible.

• 1030

The Vice-Chairman: The Chair regrets that neither Mr. Hudecki nor Mr. Watson could be recognized because of lack of time.

I now adjourn to the call of the Chair.

[Traduction]

les plus brefs délais, d'une entente qui serait signée par tous les parties.

En ce qui concerne l'Union soviétique, il est évident que nous espérons qu'elle reconnaîtra l'avantage de cette entente, pour permettre le rétablissement de la paix et de la stabilité dans la région, et qu'elle va finir par se rallier à cette entente qui vient d'être signée.

M. Laniel: Est-ce que l'entente prévoit également le retrait des troupes américaines et des forces envoyées par les Nations unies?

M. Schioler: Non.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Laniel. Je crois que M. Roche aimerait poser la question supplémentaire la plus courte qu'on ait jamais vue.

M. McLean: Madame le président, j'aimerais poser une brève question. Je peux la poser à M. Massé ou à M. Johnstone. Quel renseignement peut-on fournir aux membres du Comité au sujet des questions dont on a discuté à Williamsburg et des diverses pétitions du gouvernement canadien? Je ne demande pas que l'on nous dépose le cahier d'information destiné au premier ministre, même si ce document devait être très intéressant, mais qu'on nous donne plutôt tout renseignement qui permettrait, d'après vous, de nous mettre au courant de la situation et de la position canadienne quant aux questions qui ont fait l'objet de discussions à Williamsburg? J'aimerais recevoir ces documents aussitôt que possible, s'il vous plaît.

Le vice-président: Le président regrette que ni M. Hudecki ni M. Watson ne pourra prendre la parole faute de temps.

La séance est levée jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.



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WITNESSES—TÉMOINS

From the Department of External Affairs:

Mr. Marchand, Deputy Minister, Foreign Policy;
Mr. D. Molgat, Assistant Under-Secretary, Bureau of
European Affairs;
Mr. R. Johnstone, Deputy Minister, International Trade
and Coordinator, International Economic Relations;
Mr. J.A. Malone, Director, Caribbean and Central American
Division;
Mr. J.P. Schioler, Director, Middle Eastern Division.

Du ministère des Affaires extérieures:

M. Marchand, sous-ministre adjoint, Politique étrangère;
M. D. Molgat, sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint, Bureau des
affaires de l'Europe;
M. R. Johnstone, sous-ministre, Commerce international et
coordonnateur des Relations économiques internationales;
M. J.A. Malone, directeur, Direction des Antilles et de
l'Amérique centrale;
M. J.P. Schioler, directeur, Direction du Moyen-Orient.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 95

Tuesday, May 17, 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 95

Le mardi 17 mai 1983

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

External Affairs and National Defence

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

Visit to Canada of the Soviet Parliamentary Delegation

CONCERNANT:

Visite au Canada de la Délégation parlementaire
soviétique

APPEARING:

Mr. Mikhail S. Gorbachev,
Head of Delegation; Member of the Politburo of the
Soviet Union

COMPARAÎT:

M. Mikhail S. Gorbachev,
Chef de la délégation; membre du Politburo de l'Union
soviétique



First Session of the
Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la
trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

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Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appolloni

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(Quorum 8)

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, MAY 17, 1983

(150)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met jointly with members of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs at 10:45 o'clock a.m., this day, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, Chairman of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, presiding jointly with the Honourable Senator Martial Asselin, Deputy Chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The Committee was honoured by the presence of the Honourable Senator Jean Marchand, P.C., Speaker of the Senate and the Honourable Jeanne Sauvé, P.C., Speaker of the House of Commons.

Members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Dupras, Hudecki, Miss Jewett, Messrs. Laniel, Lapierre, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Prud'homme and Roche.

Alternates present: Messrs. Darling, McLean, Ogle, Stewart and Watson.

Other Members present: Messrs. Berger, Gauthier and Lawrence.

Members of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs present: The Honourable Senators Asselin, Bosa, Graham, Hicks, Lafond, Langlois, Lapointe, McElman, Molgat, Murray, Neiman and Yuzyk.

Other Senators present: The Honourable Senators Frith, Godfrey, Muir, Riley, Rousseau and Sparrow.

Appearing: Mr. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Head of Delegation; Member of the Politburo of the Soviet Union.

Present: His Excellency Dr. Alexander N. Yakovlev, Ambassador, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Members of the visiting Soviet Parliamentary Delegation: Mr. Alexander V. Gitalov, Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; Mr. Alexander A. Ezhevsky, Member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Minister of Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Building Industry, Moscow; Mr. Sergei I. Manyakin, Member of the Planning and Budgetary Commission of the Council of the Union, First Secretary of the Omsk Area Committee of the CPSU, Omsk; Mr. Orazbek S. Kuanyshiev, Member of the Agricultural Commission of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, First Secretary of the Kockchetav area of the Communist Party of the USSR, Kockchetav; Mr. Alexander A. Zhuchenko, Deputy Chairman of the Commission on Nature Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, President of the Academy of Sciences of the Moldavian SSR, Kishinev; Mr. Anatoly P. Lutschikov, Assistant to Mr. Gorbachev; Mr. Vladimir N. Sushkov, Deputy Minister, USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade; Mr. Vladimir P. Ulasevich, Senior Representative of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU; Mr. Pavel P. Bezushko, Senior Representative of

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE MARDI 17 MAI 1983

(150)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale et les membres du comité sénatorial permanent des affaires extérieures se réunissent aujourd'hui à 10h45 sous la présidence conjointe du président du Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale, M. Marcel Prud'homme, et de l'honorable sénateur Martial Asselin, vice-président du Comité sénatorial permanent des affaires extérieures.

Le Comité est honoré de la présence de l'honorable sénateur Jean Marchand, C.P., président du Sénat et de l'honorable Jeanne Sauvé, C.P., Orateur de la Chambre des communes.

Membres du Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale présents: M^{me} Appolloni, MM. Dupras, Hudecki, M^{lle} Jewett, MM. Laniel, Lapierre, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Prud'homme et Roche.

Substituts présents: MM. Darling, McLean, Ogle, Stewart et Watson.

Autres députés présents: MM. Berger, Gauthier et Lawrence.

Membres du Comité sénatorial permanent des affaires étrangères présents: Les honorables sénateurs Asselin, Bosa, Graham, Hicks, Lafond, Langlois, Lapointe, McElman, Molgat, Murray, Neiman et Yuzyk.

Autres sénateurs présents: Les honorables sénateurs Frith, Godfrey, Muir, Riley, Rousseau et Sparrow.

Comparait: M. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, chef de la délégation; membre du Politburo de l'Union soviétique.

Présent: Son Excellence M. Alexander N. Yakovlev, ambassadeur, Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques.

Membres de la délégation parlementaire soviétique en visite: M. Alexander V. Gitalov, membre du Praesidium du Soviet Suprême de l'URSS; M. Alexander A. Ezhevsky, membre du Soviet Suprême de l'URSS, ministre de l'industrie de construction des tracteurs de la machinerie agricole, Moscou; M. Sergei I. Manyakin, membre de la Commission de la planification et du budget du Conseil de l'Union soviétique, premier secrétaire du Comité de la région d'Omsk du PCUS, Omsk; M. Orazbek S. Kuanyshiev, membre de la Commission agricole du Conseil des nationalités du Soviet Suprême, premier secrétaire de la région de Kockchetav du Parti communiste de l'URSS, Kockchetav; M. Alexander A. Zhuchenko, vice-président de la Commission de la Protection de la nature et de l'utilisation rationnelle des ressources naturelles du Conseil des nationalités du Soviet Suprême, président de l'Académie des sciences de la République socialiste de Moldavie Kishinev; M. Anatoly P. Lutschikov, adjoint de M. Gorbachev; M. Vladimir N. Sushkov, sous-ministre, Ministère du commerce extérieur de l'URSS; M. Vladimir P. Ulasevich, haut fonctionnaire du ministère international du Comité central du PCUS; M. Pavel P.

the Administrative Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Mr. Valery N. Zemskov, Head of the Canadian Section of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Messrs. Peter Dobell, Director; Roger Hill, Assistant Director and Ms. Carol Seaborn, Special Assistant to the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The Committee considered issues regarding Canada's relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pursuant to its Order of Reference dated Wednesday, February 23, 1983, relating to the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984.

The Chairman of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence made an opening statement.

The Deputy Chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs made a statement.

Mr. Gorbachev made a statement and answered questions.

At 12:48 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Bezushko, haut fonctionnaire du ministère de l'Administration du Comité central du PCUS et M. Valery N. Zemskov, chef de la section canadienne du ministère des Affaires étrangères de l'URSS.

Aussi présents: Du Centre parlementaire des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur: M. Peter Dobell, directeur; M. Roger Hill, directeur adjoint et M^{me} Carol Seaborn, adjointe spéciale auprès du Comité sénatorial permanent des Affaires extérieures.

Le Comité se penche sur les relations du Canada avec l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques conformément à son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 23 février 1983 portant sur le Budget principal pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984.

Le président du Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale fait une déclaration préliminaire.

Le vice-président du Comité sénatorial permanent des affaires étrangères fait une déclaration.

M. Gorbachev fait une déclaration et répond aux questions.

A 12h48, le Comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le greffier du Comité

Peter Huca

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

*(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)**[Texte]*

Tuesday, May 17, 1983

• 1052

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Mesdames, messieurs, monsieur Gorbachev, messieurs les membres de la délégation soviétique, honorables sénateurs, chers collègues, qu'il me soit tout d'abord permis de dire que c'est avec plaisir que j'accueille, aujourd'hui, nos hôtes, au nom du Comité de la Chambre des communes chargé des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale et en celui du Comité du Sénat chargé des questions de politique étrangère.

A l'époque où nous vivons, ce genre de rencontre revêt une importance toute particulière pour tous ceux qui, comme nous, s'intéressent à la paix et à la coopération internationale. C'est en effet l'occasion de promouvoir la compréhension mutuelle et de comparer nos vues sur les grands sujets de préoccupation internationale.

Mon collègue, le sénateur van Roggen, s'excuse pour son absence, due à la maladie. Cependant, il me fait plaisir de vous présenter l'honorable sénateur Martial Asselin, ancien ministre dans le cabinet du Très honorable John Diefenbaker et dans celui de M. Joe Clark. Il coprésidera cette séance de travail et il offrira les remerciements.

Comme chacun le sait, nous recevons la plus prestigieuse délégation soviétique, et elle visite le Canada pour la première fois depuis plus de dix ans. M. Mikhaïl S. Gorbachev, membre du Politburo, la dirige. La présence parmi nous de nos collègues soviétiques sera l'occasion d'échanges, que nous espérons fructueux, sur les questions bilatérales, mais aussi sur les principaux problèmes internationaux.

Si nous ne voulons pas perdre de vue le fait que les questions agricoles ont été la principale raison de cette visite, je suis convaincu que tous autant que nous sommes, Soviétiques comme Canadiens, nous ne voudrions pas non plus omettre de parler de nos échanges commerciaux et d'aborder les grands thèmes du désarmement, du Moyen-Orient, de la sécurité européenne et de la conjoncture économique internationale.

• 1055

A ce stade-ci, je voudrais remercier l'honorable Président du Sénat qui nous honore de sa présence. Dans quelques instants, l'honorable Président de la Chambre des communes sera ici également.

In addition to Mr. Gorbachev, I would also like to extend a very warm welcome to the other members of the Soviet delegation here today.

I wish to mention in particular Mr. Alexander Gitalov, member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; Mr. Alexander Ezhevsky, member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; Mr. Sergei Manyakin, member of the Planning and Budgetary Commission of the Council of the Union; Mr. Orazbek Kuanyshhev, member of the Agricultural Commission of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet; Mr.

TÉMOIGNAGES

*(Enregistrement électronique)**[Traduction]*

Le mardi 17 mai 1983

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Gorbachev, members of the Soviet delegation, Honourable Senators, my dear colleagues, let me first say how pleased I am, on behalf of the standing committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the House of Commons, and of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, to welcome our guests.

In these times, such a meeting is most significant for all of those, who, like ourselves, are interested in both peace and international co-operation. This is indeed an opportunity to foster mutual understanding, and to compare our views on major points of international concern.

My colleague, Senator van Roggen, has asked to be excused due to illness. However, I am pleased to introduce the Honourable Senator Martial Asselin, former minister in the Cabinet of the Right Honourable John Diefenbaker and in that of Mr. Joe Clark. He shall chair this working session with me, and make the closing remarks.

As everyone knows, we are receiving the most prestigious of Soviet delegations, which is visiting Canada for the first time in ten years. The chief delegate is Mr. Mikhaïl S. Gorbachev, a member of the Politburo. This visit of our Soviet colleagues will provide an occasion, a productive occasion I hope to discuss bilateral issues, as well as major international concerns.

Although the main reason of this visit is to discuss agricultural issues, I am convinced, that all of us, Soviets as well as Canadians, will no doubt want also to discuss our trade concerns, as well as the major issues of disarmament in the Middle-East, European security, and the international economic situation.

For the moment, I would like to thank the Honourable Speaker of the Senate who will honour us by his attendance. In a few minutes the Honourable Speaker of the House of Commons will be here too.

En plus de M. Gorbachev, je voudrais également souhaiter chaleureusement la bienvenue aux autres membres de la délégation soviétique qui nous rend visite aujourd'hui.

Je voudrais remercier en particulier M. Alexandre Gitalov, membre du Presidium du Soviet Suprême de l'URSS, M. Alexander Ezhevsky membre du Soviet Suprême de l'URSS; M. Sergei Manyakin membre de la Commission de la planification du budget du Conseil de l'Union Soviétique; M. Orazbek Kuanyshhev membre de la Commission agricole du Conseil des nationalités du Soviet Suprême; M. Alexandre

[Text]

Alexander Zhuchenko, Deputy Chairman of the Commission on Nature Protection and Rational Use of Natural Resources of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet; Mr. Anatoly Lutschikov, Assistant to Mr. Gorbachev; Mr. Vladimir Sushkov, Deputy Minister, USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade; Mr. Vladimir Ulasevich, Senior Representative of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU; Mr. Pavel Bezushko, Senior Representative of the Administration Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU; and Mr. Valery Zemskov, Head of the Canadian Section of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Also, and I am sure it is a pleasure for me and for you, for me to do it, I want to note for everyone's presence here today, of the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Ottawa, Dr. Alexander Yakovlev. Not only is he a personal friend but also he is a very well known to everyone as the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in this country.

He has served here in Canada for more than 10 years, and I want to say how welcome he is here on this occasion today.

I am sure that our Soviet friends will be interested to know that in appearing before this joint meeting of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence and the standing committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, they are following in the footsteps of some other very distinguished persons.

I wish to mention in particular, President Mubarak of Egypt, President Zia of Pakistan, the Prime Minister Papan-dreu from Greece, who did us the honour of meeting with us earlier in this session.

Our Soviet guests, may also know that one of their own distinguished colleagues, Dr. Georgi Arbatov, Director of the Soviet Institute of the United States and Canada, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR also appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence just over a year ago, when the committee was engaged in a very intensive series of hearings on the question of international security and disarmament.

Relations between Canada and the Soviet Union have of course, been very intensive in some areas over the past two decades. For example, I recall a statement of a commission of the Canadian Wheat Board before one of our subcommittees studying the question of European Co-operation and Security, that indicated that in the board's experience, the Soviet Union was one of its best and most reliable customers.

Our Minister of Agriculture, the Hon. Eugene Whelan, travelled to the Soviet Union in September and October 1982, and I believe had an excellent visit.

There are also a variety of other areas where the Soviet Union and Canada have interests in common, sometimes because they complement each other in the economic field and at other times because they face such similar conditions of

[Translation]

Zhuchenko vice-président de la Commission de la protection de la nature et de l'utilisation rationnelle des ressources naturelles du Conseil des nationalités du Soviet Suprême, M. Anatoly Lutschikov, adjoint de M. Gorbachev, M. Vladimir Sushkov, sous-ministre, Ministère du Commerce international, M. Vladimir Ulasevich haut-fonctionnaire du ministère international du Central comité du PCUS, M. Pavel Bezushko, haut-fonctionnaire du ministère de l'Administration du Comité central du PCUS, et M. Valery Zemskov, chef de la section canadienne du ministère des Affaires étrangères de l'Union Soviétique.

Je suis sûr que c'est un plaisir que nous partageons, je voudrais signaler à l'attention de tous aujourd'hui la présence parmi nous de M. Alexander Yakovlev, Ambassadeur de l'Union Soviétique à Ottawa. En plus d'être un ami personnel, il est également très bien connu de tous étant le doyen du corps diplomatique au Canada.

M. Yakovlev représente son pays depuis 10 ans au Canada, et je tiens à lui signaler qu'il est très bienvenu ici aujourd'hui.

Je suis sûr que nos amis soviétiques apprendront avec plaisir qu'en comparaisant aujourd'hui devant le Comité mixte permanent de la Chambre des communes des Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale et de l'Assemblée législative du Québec le Comité sénatorial permanent des Affaires extérieures, ils emboîtent le pas, pour ainsi dire, à d'autres diplomates très distingués.

Je voudrais citer notamment le Président Mubarak de l'Égypte, le Président Zia du Pakistan, le Premier ministre Papandreu de Grèce qui nous a fait l'honneur de participer à une séance du Comité il y a quelques mois.

Nos invités soviétiques savent peut-être qu'un de leurs collègues distingués, M. Georgi Arbatov, Directeur de l'Institut soviétique du Canada et des États-Unis, membre du Comité central du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique et membre du Soviet Suprême de l'Union Soviétique a également comparu devant le Comité permanent des Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale de la Chambre des communes il y a juste un peu plus d'un an au moment où le Comité tenait une série d'audiences intensives sur la question du désarmement et de la sécurité internationale.

Les relations bilatérales entre le Canada et l'Union Soviétique ont été bien entendues très nombreuses dans certains domaines au cours des deux dernières décennies. Par exemple, je me souviens d'une déclaration d'une Commission de la Commission canadienne du blé devant l'un de nos sous-comités chargé d'étudier la question de la coopération et de la sécurité en Europe à l'occasion de laquelle les fonctionnaires qui comparaissaient ont reconnu que l'Union Soviétique était l'un de leurs meilleurs clients mais également le plus digne de confiance.

Notre ministre de l'Agriculture l'honorable Eugène Whelan s'est rendu en Union Soviétique en septembre et en octobre 1982 et je crois que sa visite a été très fructueuse.

Il y a également plusieurs autres domaines où l'Union Soviétique et le Canada ont des intérêts communs parfois parce que leurs activités sont complémentaires dans le secteur économique et parfois parce qu'ils vivent dans des conditions

[Texte]

geography and of course, of weather. We both have a great deal to learn from each other about how to live in our northern latitude.

Looking at issues on a worldwide basis, I want to draw your attention to a recent, very recent statement of our Prime Minister, Mr. Trudeau, and I quote, in the *Toronto Star*, of Saturday last. He said: "I think the Soviet Union is a great power and should be treated as a great power".

• 1100

I should also mention here that this perception of the Soviet Union as a great power with its own particular needs and concerns also emerged very strongly during the hearings the standing committee held on the question of international security and disarmament at this time last year.

However, I would be less than frank if I did not say there are many other points on which Soviets and Canadians disagree. We often have different points of view about such questions as international security or the ways of achieving economic development. We have a great deal to learn from each other; for example, about such difficult problems as the Middle East. I hope this meeting today and the others which the Soviet delegation will have while they are in Canada will help to develop mutual understanding and a stronger basis for the pursuit of effective solutions.

Without saying more, I would like now to declare the meeting open and to give the floor to our distinguished guest, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. I shall recognize my colleagues by alternating between the House of Commons and the honourable other chamber, the Senate; and I will ask Senator Marcel Asselin to kindly recognize his own members, as I shall recognize the members of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs.

Mr. Gorbachev, we are listening to you. We will have French, English and Russian translation.

Mr. Mikhail S. Gorbachev (Head of Delegation, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, Chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission of the Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Moscow): (Interpretation) Thank you, thank you.

Ladies and gentlemen, allow me to take advantage of this meeting to share my thoughts with regard to what is disturbing the Soviet leaders and the Soviet people today.

In the current tense international situation, it is important and necessary that governments and nations have an accurate picture of each other. This is particularly true with regard to the cardinal issues of politics—of war and peace. We believe that meetings such as ours between representatives of the

[Traduction]

géographiques et, bien entendu, climatiques similaires. Nous avons donc beaucoup à apprendre l'un de l'autre sur la façon de vivre dans le Nord.

En ce qui concerne les questions mondiales, je voudrais attirer votre attention sur une très récente déclaration de notre premier ministre M. Trudeau, et je cite un article publié dans le *«Toronto Star»* de samedi dernier. Il a dit: «Je crois que l'Union Soviétique est une grande puissance qui mérite d'être traitée comme une grande puissance».

Il convient d'ajouter que cette perception de l'Union Soviétique comme une grande puissance qui a ses besoins et ses préoccupations particulières nous est apparue très clairement pendant les audiences du Comité permanent consacré à la sécurité internationale et au désarmement et qui remonte à il y a un an.

Toutefois, en toute honnêteté, je dois reconnaître qu'il reste de nombreux points sur lesquels les Soviétiques et les Canadiens ne sont pas d'accord. Les questions de sécurité internationale et les moyens de parvenir au développement économique sont des questions sur lesquelles nos opinions diffèrent. Nous avons beaucoup à apprendre les uns des autres. Par exemple, lorsqu'il s'agit des problèmes du Moyen-Orient. J'espère que la séance d'aujourd'hui et les autres réunions auxquelles la délégation soviétique aura l'occasion d'assister pendant son séjour au Canada favoriseront la compréhension mutuelle et constitueront une base plus solide pour la recherche de solutions utiles.

Sans plus tarder, je déclare maintenant la séance ouverte et je donne la parole à notre invité particulièrement distingué, M. Mikhail Gorbachev, membre du Politburo du Comité central du parti communiste de l'Union Soviétique. Je donnerai la parole à mes collègues de la Chambre des communes et de l'honorable Chambre haute, le Sénat, en alternance. Je demanderai au sénateur Marcel Asselin de bien vouloir donner lui-même la parole à ses collègues; de mon côté, je donnerai la parole aux membres du Comité permanent des affaires extérieures de la Chambre des communes.

Monsieur Gorbachev, nous vous écoutons. La séance est interprétée en français, en anglais et en russe.

M. Mikhail S. Gorbachev (chef de délégation, Membre du Politburo du Comité central du parti communiste de l'Union soviétique, secrétaire du Comité central du parti communiste de l'Union soviétique, président de la Commission des propositions législatives du Conseil de l'Union du soviet suprême de l'Union soviétique, Moscou): (Interprétation) Merci, merci.

Mesdames et messieurs, Permettez-moi de profiter de l'occasion que nous offre notre rencontre pour échanger avec vous des idées sur les questions qui préoccupent aujourd'hui les autorités et le peuple soviétique.

Dans la conjoncture internationale actuelle, qui est tendue, il est important et nécessaire que les gouvernements et les peuples aient une idée exacte les uns des autres. Notamment en ce qui concerne les questions cruciales touchant la politique, la paix et la guerre. À notre avis, des rencontres dans le genre

[Text]

higher legislative bodies of two countries can and must foster mutual understanding and improved relations, and that they are in the interests of the countries involved and in the interests of universal peace. We are convinced that normal good relations between Canada and the Soviet Union also contribute to greater international stability. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of our Party, Comrade Andropov, has spoken extensively about the course being followed by our country in international affairs.

We are in favour of broadly-based, fruitful co-operation between all nations of this planet, to their mutual profit and the benefit of all mankind. This co-operation must be free from *diktat* and meddling in the affairs of others.

The Soviet Union will do all in its power to ensure that present and future generations live in peace. This is the aim of our policies and we shall never waver from this course.

The Constitution of the USSR declares that the strengthening of peace is the official philosophy of our country, and makes it incumbent on all state bodies and all Soviet citizens to adhere strictly to the concepts of peace. Our social system and world view reject war as an instrument for settling international problems. Our fundamental policy of advocating peaceful co-existence for states with different social systems has found concrete expression in numerous peaceful initiatives. And indeed, what possible motive could the Soviet Union have for bringing matters to the point of war?

We have an enormous amount of land and huge reserves of all kinds of resources, so we have no need for land, sources of raw materials, or energy belonging to others. We have no social strata who would be enriched by militarism.

• 1105

The Soviet people suffered grievous losses during the Second World War, the consequences of which are still being felt today. Twenty million Soviet people died in that war. The Fascists spread ruin and laid waste to 1,710 towns and cities, reduced more than seventy thousand villages and hamlets to ruin.

People who visit our country today no longer see these traces of war. The Soviet people have not only restored what was destroyed, but at the same time they have built new cities and have developed new regions of the country. We have not done all that in order to have everything destroyed once again.

There is a great uproar in the west about the Soviet military threat and the Soviet military superiority. What can one say on this subject? Such assertions do not correspond to the actual state of affairs. And those political and military leaders in the west who should know the facts, know this. So why then do they propagate such myths?

[Translation]

de la nôtre entre représentants des organes législatifs supérieurs de deux pays sont appelés à promouvoir la compréhension mutuelle et l'amélioration des relations entre les pays dans leur propre intérêt et dans l'intérêt de la paix universelle. Nous sommes convaincus que de bonnes et normales relations soviéto-canadiennes sont également un facteur d'une plus grande stabilité internationale. Le Secrétaire général du Comité central de notre parti, le camarade Andropov, a très nettement défini la voie qu'empruntera notre pays dans les affaires internationales.

«Nous sommes en faveur d'une vaste coopération fructueuse, libre de tout diktat et d'ingérence dans les affaires d'autrui, entre tous les peuples de notre planète pour leur bien mutuel et pour le bien de toute l'humanité.

L'Union soviétique fera tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour assurer à la génération actuelle et aux générations futures un avenir fait de paix. C'est là le but de notre politique et nous ne nous en écarterons point.»

La Constitution de l'URSS stipule que le renforcement de la paix est la philosophie officielle de notre pays et qu'elle engage tous les organes gouvernementaux, tous les citoyens soviétiques à suivre de façon rigoureuse les préceptes de la paix. Notre système social et notre conception du monde rejettent la guerre en tant que moyen de régler les problèmes internationaux. Notre engagement de principe envers la co-existence pacifique des nations appartenant à divers systèmes sociaux a su se réaliser dans de nombreuses initiatives pacifiques. Et en fait, quels pourraient être les motifs de l'Union soviétique qui l'inciteraient à chercher la guerre?

Nous avons un territoire des plus vastes, des réserves colossales de ressources les plus variées, nous n'avons besoin d'aucun territoire étranger, d'aucune source étrangère de matières premières et d'énergie. Les couches sociales qui pourraient s'enrichir à l'aide du militarisme n'existent pas chez nous.

Le peuple soviétique a connu des pertes très lourdes au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, dont les conséquences se font sentir aujourd'hui encore. Vingt millions de citoyens soviétiques ont péri au cours de cette guerre. Les fascistes ont détruit, pillé 1 710 villes, ont laissé en ruine plus de 70 000 villages et hameaux.

Aujourd'hui, si vous visitez notre pays, vous ne verrez plus ces traces de la guerre. Le peuple soviétique n'a pas seulement reconstitué tout ce qui avait été détruit, il a construit de nouvelles villes, a aménagé de nouveaux territoires. Tout cela n'a pas été fait pour être détruit de nouveau.

A l'Ouest, on fait beaucoup de bruit à propos de la menace militaire soviétique, de la supériorité militaire soviétique. Que peut-on dire à ce sujet? Pareilles assertions ne correspondent pas à la situation réelle. Les dirigeants politiques et militaires occidentales dont c'est le devoir, en raison de leur position, de connaître les faits, le savent bien. Alors pourquoi répandre des mythes de ce genre?

[Texte]

Let us recall that in the 1950's and 1960's similar situations occurred. At one time supposedly the Soviet Union was considerably ahead in bombers, another time it was discovered that the U.S.A. was far behind in missiles. After some time these fantasies burst like bubbles.

This, however, did not pass without consequence.

A deliberate mistrust of the Soviet Union and of Soviet policies were constantly being sown in the minds of the people. Also, irreversible events occurred. For, behind these farfetched suggestions, new, wide-ranging military programs were being developed and the arms race was being sharply stepped up. No one can deny that the Soviet Union was only reacting to the challenge with which it was being confronted.

It was not the Soviet Union which was the first to introduce any of the main types of strategic arms. We only responded. A legitimate concern to ensure our defensive capabilities, and nothing more, forced us to act as we did.

For our part it was repeatedly affirmed at the highest levels that the USSR was not striving for military supremacy. We have never had and do not have such intentions. Yes, we have managed to achieve strategic parity. This parity was clearly verified and fixed in the Soviet-American agreements on strategic arms and in particular in the SALT II Treaty of 1979.

Has anything, in fact, changed since that time? No, nothing has changed. The USSR is observing the relevant provisions of that treaty. And, in any case, strategic parity cannot alter any fundamentally in the course of a few years. Such is the objective situation.

Nevertheless the idea of some sort of Soviet superiority is still being inculcated in people's minds. In the meantime, the war machine is again gathering momentum, insatiably devouring huge resources; its sole product can only be new and still more horrible means of war.

Does mankind really need this? We state categorically: No! At the same time, we are utterly opposed to double standards in matters of security. One can, of course, verbally deny the approximate military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization. One can pretend that there are no military bases equipped with nuclear weapons surrounding the USSR, that in the European zone there do not exist almost a thousand medium-range nuclear weapons aimed at the USSR and its allies, that it is not known in the west that, in terms of the total number of nuclear warheads on these NATO weapons, NATO has a 1.5 advantage compared to the USSR.

One can, of course, declare that the west will not tolerate the deployment of Soviet missiles close to its borders without giving any thought as to why we should tolerate anybody else's missiles on our doorstep.

[Traduction]

Rappelons que des cas analogues se sont produits dans les années cinquante et soixante. Tantôt on entendait que l'URSS était fortement en avance pour ce qui est des bombardiers, tantôt on découvrait que les États-Unis prenaient fortement du retard dans le domaine des missiles. Après un certain temps, ces inventions crevaient comme des bulles de savon.

Mais il restait des conséquences.

Dans la conscience des gens on semait de façon répétée et préconçue le manque de confiance à l'égard de l'Union soviétique et de sa politique. De même, des choses irréversibles se passaient. En effet, sous le couvert de ces prétextes inventés, de nouveaux et vastes programmes militaires étaient déployés, et la course aux armements partait en flèche. Personne ne niera le fait que l'Union soviétique ne faisait que réagir aux défis qu'on lui lançait.

Ce n'est pas en Union soviétique que les types principaux d'armements stratégiques avaient été introduits pour la première fois. Nous ne faisons qu'y répondre. Seule la contrainte imposée par une inquiétude légitime au sujet de la garantie de notre capacité à nous défendre nous y contraignait.

De notre côté, c'est au plus haut niveau qu'a été répété maintes fois que l'URSS ne vise pas la supériorité militaire. Telle n'a jamais été et ne sera jamais notre intention. Il est vrai que nous avons su atteindre la parité stratégique. Mais cette parité a été établie de façon précise dans les accords soviéto-américains sur les armements stratégiques, notamment dans l'accord SALT II de 1979.

Est-ce que quelque chose a changé depuis? Non, rien n'a changé. L'URSS respecte les conditions pertinentes de cet accord. Et en général, la parité stratégique ne peut pas changer de façon radicale en l'espace de quelques années. C'est là la situation objective.

Ce qui n'empêche pas que l'idée au sujet d'une prétendue supériorité militaire soviétique soit inculquée aux gens comme auparavant. Et pendant ce temps-là, la machine militaire reprend de l'élan, machine insatiable qui engloutit des ressources fabuleuses, et dont l'unique produit ne peut être que des moyens militaires nouveaux encore plus affreux.

Est-ce que l'humanité a besoin de cela? Nous répondons de façon catégorique: non, elle n'en a pas besoin. En même temps, nous sommes tout à fait opposés à ce qu'il y ait deux poids deux mesures en matière de sécurité. On peut bien sûr nier verbalement l'équilibre approximatif dans le domaine militaire entre l'OTAN et l'organisation du Pacte de Varsovie. On peut prétendre qu'il n'existe pas de bases militaires avec armement nucléaire autour de l'URSS. On peut faire comme s'il n'existait pas dans la zone européenne près de 1 000 installations nucléaires à moyenne portée dirigées vers l'URSS et ses alliés, faire comme si on ne savait pas, en Occident, que en ce qui concerne la quantité globale de charges nucléaires dans ces installations de l'OTAN, l'avantage de l'OTAN est de l'ordre de cinquante pour cent par rapport à l'URSS.

On peut bien sûr affirmer que l'Occident ne tolérera pas la mise en place de missiles soviétiques à proximité de ses frontières, sans se demander pourquoi est-ce que nous devrions supporter les missiles de quelqu'un d'autre à nos portes.

[Text]

Within the context of practical politics, we cannot be expected to close our eyes to the feverish deployment of nuclear weapons targeted against the USSR. We will do everything that is necessary to preserve the military-strategic parity which serves as the guarantee of peace. At the same time, we are convinced of the erroneousness of the idea that an arms build-up equates with a strengthening of security. We are consistent and resolute opponents of the arms race. In the current difficult and dangerous situation our nation declares: there is today no more important task facing international politics than removing the increasing threat of nuclear war.

Our position on this question is clear

declared the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Comrade Andropov.

Nuclear war must not be allowed to take place. Neither small, nor large, not limited, nor total.

Demonstrating its dedication to peace, the Soviet Union has taken an unprecedented step. We have unilaterally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The west, however, has not supported this our initiative.

• 1110

As a justification they allege that the Warsaw Pact nations have a superiority in conventional weapons. However, in the first place, this is not in accord with the actual situation, secondly, the whole world knows that we are willing to come to an agreement whereby neither side will be the first to use either nuclear arms or conventional weapons. It is toward this aim that the proposal of the political advisory committee of the Warsaw Pact nations is directed—to reach agreement on the reciprocal non-use of military force and maintaining relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations. But, as yet, we have heard no answer to this proposal either. They tell us that they need more time to study the matter. But still no answer.

At the Geneva talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic and nuclear weapons we are guided by the honest and just principle of parity and equal security.

The Soviet proposals embrace all types of strategic weapons without exception and envisage their reduction by many hundreds. And, while the talks are underway, we propose to freeze the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

Such a "freeze" is important in itself. It would also make it considerably easier to move toward a radical limitation and reduction of strategic weapons. It is gratifying that this idea is gaining more and more supporters, some on the American continent.

We want to see all aspects of the strategic arms race stopped. Guided by this principle, the Soviet Union has proposed that the USSR and the U.S.A. should make a mutual

[Translation]

Si on veut rester dans le domaine de la politique réelle, il ne faut pas s'attendre à ce que nous ferions les yeux devant l'activité fébrile de déploiement d'armes nucléaires dirigées contre l'URSS. Nous allons faire tout ce qui est possible pour garder cette parité militaire et stratégique qui sert de garantie de paix. En même temps, nous sommes convaincus qu'il est faux de mettre sur un pied d'égalité l'accumulation des armements et le renforcement de la sécurité. Nous nous opposons de façon conséquente et décisive à la course aux armements. Dans cette situation complexe et dangereuse qui s'est créée, notre pays déclare ce qui suit: Il n'existe pas en ce moment, dans la politique internationale, de devoir plus urgent que celui de faire reculer la menace grandissante de la guerre nucléaire.

«Notre position à ce sujet est claire»,

a déclaré le Secrétaire général du Comité central du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique, le camarade Andropov.

«On ne peut pas permettre la guerre nucléaire, qu'elle soit petite, grande, limitée ou totale.»

Pour démontrer son dévouement à la cause de la paix, l'Union soviétique a pris une mesure sans précédent. Nous nous sommes engagés de façon unilatérale à ne pas être les premiers à se servir de l'armement nucléaire. Mais le monde occidental n'a pas appuyé notre initiative.

En guise de justification, on nous répond que les pays du Pacte de Varsovie auraient la suprématie dans les armements conventiels. D'une part, cela n'est pas conforme à la réalité, d'autre part, le monde entier sait que nous sommes prêts à nous mettre d'accord pour qu'aucune partie ne soit la première à utiliser non seulement l'armement nucléaire mais aussi l'armement conventionnel. C'est justement cela que vise la proposition du Comité politique consultatif des pays du Pacte de Varsovie qui veut conclure un accord relatif à la non utilisation réciproque de la force armée et au maintien des relations entre les pays de l'organisation du Pacte de Varsovie et de l'OTAN. Mais, encore une fois, cette proposition de notre part n'a pas eu d'écho. On nous dit qu'il faut encore du temps pour étudier la question. Mais toujours pas de réponse.

Aux pourparlers de Genève sur la limitation et la réduction des armements stratégiques et nucléaires, nous avons recours au principe honnête et juste de la parité et de la sécurité égale.

Les propositions soviétiques englobent sans exception tous les types d'armement stratégique et prévoient une réduction de plusieurs centaines d'unités. Pendant que se déroulent les pourparlers, nous proposons le gel des arsenaux nucléaires des deux côtés.

Ce «gel» est important en lui-même. Il faciliterait aussi de façon sensible le mouvement vers une limitation radicale et une réduction des armements stratégiques. Cela fait plaisir de voir que cette idée réunit de plus en plus d'adeptes y compris ici sur le continent américain.

Nous voulons que soient empêchés tous les aspects de la course aux armements stratégiques. Fort de cette conviction, l'Union soviétique a proposé pour que l'URSS et les États-

[Texte]

commitment not to deploy a new type of strategic weapon, the long-range cruise missile.

The U.S. refusal to enter into such an agreement is an illustration of their intention to further develop their strategic offensive potential. We cannot help but make the appropriate conclusions. In my opinion, it is understandable. A special threat to peace is posed by the plans to deploy hundreds of American medium-range nuclear missiles in West European countries.

The realization of the plans would mean advancing toward our border first strike nuclear weapons which can reach their targets in a few minutes, to be more exact, within six minutes. A radical and fair proposal was made by us concerning this problem at the talks in Geneva. Our country proposes that there should be no nuclear weapons in the European zone, neither medium-range nor tactical, neither on the part of the USSR nor on the part of the NATO countries. This would be the authentic zero alternative. Inasmuch as this initiative was met with complete silence, we proposed another alternative, that both sides should reduce their medium-range weapons by more than a factor of three. In this case, there would no longer be any American or Soviet medium-range missiles facing one another, and the Soviet Union would keep only a number of missiles and warheads equal to those possessed by England and France. In addition, full parity in the number of launcher aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and in warheads on such aircraft, would be established at a level considerably lower than at present. The Soviet position makes any arguments in favour of the so-called "NATO arms build-up to achieve parity" quite groundless. After all, the acceptance of our stand would lead to a situation whereby the number of medium-range missiles and their warheads located in the European part of the Soviet Union would be considerably less than during the time up to 1976, when we did not have any SS-20 missiles at all. Neither the zero nor the intermediate alternatives are acceptable to us since they violate the principle of parity and equal security.

• 1115

We are not naive and should not be expected to disarm unilaterally. If the American and NATO plans are put into effect, then the Soviet Union will be obliged to take corresponding reciprocal measures. But this would be a forced decision thrust upon us. It is not yet too late to come to a reasonable agreement. The Soviet Union supports this and we call on the other side to do its part.

There is yet another extremely important question. You are familiar with the statement about the creation of a large-scale anti-missile defence system. This not-so-bright idea may create a most dangerous situation. If it becomes a reality, then it will

[Traduction]

Unis s'engagent mutuellement à ne pas développer de nouveaux types d'armement stratégique, soit les missiles de croisière à longue portée.

Le refus de la part des États-Unis de s'engager dans cet accord témoigne d'une intention de développer encore plus son potentiel stratégique offensif. Nous ne pouvons pas nous empêcher d'en tirer les conclusions qui s'imposent. Cela, me semble-t-il, est compréhensible. Les projets d'installation dans les pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest de centaines de missiles américains nucléaires à moyenne portée représentent un danger particulier pour la paix.

La réalisation de ces projets signifierait l'avancement vers nos frontières d'un armement nucléaire de première frappe qui atteindrait son objectif en l'espace de quelques minutes seulement, et plus précisément en six minutes. Aux pourparlers de Genève consacrés à cette question, nous avons encore une fois fait une proposition radicale et équitable. Notre pays propose qu'il n'y ait aucun armement nucléaire dans la zone européenne, ni d'armement à moyenne portée, ni d'armement tactique, et ce ni du côté de l'URSS, ni du côté des pays de l'OTAN. Ce serait là la véritable option zéro. Étant donné que cette initiative s'est heurtée au silence le plus complet, nous avons proposé une autre variante, à savoir que les deux côtés réduisent de plus de trois fois leur armement à moyenne portée. En outre, d'après cette variante, les missiles à moyenne portée soviétiques et américains dirigés les uns contre les autres n'existeraient pas du tout, et l'Union soviétique garderait seulement un nombre de missiles et d'ogives égal à ceux de l'Angleterre et de la France réunies. On établirait également, le plein équilibre dans le nombre d'avions lanceurs capables de transporter de l'armement nucléaire et dans celui des charges propulsives sur ces avions, à un niveau sensiblement plus bas que le niveau actuel. La position soviétique enlève tout fondement à tout argument selon lequel il faut compléter l'armement de l'OTAN pour atteindre la parité. Voyez-vous, l'acceptation de cette position aurait pour résultat que le nombre de missiles à moyenne portée et de leurs ogives sur la partie européenne de l'URSS serait sensiblement inférieur à celui d'avant 1976, alors que nous n'avions pas du tout de missiles SS-20. Mais ni l'option zéro ni la solution intermédiaire ne sont acceptables pour nous, dans la mesure où elles violent le principe de la parité, de l'équilibre et de la sécurité égale.

Nous ne sommes pas naïfs, et il ne faut pas s'attendre à un désarmement unilatéral de notre part. La réalisation des plans américains et de l'OTAN forcerait l'Union soviétique à prendre les mesures de représailles correspondantes. Mais ce serait là une solution qui nous serait imposée. Il n'est pas encore trop tard pour arriver à une entente raisonnable. L'Union soviétique est en faveur de cela. Et nous convions l'autre partie à faire sa part.

Il y a encore une autre question très importante. Vous êtes au courant de la déclaration relative à la mise sur pied d'une défense anti-missiles de grande envergure. Cette «idée brillante» peut engendrer une situation des plus dangereuses.

[Text]

be still another move threatening escalation of both the offensive and the defensive arms race.

Distinguished Soviet scientists in their address to scientists of the world emphasized, and I quote:

We declare with full responsibility that there are no effective means of defence in nuclear war and it is impossible from a practical point of view to create them.

Now it is more important than ever before that concerned governments meet at the conference table without delay in order to work out an agreement to prohibit the deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space. As far as we are concerned, the Soviet Union will continue to exert every effort to ensure that plans to carry over the arms race into outer space do not become reality. The arms race must be halted where it is and not permitted to start in areas where it does not exist.

These, briefly, are the most important Soviet peace initiatives advanced recently. To this I only want to add we do not claim to have a monopoly on proposals concerning how to stop the arms race. In the Soviet Union we are ready to carefully consider any constructive realistic proposal. The Canadian proposal, for instance, concerning the suffocation of new types of weapons in the laboratories, was received with interest by us. Separate elements of this proposal are close to the Soviet position. We believe on the whole the struggle against the military threat to be the joint concern of all peoples and their representatives in the legislative organs of their nations and of all responsible and sober-thinking politicians. It was exactly in pursuit of the aim of joint action in the struggle against the growing danger of war, that the plenipotentiary representatives of all peoples of the Soviet Union adopted an appeal to Parliaments, governments, political parties and peoples of the world at the end of 1982 when we marked the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR.

We in the Soviet Union are sure that the 1970's, which were years of détente, were not an accidental episode in the difficult history of mankind. The policy of détente has not run its course. The term *détente* has taken a firm place in the political dictionary because the future belongs to détente. We are proceeding on the assumption that Canada is also interested in détente. As far as we are concerned, we will persistently continue to follow a line that will prevent further exacerbation of the international situation and which will not allow the positive potential of détente to be buried. The policy of our government with regard to Canada is consistent and one of principle. We are in favour of good friendly relations with our neighbour across the pole, of broadening mutually advantageous collaboration in all areas and the continuation and deepening of political dialogue. Not confrontation but mutually advantageous collaboration—that is our program.

[Translation]

Si elle vient à être mise à exécution, ce serait un autre pas en avant, encore plus dangereux, dans la course aux armements tant offensifs que défensifs.

Les scientifiques soviétiques les plus éminents ont fait remarquer dans leur adresse aux scientifiques du monde entier (et je cite):

«Nous déclarons en toute connaissance de cause qu'il n'existe pas dans la guerre nucléaire de moyen défensif efficace et que la création de tels moyens est impossible au point de vue pratique».

Il est aujourd'hui plus important que jamais que les gouvernements concernés se réunissent sans tarder autour de la table des négociations pour se consacrer à l'élaboration d'un accord visant à interdire tout déploiement d'armes dans l'espace, sous quelque forme que ce soit. En ce qui nous concerne, l'Union soviétique va continuer à faire le maximum pour que les plans de transfert dans l'espace de la course aux armements ne se concrétisent pas. Il faut arrêter la course aux armements là où elle se trouve et ne pas la commencer là où elle n'existe pas encore.

Voilà en résumé les plus importantes initiatives soviétiques prises dans le domaine de la paix dernièrement. Je voudrais juste ajouter une chose. Nous ne prétendons pas détenir le monopole des propositions concernant la meilleure façon d'arrêter la course aux armements. En Union soviétique, nous sommes prêts à étudier attentivement toute proposition constructive réaliste. C'est avec intérêt que nous avons, par exemple, accueilli la proposition canadienne d'étouffement des types nouveaux d'armement en laboratoire. Certains éléments de cette proposition se rapprochent de la position soviétique. Nous estimons, dans l'ensemble, que la lutte contre la menace militaire est l'affaire de tous les peuples et de tous leurs représentants dans leurs organes législatifs respectifs, l'affaire de tous les hommes politiques responsables et éclairés. C'est justement en poursuivant l'objectif commun de la lutte contre le danger de guerre grandissant que les représentants plénipotentiaires de tous les peuples de l'Union soviétique ont adopté à la fin de l'année 1982, au cours de laquelle nous célébrions le sixième anniversaire de la création de l'URSS, l'adresse aux parlements, aux autorités, aux partis politiques et aux peuples du monde entier.

Nous, en Union soviétique, sommes convaincus que les années soixante-dix, qui se sont déroulées sous le signe de la détente, n'étaient pas un épisode fortuit dans la difficile histoire de l'humanité. La politique de la détente n'est pas une étape terminée. Le terme «détente» a pris une place durable dans le dictionnaire politique parce que c'est à la détente qu'appartient l'avenir. Nous supposons que le Canada s'intéresse lui aussi à la détente. En ce qui nous concerne, nous allons poursuivre avec insistance nos efforts pour empêcher une nouvelle exacerbation de la situation internationale et ne pas laisser se perdre les possibilités de la détente. La ligne de conduite de notre gouvernement à l'égard du Canada se caractérise par sa cohérence et ses principes. Nous cherchons à établir de bonnes et amicales relations avec notre voisin de l'autre côté du pôle, à élargir une collaboration mutuellement profitable dans tous les domaines, ainsi qu'à poursuivre et à

[Texte]

It would be far better, if guided by the similarity of natural and geographical conditions of various nations, among which are Canada and the USSR, they could deal jointly with solving ecological, energy, agriculture and other shared problems. We should like to see the Arctic as a region of joint scientific research and development, and not a theatre of military operations. And the distance between the continents should not be measured by the minutes of flight of ballistic missiles, but by the closeness of our human values, the most basic of which is life itself. In order to achieve these goals, we are ready for the broadest co-operation with the government, Parliament, business circles, cultural workers, and social organizations of Canada.

Thank you.

• 1120

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): *Merci.* Thank you.

In view of a little bit more lengthy statement than my colleagues may have been expecting, I will arbitrarily decide to prolong, at least for a good 15 minutes. Instead of adjourning at 12.00, I thought I would adjourn at 12.15 p.m., but by consent with Mr. Speaker of the Senate, I will go until 12.30 p.m. I am sure my colleagues will appreciate that unilateral decision.

I will now recognize as first questioner, as is our custom in our committee of foreign affairs, the honourable official critic of the Official Opposition, the Hon. Mr. McKinnon. Mr. McKinnon was Minister of National Defence in Mr. Joe Clark's Cabinet, and is a member of Parliament from the Province of British Columbia.

Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to Canada, Mr. Gorbachev. I must say that I find comfort in some of your remarks, and, as so frequently happens when we try to understand the USSR, I found I was mystified by some of your other remarks.

You dwelt for awhile on SALT II early in your remarks; I am glad you did, because that is the first question I wanted to put to you, sir. This mystery that shrouds some of the decisions the USSR takes in world affairs is deepening to us, particularly the events that happened in 1979. You may recall the situation at that time: the USSR was deploying SS-20s in Europe; President Carter had ratified the SALT II agreement . . .

An hon. Member: Just a moment, please. There is no Russian translation.

Mr. McKinnon: Some of my best words gone.

An hon. Member: Let us do it in Russian.

[Traduction]

approfondir le dialogue politique. Notre programme, ce n'est pas la confrontation, mais la collaboration mutuellement profitable.

Il serait infiniment préférable de voir deux pays différents comme l'URSS et le Canada, que rapprochent des conditions naturelles et géographiques semblables, entreprendre ensemble la recherche de solutions aux problèmes communs écologiques, énergétiques, agricoles et autres. Nous voudrions voir l'Arctique devenir une région où se dérouleraient des recherches scientifiques et un aménagement du territoire communs et non pas le théâtre d'activités militaires, et on voudrait mesurer la distance entre les continents non pas à l'aide des minutes du vol des missiles balistiques mais plutôt à l'aide de la proximité de nos valeurs humaines dont la plus importante parmi eux est la vie elle-même. Pour atteindre ces objectifs, nous sommes prêts à nous engager dans la collaboration la plus vaste avec les représentants du gouvernement, du Parlement, du secteur commercial, du secteur de la culture et des organisations sociales du Canada.

Je vous remercie de votre attention.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): *Thank you merci.*

Étant donné que la déclaration a été plus longue que ce à quoi mes collègues s'attendaient, de mon propre chef, je prolongerai la séance d'au moins 15 minutes. Plutôt que d'ajourner à midi, j'avais pensé que nous pourrions ajourner à 12h15 mais avec l'accord du Président du Sénat, je prolongerai la séance jusqu'à 12h30. Je suis sûr que mes collègues se féliciteront de cette décision unilatérale.

Comme c'est notre coutume au comité des affaires étrangères, je donnerai la parole en premier lieu au critique officiel de l'opposition officielle, l'honorable M. McKinnon. M. McKinnon a été ministre de la Défense nationale dans le cabinet de M. Joe Clark et il est député d'une circonscription de la province de Colombie-Britannique.

Monsieur McKinnon.

M. McKinnon: Merci, monsieur le président.

Bienvenue au Canada, M. Gorbachev. J'ai trouvé certaines de vos remarques réconfortantes, mais comme c'est souvent le cas quand nous essayons de comprendre l'URSS, certains de vos propos m'ont laissé perplexe.

Au début de vos remarques, vous avez insisté sur l'accord SALT II. Je suis heureux que vous l'ayez fait car c'est le sujet de ma première question. Le mystère qui entoure certaines décisions que l'URSS prend en matière de politiques internationales n'a cessé de s'embrouiller pour nous surtout depuis les événements de 1979. Vous vous souviendrez de la situation à l'époque: l'URSS déployait les SS-20 en Europe tandis que le président Carter avait ratifié l'accord SALT II . . .

Une voix: Il n'y a pas d'interprétation vers le russe.

M. McKinnon: Que de belles paroles perdues.

Une voix: Parlons donc russe.

[Text]

Mr. McKinnon: It is like . . .

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): *Dialogue de sourds.*

Mr. McKinnon: —pressing the wrong button on a computer, is it not?

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): Will the translator speak, please? Please, would you speak?

Yes, number three.

So it is a repeat performance; would you please kindly proceed?

Mr. McKinnon: Well, perhaps I have mystified you as much as you have . . .

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): With your kind words at the beginning included, please.

Mr. McKinnon: Well, perhaps I have mystified you as much as you have mystified me. I was welcoming you to Canada and to our parliamentary system.

You mentioned SALT II early in your remarks, and I asked you to cast your memory back to 1979. We are very glad to have someone here who would not only have participated in the decisions taken by the USSR that year, but can inform us, possibly, of the reasons behind some of them.

You may recall that in 1979 the deployment of the SS-20 commenced. President Carter signed the SALT II agreement, which then went to Washington to be ratified by their Senate. They were having some difficulty, but the odds were about even that it would be ratified by the end of 1979, although the deployment of the SS-20s rather chilled the enthusiasm for any agreement on arms limitation at that time. This was exacerbated by the events in Iran where the change of government took place among a great deal of bloodshed and confusion and the American embassy was captured and American citizens were made hostage. At that particular time the USSR invaded Afghanistan, and that really in the minds of many of us—myself included—put the kiss of death on the SALT II agreement in the United States Senate. Officials of the United States government informed us shortly thereafter there was no hope whatsoever of getting SALT II ratified and they withdrew it rather than have it voted down. This leaves it open to future ratification.

• 1125

I wonder when the decision was made that you would invade Afghanistan; how much importance was placed on the factor that SALT II was up for ratification in the United States Senate and that it might well damage its chances of passage by the aggressive action that Russia took toward Afghanistan at that time? That is the first question.

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) I wish to answer your question. There is a widespread conception in the west that the process of détente and the fate of SALT II are tied to events in Afghanistan and the corresponding action of the Soviet Union in that region of the world. We are not in agreement with that

[Translation]

M. McKinnon: C'est comme . . .

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): C'est un dialogue de sourds.

M. McKinnon: . . . si on pressait le mauvais bouton d'un ordinateur, n'est-ce pas?

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): L'interprète peut-il parler? S'il vous plaît?

Oui, le numéro trois.

Il faut donc recommencer. Poursuivez.

M. McKinnon: Peut-être vous ai-je embrouillé tout autant que vous . . .

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Reprenez les belles paroles que vous avez prononcées au début, s'il vous plaît.

M. McKinnon: Peut-être vous ai-je embrouillé tout autant que vous m'embrouillez. Je vous souhaitais la bienvenue au Canada, en régime parlementaire.

Au début de vos remarques, vous avez parlé de l'accord SALT II et je vous ai demandé de vous reporter en 1979. Nous sommes heureux d'accueillir ici quelqu'un qui non seulement a participé aux décisions prises par l'URSS cette année-là mais qui peut peut-être nous renseigner sur les raisons qui les ont motivées.

C'est en 1979 qu'a commencé le déploiement des SS-20. Le président Carter a signé l'accord SALT II et l'a présenté au Sénat à Washington pour qu'il soit ratifié. Il y avait des difficultés mais on estimait que l'accord serait ratifié avant la fin de 1979 même si le déploiement des SS-20 avait refroidi l'enthousiasme que suscitait tout accord de limitation des armes à l'époque. La situation fut exacerbée par les événements en Iran où le changement de gouvernement s'est fait dans un bain de sang et dans la confusion et où l'ambassade américaine a été prise d'assaut et des citoyens américains fait otages. C'est à ce moment que l'URSS a envahi l'Afghanistan et pour beaucoup d'entre nous, moi notamment, cela marqua la fin de l'entente SALT II au Sénat des États-Unis. Les officiels du gouvernement américain nous ont informés peu après qu'il n'y avait aucun espoir de voir l'entente ratifiée et qu'ils préféraient la retirer que de la voir rejeter. Cela permettait d'envisager une ratification ultérieure.

Pourriez-vous dire si, lorsqu'il a été décidé que vous envahiriez l'Afghanistan, on avait considéré le fait que l'entente sur la limitation des armes stratégiques devait être ratifiée par le Sénat des États-Unis et que cet acte d'agression russe contre l'Afghanistan risquait de tout remettre en question? Voilà pour ma première question.

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Permettez-moi de répondre à votre question. À l'Ouest, beaucoup de gens pensent que le processus de détente et le sort des négociations SALT II sont liés aux événements en Afghanistan et à l'action correspondante de l'Union soviétique dans cette région du monde. Nous

[Texte]

evaluation. As regards our approaches and arrangements, including those on such an important question as SALT II, we not only at the time adhered firmly to the content of that important document, we are still observing it strictly. Although, incidentally, voices are now heard saying that we are already violating SALT II and that we are continuing to do so; I must say that this does not correspond to reality.

Now, as regards Afghanistan and the events in Afghanistan. Why did the introduction of a limited contingent become possible?

Afghanistan is an old neighbour of ours with whom we have always had friendly relations. In 1978, a people's democratic revolution took place in that country which overturned the feudal regime and chose the course of democratic reform, in particular, in agriculture and in other areas of social and economic policy. This provoked a sharp reaction on the part of the internal counter-revolutionary forces within the country itself, but the most significant factor was that these forces received widespread support from both Pakistan and Iran, but they primarily received this support by relying on the massive assistance of the western countries, with the U.S.A. in the forefront, as well as West Germany. China assumed the same position. Generally speaking, by the end of 1979, we had essentially a situation where an undeclared war was being waged against the new regime, against the new order, or against the process that had begun. In this situation the government—incidentally, this was not the first nor the last request—there were many—by the end of 1979, the situation was such that war had practically broken out, aimed at nullifying what the people of this neighbouring country of ours had won. The Soviet Union responded; and this was not in contravention of any article of the United Nations Charter by sending a limited contingent of armed forces for one purpose—to render assistance in response to a request made by the legitimate representatives of the people. And these troops are there at the present time. I will tell you right now, to conclude this part of the question, we want to see this problem resolved as soon as possible, resolved by political means, and as you know, definite steps are being taken in that direction at present. We hope that the ever-increasing understanding of the processes taking place in Afghanistan will be better and more realistic and that ways will be found towards a political settlement.

• 1130

Our troops, our soldiers, who are now in that country, and, I repeat once more, at the request of the legitimate government, will not remain one day longer once the obstacles to their withdrawal have been removed. What we are talking about here is the cessation of subversive activities against this legally established government. It is difficult to say how things will go. We see, for example, that the American Administration is not interested in a political settlement of this matter, claiming openly that we are giving armed aid. Nonetheless, public

[Traduction]

ne sommes pas d'accord avec cette évaluation. En ce qui concerne nos positions et les ententes conclues, y compris la question très importante de SALT II, nous avons toujours respecté à la lettre, à ce moment-là et aujourd'hui encore, ce qui était contenu dans ce document important. Cependant des bruits courent déjà selon lesquels nous serions en train de violer ou de continuer de violer les accords SALT II. Je dois dire que cela ne correspond pas à la réalité.

Parlons maintenant de l'Afghanistan et des événements en Afghanistan. Pourquoi l'entrée d'un contingent limité de forces soviétiques dans ce pays est-elle devenue possible?

L'Afghanistan est l'un de nos vieux voisins avec lesquels nous avons toujours entretenu des relations amicales. En 1978, une révolution populaire démocratique a eu lieu dans ce pays, une révolution qui a renversé le pouvoir féodal et a placé le pays sur la voie des réformes démocratiques, notamment dans le secteur agricole et dans d'autres secteurs de la politique socio-économique. Cela a provoqué une vive réaction de la part des forces contre-révolutionnaires internes dans le pays même. Ce qui est le plus important, c'est que ces forces ont reçu un très fort appui de la part du Pakistan et de l'Iran, cet appui ayant bénéficié avant tout de l'aide substantielle accordée par les pays occidentaux, en premier lieu les États-Unis d'Amérique et aussi la République fédérale d'Allemagne. La Chine a adopté la même attitude. En somme, vers la fin de l'année 1979, la situation était devenue telle qu'on s'est trouvé aux prises avec une guerre non déclarée, une guerre contre le nouveau régime, contre le nouveau processus qui venait de s'enclencher. Devant cette situation, ce gouvernement a présenté une requête, qui n'était ni la première ni la dernière, car il en a eu de fort nombreuses. Vers la fin de l'année 1979, la situation s'est dégradée au point qu'une guerre en bonne et due forme s'est déclarée dans le but de réduire à néant les gains acquis par le peuple de ce pays qui est notre voisin. L'Union soviétique a répondu à la requête susmentionnée sans contrevenir aux articles correspondants de l'Organisation des Nations unies, et un contingent limité des forces armées a été envoyé avec un seul objectif, celui d'offrir son aide en réponse à la requête des représentants légitimes du peuple. Et ces forces armées se trouvent là-bas en ce moment. Nous sommes en faveur d'une solution à ce problème et je le dis tout de suite pour répondre à cette partie de la question, d'une solution rapide, par la voie politique. Comme vous le savez, un processus particulier s'est engagé dans ce sens en ce moment. Nous espérons que la compréhension grandissante des processus se déroulant en Afghanistan s'améliore, devienne plus réaliste et que soient trouvés les moyens d'un règlement politique.

Nos forces armées, nos soldats qui se trouvent dans ce pays, et je le répète, à la demande du gouvernement légitime, ne resteront pas un jour de plus une fois que seront éliminés les obstacles s'opposant à leur départ. Et là, il s'agit d'arrêter les activités subversives subversives contre ce gouvernement légitime. Mais il est difficile de savoir comment l'affaire va évoluer. Pour notre part, nous voyons bien que l'administration américaine n'est pas intéressée à une solution politique de ce problème et déclare ouvertement que nous offrons une aide

[Text]

opinion in most countries of the world supports a political settlement of this problem, and in the shortest possible time at that. We support such an approach. We have not lost anything in Afghanistan; we responded to the request of a neighbouring country which, in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the U.N. Charter, turned to us for help. It is a different matter that subsequently this fact was used to poison the international climate and, under the guise of exposure and censure, to give impetus to those processes for which, in fact, the conditions were already ripe.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): I have a little difficulty, because usually I recognize one question. I forgot completely, at the beginning, to ask both those who question and our distinguished guests to be as brief as possible, because if I look at the list of people who want to question, we will never be able to give a chance to many more members. I will ask my joint chairman, Senator Asselin, to recognize one member of the Senate. But I have been forgetful, and I take the blame for it. I may allow Mr. MacKinnon, from the fact that he is an ex-Minister of National Defence—but exceptionally, because I made the mistake.

If you have a very brief short question, that will be the exception of the meeting, and then I will go to Senator Asselin.

Mr. MacKinnon: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be brief, as all other ex-ministers in the crowd will, I am sure.

In the reply, you mention that there had been some rumours or accusations of breach of SALT II. I would like to say I think I can speak for Canadians on all sides of the political spectrum that we are pleased that both superpowers seemed to have followed the terms of SALT II although it has not been ratified, and we are grateful for that, and we wish to compliment both sides.

My second question is about the SS-20s. In 1979 Mr. Brezhnev said they had equality at that time, yet since that time the USSR has continued deploying the SS-20s about one a week or one every five days, so they have deployed some 250 since then. If you had equality—and you mentioned in your remarks that they had achieved equality and nothing has changed since then; but what has changed is that there are now 250 more SS-20s. Why do you keep on deploying these things if you had equality in 1979, according to Mr. Brezhnev?

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) I respond to your appeal.

We undertook a unilateral commitment not to deploy missiles, you will remember, at one time. And we are not deploying these missiles . . . as of the beginning of negotiations.

[Translation]

militaire. Il n'empêche que la majorité de la collectivité mondiale penche pour sa solution politique, et ce dans des délais plus courts. Nous soutenons cette opinion. Nous n'avons rien perdu en Afghanistan, nous avons répondu à l'appel d'un pays voisin qui, conformément aux dispositions correspondantes de la charte de l'Organisation des Nations unies s'est tourné vers nous pour demander de l'aide. Ce qui s'est passé ensuite, c'est que ce fait a été utilisé pour empoisonner l'atmosphère internationale en général et pour entamer, sous le couvert de la dénonciation et de l'accusation, des processus auxquels la situation se prêtait.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): J'ai un petit problème, car normalement je ne permets qu'une seule question. Au début de la séance, j'ai complètement oublié de demander à ceux qui posent les questions et à nos invités distingués d'être aussi brefs que possible, car je m'aperçois qu'il y a beaucoup de noms sur ma liste, et sans cela, nous ne pourrions jamais donner la parole à tout le monde. Je demanderai à mon coprésident, le sénateur Asselin, de donner la parole à un membre du Sénat. Mais c'est de ma faute, et j'avoue ma responsabilité. Je permettrai une autre petite question à M. MacKinnon, du fait que c'est un ex-ministre de la Défense nationale, mais ce sera une exception, étant donné que c'est moi qui me suis trompé.

Je vous permettrai de poser une très courte question, mais ce sera la seule exception à la règle, et ensuite je passerai au sénateur Asselin.

M. MacKinnon: Merci, monsieur le président. J'essaierai d'être bref, comme le feront sans doute tous les autres ex-ministres ici présents, j'en suis sûr.

Dans votre réponse, vous dites que le bruit courait ou que quelqu'un vous avait accusé de ne pas avoir respecté l'accord SALT II. Je crois que je parle au nom de tous les Canadiens, quelles que soient leurs opinions politiques, lorsque je dis que nous sommes très heureux de constater que les deux superpuissances semblent avoir respecté les termes de l'accord, bien que celui-ci n'ait pas été ratifié, et que non seulement nous vous en savons gré, mais nous tenons absolument à féliciter les deux camps.

Ma deuxième question concerne les SS-20. En 1979, M. Brejnev a dit que vous étiez sur un pied d'égalité avec les autres à l'époque; or, depuis ce temps-là, l'Union soviétique a continué à déployer environ un SS-20 par semaine ou tous les cinq jours, de sorte qu'elle a maintenant déployé environ 250 missiles de plus. Si vous étiez sur un pied d'égalité—et vous avez dit dans vos remarques que c'était le cas et que rien n'était changé depuis; mais en fait, ce qui a changé, c'est justement qu'il y a maintenant 250 SS-20 de plus. Pourquoi continuez-vous à déployer ces missiles si vous étiez sur un pied d'égalité avec les autres puissances en 1979, à en croire M. Brejnev?

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Je réponds à votre appel.

Nous avons pris à un moment donné, vous vous en souvenez, des engagements de façon unilatérale pour ne pas mettre en place les missiles. Et nous ne les mettons pas en place depuis le début des pourparlers. Nous avons pris des engagements

[Texte]

We committed ourselves unilaterally, to cease deployment . . . and after that, we have not been deploying these missiles.

• 1135

Mr. McKinnon: Since when?

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) This was announced . . .

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): I am sure we will have a chance to return to that.

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) —my Soviet friends will help me with the date here—when we undertook the unilateral commitment, so to speak, to cease deployment—when there was no response—at the time of the negotiations—we have been observing this—1981. And, incidentally, Comrade Andropov gave a reply to a similar question not long ago.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): *Sénateur Asselin, s'il vous plaît.*

The Joint Chairman (Senator Asselin): Thank you, Mr. Prud'homme.

Now I will give the floor to the honourable Senator Frith. He is the Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate.

Senator Frith: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gorbachev, I would like to ask you a question that I believe is on the minds of a lot of Canadians. I guess since Hiroshima, Canadians, like other human beings, have to face the possibility not only of their own individual death but also the wiping out of the species. So we are spectators like everyone else and, as you have said, we share with the Soviet Union and all other countries a hope for peace and that we will not find ourselves faced with a nuclear war.

Is there any special role that you can see for Canada, given first its history as a peace-keeping nation and a nation that has attempted to improve relations between countries, having won a Nobel Prize for it, other than the initiatives that you have suggested, that you are asking all nations to try to make propositions and bring forward efforts for peace?

Given the fact in realistic terms, we as Canadians—is there anything we can do except politely listen to you; listen to the debate; watch the two super-powers, you and United States, as the ones that are really doing the negotiating—given the fact that we are friends and neighbours of the United States and will stay friends and neighbours of the United States, that we are not likely to resign or retire from NATO?

Given all those things and given the fact that we are the meat in the sandwich between the two of you superpowers and given our history as honest brokers, do you see any special role that you can tell Canadians that you think Canada could play under those conditions different from just coming forward with the rest of the nations and coming up with hopes for peace?

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) Thank you for your question. Of course, the question of what role Canada must

[Traduction]

unilatéraux pour arrêter le déploiement des missiles, et depuis nous ne les déployons pas.

M. McKinnon: Depuis quand?

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Cela a été annoncé.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Je suis sûr que nous aurons l'occasion d'y revenir.

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Mes collègues soviétiques vont m'aider à donner la date, quand nous avons pris ces engagements unilatéraux pour arrêter la mise en place, quand on a pas répondu à notre appel, depuis le début des pourparlers, nous respectons ces engagements, c'est-à-dire depuis 1981. D'ailleurs récemment le camarade Andropov a donné une réponse à une question semblable.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Sénateur Asselin, s'il vous plaît.

Le coprésident (le sénateur Asselin): Merci, monsieur Prud'homme.

Je vais maintenant donner la parole à l'honorable sénateur Frith qui est leader adjoint du gouvernement au Sénat.

Le sénateur Frith: Merci, monsieur le président.

Monsieur Gorbachev, je voudrais vous poser une question qui, je crois, hante l'esprit de beaucoup de Canadiens. Depuis Hiroshima, les Canadiens, tout comme les autres êtres humains, doivent faire face non seulement à l'éventualité de leur propre décès mais également à la disparition de l'espèce. Nous sommes donc des spectateurs, comme tout le monde, et, comme vous l'avez dit, nous partageons avec l'Union soviétique et tous les autres pays l'espoir d'un monde en paix pour que nous ne nous trouvions pas face à une guerre nucléaire.

Pensez-vous que le Canada aurait un rôle spécial à jouer, compte tenu de ses antécédents en tant qu'État gardien de la paix et en tant que nation qui a essayé d'améliorer les relations entre pays, puisqu'il a obtenu un prix Nobel pour ses efforts, autre que les initiatives que vous avez déjà proposées, à savoir, demander à tous les États d'avancer des propositions et déployer des efforts en vue d'une paix durable?

Sur un plan réaliste, est-ce que, en tant que Canadiens, nous pouvons faire autre chose que de vous écouter poliment, d'écouter ces discussions? Pouvons-nous faire autre chose que d'assister passivement aux négociations qui se déroulent entre les deux superpuissances, entre l'Union soviétique et les États-Unis, étant donné que nous demeurerons les amis et les voisins des États-Unis et que nous n'entendons pas démissionner de l'OTAN?

Compte tenu de tous ces éléments, du fait que nous sommes pris entre ces deux superpuissances et que nous passons pour des médiateurs honnêtes, pensez-vous que le Canada pourrait jouer un rôle spécial dans ces circonstances autre que de favoriser et d'espérer la paix avec la collaboration des autres nations?

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Je vous remercie de votre question. Il est évident que le rôle que doit jouer le Canada,

[Text]

play is primarily a matter for the Canadian Parliament and government. I would not take it upon myself to formulate the tasks of Parliament and government in this area. Nevertheless, I shall say the following. The Canadian government, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Trudeau, personally, made a large contribution at the beginning of the 1970's to the creation of a suitable climate in international relations, what we called *détente*. This was a period of active political dialogue and an expansion of economic and cultural ties, and this is what created the basis for high hopes for a successful resolution of the problems of disarmament and the attainment of control over this type of weaponry, and also the creation of the appropriate reliable conditions for a strengthening of peace. It seems to me that Canada's role in this area is noticeable and it may grow. Ultimately, it is the general political climate that will tell, and the general opinion of the leaders, Parliaments, state bodies, which the leaders of any country, including those which you have spoken of, must reckon with. Now as you have expressed yourself frankly in posing your question, allow me to inject a similar note of frankness into my reply.

We know that there is an agreement between Canada and the U.S.A. on the possibility of testing in the appropriate conditions and at the appropriate time, cruise missiles, and this cannot but disturb us. After all, it is a question of testing medium-range missiles in conditions similar to those obtaining in our own country. So what we are talking about here is the refinement of this dangerous weapon under Canadian conditions, a weapon that we consider will be a destabilizing element if it is produced. Therefore, without meddling in your internal affairs, but merely answering your question, I should simply like to draw your attention to this problem.

Thank you.

• 1140

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): *Merci*, Senator Frith.

The official critic of the New Democratic Party, Dr. Pauline Jewett. She is a member of Parliament from British Columbia also. Dr. Jewett.

Miss Jewett: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to Mr. Gorbachev. There are many of us, who are also quite disturbed about the Cruise missile testing, as he will undoubtedly hear during the course of his visit. One of the reasons that there is a lot of concern about, not only the testing but the possible deployment of the Cruise and Pershing 2, is that many of us see this as an escalation and a highly destabilizing escalation.

If I were to be asked what I thought was the Soviet Union's most destabilizing action, I would say it was the replacement of the SS-4 and 5 with the SS-20, and the further development of the SS-20 against Asia. I have never had a satisfactory

[Translation]

c'est l'affaire du Parlement et du gouvernement canadien avant tout. Et ce n'est pas moi qui me chargerai d'énoncer quels devraient être les devoirs du Parlement et du gouvernement dans ce domaine. Cependant, je présenterais la chose de cette façon: le gouvernement du Canada représenté en la personne de M. le Premier ministre Trudeau a apporté une contribution importante au début des années 70 à la formation de l'atmosphère requise dans les relations internationales que nous qualifions de détente. Cela a été une période de dialogue politique actif, d'intensification des relations économiques et culturelles, et c'est cela qui créait une base permettant d'avoir les plus grands espoirs au sujet de la solution réussie des problèmes du désarmement et l'atteinte du contrôle de ce type d'armements, et de la création des conditions correspondantes prometteuses pour la consolidation de la paix. Il me semble que même en ce moment le rôle du Canada dans cette voie est visible et qu'il peut devenir encore plus important. Car en fin de compte c'est le climat politique général qui sera décisif, tout comme le seront les opinions des dirigeants responsables, des parlements, des organes gouvernementaux dont doivent tenir compte tous les dirigeants de pays, y compris les pays dont vous avez parlé. Étant donné que vous avez présenté la question de façon très ouverte, permettez-moi d'inclure cet élément de sincérité dans ma réponse.

Nous savons qu'il existe un accord entre le Canada et les États-Unis d'Amérique sur la possibilité d'essai dans les conditions qui s'imposent et au moment choisi des missiles de croisière, ce qui nous inquiète, ce qui ne peut pas manquer de nous inquiéter. Il s'agit en effet de l'essai de missiles de croisière à moyenne portée dans des conditions semblables aux conditions naturelles de notre pays. Cela signifie donc qu'il s'agit de mettre au point dans les conditions canadiennes cet armement, cet armement dangereux qui, à notre avis, s'il vient à être produit, apportera un élément de déstabilisation. C'est pourquoi, sans vouloir nous ingérer dans vos affaires internes, et pour ne faire que répondre à votre question, je voudrais simplement attirer votre attention sur cette question.

Je vous remercie.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): *Thank you*, sénateur Frith.

Le porte-parole officiel du Nouveau parti démocratique, M^{me} Pauline Jewett. M^{lle} Jewett est aussi député de Colombie-Britannique. Madame Jewett.

Mlle Jewett: Je vous remercie, monsieur le président. Je voudrais souhaiter la bienvenue à M. Gorbachev. Beaucoup d'entre nous se préoccupent aussi beaucoup des essais de missile de croisière, et il en entendra sûrement parler au cours de sa visite. L'une des raisons de toutes ces préoccupations, non seulement au sujet des essais mais du déploiement possible des missiles de croisière et des Pershing 2, c'est que beaucoup d'entre nous y voient une escalade extrêmement déstabilisante.

Si l'on me demandait ce qu'était selon moi l'initiative soviétique la plus déstabilisante, je dirais qu'il s'agit du remplacement des SS-4 et 5 par les SS-20, lesquels continuent à être déployés contre l'Asie. Je n'ai jamais obtenu de réponse

[Texte]

answer, but I am sure, if I may show such temerity, I may have one today.

Why, really why, when the SS-4's and 5's posed a mortal threat to every city in Europe, why were the SS-20's introduced? Why are they continually added to, particularly in Soviet Europe and also Soviet Asia? As I say, I think that was the most destabilizing thing the Soviet Union has done.

May I also ask, because again it is something I am sure the Presidium has discussed, and it is a question that a lot of us have been thinking about lately, and it is this: In the whole arms reduction talks, which we all feel are extremely important and as important as our visitor does today, the distinction between strategic nuclear arms and intermediate range or medium range is becoming extremely artificial. Yet these talks go on separately. My second and supplementary question is whether any consideration has been given in the Soviet Union to the possibility of merging those talks and, instead of talking about separate ceilings, talking about single ceilings?

• 1145

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) As far as the European part is concerned, no one now disputes the fact that there are approximately 1,000 intermediate-range missile carriers on either side.

As you said, these are intermediate-range missiles, ours; and then there are the intermediate-range missiles, British, French, which are stationed on the ships of about six navies operating in the European zone, and on NATO bomber aircraft. So, there are roughly 1,000 carriers, and 1½ times as many warheads.

Therefore the USSR has no superiority. There is equality, parity. But let us not talk about the arithmetic of the situation, because we both have these figures. The point is, we should be aiming at a situation where there are no missiles in Europe, none. This is our zero option.

There is, of course, the question of France and Britain, but if the west is not prepared to go as far as eliminating the French and British missiles, let us leave them alone. Then we would have on the Soviet side alone, enough missiles to offset those missiles. At any rate, we should aim at equality, at different levels, but all the time bringing the levels down until we have finally gotten rid of them all.

In addition, we should aim at the elimination of tactical missiles, that is what we suggest. Let us get on with it. You can put forward one set of figures, I can produce another set, and these figures have been published by us. You have seen them I am sure. The embassy apparently made them available to you, in the form of out official data in which all this potential is compared. Anyone who should know does know that we are equal in carrier. But let us look forward and make progress. We are in favour of this. And, we are patiently

[Traduction]

satisfaisante à ce sujet, et j'en aurai peut-être une aujourd'hui, si vous voudrez bien ne pas trouver mes questions trop téméraires.

En fait, pourquoi, alors que les SS-4 et SS-5 vont présenter une menace mortelle pour toutes les villes d'Europe, pourquoi, dis-je, les SS-20 ont-ils été introduits? Pourquoi en ajoute-t-on sans cesse, particulièrement en Europe et en Asie, dans les régions sous influence soviétique? Comme je le disais, il s'agit là selon moi de l'initiative la plus déstabilisante que l'Union soviétique ait jamais prise.

Puis-je aussi vous demander, parce que là encore je suis sûr que le Présidium a discuté de cette question, sur laquelle beaucoup d'entre nous se sont aussi penchés récemment... voici ce dont il s'agit: Dans toutes les négociations sur la réduction des armements, qui revêt pour nous tous, comme pour notre visiteur d'aujourd'hui une importance capitale, la distinction entre armements stratégiques nucléaires et forces de portée intermédiaire ou moyenne devient extrêmement artificielle. Or, ces négociations se poursuivent séparément. Ma seconde question supplémentaire est de savoir si l'Union soviétique a envisagé la possibilité de fusionner ces négociations, et de parler de plafond unique au lieu de plafond séparé.

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Venons-en à la partie européenne. Aujourd'hui personne ne met en doute le fait que probablement près de 1000 vecteurs existent d'un côté et de l'autre, des lanceurs à moyenne portée.

Ceux que vous dites nôtres, et les missiles à moyenne portée, ces missiles anglais, français qui sont installés sur des navires de quelque six flottes qui circulent dans la zone de l'Europe, ainsi que sur les avions bombardiers de l'OTAN. C'est pourquoi il y a approximativement 1000 vecteurs et plus de 1500 charges propulsives.

On ne peut donc parler de la supériorité de l'Union soviétique. Il y a équilibre, parité. Et je vous convie ici à ne pas avancer de chiffres, car nous avons nous aussi, tout comme l'Ouest, des données à ce sujet. Il s'agit plutôt de ceci: faisons en sorte qu'il n'y ait pas de missiles en Europe, aucun missile. Voilà notre option zéro.

Il y a aussi la question de la France et de l'Angleterre. Mais si, à l'Ouest, on n'est pas prêt à ce qu'il n'y ait pas de missiles français ni anglais, alors ne les touchons pas, alors nous n'aurons du côté de l'Union soviétique qu'une quantité équivalente à cette quantité de missiles. En tout cas, il faut tendre vers l'équilibre aux divers niveaux, ces niveaux baissant continuellement jusqu'à atteindre l'élimination.

Pour ce qui est de la suppression des missiles tactiques, c'est aussi notre proposition. Allons de l'avant. Si, vous voulez présenter certaines données, moi je peux vous en montrer d'autres qui sont publiées chez nous et qui circulent chez vous. Je suis sûr que l'ambassade vous a présenté ce livre dans lequel sont publiées nos données officielles et où figure une comparaison s'appliquant à tout ce potentiel. Tous ceux qui sont censés connaître ces données les connaissent, et ils savent qu'il y a équilibre au niveau des vecteurs. Mais allons encore plus loin.

[Text]

waiting actively explaining our position to the Americans through diplomatic channels, and to other countries, and our visit here is part of the same process, we are using it to make clear what we want. This is the first thing.

As far as the missiles stationed in Asia are concerned, what do you expect from us? There are missiles in South Korea and on ships in the Pacific. The Nakasane government have agreed to turn Japan into an unsinkable missile carrier, and militaristic plans are being hatched. What position are we to adopt? We cannot ignore the situation. Therefore, as far as the missiles in Asia are concerned, since we already have an exchange of views and it is not restricted to European affairs, but touches on all others, let us start work on limitation there as well; we have, by the way, put forward all the proposals—beginning with regional talks and the reduction of nuclear intermediate-range strategic missiles, and then proceeding to a total ban. That is our final aim. That deals with the second part of your question.

And, in the third part, you were talking about the possibility of merging these talks. Well, let us see how things go when we start the next round. Perhaps there will be new circumstances making that a possibility. We can discuss anything, take a look at all sorts of things.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Monsieur le sénateur Asselin.

Le coprésident (le sénateur Asselin): Je vais maintenant donner la parole à l'ancienne présidente du Sénat, l'honorable sénateur Lapointe de la province de Québec.

Sénateur Lapointe.

Senator Lapointe: Would you please comment on your refusal to grant permission to many of your citizens to leave their country as they wish, when you recognized that right as a fundamental right in the Helsinki Final Act?

• 1150

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) Either you are not correctly informed or there are other reasons for your wanting to accuse us of something in your question. We have definite legislation, approved by the Supreme Soviet, on the basis of which this question is settled. Local authorities, who have special powers to resolve these questions, make the decisions, and all applications are examined most carefully. If one speaks about emigration from our country, then this involves the Jewish part of the population; 93% of requests have been met during the last 15-20 years. 7% were denied, but this was in accordance with existing laws. We do not give permission, or rather, the laws stipulate that persons involved in activity constituting a state secret do not receive permission to leave.

[Translation]

Nous sommes fortement en faveur de cela. Et nous attendons avec patience. Nous expliquons de façon active notre position aux Américains, par la voie diplomatique et par la voie des relations avec d'autres pays. C'est la raison de notre visite dont une partie est utilisée pour justement faire part de notre désir. C'est là le premier point.

En ce qui concerne les missiles en Asie, dites-nous donc ce que nous devons faire. Il y a des missiles en Corée du Sud et sur les navires des flottes circulant dans l'océan Pacifique. Si le gouvernement de Nakasane donne son accord pour la conversion du Japon en un porteur de missiles insubmersible et que les plans militaristes commencent en quelque sorte à être élaborés, que devons-nous faire en général, quelle position devons-nous prendre? Nous ne pouvons tout de même pas laisser faire les choses! C'est pourquoi, en ce qui concerne les missiles en Asie, étant donné que nous avons déjà un échange et que dans le cas présent il ne concerne pas seulement les affaires européennes mais toutes les autres affaires également, engageons-nous à commencer là-bas le même travail de limitation. A ce propos, nous avons déjà présenté toutes les propositions en commençant par les pourparlers régionaux et par la réduction des missiles stratégiques nucléaires à moyenne portée et en finissant par l'interdiction générale et globale. C'est là notre but ultime. Cela répond à la deuxième partie de votre question.

Troisièmement, vous mentionnez le fusionnement possible de ces négociations. Mais attendons que la prochaine série de pourparlers commence. Voyons si de nouvelles conditions s'y prêtent, nous pourrions alors discuter de tout, étudier le tout.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): Senator Asselin.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Asselin): I will now give the floor to the former Speaker of the Senate, the Honourable Senator Lapointe from the Province of Quebec.

Senator Lapointe.

Le sénateur Lapointe: Pourquoi refusez-vous d'accorder à bon nombre de vos citoyens la permission de quitter leur pays s'ils le veulent alors que, dans le cadre de l'Acte final d'Helsinki, vous avez reconnu qu'il s'agissait d'un droit fondamental?

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Ou bien on vous a mal informé, ou bien il y a d'autres raisons qui font que, dans votre question même, vous essayez de nous accuser de quelque chose. Nous avons une législation bien précise qui est approuvée par le Soviet suprême, et c'est cette législation qui permet de régler cette question. Les organismes locaux ont tous pouvoirs pour régler ces questions. Ils les règlent et étudient avec le plus de soin possible les demandes. Lorsqu'on parle de la sortie d'émigration, cela concerne la partie israéliite de notre population. Quatre-vingt-treize p. cent des demandes présentées au cours des dernières quinze à vingt années ont été satisfaites. Autrement dit, 7 p. 100 d'entre elles ont été refusées, et elles l'ont été conformément aux lois en vigueur.

[Texte]

The same holds true when it has been established that there are no essential reasons for giving permission. In any case, I repeat once more, that as far as the Jewish part of the population is concerned, 93% of applications have been processed satisfactorily. Lately, the number of requests has decreased significantly to about 5,000, of which more than 4,000 have been satisfactorily settled during recent years. Therefore, there is no problem here, as we understand it. As far as emigration to Canada is concerned, we had such requests; between 760-780 people left to take up permanent residence in Canada and more than 6,000 ... 6,400 ... 6,500 left for Canada temporarily, where they lived for 1, 2, 3 or 4 years, after which they returned to the Soviet Union. We consider this normal. There are individuals, in connection with whom explanations were given by our embassy, ... I don't want to go into that today ... people who, for one reason or another, are serving time in prison for having violated the criminal code. I can say that much.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Je donne maintenant la parole à M. Laniel, un député de la province de Québec à la Chambre des communes, élu il y a 21 ans.

Je donnerai ensuite la parole à MM. Hudecki, Roche, Dupras et Munro, et à d'autres si possible.

Monsieur Laniel.

M. Laniel: Monsieur le président, ma question a trait au Moyen-Orient et à l'entente conditionnelle que viennent de signer le Liban et Israël, ayant comme objectif de réduire la tension au Liban et de fournir au Liban une occasion de retrouver sa souveraineté et son unité. Comme cette entente, qui a déjà été rejetée par la Syrie et l'O.L.P., est conditionnelle au retrait des troupes syriennes—il y en a 40,000 au Liban—de même qu'au retrait de celles de l'O.L.P., M. Gorbachev peut-il nous dire si l'U.R.S.S. est prête à faire des pressions sur la Syrie pour qu'elle retire ses troupes comme l'exige l'entente? Ces troupes étaient là à l'invitation du Liban, d'accord, mais comme le Liban est maintenant partie de l'entente avec Israël, il me semble qu'il est tout à fait normal que les troupes de la Syrie se retirent. Également, M. Gorbachev n'est-il pas d'avis que si cette entente n'est pas respectée, ce seront le peuple palestinien et le peuple du Liban qui en souffriront le plus?

• 1155

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) Our view on the Middle East question was enunciated a few days ago in a special government statement on this question. What is proposed and presented today as the resolution of the serious conflict in the Middle East, in the form of an agreement between Lebanon and Israel, we consider will not help matters because it will not decide the question of Lebanon's sovereignty; it preserves buffer and intermediate zones, Israeli control, puppet groupings, et cetera. In other words, if that is to be the decision, then the conflagration cannot be extinguished; solutions must be found which will take into account the interests of all parties, not just the unilateral interests of Israel, the faithful executor

[Traduction]

Ce n'est pas une question de permission. Ce sont les lois qui stipulent que les personnes dont l'activité constitue un secret d'État ne reçoivent pas d'autorisation. Et aussi pour d'autres raisons, lorsqu'il est établi qu'il n'existe pas de fondements essentiels pour donner cette autorisation. En tout cas, et je le répète, en ce qui concerne la partie juive de la population, 93 p. 100 des demandes ont été satisfaites. Mais le nombre de demandes d'émigration a baissé très sensiblement ces derniers temps. Sur les 5000 demandes déposées, plus de 4000 ont été réglées, si bien qu'en fait il n'y a pas de problème à proprement parler. En ce qui concerne les demandes d'émigration au Canada, 760 à 780 personnes environ y sont parties à titre permanent. Plus de six mille personnes, de 6400 à 6500 y sont allées pour des périodes de temps variant d'un an à quatre ans pour revenir ensuite en Union soviétique, ce qui est considéré tout à fait normal. Il y a la question de certains individus, au sujet desquels notre ambassade a dû fournir des explications qui se trouvent en prison pour différents délits après avoir violé le Code pénal, mais je ne veux pas parler de cela aujourd'hui. Voilà tout ce que j'ai à vous dire à ce sujet.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): I now yield the floor to Mr. Laniel, a Member of Parliament from the Province of Quebec who was elected to the House of Commons 21 years ago.

Afterwards I will yield the floor to Messrs. Hudecki, Roche, Dupras and Munro, and others if possible.

Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, my question relates to the Middle East and to the conditional agreement which has just been signed by Lebanon and Israel, the aim of which is to reduce tension in Lebanon and allow this latter country to recover its sovereignty and its unity. As this agreement which has already been rejected by Syria and by the PLO contains a conditional clause whereby Syrian troops, who number some 40,000, must be withdrawn from Lebanon, as well as the PLO troops, could Mr. Gorbachev tell us if the USSR is prepared to pressure Syria into withdrawing its troops to meet this condition? These troops are there at the invitation of Lebanon, this I grant you; but as Lebanon is now party to an agreement with Israel, it would seem absolutely normal that the Syrian troops should now withdraw. Also, does Mr. Gorbachev feel that if this agreement is not adhered to, the Palestinian and Lebanese people are the ones who will suffer most?

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Notre position en ce qui concerne la situation au Proche-Orient a fait l'objet d'une déclaration spéciale du gouvernement parue il y a quelques jours. Nous estimons que l'accord conclu entre le Liban et Israël, n'améliorera pas la situation très grave au Proche-Orient, cet accord ne réglant pas la question de la souveraineté du Liban, car Israël en effet garde toujours des zones tampons qu'il continuera à contrôler et différents groupes fantoches continueront à fonctionner. Pour mettre un terme à la situation incendiaire qui règne dans la région, il faut trouver des solutions tenant compte non pas uniquement des intérêts d'Israël, qui agit au nom des États-Unis au Proche-Orient,

[Text]

of the will of the U.S.A. in the Middle East. We support a broad solution to this question, one that takes into account the interests of all countries, including Israel, the first phase of which, of course, should be resolution of the Palestinian question, on the basis of self-determination.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Asselin): Now I give the floor to Dr. Yuzyk. Dr. Yuzyk is a university professor. He is also of Ukrainian extraction. Dr. Yuzyk.

Senator Yuzyk: The Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is now in session two and a half years. It has bogged down, with no apparent prospects for the solution of the problems of disarmament, economic co-operation, human rights and humanitarian issues. The free flow of information and people between the Soviet bloc and the western democracies is basic in the Helsinki Final Act. The neutral and non-aligned countries have presented a proposal which recognizes a partial solution for the implementation of human rights by both sides. Why is the Soviet Union holding up its approval of the proposal of the neutral and non-aligned countries which is now supported by the western countries?

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) I think that you are not sufficiently informed. We made a statement which was published publicly, and I think that our embassy, if it has not already done so, can make the statement available to you. In that statement, we appealed to all countries participating in the Madrid meeting to accept, as a basis, the draft submitted by the neutral states and to rule out all further amendments to the existing amendments and to use the practical compromise which is contained in that document. We stated this, it was published. We are in favour of the process started in Helsinki being continued in the same vein. That is why we want to overcome this impasse. Our statement was officially transmitted to Canada a week ago. You have probably not received this document yet.

Senator Yuzyk: Thank you very much. I have not seen the document, and I hope it will bring this session of the Madrid Conference to at least an ending that will promote future co-operation between both blocs.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): Thank you.

• 1200

Next on my list for the moment is the hon. Member Mr. Munro, from Esquimalt—Saanich, British Columbia. Very strangely, I have a weakness this morning for the west. Mr. Munro will be followed by Dr. Hudecki and, then, the Senate. I ask your kind co-operation. I want to give the floor to as many people as possible from now on. Mr. Munro, please.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you Mr. Chairman. As I understood the reply of Mr. Gorbachev to my colleague, Mr. McKinnon, there has been no deployment in the Soviet Union of SS-20s since 1981. That is my understanding of the reply as it reached me. But this information does not correspond to the information available to us in Canada from a variety of sources—not from just one source. Mr. Gorbachev

[Translation]

mais de l'intérêt de toutes les parties en cause, y compris Israël, en vue de régler la question palestinienne sur la base du principe de l'autodétermination, question fondamentale pour la région.

Le coprésident (le sénateur Asselin): Je cède maintenant la parole à M. Yuzyk. M. Yuzyk est professeur d'université. Il est également d'origine ukrainienne. Monsieur Yuzyk.

Le sénateur Yuzyk: La conférence de Madrid sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe dure depuis deux ans et demi. Elle s'est enlisée et on ne semble pas prévoir trouver une solution aux problèmes du désarmement, de la coopération économique, des droits de la personne, ou à des questions humanitaires. La libre circulation de renseignements et de personnes entre les pays du bloc soviétique et les démocraties occidentales est un élément essentiel de l'Acte final d'Helsinki. Les pays neutres et non-alignés ont présenté une proposition qui prévoit une solution partielle au problème du respect des droits de la personne des deux côtés. Pourquoi l'Union Soviétique tarde-t-elle à approuver la proposition des pays neutres et non-alignés, proposition qui s'est méritée l'appui des pays occidentaux?

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Je crois que vous n'êtes pas suffisamment bien informé. Notre ambassade pourrait vous faire parvenir la déclaration que nous avons faite à ce sujet; nous nous sommes notamment adressés à tous les pays ayant participé à la Conférence de Madrid en leur proposant d'adopter en tant que base le projet soumis par les pays neutres, tout en éliminant les amendements aux amendements existants et de se servir du compromis réaliste que constitue ce document. Nous avons donc fait savoir, cela a été publié, que nous tenons à la poursuite du processus engagé à Helsinki afin de sortir de l'impasse actuelle. On me signale que cette déclaration a été communiquée officiellement au Canada la semaine dernière, mais vous n'en avez sans doute pas encore eu connaissance.

Le sénateur Yuzyk: Merci beaucoup. Je n'ai pas vu le document; j'espère qu'il est tel qu'il permettra de mettre fin à cette session de la conférence de Madrid avec l'espoir d'une coopération entre les deux blocs.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Merci.

Le suivant sur ma liste pour le moment est le député d'Esquimalt—Saanich en Colombie-Britannique, M. Munro. C'est étrange, mais ce matin j'ai une faiblesse pour l'Ouest. M. Munro sera suivi de M. Hudecki puis de représentants du Sénat. Je vous demanderai votre coopération. Je veux donner la parole à autant de personnes que possible. Monsieur Munro, s'il vous plaît.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci, monsieur le président. Si j'ai bien compris la réponse de M. Gorbachev à mon collègue, M. McKinnon, il n'y a pas eu déploiement de SS-20 en Union soviétique depuis 1981. C'est ce que j'ai cru comprendre de la réponse qui m'est parvenue. Cette information, cependant, ne correspond pas aux informations disponibles au Canada à partir d'un certain nombre de sources, non

[Texte]

indicated, as well, that the figures of the deployment were public, and I should be grateful—although he may not have the information with him—if, through the ambassador, he would provide information to us as to the dates and the numbers of the SS-20 deployments, and when the deployment stopped. I am not talking about manufacture; I am talking about deployment in Europe. I would appreciate it if it could be specified as to the deployment in Europe and in Asia. Thank you.

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) I would like to confirm what I said about the Soviet Union's unilateral move to cease deployment of these missiles—this remains in force and as far as concrete figures are concerned—I have them here, we have published an official brochure on this in many languages, we will ask our Ambassador to provide you with these data. And now the third part of the question.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): *Spasebo.*

Dr. Hudecki is Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, a member of the government side, and a distinguished member of the Province of Ontario.

Mr. Hudecki: A country which still remains in the sphere of influence of the USSR and, due to the deterioration of its economic conditions, is unable to meet its financial responsibilities, is Poland. As a result of that, after June, 1983 this country will suffer acute shortage of wheat and grain. Now, Canada has assisted that country; they have given it credit to the tune of a half-billion dollars for the past three years, but the country has been unable to meet its financial responsibilities. I wonder if the USSR is considering any form of concession, any form of help—whether by increasing its manufacturing potential or helping to alleviate that problem which could lead to a serious food shortage in the very near future. Thank you.

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) Of course, it would be better for a representative of Poland to answer this question, but I'll say that we are not indifferent to what is taking place in a fraternal country, Poland; and during this period of internal processes and changes in Poland, the western countries have taken the position of an economic blockade of Poland, and have in point of fact compromised the economic relations established with the country. They have deprived the country itself and its enterprises of the opportunity to operate and function normally. This probably got us thinking about the range of cooperation between the socialist and western countries. That is point one; point two is that we, on our part, are helping our Polish friends, the Polish nation. We are helping them in every possible way, financially, economically and in the way of food. The processes in Poland are positive ones. As far as we know, the harvest promises to be good this year, and we hope that the situation will improve in all spheres of life, political and economic.

[Traduction]

pas simplement à partir d'une seule source. M. Gorbachev a également indiqué que les chiffres de ce déploiement étaient publics, et je serais très heureux, bien qu'il n'ait peut-être pas ces renseignements avec lui, si, par l'intermédiaire de son ambassadeur, il pouvait nous fournir des renseignements quant aux dates et au nombre de SS-20 déployés, et quand ce déploiement a cessé. Je ne parle pas de fabrication, je parle de déploiement en Europe. J'aimerais, si c'est possible, qu'on me donne des chiffres concernant le déploiement en Europe et en Asie. Merci.

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Je tiens donc à réitérer que l'Union soviétique a décidé unilatéralement d'arrêter le déploiement de ces missiles et que cette position reste en vigueur. Pour ce qui est des chiffres, je les ai là à portée de la main et ils figurent aussi dans notre brochure officielle publiée à ce sujet en plusieurs langues et qui je crois se trouve à notre ambassade, n'est-ce pas? Je demanderai donc à notre ambassadeur de fournir ces données. Quelle est la troisième partie de la question?

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): *Spasebo.*

M. Hudecki est le secrétaire parlementaire du Ministre de la défense nationale, député ministériel et éminent de la province de l'Ontario.

M. Hudecki: Un pays, la Pologne, toujours dans la sphère d'influence de l'URSS, est dans l'incapacité de remplir ses obligations financières à cause de la détérioration de ses conditions économiques. En conséquence, à partir de la fin de juin 1983, ce pays souffrira de graves pénuries de blé et de céréales. Le Canada a aidé ce pays; il a accordé un crédit se montant jusqu'à un demi-million de dollars au cours des trois dernières années, mais ce pays n'a pas été en mesure de faire face à ses obligations financières. Je me demande si l'URSS envisage une forme d'assistance, en accroissant ses commandes industrielles, par exemple, pour remédier à cette situation qui pourrait aboutir à une pénurie alimentaire très grave dans un proche avenir. Merci.

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Il conviendrait davantage au représentant de la Pologne de répondre à cette question. Qu'il me suffise de dire que nous ne saurions être indifférents à ce qui se passe dans un pays frère, la Pologne en l'occurrence. Alors que ce pays traverse une période de transformation et de changement, les pays occidentaux ont institué un blocus économique contre la Pologne, rompant ainsi en quelque sorte les liens économiques qui existaient par le passé, empêchant ainsi les entreprises de ce pays de fonctionner normalement. On se pose dès lors la question de savoir ce que vaut la coopération entre les pays socialistes et les pays occidentaux. C'est là le premier point. Deuxième point, en ce qui nous concerne, nous aidons nos amis polonais, le peuple polonais du mieux que nous pouvons, au plan financier, au plan économique et au plan alimentaire. La situation en Pologne évolue favorablement; on prévoit une bonne récolte pour cette année et nous espérons que la situation s'améliorera, tant au plan politique qu'économique.

[Text]

If we are going to talk about interference as certain well-known representatives of certain circles in the west frequently do, I can say that the Soviet Union's interference lies in rendering assistance to a fraternal nation in dire straits.

• 1205

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Messieurs du Sénat, s'il vous plaît.

Le coprésident (le sénateur Asselin): Je donne la parole au sénateur Bosa qui est de Toronto et d'origine italienne.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): S'il vous plaît, sénateur Bosa.

Senator Bosa: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gorbachev, two delegates from the Soviet peace committee currently touring Canada stated that they have never demonstrated against their own government's nuclear armament policies, because they believe their country to be a leading proponent of world peace. While we have a lot of demonstrations in the western world, which have gone on since the first explosion in Hiroshima, the western democracies, it is a known fact, are also living proponents of world peace.

What I am asking myself is who is right and who is wrong? I believe both the citizens of the east and the citizens of the west have a right to know who is speaking with a forked tongue and who is not. To that end, would you be agreeable to having a national TV debate, both in the Soviet Union and in the west, on the issues that divide east and west, so that the citizens of both sides can learn the truth of what the situation is really all about?

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) In the first place, among our people and in our country all of the years have been after the war characterized by the active participation of the public in the struggle for peace. We have a National Committee for the Defence of Peace, which carries out a vast amount of work inside the country and in the international arena, on the basis, so to speak, of expanding contacts and cooperation, of explaining policy, and of looking into and discussing the problems that concern peoples. We have a movement of physicians, who are now doing a great deal of work, and in particular they are cooperating with the physicians of other countries, including the United States of America. We have a movement of scientists; just today a session of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR is opening which will specially discuss these matters, the questions of the struggle for peace, and representatives of scientific centres outside the USSR are participating in this session. We have writers who are taking an active part in all of this struggle; in our collective groups of workers we have set up special, so to speak, regional subdivisions of the Committee for the Defence of Peace. Whether you walk or go by any form of transport, anyone who has managed to spend some time in our Soviet Union are no doubt convinced that by far the greatest, the most burning desire in our people is to struggle for peace. Therefore they even take part in street demonstrations, such as the peace march last year, which began somewhere in the Scandinavian countries and passed through Moscow, Leningrad, Moscow, the Ukraine, and so on.

[Translation]

Pour ce qui est de l'ingérence de l'Union soviétique évoquée en occident par certains milieux, cette ingérence se borne à l'aide que nous donnons à un pays frère qui se trouve dans une situation difficile.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): Gentlemen of the Senate, if you please.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Asselin): I give the floor to Senator Bosa who is from Toronto and of Italian descent.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): If you please, Senator Bosa.

Le sénateur Bosa: Monsieur le président, monsieur Gorbachev, deux délégués du comité soviétique sur la paix en tournée actuellement au Canada ont déclaré qu'ils n'avaient jamais manifesté contre les politiques d'armement nucléaire de leur propre gouvernement, car ils croient leur pays un partisan de premier plan de la paix mondiale. Bien que nous ayons beaucoup de manifestations dans le monde occidental, et ce depuis la première explosion à Hiroshima, les démocraties occidentales, c'est un fait connu, sont également de réels partisans de la paix mondiale.

Je me demande donc qui a raison et qui a tort? Je crois que les citoyens et de l'Est et de l'Ouest ont le droit de savoir qui parle avec une langue fourchue et qui n'en fait rien. A cette fin, seriez-vous prêt à accepter la tenue d'un débat national, télévisé à la fois en URSS et dans le monde occidental, et portant sur les questions qui divisent l'Est et l'Ouest, de façon que les citoyens des deux côtés puissent apprendre la vérité sur le fond de la situation?

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Tout d'abord, dans notre pays, les années d'après guerre ont été caractérisées par la participation active du peuple tout entier à la lutte pour la paix. Nous avons un Comité national pour la défense de la paix qui fait un énorme travail tant dans le pays que dans le domaine international en vue de renforcer les relations et la coopération, d'expliquer la politique, d'étudier les problèmes qui préoccupent les peuples. Nous avons également un mouvement très actif de médecins qui coopèrent avec les médecins d'autres pays, y compris ceux des États-Unis. Nous avons une association de savants qui luttent pour la paix; une séance de l'Académie des sciences de l'URSS a justement lieu aujourd'hui avec la participation de représentants d'institutions scientifiques étrangères, séance au cours de laquelle on discutera de la lutte pour la paix. Nos écrivains participent également à la lutte pour la paix. Dans les groupes collectifs de travailleurs, on a créé des sortes de sous-comités du Comité pour la défense de la paix. Quiconque a eu l'occasion de voyager en Union soviétique a pu se rendre compte sans aucun doute que notre peuple n'a pas de désir plus ardent que celui de défendre la paix. C'est pourquoi le peuple participe à diverses manifestations dont notamment la marche de la paix qui a eu lieu l'an dernier. Cette marche entamée dans les pays scandinaves a traversé Moscou, Leningrad, Moscou, l'Ukraine, etc. Si vous avez les moindres doutes quant au désir de l'Union soviétique de lutter pour la paix, nous vous invitons à venir chez nous, à condition que le Sénat vous libère de vos obliga-

[Texte]

Therefore if you have doubts that the Soviet Union has the will to struggle for peace, we invite you to come for as long as you are permitted; well, you represent the Senate; the Senate governing body will give you leave from work, and come, look at our life and at our attitudes to these problems! Because I hear a concealed meaning in your question, this kind of impression, but to raise the questions that you will present; you present it so that as if some kind of movement should be organized which would come against the government, perhaps; how can it come out against a government which affirms a peace program at its conferences, struggles for this peace program, involves all the others in contacts and in discussions, struggles for the preservation of détente, for disarmament and so on. The people support this. I say to you directly: in our country only a Government which will conduct a peace policy, will enjoy the support of the people. But as regards some trips made by some committee, I don't know: which committee? Well, you know, all this can be discussed; what forms are possible, am not prepared at the present time to say to you, to issue, so to speak, specific recommendations, or advice or consent. This can all be discussed.

• 1210

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): On February 23, 1982, that is exactly what we said in our committee. Mr. Stan Darling will remember very well—I will try to recognize him also—when I said to Mr. Arbatov that I am hoping maybe this will open new avenues of exchange between Canada and the Soviet Union where we could be given equal treatment. I am sure Mr. Darling remembers these words very well.

I recognize at this time Mr. Roche, Mr. Dupras, the Senate, Father Ogle, Stan Darling, the Senate, Mr. Lawrence, Mr. Berger, Mr. Watson and Mr. Lapierre. I am in your hands, so please be brief.

Mr. Roche is a member of Parliament from the Official Opposition from the Province of Alberta.

Mr. Roche: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gorbachev, another principle threat to security in the world today is the international economic crisis that affects all nations. In the closing words of your opening address, you spoke about co-operation. I want to ask you if the Soviet Union would review its position with respect to international development assistance and participation in the international forums of the world, trying now to solve what is called the North—South crisis? Instead of dismissing the case as a residue of the colonialist regimes, would you recognize that today no nation is absolved of its responsibility to bring about economic security and stability and participate not with military aid but with economic assistance in those poorest nations of the world that need to be brought up to basic standards?

Specifically, would you participate in the next North—South summit, the first one having been held in Cancun, Mexico, with 22 world leaders but the Soviet absent? Would you participate in the next North—South summit?

[Traduction]

tions, vérifier sur place ce qu'il en est. Votre question laisse en effet entendre qu'il devrait exister en Union soviétique un mouvement s'opposant au gouvernement; mais pourquoi les gens s'opposeraient-ils à un gouvernement qui réitère le programme de la paix à tous ses congrès, qui lutte pour ce programme de paix et fait participer tous les autres aux relations et aux discussions, lutte pour le maintien de la détente, du désarmement, etc. Le peuple soutient le gouvernement. D'ailleurs dans notre pays, le gouvernement est obligé, pour avoir le soutien du peuple, de lutter pour la paix. Pour ce qui est des voyages du comité que vous venez d'évoquer, je ne suis pas au courant. Quel comité? Mais en principe il y a moyen de discuter de tout, d'établir les modalités. Je n'ai cependant pas de recommandation concrète à vous soumettre pour l'instant concernant les autorisations ou les conseils pertinents. On pourra en discuter.

Le co-président (M. Prud'homme): C'est exactement ce que nous avons dit au Comité le 23 février 1982. M. Stan Darling s'en rappellera très bien—je vais essayer de lui céder la parole également—lorsque j'ai dit à M. Arbatov que j'espérais que peut-être de telles rencontres ouvriraient de nouvelles avenues d'échange entre le Canada et l'Union Soviétique où nous serions traités de la même façon. Je suis persuadé que M. Darling se souvient très bien de ces paroles.

Je vais maintenant céder la parole, dans l'ordre suivant, à MM. Roche et Dupras, à un sénateur, à MM. Ogle et Stan Darling, à un sénateur, à MM. Lawrence, Berger, Watson et Lapierre. Je m'en remets à vous alors veuillez être brefs.

Monsieur Roche est député de l'opposition officielle et vient de la province de l'Alberta.

M. Roche: Merci, Monsieur le président.

M. Gorbachev, la crise économique internationale qui touche toutes les nations constitue une autre grande menace à la sécurité du monde de nos jours. En terminant votre déclaration, vous avez parlé de collaboration. Je veux vous demander si l'Union Soviétique est disposée à revoir sa position relativement à l'aide au développement international et à sa participation dans les forums internationaux, qui essaient en ce moment de résoudre ce que l'on appelle la crise Nord-Sud? Plutôt que de rejeter l'affaire comme un reste des régimes colonialistes, êtes-vous prêt à reconnaître qu'aujourd'hui aucune nation ne peut être déchargée de sa responsabilité de promouvoir la sécurité économique et la stabilité en apportant non pas une aide militaire, mais une aide économique aux plus pauvres nations du monde qu'il faut relever à des normes essentielles?

Plus précisément, seriez-vous prêt à participer au prochain sommet Nord-Sud, le premier ayant eu lieu à Cancun, au Mexique, en présence de 22 dirigeants mondiaux, mais en l'absence de l'Union Soviétique? Voulez-vous participer au prochain sommet Nord-Sud?

[Text]

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) I'll answer your question this way. I do not agree with your opinion that we do not feel our responsibility for rendering assistance to developing states, which have thrown off the colonial yoke and have taken the road to independent development and need help. There are official data, and by the way I have them, that if you take our aid for—there are official figures, and I have them available by the way, which show that if you look at our aid over the last few years you will see that it amounts to approximately 2% of our GNP, whereas in many countries it is under 1.5%, and in some even less than 1%. Therefore even now the USSR is providing an immense amount of aid. Furthermore, our aid does not involve penetrating the economies of the recipients and continuing to pillage them by using up their raw material resources. Our method is to establish national enterprises, to form a national working class and national intelligentsia which will be able to operate the power-generating, metallurgical and other enterprises. In this way all the benefit accrues to the recipient country. This answers the first part of your question, then. As far as the second part is concerned, we must stress that as the USSR never had any colonies we do not bear any responsibility for the disastrous situation in which those countries now find themselves. We are entitled to remind the West of this, those western nations who built up their own economies by pillaging the resources of the countries in question. And indeed, the same policies are being pursued now, aimed at binding those countries to the developed nations, so that it will always be possible to exert economic pressure on them, to lock them, as it were, in a tight economic embrace. I would say that Canada has had some experience of this sort of thing herself, and will therefore understand what it is like when foreign capital intrudes into the economy of another country. We therefore believe in our own policy of extending genuine international aid to countries that are on the road to independent development, and we will increase the amount of such aid as far as possible. As to whether the USSR will participate, I can only say that we have not discussed this question. That is all. Thank you.

• 1215

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Le suivant sur ma liste est M. Maurice Dupras, député de la province de Québec qui a présidé un important sous-comité du Comité des Affaires extérieures, sur les affaires de l'Amérique latine.

Monsieur Dupras...

... who will be followed by a distinguished member of the Senate.

M. Dupras: Merci, monsieur le président.

Monsieur Gorbachev, dans vos remarques, vous nous avez rappelé, à nous Canadiens, les souffrances qu'a connues votre pays durant la dernière guerre de 1939-1945 et nous avons tous à la mémoire, surtout ceux qui ont participé à cette guerre, la résistance héroïque de votre peuple durant le siège de Leningrad.

[Translation]

Le co-président (M. Prud'homme): Monsieur Gorbachev.

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Je vais répondre à votre question de la façon suivante. Il est faux de dire que nous n'assumons pas nos responsabilités en ce qui concerne l'aide aux pays en voie de développement qui se sont libérés du joug du colonialisme et se sont engagés sur la voie d'un développement indépendant et ont besoin d'aide. En effet d'après les chiffres officiels que j'ai là, notre aide au cours des dernières années représente 2 p. 100 de notre produit national brut alors que dans de nombreux pays ne dépasse 1,5 p. 100 et est même parfois inférieure à 1 p. 100. Donc l'Union soviétique accorde même maintenant une aide très importante. En outre, notre aide ne consiste pas à nous ingérer dans les économies de ces pays ni à continuer à les piller en exploitant leurs richesses naturelles. Au contraire, nous les aidons à construire des entreprises nationales, à former leurs classes ouvrières et leurs élites intellectuelles de façon à ce qu'ils puissent profiter eux-mêmes de leurs richesses énergétiques, métallurgiques et autres. Je tiens à souligner par ailleurs que l'Union soviétique n'ayant pas été une puissance coloniale, n'est nullement responsable de la situation déplorable dans laquelle ces pays se trouvent. Il faut le rappeler aux pays occidentaux qui, eux, ont fondé leurs richesses sur la rapine, sur l'exploitation des richesses naturelles de ces pays. Les pays occidentaux poursuivent d'ailleurs la même politique qui consiste à s'attacher les pays en voie de développement de façon à toujours pouvoir exercer des pressions économiques sur ces derniers, les enfermer dans un étai économique. Le Canada a d'ailleurs une longue expérience de ce genre de choses et comprendra donc ce qui se passe quand des capitaux étrangers s'immiscent dans l'économie d'un autre pays. Pour notre part, nous préconisons une réelle aide internationale aux pays en voie de développement, de façon à les mettre sur la voie d'un développement indépendant. Nous allons augmenter notre aide dans toute la mesure du possible. La question de la participation de l'Union soviétique n'a pas été abordée. C'est tout. Merci.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): The next name on my list is that of Mr. Maurice Dupras, a Member of Parliament from the Province of Quebec who chaired an important subcommittee of the External Affairs Committee on Latin American Affairs.

Mr. Dupras...

... sera suivi d'un sénateur distingué.

Mr. Dupras: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gorbachev, in your remarks you reminded Canadians of the suffering experienced by your country during the 1939-1945 war. We all remember, particularly those of us who fought in that war, the heroic resistance of your people in the siege of Leningrad.

[Texte]

Cette occasion, pour nous, est vraiment unique parce qu'elle nous permet d'établir de meilleurs rapports et de meilleures relations entre parlementaires russes et parlementaires canadiens. Vous savez, en Amérique du Nord, nous entretenons un mythe que rappelait votre excellent et distingué ambassadeur le docteur Yakovlev à l'*Imperial Club* de Toronto il y a quelques semaines, un mythe, dis-je, qui veut que les communistes, ce sont les méchants et les autres, ce sont les bons. C'est tranché de cette façon aussi simpliste qu'étrange, et des pays comme le Nicaragua, ou d'autres pays qui visent à l'indépendance et qui veulent se départir, se débarrasser des régimes dictatoriaux à la Somoza par exemple, sont accusés immédiatement de se tourner vers le communisme puisqu'ils ne sont pas heureux sous une telle dictature.

Je me demande, monsieur Gorbachev, si à la lumière des ouvertures de votre pays et de l'Europe de l'Ouest, par exemple dans la construction de ce pipe-line qui va prendre le gaz naturel de votre pays de la Sibérie pour l'amener au cœur même de l'Europe de l'Ouest, je me demande donc si, devant l'ouverture de votre chef M. Andropov, quant à réduire les armes nucléaires et peut-être viser la parité, une intervention de notre premier ministre, M. Trudeau, auprès de M. Andropov ne pourrait pas faire avancer les choses et peut-être obtenir des précisions sur ses intentions réelles, puisque les communications et les sources d'information ne sont pas toujours aussi bonnes que l'on voudrait. Ne pensez-vous pas que M. Trudeau soit la personne qui pourrait obtenir des précisions sur les intentions de votre chef?

• 1220

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) Your Prime Minister, Mr. Trudeau, is a highly experienced politician with a distinctive realistic approach to assessing the events taking place in the world, and it seems to me that he is in a better position to decide what to do in the present situation, what steps to take on his part. As far as I know, we are scheduled to meet with Mr. Trudeau, and perhaps then... well, we will not predict the outcome of our talks; first we will discuss matters, and then maybe something more concrete will emerge.

I shall not attempt to answer your question now, since I think my answer will depend first of all on Mr. Trudeau's position.

We are aware of the Trudeau Government's contribution to détente in the 1970's. We are impressed that the word «détente» is still being used by Canadian political figures; this is an indication of their realism and their responsibility for finding ways of continuing the political dialogue in order to solve these difficult problems in the interests of all countries, in the interests of mankind.

The Joint Chairman (Senator Asselin): I will now give the floor to the Honourable Senator Joan Neiman. She is the chairwoman of the Legal Consumer Affairs committee in the Senate. Senator Neiman.

Senator Neiman: Mr. Gorbachev, the situation in the Middle East is so worrisome and precarious that I would like to go back to it just for a moment. If I understood you

[Traduction]

This is really a unique opportunity for us, because it enables us to establish better relations between Russian and Canadian parliamentarians. In North America, there is a myth that your distinguished Ambassador, Dr. Yakovlev, pointed out in his remarks at the Imperial Club in Toronto a few weeks ago. According to the myth, communists are the bad guys, and all the others are the good guys. The distinction is that simplistic and that strange. Countries such as Nicaragua, or other countries that are striving for independence and are trying to rid themselves of dictatorial regimes in the Samosa style, for example, are immediately accused of turning to communism because they are not happy under a dictatorship.

In light of the overtures by your country and Western Europe, for example in the building of the natural gas pipeline from Siberia to the very heart of Western Europe, and in light of the efforts made by your leader, Mr. Andropov, with respect to reducing nuclear arms and perhaps aiming for parity, I am wondering whether progress might not result from an intervention by our Prime Minister, Mr. Trudeau, with Mr. Andropov. Perhaps Mr. Trudeau could obtain clarification about your country's real intentions because communications and information sources are not always as good as we would like them to be. Do you not think that Mr. Trudeau would be the person who could obtain clarifications about your leader's intentions?

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) M. Trudeau, le premier ministre du Canada, est un homme politique très expérimenté, connu pour son attitude réaliste vis-à-vis des problèmes qui se posent à l'échelon international. Je lui fais donc pleinement confiance pour décider de l'attitude à adopter et des mesures à prendre dans la conjoncture actuelle. Je dois d'ailleurs rencontrer M. Trudeau et je ne vais donc pas préjuger de l'issue des conversations, qui déboucheront peut-être sur quelque chose de plus concret.

Donc pour répondre à votre question, cela dépend essentiellement de M. Trudeau lui-même.

L'apport du Canada, sous la direction de M. Trudeau, à la détente au cours des années soixante-dix est bien connu de tous. Nous avons été très impressionnés par le fait que le mot détente est toujours utilisé par les hommes politiques canadiens, ce qui est une preuve certaine de leur réalisme et montre qu'ils comprennent la nécessité de poursuivre le dialogue politique pour résoudre les problèmes difficiles qui se posent, et ce dans l'intérêt de tous les pays, de l'humanité toute entière.

Le coprésident (le sénateur Asselin): Je donne maintenant la parole à l'honorable sénateur Joan Neiman. Mme Neiman préside le Comité sénatorial des affaires juridiques et constitutionnelles. Sénateur Neiman.

Le sénateur Neiman: Monsieur Gorbachev, la situation au Moyen-Orient est très précaire et préoccupante; c'est pourquoi j'aimerais y revenir un instant. Si j'ai bien compris votre

[Text]

correctly, in answer to a previous question on this subject, you stated that the Soviet Union could not support the present accord because it did not sufficiently protect the boundaries of Lebanon. It seems to me that if Israel and Lebanon have entered into this accord and, in Lebanon's case, by its duly elected and legitimate leaders of that country, that that is a very useful first step. Nobody assumes for a moment that that is going to settle all the problems of the Middle East, but at least it is a beginning.

I believe all countries are as anxious as you state your country is that Israeli troops withdraw, that their boundaries be defined and preserved, as they would want—perhaps not as they would want, but as we feel would be fair. But surely another element of that has to be that the Syrian troops withdraw, and I cannot understand why the Soviet Union would not be prepared to encourage the Syrian troops to withdraw so that negotiations could go on in a progressive and thoughtful way among all these people.

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) I would again like to say that our fundamental position has been presented quite extensively in our statement, and so there is really nothing more that I can add to that. Like yourselves, we are also troubled by the situation in the Middle East, and what is more, the Middle East is right next to us, so we are not indifferent to what goes on there.

Furthermore, the bundle of acute problems that has accumulated in the Middle East naturally requires more cardinal solutions, primarily that the interests of all countries, and first of all the Palestinians and the peoples of all the other Arabic countries, be taken into consideration.

We, therefore, believe that the signing of an agreement between Israel and Lebanon today does not solve these questions. However, we are all for contributing to the peaceful, political solution of the acute problems in the Middle East with regard to the interests of the Arabic peoples and, of course, the Israeli people.

• 1225

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): The Reverend Father Ogle, member of the New Democratic Party from the Province of Saskatchewan, a member of the Roman Catholic Church.

Mr. Ogle: Mr. Gorbachev, an area of concern for many Canadians is Central America and the difficulties those countries are experiencing at this time. The American administration is saying that the problems there are basically one of east-west, and that it is the influence of the Soviet bloc that is creating many of the problems. Could you tell us what your position is on Central America?

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) I shall only answer that part of the question where you speak of the effect of some actions by the Soviet Union to exacerbate the situation in this region of Western America. This does not correspond to reality, and, incidentally, this is well known even by those who advance such accusations against the Soviet Union. Today, as soon as some crisis situations arise somewhere in one region or

[Translation]

réponse précédente, l'Union soviétique ne peut être favorable à l'accord actuel parce qu'il ne protège pas suffisamment les frontières du Liban. Or Israël et le Liban ont signé cet accord, et notamment pour le Liban, ce sont les représentants élus et légitimes du pays qui l'ont fait; cela me semble donc de très bonne augure. Personne ne prétend que cet accord régle tous les problèmes du Moyen-Orient, mais au moins c'est un pas dans cette direction.

Tous les pays sont aussi pressés que le vôtre de voir les troupes israéliennes se retirer du Liban, et les frontières, précisées et protégées, comme ces deux pays le veulent, ou plutôt comme ce qui est perçu comme juste. Mais sans aucun doute, pour faire pendant à ce retrait des troupes israéliennes, les troupes syriennes doivent se retirer, et je ne comprends pas pourquoi l'Union soviétique ne veut pas encourager les Syriens à se retirer pour que les négociations progressent de la façon la plus positive et la plus raisonnable pour tous.

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Je voudrais répéter que notre position de principe a été clairement explicitée dans cette déclaration à laquelle je n'ai rien à ajouter. Tout comme vous, la situation au Proche-Orient nous préoccupe et ce d'autant plus que nous avons des frontières communes avec cette région, si bien que ce qui s'y passe ne nous est pas indifférent.

Afin de résoudre de façon plus poussée les problèmes extrêmement complexes qui se posent au Proche-Orient, il va falloir tenir compte des intérêts de tous les pays intéressés, en tout premier lieu du peuple palestinien et de tous les autres pays arabes.

C'est pourquoi nous estimons que l'accord conclu aujourd'hui entre Israël et le Liban n'est pas susceptible de résoudre ces problèmes. Mais nous sommes tout disposés à contribuer à la solution pacifique des graves problèmes qui se posent au Proche-Orient, compte tenu des intérêts des pays arabes et bien sûr du peuple israélien.

Le co-président (M. Prud'homme): Le révérend père Ogle, député néo-démocrate de la Saskatchewan, et membre de l'Eglise catholique romaine.

M. Ogle: Monsieur Gorbachev, beaucoup de Canadiens sont préoccupés par l'Amérique Centrale et les difficultés que traversent actuellement les pays de cette région du globe. Selon le gouvernement des États-Unis, les problèmes sont essentiellement dus au conflit est-ouest, l'influence du bloc soviétique étant à l'origine de nombre d'entre eux. Pourriez-vous nous préciser votre position sur l'Amérique Centrale?

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Je me bornerais à répondre à la partie de votre question où vous parlez de l'influence et de certaines activités de l'Union soviétique qui viseraient à aggraver la situation en Amérique du Sud. Cela ne correspond pas à la réalité, comme le savent d'ailleurs fort bien ceux qui lancent aujourd'hui ces accusations contre les Soviétiques. Dès qu'il y a une crise dans une région quelconque, certains milieux

[Texte]

another, certain circles immediately resort to the standard techniques: "the hand of Moscow, interference by Moscow, its support of subversive elements, terrorists and so forth." All of this is nonsense that has no relation to the real processes taking place in the world. The world is developing, and the face of the world is changing whether we like it or not, but the world is evolving, and we must stand on the ground of reality. As regards Central America, what we are talking about is the fact that certain circles are interested in supporting in any way they can these bloody regimes, which trample on all human rights. And what we cannot understand is, where is this mighty voice in defence of the rights of man and in condemnation of those who violate these rights, where blood flows only because people want a better life and to run their country themselves? What we support is that the processes that are coming to a head in one or another country by virtue of the country's own internal development, be decided by the people themselves. We are on the side of people progressively struggling for progressive transformation, and we are morally on the side of those who struggle against bloody regimes. This is what we say. The Soviet Union, however, has no mercenary aims in these remote regions, nor has it any direct interest. I declare this categorically, in the name of the Soviet leadership. But we are morally on the side of those who struggle with these bloody regimes.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): I am coming slowly to the end, because we have to be reasonable. Mr. Gorbachev has another meeting this afternoon, a joint meeting of the Agricultural Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons. You may come back at 3.30 in this room.

• 1230

There is a series of events since the morning, and tonight; but I will still recognize, with your kind patience, Mr. Stan Darling, member of the Official Opposition, distinguished member from the Province of Ontario.

Mr. Darling: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gorbachev, another problem, an entirely different problem and one of the most serious facing the world, is air pollution and acid rain. Your great country is an industrial giant now and therefore probably one of the great contributors to acid rain. This is a problem that is not only for communist countries but for countries across the world.

I happened to serve on a special committee in the Canadian Parliament, and we are very concerned. We are polluters. We have the unenviable... country of having the greatest individual polluter in the world, International Nickel. Our American neighbours to the south are polluters, each of us hurting ourselves and the others.

I assume that this is a problem facing your country and countries in the East Bloc. I am wondering if you are aware of the seriousness of it. I am wondering if you are taking steps when I think of countries in Europe and your own, an ancient

[Traduction]

s'empresent d'y voir la main de Moscou, l'ingérence de Moscou qui viendrait appuyer les éléments subversifs, les terroristes, etc. Cela ne tient pas debout et n'a rien à voir avec les processus concrets se déroulant dans le monde. Le monde évolue, que cela nous plaise ou non, l'essentiel c'est d'être réaliste. En ce qui concerne l'Amérique centrale, certains milieux ont intérêt à appuyer par tous les moyens les régimes sanguinaires qui font fi des droits de l'homme. Comment se fait-il qu'on n'entende pas en l'occurrence cette puissante voix s'élever pour défendre ceux dont le sang coule pour la seule raison qu'ils cherchent à améliorer leur niveau de vie et à diriger leur propre pays? Nous estimons que les processus d'évolution d'un pays qui découlent du développement interne de ce pays soient résolus par celui-ci. Nous appuyons les peuples qui luttent pour leur transformation progressiste et donnons notre caution morale aux peuples qui luttent contre les régimes sanguinaires. Voilà ce que nous déclarons. L'Union soviétique ne cherche pas à gagner quoi que ce soit dans ces pays lointains, n'a pas d'intérêts directs. Je déclare cela de façon catégorique, au nom de l'administration soviétique. Mais au plan moral, nous sommes du côté de ceux qui luttent contre ces régimes sanglants.

Le co-président (M. Prud'homme): Nous en arrivons lentement à la conclusion, parce qu'il faut être raisonnable. M. Gorbachev a une autre réunion cet après-midi; il assistera à une séance mixte des comités de l'agriculture du Sénat et de la Chambre des communes. Vous pouvez revenir dans cette salle à 15h30.

La journée a été longue depuis ce matin, et elle n'est d'ailleurs pas terminée, néanmoins avec votre indulgence je vais donner la parole à M. Stan Darling, député de l'opposition officielle, de la province d'Ontario.

M. Darling: Merci, monsieur le président.

Monsieur Gorbachev, je voudrais aborder un autre problème complètement différent, au demeurant l'un des plus graves pour le monde, je veux parler de la pollution de l'air et des pluies acides. Votre grand pays est à l'heure actuelle un géant industriel et, en conséquence, probablement l'un des grands responsables des pluies acides. Il s'agit d'un problème qui touche non seulement les pays communistes, mais tous les pays du monde.

J'ai eu l'occasion de siéger à un comité spécial du Parlement canadien chargé d'étudier les pluies acides, et je dois vous dire que nous sommes extrêmement préoccupés. Nous avons le privilège peu enviable au Canada d'avoir le plus grand pollueur individuel au monde, je veux parler de la compagnie *International Nickel*. Nos voisins américains sont également coupables de pollution et, en fait, nous nous faisons tort à nous-mêmes et aux autres.

Je pense que vous devez avoir le même problème dans votre pays, ainsi que dans les autres pays de l'Est. Je me demande si vous êtes conscient de la gravité de ce problème. Je me demande si vous prenez des mesures pour lutter contre la

[Text]

country with beautiful buildings that are probably being damaged by it, agriculture—you have high responsibilities, Mr. Gorbachev, I believe, in agriculture. This certainly, I think, hurts agriculture, as well as forests. I am wondering if you have any comments to make on this and if the USSR are taking steps to reduce emissions.

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) I share your view regarding the fact that this is a very significant problem, as a matter of fact a global problem, which affects the interests of all mankind. We also have these problems.

We believe that they should be solved in a more organized fashion, let us say on a planned basis, because ours is a planned economy.

We have recently undertaken a number of major organizational and economic measures. I will begin by saying that we have established commissions in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, two commissions of the Soviet of Nationalities and the Soviet of the Union, which are responsible for controlling the organization of branches of the national economy with a view towards improving the environment. Secondly, a special section which provides for measures and financing especially for environmental protection. Furthermore, an orderly organizational system of departments has been established to control, in one case, the use of the land, in another case the use of our water resources, in another case the atmosphere, and so on. All of these organizations have extensive rights to control and suspend the economic activity of enterprises which harm the environment.

In any case, this matter is a planned nationwide undertaking in our country, and we are actively co-operating not only within the framework of our own socialist commonwealth, but also with other countries on a world scale. The exchange of know-how is also very important where these questions are concerned.

I would say that we understand the importance of these problems, and not only understand, but take steps to protect Nature as the environment in which we all live and in which our future generations must live.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): By agreement, I will be ready to say the Senate for one short question. Mrs. Appolloni . . .

The Joint Chairman (Senator Asselin): We have no more time to do it. It is time to conclude.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): As you know, it is a parliamentary delegation. We are a member of the International Parliamentary Union. My vice-chairman of the parliamentary union has been desperately showing his hand since the beginning and to really show this is a parliamentary delegation . . . We are a member of it.

[Translation]

pollution et, en disant cela, je pense aux pays d'Europe et également à l'Union Soviétique, pays très vieux, où existent de très beaux édifices, qui sont probablement attaqués par la pollution—je pense aussi à l'agriculture, monsieur Gorbachev, vous avez de grandes responsabilités, je crois, dans ce domaine. La pollution, j'en suis certain, porte préjudice à l'agriculture et aux forêts. Je voudrais savoir si vous avez quelque chose à dire à ce sujet et si l'URSS prend des mesures pour réduire la pollution.

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec vous pour dire qu'il s'agit effectivement d'un problème de la plus haute importance, d'un problème global qui intéresse l'humanité toute entière.

Ces problèmes se posent également chez nous, mais nous comptons les attaquer de façon planifiée, notre économie étant planifiée.

Nous avons depuis peu mis en oeuvre une série de mesures, tant au niveau de l'organisation que de l'économie. Auprès du Soviet Suprême, on a établi des commissions, deux commissions du Soviet des nationalités et du Soviet de l'Union dont relève le contrôle de l'organisation des secteurs de l'économie nationale visant l'amélioration de l'environnement. Par ailleurs, une section spéciale a été créée, section chargée d'étudier les mesures et les moyens financiers nécessaires pour la protection de la nature. Nous avons en outre créé toute une série de services chargés de contrôler les modalités d'utilisation des terres, des eaux, de l'atmosphère, etc. Ces services possèdent des pouvoirs de contrôle étendus et peuvent éventuellement arrêter l'activité économique des entreprises, qui nuirait à l'environnement.

Ce travail se fait donc chez nous de façon planifiée, à l'échelon national et à cette fin, nous coopérons non seulement avec les autres pays socialistes, mais également avec les pays du monde entier avec lesquels nous procédons à un échange d'information.

Nous nous rendons donc parfaitement compte de l'importance de ces problèmes et nous avons pris toutes les mesures qui s'imposent pour assurer la protection de la nature dans laquelle nous vivons tous et dans laquelle vivront les générations à venir.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Avec votre permission, je vais donner la parole à un membre du Sénat pour une brève question. Madame Appolloni . . .

Le coprésident (le sénateur Asselin): Il ne nous reste plus de temps, il faut conclure.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Comme vous le savez, c'est une délégation parlementaire. Nous sommes membres de l'Union parlementaire internationale. Le vice-président de l'Union parlementaire a désespérément essayé d'attirer mon attention en levant la main depuis le début et pour bien montrer qu'il s'agit d'une délégation parlementaire . . . Nous en faisons partie.

[Texte]

[Traduction]

• 1235

The Soviet Union is a member of it. We meet with each other. I am the Chairman of the Parliamentary Union. I think really to emphasize this meeting as a Parliamentary Union meeting, I will recognize Mr. Lawrence, hoping that he will be very short—and probably a last word by our vice-chairman, Madam Apolloni, and the Honourable Senator Asselin will be doing the thanking.

I kindly now ask you to be very, very brief, please.

Mr. Lawrence: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I originally wanted to ask a question of our guest relating to human rights and family contacts and family reunification, but I must say I was taken aback by his bald statement that no Soviet citizen is prevented from leaving the Soviet Union unless he has some form of state secret or is in jail for committing a crime. I guess it all depends on what your definitions of state secret and crime are.

So I will switch to another topic completely, if I may, and that is, obviously one of your purposes in being here, and we welcome it, is to knock down, to destroy, some of the distrust that exists in the western world about the motivation and the long-term aims of the Soviet Union. I do not understand, sir, therefore, why the Soviet Union continues to place KGB agents and espionage agents to such a huge number as it does in all the western capitals. For instance, in the Ottawa embassy here it has been estimated that fully two-thirds of the staff of our genial ambassador here have had direct KGB training and there is a huge volume of reports going back every month to both the KGB and military intelligence in Moscow.

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): A question please.

Mr. Lawrence: If we are trying to break down this distrust, why do you find it necessary to have so many espionage agents, for instance, here in Ottawa?

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) I think that, without sufficient grounds, you are here accusing the Soviet Union of ill-intentioned things. Worthy people, vested with a certain trust, represent the Soviet Union in Canada, and I should not—and I think, I hope, neither would the Canadian side—so characterize the activity of the Soviet embassy in Canada. I should emphasize that, for example, the ambassador, who has been working more than 10 years, and the staff working at the embassy in recent years, have performed a considerable task in developing relations in the agrarian sector. We are now co-operating with you in developing the North and this is a new development. We feel that it would be useful to discuss a number of the problems involved in strengthening exchanges between scientific centres, exchanges of scientific contacts. That is all the work of the embassy; that is all work in the name of the Soviet Union and we feel that our people in the embassy behave properly and represent the country properly. Therefore, I cannot agree with your characterization of the embassy in Canada.

L'Union Soviétique en fait partie. Nous nous rencontrons. Je suis le président de l'Union parlementaire. Pour souligner que cette rencontre est bien une rencontre de l'Union parlementaire, je donne la parole à M. Lawrence, espérant qu'il sera bref; je laisserai probablement le mot de la fin à notre vice-président, M^{me} Apolloni, et l'honorable sénateur Asselin fera la déclaration de remerciement.

Je vous demande donc d'être très, très bref, s'il vous plaît.

M. Lawrence: Merci, monsieur le président.

Au départ, je voulais poser à notre invité une question concernant les droits de l'homme, les contacts familiaux et la réunification des familles, mais je dois dire que j'ai été étonné de l'entendre déclarer tout net que l'on n'interdit à aucun citoyen soviétique de quitter l'Union Soviétique, à moins qu'il ne soit détenteur d'un quelconque secret d'état ou qu'il soit en prison pour avoir commis un crime. J'imagine que tout dépend de la définition de ce qu'est un secret d'état et un crime.

Je passerai donc à un tout autre sujet, si vous le permettez; il est évident que l'un des buts de votre présence ici, dont nous sommes très heureux, est d'atténuer la méfiance qui existe dans le monde occidental au sujet de la motivation et des objectifs à long terme de l'Union Soviétique. Je ne comprends donc pas pourquoi, monsieur, l'Union Soviétique continue de placer des agents du KGB et des espions en si grand nombre dans toutes les capitales de l'ouest. Par exemple, à l'ambassade d'Ottawa, ici, on estime qu'au moins les deux tiers du personnel de notre sympathique ambassadeur ont été directement formés par le KGB et qu'une énorme quantité de rapports est transmise tous les mois au KGB et au service de renseignements militaires à Moscou.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Veuillez formuler une question, s'il vous plaît.

M. Lawrence: Si nous voulons faire disparaître cette méfiance, pourquoi trouvez-vous si nécessaire d'avoir autant d'espions, par exemple, ici à Ottawa?

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Ces accusations contre l'Union soviétique sont tout à fait non fondées. Les personnes qui au Canada représentent l'Union soviétique sont des personnes parfaitement honorables qui méritent la confiance qui leur est faite. J'espère pouvoir en dire autant du personnel diplomatique canadien en poste à Moscou. Ainsi notre ambassadeur qui est en poste à Ottawa depuis plus de dix ans de même que tous les membres de notre corps diplomatique ont fait un excellent travail pour renforcer la coopération entre nos deux pays dans le domaine agricole. Nous coopérons également depuis quelque temps à la mise en valeur du Grand nord. Nous avons également l'intention d'étudier les séries de questions liées à la multiplication des échanges entre les institutions scientifiques. Tout ceci doit être assuré par notre ambassade et nous estimons que notre personnel diplomatique représente notre pays comme il convient de le faire; je ne saurais donc accepter ce que vous venez de dire au sujet de notre ambassade à Ottawa.

[Text]

With regard to your emphasizing that in all embassies many intelligence agents, spies, are used, I think that you, as ordinary citizens, find yourselves prisoners of that spy mania that America is now whipping up. And, today, as if on orders, in co-ordinated fashion, like a train proceeding according to schedule, so it travels from one country to another. The accusation is made: that is a spy, that is a spy, that is a spy, and so on. That is all a calculated action. Do you really think that we are such simpletons? We understand it all very well. It is calculated ideological sabotage to discredit the Soviet Union, to strike a blow at her prestige, at her authority, to lessen her influence. But that is all, on the whole, a futile attempt. That has happened before, and not just that.

I will tell you bluntly, as they say in our country in Central Asia: "The dog barks, the wind blows, and the caravan passes on". And our caravan the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, despite all the intrigues of our ideological opponents, proceeding in its peaceful policy, guided by its humane ideology, has built its own society, has developed it, has dealt respectfully with the rights of nationalities, their right to plan their own life in their own way, according to their own outlook, and it can only be this way. It is all the conversations to the effect that revolutions can be exported, that it—the revolution—can be foisted on someone, this after all is nonsense, fit for the speech of uneducated people, but for us, for people who are concerned with politics, in this case we can only see that even among the politicians someone has caught this infection and wants to impair the atmosphere of our frank, productive meeting by introducing an unpleasant note. I should like to consider that this is but an episode in our meeting, and to say that I am very pleased with this frank discussion, which has shown our common interest in solving those major problems that concern not only our Parliaments and our countries, but also all other countries. I feel too that we have a broad field for co-operation with Canada at all levels and especially at the level of Parliament, as representing the will of the Canadian people.

I therefore wish to express my deep gratitude both to the speakers of the Chambers and to the heads of the committees for this meeting, for this meeting among colleagues and for the frank exchange of views forming a part of the very political dialogue on the basis of the agreement which we have on this account.

I thank you all for your attention, and I wish you . . .

• 1240

The Joint Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): Maybe I should have recognized Mr. Lawrence earlier on, because this is the kind of exchange that members of this committee like. We call that a give and take; we appreciate the answer, we appreciate the question. I said I was going to give the floor to Mrs. Appolloni, and as I want to survive politically in this democratic country of ours, I will recognize Mrs. Appolloni, as, after all, not many ladies ask questions. With your kindness, a short question, and then of course I will allow you to say one last word; and then the hon. Senator Asselin and I thank you very warmly.

[Translation]

Le seul fait de nous accuser de peupler nos ambassades d'espions prouve que vous êtes la victime de l'espionnage aigüe propagée par les États-Unis. Il s'agit d'accusations orchestrées; et on s'accuse mutuellement d'envoyer des espions. Mais nous ne sommes pas naïfs et nous savons ce qu'il en est. Il s'agit notamment d'une diversion idéologique intentionnelle, destinée à calomnier l'Union soviétique en vue de nuire à son prestige, à son autorité et à son influence. Mais c'est là une tactique tout à fait inadmissible. Ce n'est d'ailleurs pas la première fois qu'on y a recours.

Mais comme on dit chez nous en Asie centrale, «Les chiens aboient, la caravane passe». Or notre caravane, l'Union des républiques soviétiques socialistes, malgré tous les efforts de nos ennemis idéologiques, poursuit son chemin sur la base de sa politique pacifique, de son idéologie humanitaire, en poursuivant la construction et le développement de notre société, tout en respectant le droit des peuples à vivre selon leurs opinions et leur conception du monde. C'est d'ailleurs ainsi que les choses doivent se passer. Tous ces racontars sur l'exportation de la révolution ne sont que des sonnettes destinées aux naïfs. Mais il faut croire que même des hommes politiques expérimentés comme nous peuvent être atteints par la contagion. On cherche notamment à empoisonner l'atmosphère et à saboter notre réunion. Mais ce n'est là qu'un détail, car dans l'ensemble, je me félicite vivement de la franchise de nos discussions, laquelle prouve que nous nous intéressons de part et d'autre à résoudre les grands problèmes de l'heure qui préoccupent non seulement nos parlements et nos pays mais le monde tout entier. J'estime que la coopération entre nos deux pays peut se faire à de multiples niveaux et plus particulièrement au niveau du Parlement qui représente le peuple canadien.

C'est pourquoi je tiens à remercier très vivement les présidents des deux Chambres et les présidents des comités pour cette réunion, cette réunion parmi des collègues, et pour l'échange de vues très franc faisant parti d'un dialogue fortement politique basé sur l'accord que nous avons conclu à cet effet.

Je vous remercie de votre attention et je vous souhaite . . .

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Peut-être aurais-je dû donner la parole à M. Lawrence plus tôt, car c'est le genre d'échanges qu'aiment les membres de ce Comité. C'est donnant donnant; nous sommes reconnaissants et de la réponse et de la question. J'ai dit que j'allais donner la parole à M^{me} Appolloni, et puisque je tiens à survivre politiquement dans ce pays démocratique qui est le nôtre, je vais maintenant donner la parole à M^{me} Appolloni puisque après tout, il n'y a pas beaucoup de femmes qui posent des questions. Je vous demande d'avoir l'amabilité de poser une brève question et, ensuite, je vais vous permettre d'ajouter un dernier commen-

[Texte]

Mrs. Appolloni: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my question will be brief.

Some reference has already been made to the general economic situation in the world. I was wondering, Mr. Gorbachev, if you could give us your own description of the present state of the Soviet economy.

Mr. Gorbachev: (Interpretation) We may say that the situation with regard to the Soviet economy is one of steady development, but industrial growth rates have in recent years not suited us. They have been lower than those on which we counted, but I must say that as a result of measures which have been taken and which cover a wide range of problems—matters of production organization, co-operation between industrial enterprises, labour incentive, tightening up labour discipline and improving planning work—have now enabled us to improve the situation somewhat, and tendencies in recent months have been favourable.

If we take the first four months of this year, growth in industrial production has exceeded 4%, while growth in output per man-hour has been in the range of 3.9%. This is not a bad growth for our enormous economy. We have been heavily assailed by drought in recent years, and we have been faced with the serious problem of conserving our resource base in agriculture. We have been successful in this area, using both the vast resources of our economy and receiving support from international co-operation, and in this instance I should like to note the fruitful co-operation that has characterized the grain trade with Canada.

At present, the agricultural situation is also improving. If we take the first four months of this year alone, meat production and procurement in our country have increased by 7%, and milk sales have risen by 16% in comparison with last year.

We have livestock resources, and we have the animal husbandry accommodation necessary for a high level of productivity. In practical terms with slight increases in productivity we shall be able to realize our food supply program even earlier than we intended. The only thing we really need, so to speak, is a little help from the skies. But, we shall talk about this in the agricultural committee; I do not wish to enlarge on this particularly at the moment. The weather as it stands now is not bad for the harvest. That's all I had to say, and I hope it's satisfactory. Thank you.

• 1245

The Joint-Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): Madam Speaker, honourable dean of the diplomatic corps, ambassador, and friends, *spasibo*; and I ask for the last word,

l'honorable Martial Asselin, s'il veut bien s'acquitter de cette tâche agréable et vous remercier.

Le sénateur Asselin: Merci, monsieur Prud'homme.

[Traduction]

taire. Ensuite, je vais donner la parole au sénateur Asselin. Je vous remercie très sincèrement.

Mme Appolloni: Merci, monsieur le président. Ma question sera brève.

On a déjà parlé de la situation économique dans le monde. Pourriez-vous nous décrire, monsieur Gorbachev, l'état actuel de l'économie soviétique.

M. Gorbachev: (Interprétation) Dans l'ensemble, le développement de l'économie soviétique s'est fait de façon régulière, bien que le rythme de la croissance de notre industrie ne nous ait pas donné satisfaction ces dernières années. En effet la croissance a été plus lente que prévue; néanmoins, grâce aux mesures qui ont été prises, notamment au plan de l'organisation de la production, de la coopération des entreprises, de la stimulation du travail, du renforcement de la discipline de travail, de l'amélioration de la planification, la situation a été redressée quelque peu et les tendances qui se dégagent depuis quelques mois sont positives.

Pour les quatre premiers mois de l'année, la production industrielle a augmenté de 4 p. 100, et la productivité du travail, de 3,9 p. 100, ce qui n'est pas si mal pour une économie aussi vaste que la nôtre. Notre agriculture a eu à affronter de terribles sécheresses ces dernières années et le grave problème du maintien de l'agriculture en tant que base de notre structure de ressources. Nous avons néanmoins réussi à redresser la barre, d'une part grâce aux ressources de notre propre économie, et d'autre part, grâce à la coopération internationale; à ce propos, je tiens à rendre hommage à la coopération fructueuse entre l'Union soviétique et le Canada dans le domaine du commerce des céréales.

Ainsi, notre agriculture est actuellement en voie de redressement. Pour les quatre premiers mois de l'année, la production de viande et l'approvisionnement en viande ont augmenté de 7 p. 100 tandis que la vente de lait a augmenté de 16 p. 100 par rapport à l'an dernier.

Nous avons le bétail et les installations nécessaires pour atteindre un haut niveau de rendement. En termes concrets, avec l'aide d'accroissements limités de la productivité nous pourrions réaliser notre programme alimentaire plus tôt que prévu. Pourvu que les éléments nous soient favorables! Mais je pense que nous discuterons de cette question plus en détail lors de la réunion du Comité de l'agriculture. Les conditions atmosphériques ne sont pas mauvaises pour la récolte en ce moment. C'est tout ce que j'avais à dire, j'espère que cela est satisfaisant. Merci.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Madame le président, monsieur l'honorable doyen du corps diplomatique, monsieur l'ambassadeur, mes amis, *spasibo*; avant de lever la séance,

I will leave to the Honourable Martial Asselin, the agreeable task of thanking you.

Senator Asselin: Thank you, Mr. Prud'homme.

[Text]

Monsieur Gorbachev, au nom des parlementaires ici présents, je vous remercie très sincèrement de nous avoir permis cette discussion et ces échanges bénéfiques et fructueux, pour nos deux peuples respectifs.

A une époque où la tension internationale s'accroît à un rythme alarmant, il est particulièrement utile que les contacts se multiplient entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Je me félicite d'autant plus de cette visite, qu'elle a pour thème principal l'agriculture, c'est-à-dire une question qui a trait à la paix plutôt qu'à la guerre.

Puisque nous parlons d'échanges et de l'importance des contacts individuels pour la promotion de la paix et de la compréhension internationale, qu'il me soit aussi permis de rappeler à nos hôtes combien nous souhaitons, nous, Canadiens, voir s'établir des rapports plus directs et plus nombreux, non seulement entre nos deux gouvernements mais aussi et surtout, entre nos deux peuples. Il importe que nous réduisions les obstacles à ces contacts et que nous augmentions les occasions pour nos concitoyens de mieux se comprendre, c'est-à-dire de se parler, de se lire, de s'écrire et aussi de communiquer, sans contraintes inutiles. Je veux croire que votre visite aujourd'hui, monsieur Gorbachev, et celle de vos collègues contribuera de quelque manière à rapprocher le jour où ces contacts personnels pourront prendre l'ampleur que nous souhaitons leur voir acquérir et que vous saurez, en attendant, transmettre au peuple soviétique notre souci constant pour la paix du monde.

Mr. Gorbachev, welcome in Canada, and please receive the best wishes of the Canadian people.

The Joint-Chairman (Mr. Prud'homme): Thank you. The meeting is adjourned. *Spasibo.*

[Translation]

On behalf of the parliamentarians hereby present, Mr. Gorbachev, I thank you very sincerely for having agreed to this discussion and these exchanges, which will be fruitful and beneficial for our respective peoples.

At a time when international tension is growing at an alarming rate, it is particularly useful to increase the number of East-West contacts. I am all the more pleased with this visit in that its main theme is agriculture, which is an area that has more to do with peace than with war.

Since we are discussing exchanges and the importance of individual contacts in promoting peace and international understanding, allow me to remind our guests how much we, as Canadians, wish to establish more direct and more numerous links, not only between our two governments, but also and especially between our two peoples. It is important that we reduce the obstacles that stand in the way of these contacts and that we multiply the opportunities for our fellow citizens to better understand one another by talking to one another, reading one another's writing, writing to one another and communicating, without unnecessary restrictions. I would hope, Mr. Gorbachev, that your visit today and that of your colleagues will contribute in some way to bringing closer the day when these personal contacts will be as numerous as we would like to see them be and that you will, in the meantime, tell the Soviet people of our constant concern for world peace.

Je vous souhaite la bienvenue au Canada, monsieur Gorbachev, et je vous transmets les meilleurs vœux du peuple canadien.

Le coprésident (M. Prud'homme): Merci. La séance est levée. *Spasibo.*



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HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 96

Thursday, May 19, 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 96

Le jeudi 19 mai 1983

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

External Affairs and National Defence

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

Main Estimates 1983-84: Vote 1—Operating
Expenditures under NATIONAL DEFENCE

CONCERNANT:

Budget principal 1983-1984: Crédit 1—Dépenses de
fonctionnement sous la rubrique DÉFENSE
NATIONALE

WITNESSES:


(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:

(Voir à l'endos)

First Session of the
Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la
trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983



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Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appolloni

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Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, MAY 19, 1983
(151)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9:34 o'clock a.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Bradley, Hudecki, Miss Jewett, Messrs. Laniel, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Prud'homme and Sergeant.

Alternates present: Messrs. Darling and Stewart.

Witnesses: From the Department of National Defence: Mr. D.B. Dewar, Deputy Minister; Gen. R.M. Withers, Chief of the Defence Staff; VAdm D.N. Mainguy, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff; Mr. J.R. Killick, Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel); Mr. L.E. Davies, Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance); BGen J.A. Williams, Director General Manpower Utilization; Mr. R.L. Patenaude, Director Personnel Requirements and Control.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Mr. Roger Hill, Assistant Director.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated Wednesday, February 23, 1983 relating to the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984. (See *Minutes of Proceedings, Tuesday, March 15, 1983, Issue No. 83*).

The Committee resumed consideration of Vote 1 under NATIONAL DEFENCE.

The witnesses answered questions.

It was agreed,—That the response submitted by the Department of National Defence to a question raised by Mr. McKinnon at a meeting of the Committee of May 12, 1983 be appended to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. (See *Appendix "EAND-75"*)

At 11:15 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE JEUDI 19 MAI 1983
(151)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale se réunit aujourd'hui à 9h34 sous la présidence de M. Marcel Prud'homme (président).

Membres du Comité présents: M^{me} Appolloni, MM. Bradley, Hudecki, M^{lle} Jewett, MM. Laniel, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Prud'homme et Sargeant.

Substituts présents: MM. Darling et Stewart.

Témoins: Du ministère de la Défense nationale: M. D.B. Dewar, sous-ministre; le Gén. R.M. Withers, Chef de l'état-major de la défense; le VAm D.N. Mainguy, sous-chef de l'État-major de la défense; M. J.R. Killick, sous-ministre adjoint (Matériel); M. L.E. Davies, sous-ministre adjoint (Finances); le BGén J.A. Williams, directeur général—Utilisation des effectifs; M. R.L. Patenaude, directeur—Besoin en personnel et contrôle.

Aussi présent: Du Centre parlementaire des affaires étrangères du commerce extérieur: M. Roger Hill, directeur adjoint.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 23 février 1983 portant sur le budget principal pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984. (*Voir procès-verbal du mardi 15 mars 1983, fascicule n° 83*).

Le Comité reprend l'étude du crédit 1 sous la rubrique DÉFENSE NATIONALE.

Les témoins répondent aux questions.

Il est convenu,—Que la réponse soumise par le ministère de la Défense nationale à une question posée par M. McKinnon à la séance du Comité du 12 mai 1983, soit jointe aux procès-verbal et témoignages de ce jour. (*Voir Appendice «EAND-75»*)

A 11h15, le Comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

*(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)**[Texte]*

Thursday, May 19, 1983

• 0933

The Chairman: Could we please start? First, on your behalf, I want to offer our clerk our deepest sympathy with regard to a death in his family. I believe his mother-in-law passed away and that is the reason he was absent on Tuesday. I am sure you join with me in expressing your deep sorrow.

Second, I think I have a point of order by Mr. Munro, then we will proceed. Mr. Munro, please.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I have two points of order, if I may. The first one relates to the joint meeting we had earlier this week with the visitors from the Soviet Union. I wonder whether the text of that particular meeting will be available to us in one form or another.

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): It will be printed and distributed?

The Chairman: Yes. I have not yet received the final version for some corrections to the wording of some names, but the answer is yes.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I hope that it is just changing the names, not the answers.

The Chairman: I doubt very much that I would allow anyone to tamper with it. We have our lessons.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): The other one is an administrative one in a way. I understand from the interpreters in the booth that this is a very difficult room . . .

• 0935

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): —and if those who are speaking can get as close as they can to the microphones, it will help them.

The Chairman: That is very kind. I will recognize this morning . . . The deputy minister and the chief of staff were in Cabinet this morning. You can imagine the reason; this is something to ask them. Maybe it will attract your curiosity. We have now the deputy minister, and the Chief of Defence Staff will be here in a moment. I saw that General Thériault was here a minute ago, but he will be back. The minister has to go to a funeral in Quebec, I think it is . . .

Mr. D.B. Dewar (Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence): The minister is absent, attending the funeral of Mr.

TÉMOIGNAGES

*(Enregistrement électronique)**[Traduction]*

Le jeudi 19 mai 1983

Le président: Pouvons-nous commencer, s'il vous plaît? Je voudrais tout d'abord, en votre nom, offrir à notre greffier nos condoléances les plus sincères pour le décès survenu dans sa famille. J'ai appris que sa belle-mère est décédée et c'est la raison pour laquelle il était absent mardi. Je suis certain que vous vous joindrez à moi pour lui dire à quel point nous sommes peînés.

Deuxièmement, M. Munro désire invoquer le règlement, après quoi nous pourrions reprendre nos délibérations. Monsieur Munro, s'il vous plaît.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Si vous me permettez, je voudrais invoquer le règlement sur deux questions. La première a trait à la réunion mixte à laquelle nous avons assisté cette semaine avec les visiteurs de l'Union soviétique. Je me demande si le texte de cette réunion nous sera distribué sous une forme ou une autre.

Le président: Oui.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Il sera imprimé et distribué?

Le président: Oui. Je n'ai pas encore reçu la version finale à cause de certaines corrections qu'il faut apporter à l'orthographe de certains noms, mais la réponse, c'est oui.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): J'espère qu'on ne fait que modifier les noms et non pas les réponses.

Le président: Je doute beaucoup que je permettrais à quiconque de falsifier le texte. Nous avons eu notre leçon.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): L'autre rappel au règlement a trait à une question administrative d'une certaine façon. D'après les interprètes, je crois comprendre que cette pièce leur cause des problèmes . . .

Le président: Oui.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): . . . si les intervenants veulent parler très près de leur micro, cela faciliterait les choses pour les interprètes.

Le président: C'est très aimable à vous. Je donne la parole ce matin . . . Le sous-ministre et le chef d'état-major assistaient à un conseil de Cabinet ce matin. Vous pouvez vous imaginer pour quelle raison, mais vous pouvez leur demander. Votre curiosité sera probablement piquée. Nous accueillons maintenant le sous-ministre, et le chef de l'état-major de la Défense sera ici très bientôt. J'ai remarqué que le général Thériault était présent il y a quelques instants, il reviendra. Le ministre a dû se rendre à des funérailles à Québec, je crois que . . .

M. D.B. Dewar (sous-ministre, ministère de la Défense nationale): Le ministre est absent, il assiste aux funérailles de

[Texte]

Joe Power, who was head of the National Defence employees' union who died suddenly last weekend.

The Chairman: He is in Quebec City this morning.

We have now our Chief of Defence Staff, and you see all the gentlemen at your disposal. By agreement, it was agreed we would proceed with this meeting, even though we postponed the meeting. Therefore, I do not think there is any statement. Is there no statement?

Mr. Dewar: No, sir.

The Chairman: We will have a good session this morning. There will be a steering committee at 11.00 a.m.

I recognize the official critic of the Official Opposition on a matter of national defence, the Hon. Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to send my sympathy to the relatives of Mr. Joe Power, who was a very highly regarded head of the National Defence employees' union. He will be sorely missed. He was an extremely capable man and easy to work with. He co-operated to a degree—I might be so bold as to say, an unusual degree—and our regrets go out to them.

I would like to thank the department for being prompt with its response to my question concerning the double widows who . . . On a quick glance at this answer, it appears that the widows, when they lose their second husband, can go back to drawing the allowance from their first husband by right. There is no means test. This answer is here.

I would like to, first of all, ask a question I have been asking more or less on a weekly basis since these meetings started. Has any progress been made on Bill C-38?

Mr. Dewar: Mr. Chairman, on Bill C-38, I can say—and perhaps this has been said already at this committee—that Part I of the bill has been proclaimed, which deals with garnishee of pay.

Mr. McKinnon: That has been said each week, Mr. Deputy Minister.

Mr. Dewar: The other parts dealing with pension have not been proclaimed. The regulations which will govern how the bill will be implemented are under preparation under the leadership of the Privy Council Office and the Department of Justice. I have asked the department to prepare Mr. McKinnon a written reply giving as much information as we can about the situation, and that written reply is now being worked on. I am afraid there is not anything more really that I can contribute at the moment.

Mr. McKinnon: During your discussions with whomever these nameless people are who are holding the bill up, did you get any estimate on when they expect to have this bill proclaimed? As you know—everyone knows now—it is 10 months since Parliament passed it, and I think this is sufficient time to write the regulations for the most complex of bills.

[Traduction]

M. Joe Power, le chef du syndicat des employés de la Défense nationale, qui est décédé soudainement pendant la fin de semaine.

Le président: Il se trouve à Québec ce matin.

Le chef de l'état-major de la Défense est maintenant arrivé, et vous voyez tous ces messieurs qui sont à votre disposition. Nous avons convenu de tenir la réunion ce matin, bien que nous l'ayons reportée. Par conséquent, je ne crois pas qu'il y ait de déclaration, n'est-ce pas?

M. Dewar: Non, monsieur.

Le président: Nous aurons donc une bonne réunion ce matin et ensuite une réunion du Comité directeur à 11 heures.

Je donne la parole à l'honorable McKinnon, critique officiel de l'Opposition officielle en matière de défense nationale.

M. McKinnon: Merci, monsieur le président. Je voudrais tout d'abord offrir mes condoléances à la famille de M. Joe Power, qui était le chef très estimé du syndicat des employés de la Défense nationale. Il va sûrement beaucoup manquer aux employés. C'était un homme extrêmement compétent et il était très facile de travailler avec lui. Il a fait preuve de coopération jusqu'à un certain point—je pourrais même m'aventurer à dire de façon exceptionnelle—et nous désirons exprimer nos regrets les plus sincères.

Je désire remercier le ministère qui a rapidement répondu à ma question concernant les doubles veuves qui . . . J'ai jeté un regard rapide sur la réponse, il semble que les veuves, lorsqu'elles ont perdu leur deuxième mari, ont le droit de retirer de nouveau l'allocation du premier mari. Elles n'ont pas à subir un examen des ressources et des besoins. Nous avons la réponse ici.

Je voudrais tout d'abord poser une question, celle que je pose presque toutes les semaines, depuis le début de ces réunions. Est-ce qu'on a fait des progrès au sujet du projet de loi C-38?

M. Dewar: Monsieur le président, au sujet de ce projet de loi, je puis répondre—et peut-être qu'on l'a déjà mentionné au comité—que la partie I du projet de loi a été promulguée, elle a trait à la saisie-arrêt du salaire.

M. McKinnon: Voilà ce qu'on nous dit chaque semaine, monsieur le Sous-ministre,

M. Dewar: Les autres parties concernant la pension n'ont pas encore été promulguées. Les règlements d'application sont en cours de préparation sous la direction du Bureau du Conseil privé et du ministère de la Justice. J'ai demandé au ministère de préparer à l'intention de M. McKinnon une réponse écrite vous donnant autant de renseignements que possible au sujet de cette situation, et cette réponse est en cours de rédaction. Je crains ne pouvoir vraiment rien ajouter d'autre pour le moment.

M. McKinnon: Pendant vos discussions avec ces personnes sans nom qui retardent le projet de loi, avez-vous une idée de la date à laquelle ce projet de loi sera promulgué? Vous le savez, tout le monde le sait—le projet de loi a été adopté par le Parlement il y a 10 mois, c'est suffisamment long, à mon avis,

[Text]

Mr. Dewar: No, sir, I do not have any estimate on that point. But it is our intention to pass on to the other departments who are leading this operation the concerns that Mr. McKinnon has raised.

Mr. McKinnon: So much for this week's instalment on the Bill C-38.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to bring up the question of the frigate program. There is a great reluctance, it seems to me, in the House and in this committee to answer many detailed questions about the frigate program. I would like us to establish some kind of ground rules about what is likely to be answered here and what is not. I am saying this because, despite the fact that the answers that we get in this committee or in the House of Commons are kind of in the nature of what you do not know will not hurt you and will probably be good for the country, I find newspaper reporters are able to get quite accurate descriptions of the two project frigates. The two consortiums are willing to supply information on demand or request; the only people who do not seem to be able to supply the information are the Department of National Defence, and the only people who cannot get it seem to be members of Parliament.

I am sure most of you have read what somebody called Ron Lowman wrote in *The Toronto Star* about Canada's navy, providing a picture of what some artist thought that frigate would look like. It describes the equipment, how the ships stack up, the scan vessels have a certain length, width, displacement, propulsion speed, number of funnels, weapons, engines, guns, and so on.

Another article appears in a magazine, and I might say a word about this magazine; it is *Aeromag*. It used to be put out on a bilingual basis; unfortunately for me, it is now unilingual French. It is without a doubt, I think, the best magazine that is put out in this defence equipment area in Canada. It is put out by Guy Charpentier of—I suppose he lives in Montreal. It is an extraordinarily good magazine. I wonder if the department—this will be my first short question—has ever considered subsidizing a magazine like this, because of what seems to me its proven excellence, subsidizing the translation of this or helping them so that they can put out, once again, a bilingual magazine instead of unilingual. Has this ever been considered?

Mr. Dewar: Mr. McKinnon, as far as I am aware we have not considered that. I would add that we are very much aware of the magazine, and I agree with you about the general quality and importance in the country. I would like, if I could, to take your question as notice to come back a little more substantively on it.

Mr. McKinnon: The reason I bring it up at this time is that Mr. Charpentier has an article on the frigates. From my Saskatchewan high school French, I learned more from this

[Translation]

pour formuler les règlements d'application des lois les plus complexes.

• 0940

M. Dewar: Non, monsieur, je n'en ai pas la moindre idée. Nous avons l'intention, toutefois, de transmettre aux autres ministères intéressés les préoccupations de M. McKinnon.

M. McKinnon: Voilà ce que nous obtenons cette semaine pour le projet de loi C-38.

Monsieur le président, je voudrais soulever la question du programme concernant les frégates. Je constate une grande réticence devant la Chambre comme devant notre Comité pour ce qui est de fournir des réponses détaillées concernant ce programme. J'aimerais que nous établissions des règles de base relatives aux questions qui requièrent une réponse et à celles qui peuvent rester sans réponse. Je le mentionne, car en dépit du fait que les réponses obtenues devant notre Comité ou en Chambre reviennent à nous dire que ce que nous ne savons pas ne nous fera pas de mal, et probablement sera bon pour le pays, les journalistes peuvent obtenir des descriptions fort exactes des deux frégates prototypes. Les deux consortiums en cause sont disposés à fournir des renseignements sur demande; les seules personnes qui ne semblent pas pouvoir offrir de renseignements se trouvent au ministère de la Défense nationale, et les seules personnes qui ne peuvent les obtenir sont les députés.

Je suis certain que la plupart d'entre vous ont lu ce que Ron Lowman a écrit dans le *Toronto Star* au sujet de la marine canadienne, en donnant une photo de la conception d'une frégate par un artiste. L'article décrit l'équipement, le coût des frégates, donne la longueur, la largeur, le déplacement, la vitesse de propulsion, le nombre de cheminées, les armes, les moteurs, les canons, etc.

Un autre article paraît dans une revue, je vais peut-être dire quelques mots au sujet de cette revue, il s'agit de *Aeromag*. Elle était bilingue au départ, malheureusement pour moi, elle est maintenant publiée en français seulement. Il s'agit, sans doute, de la meilleure revue publiée dans le domaine du matériel de défense au Canada. Le responsable en est Guy Charpentier, et j'imagine qu'il vit à Montréal. C'est une revue extrêmement bien faite. Je me demande si le ministère—ce sera ma première question—a jamais songé à subventionner une revue comme celle-ci, car il me semble qu'elle a fait ses preuves d'excellence? Est-ce qu'on ne pourrait pas subventionner la traduction de cette revue, pour qu'elle soit publiée de nouveau dans les deux langues? Y a-t-on jamais songé?

M. Dewar: Monsieur McKinnon, pour autant que je sache, nous ne l'avons pas fait. J'ajouterai que nous connaissons très bien cette revue, et je suis d'accord avec vous au sujet de sa qualité en général et de son importance au pays. J'aimerais, si vous me permettez, prendre note de votre question pour vous répondre de façon plus détaillée plus tard.

M. McKinnon: La raison pour laquelle je soulève cette question, c'est que M. Charpentier a écrit un article au sujet des frégates. En me servant du français que j'ai appris à l'école

[Texte]

article than I ever have from this committee, I might say, about the frigates. I wonder if the officer in charge of the frigate program—or if there is anyone here who has read the article—could comment whether Mr. Charpentier is correct in his detailed description of the two frigates.

Mr. Dewar: Mr. Chairman, if I could answer, I am sure the committee understands that we are in the middle of a competitive process during the evaluation of the proposals put forward by the two companies. The department's position during that process, which is still going on, is that the department will not comment, cannot comment on the quality or on the other factors that are being evaluated. It is true that the press has published several articles on those subjects, including the two that Mr. McKinnon has referred to, which we of course have seen. But, in the present situation, it would simply not be possible for the department to comment on those articles, either to confirm or to deny the items in them.

• 0945

I can assure the committee that in our attempt to be as responsible as we can in the objective evaluation of the proposals, we are not the source, nor is the project office, of the information in those articles. It would be tempting sometimes to enter into a discussion about this, but I do not think we responsibly can do so.

Mr. McKinnon: I will put it to you, Mr. Chairman, there is an anomaly here, is there not, that newspaper reporters are able to obtain this information, or able to print it? It is never denied; it is not discussed; it is not confirmed.

The two articles that I have particularly noted come out with so many similarities that it seemed pretty obvious that they have correct information, and some of them... Particularly, Lowman reports his as if he had heard quite a bit of it from sources within the department; and yet, the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the Parliament of Canada, which is meeting to discuss the estimates of the Department of National Defence, is denied this information. Does that not seem to you, Mr. Chairman, to be a strange anomaly, that this is a debating matter in the editorial rooms all across the country and is debated everywhere except in the standing committee? We are denied any opportunity, really, to debate or to have anything to do with the final decision or the process of without a doubt the most important contract, or the largest contract, that Canada has ever let.

I would like to hear from the chairman if he would care to indulge us in this matter.

The Chairman: It is not the practice of the chairman to comment on a member's view, and I listened with great interest to the Hon. Mr. McKinnon. I am very curious as to how this could be so well publicized; but I have no comment to make really, except to express my own surprise. I learned a lot that I did not know myself as chairman of the committee. I am in the same position as the Hon. Mr. McKinnon.

[Traduction]

secondaire en Saskatchewan, j'en sais davantage après avoir lu cet article qu'après avoir assisté aux réunions du Comité, au sujet des frégates. Je me demande si l'officier responsable du programme des frégates—y a-t-il quelqu'un ici qui ait lu cet article?—pourrait me dire si M. Charpentier a donné une description correcte de ces frégates.

M. Dewar: Monsieur le président, permettez-moi de répondre, je suis certain que le Comité comprend que nous sommes en train d'évaluer les offres présentées par deux compagnies concurrentes. Pendant le processus d'évaluation, le ministère ne peut faire de commentaires sur la qualité ou sur les autres facteurs qui sont évalués. Il est vrai que plusieurs articles ont été publiés dans la presse à ce sujet, y compris les deux que M. McKinnon a mentionnés, et que nous avons lus évidemment. Dans la situation actuelle, il ne serait pas possible, cependant, que le ministère dise quoi que ce soit au sujet de ces articles, soit pour confirmer soit pour infirmer ce qu'ils contiennent.

Je puis assurer aux membres du Comité que nous tentons d'être aussi responsables que possible pour évaluer de façon objective les propositions, ni le service de gestion du programme ni nous-mêmes ne sommes la source des informations contenues dans ces articles. Cela serait parfois tentant de discuter à ce sujet, mais je ne pense pas que nous puissions le faire sans indiscrétion.

M. McKinnon: Je tiens à souligner, monsieur le président, qu'il y a une anomalie, n'est-ce pas, puisque les journalistes peuvent obtenir des renseignements et les imprimer? Ces renseignements n'ont été ni niés, ni discutés, ni confirmés.

Les deux articles que j'ai notés comportent tellement de similarités qu'il semble presque évident que les journalistes ont obtenu des renseignements exacts, et certains... Lowman surtout rapporte que beaucoup de choses lui viennent de certaines sources du ministère. Pourtant, le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale du Parlement du Canada, qui siège pour discuter du budget du ministère de la Défense nationale, ne peut obtenir ces renseignements. Monsieur le président, n'est-ce pas, à votre avis, une anomalie assez étrange que la question soit discutée dans les salles de rédaction partout au pays, et ailleurs, sauf au Comité permanent? Nous n'avons pas l'occasion vraiment d'en discuter, nous ne sommes pas parties non plus à la décision finale ni au processus en cours pour un contrat qui est sans doute le plus important, le plus gros, qu'ait jamais accordé le Canada.

J'aimerais savoir ce que le président a à dire à ce sujet, s'il veut bien le faire.

Le président: Le président n'a pas l'habitude de commenter l'opinion d'un député, et j'écoute avec beaucoup d'intérêt ce qu'avait à dire l'honorable McKinnon. Je suis assez curieux de savoir comment ce sujet peut recevoir tant de publicité, mais je n'ai pas vraiment de remarques à faire, sauf pour exprimer ma propre surprise. J'ai appris beaucoup de choses que je ne savais pas en tant que président du Comité. Je suis dans la même situation que l'honorable McKinnon.

[Text]

But I must admit that something similar to that happened when the F-18 was in limbo; we learned so much from the press which we did not learn in our own caucus. At that time, I found out that the companies were very, very eager to get every bit of information out so that they might be favoured by public opinion, one way or the other. My own colleagues had every detail from the company, but nothing from the government; and I must admit that they expressed the same surprise that they could get more from the company than they could get from the government. I do not know if it is similar now. I would not dare comment, except to express my surprise at having been so well informed by the press.

Mr. McKinnon: I wonder if the Chief of the Defence Staff would care to comment on this, or the deputy minister, that it certainly hinders intelligent discussion among a group that perhaps at one time were considered to be decision-makers in this country but now are not supposed to have any part in decision-making, it would appear. What is the purpose of the committee's studying the estimates if in the vital areas we are not allowed to have any information from which to make a recommendation?

The Chairman: Mr. Dewar.

• 050

Mr. Dewar: Mr. Chairman, I wish I could be more helpful. I am afraid there really is not very much I can add to what I have said. I feel we have no choice but to play the proper role in the competitive process as I described it. The only possible thing I could add would be that, if the committee has questions they would like to pose, we might take them under advisement and consider if they could be asked without damaging that responsibility. They would be questions, I would gather, more on process than on content.

Mr. McKinnon: Mr. Chairman, let us try one, then. In the specifications put out calling for the bids, did the specifications call for type of propulsion other than the gas turbine motors? Did it say there was to be an alternative method of propulsion, which in the case of one consortium has ended up with having a diesel motor as well as the gas turbines and in the other consortium has not? Is that part of the specifications?

Mr. Dewar: I do not know whether we can answer that question. The officer who should deal with it is the ADM (Materiel).

Mr. J.R. Killick (Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, the specification for the vessels we require is a performance specification. It describes the role and the performance we expect the vessel to function under. In that competitive process, the two competing consortiums make their own technical decisions and make their own offers in the various equipments that result in an operational vessel. We do not say to an individual: You must use type A type of propulsion or type C type of propulsion. That is his judgment.

[Translation]

Je dois admettre, toutefois, qu'à peu près la même chose s'est produite lorsque le F-18 était encore dans les limbes; nous avons beaucoup appris de la presse et rien de notre propre caucus. À l'époque, je me suis rendu compte que les compagnies étaient très très disposées à révéler toutes sortes de renseignements pour que l'opinion publique les favorise, d'une façon ou d'une autre. Mes propres collègues avaient obtenu tous les détails de la compagnie, mais rien du gouvernement, et je dois admettre qu'ils se sont également montrés surpris de pouvoir obtenir plus de la compagnie que du gouvernement. Je ne sais pas si c'est la même chose qui se produit maintenant. Je n'ose pas faire de commentaires, sauf pour me dire étonné d'être si bien informé par la presse.

Mr. McKinnon: Je me demande si le chef de l'état-major de la Défense a quelque chose à dire à ce sujet, ou le sous-ministre, étant donné que nous ne pouvons certainement pas discuter intelligemment au sein d'un groupe qui, à une époque, était censé prendre des décisions au pays, mais qui maintenant n'est pas parti à cette prise de décisions. Dans quel but le Comité peut-il examiner le budget, si pour des secteurs vitaux, nous ne pouvons pas obtenir de renseignements qui nous permettraient de présenter des recommandations?

Le président: Monsieur Dewar.

Mr. Dewar: Monsieur le président, j'aurais voulu être plus utile. Malheureusement, je ne peux pas ajouter grand-chose à ce que j'ai déjà dit. Je n'ai pas le choix: Je dois jouer le rôle qu'il convient de jouer dans le processus concurrentiel que j'ai décrit. Tout ce que je puis dire, c'est que si les membres du Comité ont des questions à poser, nous en prendrons note et nous déciderons si les questions peuvent être posées sans nuire aux responsabilités de qui que ce soit. Il s'agirait, je suppose, de questions portant plutôt sur le processus que sur le contenu.

Mr. McKinnon: Monsieur le président, tentons une question. Les spécifications précisées dans les appels d'offres stipulaient-elles qu'il fallait un mode de propulsion plutôt que des moteurs munis de turbines à essence? Précisait-on qu'il fallait prévoir un autre mode de propulsion, ce qui expliquerait qu'un des consortiums a un moteur diesel et des turbines à gaz tandis que l'autre consortium n'a prévu qu'un mode de propulsion? Les spécifications le précisaient-elles?

Mr. Dewar: Je ne sais pas si nous pouvons répondre à la question. Il faudrait demander au sous-ministre adjoint (matériels).

Mr. J.R. Killick (sous-ministre adjoint (matériels), ministère de la Défense nationale): Monsieur le président, les spécifications des navires dont nous avons besoin sont des spécifications de performance. Elles décrivent le rôle et la performance que devra avoir le navire. Dans le processus concurrentiel, les deux consortiums prennent leurs propres décisions d'ordre technique et font leurs propres offres quant aux divers équipements nécessaires pour rendre le navire opérationnel. Nous ne disons pas à qui que ce soit d'utiliser le type A ou le type C dans le domaine de la propulsion. C'est aux soumissionnaires de décider.

[Texte]

Mr. McKinnon: Did the specifications call for a cruising range the vessel must have?

Mr. Killick: I cannot answer that question specifically. But the specification described in general all the significant performance criteria of the vessel required.

Mr. McKinnon: Surely cruising range would be within that, would it not?

Mr. Killick: I would imagine, yes. But I would like to ensure I know that by checking the specification.

The Chairman: When you check, would you be kind enough to send an answer right away? I will provide it.

Mr. McKinnon: I think I have gone over my time pretty well. If there is a second round, I will get into the nitpicking bits of the estimates we are allowed to discuss intelligently here, provided I do not go over a few bucks here and there.

The Chairman: Dr. Hudecki, please.

Mr. Hudecki: I was just going to raise a point of order. I think in principle the officials and the department, in making any statements at this point, are giving information on which the bidding may be based. I do not think in principle they are able to give specific details that may favour any or would confuse the judges about who should win the competition.

On the other hand, I feel the members of the committee are perfectly free to give their suggestions on what they consider could add substantially to improvement of the program. I do not think there is anything prohibiting any one of us from passing that information.

I think there is a difference there of communicating our ideas but not asking for information that will prejudice the judgment of the people who have to make the final decision.

Mr. McKinnon: On the same point of order, Dr. Hudecki surely is suggesting it is all right for us to make suggestions as long as we do not know what we are talking about. What you are telling me is that you are not quite sure what you want, but you are anxious to criticize what is being recommended by the officials.

• 0955

Mr. McKinnon: Not at all. I am anxious to study what has been asked for and what has been submitted. I do not want to criticize anything in particular. I would like to know what we are spending \$5 billion on.

Mrs. Appolloni: On the same point of order.

The Chairman: Madam, please, it is an exchange that is going a little bit far, but we are in a good mood. I would not like to prolong it too long.

Madam Appolloni, if it is on the same point.

[Traduction]

Mr. McKinnon: Les spécifications précisaient-elles quel rayon d'action le navire devait avoir?

Mr. Killick: Je ne peux pas répondre à cette question de façon précise. Mais, de façon générale, les spécifications précisent tous les critères de performance importants auxquels le navire doit répondre.

Mr. McKinnon: Dans ce cas, il faudrait certainement préciser le rayon d'action, n'est-ce pas?

Mr. Killick: Oui, je suppose. Mais pour vous répondre par un oui catégorique, il faudrait vérifier les spécifications.

Le président: Lorsque vous ferez cette vérification, pouvez-vous nous faire connaître votre réponse immédiatement? Je la transmettrai.

Mr. McKinnon: Je vois que j'ai nettement dépassé mon temps de parole. Si nous procédons à un deuxième tour, je poserai des questions sur les détails du budget dont nous pouvons discuter de façon intelligente, à condition de ne pas nous en tenir à des sommes peu importantes.

Le président: Monsieur Hudecki, je vous prie.

Mr. Hudecki: J'étais sur le point d'invoquer le Règlement. Le ministère et ses représentants, en répondant à nos questions, nous donnent des renseignements du cahier des charges. En principe, ils ne devraient pas nous donner des renseignements précis qui pourraient favoriser un soumissionnaire ou confondre ceux qui doivent adjuger les contrats.

Par contre, il me semble que les membres du Comité sont tout à fait libres de faire des propositions qu'ils pourraient estimer aptes à améliorer considérablement le programme. Rien ne nous empêche de transmettre ces suggestions.

Il faut distinguer entre communiquer nos opinions et demander des renseignements qui pourraient influencer sur ceux qui ont à prendre la décision finale.

Mr. McKinnon: Moi aussi, j'invoque le Règlement: M. Hudecki dit donc que nous pouvons faire des propositions dans la mesure où nous ne savons pas de quoi nous parlons. Vous me dites que vous ne savez pas au juste ce que vous voulez; mais vous êtes impatient de critiquer ce que les représentants du ministère ont recommandé.

Mr. McKinnon: Pas du tout. Je suis impatient de connaître ce que l'on a demandé et ce qui a été proposé. Je ne veux pas critiquer quoi que ce soit en particulier. Je veux savoir où iront les 5 milliards de dollars.

Mme Appolloni: J'invoque le même Règlement à mon tour.

Le président: Madame, je vous en prie; cette discussion a pris une tangente, mais nous sommes tous de bonne humeur; quoiqu'il en soit, je ne voudrais pas que cela dure trop longtemps.

Madame Appolloni, pourvu qu'il s'agisse de la même question.

[Text]

Mrs. Appolloni: It is on the same point of order, Mr. Chairman. As I see it, there is a fundamental point at issue here, and that is the responsibility of the department towards the two consortia. As in any business situation, I also fully sympathize, however, with Mr. McKinnon's right to have certain information, particularly in discussing main estimates, and I sympathize tremendously with his frustration at finding information in the press that he appears to be unable to gain from the department.

Having said that, however, I come back to the fundamental responsibility of the department towards the two consortia. I wonder if it would not be better and easier if we were to have legal opinion on that very point; that is, the extent to which the department can go, knowing that no contract has been let at this moment, and knowing that if it were to overstep its bounds, shall we say, whatever they may be, one way or the other, that either consortium could accuse them of breach of contract. It seems to me it is a legal position. In all fairness to the department, Mr. Chairman, I would not like the record to show that there has been even a hint of distrust on the part of anyone in this room towards the department.

The Chairman: Surely, madam, legally speaking, it may be very interesting to know; but it is a question of practicability. The department is being questioned; they know how far they can go. Members have no limit; members can ask anything. It is for the department to be on their toes and realize how far they can go in the answer.

The point that was raised by Mr. McKinnon is the point I had in my mind myself. I too read newspapers and I too was absolutely—not surprised, not shocked—astounded maybe, but I read and I saw something interesting that I have not seen anywhere else. My curiosity was also aroused; like yours, I am sure.

Mrs. Appolloni: But, Mr. Chairman . . .

The Chairman: But we are not blaming anybody. I think the department knows how far they can answer and members usually take the word of the department. The last appeal is to the minister; they can question the minister.

Mrs. Appolloni: No, Mr. Chairman, in the interest of fairness towards the department, the witnesses . . .

The Chairman: Madam, the department has not been put in any embarrassing situation. I think departmental people are tough officials. I think, in all fairness, they have said: I think that is how far I can go. I do not think, unless I have not listened well this morning . . .

Mrs. Appolloni: The point is that the department is limited by certain restrictions . . .

The Chairman: Of course.

Mrs. Appolloni: —which do not necessarily apply to the people who form the consortia. It is that basic and that should be established on the record.

[Translation]

Mme Appolloni: C'est bien cela, monsieur le président. Selon moi, il y a une question fondamentale à régler dans ce cas-ci: la responsabilité du ministère envers les deux consortiums. Je suis tout à fait d'accord que M. McKinnon est en droit d'obtenir certains renseignements, particulièrement dans le cadre de l'examen du budget principal; je comprends tout à fait le sentiment de frustration qu'il éprouve en lisant dans les journaux des renseignements qu'il ne peut pas obtenir directement du ministère.

Cela dit, je reviens à la responsabilité première du ministère envers les deux consortiums. Ne serait-il pas mieux et plus facile d'obtenir l'avis d'un conseiller juridique sur la question suivante: Étant donné qu'aucun contrat n'a été accordé jusqu'ici, dans quelle mesure le ministère peut-il être accusé de violation de contrat par l'un ou l'autre des consortiums si les fonctionnaires divulguent trop de renseignements? Il me semble que c'est une question d'ordre juridique. Monsieur le président, je ne veux pas que le compte rendu laisse entendre que quelqu'un dans cette pièce éprouve une certaine méfiance à l'égard du ministère.

Le président: Bien sûr, madame, et c'est très intéressant d'avoir l'avis d'un conseiller juridique à cet égard; mais il s'agit d'une question d'ordre pratique. On interroge le ministère; les fonctionnaires savent jusqu'où ils peuvent aller. On n'impose pas de limite aux questions que les députés peuvent poser. C'est aux représentants du ministère d'être sur leur garde et de faire preuve de prudence en donnant une réponse.

M. McKinnon a soulevé une question qui m'intéresse également. Moi aussi, je lis les journaux et j'étais tout à fait . . . non pas étonné, ni bouleversé . . . mais abasourdi en lisant des renseignements intéressants que je n'avais pas vus ailleurs. Ma curiosité a également été piquée; comme la vôtre, j'en suis sûr.

Mme Appolloni: Mais, monsieur le président . . .

Le président: Mais nous ne blâmons pas qui que ce soit. Les fonctionnaires du ministère savent jusqu'où ils peuvent aller en répondant aux questions et les députés acceptent généralement leurs réponses. En dernier recours, ils peuvent faire appel au ministre et lui poser des questions.

Mme Appolloni: Non, monsieur le président; pour nous montrer justes envers le ministère, les témoins . . .

Le président: Madame, le ministère n'a pas été placé dans une situation gênante. Il me semble que les représentants du ministère sont des durs. Soyons justes: Il me semble qu'ils se sont dit: Voici jusqu'où nous pouvons aller. À moins de n'avoir pas porté une attention suffisante aux discussions de ce matin, . . .

Mme Appolloni: Le fait demeure que le ministère est assujéti à certaines restrictions . . .

Le président: D'accord.

Mme Appolloni: . . . qui ne visent pas nécessairement les membres des consortiums. C'est aussi simple que cela et le compte rendu devrait le reconnaître.

[Texte]

The Chairman: That is probably what I hinted when I said that maybe the consortia have some interests in spreading news around. That does not mean it is the department. I think members see that very well.

Mr. Laniel, on the same point.

I would not like to extend. These are procedural points. Members have an opinion. I give the floor to each member and they can express themselves; but since I have recognized others on this point, I will also recognize Mr. Laniel, and I will revert back to recognizing members. The next one is Mr. Munro.

Mr. Bradley: Two years from now, we will believe them all.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel, please.

Mr. Laniel: In relation to that point of order, I just wanted to ask whether these specification documents are public documents or not, whether they are available to members of this committee and whether they are very voluminous. Could they be useful to us?

• 1000

Mr. Dewar: I would like the Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel to answer that question, please.

The Chairman: Mr. Killick.

Mr. Laniel: My question is: Are the specification documents public documents and are they available? Are they voluminous and could they be useful to the members of this committee, if they are public documents? And if they are not public documents, why?

Mr. Killick: Mr. Chairman, the documents, if they are in an unclassified form and in a general form, then there does not seem to me at this point in time any objection as to why you should see them. Some sections of that document would be unclassified. I can imagine there are some other sections—and I was just going to make a phone call—which would have classified sections; the performance, for example, of a missile system. I think, sir, you would understand that.

Mr. Laniel: Very much so.

Mr. Killick: Perhaps if I could just make that telephone call, I could probably answer Mr. McKinnon's question and also get a reading on that, if I could have five minutes.

The Chairman: Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: Mr. Chairman, I would fully support that. We all know there are limitations on the department, that they cannot provide us with a minute-by-minute account of their deliberations as to which consortium to choose, but this would be very helpful to this committee if we could see the calls for tender, which really is what it amounts to, or at least those parts of it that are unclassified. I would ask you to look at the classifications in a fairly sparing sense. There are political classifications as well as military classifications, and I would

[Traduction]

Le président: C'est probablement ce que j'ai laissé entendre en disant que les consortiums avaient probablement intérêt à répandre des nouvelles. Cela n'implique pas nécessairement le ministère. Les députés le comprennent très bien, il me semble.

Monsieur Laniel, au sujet de la même question.

Je n'aimerais pas que cette discussion se prolonge. Il s'agit de questions de procédure. Les députés ont leur opinion. Je leur donne la parole à tour de rôle pour qu'ils expriment leur opinion; mais puisque j'ai donné la parole à d'autres, il faudra également que je la donne à M. Laniel; ensuite, chacun des députés aura son tour de questions. Le prochain intervenant est M. Munro.

M. Bradley: Dans deux ans, nous les croirons tous.

Le président: Monsieur Laniel, s'il vous plaît.

M. Laniel: Au sujet de cette même question de règlement, j'aimerais savoir si le cahier des charges relève ou non du domaine public, et si les membres de ce Comité peuvent en obtenir un exemplaire. Les documents sont-ils volumineux? Nous seraient-ils utiles?

M. Dewar: Je demanderais au sous-ministre adjoint (Matériels) de répondre à cette question, si vous permettez.

Le président: Monsieur Killick.

M. Laniel: Voici ma question: le cahier des charges est-il public? Peut-on en obtenir un exemplaire? Est-il volumineux et pourrait-il être utile à ce Comité? S'il ne s'agit pas d'un document public, pouvez-vous nous en donner la raison?

M. Killick: Monsieur le président, je ne vois pas pourquoi on pourrait s'opposer à ce que vous en ayez un exemplaire, s'il s'agit, bien entendu, d'un document général qui n'est pas couvert par le secret. Certaines parties du document ne seraient pas couvertes par le secret. Par contre, d'autres le seraient; j'étais sur le point de faire un appel pour le savoir; la performance du système de missiles serait probablement couverte par le secret. Il me semble que vous pouvez vous imaginer pourquoi.

M. Laniel: Bien sûr.

M. Killick: Si vous me donnez cinq minutes, je pourrais faire cet appel, ce qui me permettrait de répondre à la question posée par M. McKinnon et à vous en dire davantage pour répondre à la vôtre.

Le président: Monsieur McKinnon.

M. McKinnon: Monsieur le président, je suis tout à fait d'accord. Nous savons que certaines restrictions ont été imposées au ministère et que ses fonctionnaires ne peuvent pas nous donner un compte rendu exact des discussions qu'ils ont tenues pour choisir un consortium; toutefois, il serait très utile aux travaux de ce Comité si ses membres pouvaient voir les appels d'offres et, tout au moins, les parties des documents qui ne sont pas couvertes par le secret. Je vous demanderais de considérer les cotes de confidentialité avec circonspection. Il existe des restrictions politiques et des restrictions militaires et

[Text]

not want to divulge anything that is truthfully called confidential, secret or restricted for military reasons.

The Chairman: Okay. Are there any other comments?

I recognize Mr. Munro.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I am still on this point of order, and I hope we can get it cleared up. The suggestion that Dr. Hudecki was making suggested there is one set of criteria going to one of the consortia and another set of criteria going to the other. Surely we ought to know whether they are trimarans or single-hull ships, whether they are so many meters at the water line, whether they have two stacks or three stacks, or whether they have no stacks. That sort of thing and the general performance, whether they are supposed to go at 75 knots, whether they have pontoons, whether they have steps up, whether they . . .

Mr. Laniel: What about the air force?

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Well, we might have asked the same about the F-18s, but it does seem extraordinary. I do not see anything commercially that offends the competitive nature of the bidding if the same criteria are being sent to those who are going to do the bidding. I think that is the point that Mr. McKinnon is making. It is just crazy.

The Chairman: Yes, please. Mr. Dewar.

Mr. Dewar: Mr. Chairman, obviously Mr. Munro is right, and we may have a misunderstanding on this point. There were certain performance specifications established at the beginning of this process which were obviously common specifications to both consortia. Mr. Killick commented a few minutes ago that he would inquire into the nature of the documentation on that point. He will report back to us.

On the question as to what can be public and what cannot, I really would request to defer that until Mr. Killick comes back, but I assure Mr. Munro that he is quite right. We are dealing with a common statement of performance requirement against which the two bidders responded.

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Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Munro, you still have the floor.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): No. It was merely on this point of order.

The Chairman: Well, fine, but I had at that time recognized you. So I will recognize now Mrs. Appolloni and then come back to others who will so indicate.

Madame Appolloni, s'il vous plaît.

Mrs. Appolloni: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My question regards the proposal to put young people in the armed forces for a short period of time. I would like a progress report on the program, particularly in view of an article I read in the newspaper, I think about a week ago, coming from a recruiting office in British Columbia. Evidently the man who

[Translation]

je ne voudrais pas rendre publics des renseignements qui seraient effectivement confidentiels, secrets ou destinés à une diffusion restreinte pour des raisons militaires.

Le président: Bon. D'autres commentaires?

Je cède la parole à M. Munro.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je m'intéresse également à cette question et j'espère que nous pourrions la régler. M. Hudecki pense qu'on a pu imposer une série de critères à un des consortiums et une autre série de critères à l'autre. Il nous faudrait certainement savoir s'il s'agit de trimarans ou de monocoques, combien de mètres on peut compter à la ligne de flottaison, combien il y a de cheminées, le cas échéant. Il faudrait avoir des renseignements de ce genre et des détails quant à la performance générale; les navires sont-ils censés atteindre une vitesse de 75 noeuds? Seront-ils dotés de pontons, d'échelles . . . ?

M. Laniel: Et des renseignements sur les forces aériennes?

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Eh bien, nous aurions pu poser les mêmes questions au sujet des F-18, mais c'est assez extraordinaire. Je n'ai rien à redire quant à l'aspect concurrentiel des appels d'offres si les mêmes critères sont envoyés aux soumissionnaires. Voilà ce que M. McKinnon voulait dire. C'est insensé.

Le président: Oui; allez-y, monsieur Dewar.

M. Dewar: Monsieur le président, M. Munro a raison, bien entendu; et il y a peut-être un malentendu à ce sujet. Au début, on avait prévu certaines spécifications de performance qui étaient les mêmes pour les deux consortiums. M. Killick a dit il y a quelques minutes qu'il demanderait quelle cote de secret a été donnée aux documents. Il nous donnera une réponse sous peu.

Quant à savoir quels renseignements peuvent être rendus publics ou non, j'aimerais y répondre lorsque M. Killick nous aura donné ses réponses; mais je tiens à signaler à M. Munro qu'il a tout à fait raison. Il s'agit du même cahier des charges de performance sur lequel les deux consortiums ont fondé leurs soumissions.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci.

Le président: Monsieur Munro, vous avez encore la parole.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Non, je voulais tout simplement apporter cette précision.

Le président: Très bien; je vous avais pourtant cédé la parole, Je la cède donc à M^{me} Appolloni; puis, à ceux qui la demanderont.

Mrs. Appolloni, if you please,

Mme Appolloni: Merci, monsieur le président.

Ma question porte sur le programme destiné à incorporer des jeunes gens dans les Forces armées pour une brève période. J'aimerais savoir où en est ce programme, étant donné un article paru dans le journal, il y a une semaine, au sujet d'un bureau de recrutement en Colombie-Britannique. De toute

[Texte]

was interviewed said there seemed to be little interest in the program. Now, in my own riding last Friday I found a mother whose son had applied quite a while ago for the regular forces and he was accepted conditionally at that time, conditional upon a vacancy occurring. The vacancy obviously did not occur, and the young man is still unemployed. The point I am trying to make is that neither the mother nor her son knew about this possibility of the young boy being accepted at least for one year. That is quite conceivable in view of the type of people I am thinking of. That boy has been unemployed for quite a long time and, frankly, cannot afford a daily newspaper. So I would be concerned if there were an apparent lack of interest due to lack of information about the program.

The Chairman: Mr. Dewar.

Mr. Dewar: May I just clarify one point? Mrs. Appolloni is referring here to the extended youth employment program, the military program for 5,000 people?

Mrs. Appolloni: Yes, I am.

Mr. Dewar: I . . .

Mrs. Appolloni: Which, frankly, I was hoping would take in quite a lot more than 5,000.

Mr. Dewar: If I may, I would like to ask Mr. Patenaude to respond to this.

Mr. R.L. Patenaude (Director, Personnel Requirements and Control, Department of National Defence): In reply, Mrs. Appolloni, I would like to just mention that the program started on May 9 as far as bringing young recruits in. We are taking them in weekly, every Monday, and approximately 5,000 from across the country. I can even give you the approximate distribution: in the Atlantic zone, about 18% of the 5,000; in Quebec, approximately 27%; in the central zone, 31%; in the western zone, 24%. The program is designed to take people from the lists of young people who are already known by the recruiters plus anyone else who presents himself. Some come from the unemployed people who are attached to our reserve units. The plan is to go for approximately 18 months and the build-up will continue through the summer right through the fall in the various trades available depending on where we can train them. That is a general overview. If you have some more specific questions you would like to ask . . . ?

Mrs. Appolloni: Yes. Is the department meeting difficulty in finding the 18%, the 21% and so on, or is the quota being filled? It started on May 9. There was good TV coverage in Toronto about the first two girls. I suppose it is too early to know how the initial recruits are doing.

Well, that for the moment. I have another question later on.

[Traduction]

évidence, l'homme que l'on a interrogé semblait croire que les gens ne s'intéressaient guère à ce programme. Or, dans ma propre circonscription, vendredi dernier, j'ai rencontré une mère dont le fils avait demandé il y a assez longtemps à faire partie des Forces régulières; à ce moment-là, on l'a accepté sous condition qu'il y ait un poste à pourvoir. Il n'y a pas eu de poste à pourvoir et le jeune homme est toujours sans emploi. Voici où je veux en venir: ni la mère ni le fils n'avaient été mis au courant de la possibilité que le jeune homme puisse être accepté, ne serait-ce que pour un an. On peut le comprendre, étant donné le genre de personnes dont il s'agit. Ce jeune homme est sans emploi depuis assez longtemps et, franchement, il ne peut même pas trouver les moyens de s'acheter un journal. Je m'inquiète de ce que ce manque d'intérêt possible peut être inépuisable à un manque d'information au sujet du programme.

Le président: Monsieur Dewar.

M. Dewar: Puis-je demander une précision? Mme Appolloni fait-elle allusion au programme prolongé d'instruction et d'emploi qui vise à offrir un emploi dans un cadre militaire à 5,000 personnes?

Mme Appolloni: Oui. C'est ça.

M. Dewar: Je . . .

Mme Appolloni: . . . programme qui, je l'espérais, viserait beaucoup plus que 5,000 personnes.

M. Dewar: Si vous permettez, je demanderai à M. Patenaude de répondre à cette question.

M. R.L. Patenaude (directeur, Besoins en personnel (contrôle), ministère de la Défense nationale): Madame Appolloni, je vous signale que nous avons donné suite à ce programme le 9 mai lorsque nous avons commencé à recevoir les jeunes recrues. Ces personnes sont incorporées tous les lundis, et il y en aura environ 5,000 de toutes les régions du pays' Je peux même vous donner une ventilation approximative: de la région de l'Atlantique, environ 18 p. 100 des 5,000; de la région du Québec, environ 27 p. 100; de la région centrale, 31 p. 100; de l'Ouest, 24 p. 100. Le programme est conçu de telle sorte qu'il incorpore d'abord les jeunes gens dont les noms figuraient déjà sur la liste, qui sont connus des agents de recrutement, puis de toute personne qui se présente. Certains des sans-emploi sont rattachés à nos unités de réserve. Le programme est censé durer environ 18 mois et il battra son plein durant l'été et l'automne, au moment où on donnera diverses formations professionnelles, selon la disponibilité des locaux. C'est un aperçu général du programme. Si vous avez des questions plus précises à poser . . . ?

Mme Appolloni: Oui, Est-il difficile pour le ministère de trouver ces 18 p. 100, ces 21 p. 100 ou réussit-il à trouver le quota? Le programme a été amorcé le 9 mai. À Toronto, la télévision a donné une large publicité à l'incorporation des deux premières jeunes filles. Il est sans doute trop tôt pour savoir comment vont les premières recrues.

Eh bien, voilà, pour le moment. J'aurai une autre question à poser plus tard.

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Mr. Patenaude: Right. There has been no difficulty filling the quotas at this early stage. If we found later on that we were exhausting the people either presenting themselves or that we have available on our lists, then possibly we would have to publicize a little more. But the program is well known, I think, by some of the young people and they are certainly presenting themselves. We are having no difficulty filling the quotas.

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I cannot really say any more on that.

Mrs. Appolloni: Still on youth, but a different type, particularly summer programs for youth...

Mr. Hudecki: May I ask a supplementary on that?

The Chairman: Yes, you may.

Mr. Hudecki: Do we advertise through the employment centres?

Mr. Patenaude: Yes, we do. The employment centres know about the program and it is advertised there as well as through our...

Mr. Hudecki: So those looking for work have an opportunity to...

Mr. Patenaude: Anyone looking for work has the opportunity to apply for this program.

Mrs. Appolloni: This might be rather lengthy. Perhaps you could give a written reply, Mr. Patenaude. What particular trades are the young people going to be trained in during the 18-month period?

If you prefer a written reply, it is fine.

Mr. Patenaude: If you wanted the specific trades, I would have to give you a written answer to that. But they are basically the same trades as we employ regular force people in.

Mrs. Appolloni: Turning to the summer youth programs, maybe it is a sign of the times—I hope that is all it is—but I have been receiving quite a few complaints from young people that they are not able to go to the cadet camps, or in some cases even the BOC training courses, because they are full. I had understood that the budget had allowed the department extra money this year for summer employment for young people. Is it because the interest is too high, or is it because the money is quite simply not sufficient for youth?

Mr. Patenaude: I am not directly responsible for that program, but I do have some knowledge. The extra money and the extra people—all I can see is that there are sufficient numbers who want to get into these programs. I think it is a matter of volume. There are enough people to fill them, and once they are filled, that is it; that is the capacity of the

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M. Patenaude: Bon. Nous n'avons pas eu de difficulté à atteindre les quotas à ce stade-ci. Si, par la suite, on découvrirait qu'un nombre insuffisant de personnes se présentaient ou que nos listes étaient épuisées, il faudrait accorder un peu plus de publicité à ce programme. Mais le programme est bien connu des jeunes gens, si l'on en juge par le nombre d'entre eux qui se présentent. Nous n'avons pas vraiment de difficulté à remplir les contingents.

Je ne peux pas en dire davantage vraiment.

Mme Appolloni: Au sujet toujours des jeunes, mais d'un autre genre, les programmes d'été qui s'adressent aux jeunes...

M. Hudecki: Puis-je poser une question supplémentaire à ce sujet?

Le président: Oui, allez-y.

M. Hudecki: Est-ce que nous faisons de la publicité dans les centres d'emplois?

M. Patenaude: Oui; nous en faisons. Les centres d'emplois connaissent le programme et on y fait de la publicité de même que par l'entremise de nos...

M. Hudecki: Ainsi, ceux qui cherchent du travail ont l'occasion de...

M. Patenaude: Tous ceux qui cherchent du travail peuvent présenter une demande dans le cadre de ce programme.

Mme Appolloni: Comme ce peut être assez long, vous pourriez peut-être nous envoyer une réponse écrite, monsieur Patenaude. Quels sont les métiers pour lesquels les jeunes recevront une formation pendant ces 18 mois?

Si vous préférez me répondre par écrit, cela me conviendra parfaitement.

M. Patenaude: Si vous voulez parler des métiers spécifiques, il me faudra vous répondre par écrit. Il s'agit, fondamentalement, des mêmes métiers auxquels s'adonnent les Forces armées régulières.

Mme Appolloni: Pour en revenir aux programmes d'été offerts aux jeunes, c'est peut-être un signe des temps—j'espère que ce n'est que cela—mais j'ai reçu quelques plaintes de jeunes qui ne sont pas acceptés dans des camps de cadets, ou même dans certains cas, qui ne sont pas admis à des cours de formation BOTC, parce qu'il n'y a plus de places. Je crois comprendre qu'on alloue dans le budget à votre ministère les sommes additionnelles cette année pour l'emploi d'été des jeunes gens. Est-ce parce qu'on y porte trop d'intérêt, ou tout simplement parce que l'argent affecté au profit des jeunes n'est pas suffisant?

M. Patenaude: Je ne suis pas directement responsable de ce programme, mais je le connais quelque peu. Les sommes additionnelles et les personnes additionnelles—tout ce dont je me rends compte c'est qu'il y a suffisamment de jeunes qui veulent s'inscrire à ce programme. C'est une question de volume. Il y a suffisamment de personnes pour le nombre de places prévues, mais une fois qu'elles sont comblées, c'est tout,

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program—the 17,000 young people involved. I do not know just the exact detail of that program, though.

The Chairman: The chief of staff, please.

General R.M. Withers (Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, I might add to what Mr. Patenaude has said. It has been the case over the last several years that each summer the summer programs have been oversubscribed. In addition to the moneys that were specifically allocated to us for summer employment from the department, we have in turn added additional funds to make the programs as large as we feasibly can. I think the popularity of the programs is really the thing that is at issue.

The Chairman: May I exceptionally ask a question? You know it is not in my practice; in the British parliamentary system, the chairmen chair, so I usually do that. But I have been trying for many years to learn more about this project.

You said because of the—I am talking now to General Withers—popularity of the project it is always overbooked, if I may use this expression. I am always surprised that because something is very popular it seems we have some limitation; and when it is not too popular we go on with the program.

Could you in your quick evaluation give us, for us to make more representations, an approximate number for the percentage of people who are turned down? I am a strong, strong, strong supporter of these summer projects for our youth: good training, good discipline—the beginning of good discipline—it is healthy; and everything else that I have seen. I have visited some of them. I attended the graduation. I was very moved when I saw these young Canadians coming from everywhere, singing almost in one tongue, *O Canada*. Right in the heartland of Quebec, to see some kids coming from Quebec singing *O Canada* at the end of the summer—probably some of them did not even know the words at the beginning of the summer. I will not elaborate more about the good it does in many ways.

What is, in your evaluation, the number of people who are turned down? It is our duty as politicians to make sure that sufficient funds should be given the military to help them help our youth.

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Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, I should add that in addition to the dollars allocated to the program there is another practical limit we have; that is, accommodation and the availability of leadership to run the programs. For instance, I recall having visited one of the summer youth employment programs last year where the armoury that they had available to them could only sustain a strength of about 210. And they

[Traduction]

le programme a une certaine capacité—je crois que 17,000 jeunes sont prévus. Je ne connais pas tous les détails de ce programme cependant.

Le président: Monsieur le chef de l'état-major de la Défense, s'il vous plaît.

Le Gén. R.M. Withers (chef de l'état-major de la Défense, ministère de la Défense nationale): Monsieur le président, j'ajouterai à ce qu'a dit M. Patenaude, qu'au cours de ces dernières années, nous avons reçu beaucoup plus de demandes que nous n'avions de places pour ces programmes d'été. De plus, le ministère nous a attribué certaines sommes pour les emplois d'été, mais nous avons également reçu des fonds additionnels pour donner aux programmes toute l'extension possible. Mais ce qui est en cause, c'est la popularité des programmes.

Le président: Exceptionnellement, puis-je poser une question? Vous savez que je ne le fais pas habituellement, mais dans le système parlementaire britannique, le président préside, et c'est ce que je fais normalement. Cependant, j'essaie depuis bien des années d'en connaître davantage au sujet de ce projet.

Je m'adresse maintenant au général Withers, vous avez déclaré qu'à cause de sa popularité, vous êtes débordés de demandes pour ce projet, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi. Je suis toujours un peu étonné de voir que, si quelque chose est populaire, il semble que nous ayons des limites, et lorsque ce n'est pas populaire, nous pouvons donner suite au programme.

Pouvez-vous nous dire brièvement, afin que nous puissions présenter des recommandations, quel est le pourcentage approximatif des jeunes qui sont rejetés? J'appuie avec beaucoup de conviction ces programmes d'été pour la jeunesse: pour qu'elle reçoive une bonne formation, une bonne discipline—le début d'une bonne discipline—c'est très sain, il en va de même pour tout ce que j'ai vu. J'ai visité certains camps. Je me suis rendu à des remises de diplômes. C'était très émouvant de voir ces jeunes Canadiens venus d'un peu partout, chanter presque dans une même langue, «Oh Canada». Au coeur même du Québec, j'ai vu ces enfants du Québec et je les ai entendu chanter «Oh Canada» à la fin de l'été—probablement que certains au début de l'été ne connaissaient même pas les paroles. Je ne vais pas en dire davantage sur les bons effets que ces programmes ont, et cela sur bien des plans.

Quelle est votre évaluation du nombre de jeunes qui sont rejetés? C'est notre devoir, en tant que politiciens, de nous assurer que des sommes suffisantes sont attribuées aux militaires afin qu'ils aident notre jeunesse,

Gén Withers: Monsieur le président, j'ajouterais qu'à part les crédits affectés au programme, il y a une autre limite pratique, autrement dit le logement et la disponibilité des dirigeants pour ces programmes. Je me souviens avoir visité un endroit où il se donnait un des programmes d'emplois d'été pour les jeunes, l'an dernier, et le manège militaire où se trouvaient les jeunes ne pouvait accommoder que 210 person-

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had at that location an additional 60 people who wanted to be involved but could not be.

It is also worth noting, I think, that the summer is our busiest period and represents the maximum impact on all our training facilities because of the militia, summer training, the cadet programs and the additional programs this year. So really, the plant is operating at maximum physical capacity.

As to your question of how many we turn down across the country, I regret I cannot answer that now; but I would be happy to attempt to answer it in due course.

The Chairman: Could I make a suggestion? It is a very positive suggestion. I see so many beautiful, large, immense colleges that close down during the summer, where there is every facility: sports facilities, dormitory facilities, food facilities. I see high schools that are closed down for the summer, where they have sports facilities. Maybe not dormitories, but it will be a question of finding how we can do it. As for the leadership necessary, I am sure if we had to go through an unfortunate, severe international period, we would find almost immediately the leadership necessary.

So could I kindly suggest that maybe you should look into—I will put it kindly first and then I will do the rest politically... to using the schools? We have so many. For instance, in my province—I do not know enough about the others, but surely they must be the same... there are private schools that close for the summer, where they have dormitories, where they have a cafeteria, where they have sports facilities. Maybe it would be a good combination to use that. And it is good income for these schools. That would be paid by the federal government. And the facilities are there.

So I just leave it without an answer. I just leave it to you as a suggestion.

Mr. Laniel, on this question? Otherwise I will go back to Mrs. Appolloni. Mrs. Appolloni, have you terminated?

Mrs. Appolloni: Just to sum up, I would very much like the whole defence question to have a higher priority within Canadian youth. I do not think your image has been too shiny at all times; not particularly the Canadian military image, but military images in this hemisphere. So therefore, I personally appreciate any efforts that are made to attract youth to the military ideal. And particularly just now, when there is high unemployment, I would like to feel that every effort is being made within the department's own constraints to get the youth and to give them as far as possible some kind of job and training.

Coming back to this extended youth program or whatever Mr. Patenaude calls it, he said that priority was being given to those young people who had already volunteered to join the regular forces. I just wonder how aggressively the recruiting offices are following this. Are they phoning the people and

[Translation]

nes. À cet endroit, 60 jeunes de plus voulaient s'inscrire, mais c'était impossible.

Il faut remarquer également que l'été est la période la plus active, la plus exigeante pour nos services de formation, à cause de la milice, de la formation d'été, des programmes offerts aux cadets et des programmes additionnels cette année. Par conséquent, nous fonctionnons vraiment au maximum de notre capacité matérielle.

Pour ce qui est de savoir combien de jeunes nous ne pouvons pas accepter au pays, je regrette de ne pouvoir vous répondre maintenant, mais je serai heureux de vous fournir une réponse le moment voulu.

Le président: Puis-je me permettre une suggestion? Il s'agit d'une suggestion très positive. Je me rends compte qu'il y a tellement de collèges immenses, magnifiques, qui ferment leurs portes pendant l'été, et on y dispose de toutes sortes de services: sports, dortoirs, cafétérias. Il y a aussi des écoles secondaires qui ferment pendant l'été, et qui disposent d'installations sportives. Elles n'ont peut-être pas de dortoirs, mais il s'agit peut-être de trouver comment on peut procéder. Pour ce qui est des dirigeants, je suis certain que si nous avions à subir une période difficile, grave, sur le plan international, nous trouverions immédiatement les chefs nécessaires.

Permettez-moi donc de vous suggérer d'étudier la question, je vous la propose d'abord, j'irai ensuite sur le plan politique, afin que l'on puisse se servir de ces écoles? Nous en avons tellement. Dans ma province, par exemple, je ne connais pas suffisamment les autres provinces, mais ce doit être à peu près la même chose, il y a des écoles privées qui ferment pendant l'été, et il s'y trouve des dortoirs, des cafétérias, des installations sportives. On pourrait peut-être se servir de ces deux genres d'établissements. Ce serait également une très bonne source de recettes pour ces écoles. Ce serait payé par le gouvernement fédéral. De toute façon, elles ont les installations qu'il faut.

Je ne m'attends pas à une réponse, il s'agit simplement d'une suggestion.

Monsieur Laniel, voulez-vous prendre la parole à ce sujet? Autrement, je donne de nouveau la parole à M^{me} Appolloni. Madame Appolloni, avez-vous terminé?

Mme Appolloni: Pour résumer, j'aimerais bien que toute cette question de la défense occupe une priorité plus élevée chez les jeunes Canadiens. Je ne pense pas que votre image ait été tellement bonne, tout le temps, pas tellement l'image militaire canadienne, mais l'image militaire de cette hémisphère. Personnellement, j'apprécie beaucoup les efforts qui sont faits pour prôner cet idéal militaire chez les jeunes. Surtout maintenant, en période de fort chômage, j'aimerais croire que l'on fait tout ce qui est possible compte tenu des contraintes du ministère, pour attirer les jeunes et pour leur donner un emploi et une formation.

Je voudrais en revenir à ce programme élargi pour les jeunes, quelle que soit l'appellation que lui donne M. Patenaude, il a déclaré que l'on accorderait la priorité aux jeunes qui s'étaient déjà portés volontaires pour s'enrôler dans les forces régulières. Je me demande à quel point les bureaux de

[*Texte*]

saying: Look, I know you want to go into the regular. We cannot take you because of our ceiling, but you could possibly join this more temporary program. I am just wondering about the aggressiveness and how sincerely interested the various recruiting officers are.

Mr. Patenaude: Yes, I can answer that question. What you described is exactly what is happening. The recruiters are calling because they have what we call waiting lists, they know where these people are and they are giving them an offer to go into this new training employment program in lieu of the fact that there are not as many openings in the regular force. They are giving these young people the choice of joining up for approximately one year under this program; and there is a possibility that, at some point by 1984, there might be some more vacancies in the regular force. These people are being trained to regular force standards.

• 1020

Mrs. Appolloni: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, madam. Next on my list I have Mr. Stewart, then I will recognize others. I also have Mr. Bradley and Mr. Laniel. So please, Mr. Stewart followed by Mr. Laniel and Mr. Munro.

Mr. Stewart: There are still a lot of rumblings coming from the U.S. that the manufacture of the F-18 will be considerably lower than the 1,366 projected for the offsets. Also, there is another bill that could come before Congress, HR-2057, which in essence plans to exclude Canada from access to U.S. defence industry development programs, partially because the consideration has been that Canada has been taking a free ride on defence and because they feel that we are a security risk after the Hambleton affair. I would like to have your comments on that. Also, we know that the minister has been running directly to the U.S. government, as far as the F-18 is concerned, and I would like to know if there is any change in the offset program and if there are any future purchases of the F-18 contemplated for attrition.

Gen Withers: I might answer that, Mr. Chairman; and to the extent that I do not have the details, perhaps I will ask for an additional voice. First of all, we have no indication that F-18 U.S. production, F/A-18, will be any lower than was contemplated. Indeed, recently the decision was taken by the U.S. Navy and the Department of Defense to move ahead with the attack side of it; the F-18 will, in other words, go ahead according to the original concept. That is the picture on the F-18.

As to the effect of any legislation being contemplated in Washington in regard to technology transfer, I would ask Mr. Killick, the Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), to answer that.

Mr. Killick: It is correct to say that there have been press reports and speculations in the press. However, in our day-to-day contacts with the Pentagon, which are on almost a continuous basis, there is no evidence that there is going to be

[*Traduction*]

recrutement suivent activement cette directive. Est-ce que l'on appelle les jeunes pour leur dire: écoutez, je sais que vous voulez vous enrôler dans les forces régulières. Nous ne pouvons pas vous prendre parce que nous avons une limite, mais vous pouvez probablement vous inscrire à un programme temporaire. Est-ce qu'on est vraiment entreprenant, vraiment intéressé, chez les officiers de recrutement.

M. Patenaude: Oui, je peux répondre à cette question. Ce que vous avez décrit, c'est exactement ce qui se produit. Les officiers de recrutement appellent, car ils ont des listes d'admissibilité, ils savent où se trouvent les jeunes et ils peuvent leur offrir ce nouveau programme de formation étant donné qu'il n'y a pas de places actuellement dans les forces régulières. Ils offrent à ces jeunes le choix de faire partie de ce programme pendant environ un an, et c'est possible, à certains moments en 1984, qu'il y ait des vacances dans les forces régulières. Ces jeunes sont formés selon les normes des forces régulières.

Mme Appolloni: Merci, monsieur le président.

Le président: Merci, madame. Le prochain sur ma liste est M. Stewart, et je donnerai ensuite la parole à d'autres. J'ai également les noms de MM. Bradley et Laniel. Ce sera donc M. Stewart d'abord, suivi des MM. Laniel et Munro.

M. Stewart: On entend toujours beaucoup de rumeurs venant des États-Unis, selon lesquelles la production des F-18 sera bien inférieure au chiffre de 1,366 prévu au départ. Il y a aussi un autre projet de loi qui sera présenté au Congrès, le HR-2057, et qui vise essentiellement à empêcher le Canada d'avoir accès aux programmes de développement de l'industrie de la défense américain, en partie parce qu'on considère que le Canada a profité de la protection militaire des États-Unis et qu'il pose des problèmes de sécurité, surtout après l'affaire Hambleton. J'aimerais bien que vous me disiez ce que vous en pensez. De plus, nous savons que le ministre s'est adressé directement au gouvernement américain, du moins pour les F-18, et j'aimerais savoir s'il y a des changements au programme initial, et si on prévoit acheter d'autres F-18 de rechange.

Gén Withers: Je pourrais peut-être répondre, monsieur le président, mais je n'ai pas les détails, et je demanderai peut-être que quelqu'un d'autre ajoute ces détails. Premièrement, rien ne nous permet de penser que les F-18 aux États-Unis, les F/A-18, seront moins nombreux que prévu. En réalité, la marine américaine et le ministère de la Défense des États-Unis ont récemment pris la décision d'aller de l'avant, autrement dit le F-18 sera construit selon le concept initial. Voilà ce qui en est pour le F-18.

Pour ce qui est des effets de la loi prévue à Washington concernant le transfert de la technologie, je vais demander à M. Killick, le sous-ministre adjoint (matériel) de vous répondre.

M. Killick: Il est juste de dire qu'il y a eu des articles publiés par la presse qui s'est livrée à des conjectures à ce sujet. Cependant, nous n'avons aucune preuve dans nos contacts quotidiens avec le Pentagone, sur une base presque

[Text]

any change in policy and we do enjoy a very professional relationship with the U.S. Defense department.

Mr. Stewart: That is good to hear.

When our subs are no longer serviceable, is there a contemplation of replacing them with new or used ones? And do we have any idea of the cost of a sub replacement? Are we going to join—I have three little questions here at once—in an AWAC program with the United States? If so, by what percentage?

I wonder if there has been any serious thought given to smaller patrol boats in Canada. I was in South Africa and saw their patrol boats that were missile armed, and I just wondered if there was any serious consideration being given to a smaller patrol boat that could be used for search and rescue and defence.

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, on the question of the submarines, our submarines are just in the process of going through a program called SOUP, the Submarine Operational Update Plan, which will essentially modernize their command, control and communications systems.

• 1025

Those submarines will be effective units in the fleet into the 1990s. However, in the 1990s there will be a requirement to replace our submarines. We are now studying possible solutions to this problem.

It was mentioned that a number of countries have a similar type requirement and, indeed, we will be looking at the benefit of becoming a member of this kind of, if you will, submarine club for future replacements. A number of interesting designs are being examined.

As to the feasibility of the patrol boat solution, a number of our allies in NATO do have such units. I am thinking principally of the Norwegians and the Germans. Their ideal small unit is 150 to 200 tonnes for their coastal waters.

In our case, the principal requirement, or the most demanding requirement, which faces us is the North Atlantic. After many years of examining the question, we are still very firmly of the opinion that the type of ship needed for that ocean is one that is a very stable helicopter platform in those very demanding conditions; and this is generally something in the neighbourhood of, well, between 3,500 and 4,500 tonnes.

In terms of search and rescue, it is interesting that one of the most effective search and rescue vehicles, especially in the Atlantic, is one of these destroyers. I recall, for example, the rescue of the crew of the *Euro Princess* when it grounded on Sable Island. Very, very fortunately, one of our 280-class destroyers was within range; and notwithstanding that the winds at the time were, in fact, above what one would normally consider a safe limit, they were able to operate their helicopter and effect the rescue.

[Translation]

permanente, qu'il y aura des changements de politique, nous avons le plaisir d'avoir des rapports très professionnels avec le ministère de la Défense des États-Unis.

M. Stewart: C'est bon de vous l'entendre dire.

Lorsque nos sous-marins ne seront plus utilisables, est-ce que vous prévoyez les remplacer par des sous-marins neufs ou usagés? Avez-vous une idée du coût de remplacement d'un sous-marin? Allons-nous nous joindre—je vous pose ici trois courtes questions—au programme AWAC avec les États-Unis? Dans l'affirmative, dans quelle mesure?

Je me demande si vous avez songé sérieusement à obtenir de plus petits bateaux de patrouille pour le Canada. Je me suis rendu en Afrique du Sud et j'ai vu que leurs bateaux de patrouille étaient armés de missiles, et je me demande si on a vraiment songé à obtenir de plus petits bateaux de patrouille qui pourraient être utilisés pour la recherche et les sauvetages et également la dépense.

Gén Withers: Monsieur le président, au sujet des sous-marins, ils font actuellement l'objet d'un programme appelé SOUP. Il s'agit d'un programme de remise à jour opérationnelle de sous-marins, qui vise essentiellement à moderniser leur système de commande, de contrôle et de communication.

Ces sous-marins seront des unités efficaces de la flotte jusque dans les années 1990. Cependant, il faudra à ce moment-là, songer à remplacer nos sous-marins. Nous étudions présentement les solutions possibles à ce problème.

J'ai mentionné qu'un certain nombre de pays avaient des exigences semblables, et nous examinons les avantages de devenir membres d'un club de sous-marins, si vous voulez, pour ces remplacements futurs. Il y a un certain nombre de conceptions intéressantes qui sont en cours d'examen.

Pour ce qui est de la faisabilité de la solution d'un bateau de patrouille, un certain nombre de nos alliés de l'OTAN ont des unités semblables. Je pense surtout aux Norvégiens et aux Allemands. La petite unité idéale dont ils disposent est un bateau de 150 à 200 tonnes pour la patrouille côtière.

Dans notre cas, cette exigence est surtout essentielle pour l'Atlantique-nord. Après avoir étudié la question pendant bien des années, nous sommes toujours convaincus que le bateau nécessaire pour cet océan doit disposer d'une plate-forme d'hélicoptère très stable à cause des conditions très éprouvantes de l'océan. Il s'agirait donc d'un bateau de quelque 3,500 à 4,500 tonnes.

Pour ce qui est de la question de la recherche et du sauvetage, il est intéressant de remarquer qu'un des navires de recherche et de sauvetage les plus efficaces, surtout dans l'Atlantique, est un destroyer. Je me souviens, par exemple, du sauvetage de l'équipage de l'*Euro Princess*, qui s'était échoué sur l'île des Sables. Par chance, un de nos destroyers 280 se trouvait tout près, et en dépit des vents fort violents à ce moment-là, supérieurs à la limite considérée comme tolérable, on a pu faire décoller l'hélicoptère pour effectuer le sauvetage.

[Texte]

As to inshore rescue, of course, the responsibility for vessels for that role is the Canadian Coast Guard. Indeed, in the Canadian Coast Guard Development Plan, they are bringing into commission such small vessels.

Mr. Stewart: I have one short question.

I am very disturbed as far as Base Borden is concerned, which happens to be in my riding and—I think bases across the country and—the fact of the employment program in which, in our particular case, some 275 new jobs, supposedly, were created. In actuality, it was a job replacement program because the workers who would normally have been on the base, some of them with six years experience, were laid off. On checking at the base, I was told that the military were powerless to prevent the layoffs, of course, but I wonder if we had done anything about speaking to the Minister of Employment and Immigration, because I do not think this does much for the morale of any base when they know what is going on out there. Everyone was very cognizant of the fact that 275 were laid off and 275 were replaced—many of them people on welfare who did not want the job. Would you care to comment?

Mr. Dewar: Mr. Chairman, I will comment on this.

The Chairman: Mr. Dewar, please.

Mr. Dewar: The problem raised here is one we have had some difficulty in explaining. I think one must realize, first of all, that for every fiscal year we enter, we have a new set of plans as to our casual employment pattern. From year to year the priorities change from base to base and from one year to the other we have different authority levels from the Treasury Board as to how many casuals we will be able to employ. This occurred at the end of 1982-1983 as other years.

For 1983-1984, our authority to hire casuals or term employees was reduced in the budget planning. That plus the fact that priorities shift from one base to another from year to year led to a new pattern of authority for them, which was transmitted to the commands and to the bases towards the end of the last fiscal year. It was for that reason that across the country there was a considerable number of situations where term employees whose terms, as they understood it, were to end at the end of 1982-1983 were told they would not have renewal.

• 1030

Now, quite separately from the situation I have just described, the government put in place the civilian employment program; that is, the DND part of the NEED program. Under that program the department is authorized to hire some 3,000 people for varying periods in 1983-1984. There have been situations in which the kinds of jobs that were being done by term employees in the previous year are being done under the NEED program in the current year, but they are jobs which were not planned to be done by term employees in the current year because we did not have the authority under our

[Traduction]

Pour ce qui est des bateaux chargés du sauvetage côtier, la Garde côtière du Canada en a la responsabilité. Quant au projet d'expansion de la Garde côtière du Canada, on prévoit la mise en service de tels petits bateaux.

M. Stewart: J'ai une brève question à poser.

Je suis assez inquiet au sujet de la base Borden, qui se trouve dans ma circonscription—et aussi pour les autres bases du pays—du fait que les programmes d'emplois, dans ce cas-ci, prévoient apparemment 275 nouveaux emplois. En réalité, il s'agissait d'un programme de remplacement d'emplois, parce que des travailleurs qui auraient dû être en service à la base, certains d'entre eux avaient six ans d'expérience, ont été mis à pied. J'ai vérifié auprès de la base, et on m'a répondu que les militaires ne pouvaient absolument pas empêcher ces mises à pied, évidemment, mais je me demande si on a parlé au ministre de l'Emploi et de l'Immigration, car je ne pense pas que ce soit très bon pour le moral d'une base de savoir que ce genre de choses s'y passent. Chacun sait que 275 personnes ont été mises à pied et que 275 personnes ont été remplacées—beaucoup étaient des assistés sociaux et ils ne voulaient pas de travail. Voulez-vous me dire ce que vous en pensez.

M. Dewar: Monsieur le président, permettez-moi de répondre à cette question.

Le président: Certainement, monsieur Dewar.

M. Dewar: Le problème que vous soulevez ici est difficile à expliquer. Il faut savoir, tout d'abord, que pour chaque année financière, nous avons une nouvelle série de projets quant à l'embauche des travailleurs occasionnels. D'une année à l'autre, les priorités changent d'une base à une autre, et nous avons diverses limites que nous fixe le Conseil du Trésor et qui définissent combien de travailleurs occasionnels nous devons remplacer. Cela s'est produit à la fin de 1982-1983 comme pour les autres années.

Pour 1983-1984, notre limite d'embauche des travailleurs occasionnels ou temporaires a été réduite dans la planification budgétaire. Ajoutez à cela que les priorités changent d'une base à l'autre, ce qui a modifié quelque peu leurs limites propres qui ont été communiquées aux commandements et aux bases vers la fin du dernier exercice financier. C'est pour cela que l'on comptait bon nombre d'employés temporaires au pays, employés qui ne prévoyaient pas que leur emploi serait renouvelé à la fin de 1982-83.

Outre la situation que je viens de décrire, le gouvernement a créé un programme d'emplois destiné aux civils, le programme RELAIS dont une partie relève du ministère de la Défense nationale. Dans le cadre de ce programme, le ministère est autorisé à embaucher quelque 3,000 personnes pendant des périodes qui peuvent varier, en 1983-1984. Dans certains cas, des emplois détenus par les employés temporaires l'an précédent ont été confiés à d'autres dans le cadre du programme RELAIS de cette année, mais il s'agit d'emplois qui ne devaient pas être donnés à des employés temporaires au cours de l'année en cours car notre budget d'emplois temporaires ne

[Text]

term employment budget to do them. They are all additional to work that we had planned to be able to do for this year.

Because of the obvious perception that there was displacement going on within the current fiscal year, the minister has made his instructions very clear to the commands, to our regions, that there is to be no displacement of term employees planned to be hired in the current fiscal year by the NEED program people. If there are any cases where that has actually happened, he has given instructions that they are to be investigated and corrective action taken.

There remains this problem of perception because of relating this pattern of activity in the current year back to last year's pattern of activity, which is regrettable, but I am afraid the best I can do is explain it the way I have.

Mr. Stewart: I will be forwarding to you the letters of reference from all the employees who have written me to tell me exactly what has happened at Base Borden for your own information, if I may.

One last question, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Please.

Mr. Stewart: In Vote 10 there is an estimate for \$60,000 for a research fellowship in emergency planning. Could you just tell me who will receive that, what will be studied and what the outcome...?

The Chairman: *S'il vous plaît.*

Mr. Dewar: I am sorry; I will have to take that as notice.

The Chairman: We have a meeting next Tuesday. Even though it is on another department, we will get your answer. Can we have the answer for next Tuesday?

Mr. Dewar: Yes.

The Chairman: For the next half hour I have three members, and I will divide the time equally.

... L'honorable député, monsieur Laniel, l'honorable député, M. Bradley et l'honorable député, M. Munro.

Monsieur Laniel s'il vous plaît.

M. Laniel: Monsieur le président, mes questions sont au sujet du programme de...

Considering the escalating cost of that program... it was \$1.6 billion in the 1970s, in 1982 it was estimated at \$3.6 billion and now it is \$5 billion—you start to worry and you ask how we can be a judge in making that decision and get the best for our money; at the same time knowing that when we made the selection between the F-18 and the F-16, we did not necessarily choose the less expensive plane; also, because there is some hearsay that some people who are bidding have been asked one, two, maybe up to three times to review their costs, revise them down... Because there is a political aspect to that decision, I would like to be told exactly, step by step, what the processes are; what the military input is; what the political input is from the time tenders have been called; who are the people invited. I think this should be on the record. What are

[Translation]

nous autorisait pas à le faire. Ces emplois viennent s'ajouter aux travaux que nous avions prévus pour cette année.

Parce qu'on semblait percevoir que la situation était chambardée au cours de cet exercice financier, le ministre a demandé expressément aux commandements, aux régions de ne pas déloger des employés temporaires qui devaient être embauchés dans le cadre du programme RELAIS au cours de cet exercice financier. Si des cas sont relevés, le ministre a dit qu'ils feraient l'objet d'une enquête et que des mesures seraient prises.

Il existe encore un problème de perception étant donné que nous faisons le rapport entre les activités de cet exercice financier et celles de l'exercice précédent; c'est malheureux, le plus simple, c'est de l'expliquer comme je l'ai fait.

M. Stewart: Je vous enverrai les trois plaintes des trois employés qui m'ont écrit pour me décrire la situation à la base de Borden, pour votre gouverne, si vous le voulez.

Une dernière question, monsieur le président?

Le président: Je vous en prie.

M. Stewart: Le crédit 10 prévoit qu'une bourse de recherche de \$60,000 sera accordée en matière de préparation d'urgence. Pouvez-vous me dire qui en sera le bénéficiaire, quel sujet sera traité et quels résultats on compte obtenir?

Le président: *If you please.*

M. Dewar: Je vous demande pardon; il faudra que je vous donne une réponse un peu plus tard.

Le président: Nous nous réunirons mardi prochain. Même si la réunion porte sur un autre ministère, nous pourrions recevoir votre réponse. Pouvez-vous nous donner une réponse mardi prochain?

M. Dewar: Oui.

Le président: Il nous reste 30 minutes et trois noms figurent sur la liste; je leur accorderai donc le même temps de parole.

The honourable Mr. Laniel, the honourable Mr. Bradley and the honourable Mr. Munro.

Mr. Laniel, go ahead.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, my questions relate to the program...

Étant donné la hausse des coûts de ce programme... Ce programme coûtait 1.6 milliard de dollars dans les années 1970, et en 1982, il coûtait 3.6 milliards de dollars; maintenant, il coûte 5 milliards de dollars; il faut se demander comment prendre une décision en vue de tirer le meilleur profit des sommes investies. Tout cela en sachant que lorsque le choix a été fait entre le F-18 et le F-16, nous n'avons pas nécessairement choisi l'avion le moins coûteux; et on entend dire qu'on a demandé à certains soumissionnaires de réviser leurs coûts à la baisse une, deux, et même trois fois... Étant donné qu'un élément politique intervient, j'aimerais savoir exactement quelles sont les étapes suivies avant d'arriver à une décision; quel est l'apport militaire; quel est l'apport politique dès la publication des appels d'offres; qui est invité à présenter une

[Texte]

we asking of each of them? What are the time elements? What is the input while this process is going on of the military people? And at what moment will the political input appear, if there is to be some?

• 1035

Mr. Dewar: Mr. Chairman, first of all on the question of the cost which Mr. Laniel referred to at the beginning of his intervention, the \$1.5 billion in 1977 was the estimated cost of the kind of ship we felt we needed. The change from that to the current date is the result of inflation factors in the categories of goods and equipment that go into this kind of ship; \$1.5 billion in 1977 dollars equates to something over \$3 billion in 1983 dollars. If one projects the likely inflation over the period in which the ship, in fact, will be built, one reaches a number approximating the \$5 billion which was referred to. So that is the explanation for that kind of thing.

As to the process, in December 1978 five competitors responded to a request for a proposal. There was an evaluation of their responses, which led in 1980 to a list of qualified contractors for contract definition. The government at that point asked for contract definition proposals to come in from two consortia: Saint John and Scan. Their detailed proposals for the ship against the specifications were received in October 1982. Since that time, they have been evaluated by a project office team, and negotiations have taken place, more or less continuously, between the project office and the two consortia to define what was meant in the proposals, to ensure their conformity with specifications or to reach agreement on adjustment of the proposals, and to clarify and negotiate price elements. That contract definition evaluation phase is now reaching its conclusion, and recommendations are going forward from the department to the Cabinet on the findings of that evaluation.

I guess my comment on your last point, sir, would be that the political judgment is obviously applied at this point, when the Cabinet undertakes the review of the report of the evaluation process.

• 1040

Mr. Laniel: Is it foreseen in the department, on the military side, that the Canadian forces would gain in choosing only one of those two; or does it matter, really, if the evaluation proves it is comparable as to efficiency and cost to have two different frigates at our disposal, in the end to be manufactured, or are you aiming at one frigate? If so, is it possible in that kind of decision that whatever selection is made there could be a sharing of the work, one way or the other?

Mr. Dewar: The competition is based on a request for a proposal to build all six, and therefore each consortium has put forward a proposal on that basis. In effect, that was the term of the game, the rule of the game. I think to go any other route would probably require a reopening of the process.

[Traduction]

soumission? Il me semble qu'il faudrait tenir compte de cela. Que demandons-nous à chaque soumissionnaire? Quels délais sont impartis? Quelle est la contribution des militaires au cours de ce processus? À quel moment l'élément politique intervient-il, le cas échéant?

M. Dewar: Monsieur le président, pour répondre à la question posée par M. Laniel au sujet des coûts, je signale que le 1.5 milliard de dollars représente le coût estimatif du genre de navires qu'il nous fallait, à notre avis. L'augmentation de la somme est attribuable à une inflation marquée dans les catégories de biens et d'équipements nécessaires à la fabrication d'un navire de ce genre; 1.5 milliard de dollars exprimés en dollars de 1977 équivalait à environ 3 milliards de dollars, exprimés en dollars de 1983. Si l'on tient compte de l'inflation probable au cours de la période de construction du navire, on peut calculer que la somme s'élèvera à 5 milliards de dollars. Voilà ce qui explique la situation.

Quant au processus, en décembre 1978, cinq soumissionnaires ont répondu à notre invitation à faire des propositions. On a fait une étude de leurs propositions, et en 1980, on a dressé une liste des entrepreneurs auxquels on pouvait accorder un contrat. À ce moment-là, le gouvernement a demandé que des propositions soient obtenues de deux consortiums: Saint John et Scan. Les soumissions détaillées fondées sur le cahier des charges ont été reçues en octobre 1982. Depuis, elles ont été soumises à des études, des négociations pratiquement ininterrompues ont eu lieu entre l'équipe du bureau des projets et les représentants des deux consortiums; on tenait à savoir tout ce qui sous-tendait les propositions, à assurer le respect du cahier des charges ou à en arriver à un accord sur les rectifications apportées aux propositions et à préciser et à négocier les prix. L'étape d'évaluation des contrats tire à sa fin et le ministère enverra au Cabinet les conclusions de cette étude.

Pour répondre à la dernière partie de votre question, je dirais que l'élément jugement politique intervient à ce stade-ci, au moment où le Cabinet examine les conclusions de l'étude.

M. Laniel: Le côté militaire du ministère estime-t-il que les Forces canadiennes auraient intérêt à choisir l'une des deux frégates? Avez-vous l'intention de construire un seul type de frégates ou cette considération serait-elle importante dans la mesure où l'étude démontre qu'il est tout aussi efficace et tout aussi coûteux de construire deux genres de frégates? Y aurait-il moyen, quel que soit le choix définitif, de partager le travail d'une façon ou d'une autre?

M. Dewar: L'appel d'offres prévoit que le soumissionnaire doit construire les six frégates; par conséquent, chaque consortium a présenté une soumission en tenant compte de cela. C'était, en quelque sorte, la règle du jeu. Si nous changeons d'avis, il faudrait probablement recommencer le processus à zéro.

[Text]

Mr. Laniel: The reason I asked that question is you are not unaware of some of the affirmation in the House and in other places, even in front of this committee, of some of us, or some of our colleagues, wishing that maybe more than one area of this country benefits from this program. In that perspective, does that not change the rules of the game immediately? How do you prepare yourself to face that kind of political concern, or economic distribution if you want to call it otherwise?

Mr. Dewar: Mr. Chairman, I am aware.

Mr. Laniel: You are.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Bradley.

Mr. McKinnon: Could I have a supplementary?

The Chairman: A supplementary, asked by Mr. McKinnon earlier on. A supplementary followed by Mr. Bradley, please.

Mr. McKinnon: Mr. Deputy Minister, in your remarks you pointed out how you currently estimated the total costs, taking into account inflation year over year. Now, in the 1982-1983 estimates, the total cost of ships under Maritime Forces, on page 17-16, was \$4.859 billion. That would have taken into consideration the anticipated inflation, which was running at 16%—I suppose 18% for military stores types of equipment, and so on. In this year's estimates, under the same heading, Maritime Forces, page 17-16, for ships it is \$5.784 billion, which is nearly a billion dollars over what you estimated it would be last year, taking into account last year that you were going to have maybe 16% inflation. When surely you must have lower inflationary expectations this year than you had last year, how come the price has gone up nearly a billion dollars over what you anticipated last year?

Mr. Dewar: May I ask the Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance to respond?

Mr. L.E. Davies (Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance), Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, the difference between 1982-1983 and 1983-1984, the billion dollars, is not all inflation. Programs have been dropped, programs have been added; it is a combination of factors, but the billion dollars is not all inflation.

Mr. McKinnon: I take it that some year, presumably next year, there will be a separate line item for the frigate program.

Mr. Davies: Yes, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned at the last meeting, as soon as the program is approved by Cabinet and the contract is let, at the first opportunity the department has in a supplementary estimate, for example in the fall, we will come through as normal practice with a line item, Canadian Patrol Frigate, with the contract price and our estimate of future years' requirements, etc.

[Translation]

M. Laniel: Voici pourquoi j'ai posé cette question: Vous savez sans doute qu'à la Chambre et ailleurs, aux réunions de ce comité, certains de nos collègues ont dit qu'il serait peut-être bon que plus d'une région du pays puisse tirer profit de ce programme. Cette considération ne change-t-elle pas immédiatement la règle du jeu? Comment faire face à cette considération ou à cette question de distribution économique, si vous préférez?

M. Dewar: Monsieur le président, je suis au courant de la situation.

M. Laniel: Vous l'êtes.

Le président: Merci.

Monsieur Bradley.

M. McKinnon: Puis-je poser une question supplémentaire?

Le président: M. McKinnon a demandé à poser une question supplémentaire. Ensuite, ce sera le tour de M. Bradley.

M. McKinnon: Monsieur le sous-ministre, dans vos déclarations, vous avez dit comment vous calculiez actuellement le coût total, en tenant compte de l'inflation d'une année à l'autre. Or, dans le budget de 1982-1983, à la page 17-17, le coût des navires des Forces maritimes s'élevait à 4.859 milliards de dollars. Cette somme aurait tenu compte des prévisions du taux d'inflation, calculé à 16 p. 100, ou à 18 p. 100, pour l'équipement ou les fournitures militaires. Dans le budget de cette année, à la page 17-17, le coût total des navires des Forces maritimes s'élève à 5.784 milliards de dollars, soit pratiquement 1 milliard de dollars de plus que l'estimation de l'an dernier; rappelez-vous que l'an dernier, le taux d'inflation était calculé à 16 p. 100. Cette année, vous devez sans doute prévoir que le taux d'inflation sera inférieur à celui de l'an dernier; comment alors expliquer cette différence d'un milliard de dollars par rapport aux prévisions de l'an dernier?

M. Dewar: Permettez-moi de demander au sous-ministre responsable des finances de répondre.

M. L.E. Davies (sous-ministre adjoint (Finances), ministère de la Défense Nationale): Monsieur le président, l'inflation n'est pas le seul facteur responsable de la différence entre le budget de 1982-1983 et celui de 1983-1984. On a mis fin à certains programmes, on en a créé d'autres; l'inflation n'est pas le seul facteur responsable de cette hausse d'un milliard de dollars; d'autres éléments interviennent.

M. McKinnon: À un moment donné, l'an prochain, je suppose qu'il y aura un poste spécial au budget pour tenir compte du programme de construction des frégates.

M. Davies: Oui, monsieur le président. Comme je l'ai dit lors de la dernière réunion, dès que le programme aura été approuvé par le Cabinet et le contrat adjugé, le ministère, à la première occasion qu'il a de prévoir un budget supplémentaire, à l'automne peut-être, prévoira comme à l'accoutumée un poste au budget pour les frégates de la patrouille canadienne, qui précisera le prix du contrat et les prévisions des besoins des années à venir...

[Texte]

• 1045

Mr. McKinnon: I take it from that that had nothing been added to the ships program, we would have had a figure that would have corresponded fairly closely with last year's estimate rather than this rather large increase of some 18% or 20%.

Mr. Davies: That is right, Mr. Chairman. But as I say, programs are added in, programs as they are completed drop out; a combination of factors.

Mr. McKinnon: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Bradley, please.

Mr. Bradley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to go back initially to a topic that Mrs. Apolloni raised on the extended youth program, if I may. I was initially under the impression that this was going to increase the numbers in the forces and the initial program, as the minister had announced, would be an increase of 5,000 in the regular force. I am led to believe now—correct me if I am wrong... they are going to be taken into the reserve forces and trained by the regular force, where possible, and possibly the numbers will be 16,000 to 17,000, over an 18-month period. I am led to believe the training will be for a period of 10 to 12 months per individual.

Is that correct, or are we off on that?

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, first of all, we never had the intention of raising the regular force benchmark by these numbers. In fact, in the coming fiscal year the continuing strength of the regular force will increase by 400.

The total number of people involved in the youth training program is 5,000. The figure of 16,000 I think probably you are thinking of is summer employment across the board. The 5,000 who will be taken into the program will indeed be members of the reserves, and will be, as you accurately describe, trained by the regular force. Their term of employment will be about one year. In fact, these individuals will receive training in a number of trades, as was brought out earlier. What we are doing here, of course, is using the full capability of the training system, so it is a varying number for each trade.

Mr. Bradley: Thank you, General.

I could follow up on that, if I may. These 5,000 who are being trained—undoubtedly a number of them would like to go into the regular force, because the majority of them now have already given an indication they would like to. Will at least the reserve authorized ceilings be increased to accept whatever numbers of those 5,000 wish to stay on in the reserve forces?

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, the individuals so enrolled will continue in the supplementary reserve thereafter. As to the ceiling on the primary reserve, we will not be raising it at this time. But in our planning for the future, based on the total

[Traduction]

M. McKinnon: Je crois donc comprendre que si l'on n'avait rien ajouté au programme d'acquisition de navires, le montant aurait été plus ou moins semblable à celui de l'an dernier; on n'aurait pas eu l'augmentation, qui est plutôt importante, de 18 ou de 20 p. 100.

M. Davies: C'est exact, monsieur le président. Mais, comme je l'ai signalé, nous avons ajouté de nouveaux programmes et supprimé des programmes qui étaient terminés; plusieurs éléments sont entrés en jeu.

M. McKinnon: Merci, monsieur le président.

Le président: Monsieur Bradley, s'il vous plaît.

M. Bradley: Merci, monsieur le président.

Je voudrais, si vous me le permettez, revenir à la question soulevée par M^{me} Apolloni, à savoir l'expansion du programme destiné à la jeunesse. J'avais l'impression, au début, que le programme annoncé par le ministre devait permettre, à l'origine, d'augmenter de 5,000 le nombre de militaires dans les forces régulières. Je crois comprendre maintenant—et vous me corrigerez si je me trompe—que ces recrues seront intégrées aux forces de réserve et formées par les forces régulières, et qu'il se peut qu'on en prenne entre 16,000 et 17,000 sur une période de 18 mois. On me dit que la période de formation sera de 10 à 12 mois pour chaque personne.

Est-ce exact ou est-ce que je me trompe?

Gén Withers: Je tiens d'abord à signaler, monsieur le président, que nous n'avons jamais eu l'intention d'augmenter d'autant les forces régulières. En fait, au cours de l'année financière qui vient, les forces régulières n'augmenteront que de 400.

Le nombre de participants au programme de formation de la jeunesse s'élève à 5,000. Lorsque vous avez cité le chiffre de 16,000, vous pensiez probablement à tous les emplois d'été. Les 5,000 jeunes qui participeront au programme appartiendront, effectivement, à la réserve et ils seront, comme vous l'avez dit, formés par les forces régulières. Ils seront engagés pour à peu près un an et ils seront formés, comme on l'a dit tout à l'heure, dans un certain nombre de professions. Il s'agit, évidemment, d'exploiter pleinement les programmes de formation. Et le nombre de participants varie selon la profession.

M. Bradley: Merci, mon général.

Je voudrais poursuivre, si vous me le permettez. De ces 5,000 jeunes qui reçoivent une formation, il y en a sans doute beaucoup qui voudraient entrer dans les forces régulières, car la majorité d'entre eux ont déjà indiqué leur désir d'y entrer. Allez-vous augmenter la limite qui s'applique au nombre de personnes que les forces de réserve peuvent prendre, pour que ceux qui, parmi ces 5,000 jeunes le veulent, puissent rester dans la réserve?

Gén Withers: Les participants continueront à faire partie de la réserve supplémentaire. En ce qui concerne la limite qui s'applique à la réserve principale, nous n'avons pas l'intention de l'augmenter. Mais lorsque nous ferons nos prévisions pour

[Text]

force approach, we are going to have to establish new numbers for both regular and reserve. As a forecast, I would say that yes, that will increase in a future fiscal year—not this one—in a future fiscal year will increase the size of the primary reserve.

Mr. Bradley: Thank you, General.

We had good figures before, and I appreciate them, for the breakdown of these recruits across the country. Do we have a figure on what percent will be female?

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, I might call on Mr. Patenaude again.

The Chairman: Mr. Patenaude.

Mr. Patenaude: On the number of females in the program, we are not sure yet of the exact number. It will be approximately 1,200 to 1,500.

• 1050

One of the reasons you must keep in mind is that many of the trades are male-only trades that will bring these young people in, and because they are being trained to regular force standards there are only so many trades that females can go into. But that is the number we are aiming for.

Mr. Bradley: You are referring . . . ?

The Chairman: Can I . . . ?

Mr. Bradley: I hope you are referring to front-line troops and fighter pilots.

The Chairman: Are there are only three . . . ?

Mr. Dewar: Only in the trades.

Mr. Bradley: How many fighter pilots are you training in this program?

Mr. McKinnon: All told it is about . . .

The Chairman: Is it the chief of staff?

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, the fact is that while a large number of trades in the Canadian forces are most certainly open to women, and indeed the strength of the regular force, I think, shows very close to 9% are women at this time, nevertheless, what we call the hard C trades and the combat arms are not open to women, and a significant number of this 5,000 is found in those trades. I might point out that the estimate of 1,200 to 1,500 out of 5,000 is substantially higher than 9%.

Mr. Bradley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General. I would be very pleased to see the number 1,200 to 1,500. I congratulate you on it.

I wonder if we could take a look at the European brigade, the European theatre, at the moment; and if I could have an update on the authorized ceiling strength of the brigade in Europe, what the actual strength is and what percentage of the actual strength might be augmentation from the reserves? Maybe we could just have copies of all the cards, General.

Some hon. Members: Oh, oh!

[Translation]

l'ensemble des forces, il va falloir modifier les limites et pour les forces régulières et pour la réserve. Je prévois que la limite qui s'applique à la réserve principale augmentera à l'avenir.

M. Bradley: Merci, mon général.

On nous a déjà donné une excellente ventilation du nombre de recrues au Canada et j'en suis reconnaissant. Savez-vous quel pourcentage des recrues seront des femmes?

Gén Withers: Encore une fois, monsieur le président, je vais demander à M. Patenaude de répondre.

Le président: Monsieur Patenaude.

M. Patenaude: Nous ne savons pas encore le nombre exact. Ce sera entre 1,200 et 1,500.

Il ne faut pas oublier que beaucoup de professions dans lesquelles ces jeunes sont formés sont réservées aux hommes. Comme la formation qu'on leur donne leur permettrait d'entrer dans les forces régulières, le nombre de professions accessibles aux femmes est limité. Mais le chiffre que j'ai cité est l'objectif que nous visons.

M. Bradley: Vous parlez . . . ?

Le président: Puis-je?

M. Bradley: Vous parlez, j'espère, des forces de combat et des pilotes de chasseurs.

Le président: Il n'y en a que trois . . . ?

M. Dewar: Uniquement pour les professions.

M. Bradley: Combien de pilotes de chasseurs reçoivent une formation dans le cadre de ce programme?

M. McKinnon: Tout compte fait, environ . . .

Le président: S'agit-il du chef de l'état-major?

Gén Withers: Dans les forces armées, monsieur le président, de nombreuses professions sont ouvertes aux femmes; celles-ci représentent, en fait, près de 9 p. 100 des forces régulières. Mais les professions de la catégorie C et les forces de combat ne sont pas ouvertes aux femmes, et un pourcentage important de ces 5,000 jeunes reçoivent une formation dans ces deux professions. Je vous signale d'ailleurs que 1,200 ou 1,500 sur 5,000, c'est beaucoup plus que 9 p. 100.

M. Bradley: Merci, monsieur le président. Merci, mon général. Je serais ravi si vous pouviez atteindre 1,200 ou 1,500. Je vous en félicite.

Je voudrais maintenant parler de l'Europe et de la brigade européenne. Quelle est la limite en ce qui concerne la brigade européenne? Combien de militaires compte-t-elle et quel pourcentage de ce nombre est attribuable à une augmentation de la réserve? Vous pourrez peut-être, mon général, nous donner des exemplaires de tous les documents.

Des voix: Oh, oh!

[Texte]

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, these are strengths right across the forces. The authorized strength of Canadian forces—Europe, exclusive, of course, of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force and those members who are fulfilling roles at various NATO headquarters, is 5,400. The actual numbers serving today, I could not give you; it is a snapshot, but I can provide it by the next meeting, the numbers serving there today.

Mr. Bradley: Could we also have the number, General, that may be there presently as augmentation forces from the reserve units?

Gen Withers: Yes, we can provide that. I can simply say, today, that at any time, on any day, there are members of the Reserve Force serving in Europe in various roles. In addition to that, during the time of the fall exercises, we have a fly-over that varies in size, but has been in some years as high as about 500. So we can provide the figures as to what the size of the fly-over is this year, and how many reservists on a continuing basis are serving in Europe.

Mrs. Appolloni: Could I have a supplementary on the opening question?

The Chairman: A short supplementary because now, this morning, it is something new. Everybody is getting in on everybody's question time. But, Madam Appolloni, a last question, because I want to recognize Mr. Munro.

Mrs. Appolloni: It was just that the part about the European theatre reminded me. What stage are we at in Norway for pre-positioning of equipment?

Gen Withers: I might ask Vice-Admiral Mainguy.

Vice-Admiral D.N. Mainguy (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): At the moment, there are two companies of vehicles pre-positioned in Norway in support of the CAST Brigade.

An hon. Member: How many vehicles is that?

VAdm Mainguy: I do not know. I would have to dig that out.

The Chairman: Please, for our meeting next Tuesday we will get the answer?

• 1055

Mr. Bradley: If I may, Mr. Chairman, a very short question. I wanted to get into the extra DASH numbers now and their APCs and their replacement, but I will stay away from that.

I would assume that we are now looking at a lower attrition rate in the forces because of the high unemployment in Canada, and assuming that we will have a lower attrition rate again this year than we had last year, does it mean that the recruiting levels of the forces will be lower this year than they have been in the past? If so, by what percentage?

[Traduction]

Gén Withers: Les chiffres que je vais vous donner, monsieur le président, représentent toutes nos forces en Europe. Le nombre autorisé de militaires canadiens en Europe—sans compter, bien sûr, les forces de l'OTAN, qui s'occupent du système aéroporté d'alerte anticipée et les militaires qui travaillent à l'administration centrale de l'OTAN—s'élève à 5,400. Je ne peux pas vous dire combien d'entre eux sont en service; le chiffre ne vous donnerait qu'un bref aperçu, mais je vous le transmettrai avant la prochaine séance.

M. Bradley: Pouvez-vous nous dire, mon général, combien d'entre eux viennent des unités de réserve et font partie des forces supplémentaires?

Gén Withers: Oui, on peut vous donner les chiffres. Mais je peux vous dire tout de suite qu'il y a toujours, en Europe, des membres des forces de réserve qui jouent divers rôles. D'ailleurs, à l'époque des manœuvres d'automne, nous transportons des militaires en Europe; le nombre varie selon l'année, mais il peut atteindre 500. On peut donc vous dire combien de militaires on a envoyés cette année et combien de réservistes servent en Europe de façon permanente.

Mme Appolloni: Puis-je poser une question supplémentaire?

Le président: Si vous êtes brève. Ce que nous faisons ce matin est complètement nouveau. Tout le monde empiète sur le temps du député qui a la parole. Mais je vais permettre à Mme Appolloni de poser une dernière question, car je veux donner la parole à M. Munro.

Mme Appolloni: Le fait que vous avez parlé de l'Europe m'a rappelé quelque chose. Où en sommes-nous rendus en Norvège en ce qui concerne la mise en place anticipée du matériel?

Gén Withers: Je vais demander au vice-amiral Mainguy de répondre à la question.

Le vice-amiral D.N. Mainguy (chef adjoint de l'État-major, ministère de la Défense nationale): En ce moment, il y a, en Norvège, deux compagnies de véhicules qui appuient la brigade CAST.

Une voix: Cela fait combien de véhicules?

VAm Mainguy: Je ne le sais pas. Il faudrait que je cherche les chiffres.

Le président: Pouvez-vous nous le transmettre avant la séance de mardi?

M. Bradley: Si vous le permettez, monsieur le président, je voudrais poser une brève question. J'aurais voulu avoir les chiffres sur les nouveaux DASH, leurs APCs et leur emplacement, mais je ne poserai pas des questions là-dessus.

Je suppose que, le taux de chômage étant ce qu'il est, il y a de moins en moins de personnes qui quittent les forces armées. Si l'on tient pour acquis que le nombre de départs volontaires diminuera par rapport à l'an dernier, cela veut-il dire que le nombre de recrues diminuera également? Dans l'affirmative, de quel pourcentage?

[Text]

The Chairman: General Williams, please, Director General Manpower Utilization. Then I will recognize Mr. Munro, but I will not cut off—it will be a good 10 minutes. Please.

Brigadier General J.A. Williams (Director General Manpower Utilization, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, the attrition rate for the forces is now running at about 8% compared to the normal 12% to 13% in a normal year. Consequently, there is much less need to replace people and we are recruiting in much lower numbers than the normal 12,000 or so per year that we normally do. I can get you exact figures for 1982-1983 and 1983-1984, but they are of the order of 6,000 to 7,000 recruits in total for 1983-1984 as opposed to a normal figure of the order of 12,000.

Mr. Bradley: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Bradley. Mr. Munro, *s'il vous plait*.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask whether we can expect an answer today to the question that was raised at the beginning of our meeting or whether we will have to wait until next Tuesday, and that is the matter related to the frigate program, about which there was some telephoning a little earlier on.

Mr. Dewar: Yes, sir. On the question of the specifications that were provided for this program, parts of the performance specification are unclassified and parts are classified. For example, the specification on range and speed is classified information. What we could do would be to provide, if the committee wants, a précis of the unclassified information in this respect. I think we would have to do it in writing because we would have to take some care in doing it, and we certainly cannot do it today, sir.

The Chairman: Well, we will have time because now I just found out that we have supplementary some time in June. At least, that gives you ample time. There will be another meeting maybe next week. We will decide at the steering committee. But there is supplementary in Defence on CIDA. So that means I will be able to sit in June. By agreement; I will discuss that in the steering committee this morning.

Mr. McKinnon: On the same point, if it is a point of order, I agree with the question of Mr. Munro and I think it is an admirable suggestion that we do get a précis of the unclassified material. I would like to add that I hope I do not see a press release out of the department someday saying that the range is to be 27,000 miles or something at 48 knots, or that . . . I think you will get the message.

The Chairman: One of the advantages of this committee that I discovered is that the Department of National Defence has a copy of the minutes at the same time as I do. So they will revise all the promises they made as to what they are to produce either by writing or by next Tuesday or by June. So that is an advantage; I do not even have to call them. They do it even before I ask.

[Translation]

Le président: Général Williams, s'il vous plaît, directeur général, utilisation des effectifs. Ensuite, je donnerai la parole à M. Munro. Mais je ne veux pas diminuer votre temps; vous aurez dix minutes comme il faut. S'il vous plaît.

Le brigadier général J.A. Williams (directeur général, utilisation des effectifs, ministère de la Défense nationale): Cette année, monsieur le président, il y a eu 8 p. 100 de départs volontaires, alors que la norme est de 12 ou de 13 p. 100. Par conséquent, il y a moins de personnes à remplacer et nous recrutons beaucoup moins que les 12,000 personnes recrutées normalement en une année. Je peux vous transmettre les chiffres exacts pour 1982-1983 et 1983-1984, mais je sais qu'ils sont de l'ordre de 6,000 à 7,000 recrues pour 1983-1984, par opposition à la norme de 12,000.

M. Bradley: Merci beaucoup.

Le président: Merci beaucoup, monsieur Bradley. Monsieur Munro, s'il vous plaît.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci, monsieur le président. Au début de la séance, on a posé une question sur le programme d'acquisition de frégates et l'on a téléphoné pour avoir la réponse. Je voudrais savoir si nous aurons la réponse aujourd'hui ou s'il va falloir attendre mardi prochain.

M. Dewar: Oui, monsieur. Certaines parties des devis ne sont pas secrètes, d'autres le sont. Par exemple, les devis concernant la portée et la vitesse sont secrets. Si le Comité le désire, nous pourrions vous remettre un résumé des données qui ne sont pas secrètes. Il faudrait vous le remettre par écrit, car il faudra faire attention à ce que nous faisons, et nous ne pourrions certainement pas le faire aujourd'hui.

Le président: Eh bien, nous aurons le temps, car je viens d'apprendre qu'un Budget supplémentaire sera déposé en juin. Cela vous donne largement le temps. Il y aura une autre séance, peut-être la semaine prochaine. Le Comité directeur décidera. Comme le Budget supplémentaire de l'ACDI sera déposé devant le Comité, nous pourrions siéger au mois de juin. Si cela vous convient, j'en discuterai demain matin à la réunion du Sous-comité directeur.

M. McKinnon: Au sujet du même rappel au Règlement, s'il s'agit d'un rappel au Règlement, je suis d'accord avec M. Munro et je trouve admirable qu'on ait offert de préparer un résumé des informations qui ne sont pas secrètes. J'espère ne jamais voir un jour un communiqué de presse émis par le ministère, dans lequel on dirait que la portée sera de 27,000 milles à une vitesse de 48 noeuds . . . Enfin, vous me comprenez.

Le président: L'un des avantages du Comité, c'est que le ministère de la Défense nationale reçoit le compte rendu en même temps que moi. Ils ont donc une liste de tout ce qu'ils ont promis de nous remettre avant mardi prochain ou avant juin. C'est un avantage; je ne dois même pas leur téléphoner. Ils le font avant que je le leur demande.

[Texte]

Mr. Munro.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I assume also that, in light of the statements made about the timetable for consideration by Cabinet of the program, it will be too late to do anything about it anyway once we do get these particulars, classified or unclassified. However, it would be of interest to get in the regular way the material to which this particular committee is entitled, even if late. I would like to ask about the process, I guess, first of all, by which the court martial of a cadet from the military college in Kingston was overturned last week. Who overturned it? Was it the JAG? Was it the minister? Was it a group in the chief's office? Who was it that overturned the court martial ruling?

• 1100

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, the process was the normal process as provided in the National Defence Act and Queen's Regulations. A court martial is convened by a convening authority. Now, for the Royal Military College, the convening authority is an officer in headquarters. As a matter of fact, he is a Major General and he holds the appointment of Associate Deputy Minister, Finance and also Chief of Financial Services. After a court martial has taken place, the transcript is forwarded to the convening authority for his review. The convening authority may, of course, take advice from an officer of the JAG branch in performing such a review, in the event the decisions taken on that particular court martial were taken entirely by the convening authority in his review.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): If I am getting into the area of impugning the justice system in this country, I would be grateful if I were told: You can go no further. However, I would like to ask, first of all, whether the fact that the cadet in question was a woman had anything to do with the overturning of the first ruling.

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, the answer is no.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Could I also ask if there is anyone in this room who is prepared today to make a comment on the effect on discipline of that reversal of the court martial.

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, this is not the first court martial that has been overturned.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Of that kind?

Gen Withers: I cannot specifically answer, Mr. Chairman, in terms of a drug or drug-related offence, and I do not think there is anyone here. I think we would need the Judge Advocate General's records to be examined to find out the frequency thereof.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): That did not quite answer the question. Is there anyone in this room who is prepared to comment on the effect on discipline of that overturning of this particular court martial ruling.

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, I am quite happy to comment on that. I think that the ruling shows the validity and fairness

[Traduction]

Monsieur Munro.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Étant donné que le programme serait soumis bientôt au Cabinet, ces informations, qu'elles soient secrètes ou non, nous arriveront trop tard pour que nous puissions faire quoi que ce soit. Mais il serait intéressant de recevoir les informations auxquelles nous avons droit, même avec du retard. Ma question porte sur une décision de la cour martiale concernant un cadet du collège militaire à Kingston, décision qui a été renversée la semaine dernière. Qui l'a renversée? Le JAG? Le ministre? Un groupe du bureau du commandant en chef? Qui a renversé la décision de la cour martiale?

Gén Withers: Tout s'est déroulé en conformité avec la Loi sur la Défense nationale et le règlement de la reine. Une cour martiale doit être convoquée par l'autorité convocatrice. Dans le cas du *Royal Military College*, l'autorité convocatrice est un officier au quartier général. En fait, il est major-général, sous-ministre adjoint aux Finances, et chef du Service des finances. Une fois la cour martiale terminée, le compte rendu est renvoyé à l'autorité convocatrice, qui l'étudie. En étudiant la décision, elle peut, évidemment, prendre conseil de la direction du juge-avocat général. En l'occurrence, les décisions concernant la cour martiale ont été prises par l'autorité convocatrice, et par elle seule, lors de son étude.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Avant d'attaquer l'administration de la justice au Canada, j'aimerais bien qu'on me dise jusqu'à quel point je peux aller. Mais je voudrais d'abord savoir si l'on a tenu compte, lorsqu'on a décidé de renverser la décision, du fait que le cadet en question était une femme.

Gén Withers: Monsieur le président, la réponse est non.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je voudrais aussi savoir s'il y en a parmi vous qui seraient prêts à nous parler de l'effet qu'aura sur la discipline le renversement de cette décision.

Gén Withers: Ce n'est pas la première fois, monsieur le président, qu'on renverse la décision d'une cour martiale.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Une décision de ce genre?

Gén Withers: Je ne peux pas vous donner une réponse précise en ce qui concerne les drogues ou les infractions où il est question de drogue. Je ne crois pas qu'il y en ait parmi nous qui soient en mesure de vous répondre. Pour savoir si c'est fréquent, il faudrait consulter les dossiers du juge-avocat général.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Vous n'avez pas tout à fait répondu à la question. Y a-t-il quelqu'un dans cette salle qui soit prêt à nous dire ce qu'il pense de l'effet qu'aura sur la discipline le renversement de cette décision?

Gén Withers: Je veux bien, monsieur le président, vous dire ce que je pense. Je pense que la décision confirme la validité et

[Text]

of the code of service discipline and the system of military justice, and I do not think that it damages discipline or morale.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I hope you are right.

I would like to turn . . .

The Chairman: May I ask a question?

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Yes, certainly.

The Chairman: You said drug. Do you make a difference between hard drugs and soft drugs in your answer?

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, the facts of this case are that the substance involved was marijuana. We do not, or I should say I do not, in my mind, draw for the service a distinction between the two so-called categories of hard drugs and soft drugs. Any drug, any non-medical and illegal use of the drugs in the forces is a serious situation.

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The Chairman: I am sorry to insist, but is it not a fact that the use of soft drugs is much more frequent than we would dare admit?

Gen Withers: No, Mr. Chairman, I do not think it is.

Mr. Laniel: In the forces.

Gen Withers: Exactly.

The Chairman: In the forces, you do not think so.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): What about trafficking?

The Chairman: Trafficking? I was talking about the use of . . .

Gen Withers: May I simply say that, in relation to certain other armed forces, we have far less of a problem. I am not denying the problem, or that drugs are used, have been used, and continue to be used by members of the forces in this way. But it is our objective to have no such use at all within the forces.

The Chairman: I like at least your frankness. We cannot deny it, because it is a fact.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): This committee's records will testify that it is a very serious problem.

The Chairman: That it is.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I can recall two or three years ago when we had practically a whole meeting on this matter.

The Chairman: That is exactly what I had in mind.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Exactly. Yes, indeed.

I would like to come back to the frigate program in a way, and to the DELEX program and its relation to the frigate program.

I was told at a meeting we had the other day with the association of shipbuilders that it would be possible, in terms

[Translation]

l'équité du code de discipline et des tribunaux militaires; je ne crois pas qu'elle nuise à la discipline ou au moral.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): J'espère que vous avez raison.

Je voudrais maintenant aborder . . .

Le président: Puis-je poser une question?

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Oui, certainement.

Le président: Vous avez parlé de drogues. Faites-vous la distinction entre les drogues dites dures et les autres?

Gén Withers: Il s'agissait, en l'occurrence, de la marijuana. Je n'ai pas l'impression qu'on fasse de distinction entre les drogues dites dures et les autres. Dans les forces armées, l'utilisation non médicale et illégale de la drogue, de n'importe quelle drogue, est une infraction grave.

Le président: Je m'excuse d'insister, mais n'est-il pas vrai que la consommation de drogue douce est beaucoup plus fréquente qu'on n'oserait l'avouer?

Gén Withers: Non, monsieur le président, je ne le pense pas.

M. Laniel: Dans les forces armées.

Gén Withers: Exactement.

Le président: Vous ne pensez pas que ce soit le cas dans les forces armées.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Et qu'en est-il du trafic?

Le président: Du trafic? Je parlais de la consommation de . . .

Gén Withers: Permettez-moi de dire seulement que si l'on compare notre armée à celle d'autres pays, notre problème est beaucoup moins grave. Je ne nie pas son existence, ni le fait que certains membres des forces armées consomment des drogues, s'en servent et continuent de le faire. Notre objectif, c'est d'éliminer cela des forces armées.

Le président: J'apprécie votre franchise. Nous ne pouvons le nier, parce que c'est un fait.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Les procès-verbaux des réunions du Comité permettraient de démontrer qu'il s'agit d'un problème très grave.

Le président: En effet.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je me souviens qu'il y a deux ou trois ans nous avons eu une réunion pendant laquelle nous n'avons parlé que de cela.

Le président: C'est justement à cela que je pensais.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Exactement. Tout à fait.

J'aimerais maintenant revenir au programme des frégates et au programme DELEX, ainsi qu'aux liens de ce dernier avec le programme des frégates.

Lors d'une réunion que nous avons eue l'autre jour avec des représentants de l'Association des constructeurs navals, on m'a

[Texte]

of the disposability of material for building the ships—the hulls—and equipping them with their mode of power, to do all six ships in Canada in Canadian yards at the same time. There was a caveat to that, that it would be better to do one first somewhere, in order to see where the snags were. There might be snags in building to one's particular specification. I understand that it would be a good idea to test out the automated equipment that all shipyards, I understand, have, and to run a test hull, if you like, through one yard. Then you could turn them out by the score after that.

Is there any thought of doing them this way; I mean, of running a test hull and putting the mode of power into it? The time consumed, I gather, once the hull is produced, is used in getting all the fancy equipment into it. The main part of the problem would be there, in point of time. Is it being considered that the ships should be run through? After all, we are told the ships that are now being used are having some difficulty—if I can exaggerate a little—in staying afloat, and therefore they are dangerous vehicles, and their life is 35 to 40 years now.

This is my last question, and it is related to the DELEX program. The DELEX program has done something, but it has not made new vessels out of the old ones. I would just like a general comment in that area about doing them all at once, in order to give us serviceable vessels right away.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Munro. The last answer, please.

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, I am really no expert on ship construction, so I do not feel qualified myself to comment on that. As to whether our current ships are dangerous, I emphatically deny that. Our ships are safe to go to sea. I do not deny the fact that we have operational deficiencies; we most definitely do, and they cover a range of things, whether it be in sensors, radar, underwater sensors, close-in weapon systems or air defence—a number of operational deficiencies. But one thing they do have is the capability of going to sea safely.

As to their age, most of them having been built from the mid-1950s through to 1965—so 1955 to 1965—we are talking about the steam destroyers; we are not talking about the four ships of the tribal class which were early 1970s. But the 265 class—the last ones of the steamers were commissioned about 1965. So they are substantially under 40 years of age.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saenich): Only just.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Traduction]

dit qu'il serait possible, parce qu'on disposait des matériaux nécessaires pour construire les navires, les coques, et pour les équiper avec les moteurs nécessaires... qu'il serait possible de construire les six navires au Canada, dans des chantiers navals canadiens, et ce en même temps. Mais on a cependant souligné une condition: on nous a dit qu'il serait préférable de construire un seul des navires quelque part d'abord, pour voir quels étaient les problèmes. Il pourrait y avoir des problèmes de construction, pour que celle-ci soit conforme aux devis établis. D'après ce que j'ai compris, ce serait une bonne idée de mettre à l'essai le matériel automatisé de tous les chantiers navals, et de faire des essais pour la coque dans un seul chantier. Après quoi on pourrait les construire en autant d'exemplaires qu'on voudrait.

Avez-vous songé à procéder de la sorte, c'est-à-dire à faire des essais avec la coque et à y installer les moteurs nécessaires? D'après ce que j'ai compris, une fois la coque fabriquée, c'est l'installation de tout le bel équipement qui prend tant de temps. Le gros problème se situerait là, en ce qui concerne les délais. A-t-on envisagé cela? Après tout, on nous dit que les navires dont on se sert à l'heure actuelle ont du mal—si vous me permettez d'exagérer un petit peu—à flotter, et qu'ils sont dangereux. Leur durée de vie est évaluée à 35 ou à 40 ans.

J'en arrive maintenant à ma dernière question, et celle-ci se rapporte au programme DELEX. Ce programme a fait quelque chose, mais il n'a pas créé de nouveaux navires à partir des vieux. J'aimerais savoir ce que vous pensez de l'idée de les construire tous en même temps, pour nous approvisionner tout de suite en navires utilisables.

Merci.

Le président: Merci, monsieur Munro. Pourriez-vous, s'il vous plaît, répondre à cette dernière question.

Gén Withers: Monsieur le président, je ne suis pas un expert en matière de construction navale, aussi je ne pense pas être en mesure de faire des commentaires à ce sujet. Quant à votre remarque selon laquelle les navires dont nous nous servons à l'heure actuelle sont dangereux, je le nie catégoriquement. Nos navires sont en état de naviguer. Je ne prétends pas que nous n'avons pas certains problèmes; nous en avons, et ce pour bon nombre de choses, qu'il s'agisse de détecteurs, de radars, de détecteurs sous-marins, de systèmes d'armes d'encerclement ou de défense aérienne, il existe un certain nombre de défauts opérationnels. Mais s'il est une chose dont je suis certain, c'est que ces navires sont en état de naviguer en toute sécurité.

Quant à leur âge, la plupart d'entre eux ont été construits entre le milieu des années 1950 et 1965, donc entre 1955 et 1965... je parle ici des destroyers à vapeur; je ne parle pas des quatre navires de catégorie tribale qui ont été construits au début des années 1970. Mais pour ce qui est de la catégorie 265... les derniers bateaux à vapeur ont été commandés aux environs de 1965. Ils ont donc moins de 40 ans, et de loin.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saenich): Très juste.

Merci, monsieur le président.

[Text]

The Chairman: Supplementary final, and then, may I kindly ask you, before members leave . . . ? I need to have a steering committee meeting. We are all here, so if the ladies and gentlemen would promptly leave . . . Many people ask, why not hold it here? So, by agreement, we will hold the steering committee right here to save time.

Mr. McKinnon, please.

Mr. McKinnon: I hope this will be short. I would like to go back to that court martial for a moment.

It would have been helpful, I think, to the department had there been a statement issued as to why the court martial was overturned. Was it on a legality or through the person's being falsely charged, or incorrectly charged? The result of it is that the person who had been found guilty, as I understand it, is now found innocent. And yet the other person involved was fined, I believe. I would be curious if that fine still stands.

It deals particularly with the idea of charging somebody with trafficking, and it is my understanding that the services have a rather wider interpretation of trafficking than most civilian courts do; that is, if a person brings a marijuana cigarette to another person for mutual enjoyment, if such is the case, or the right phrasing, that person can be accused of trafficking, which is not being done for gain obviously.

The Chairman: That is right.

Mr. McKinnon: If that was the flaw in the court martial, then there must be hundreds of cases—I do not think that is any exaggeration—of people who have been found guilty of trafficking under somewhat similar circumstances. Could the chief give me any more details as to why this court martial was upset?

Gen Withers: No, Mr. Chairman, I cannot because I personally have not seen the transcript. It would not in fact come to me at all in view of the fact that the convening authority has taken this decision. Of course, that is a final decision.

Mr. McKinnon: In view of the very wide publicity this case has, I frankly think that it would be in the services' interest to give out some more information than this very cryptic announcement that the court martial had been overturned. I have the same confidence the chief has in the justice of the procedures in the services. I think they are needlessly giving themselves a bum rap here.

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, I will undertake to see what we can put out on that, having due regard, of course, to the Human Rights Act and the rights of the individuals concerned.

The Chairman: I doubt very much that it is privileged information. I would appreciate receiving both the first transcript and the second.

Dr. Hudecki, please.

[Translation]

Le président: Une dernière question supplémentaire après quoi, . . . puis-je vous demander, avant que les députés ne partent . . . ? Il faut que nous ayons une réunion du comité directeur. Nous sommes tous ici, alors si ces messieurs et dames, veulent bien partir . . . beaucoup de gens m'ont demandé pourquoi on ne la tiendrait pas ici. Si vous êtes tous d'accord, nous tiendrons la réunion du comité directeur ici même, ce qui nous permettra d'économiser du temps.

Monsieur McKinnon, s'il vous plaît.

M. McKinnon: J'espère que ce sera bref. J'aimerais revenir pendant quelques instants sur l'affaire de la cour martiale.

Je pense qu'il aurait été utile au Ministère que l'on déclare pourquoi la décision de la cour martiale a été renversée. Était-ce à cause d'un point de légalité, ou parce que l'on avait accusé la personne à tort de façon incorrecte? En tout cas, d'après ce que j'ai compris, la personne que l'on avait déclarée coupable a depuis été reconnue innocente. Pourtant, l'autre personne impliquée dans l'affaire a, je pense, dû payer une amende. J'aimerais savoir si cette amende a été maintenue.

Il s'agit de l'accusation de trafic; d'après ce que j'ai compris les forces armées ont une interprétation plus large que la plupart des tribunaux civils de ce qui constitue une activité de trafic. Autrement dit, si une personne apporte une cigarette de marijuana à une autre pour qu'elles en jouissent toutes les deux, si c'est le cas, et je ne sais pas si j'utilise la bonne formule, on pourra accuser cette personne de faire du trafic, bien qu'elle ne fasse ce qu'elle fait pour réaliser un profit.

Le président: C'est exact.

M. McKinnon: Si c'était là le problème qu'il y a eu avec la cour martiale, alors il doit y avoir des centaines de cas . . . et je ne pense pas que ce soit là une exagération . . . de personnes qui ont été trouvées coupables de trafic dans des circonstances semblables. Le chef pourrait-il m'expliquer pourquoi la décision prise par la cour martiale a été renversée?

Gén Withers: Non, monsieur le président, je ne le peux pas, parce que je n'ai moi-même pas lu la transcription. D'ailleurs, ce document ne me parviendrait pas en temps normal, parce que les responsables ont pris leur décision, décision qui est, bien sûr, finale.

M. McKinnon: Étant donné toute la publicité qui a entouré cette affaire, je pense bien franchement qu'il serait dans l'intérêt des forces armées de fournir des renseignements autres que l'annonce sybilline que la décision de la cour martiale a été renversée. J'ai la même confiance que le chef envers la justice des procédures appliquées dans les forces armées. Mais je pense qu'ils se font inutilement du tort dans ce cas-ci.

Gén Withers: Monsieur le président, je me renseignerai pour savoir ce que nous pourrions déclarer à ce sujet, en tenant compte, bien sûr, de la Loi sur les droits de la personne et des droits des personnes concernées.

Le président: Je doute fort qu'il s'agisse de renseignements secrets et j'aimerais que l'on me fournisse et la première et la deuxième transcription.

Monsieur Judecki, je vous prie.

[Texte]

Mr. Hudecki: I have just a quick comment on it. This was a very common experience in the Second World War. What happened was that the transcripts usually were found, and we had a lawyer who eventually became a judge in civil courts; and as a lawyer he just listened to all the technical, legal material that was going through and then he would quickly see the technical errors in it. He would not argue the case at all but he would write to the Adjutant General or to the Advocate General and point out the legal, technical errors. Case after case was thrown out, and I have a feeling it is probably on the same basis here.

The Chairman: Well, gentlemen, next week there may be another meeting on National Defence. If not, you will be advised next Tuesday. Your steering committee will deliberate about that.

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Thank you very much.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): You were inquiring about receiving a transcript. Was that for your own personal use or for the use of members?

The Chairman: Well, I am a very curious man. At first it was for my own, but I will see and will advise you on that.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Yes, thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, all. May I kindly ask the steering to come forward within a minute or two? Thank you, gentlemen.

[Traduction]

M. Hudecki: Je n'ai qu'un bref commentaire à faire. Ce fut très courant pendant la deuxième Guerre mondiale. En général, on retrouvait les transcriptions, et on avait un avocat, qui est devenu, plus tard, un juge dans la cour civile. En tant qu'avocat, il écoutait tous les renseignements techniques et juridiques qu'on lui donnait, et il y trouvait très vite les erreurs techniques. Il ne discutait pas du tout de l'affaire, mais il écrivait à l'adjutant général ou à l'avocat général pour lui signaler les erreurs techniques ou juridiques. De nombreuses affaires ont alors été rejetées, et j'ai l'impression que c'est ce qui s'est produit dans ce cas-ci.

Le président: Messieurs, la semaine prochaine il y aura une autre réunion qui portera sur la Défense nationale. En cas de changement, vous en serez avertis mardi prochain. Le comité directeur en discutera.

Merci beaucoup.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Vous avez posé une question au sujet de la possibilité de recevoir une transcription. Était-ce pour vous personnellement ou pour les membres du Comité?

Le président: Je suis très curieux. Je l'ai d'abord demandé pour moi, mais je verrai bien, et je vous tiendrai au courant.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci.

Le président: Merci à vous tous. Je demanderai aux membres du Comité directeur de rester une minute ou deux dans la salle. Merci, messieurs.

APPENDIX ' 'EAND-75' '

RESPONSE TO QUESTION CONCERNING WIDOWS ALLOWANCE UNDER CANADIAN FORCES SUPERANNUATION ACT RAISED BY MR. MCKINNON AT THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Section 13(2) of the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act (CFSA) provides that where the widow of a contributor is entitled to an annual allowance under the Act, payment of the allowance shall be suspended in the event of her remarriage but shall be resumed in the event of the dissolution or annulment of that marriage or the death of her husband by that marriage. Subsection 13(2) provides further that where an annual allowance is suspended by reason of remarriage, an amount equal to a return of contributions less the total amount of the payments made to the contributor and to his widow and children, may be paid to the widow in lieu of any further claim to payment of the annual allowance. The lump sum payment may be made to the widow upon request by her to the Minister, in writing, at any time before the dissolution or annulment of that marriage or the death of her husband by that marriage, provided there is no child of the contributor entitled to an annual allowance under the Act.

The resumption of the payment of the annual allowance on the dissolution or annulment of the widow's subsequent marriage or the death of her husband by that marriage, is a right conveyed through the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act and is not subject to a means test. Payment of the annual allowance would not be resumed where the widow had been paid an amount in lieu of any further claim to payment of the allowance.

APPENDICE «EAND-75»

RÉPONSE À UNE QUESTION POSÉE PAR M. MCKINNON AU COMITÉ PERMANENT DES
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES ET DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE SUR L'ALLOCATION DES VEUVES,
AUX TERMES DE LA LOI SUR LA PENSION DE RETRAITE DES FORCES CANADIENNES.

Aux termes du paragraphe 13(2) de la Loi sur la pension de retraite des Forces canadiennes, lorsque la veuve d'un contributeur a droit à une allocation annuelle sous le régime de cette Loi, le paiement doit en être suspendu dans le cas de son remariage, mais doit reprendre dans le cas de la dissolution ou de l'annulation de ce mariage, ou du décès de son mari par ce mariage. De plus, toujours aux termes du paragraphe 13(2), lorsque le paiement de l'allocation annuelle est suspendu dans le cas de remariage, il peut être payé à la veuve un montant égal à un remboursement de contribution, moins l'ensemble des montants versés au contributeur et à sa veuve et à ses enfants en remplacement de tout autre titre au paiement de l'allocation annuelle. Ce paiement peut être versé à la veuve, sur sa demande écrite au Ministre, à tout moment avant la dissolution ou l'annulation de ce mariage ou le décès de son mari par ce mariage, s'il n'y a pas d'enfant du contributeur ayant droit à une allocation annuelle en vertu de la présente Loi.

La reprise du paiement de l'allocation annuelle au moment de la dissolution ou de l'annulation de ce mariage, ou du décès de son mari par ce mariage, est un droit garanti par la Loi sur la pension de retraite des Forces canadiennes et ne dépend pas des ressources de la personne. Le paiement de l'allocation annuelle ne reprendrait pas si la veuve avait reçu une somme en remplacement de tout autre titre au paiement de l'allocation.



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WITNESSES—TÉMOINS

From the Department of National Defence:

Mr. D.B. Dewar, Deputy Minister;
Gen. R.M. Withers, Chief of the Defence Staff;
VAdm D.N. Mainguy, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff;

Mr. J.R. Killick, Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel);
Mr. L.E. Davies, Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance);
BGen J.A. Williams, Director General Manpower Utiliza-
tion;
Mr. R.L. Patenaude, Director Personnel Requirements and
Control;

Du ministère de la Défense nationale:

M. D.B. Dewar, Sous-Ministre;
Gén. R.M. Withers, Chef de l'état-major de la Défense;
VAm D.N. Mainguy, Sous-chef de l'état-major de la
Défense;
M. J.R. Killick, Sous-Ministre adjoint (Matériels);
M. L.E. Davies, Sous-Ministre adjoint (Finances);
Bgén J.A. Williams, Directeur général—Utilisation des
effectifs;
M. R.L. Patenaude, Directeur—Besoins en personnel
(Contrôle);

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 97

Tuesday, May 24, 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 97

Le mardi 24 mai 1983

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

External Affairs and National Defence

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

Main Estimates 1983-84: Vote 1—Operating
Expenditures under EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONCERNANT:


Budget principal 1983-1984: crédit 1—dépenses
d'opération sous la rubrique AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES

WITNESSES:

(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:

(Voir à l'endos)



First Session of the

Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la

trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

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Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appolloni

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(Quorum 8)

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

ORDER OF REFERENCE

Wednesday, May 18, 1983

ORDERED,—That External Affairs Votes L36a and L37a; and

That National Defence Vote 5a for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984, be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

ATTEST:

ORDRE DE RENVOI

Le mercredi 18 mai 1983

IL EST ORDONNÉ,—Que les crédits L36a et L37a, Affaires extérieures; et

Que le crédit 5a, Défense nationale, pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984, soient déferés au Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale.

ATTESTÉ:

Le Greffier de la Chambre des communes

C.B. KOESTER

The Clerk of the House of Commons

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, MAY 24, 1983
(152)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9:30 o'clock a.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Dupras, Hudecki, Lapierre, McKinnon, Prud'homme, Robinson (*Etobicoke-Lakeshore*) and Stevens.

Alternates presents: Messrs. Breau, Darling, Ogle and Watson.

Witnesses: From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. M. Massé, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. W.T. Delworth, Assistant Deputy Minister—Political Affairs; Mr. R.V. Gorham, Assistant Under-Secretary, Bureau of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs; Mr. E.J. Bergbusch, Director, African Affairs Division; Mr. W.J. Jenkins, Assistant Deputy Minister, Sectoral and Economic Relations.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Mr. Robert Miller, Consultant/Researcher.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated Wednesday, February 23, 1983, relating to the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (*See Minutes of Proceedings, Tuesday, March 15, 1983, Issue No. 83*).

The Order of Reference dated Wednesday, May 18, 1983, in relation to the Supplementary Estimates (A) for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984, being read as follows:

ORDERED,—That External Affairs Votes L36a and L37a; and

That National Defence Vote 5a for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984, be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

The Chairman presented the Fourteenth Report of the Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure, as follows:

Your Sub-committee met on Thursday, May 19, 1983 to consider the future business of the Committee in relation to its Order of Reference dated, Wednesday February 23, 1983 respecting the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 and in relation to its Order of Reference dated, Wednesday May 18, 1983 respecting the Supplementary Estimates (A) for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984.

Your Sub-committee has agreed to recommend the following schedule of meetings:

Main Estimates 1983-84:

Tuesday, May 24, 1983, 9:30 a.m.:

Officials from the department of External Affairs.

Supplementary Estimates (A) 1983-84:

Tuesday, June 7, 1983, 9:30 a.m.:

Officials from CIDA

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE MARDI 24 MAI 1983
(152)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale se réunit aujourd'hui à 9h30 sous la présidence de M. Marcel Prud'homme (président).

Membres du Comité présents: M^{me} Appolloni, MM. Dupras, Hudecki, Lapierre, McKinnon, Prud'homme, Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*).

Substituts présents: MM. Breau, Darling, Ogle et Watson.

Témoins: Du ministère des Affaires extérieures: M. M. Massé, sous-secrétaire d'État aux affaires extérieures; M. W.T. Delworth, sous-ministre adjoint, Affaires politiques; M. R.V. Gorham, sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint, Bureau des affaires de l'Amérique latine et des Antilles; M. E.J. Bergbusch, directeur, Direction de l'Afrique anglophone; M. W.J. Jenkins, sous-ministre adjoint, Relations sectorielles et économiques.

Aussi présent: Du Centre parlementaire des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur: M. Robert Miller, conseiller/rechercheur.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 23 février 1983 portant sur le budget principal pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984 (*Voir Procès-verbal du mardi 15 mars 1983, fascicule n° 83*).

Lecture est faite de l'ordre de renvoi suivant du mercredi 18 mai 1983 ayant trait au budget supplémentaire (A) pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984:

IL EST ORDONNÉ,—Que les crédits L36a et L37a, Affaires extérieures; et

Que le crédit 5a, Défense nationale, pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984, soit déferé au Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale.

Le président présente le Quatorzième Rapport du Sous-comité du programme et de la procédure suivant:

Votre Sous-comité se réunit le jeudi 19 mai 1983 pour étudier les travaux futurs du Comité en relation avec son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 23 février 1983 portant sur le Budget principal pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984 et en relation avec son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 18 mai 1983 portant sur le Budget supplémentaire (A) pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984.

Votre Sous-comité convient de recommander l'horaire suivant:

Budget principal 1983-1984:

Le mardi 24 mai 1983, 9h30:

Hauts fonctionnaires du ministère des Affaires extérieures

Budget supplémentaire (A) 1983-1984:

Le mardi 7 juin 1983, 9h30:

Hauts fonctionnaires de l'ACDI

Thursday, June 9, 1983, 9:30 a.m.:

Hon. J. Gilles Lamontagne, Minister of National Defence

Your Sub-committee has agreed to recommend:

That the Committee retain the services of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, for the period 1 April 1983 to 31 March 1984, to assist in the consideration of its Orders of Reference subject to the expectation, during the current fiscal year, that the Special Committee on Standing Orders and Procedure address the question of the relative roles of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, on the one hand, and the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament and other research facilities, on the other; and

That this examination take into account the staffing and research needs of the committees of the House of Commons.

It was agreed,—That the Fourteenth Report of the Sub-committee on Agenda and Procedure be concurred in.

The Committee resumed consideration of Vote 1 under External Affairs.

The witnesses answered questions.

The Chairman authorized that the following replies to questions by members of the Committee be appended to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix "EAND-76"*):

Reply to Mr. Crosbie (*St-John's West*)—May 18, 1983

Reply to Mr. Darling—May 11, 1983

Reply to Miss Jewett—May 18, 1983

Reply to Mr. Laniel—May 18, 1983

Replies to Mr. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*)—May 12, 1983 (2)

Replies to Mr. Roche—May 11, 1983 (2)

Replies to Mr. Robinson—May 12, 1983 (2)

Reply to Mr. Stewart—May 18, 1983

Reply to Mr. Watson—May 16, 1983

At 11:29 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Le jeudi 9 juin 1983, 15h30:

L'hon. J. Gilles Lamontagne, ministre de la Défense nationale

Votre Sous-comité convient de recommander:

Que le Comité retienne les services du Centre parlementaire pour les Affaires étrangères et le Commerce extérieur, pour la période du 1^{er} avril 1983 au 31 mars 1984, afin de l'assister dans l'étude de ses ordres de renvoi, dans l'expectative que durant la présente année financière, le Comité spécial chargé d'examiner le Règlement et la procédure se penche sur la question des rôles relatifs du Centre parlementaire pour les Affaires étrangères et le Commerce extérieur, d'une part, et du Service de recherches de la Bibliothèque du Parlement et de d'autres services de recherches, d'autre part; et

Que cette étude tienne compte du personnel de soutien et des besoins de conseillers en recherche des comités de la Chambre des communes.

Il est convenu,—Que le Quatorzième Rapport du Sous-comité du programme et de la procédure soit adopté.

Le Comité reprend l'étude du crédit 1 sous la rubrique AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES.

Les témoins répondent aux questions.

Le président autorise que les réponses suivantes aux questions du Comité soient jointes aux procès-verbal et témoignage de ce jour (*Voir Appendice "EAND-76"*):

Réponse à M. Crosbie (*St. John's West*)—le 18 mai 1983

Réponse à M. Darling—le 11 mai 1983

Réponse à M^{lle} Jewett—le 18 mai 1983

Réponse à M. Laniel—le 18 mai 1983

Réponses à M. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*)—le 12 mai 1983 (2)

Réponses à M. Roche—le 11 mai 1983 (2)

Réponses à M. Robinson—le 12 mai 1983 (2)

Réponse à M. Stewart—le 18 mai 1983

Réponse à M. Watson—le 16 mai 1983

A 11h29, le Comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le greffier du comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

*(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)**[Texte]*

Tuesday, May 24, 1983

• 0932

The Chairman: Could I call you to attention, please?

Mesdames and gentlemen, your subcommittee met on Thursday, May 19, last week, to consider the future business of the committee in relation to its order of reference dated Wednesday, February 23, respecting the main estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984, and in relation to its order of reference dated Wednesday, May 18, 1983 respecting the Supplementary Estimates (A) for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984. Your subcommittee has agreed to recommend the following schedule: main estimates 1983-1984, this morning, May 24, with officials of the Department of External Affairs—that is exactly what we are doing—and supplementary estimates.

I have the choice, Mr. McKinnon, if you remember, between the seven and the nine... whomever I could get first as a minister—so Tuesday will be officials from CIDA, because we have in the supplementary estimates some supplementary estimates for CIDA. Therefore there will be a meeting for supplementary estimates for CIDA on Tuesday, June 7, at 9.30 a.m. as agreed.

• 0935

We also have the supplementary estimates for National Defence. Therefore there will be a meeting—that is not meaning only a meeting, but at least another meeting—on Thursday June 9, 1983 at 3.30 p.m.; and it is confirmed that the Minister of National Defence and his officials will be here for that meeting. At least, I got that confirmed before the weekend. Therefore your subcommittee recommends today, of course, and then supplementary estimates on June 7 for CIDA, and on June 9, Thursday, for National Defence.

That is your subcommittee report. Also...

Mr. McKinnon: Could I just interject?**The Chairman:** Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: That is the reverse of what I had written in, but it is quite acceptable to me. If you can do anything about moving the Thursday one into the morning rather than the afternoon...

The Chairman: Yes. I will ask the clerk. I may confirm that before the end of this meeting.

Mr. McKinnon: We have to start picking the next Prime Minister of Canada that afternoon.

The Chairman: Yes, I think you have said enough. I also want to be there. I am attending the conference.

Mr. McKinnon: We always thought you belonged there.

TÉMOIGNAGES

*(Enregistrement électronique)**[Traduction]*

Le mardi 24 mai 1983

Le président: Pouvons-nous commencer, s'il vous plaît?

Mesdames et messieurs, votre Sous-comité s'est réuni le jeudi 19 mai, la semaine dernière, pour étudier les travaux futurs du Comité en relation avec son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 23 février 1983 portant sur le Budget principal pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984 et en relation avec son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 18 mai 1983 portant sur le Budget supplémentaire (A) pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984. Votre Sous-comité est convenu de recommander le programme suivant: ce matin, nous allons étudier le Budget principal de 1983-1984 en présence des hauts fonctionnaires du ministère des Affaires extérieures, ce que nous faisons aujourd'hui, puis le Budget supplémentaire.

Si vous vous souvenez bien, monsieur McKinnon, j'ai le choix entre le 7 juin et le 9 juin, cela dépendait du programme des ministres, et par conséquent nous entendrons les représentants de l'ACDI mardi puisque le Budget supplémentaire prévoit l'octroi de crédits complémentaires à l'ACDI. Donc, comme convenu, le mardi 7 juin, à 9h30, comparaitront les hauts fonctionnaires de l'ACDI.

Nous devons également étudier le Budget supplémentaire du ministère de la Défense nationale. Par conséquent, le Comité siégera le jeudi 9 juin 1983 à 15h30 et d'autres séances auront lieu si le besoin s'en faisait sentir. Je puis d'autre part vous confirmer que le ministre de la Défense nationale et ses collaborateurs seront ici lors de cette séance. J'ai au moins pu obtenir cette confirmation avant la fin de la semaine dernière. Le programme du Sous-comité est donc le suivant: Budget principal aujourd'hui, puis Budget supplémentaire de l'ACDI le 7 juin et de la Défense nationale le jeudi 9 juin.

Voilà donc le rapport du Sous-comité.

M. McKinnon: Puis-je vous interrompre?**Le président:** Monsieur McKinnon.

M. McKinnon: C'est le contraire de ce que j'avais noté, mais cela me satisfait pleinement. Par contre, si vous pouviez avancer la séance de jeudi pour qu'elle ait lieu le matin et non l'après-midi...

Le président: Oui, je vais en aviser le greffier. Je pourrais peut-être vous le confirmer avant la fin de cette séance.

M. McKinnon: Il va falloir commencer à talonner le prochain premier ministre du Canada cet après-midi-là.

Le président: Oui, je pense que vous en avez dit assez. Je veux également être là et d'ailleurs j'assisterai à cette conférence.

M. McKinnon: Nous avons toujours pensé que c'était là votre place véritable.

[Texte]

The Chairman: The question now, you understand, will be to make sure we could also get the minister that morning. Maybe the staff of the minister could try to confirm that for me.

Would you try to see if the minister could be here at 9.30 a.m., Thursday, June 9, instead of 3.30 p.m. or 11.00 a.m.? It is the best of both.

Also, your subcommittee recommends that the committee retain the services of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade for the period of April 1, 1983 to March 31, 1984 to assist in the consideration of its order of reference, subject to the expectations—and I bring your very close attention to that—during the current fiscal year that the Special Committee on Standing Orders and Procedure will address the question of the relative roles of the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, on the one hand, and the Research Branch of the Library of Parliament and other research facilities, on the other hand. This examination should take into account the staffing and research needs of the committee of the House of Commons. This was a long discussion of the steering committee, and we thought we should come up this morning with this recommendation as to the renewal of the contract with the foreign affairs and foreign trade group.

Therefore this is your respectfully submitted fourteenth report of the subcommittee on agenda and procedure. So all I need is a proposal to accept.

Mr. Ogle: I move the report be accepted.

Mr. McKinnon: I second that.

Mr. Dupras: I second it.

Motion agreed to.

(See *Minutes of Proceedings*)

The Chairman: Therefore we shall sit this morning—we are there—June 7 and 9, and we shall retain the services of the foreign affairs and foreign trade group, with the special reference that I am ordered by not only the steering committee now but the committee to implement; this resolution that you have just passed. I shall distribute a copy right now to all.

Merci.

Mrs. Appolloni: On a point of order.

The Chairman: Madam.

Mrs. Appolloni: The copy you are distributing, Mr. Chairman: what is it exactly?

The Chairman: What you just voted.

Mrs. Appolloni: Oh, just the main motion.

The Chairman: Yes.

Mrs. Appolloni: Right. Thank you.

Le président: Monsieur Massé, vous avez une déclaration à faire? Aucune déclaration?

[Traduction]

Le président: Il va maintenant falloir s'assurer de la présence du ministre ce matin-là. Le personnel du ministre pourrait peut-être essayer de nous le confirmer.

Pourriez-vous voir si le ministre peut venir à 9h30 jeudi 9 juin au lieu de 15h30? Ou alors à 11 heures; ce serait un compromis acceptable.

Votre Sous-comité recommande également que le Comité retienne les services du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur pour la période du 1^{er} avril 1983 au 31 mars 1984 afin de l'assister dans l'étude de ses ordres de renvoi, dans l'expectative et je voudrais attirer votre attention là-dessus, que durant la présente année financière, le Comité spécial chargé d'examiner le règlement et la procédure se penche sur la question des rôles relatifs du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur, d'une part, et du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement et de d'autres services de recherche, d'autre part. Cette étude devrait tenir compte du personnel de soutien et des besoins de conseillers en recherche des comités de la Chambre des communes. Cela a fait l'objet d'une longue discussion lors de la réunion du Comité directeur et nous avons pensé proposer ce matin la reconduction du contrat conclu avec le Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur.

Il s'agit donc là du quatorzième rapport du Sous-comité du programme et de la procédure, rapport respectueusement soumis. J'ai donc besoin d'une motion d'adoption.

M. Ogle: Je propose que le rapport soit adopté.

M. McKinnon: Je l'appuie.

M. Dupras: Je l'appuie.

La motion est adoptée.

(Voir *Procès-verbaux et témoignages*)

Le président: Nous allons donc siéger ce matin, puis les 7 et 9 juin et retenir les services du Centre parlementaire pour les affaires étrangères et le commerce extérieur et je suis maintenant tenu de respecter ces recommandations proposées antérieurement par le Comité directeur puis par le Comité maintenant. Je vais distribuer une copie de cette résolution maintenant.

Thank you.

Mme Appolloni: Un rappel au Règlement.

Le président: Madame Appolloni.

Mme Appolloni: Quel document au juste entendez-vous distribuer, monsieur le président?

Le président: Le document que vous venez d'adopter.

Mme Appolloni: Oh, il ne s'agit que de la motion principale.

Le président: Oui.

Mme Appolloni: Très bien. Merci.

The Chairman: Mr. Massé, do you have a statement to make? No statement?

[Text]

At this time, I would like to say I have sent a series of letters from the minister to you, sir, Mr. Delworth, and many others, thanking them very much for the great services the Department of External Affairs has offered to the IPU delegation which went to Helsinki for the briefing, and also the excellent briefing we got for a delegation that will be going to Hungary on the conference on security in Europe.

• 0940

Co-operation is excellent and I will make sure the minister is well informed of this so that we can expect the same kind of services in the future. During the month of June, I may come back another Friday morning with the next report of another group of parliamentarians who have gone abroad. We have implemented this now.

I reported to the House that this committee has studied the IPU meeting that went to Rome and we shall study the IPU meeting that went to Helsinki and other organizations that may refer their report to us.

I will proceed in our usual fashion. The critic of the official opposition, the Honourable Mr. McKinnon, please, followed by Father Ogle, Mr. Dupras, and Madam Appolloni.

Mr. McKinnon, please.

Mr. McKinnon: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to speak to questions on a couple of subjects that are much in the news these days; and perhaps you will give me the breadth of reference that is customary in this committee.

We have news of the problems of the bombing in South Africa. The accompanying news, which concerns me, right at the moment, is this Mr. Saloojee of Toronto, representing the ANC, who said:

I think that Western companies operating in South Africa should take serious warning from our latest attack. Because... we have just been concentrating on South African Government targets, those Western companies, including Canadian firms, are not immune from attacks, particularly if they are contributing to the military sector...

As he includes Canadian firms, I wonder if you could tell us what reaction the Canadian Department of External Affairs takes to threats such as this, which, I believe, were delivered by a gentleman living in Canada.

Mr. M. Massé (Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs): Mr. Chairman, maybe Mr. Bergbusch from External Affairs, who is the specialist in that area, could answer the critic's question.

Mr. E.J. Bergbusch (Director, African Affairs Division, Department of External Affairs): Thank you.

It has always been the Canadian government's position that Canadian firms were perfectly free to carry on normal trade and investment in South Africa. This basic proposition would

[Translation]

Je voudrais donc maintenant préciser que je vous ai adressé, monsieur Delworth, et à d'autres, une série de lettres provenant du ministre et dans lesquelles il remerciait le ministère des Affaires extérieures des énormes services qu'il a rendus à la délégation de l'Union interparlementaire qui s'est rendue à Helsinki. Il vous remercie de ces séances d'information ainsi que des autres séances qui ont été offertes à une délégation qui assistera à la Conférence sur la sécurité en Europe en Hongrie.

Le ministère s'est vraiment montré coopérant et je veillerai à ce que le ministre en soit avisé pour que nous puissions être aussi bien traités à l'avenir. Au cours du mois de juin, il se peut que l'on aborde un vendredi matin le rapport d'un autre groupe de parlementaires qui se sont rendus à l'étranger. C'est une décision que nous avions prise.

J'ai fait savoir à la Chambre que ce Comité avait étudié la réunion du groupe de l'Union interparlementaire qui s'est déroulée à Rome et que nous étudierons celle qui a eu lieu à Helsinki ainsi que les rapports d'autres organisations dont nous serions saisis.

Je vais procéder de la manière habituelle et ainsi donner la parole à l'honorable M. McKinnon, critique de l'Opposition officielle, puis à M. Ogle, à M. Dupras et à M^{me} Appolloni.

Monsieur McKinnon, s'il vous plaît.

M. McKinnon: Merci, monsieur le président. Je voudrais aborder certaines questions qui font les manchettes ces jours-ci; et j'espère que vous me donnerez la marge de manoeuvre nécessaire, ce qui est habituellement le cas au sein de ce Comité.

Nous avons eu vent du raid perpétré en Afrique du Sud. Mais ce sont les propos tenus par M. Saloojee de Toronto, représentant le Congrès national africain, qui me préoccupent le plus. Voici ce qu'il a dit:

Je crois que les entreprises occidentales exerçant des activités en Afrique du Sud devraient considérer ce raid comme un sérieux avertissement. Ce n'est pas parce que nous avons bombardé des bâtiments appartenant au gouvernement sud-africain que les entreprises occidentales, y compris les entreprises canadiennes, devraient se sentir à l'abri de raids, en particulier si elles apportent leur concours au secteur militaire...

Puisqu'il englobe les entreprises canadiennes, je me demande quelles mesures entend prendre le ministère des Affaires extérieures en réponse à des menaces de ce genre qui ont été proférées, je crois, par un individu résidant au Canada.

M. M. Massé (sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures): Monsieur le président, permettez-moi de demander à M. Bergbusch du ministère des Affaires extérieures, spécialiste en la matière, de répondre à la question du député.

M. E.J. Bergbusch (directeur, Direction des affaires africaines, ministère des Affaires extérieures): Merci.

La position adoptée par le gouvernement du Canada a toujours été que les entreprises canadiennes étaient tout à fait libres d'avoir des échanges commerciaux avec l'Afrique du Sud

[Texte]

continue to govern judgement with respect to any sort of comments made with respect to activities here. From the standpoint of the Canadian government, such trade and investment is perfectly legitimate in itself and we would obviously suggest that it be viewed in the light of this basic principle.

Mr. McKinnon: Is the government anticipating releasing any statement as to the government's attitude that any violent action taken against a Canadian firm, either here or in South Africa, would be considered to be a very serious offence and would probably lead to criminal charges if it happens in Canada? This appears to be a threat against what the government perceives as normal trade. Firms that are conducting what the government does not disapprove of should, it would seem, be free from such threats. What does the government intend to do about this particular incident?

Mr. Bergbusch: With respect to the events which have taken place in South Africa and in Mozambique over the weekend, a government statement is now, I believe, under consideration and will, no doubt, be issued later today.

Mr. McKinnon: No; I am not talking about the events which are happening in South Africa right now. I am talking about the gentleman, Yusuf Saloojee, of Toronto, the Canadian representative of the ANC, making a threat that if Canadian firms continue doing business with South Africa, they will be subject to similar kinds of action which happened in South Africa; that is, a demolition party.

• 0945

Mr. Bergbusch: With respect to a statement of Mr. Saloojee in Toronto, it would presumably be the position that Mr. Saloojee would have the same civil rights in Canada as any other Canadian and if any acts were carried out which were contrary to Canadian law, the appropriate judgments would be made. In the absence of any acts which are contrary to Canadian law, presumably he will be free to make such statements as he sees fit.

Mr. McKinnon: I wonder if you could clarify something for me. The military acts that took place in Mozambique over the weekend were apparently in response to the bombing in South Africa, and I am a little puzzled why a reprisal, as it is called, in Mozambique happened there rather than in Zambia; or is it now considered that Mozambique is occupying the same kind of position that Zambia is, as far as providing a haven for people who wish to attack the South African government in their position therein?

Mr. Bergbusch: I think it would be extremely difficult for anyone in the position that I am in, as an officer of the Department of External Affairs, to make a definitive judgment as to the role and activities of the ANC in the countries neighbouring South Africa. Obviously, all those so-called front-line states support the basic objectives of the ANC, which is black majority rule in South Africa; but the degree to which they are involved in active support for military operations or acts of sabotage is not something on which we would be in a position to pass judgment, or in effect...

[Traduction]

et d'y investir. Le gouvernement canadien maintient sa position dans le cas qui nous occupe. De son point de vue, il est parfaitement légitime d'avoir des échanges commerciaux avec l'Afrique du Sud et d'y investir, et nous pensons que cette affaire devrait être vue à la lumière de ce principe fondamental.

M. McKinnon: Le gouvernement entend-il publier un communiqué dénonçant toute action violente perpétrée contre une entreprise canadienne, soit ici, soit en Afrique du Sud, et que toute action de ce genre serait considérée comme une grave infraction qui pourrait donner lieu à des poursuites si elle se déroulait au Canada? Il s'agit là, semble-t-il, d'une menace contre ce que le gouvernement considère comme des échanges commerciaux normaux. Toute entreprise exerçant des activités que le gouvernement ne désapprouve pas devrait, il me semble, ne pas faire l'objet de telles menaces. Qu'entend faire le gouvernement à ce sujet?

M. Bergbusch: Pour ce qui est des événements qui se sont déroulés en Afrique du Sud et au Mozambique pendant le week-end, je crois savoir que le gouvernement entend publier un communiqué sous peu.

M. McKinnon: Non, je ne vous parle pas des événements qui se déroulent actuellement en Afrique du Sud. Je vous parle du représentant canadien du Congrès national africain, M. Yusuf Saloojee de Toronto, qui menace les entreprises canadiennes faisant affaires avec l'Afrique du Sud des mêmes actions perpétrées en Afrique du Sud; il s'agit là, ni plus ni moins, d'une entreprise de démolition.

M. Bergbusch: Pour ce qui est de la déclaration faite par M. Saloojee à Toronto, nous pensons que ce dernier bénéficie des mêmes droits civils au Canada que n'importe quel autre Canadien, mais que si des actes enfreignant le droit canadien étaient perpétrés, certaines mesures seraient prises. Dans le cas contraire, il est vraisemblablement libre de faire toutes les déclarations qu'il juge nécessaires.

M. McKinnon: Peut-être pourriez-vous m'expliquer ceci. Le raid perpétré au Mozambique pendant le week-end vient apparemment à la suite des bombardements perpétrés contre l'Afrique du Sud et je me demande pourquoi cette mesure de rétorsion, comme on l'appelle, s'est déroulée au Mozambique et non pas en Zambie. À moins que l'on ne juge que le Mozambique occupe la même position que la Zambie, c'est-à-dire qu'il est devenu une terre d'asile pour ceux qui désirent s'en prendre au régime sud-africain?

M. Bergbusch: Je pense qu'il m'est très difficile, en tant que fonctionnaire du ministère des Affaires extérieures, de juger du rôle et des activités exercés par le Congrès national africain dans les pays avoisinant l'Afrique du Sud. Apparemment, tous ces États dits de la ligne de front endossent les objectifs fondamentaux du CNA, qui sont que la majorité noire devrait gouverner en Afrique du Sud. Mais je ne pense pas que nous puissions juger de leur participation active à certaines opérations militaires ou à certains actes de sabotage, ni d'ailleurs...

[Text]

Mr. McKinnon: I see that some of the leading countries in the world have expressed their indignation or their objection to this raid into Mozambique, deploring it as an escalation of the violence; and I would like to know what Canada has done, if anything, in the same vein.

Mr. Bergbusch: As I mentioned in an earlier response, I think, a statement is now under consideration and it is expected it will be issued later today.

Mr. McKinnon: Well, I think I will pass for now, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. McKinnon.

Father Ogle, followed by Mr. Dupras.

Mr. Ogle: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask a few questions, if I may, about the situation with the Cantadora group. First of all, I want to say I was very happy the Secretary of State for External Affairs made the statement on May 11 in relation to this group, as far as I understand it, indicating that Canada would support it in its initiatives in whatever way was possible and would be open to any role the group might ask Canada to play in working toward a negotiated settlement in Central America. I believe a second meeting of the group has taken place, although I have no information about what did happen in the May meeting, or the recent meeting, outside of the fact that I do think one did take place. Could somebody tell me what did take place in the second, or the most recent meeting, I should say, of the Cantadora group?

Mr. M. Massé: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gorham is our head for Latin America and Central America. He would be the one who should answer the question.

The Chairman: Mr. Gorham, please.

Mr. R.V. Gorham (Assistant Under-Secretary, Bureau of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, Department of External Affairs): Mr. Chairman, this so-called Cantadora group is made up of the countries of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama, and it has taken on that name because the foreign ministers of those four countries met on the Island of Cantadora off the coast of Panama some weeks ago and decided to endeavour to take initiatives to start the process of discussion and dialogue leading to some sort of peaceful settlements in Central America.

• 0950

Their first more formal meeting a few weeks ago involved contact with the foreign ministers of the Central American countries—El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica. In that particular meeting the Central American representatives did not meet en masse, but the Cantadora four met with each of them individually to determine in those discussions what the perspectives of the respective governments were in regard to negotiation and their respective positions.

[Translation]

M. McKinnon: Je constate que certains des principaux pays du monde ont déjà exprimé leur indignation ou leur opposition à ce raid perpétré contre le Mozambique, le dénonçant comme une escalade de la violence. Je voudrais donc savoir ce que le gouvernement du Canada entend faire dans le même élan.

M. Bergbusch: Comme je l'ai dit tout à l'heure, je crois savoir qu'un communiqué sera publié sous peu.

M. McKinnon: Bien, monsieur le président, je vais maintenant céder la parole à d'autres.

Le président: Merci, monsieur McKinnon.

Monsieur Ogle, puis monsieur Dupras.

M. Ogle: Merci, monsieur le président.

Si vous me le permettez, je voudrais poser certaines questions sur le groupe Cantadora. Tout d'abord, je voudrais dire que je suis très satisfait de la déclaration faite le 11 mai dernier par le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à propos de ce groupe, déclaration indiquant que le Canada plaiderait sa cause à chaque fois qu'il le pourrait et serait disposé à intervenir, et ce, à la demande du groupe, en vue de favoriser un règlement négocié en Amérique centrale. Je crois savoir que ce groupe s'est réuni pour une deuxième fois, bien que je ne sache rien de ce qui s'est passé lors de la séance du mois de mai ou de cette dernière réunion; tout ce que je sais, c'est que ce groupe s'est réuni une deuxième fois. Quelqu'un pourrait-il me dire ce qui s'y est passé?

M. M. Massé: Monsieur le président, M. Gorham est le directeur des opérations en Amérique latine et en Amérique centrale. Je lui cède la parole.

Le président: Monsieur Gorham, s'il vous plaît.

M. R.V. Gorham (sous-secrétaire adjoint, Bureau des affaires de l'Amérique latine et des Caraïbes, ministère des Affaires extérieures): Monsieur le président, ce groupe dénommé Cantadora regroupe le Mexique, le Venezuela, la Colombie et le Panama. Ce groupe s'appelle ainsi car les ministres des Affaires étrangères de ces quatre pays se sont rencontrés dans l'île de Cantadora au large des côtes du Panama il y a quelques semaines et ont décidé d'essayer de lancer des initiatives dans le but de favoriser la discussion et le dialogue pouvant mener à un règlement pacifique des problèmes en Amérique centrale.

Lors de leur toute première réunion officielle, il y a quelques semaines, ils se sont mis en rapport avec les ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays d'Amérique centrale, à savoir le Salvador, le Nicaragua, le Honduras, le Guatemala et le Costa Rica. Lors de cette réunion, les quatre représentants du groupe Cantadora se sont entretenus non pas collectivement mais individuellement avec les représentants des pays d'Amérique centrale en vue de déterminer quelles étaient les perspectives de négociation de ces gouvernements respectifs et quelles étaient leurs positions.

[Texte]

A more recent meeting took place in which the Cantadora group agreed to send civilian observers to Costa Rica to examine or monitor the border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. This resulted from a request by Costa Rica initially to the Organization of American States protesting that Nicaragua was harassing or violating the frontiers of Costa Rica and that inasmuch as Costa Rica is a country—I believe the only country in the world—that does not maintain military armed forces, they were unable to prevent this type of activity. They called upon initially, as I said, the Organization of American States to establish a peacekeeping or peace-monitoring or -observing force specifically made up of representatives from the Cantadora countries.

The results of the most recent discussions were that initially the action or the investigation should take place by the designated representatives of the four Cantadora countries, and I think they will be in place—probably they are there now; if not... We heard from one of them that they would be there this weekend. Then they are to meet again, as a formal meeting, on May 28, I believe, and it remains to be seen what results will derive from that.

Meanwhile, because of this initiative by the four countries, Costa Rica has agreed to have its case before the Organization of American States postponed pending the results of the Cantadora discussions.

Mr. Ogle: Has there been any indication that the group could see Canada in any specific role, as Mr. MacEachen indicated Canada was willing to play?

Mr. Gorham: All of the countries concerned with which we have had contact take the view that the basic responsibility for taking these initiatives rests with the countries of the immediate region. They are all aware of the Canadian willingness to assist or facilitate if requested; but so far they have not requested and, as I said, it is the view of all of them that the basic responsibility rests with those most immediately concerned.

Mr. Ogle: Thank you.

Could I ask if the Department of External Affairs has any more information than was carried by the press this past week, first in *The New York Times*, that Mr. Enders and the head of the CIA had told committees in the House that they would be able to take over Nicaragua this year? Then I see in the press today that the CIA has denied they said that. Does the department have any more information on that allegation?

Mr. Gorham: No, only what we read in the newspapers. The suggestion in the press is contrary to what the official United States policy as expressed publicly has been, in which they claim that their objective is not the overthrow of the regime in Nicaragua but merely to prevent Nicaragua from engaging in military support of or arms traffic to the rebels in El Salvador.

Mr. Ogle: But there does seem to be a difference between what the press is reporting and the position that has been stated.

[Traduction]

Lors de la dernière réunion, le groupe Cantadora est convenu d'envoyer des observateurs civils au Costa Rica en vue de patrouiller la frontière entre le Costa Rica et le Nicaragua. Cette décision faisait suite à une demande déposée par le Costa Rica auprès de l'Organisation des États américains dénonçant les harcèlements perpétrés par le Nicaragua sur la frontière du Costa Rica et portant que dans la mesure où ce dernier, et je crois qu'il s'agit du seul pays au monde, ne possède pas de forces armées, il ne peut empêcher ce genre d'activités. Comme je l'ai dit, le Costa Rica a tout d'abord fait appel à l'Organisation des États américains pour qu'une force de la paix ou qu'un groupe d'observateurs composés des représentants du groupe Cantadora y soient envoyés.

Lors des discussions les plus récentes, il a été décidé que cette enquête devrait être effectuée par les représentants désignés des quatre pays du groupe Cantadora et je pense même qu'ils ont déjà été nommés. On nous a fait savoir qu'ils seraient sur place ce week-end. Ils doivent de nouveau se réunir officiellement le 28 mai, je crois, et il faudra alors attendre ce qui en ressortira.

Entre-temps, en raison de cette initiative prise par ces quatre pays, le Costa Rica a accepté de renvoyer à plus tard l'étude de la plainte qu'il avait déposée auprès de l'Organisation des États américains, et ce, en attendant l'issue des discussions menées à l'initiative du groupe Cantadora.

M. Ogle: Pensez-vous que le Canada pourrait jouer un rôle précis dans cette affaire, comme M. MacEachen l'a proposé?

M. Gorham: Tous les pays que nous avons consultés estiment que la prise de ces initiatives relève des pays avoisinants. Ils savent tous que le Canada est disposé à intervenir à leur demande; aucune demande ne nous est parvenue jusqu'à présent et, je le répète, ils estiment tous que la responsabilité première du règlement de cette affaire repose entre les mains de ceux qui sont directement en cause.

M. Ogle: Merci.

Puis-je savoir si le ministère des Affaires extérieures possède d'autres renseignements que ce que renfermait la presse la semaine dernière, et en particulier le *New York Times*, selon lequel M. Enders et le directeur de la CIA avaient dit dans des comités de la Chambre qu'ils pourraient renverser le régime nicaraguayen cette année? Je vois dans la presse aujourd'hui que la CIA nie avoir dit cela. Le ministère a-t-il d'autres renseignements à ce sujet?

M. Gorham: Non, les seuls renseignements que nous avons sont ceux qui figurent dans les journaux. Ce que prétend la presse est contraire aux déclarations publiques faites par les autorités américaines qui prétendent que leur objectif n'est pas de renverser le régime au Nicaragua, mais simplement de l'empêcher d'envoyer des armes aux rebelles du Salvador.

M. Ogle: Mais il semble pourtant y avoir une différence entre les articles publiés dans la presse et l'attitude adoptée officiellement par les États-Unis.

[Text]

Mr. Gorham: There are a lot of things reported in the press in the United States that are confusing to all of us.

Mr. Ogle: Okay.

I wonder if I could switch now to ask about the bill that Mr. Kaplan has proposed on a civilian spy organization being organized in Canada. Mr. Kaplan has proposed that a civilian spy organization be established in Canada. If that goes forward, how much input will the Department of External Affairs have in setting that up?

• 0955

Mr. M. Massé: Mr. Chairman, we have already had an input, of course, during the normal process. There are interdepartmental committees that are put together of officials that have an interest in any subject-matter, as they will in intelligence and in security. Of course, these officials look at what is the departmental interest, try to represent it, and then a basic draft bill is done that goes to the legislative committee. In the legislative committee the various ministers, including our minister, of course, have an input, and that input affects what our interests are. For that security bill the same process was followed, and we had an input both at the interdepartmental committee and at the ministerial level.

Mr. Ogle: Just speaking now from your department, do you see this as a good step—that kind of bill? It is quite a major change, is it not, in the way Canada would get information?

Mr. M. Massé: Father Ogle, you are forcing me to use vague words to answer. Whether the steps are good or bad is, of course, not my decision. It is a political decision. All that I can say is that we have had an input into the preparation of this bill that tries to make it as efficient and effective for the department as possible.

Mr. Ogle: I am not trying to put anyone in a difficult position, because you do not know, but the information that you now get regarding what goes on in other countries—how different will it be now with this new organization? Will you get more, or will you get information that you do not have now, or will you give it a mandate to look for things that you cannot get now, or . . . ?

Mr. M. Massé: From what I remember of the bill, I am not sure that it affects that much the sources of information. It is much more a question of organization in the country in order to be more efficient and meet the objectives of the bill better. The objectives of the bill, of course, are stated in the bill, and they indicate security of the nation, protection of the citizens, ability to prevent acts that would be injurious to Canadian security—these are the general objectives of the bill.

[Translation]

M. Gorham: Je dois dire que de nombreux articles publiés dans la presse aux États-Unis ne manquent pas de semer la confusion dans nos esprits à tous.

M. Ogle: Bien.

Je me demande si je pourrais maintenant aborder la question du projet de loi portant création d'un service de renseignements civil au Canada, projet de loi qu'entend présenter M. Kaplan. M. Kaplan a proposé la création au Canada d'un organisme civil d'espionnage et j'aimerais savoir, au cas où cette proposition passerait, dans quelle mesure le ministère des Affaires extérieures sera appelé à y aller de sa participation.

M. M. Massé: Nous avons déjà effectivement participé, monsieur le président, durant le cours normal des choses. Il existe des comités interministériels qui touchent à tous les sujets, et le renseignement et la sécurité ne font pas exception. Les fonctionnaires qui font partie de ces comités abordent la question sous l'angle purement ministériel, après quoi une ébauche de projet de loi passe devant le comité législatif. Ce dernier qui est composé de divers ministres dont le nôtre, bien sûr, y va lui aussi de sa participation et cela a bien sûr une incidence au niveau de nos intérêts propres. Dans le cas du projet de loi en question, il en a été de même et nous avons participé à la fois aux travaux du comité interministériel et à ceux du comité à l'échelon ministériel.

M. Ogle: Dans la perspective de votre ministère, cette mesure diriez-vous est-elle une bonne chose? Il s'agit d'une évolution assez radicale pour ce qui est de l'acquisition de renseignements par le Canada, n'est-ce pas?

M. M. Massé: Mon Père, vous m'obligez à vous répondre en termes vagues. Il ne m'appartient pas de juger si cette mesure est bonne ou mauvaise car c'est une décision à caractère politique. Je puis tout simplement vous dire que nous avons effectivement participé à la préparation du projet de loi de manière à ce qu'il soit aussi efficace et utile que possible pour notre ministère.

M. Ogle: Loin de moi l'idée de mettre quiconque sur la sellette, car il est évident que vous l'ignorez, mais j'aimerais savoir si les renseignements que vous obtenez d'ores et déjà à propos de la situation dans d'autres pays vont se présenter différemment suite à la mise en place de cette nouvelle organisation. Allez-vous en apprendre davantage, allez-vous obtenir des renseignements que vous n'aviez pas auparavant ou allez-vous charger cette organisation de vous chercher des renseignements que vous ne pouvez pas obtenir pour l'instant . . .

M. M. Massé: Si je me souviens bien du projet de loi, je ne pense pas qu'il ait beaucoup d'incidence sur les sources d'information. Il s'agit avant tout d'avoir au Canada une organisation plus efficace et susceptible de mieux répondre aux objectifs du projet de loi. Il est évident que le projet de loi énonce les objectifs en question, en l'occurrence la sécurité de la nation, la protection de ses ressortissants, la prévention de

[Texte]

Basically, the organization that is there regroups very much the same people. It is just that the purpose of the bill is to make it more efficient to get that.

My own feeling of the bill is that it was drafted much more as an attempt to organize various security and intelligence forces in a way that would make them more responsible to the powers that govern them, basically Parliament, than previously. I think the origin of it was to satisfy the recommendations of the McDonald Commission rather than get more information or new sources of information.

Of course, I was part of only a small portion of that bill. As I said, the officials had an input into the bill, but that input was limited to what was the point of view of the Department of External Affairs into making that organization more efficient, in terms of the general objectives I just quoted.

Mr. Ogle: I think I will pass on that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Monsieur Dupras, s'il vous plaît.

Mr. Dupras: Merci, monsieur le président.

Mr. Chairman, the subcommittee that I chaired for almost 20 months has tabled its report—it will be six months next Monday. The government has expressed its interest in our report, and the minister has indicated oftentimes that a response would be forthcoming. At this time, now, shortly before six months have elapsed, could the deputy minister tell us where it is at and when we should expect to have a report?

• 1000

Considering that 15 members of the subcommittee worked very hard for 18 months, travelled and held about 110 consultations in Canada and in the Caribbean, Central America and South America—just to show the importance that this work has represented to all of us, I wonder whether the government is taking this seriously and whether a response should be forthcoming.

The Chairman: Mr. Massé.

Mr. M. Massé: Mr. Chairman, the honourable Mr. Dupras, of course, has signalled the importance of his report. He knows that we have worked on it; we have had a number of consultations; we have discussed it; and therefore we have indeed taken it seriously. The response of the government is on its way; maybe Mr. Gorham would like to give more precision on what has happened and when we expect that to come.

[Traduction]

tout acte susceptible de porter préjudice à la sécurité de l'État, voilà donc les objectifs généraux du projet de loi.

Cette organisation sera en fait plus ou moins composée de la même façon. Le projet de loi a simplement pour objectif d'en accroître l'efficacité.

Personnellement, j'ai le sentiment que le projet de loi a avant tout pour but de tenter d'organiser les divers corps responsables de la sécurité et du renseignement de manière à leur permettre de mieux rendre compte devant les autorités qui les régissent, en l'occurrence le Parlement, par rapport à la situation actuelle. Il s'agissait, dirais-je, de donner suite aux recommandations de la Commission McDonald et non pas simplement d'obtenir de nouvelles sources de renseignements ou de meilleurs renseignements.

Cela dit, il est évident que ma contribution a été extrêmement minime et, comme je l'ai déjà dit, mes fonctionnaires ont pris part aux travaux, mais leur participation s'est limitée à l'opinion du ministère des Affaires extérieures, c'est-à-dire ce que le ministère pensait qu'il fallait faire pour que cet organisme soit plus efficace compte tenu des objectifs d'ensemble que je viens de signaler.

M. Ogle: Je pense que ce sera tout pour moi, monsieur le président.

Le président: Je vous remercie.

Mr. Dupras, please.

Mr. Dupras: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Monsieur le président, le sous-comité que j'ai présidé pendant près de vingt mois a déposé son rapport il y aura six mois lundi prochain. Le gouvernement s'est montré intéressé et le ministre, à plusieurs reprises, indiquait qu'il allait y répondre. Le rapport a donc été déposé il y a un peu moins de six mois et j'aimerais savoir de la bouche du sous-ministre où en sont les choses et quand nous pouvons nous attendre à obtenir une réponse.

Compte tenu du fait que 15 membres du sous-comité ont travaillé d'arrache-pied pendant 18 mois, ont voyagé, ont eu environ 110 consultations tant au Canada que dans les Antilles, en Amérique centrale et en Amérique du Sud—cela vous montre l'importance que tout cela a représenté pour nous tous—j'aimerais savoir si le gouvernement prend l'affaire vraiment au sérieux et si nous pouvons effectivement nous attendre à une réponse.

Le président: Monsieur Massé.

M. M. Massé: Monsieur le président, M. Dupras vient de parler et c'est naturel de l'importance de son rapport. Il sait que nous y avons travaillé, nous aussi nous avons eu nos consultations, nous en avons discuté et effectivement, nous avons pris ce rapport très au sérieux. La réponse officielle du gouvernement est en route et M. Gorham pourrait peut-être vous préciser davantage ce qui s'est produit et quand nous pouvons nous attendre au dépôt de la réponse.

[Text]

Mr. Gorham: I understand the minister, Mr. MacEachen, has signed a letter to you, Mr. Chairman, and it is on its way.

The Chairman: I understand it is on its way.

Mr. Gorham: I guess it will be delivered today, if it is hand-delivered. Otherwise it may be tomorrow or the next day.

The Chairman: If it was sent Friday, it should be in my office. I will send someone. But I got everything this morning. I have one from Mr. MacEachen, but it is not the same one.

Mr. Dupras: We all know now that most of us who worked on this subcommittee have a different view of the reality in Central America and South America, much different from it was before we started this work, especially with the coincidence that it was then the time when the CBI, or the Caribbean Basin Initiative, was initiated or introduced. In view of the benefits, the advantages, that this work represents, I hope the government takes this very seriously, to maintain some interest in subcommittees or task forces with a mandate such as ours, to look into specific areas of the world with a specific term or reference.

We have a letter coming. We should know in the next day or so what the intentions are. Okay.

I would like to turn now to the Cantadora consultation. I put the question to Mr. Massé last week of whether Canada has offered to go beyond what the group has done and whether Canada has sought to be part of that group to begin with, because we are in the hemisphere, and whether we requested at least to be observers at these consultations.

Mr. M. Massé: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gorham can give an even more specific answer. But before I go to that, I would like to reaffirm that the work of the subcommittee on Latin America was and is extremely useful. It has been taken very seriously.

Mr. Stevens: Especially the minority report.

An hon. Member: Which one?

Mr. M. Massé: In particular, the minority report attracted a lot of attention.

The Chairman: I am afraid that if you take all the reports, you can do anything you want.

Is that the case?

Mr. M. Massé: Certainly the reporter presents a very wide spectrum of opinions.

The Chairman: To say the least.

[Translation]

M. Gorham: Je crois savoir que M. MacEachen a signé une lettre à votre intention, monsieur le président, et que cette lettre est au courrier.

Le président: C'est ce que l'on m'a laissé entendre.

M. Gorham: Elle vous sera remise aujourd'hui sans doute si elle a été envoyée par messenger, sinon vous la recevrez demain ou après-demain.

Le président: Si elle a été envoyée vendredi, elle devrait être arrivée à mon bureau et je vais envoyer quelqu'un pour m'en assurer, mais je dois vous dire que j'ai déjà reçu mon courrier ce matin. J'ai effectivement reçu une lettre de M. MacEachen, mais ce n'est pas de celle-là dont vous voulez parler.

M. Dupras: Nous savons tous que la plupart de ceux qui ont fait partie du sous-comité voient différemment la réalité des choses en Amérique centrale et en Amérique du Sud, bien différemment en tout cas de la façon dont nous percevions la situation avant de commencer, surtout compte tenu de cette coincidence comme on l'avait interprétée à l'époque, la création de l'Initiative du bassin des Caraïbes. Compte tenu de tous les avantages que représente ce travail, j'espère que le gouvernement prend notre rapport très au sérieux et continuera à se fier à des sous-comités ou à des comités spéciaux comme le nôtre et expressément mandatés pour étudier certaines régions du monde.

Nous allons donc recevoir une lettre et nous devrions être fixés d'ici un jour ou deux sur les intentions du gouvernement. D'accord.

J'aimerais maintenant aborder le sujet des consultations de Cantadora. La semaine dernière, j'avais demandé à M. Massé si le Canada avait proposé d'aller encore plus loin que ce groupe de consultations et, en premier lieu, si le Canada avait demandé à en faire partie, ce qui est bien naturel puisque nous sommes dans le même hémisphère, et si nous avions au moins demandé à pouvoir assister aux travaux en qualité d'observateurs.

M. M. Massé: M. Gorham pourrait fournir une réponse encore plus précise, monsieur le président, mais avant de lui demander de le faire, j'aimerais réitérer le fait que les travaux du Sous-comité sur l'Amérique latine ont été et sont toujours extrêmement précieux et que le rapport a été pris très au sérieux.

M. Stevens: Surtout le rapport minoritaire.

Une voix: Lequel?

M. M. Massé: Il est certain que le rapport minoritaire a beaucoup attiré l'attention.

Le président: J'ai bien peur que si vous tablez sur tous les rapports qui ont été déposés, vous puissiez agir comme bon vous semble.

Est-ce que je me trompe?

M. M. Massé: Il est certain que le rapport regroupe une très vaste gamme d'opinions.

Le président: C'est un euphémisme.

[Texte]

Mr. Stevens: Some are right.

A Witness: Some are right, some are left.

Mr. Dupras: Some are of the extreme right.

The Chairman: Mr. Gorham, please. I am sorry.

Mr. Gorham: Mr. Chairman, to answer the question posed by Mr. Dupras, namely have we solicited a role with the Cantadora group, the answer is no, we have not; nor have we asked to be an observer or to observe their deliberations. As I indicated in my earlier comments, the countries concerned have made it very clear that they do not see any advantage in outside powers becoming involved, at least at this stage. While we are, as Mr. Dupras mentioned, a country of this hemisphere, when they refer to outside powers, they are referring to countries such as Canada or the United States—in other words, to keep it amongst the Central American countries and their immediate neighbours.

I could also point out that in consultations we have had with several western European governments, they take the same view: that no useful purpose would be served in seeking to intrude upon these discussions or negotiations until such time as they are specifically invited to do so.

• 1005

Many times we have taken an attitude toward central America and the Caribbean different from that of the United States. I would like to know if Canada is consulted whenever decisions are made with regard to this new offensive of Mr. Reagan's towards Cuba and Central America. It is becoming more and more serious every time you look at the news on TV; and last night, I thought it was a little scary. Are we consulted, we Canadians, who are greatly interested in this region of the world? We have maintained our diplomatic relations with Cuba. What prompted this new attitude of the U.S.A. towards Cuba? Is there an explanation for that?

Mr. Gorham: To answer your specific question, about being consulted by the United States government, I think the answer is in the negative. We have certainly made our views known to the United States government; it is up to them to decide to what extent they want to take those into account in forming their policy.

With regard to the second part of your question, about what motivates the United States, I do not think it is for us to try to state, categorically, what is United States policy and what motivates them, other than that, as the president has said in a formal statement to Congress, they look upon the situation in Central America as extremely critical in terms of their strategic security interests. Their basic objective, as we understand it, is to have a politically and economically stable central America under democratic forms of government. I

[Traduction]

M. Stevens: Certaines de ces opinions sont empreintes de droiture.

Une voix: Certaines penchent vers la droite et d'autres vers la gauche.

M. Dupras: Certaines penchent même vers l'extrême-droite.

Le président: Je vous en prie, monsieur Gorham, excusez-moi.

M. Gorham: Pour répondre à la question de M. Dupras, monsieur le président, à savoir avons-nous cherché à jouer un rôle au sein du groupe Cantadora, la réponse est non, et nous n'avons pas non plus demandé à assister aux consultations en qualité d'observateurs. Comme je l'ai déjà dit précédemment, les pays intéressés ont très clairement précisé qu'ils ne voyaient aucun intérêt à faire participer à leurs travaux d'autres puissances, du moins pour l'instant. Même si nous faisons partie, comme le signalait M. Dupras, de l'hémisphère Nord, lorsque ces pays parlent des autres puissances, ils parlent bien sûr de pays comme le Canada ou les États-Unis, en d'autres termes ils tiennent à rester entre eux, c'est-à-dire entre les pays de l'Amérique centrale et leurs voisins immédiats.

Je pourrais également signaler que nos consultations avec plusieurs gouvernements d'Europe occidentale ont débouché sur les mêmes conclusions, en l'occurrence qu'il serait inutile de tenter de nous immiscer dans ces discussions ou dans ces négociations tant que nous n'y sommes pas expressément invités.

Nous avons adopté à l'endroit de l'Amérique centrale et des Antilles une attitude différente de celle des États-Unis. J'aimerais savoir si le Canada est jamais consulté lorsque les décisions sont prises dans le cadre de cette nouvelle offensive du président Reagan à l'égard de Cuba et de l'Amérique centrale. La situation devient de plus en plus grave, il suffit pour s'en convaincre de suivre les actualités à la télévision. Pas plus tard qu'hier soir, je n'ai pas pu m'empêcher d'être un peu effrayé. Le Canada qui après tout s'intéresse énormément à cette région du monde, est-il effectivement consulté? Nous avons conservé nos relations diplomatiques avec Cuba. Qu'est-ce qui a poussé les États-Unis à adopter leur nouvelle attitude à l'endroit de Cuba? Y a-t-il une explication?

M. Gorham: Pour répondre à votre question, sommes-nous consultés par les États-Unis, la réponse est je crois non. Il est certain que nous avons fait part au gouvernement américain de notre opinion, mais il n'en reste pas moins qu'il lui appartient de décider dans quelle mesure il souhaite tenir compte de ces opinions lorsqu'il élabore ses politiques.

Pour passer à la deuxième partie de la question, les motifs des États-Unis, je ne pense pas qu'il nous appartienne d'exposer d'une façon catégorique les tenants et les aboutissants de la politique américaine, si ce n'est que nous savons, comme l'a dit le président lui-même dans sa déclaration au Congrès, que les États-Unis considèrent la situation en Amérique centrale comme extrêmement importante du point de vue de leurs intérêts stratégiques et de leur sécurité. Comme nous pouvons le voir, il s'agit essentiellement pour les États-Unis d'avoir en

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think the Government of Canada shares that objective. Where we differ, as you have pointed out, is the way in which one goes about achieving that objective.

Mr. Dupras: Many Canadians I have spoken to recently just do not seem to be able to read the American administration with regard to its attitude towards Nicaragua and Cuba; particularly Nicaragua. They say that if the U.S.A. closes the door to Nicaragua, that poor country, of slightly over 2.5 million, only will have the Soviets to turn to. The American administration would be responsible if that were to take place. Cannot we reason with these people?

Mr. M. Massé: Mr. Chairman, about two weeks ago I was in Washington and we discussed, among other subjects, the question of Central America. The member questioned about being consulted. Consultation is a difficult concept. There is no doubt that there are a number of discussions, at a number of levels, about Central America and that we do, indeed, discuss, with the Americans, what they do and why they do what they do. There is no doubt to me that their understanding of the situation in Central America is, as Mr. Gorham indicated, different from our understanding. The facts are there. We usually agree on what they are and who does what. But how to solve the question, I guess, is seen in a different light.

Nicaragua, for instance, is a country that you and I have visited, and we have talked to their leaders. There is no doubt to me that our understanding of what the leadership in Nicaragua is doing is just about the same in the two countries. In other words, it is clear that the Sandinistas are turning more and more to the left and are slowly getting hold of levers of power in the country, whether it is trade unions or opposition to the church or whatever.

I guess the understanding of what kind of a threat there is is really where we differ. The Americans do not want to have another Cuba in their back yard. They believe there is foreign influence in the region, and in a way there is. There is Cuban influence in the region. They also believe if they do nothing they will soon be facing a situation that will be extremely difficult, and that could create problems in their own country. Of course, we are not that close. We are a small power. We do not have the feelings of a super-power. We do not feel that we have to be policemen of the world. So of course we have a different opinion from what they have. Also I think once again, as Mr. Gorham said, we tend to believe the solution of the problem resides more in economic development.

[Translation]

Amérique centrale des pays stables du point de vue politique comme économique, pays régis par des gouvernements démocratiques. Le gouvernement canadien partage, j'imagine, cette opinion. Là où nous ne sommes plus d'accord, comme vous l'avez signalé vous-même, c'est à propos de la manière d'atteindre cet objectif.

M. Dupras: Bon nombre de Canadiens avec lesquels je me suis entretenu ces derniers temps semblent être incapables de déchiffrer les intentions de l'administration américaine et son attitude à l'endroit du Nicaragua et de Cuba, surtout du Nicaragua. Pour eux, si les États-Unis ferment la porte au Nicaragua, ce pauvre pays qui ne compte guère plus de 2.5 millions d'habitants ne pourra pas faire autrement que se tourner vers les Soviétiques. Dans cette éventualité, la responsabilité en incomberait à l'administration américaine. Ne pouvons-nous pas amener ces gens à la raison?

M. M. Massé: Il y a environ deux semaines, monsieur le président, je me trouvais à Washington, et nous avons entre autres discuté de l'Amérique centrale. Le député a parlé de consultation. La consultation est une notion difficile. Il ne fait aucun doute que nous multiplions les entretiens à tous les paliers à propos de l'Amérique centrale et qu'effectivement, nous discutons avec les Américains de ce qu'ils font et des raisons pour lesquelles ils font ce qu'ils font. Il ne fait pour moi aucun doute que les Américains, comme le signalait M. Gorham, perçoivent la situation en Amérique centrale d'une façon qui n'est pas la même que la nôtre. Les faits n'en restent pas moins là. En règle générale, nous sommes d'accord sur les faits et les protagonistes. Toutefois, la solution du problème est envisagée de part et d'autre sous un angle différent.

Ainsi, vous vous êtes rendu comme moi au Nicaragua et nous avons tous deux eu des entretiens avec les dirigeants. Pour moi, il ne fait aucun doute que les deux pays voient de la même façon les agissements des dirigeants nicaraguayens. En d'autres termes, il est absolument évident que les Sandinistes virent de plus en plus à gauche et accaparent lentement mais sûrement tous les leviers de commande du pays, qu'il s'agisse des syndicats, de l'opposition ou de l'Église.

Là où nous ne sommes plus d'accord, c'est au niveau de l'interprétation de la gravité de cette menace. Les Américains ne veulent pas un nouveau Cuba dans leur dos. Ils estiment que cette région est soumise à des influences étrangères, et dans une certaine mesure, c'est vrai. L'influence cubaine se fait sentir dans cette région. Ils estiment également que s'ils ne font rien, très bientôt la situation sera telle qu'il sera extrêmement difficile d'arriver à un revirement, ce qui pourrait dès maintenant créer des problèmes aux États-Unis mêmes. Bien sûr, nous sommes des voisins moins proches. Nous sommes également une puissance de moindre envergure. Nous ne pensons pas comme une grande puissance, nous ne pensons pas que le Canada doive jouer un rôle de policier à l'échelle mondiale. Par conséquent, notre opinion et celle des Américains ne sont pas les mêmes. Une fois encore, comme l'a dit M. Gorham, nous serions enclins à partir du principe que la solution du problème doit être davantage envisagée au niveau du développement économique.

[Texte]

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In other words, it is in attacking the economic causes of the guerilla warfare that exists in the region or the economic causes of the problems that exist in the region. But the United States tend to believe that to deal with the economic causes at this time, or the economic causes mainly or only, will not solve their problem in time, so they have a tendency to be stronger, they have a tendency to want to act faster; they have a tendency to want to use means that we do not use.

So I think your question must be answered very frankly. We are not consulted; but certainly, we discuss these questions with them. We see the situation in terms of the facts very much in the same light. In other words, the facts we have and they have are very much the same, but we tend to differ on the causes of the problems and on the solutions to bring to bear. They know what our views are and they do not believe we are right. We know what views they have and we tend to differ.

Mr. Dupras: While they were at the Security Council a few days back, they had an occasion to express their fear; and they just did not want to take that route. The Security Council could have asked for observers to monitor the movements of troops. They accused the Nicaraguans of preparing an invasion of El Salvador or of Honduras. At the Security Council, where it was brought by Nicaragua, they could have aired this situation thoroughly; but they just turned it down. They just refused to discuss this any further. Can we not make the recommendation, we Canadians: If there is such a threat to the American security and to the American economy, why do they not take the case to the Security Council?

Mr. M. Massé: Mr. Chairman, we may talk to the Americans and discuss these questions with them, but once they have made their decision, we are not going to judge it. They take their decision on the basis of how they see the situation. We may consider as an option blaming them or whatever, but obviously we do not. We try to influence them by gentle pressure rather than by going in public and opposing what they do.

Mr. Dupras: The big issue of the Canadians now is that we will wake up one morning with a fait accompli that there is a war just south of the U.S.A.; and then we will be consulted because we will be expected to play a leading role in mediating the situation because they will have spoiled the situation in a way that only Canadians, I guess, with their reasonable approach and more sensitive approach to the quest of these nations, will be able to bring back peace to that region of the world. And this I cannot see at all. I hope that Canada is a little more vocal on this question, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

[Traduction]

En d'autres termes, c'est en s'attaquant aux causes économiques de la guérilla qui frappe cette région du monde ou aux causes économiques de tous les problèmes dont cette région est victime que nous pensons pouvoir trouver une solution. En revanche, les États-Unis seraient portés à croire que le problème ne pourra pas être résolu en s'attaquant simplement ou principalement, pour l'instant du moins, aux causes économiques, et les Américains ont donc tendance à être plus rigides et à vouloir intervenir rapidement en ayant recours à des moyens que nous n'utilisons pas nous-mêmes.

Je pense donc que votre question mérite une réponse très franche. Non, nous ne sommes pas consultés, mais il n'empêche que nous discutons de tout cela avec les Américains. Nous interprétons la situation en fonction de la réalité à peu près de la même façon que les Américains. En d'autres termes, nous disposons, les Américains et nous, des mêmes faits, mais nous avons tendance à n'être pas d'accord quant aux causes des problèmes et quant aux solutions à envisager. Les Américains savent fort bien ce que nous pensons, mais ils estiment que nous avons tort. Nous connaissons quant à nous l'opinion américaine et nous serions enclins à n'être pas d'accord.

M. Dupras: Il y a quelques jours de cela, au Conseil de sécurité, les Américains ont eu une excellente occasion de manifester leur crainte, mais ils ont préféré n'en rien faire. Le Conseil de sécurité aurait pu demander l'envoi d'observateurs pour suivre les mouvements de troupes. Les Américains ont accusé le Nicaragua de préparer une invasion du Salvador ou du Honduras. La question ayant été soulevée par le Nicaragua au Conseil de sécurité, les Américains auraient pu en discuter à fond, mais ils n'ont pas voulu profiter de cette occasion et ont refusé d'en discuter. Le Canada pourrait-il pour sa part recommander par exemple ceci: si effectivement la sécurité et l'économie des États-Unis sont menacées, pourquoi les Américains n'en parlent-ils pas au Conseil de sécurité?

M. M. Massé: Monsieur le président, il est certain que nous pouvons avoir des entretiens à ce sujet avec les Américains, mais une fois qu'ils ont pris leur décision, il ne nous appartient pas d'en juger. Les Américains décident en fonction de la façon dont ils perçoivent les choses et, bien sûr, nous pourrions quant à nous envisager la possibilité de les en blâmer, mais de toute évidence, ce n'est pas cela que nous faisons. Nous essayons de les influencer en faisant gentiment pression sur eux au lieu de manifester publiquement notre position.

M. Dupras: Ce qui inquiète surtout les Canadiens pour l'instant, c'est le fait que nous pourrions fort bien nous réveiller un beau jour devant un fait accompli, en l'occurrence une guerre au sud des États-Unis. A ce moment-là, nous serions consultés parce qu'on s'attendrait à ce que nous jouions un rôle médiateur, les Américains auraient tout gâché et seul le Canada, avec son attitude modérée et compréhensive à l'endroit des préoccupations de ces pays, pourrait être en mesure de faire rétablir la paix dans cette région du monde. Cela, je ne saurais l'accepter, et j'espère que le Canada se fera un peu mieux entendre à ce propos, monsieur le président.

Je vous remercie.

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The Chairman: Thank you.

Next on my list is the hon. member from York—Peel, the Hon. Mr. Stevens, followed by Mrs. Appolloni, our vice-chairman.

Mr. Stevens: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it may be helpful, now that the Cantadora Group question has been raised, for me to put a few questions on this Central American situation. I was wondering if we could hear if any visits are planned on the part of senior Canadian officials, the minister or somebody at a comparatively high rank in the department to El Salvador to learn firsthand from the officials and other bodies in that country what the existing situation is. Is anything like that planned?

Mr. Gorham: Mr. Chairman, about visits by ministers, Mr. MacEachen has indicated his interest and desire to visit a number of the countries in Central America as soon as his schedule permits; and that, I assume, would be some time in the autumn. About officials, my colleague, Mr. Delworth, has visited all the countries in Central America just in the last few weeks. A few days ago I had the opportunity to discuss the Cantadora Group with the Prime Minister of Venezuela in Caracas. We have also been in close touch with several countries in western Europe in the NATO alliance. So I think we are maintaining a very active dialogue to keep ourselves informed. As Mr. Massé mentioned, he, himself, as well as others, has discussed this very frankly with the authorities in the United States. Mr. MacEachen has discussed this with Secretary Schultz and Vice-President Bush. Indeed, the Prime Minister had a frank discussion with President Reagan. So there is no absence of contact and information exchange.

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Mr. Stevens: Through you, Mr. Chairman, I am sorry; I missed the name of the official who had been in the area. What was his name again?

Mr. Gorham: Mr. Delworth.

Mr. Stevens: I wonder if you could tell us, Mr. Delworth, how many days did you spend in Central America and how much time in each of the countries, with particular emphasis on El Salvador and Nicaragua?

The Chairman: Mr. Delworth is the Assistant Deputy Minister for Political Affairs.

Mr. Stevens: Good title.

The Chairman: A tough one.

Mr. W.T. Delworth (Assistant Deputy Minister, Political Affairs, Department of External Affairs): I have been in Central America twice in the past six months. Both visits were essentially for familiarization, because it is a part of the world with which I had no prior firsthand involvement. So I wanted an opportunity to meet people and to get a firsthand feeling for that part of the world.

[Translation]

Le président: Merci.

Le suivant sur ma liste est le député de York—Peel, l'honorable M. Stevens, qui sera suivi par notre vice-présidente, M^{me} Appolloni.

M. Stevens: Je vous remercie, monsieur le président.

Puisque la question du groupe Cantadora a déjà été abordée, je pourrais peut-être utilement à mon tour poser quelques questions à propos de la situation en Amérique centrale. Les témoins pourraient-ils nous dire si l'un ou l'autre haut fonctionnaire, ministre ou autre personnalité du même rang du Canada, envisage de se rendre au Salvador pour se renseigner de première main, auprès des fonctionnaires et des autres organismes locaux, sur la situation actuelle. Avez-vous prévu quelque chose de ce genre?

M. Gorham: Monsieur le président, si nous parlons de visites ministérielles, M. MacEachen a effectivement manifesté son intérêt et fait part de son intention de se rendre dans plusieurs pays d'Amérique centrale dès qu'il en aura le temps. J'imagine que ses visites pourraient avoir lieu à l'automne. Pour ce qui est des fonctionnaires, mon collègue M. Delworth a terminé une tournée de tous les pays d'Amérique centrale il y a quelques semaines. Il y a quelques jours, j'ai également eu l'occasion de discuter des consultations du groupe Cantadora avec le premier ministre vénézuélien à Caracas. De plus, nous avons également été en contact avec plusieurs pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest, membres de l'Alliance de l'OTAN. Par conséquent, je dirais que nous maintenons un dialogue actif afin de nous tenir au courant. Comme M. Massé l'a déjà mentionné, il est un parmi plusieurs qui ont discuté très ouvertement de ce sujet avec les responsables américains. M. MacEachen s'est entretenu avec le secrétaire d'État, M. Schultz, et avec le vice-président, M. Bush. En fait, le premier ministre en a discuté en toute franchise avec le président Reagan. Donc, le contact et l'échange d'information ne manquent pas.

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, je suis désolé, mais le nom du fonctionnaire en question m'a échappé. Comment s'appelle-t-il?

M. Gorham: M. Delworth.

M. Stevens: Monsieur Delworth, combien de jours avez-vous passé en Amérique centrale et combien de temps avez-vous consacré à chacun des pays, notamment au Salvador et au Nicaragua?

Le président: M. Delworth est le sous-ministre adjoint responsable des affaires politiques.

M. Stevens: Un excellent titre.

Le président: Une tâche difficile.

M. W.T. Delworth (sous-ministre adjoint, Affaires politiques, ministère des Affaires extérieures): Dans les six derniers mois, j'ai visité l'Amérique centrale à deux reprises. Essentiellement, il s'agissait de me familiariser avec cette partie du monde où je n'avais eu aucune expérience directe préalablement. Je voulais saisir l'occasion de faire des connais-

[Texte]

The first visit was in November and early December. It was for a little over a week. The second visit was in March, and it was also for a little over a week. Unfortunately, these visits are fairly quick and it permits only a two- or three-day visit to each of the countries. As far as Salvador is concerned, I have been there twice; on the first occasion, for two days, and on the second occasion, for one full working day. On the second visit, my contacts were essentially in the human rights level to register with the newly formed commission on human rights Canadian concerns about a number of the cases, in addition to the general policy problem, of course. It does not permit a detailed impression of the countryside as such. You just do not have the time to get out there. Possibly the next time. Does that answer your question, Mr. Stevens?

Mr. Stevens: Yes. Now am I correct in saying you have spent about three days, then, in El Salvador?

Mr. Delworth: Yes.

Mr. Stevens: And any time in Nicaragua?

Mr. Delworth: A day and a half.

Mr. Stevens: In Guatemala?

Mr. Delworth: Three days.

Mr. Stevens: Is that pretty well the extent . . .

Mr. Delworth: Oh, well, I was in Honduras for two days; in Costa Rica, three days; Cuba, three days; and Mexico, a day and a half. But I am only one member of the department. There have been others going through, so it is really a contribution to a collective impression. The under-secretary was there, I think, in his earlier capacity as president of CIDA. Mr. Gorham has travelled through that region as well.

Mr. Stevens: Sure. Through you, Mr. Chairman, I was wondering if we could have any indication as to what visits are planned on the part of El Salvador officials, from the presidential level down, to Canada. In what way are they going to be given Canadian hospitality when they are here?

The Chairman: Mr. Delworth.

Mr. Delworth: Nothing is planned for the immediate future that I am aware of. Mr. Gorham can correct me if I am wrong, but we did have the Salvador under-secretary of the foreign ministry here in February, I think it was, on political consultation. But I think there is nothing in the mill at the moment, apart from the commitment which Mr. MacEachen has indicated of a desire to visit that part of the world in the foreseeable future.

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman, I am certainly pleased to hear that there is at least some attempt being made to get firsthand knowledge as to what is happening in that part of America. The news accounts appear to be so distorted as to what is the reality. But let me go further. On your visits or at other times, has there been discussion with respect to the forthcoming elections in El Salvador, and if so, has Canada, at least unofficially, been invited to be observers to those elections?

[Traduction]

sances et de prendre le contact avec les gens de cette partie du monde personnellement.

La première visite a eu lieu au mois de novembre, début décembre, et a duré un peu plus d'une semaine. La deuxième visite, d'une durée égale, a eu lieu au mois de mars. Malheureusement, elles étaient très rapides et ne m'ont permis que des séjours de deux à trois jours dans chacun des pays. J'ai visité le Salvador deux fois, la première fois pendant deux jours et, la deuxième, pour une journée entière. La deuxième fois, je me suis surtout concentré sur les droits de la personne afin de faire état d'un certain nombre de cas qui nous intéressent auprès de la commission des droits de la personne qui venait d'être établie. Évidemment, j'ai aussi discuté des questions de politique générale. Ces séjours limités n'offrent pas la possibilité d'obtenir une connaissance approfondie du pays. La prochaine fois, peut-être. Est-ce que j'ai répondu à votre question, monsieur Stevens?

M. Stevens: Oui. Maintenant, je reprends: vous avez passé trois jours au Salvador?

M. Delworth: Oui.

M. Stevens: Et, au Nicaragua?

M. Delworth: Un jour et demi.

M. Stevens: Au Guatemala?

M. Delworth: Trois jours.

M. Stevens: Est-ce que c'est tout pour le . . .

M. Delworth: J'ai passé deux jours au Honduras, trois jours au Costa Rica, trois jours à Cuba et un jour et demi au Mexique. Toutefois, je ne suis qu'un des employés du ministère. D'autres y sont allés également et leurs impressions ont contribué à brosser un tableau collectif de la situation. Le sous-secrétaire y est allé quand il était encore président de l'ACDI. M. Gorham également a voyagé dans cette région.

M. Stevens: D'accord. Monsieur le président, pourrait-on nous dire si on prévoit la visite de fonctionnaires salvadoriens au Canada, que ce soit au niveau présidentiel ou autre? Avons-nous l'intention de les recevoir avec notre hospitalité traditionnelle?

Le président: Monsieur Delworth.

M. Delworth: Pour autant que je sache, on ne prévoit rien dans un avenir rapproché. M. Gorham me reprendra si j'ai tort, mais je crois que le sous-secrétaire aux Affaires extérieures du Salvador est venu faire des consultations politiques au mois de février. Toutefois, pour le moment, rien n'est prévu, à l'exception de l'engagement pris par M. MacEachen de visiter cette partie du monde dans un avenir prochain.

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, je suis ravi d'apprendre que l'on fait un effort pour connaître de première main cette partie des Amériques. Les reportages semblent tellement dénaturés comparés aux événements réels. Mais permettez-moi de vous interroger davantage. A d'autres occasions, dans le cadre des élections prochaines au Salvador, aurait-on envisagé d'inviter le Canada à y envoyer, officiellement, une délégation d'observateurs?

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The Chairman: Mr. Delworth.

Mr. Delworth: The answer to the first question is yes, there has been extensive discussion of the timetable which, as you know, was brought forward in the context of the Pope's recent visit. There have been a number of conversations, not only by visiting officials, but by our ambassador, who visits Salvador quite regularly from his permanent base in Costa Rica.

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Stevens, there has been no specific suggestion that Canada should play a specific or defined part in relation to that process. We have, of course, given consideration to various modalities that might be required and contingencies that might come up, but it has never been specifically suggested or specifically offered.

Mr. Stevens: Through you, Mr. Chairman, during these discussions, has there been any indication that an observer team, as happened in the March elections last year, might be welcome from various countries of the world?

Mr. Delworth: In my conversations, no, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether we could learn what trade overtures have been made with respect to El Salvador. Has there been any attempt made to help, at least indirectly, restabilize the country by getting more normal trading relationships developed between El Salvador and Canada?

The Chairman: Mr. Gorham.

Mr. Gorham: Mr. Chairman, I would say the trading relationships between Canada and El Salvador are normal. There is no restriction on our trade with that country. As the hon. member knows, the Government of Canada does not sell goods. It is up to the Canadian private sector. Our trade commissioner based in Costa Rica is active in promoting opportunities, but it is up to the private sector in Canada to find the contacts in El Salvador to promote that trade.

Insofar as El Salvador's selling to Canada, we are an open market. I think 96% of the exports from that part of the world enter Canada either duty free or under a general preference scheme. There again, it is up to the those exporters in El Salvador to find the markets in Canada. They do have available to them the Trade Facilitation office in CIDA, which attempts to assist exporters from developing countries to find the markets in Canada or to understand the marketing system, but the bottom line is that it is up to the country concerned to sell its products. It is not for the Government of Canada to sell foreign products in this country.

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman, I guess we can all acknowledge that, but in that case I was wondering if Mr. Massé, or Mr. Gorham then, could tell us why the Canadian government chose not to have a participation in the trade fair that was held

[Translation]

Le président: Monsieur Delworth.

M. Delworth: En réponse à la première question, oui. Comme vous le savez, c'était dans le cadre de la visite du pape dernièrement que l'on a discuté longuement de l'échéancier. Il en a été question non seulement lors des visites de fonctionnaires étrangers, mais aussi lors des voyages au Salvador effectués par notre ambassadeur depuis sa base permanente au Costa Rica.

Que je sache, monsieur Stevens, on n'a jamais proposé que le Canada joue un rôle dans le processus électoral. Évidemment, nous avons réfléchi aux éventualités et aux modalités à prendre en cas d'imprévu, mais on n'a jamais fait de propositions précises en ce sens.

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, a-t-on jamais indiqué que certains pays du monde pourraient envoyer des observateurs comme on l'a fait pour les élections au mois de mars dernier?

M. Delworth: Il n'en a jamais été question lors de mes entretiens, monsieur le président.

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, pourrait-on nous dire si l'on a fait des ouvertures commerciales avec le Salvador? Afin de rétablir indirectement la stabilité au Salvador, a-t-on essayé de mettre au point des relations commerciales normales entre le Salvador et le Canada?

Le président: Monsieur Gorham.

M. Gorham: Monsieur le président, les rapports commerciaux entre le Canada et le Salvador sont normaux. Notre commerce avec ce pays-là ne subit pas de restrictions. Or, comme le sait l'honorable député, le gouvernement du Canada n'agit pas à titre d'agent des ventes. La responsabilité relève du secteur privé canadien. Notre délégué commercial au Costa Rica cherche des débouchés, mais il appartient au secteur privé au Canada de trouver au Salvador les contacts nécessaires pour promouvoir le commerce.

Quant à la vente de produits au Canada en provenance du Salvador, nous fonctionnons selon un système de libre-échange. Environ 96 p. 100 des exportations de cette partie du monde entrent au Canada exemptes de droits ou bénéficient de droits préférentiels. Encore une fois, c'est la responsabilité des exportateurs salvadoriens de trouver les débouchés au Canada. Cependant, ils ont accès aux services du Bureau de promotion d'exportations de l'ACDI dont le but est d'aider les exportateurs de pays en voie de développement à trouver un marché au Canada ou à comprendre le système de marketing. Il reste toutefois que c'est la responsabilité du pays en question de promouvoir la vente de ses produits. Il n'appartient pas au gouvernement du Canada de vendre des produits étrangers au pays.

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, nous apprécions tous la situation. Par conséquent, peut-être que M. Massé ou M. Gorham pourrait nous dire pourquoi le gouvernement canadien s'est abstenu de participer à la foire commerciale qui a eu lieu

[Texte]

in El Salvador in the fall of last year, when we were the only North American country not to be present. Certainly, the others had extensive pavilions, not only to indicate goods that they wanted to sell, but giving the El Salvadoreans an opportunity to show their possible trade items. Virtually every American country, in fact, was represented, not to mention the oriental and European countries. Why was Canada such a stand-out by not participating in that trade fair?

The Chairman: Mr. Gorham.

Mr. Gorham: I believe our trade commissioner from Costa Rica attended several days of that trade fair.

Mr. Stevens: There was no evidence of Canada's presence.

Mr. Gorham: As for the question of pavilions and so on, it depends on whether Canadian companies are sufficiently interested in the market to go down and set up a pavilion.

• 1025

In the case of the Government of Canada pavilion, that is a question that is decided upon on the basis of the totality of the trade relation and the cost benefit of spending the money from very limited resources, whether to put a pavilion in one country as opposed to another. I think the basic criterion in that regard is the overall extent of the trade; those pavilions are basically put in there to promote the trade, not necessarily to deliver a political message.

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman, could we hear then about the aid side? Why has El Salvador been selected for so little aid in sharp contrast to what is still pouring into Nicaragua?

Mr. M. Massé: If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will try to remember my aid days to answer that question.

If I remember, there was an electrical transmission line in El Salvador that had been planned for a while and amounted to something like \$10.7 million. Even though the basic materials were sent from Canada, they were stored in El Salvador, because the amount of insurrection activity in the area where the line was going to be put was such that we could not get somebody to put the line up; if we had succeeded in putting it up, it would have been blown out in a very few weeks. So if I remember well, we had a project going on in El Salvador, and a reasonably large program for a country of that size, but we had to put a hold on it because we could not execute our project and could find no firm that would execute it during that time in these areas.

In Nicaragua itself—and I am now giving the news as I knew it a few months ago—we indeed had a program, but the program was basically lines of credit. The lines of credit were based on a letter that was written then by Mr. MacGuigan, which set out, really, three conditions to the program. These conditions were the maintenance of basically a free market, maintenance of a pluralistic society, and the freedom of existing organizations. I remember, in general, that was the text of that letter, which I think was made public.

[Traduction]

l'automne passé au Salvador où nous étions le seul pays en Amérique du Nord à ne pas être représenté. Les autres pays avaient de grands pavillons où non seulement ils étalaient les produits à vendre, mais où les Salvadoriens pouvaient exposer leurs produits destinés au commerce éventuellement. Presque tous les pays américains y étaient, sans parler des pays de l'Orient et de l'Europe. Comment se fait-il que le Canada se soit illustré par son absence?

Le président: Monsieur Gorham.

M. Gorham: Je crois que notre délégué commercial au Costa Rica a assisté à la foire commerciale pendant plusieurs jours.

M. Stevens: Il n'y avait rien pour témoigner de la présence du Canada.

M. Gorham: Quant aux pavillons, il faut que les sociétés canadiennes s'intéressent suffisamment au marché pour aller y exposer leurs produits.

La décision d'établir un pavillon dans un pays plutôt que dans un autre dépend de l'importance des rapports commerciaux avec ce pays-là et des bénéfices éventuels qui seront réalisés par la suite. À cet égard, le critère de base est celui de l'importance générale des rapports commerciaux. Essentiellement, les pavillons sont établis pour promouvoir le commerce et non pas pour livrer un message politique.

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, pourrait-on nous parler de l'aide? Comment se fait-il que la différence entre l'aide accordée au Salvador et celle accordée au Nicaragua soit si marquée?

M. M. Massé: Si vous permettez, monsieur le président, je ferai appel à mon expérience antérieure pour répondre à cette question.

Si je ne m'abuse, on avait prévu une ligne de transmission électrique au Salvador qui devait coûter quelque 10,7 millions de dollars. Quoique les matériaux de base aient été expédiés depuis le Canada, ils ont été entreposés au Salvador. Il y avait tellement d'activités insurrectionnelles dans la région que l'on n'a pu trouver personne pour l'installer. Quoi qu'il en soit, on aurait fait sauter la ligne dans les semaines qui auraient suivi son installation. Donc, si je ne m'abuse, ce projet était prévu, projet d'une certaine importance étant donné l'exiguïté du Salvador, mais nous avons dû le remettre parce que nous ne trouvions pas de société prête à le mettre en oeuvre à cette époque si troublée.

En ce qui concerne le Nicaragua, selon les nouvelles que j'ai obtenues il y a quelques mois, notre programme concernait surtout l'octroi de crédits. Les marges de crédit étaient déterminées à partir d'une lettre écrite par M. MacGuigan où l'on énumérait les trois conditions du programme. Elles étaient comme suit: le maintien d'un marché libre, d'une société pluraliste et de la liberté des organismes existants. Voilà essentiellement le contenu de la lettre que l'on a rendu publique.

[Text]

That Nicaragua itself did not fully fulfil these conclusions is the least I could say. As a result, the program has been going very slowly. When I left CIDA, even though the lines of credit were available, they were either not being implemented or being implemented very slowly. So if you look at the amount of money being dispersed in the two countries, you will not find an actual difference that is as great as the one that may be indicated in the strategic overview, for instance.

To me, the main difference in terms of the amount of money being invested in these countries was a difference in the actual conditions of the countries, rather than a political judgment. There was, that I know of, no political judgment that would prevent us from investing in El Salvador and push us to invest in Nicaragua. It was basically determined by the amount of need and the ability to implement our projects.

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman, I can take it then, from Mr. Massé's comment, that with the return of stability in El Salvador there is no reason that aid programs cannot start to be developed and expanded in El Salvador?

Mr. M. Massé: That was then our intent, and I presume the intent has not changed.

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman, I was wondering if Mr. Massé or one of his officials could give us their evidence or otherwise of Cuban and Soviet presence in Nicaragua. The press, on occasion, will make reference—Oakland Ross, I remember, in *The Globe and Mail* made reference to Soviet arms being in evidence in various areas that he had witnessed in Nicaragua. We have the incident of the Libyan plane being intercepted in Brazil, which turned out to be loaded with over 100 tonnes of armaments heading to Nicaragua. I think it is important that we get your perspective as to what, in fact, is the presence of this Soviet-Cuban military might in Nicaragua. That might help Mr. Dupras, who feigns such surprise at why the United States is alarmed at what is happening there.

• 1030

Mr. M. Massé: Mr. Chairman, I am certainly not going to reveal any hidden data of arms deliveries. I would make just a few comments, first on the Libyan plane that was stopped in Brazil. There was some speculation in the press as to its destination, whether it was Colombia or Nicaragua, so I am not sure that there is an extraordinarily tight case there. But I will complete that with two personal observations, which, being personal, of course are not subject to any lid.

When I was in Nicaragua, I was a guest of the government there. I travelled in one of their army helicopters from Managua to Miskito territory and the helicopter that we took, which did transport troops, was a Russian one. Even though I felt reasonably safe in it, it was clear that it was a Russian helicopter; it had the instructions in Russian and all that. When we were in Miskito territories we met a number of teachers. They were Cuban and they were telling us they were Cuban. In fact, the Miskitos told us a number of stories about why the revolt started in the first place. Some of the reasons for the revolt were that they had Cuban teachers who insisted

[Translation]

Que le Nicaragua n'ait pas rempli ces conditions est le moins que l'on puisse dire. Par conséquent, le programme se déroule très lentement. Au moment où j'ai quitté l'ACDI, à toutes fins utiles, on ne profitait presque pas des facilités de crédit disponibles. Donc, l'écart réel entre les déboursés dans ces deux pays ne serait pas si grand que celui indiqué dans l'aperçu général, par exemple.

A mon sens, la différence entre les montants investis dans ce pays dépend de la conjoncture actuelle et non pas d'un jugement politique. Que je sache, des considérations politiques ne nous empêchent pas d'investir au Salvador ni ne nous poussent à investir au Nicaragua. Essentiellement, nous avons tenu compte du besoin et de la possibilité de réaliser les projets.

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, le commentaire de M. Massé me laisse donc conclure que le retour de la stabilité au Salvador enlèvera tout obstacle à la mise en oeuvre de programmes d'aide dans ce pays?

M. M. Massé: Oui, si je tiens pour acquis que notre intention n'a pas changé.

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, M. Massé ou l'un de ses collaborateurs, pourrait-il nous donner des indications de la présence soviétique et cubaine au Nicaragua. À l'occasion, on y fait allusion dans la presse. Oakland Ross, du *Globe and Mail*, avait fait allusion aux armes soviétiques qu'il avait vues dans diverses régions du Nicaragua. De plus, il s'est avéré que l'avion de la Libye intercepté au Brésil était chargé de plus de 100 tonnes d'armements destinés au Nicaragua. Il est important que nous ayons votre perspective sur la présence militaire soviéto-cubaine au Nicaragua. Cela pourrait aider M. Dupras qui feint d'être surpris de ce que les États-Unis s'alarment de ce qui se passe.

M. M. Massé: Monsieur le président, je ne vais certainement pas révéler de données secrètes sur les livraisons d'armes. Je ferai simplement quelques commentaires tout d'abord au sujet de l'avion libyen arraisonné au Brésil. La presse s'est livrée à des spéculations quant à sa destination, se demandant s'il s'agissait de la Colombie ou du Nicaragua, ce qui m'amène à penser que rien n'est véritablement sûr en l'occurrence. Je me permettrai d'ajouter deux remarques personnelles qui, puisque personnelles, ne sont sujettes bien entendu à aucune obligation de réserve.

Lorsque je me suis rendu au Nicaragua, j'y étais l'invité du gouvernement. J'ai pris un de leurs hélicoptères des forces armées pour aller de Managua au territoire miskito et cet hélicoptère, transporteur de troupes, était russe. Bien que je m'y sois senti bien en sécurité, il était clair que c'était un hélicoptère russe; toutes les instructions étaient en russe, etc. Dans les territoires miskitos, nous avons rencontré un certain nombre d'enseignants. Ils étaient cubains et ils nous ont dit qu'ils étaient cubains. En fait, les Miskitos nous ont raconté un certain nombre d'histoires au sujet de l'origine de leur révolte. Selon eux, les enseignants cubains insistaient pour leur

[Texte]

on teaching them Spanish when, in fact, they wanted to be taught in English. So I have no doubt, because I have seen it, that there are some Soviet armaments in the country and some Cuban people there who are acting in the field of education and health. I am not going to make a judgment on whether that is good or bad; I am just stating the facts as I saw them. I would say also that, from personal observation, you can not draw any conclusion as to the size of it, but certainly there are these facts there.

The Chairman: I will recognize two supplementary questions, but your time expired some time ago. Madame Appolloni will be next, but there are supplementaries by Mr. Dupras and Father Ogle.

Mr. Dupras: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Indeed I am interested, Mr. Stevens, and I am in good company, because a great number of congressmen, senators and American and Canadian citizens are more and more interested in what is happening in Central America.

I want to get back to the plane that was grounded in Brazil. At one time it was indicated that the arms contained in the plane might have been manufactured in Brazil. I put the question last week to the deputy secretary of state as to whether we have sought information as to what was in these planes. Do we have a list of these supposed arms, where they were manufactured and how many guns there were?

The Chairman: Mr. Gorham, please.

Mr. Gorham: In response to the question that was put before the committee a few days ago, the question to which you refer, we made official representations to the Government of Brazil, asking whether they would provide that information to us. They declined. As you perhaps know, part of the arrangement they made with the Government of Libya was that the material would be returned but they would not reveal publicly what was in it. So we do not know precisely what were the types of armaments. Obviously, the Brazilians were sufficiently concerned that they took the action they did, but they have declined to reveal the contents to us.

The Chairman: Father Ogle, please. Then I will go to the vice-chairman, Madam Appolloni.

Mr. Ogle: On one and the same question, was 100 tonnes the weight that the plane could carry?

Mr. Gorham: I do not recall precisely just what the amount was.

Mr. Ogle: It seems to be a tremendous weight.

Mr. Dupras: The final destination, was it supposed to be Nicaragua, really?

Mr. M. Massé: I have just indicated that there was speculation in the press that it could be not Nicaragua but another country, which was mentioned in the press as being Colombia.

The Chairman: Mr. McKinnon, a supplementary, since I started on supplementaries.

[Traduction]

apprendre l'espagnol alors qu'en fait, ils voulaient apprendre l'anglais. Je ne doute donc pas un instant, les ayant vus de mes propres yeux, de la présence d'armes soviétiques dans ce pays et de certains Cubains oeuvrant dans les domaines de l'éducation et de la santé. Je ne veux pas porter de jugement et dire si c'est bien ou mal, je vous relate simplement ce que j'ai vu. J'ajouterai également que mes observations personnelles ne me permettent pas de tirer de conclusion quant à l'importance de cette présence, mais elle existe.

Le président: Je vous permettrai de poser deux questions supplémentaires, mais votre temps de parole est déjà terminé depuis un petit bout de temps. M^{me} Appolloni sera la suivante, mais auparavant, M. Dupras et le père Ogle poseront des questions complémentaires.

M. Dupras: Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président. Oui, monsieur Stevens, cela m'intéresse, et je ne suis pas en mauvaise compagnie car un grand nombre de représentants, de sénateurs, de citoyens américains et canadiens s'intéressent de plus en plus à ce qui se passe en Amérique centrale.

Je voudrais revenir à l'avion qui a été arraisonné au Brésil. Il a été dit à un certain moment que les armes contenues dans cet avion pouvaient avoir été fabriquées au Brésil. J'ai demandé la semaine dernière au sous-secrétaire d'État si nous avions demandé ce que contenaient exactement ces avions. Avons-nous une liste de ces prétendues armes, l'origine de leur fabrication, combien de fusils, etc.?

Le président: Monsieur Gorham, je vous en prie.

M. Gorham: À la suite de cette question qui nous a été posée par votre Comité il y a quelques jours, nous avons officiellement demandé au gouvernement brésilien de nous fournir ces renseignements. Notre demande a été rejetée. Comme vous le savez peut-être, une partie de l'entente conclue avec le gouvernement libyen stipulait que le matériel serait renvoyé sans révéler publiquement ce qu'il contenait. Nous ne savons donc pas avec précision de quel type d'armement il s'agissait. De toute évidence, le problème était suffisamment important pour que les Brésiliens prennent la décision qu'ils ont prise, mais ils ont refusé de nous révéler ce que ces avions contenaient.

Le président: Père Ogle, s'il vous plaît. Ensuite je donnerai la parole au vice-président, M^{me} Appolloni.

M. Ogle: La charge pouvant être transportée par ces avions était-elle de 100 tonnes?

M. Gorham: Je ne me souviens pas exactement du chiffre.

M. Ogle: Cela me semble une charge énorme.

M. Dupras: Le Nicaragua était-il vraiment la destination finale?

M. M. Massé: Je viens de vous dire que selon la presse, cette destination finale n'était peut-être pas le Nicaragua, mais un autre pays et le nom de la Colombie a été avancé.

Le président: Monsieur McKinnon, une question supplémentaire, puisque je l'ai déjà permis aux autres.

[Text]

Mr. McKinnon: This is on the same subject. There were four planes involved and there were pictures of the four. Three of them were Ilyushins and one was a C-130, which is what it is known as in Canada. They went from Libya to Brazil. It would be a very strange thing if they were carrying Brazilian-made equipment on round trips, in the way of munitions. But the four planes could not carry the 200 tonnes that the press reported, but they could carry over 100 tonnes. That is fairly well known.

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The story was that the arms had come from Libya; there were stops in Brazil, and they were going to Colombia and on to Nicaragua. Now, could any of the distinguished array of senior officials from External Affairs tell me if those press reports were true or false?

Mr. Gorham: The most I could say is that, based on the information we have, it appears Colombia was not the destination and that Nicaragua was.

Mr. McKinnon: Thank you.

The Chairman: Now I will go back to our list: the hon. member from York South—Weston, Mrs. Appolloni, followed by the hon. member from Parry Sound—Muskoka. But I will recognize everybody: Mr. Breau, Mr. Robinson, Dr. Hudecki.

Mrs. Appolloni: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Massé, at the very beginning of this meeting, our chairman thanked you and your department for the excellent briefings we had had for the IPU and other fora. I agree that when we do get them they are excellent; and generally speaking, if we manage to get abroad, we have excellent briefings again. However, the point I am making from the beginning is that these briefings are given to a few selected mortals. I could and I will discuss the selection criteria in another forum. But it occurs to me that this is a fundamental question which has to be addressed from the beginning and addressed seriously. With House committee reform, which I very much welcomed, I do not believe the actual process has been upgraded as just the outlining.

For instance, in the past MPs could and did flit from one committee to the other, generally to make a specific point for a constituent; and sometimes they sat on the committee, if they were lucky enough to be chosen for that committee, because of their real interest. Here again, this is another selection criterion which I shall not discuss.

But now the rules are changed. We are allotted to one committee and we can serve on another perhaps as alternates, the assumption being that the government, in its wisdom, is trying to encourage expertise. Now, it is that assumption which attracts me. However, how to attain that expertise is the question. Unless you happen to be... We are talking now within the ambit of External Affairs and National Defence. I have to be blunt, Mr. Massé, and tell you it seems to be easier to get information from even National Defence than it is from External.

[Translation]

M. McKinnon: Il y avait quatre appareils et nous avons vu la photo de ces quatre appareils. Trois d'entre eux étaient des Ilyushins et l'autre était un C-130, nom sous lequel nous le connaissons au Canada. Ils venaient de Libye. Il serait très étrange qu'ils aient transporté des armes faites au Brésil dans ce sens. Cependant, ces quatre appareils ne pouvaient transporter les 200 tonnes rapportées par la presse, mais pouvaient transporter plus de 100 tonnes. C'est un fait connu de tous.

Selon la presse, ces armes venaient de Libye et il devait y avoir des escales au Brésil, en Colombie puis au Nicaragua. Parmi le groupe d'éminents représentants du ministère des Affaires extérieures, y en a-t-il un qui puisse me dire si ces rapports de presse étaient vrais ou faux?

M. Gorham: Tout ce que je peux dire, c'est qu'en fonction de nos renseignements, il semblait que la Colombie n'était pas la destination finale, mais que c'était le Nicaragua.

M. McKinnon: Merci.

Le président: Je reviens maintenant à ma liste: le député de York South—Weston, M^{me} Appolloni, suivie du député de Parry Sound—Muskoka. Je donnerai la parole à tout le monde: à M. Breau, à M. Robinson et à M. Hudecki.

Mme Appolloni: Merci, monsieur le président.

Monsieur Massé, au tout début de cette réunion, notre président vous a remercié ainsi que votre ministère des excellentes séances d'information sur l'UIP et les autres forums. Lorsqu'elles ont lieu, ces séances sont toujours excellentes et, d'une manière générale, avant de partir à l'étranger, nous bénéficions d'excellentes séances d'information. Cependant, ce que je veux dire depuis le début, c'est que ne bénéficient de ces séances que quelques mortels choisis. Je pourrais discuter, et je le ferai, les critères de sélection dans un autre forum. Il me semble, cependant, que c'est une question fondamentale qui doit faire l'objet d'un débat préalable et sérieux. Les comités de la Chambre ayant été réformés, ce que j'approuve infiniment, je crois que certaines réalités n'ont été qu'effleurées.

Par exemple, auparavant, les députés passaient d'un comité à un autre, généralement pour défendre les intérêts d'un de leurs commettants, et parfois, s'ils avaient la chance d'être choisis pour ce comité, ils siégeaient en fonction de leurs intérêts propres. Ici encore, il s'agit d'un autre critère de sélection que je ne discuterai pas.

Maintenant, les règles sont changées. Nous sommes nommés auprès d'un comité et nous pouvons participer aux séances d'un autre en tant que remplaçants, le gouvernement, dans sa sagesse, partant du principe qu'il faut encourager la spécialisation. Or, c'est ce principe qui m'intéresse. Il reste, comment parvenir à cette spécialisation. À moins que vous ne soyez... Nous sommes ici maintenant pour parler des Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale. Je serai directe, monsieur Massé: il me semble plus facile de nous faire communiquer des renseignements même par la Défense nationale que par les Affaires extérieures.

[Texte]

Now, I am well aware of the very delicate balance between the need to preserve national security, international security even, and the need to keep MPs informed. I am also aware, on the one hand, of the McDougall Report which plumbed the depths of the morale problem in External. Unfortunately, nobody has plumbed the depths of the morale problem among MPs. I am hoping somebody will come up with that one of these days.

But according to me—and I am not being rude, Mr. Massé—there is a chasm between External and MPs. I can see many of the reasons for it. I know, especially in the past, that the nearest many of your officials got to an MP was receiving an irate letter because one of their constituents had been stupid enough to traffic in drugs in some place or another and was thrown in jail; and the MP, in doing his or her job as a good MP, was trying to get the culprit out of that jail. That is as much, perhaps, as many of your officials think we know about External, and maybe with some justification.

But coming back to committee reform, we sitting around this floor are supposed to have at least a basic intelligence, at least a basic knowledge of the world outside. Many of us regret that our constituents do not give a damn about the world outside; and in order for us to increase their profile, their awareness, their consciousness of the interdependence of the world, we would like to be able to have more ammunition, if you will, in order to fight our battles. But where is the ammunition coming from?

I do know—and here again it is from my own experience as a parliamentary secretary . . . Again, a few select mortals do receive your clipping service. As a minimum, I wonder why the members of this committee could not receive the clipping service? And please do not tell me it would cost because when we were thinking of what we pay for many, many other things photocopying a few extra copies of the clipping service I am sure will not increase the national deficit.

I also have to say that even the department itself, the physical structure, is rather inhibiting. You cannot get from the desk up to the dining room, for God's sake, without having gone through all sorts of security checks. And we are in Canada. I think some of you know what happened to me when I went to represent Canada at the White House. I was turned away. But we are talking about Canada. How does an MP get from point A to point B without incurring the fear of the Mounties and various other sundry people.

Would it not be possible, for instance, to arrange a series of briefings from the various desks, bureaux, whatever the hell you call them, so we could meet with the European expert, South American expert, Central American expert? And you do have the expertise. You do have it. I wish you could be persuaded to share it a tiny little bit.

[Traduction]

Je n'ignore pas le délicat équilibre entre la nécessité de préserver la sécurité nationale, même la sécurité nationale, et la nécessité d'informer les députés. Je n'ignore pas non plus le rapport McDougall qui a sondé les profondeurs du problème de moral aux Affaires extérieures. Malheureusement, personne n'a sondé les profondeurs du problème de moral des députés. J'espère que quelqu'un le fera un de ces jours.

Cependant, selon moi . . . ceci dit sans vous vexer, monsieur Massé . . . il y a un abîme entre les Affaires extérieures et les députés. Je peux en comprendre nombre des raisons. Je sais, surtout dans le passé, que le contact le plus fréquent de vos fonctionnaires avec les députés était de recevoir une lettre courroucée parce qu'un de leurs commettants avait été suffisamment stupide pour faire du trafic de drogue à un endroit quelconque et avait été jeté en prison; ces députés, faisant leur bon travail de député, voulaient faire sortir le coupable de prison. C'est peut-être tout ce que vos fonctionnaires pensent de notre connaissance des Affaires extérieures, et peut-être avec une certaine justification.

Revenons, cependant, à la réforme des comités. Nous qui sommes réunis ici sommes censés avoir un minimum de compréhension et de connaissances du monde extérieur. Beaucoup d'entre nous regrettent que les électeurs se contrefichent de ce monde extérieur; et pour les sensibiliser, pour leur faire prendre conscience de l'interdépendance du monde, nous aimerions avoir plus de munitions, si vous voulez, pour mener nos batailles. D'où viennent ces munitions?

Je sais . . . et encore une fois, je bénéficie de ma propre expérience en tant que secrétaire parlementaire . . . Seuls quelques mortels reçoivent votre revue de presse. Au minimum, pourquoi les membres de ce Comité ne pourraient-ils recevoir votre revue de presse? Et ne me dites pas, je vous en prie, que cela coûterait trop cher quand on pense à ce que nous payons pour la photocopie de bien d'autres choses, quelques exemplaires supplémentaires de votre revue de presse n'augmenteront certainement pas le déficit national.

Je dois également dire que le ministère lui-même, sa structure physique, est plutôt inhibitoire. Il est impossible d'aller de la réception au restaurant, grand Dieu, sans passer par toutes sortes de points de sécurité. Nous sommes au Canada. Je pense que certains d'entre vous savent ce qui m'est arrivé lorsque je suis allée représenter le Canada à la Maison Blanche. On ne m'a pas laissé entrer. Ici, je vous parle du Canada. Comment un député peut-il aller de A à B sans être sous la menace constante d'être arrêté par la Gendarmerie royale et divers autres services de sécurité.

Ne serait-il pas possible, par exemple, d'arranger une série de séances d'information organisées par les divers bureaux ou comptoirs, quel que soit le nom que vous leur donnez, afin que nous puissions rencontrer le spécialiste de l'Europe, le spécialiste de l'Amérique du Sud, le spécialiste de l'Amérique centrale? Vous avez tous ces spécialistes. Vous les avez. Je

[Text]

And then—shall I finish my shopping list first?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mrs. Appolloni: And then, finally, the whole question of trade since you have been amalgamated. Does it occur to you here again we are talking about the reform of the committee structure? One of my colleagues asked a trade question. Probably most of us thought: Damn it, he should really have asked that question in front of the committee on trade and whatever else. There is a conflict even there. If, as many of us want to do, we were allowed to study the Pacific Rim question in depth, we would be stymied in our efforts because when we think of Pacific Rim, if we are not thinking of extending Canada's export trade and expanding it, we would be out of our treetops to study the Pacific Rim because that is where the money is. Here again, as members of this committee, we can go so far and then we are pulled back.

This, in essence, is my shopping list. I mean for this morning. It could go on and on and on, but I think I have made my point, Mr. Massé.

I have one other point. Coming back to the clipping service, I was fortunate enough to have received a little more information on Surinam. Up to the meeting with this particular person—thanks again to the largess of one of my colleagues—what I knew of Surinam had been gleaned from one tiny paragraph in *The Globe and Mail*.

There must be a way, without hammering at the doors of the librarians—I do not think that is their job either—or hammering at the doors of the parliamentary centre, we can have some kind of a global overview of our fellow Christians, our fellow human beings—I do not care what religion they are... our fellow human beings. There must be some way, without having to go into, as I said, the selection committee for criteria.

M. Lapierre: Un rappel au Règlement.

Le président: Un rappel au Règlement,

and then I would like to make a short report as to what I have been doing along that line.

Mrs. Appolloni: Yes, but do not give us so many reports that I do not get the answer, please.

The Chairman: Oh no, you will get the answer.

Mr. Lapierre, please.

Mr. Lapierre: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I think it is kind of unfair to ask that from Mr. Massé and the officials. I think this kind of relation between the department and the parliamentary committee could be dealt with when the minister is here or be dealt with by the steering committee, and making requests to the minister, because I do not...

The Chairman: Fine. Bring me the minister, then.

[Translation]

souhaiterais pouvoir vous persuader de partager un tout petit peu plus.

Ensuite... voulez-vous que j'aille tout d'abord jusqu'au bout de ma liste?

Le président: Oui.

Mme Appolloni: Ensuite, pour finir, il y a toute la question du commerce depuis la fusion des services. Cela ne vous frappe-t-il pas lorsque nous parlons de la réforme de la structure des comités? Un de mes collègues a posé une question portant sur le commerce. Il est probable que la majorité d'entre nous a pensé, bon Dieu, il aurait dû poser cette question devant le comité sur le commerce, et cetera. Il y a même conflit à ce niveau. Si, comme beaucoup d'entre nous le veulent, on nous permettait d'étudier en profondeur la question du littoral Pacifique, nous serions bloqués dans nos efforts parce que, lorsque nous pensons littoral Pacifique, si nous ne pensons pas en termes d'expansion des exportations canadiennes, on nous retirerait la priorité financière car l'argent ne doit servir qu'à cela. En tant que membres de ce Comité, encore une fois, nous pouvons aller jusqu'à un certain point, puis on nous retire l'échelle.

C'est l'essentiel de mes questions. Pour ce matin. Je pourrais continuer encore longtemps, mais je crois m'être fait comprendre, monsieur Massé.

Il me reste un autre point. Je reviens à la revue de presse. J'ai eu la fortune de recevoir un peu plus de renseignements sur le Surinam. Jusqu'à ma rencontre avec cette personne... grâce encore à la largesse d'un de mes collègues... tout ce que je savais du Surinam, je le tenais d'un tout petit paragraphe dans le *Globe and Mail*.

Il doit y avoir un moyen sans frapper à la porte des bibliothécaires... je ne pense pas non plus que cela soit leur travail... ou sans frapper à coups redoublés à la porte du centre parlementaire, de se faire dispenser une connaissance générale de nos frères chrétiens, de nos frères humains... peu m'importe leur religion... de nos frères humains. Il doit y avoir un moyen sans passer, comme je l'ai déjà dit, par les critères de sélection des comités.

Mr. Lapierre: A point of order.

The Chairman: On a point of order.

et ensuite j'aimerais vous faire un petit rapport de ce que j'ai fait dans ce domaine.

Mme Appolloni: Oui, mais ne nous inondez pas de rapports au point que je n'obtienne pas de réponse, s'il vous plaît.

Le président: Oh non, vous obtiendrez une réponse.

Monsieur Lapierre, s'il vous plaît.

M. Lapierre: J'invoque le Règlement, monsieur le président. Je pense qu'il est assez injuste de faire cette demande à M. Massé et à ses collaborateurs. Je crois que cette question des rapports entre le ministère et le comité parlementaire devrait être réglée en présence du ministre ou réglée par le Comité directeur, en faisant parvenir des demandes au ministre, car je ne...

Le président: Très bien. Faites venir le ministre, alors.

[Texte]

Mr. Lapierre: Whether it is press clippings or a series of briefings or information on trade, every time we have had a request from members—and I could give you trade issues where we have had meetings with members... It has been done, to my recollection, in the last year and I understand it was a problem, because sometimes even as parliamentary secretary you go through that. But I think it is a question to be dealt with by the minister; and maybe, Mr. Chairman, we could have a meeting with the minister, with some people, to find maybe a better way of dealing with the issues. I think it would put Mr. Massé in a terrible position to ask him to undertake all those things for us.

• 1045

The Chairman: Fine, but I am sure Mr. Massé can answer most of them point by point. They are suggestions. I want to say that, as for an order of reference, I am still working very hard, and you blow the candle, I think. That is the specific aim I have in mind, to request from the House an order of reference. Hopefully, that will be our work. Maybe we could get that order of reference before we adjourn this summer so we could work in the summer and be ready to attack the work in the autumn. It is very important for Canada; it is very important for the west, and it would be very interesting.

As for the other matters, in all due reference to your question, I will let Mr. Massé do the answering.

Mr. M. Massé: Basically I understand your problem, because I have a few problems getting information myself sometimes in that department.

There is also the question Mr. Lapierre addressed, that to do a number of these things really depends on action by the minister. But I will not put myself under his mantle of protection.

Mrs. Appolloni: Bravo.

Mr. M. Massé: I may regret that.

I think your requests are basically sound and that we should give out more information to MPs, in particular, but also to the population in general about foreign policy, about the countries that we work in, basic information, that in fact there is ammunition to be given when you meet your constituents and you want to know the facts about a certain country or a given problem, and that we should be in the business of giving you these facts.

We are not at present exactly equipped to do that because departments have not exactly been conceived as instruments for MPs to do a few things. I have put into place a communications study in the department and I am going to receive its report probably by mid-August; and communications are going to be all types of communications, not only information about Canada in foreign countries, but also information about foreign countries in Canada, and information to MPs and information to the public.

[Traduction]

M. Lapierre: Qu'il s'agisse de revue de presse ou de séances d'information ou de renseignements sur le commerce, chaque fois que nous recevons une demande de députés... et je pourrais vous citer toutes sortes de questions commerciales au sujet desquelles nous avons eu des réunions avec des députés... Pour autant que je me souviene, cela a été fait l'année dernière, et je crois qu'il y a eu un problème car parfois même le secrétaire parlementaire rencontre des difficultés à ce sujet. Je pense que le ministre devra s'en occuper et peut-être pourrions-nous le rencontrer afin de trouver un meilleur moyen de confronter les problèmes. Ce serait mettre M. Massé en situation très délicate que de lui demander d'entreprendre tout cela pour nous.

Le président: D'accord, mais je pense que M. Massé pourra répondre point par point à la plupart des questions. Il s'agit surtout de suggestions. Pour ce qui est du mandat, j'y travaille toujours et vous m'avez presque ôté les mots de la bouche. J'essaie moi-même d'obtenir un mandat de la Chambre, de préférence avant l'ajournement afin que nous puissions y travailler cet été et être prêts à commencer le travail à l'automne. C'est très important pour le Canada, c'est très important pour l'Ouest et cela serait très intéressant.

En ce qui concerne tous les autres points, je vais laisser M. Massé y répondre.

M. M. Massé: Je comprends très bien votre problème car j'éprouve moi-même parfois des difficultés à obtenir moi-même des renseignements.

Il y a également la constatation de M. Lapierre, à savoir que beaucoup de ces choses dépendent d'une initiative du ministre. Je ne vais cependant pas m'abriter derrière lui.

Mme Appolloni: Bravo!

M. M. Massé: Je le regretterai peut-être.

Je pense que vos demandes sont généralement fondées et que nous devrions mieux informer non seulement les députés eux-mêmes mais également le public en général sur notre politique étrangère, sur les pays dans lesquels nous travaillons, diffuser une information générale de façon à ce que vous puissiez répondre aux questions de vos mandants. Notre rôle devrait être de vous communiquer ces faits afin que vous sachiez bien quelles sont les données d'un problème ou la situation dans un pays en particulier, etc.

Nous ne sommes pas équipés actuellement pour le faire car les ministères n'ont pas été conçus comme instruments pour informer les députés. J'ai nommé un groupe d'étude sur les communications dans le ministère et j'attends son rapport d'ici la mi-août, il va traiter de la communication au sens large, c'est-à-dire non seulement du travail que le Canada fait dans les pays étrangers mais également du rôle des pays étrangers au Canada et de l'information à diffuser au public et aux députés.

[Text]

You have to understand, of course, that once I have stated what I think makes sense, I have to recommend it to the various ministers who govern our department and I have to get their approval. So I am going in the direction you are suggesting and I hope to be able to move, to give you action; but I have to wait awhile until, first, I have the recommendations of that communications group and, second, until the ministers have decided what I can do and cannot do.

In terms of security checks, by the way, that is a different problem; but there is really no way we can let people wander from office to office, because indeed, we deal with policies where, if information were known to outsiders, it could create problems for Canada. If you are an MP, what we can do is give you special treatment and have a guard with you all the time, but we cannot let you circulate without a guard. You know, there are things that can be done and things that cannot be done.

In terms of the clipping services, that is available now and I will inquire whether it can be distributed to members of this committee, because basically I think it could be a good idea. But I will inquire about what can be done there.

Arrange a series of briefings: You know that in very many cases, like when you are going on a trip, you can arrange to have a briefing by members of the department on a specific country or on the area where you are going. If you have any difficulty with that, communicate with my office and I will see what I can do, because in theory that is available, in practice that is available, and we should be able to put together for you and for people who are travelling a good series of briefings on the countries where you are going.

Questions of trade: Certainly, more information must be given. The Department of External Affairs is now in the business of international trade.

• 1050

We are getting ourselves organized and we should be able to give you very good briefings on what the problems are and on some of the options that are available.

Recently, we got together a group of members of Parliament on a specific question and got members of the department to give them a specific briefing on that question. So there are precedents for that. It is done, and in my view, it should continue to be done.

It is the same way for global overviews on countries. We have the information available and I am sure that our directors general or directors would be delighted to give you the information. We may not be equipped to do it. We may not have done it well in the past. But I fully agree with your basic point, which is that members of Parliament should have available to them almost all the factual information that is at our disposal.

Mrs. Appolloni: Thank you, Mr. Massé. But I just want to emphasize the fact that you do have the information and you do have the ability to communicate it. As I have said in the past, when we are going to particular countries, we get excellent briefing. The calibre is superb. However, my point is

[Translation]

Il faut cependant bien savoir que, une fois mes propres décisions prises, je vais devoir les soumettre aux divers ministres responsables et obtenir leur autorisation. Je vais donc dans le sens que vous souhaitez et j'espère pouvoir prendre des mesures concrètes, mais je dois attendre tout d'abord les recommandations du groupe de travail sur les communications et, ensuite, les décisions des ministres.

En ce qui concerne les vérifications de sécurité, c'est là un problème différent; nous ne pouvons pas laisser des inconnus errer de bureau en bureau car si certains renseignements concernant nos politiques étaient divulgués, cela créerait des problèmes pour le Canada. Ce que nous pouvons faire dans le cas d'un député, c'est de lui adjoindre un garde qui le suivra partout où il voudra aller, mais nous ne pouvons pas vous laisser circuler seuls. Il y a des choses qui peuvent se faire et d'autres qui ne le peuvent pas, vous le savez bien.

En ce qui concerne le service des coupures de presse, il existe déjà et je vais me renseigner pour savoir si l'on pourrait en faire profiter les membres du Comité car cela me paraît une bonne idée. Je vais donc voir ce qu'il est possible de faire.

L'organisation de séances d'information. Vous savez que nous pouvons en diverses occasions, comme avant l'un de vos voyages par exemple, organiser une séance d'information sur un pays donné ou sur une région où vous allez en visite. Si vous avez des difficultés à ce sujet, veuillez contacter mon bureau et je verrai ce que je peux faire car c'est possible en théorie, c'est possible aussi en pratique et nous devrions être capables d'organiser à votre intention une bonne série de séances d'information sur les pays où vous vous rendez.

Le commerce. C'est vrai, une meilleure information est nécessaire. Le ministère des Affaires extérieures s'occupe maintenant activement du commerce international.

Nous commençons à nous organiser et nous devrions être en mesure de vous informer pleinement des problèmes et des options qui s'ouvrent à nous.

Nous avons réuni récemment un certain nombre de parlementaires intéressés par un sujet en particulier et avons organisé à leur intention une séance d'information là-dessus. Il y a donc des précédents, cela se fait déjà et devrait se poursuivre.

C'est la même chose pour les survols de certains pays. Nous possédons les données et je suis sûr que nos directeurs se feront un plaisir de vous les communiquer. Nous sommes peut-être mal équipés pour cette diffusion, il y a peut-être eu des lacunes par le passé, mais je suis tout à fait d'accord avec vous, les députés devraient disposer pratiquement des mêmes renseignements que nous-mêmes.

Mme Appolloni: Je vous remercie, monsieur Massé. Je veux simplement souligner que vous possédez les renseignements et que vous avez la capacité de les diffuser. Comme je l'ai déjà fait ressortir, lorsque nous allons en déplacement dans certains pays, nous bénéficions de séances d'information excellentes qui

[Texte]

that few of us have the financial means to go all around the world, and even if we had, I do not think the idea would fill the heart of our illustrious Whip with joy; and I will not even mention our constituents. But just because we cannot get to, say, Mexico, it does not mean that members of this committee at least do not have a vital interest in knowing what the heck is going on in Mexico: Will it pull itself out of the financial doldrums and what not?

Finally, if I may inject a little bit of humour into this whole thing—but it is not humorous—I do not know if you are familiar with the records of P.D.Q. Bach. There is one beautiful line in it when he is talking about the conductor taking the rostrum and the orchestra playing against him. I think that might sum up my impression—I will not speak for my colleagues—of what is happening between this committee and External, in general.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mrs. Apolloni: I think I would rather play as a team than against you.

Mr. M. Massé: Certainly, I agree with that.

The Chairman: Thank you. In any case, I have already made arrangements for a briefing as soon as we finish our estimates and supplementary estimates. On our way to another reference, I have already arranged—and you will be informed by writing—a briefing on IDRC and a general overview. I know of the interest of many members in Latin America and so I am working on that and a general overview of the Middle East. I know we have the people ready for that so, as soon as we finish the estimates and the supplementary estimates, we shall attack that.

The hon. member from Parry Sound—Muskoka, Mr. Darling, followed by Dr. Hudecki. I think we will proceed, this morning, to recognize all those who raised their hands late. Raise your hands at the beginning of the meetings, as I usually adjust the hour according to the number of people who raise their hands. But then, later on, I have people who raise their hands. Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: Yes, on a point of order on that, Mr. Watson has just raised his hand. These meetings are supposed to start at 9.30 a.m., and I believe, end at 11.00 a.m. I, for one, make appointments for very shortly after 11.00 a.m., expecting to be free at that time, and yet the meetings always drag far past 11.00 a.m., if the room has not been taken by some other committee. It creates difficulties. I do not know if it does for other people around here. It certainly does for me. I see Mr. Dupras agrees with me. I have another appointment at 11.10 a.m. and I would like to hear what happens to the end of the committee and not read about it about two weeks from now, when I get the minutes. I would like to see us operate in a more orderly fashion, that we would start at 9.30 a.m., and finish at 11.00 a.m. It may require shorter interjections, including my own, and, if so, so be it.

Mr. Dupras: I agree with that.

[Traduction]

sont vraiment de très haute tenue. Le problème est que nous sommes peu nombreux à avoir les moyens financiers de parcourir le monde et même si nous les avions, je doute que notre illustre whip serait ravi, et je ne parle même pas de nos électeurs. Mais ce n'est pas parce que nous ne pouvons pas aller au Mexique, par exemple, que les membres du Comité ne s'intéressent pas de très près à ce qui s'y passe, de savoir s'il va parvenir à se sortir de son marasme financier, etc.

Enfin, pour apporter peut-être une petite touche d'humour à tout cela—il n'y a pourtant pas de quoi rire—je ne sais pas si vous connaissez les disques de Peter Quebec. Il a une très belle répartition lorsqu'il parle du chef d'orchestre qui monte au pupitre et que l'orchestre joue contre lui. Cela résume bien mon impression—je ne sais pas si mes collègues la partagent—des relations entre ce Comité et les Affaires extérieures, en général.

Le président: Je vous remercie.

Mme Apolloni: Il vaudrait mieux que nous fassions équipe plutôt que de nous affronter.

M. M. Massé: Je suis tout à fait d'accord.

Le président: Je vous remercie. De toute façon, j'ai déjà pris des dispositions pour tenir une séance d'information dès la fin de notre étude des budgets principal et supplémentaire. Dans l'attente d'un nouveau mandat, j'ai déjà pris des dispositions pour tenir une séance d'information sur le Conseil de recherche pour développement international et un survol général. Je connais l'intérêt que beaucoup d'entre vous portent à l'Amérique latine et je travaille donc là-dessus, ainsi que sur un survol du Moyen-Orient et je vous tiendrai au courant. Les intéressés sont déjà préparés et donc, dès que nous en aurons fini avec le budget, nous nous attaquerons à cela.

La parole est au député de Parry Sound-Muskoka, M. Darling, qui sera suivi de M. Hudecki. Je crois que je vais donner la parole ce matin à tous ceux qui l'ont demandée avec retard. La plupart la demandent en début de réunion et je prends mes dispositions en conséquence, mais par la suite se présentent toujours quelques retardataires. Monsieur McKinnon.

M. McKinnon: J'invoque le Règlement à ce sujet. M. Watson vient de lever la main. Nos séances sont censées commencer à 9h30 et se terminer, je crois, à 11 heures. Pour ma part, je prends toujours des rendez-vous peu de temps après 11 heures, m'attendant à être libre, mais nos réunions se poursuivent toujours bien au-delà lorsque la salle n'est pas prise par un autre comité. Cela crée des inconvénients. Je ne sais pas si d'autres sont dans le même cas, mais je vois que M. Dupras est d'accord. J'ai un rendez-vous à 11h10 et j'aimerais bien savoir ce qui va se dire en fin de séance et ne pas devoir attendre deux semaines pour lire le procès-verbal. J'aimerais que l'on respecte les règles, c'est-à-dire que l'on commence à 9h30 et que l'on finisse à 11 heures, même si cela nous oblige à limiter nos interventions.

M. Dupras: Je suis d'accord.

[Text]

The Chairman: Okay but, as I say, next time. This committee has always functioned well but now it is becoming a habit where a member raises his hand towards 10.30 a.m. and I have already given more time to others because there were not enough members who raised their hands at that time. I try to be helpful but I am in your hands.

Mr. McKinnon: Just for the record, I am going to be very unhappy again today. There are going to be about four members who have contributions to make to this and I will not be able to hear them.

• 1055

The Chairman: I may cut off, though. The hon. Member from Parry Sound—Muskoka, Mr. Darling. I will ask him to stay behind for a few minutes to listen to our colleagues.

Mr. Darling: Who? Me?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Darling: All right. Certainly. I have an appointment at 11 o'clock, too, and I have been here since 9.28 a.m., Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: So was I, sir.

Mr. Darling: That is right—which is more than some of the others can say..

The Chairman: Yes, sir. Please proceed, Mr. Darling.

Mr. Darling: So if I have to suffer through it, they can suffer, too. I appreciate what my colleague, Ursula Appoloni, said regarding the officials, and I appreciate the diplomacy and the skating-on-thin-ice that the deputy minister and his officials have to do not to sort of ruffle anybody's feathers, because it would "come home to roost"—if I can use the expression—on you and your officials. But I was just thinking, suppose you were facing not this committee, but facing the foreign affairs committee in the United States, in which case I am quite sure questions could be squeezed out of you whether with a rubber hose or not, and that you would have to answer the questions. Is that not correct, Mr. Massé?

Mr. M. Massé: The rules are quite different in the United States.

Mr. Darling: That is what I meant. In other words, the members of the committee—congressmen or senators, if it were a joint committee—can absolutely demand answers. Is that not correct?

Mr. M. Massé: Yes.

Mr. Darling: So it seems to be a different ballgame here. You tell us what you want to do. And the rest of you say, We are not privy to that, and we will just... in other words tell them to shut up. We will not answer their questions. This is the impression that we get. I also wonder if members of our committee could probably contact...

[Translation]

Le président: D'accord, mais ce sera à partir de la prochaine fois. Les choses ont toujours bien marché jusqu'à maintenant, mais les membres commencent à prendre l'habitude de lever la main à 10h30 alors que j'ai déjà accordé un temps de parole supplémentaire à d'autres par manque d'intervenants. Je fais de mon mieux et je suis obligé de m'en remettre à vous.

M. McKinnon: Je signale quand même que je vais être encore lésé aujourd'hui. Il y a au moins quatre députés qui vont prendre la parole et je ne vais pas pouvoir les entendre.

Le président: Peut-être pourrais-je intervenir, si vous le permettez, en demandant au député de Parry Sound—Muskoka, M. Darling, de rester encore quelques minutes pour entendre nos collègues.

M. Darling: Qui? Moi?

Le président: Vous.

M. Darling: D'accord, si vous voulez. Moi aussi j'ai un rendez-vous à 11 heures et je suis ici depuis 9h28 ce matin, monsieur le président.

Le président: Moi aussi, monsieur.

M. Darling: C'est exact, mais tout le monde ne peut pas en dire autant.

Le président: Vous avez raison, veuillez poursuivre, monsieur Darling.

M. Darling: Dès lors, si je dois en pâtir, que les autres en pâtissent également. Je sais gré à ma collègue, madame Appoloni, d'avoir dit ce qu'elle a dit à propos des fonctionnaires, et j'apprécie à sa juste valeur la diplomatie et les dons d'équilibriste du sous-ministre et de ses fonctionnaires qui prennent bien garde à ne froisser aucune susceptibilité, de peur de recevoir la monnaie de leurs pièces. Mais supposons un instant que vous comparassiez non pas devant nous, mais devant le comité des affaires étrangères des États-Unis, j'imagine que ces messieurs seraient bien capables de vous arracher toutes les réponses qu'ils voudraient, à coup de tuyaux en caoutchouc s'il le faut, n'est-ce pas, monsieur Massé?

M. M. Massé: Les règles ne sont pas les mêmes aux États-Unis.

M. Darling: C'est exactement ce que je voulais dire. En d'autres termes, les membres du Congrès et du Sénat, s'il s'agissait d'un comité mixte, seraient aux États-Unis parfaitement en droit d'exiger des réponses, n'est-ce pas?

M. M. Massé: Absolument.

M. Darling: Ici, il n'en va donc pas du tout de même. Vous nous dites ce que vous voulez bien, quant au reste, vous nous répondez que vous ne savez pas et que vous allez peut-être... En d'autres termes, c'est la conspiration du silence et les questions restent sans réponse. C'est du moins mon impression. Les membres du Comité pourraient probablement, qu'en pensez-vous, s'adresser...

[Texte]

Mr. Breau: Go to a republic?

Mr. Darling: —the American Embassy and probably get more information about our department, or questions that we want, than from our own officials. Would that be possible?

Mr. M. Massé: It would be difficult in certain cases.

Mr. Darling: It would be difficult in certain cases, but I bet you it would be possible in certain cases. Now this has nothing to do with this department, but when one of the committees was trying to demand the salaries of some of these Crown corporations and other companies, you could not get it here, but you could sure get it by going to the United States.

Mr. M. Massé: Theirs is a different system.

Mr. Breau: You are not advocating a republican form of government, are you?

The Chairman: Mr. Darling has the floor, please.

Mr. Darling: I just wanted to make that comment. Mr. Massé, in your department among the officials in the various embassies and the trade commissioners, there is a sort of new setup now where trade commissioners are actually officials of your department, is that not correct?

Mr. M. Massé: Yes.

Mr. Darling: How is their profile? I wonder if the profile has been sort of played down, and they do not have as important a part to play. I can see that the two can go together through the embassy, but I just wonder if we, as a trading nation, are losing out on this deal? Or do you think it will help?

Mr. M. Massé: I would say it is going to help. That is a very subjective answer, but there is no doubt that one of the main reasons why the international trade group and the external affairs group were put together was in order to increase the profile of international trade—not to decrease it. So the trade commissioners, therefore, should have a more important role to play in the future, rather than a less important role. In other words, what has happened is not an integration of trade commissioners in international trade under the prior-existing group. That was not what was done in terms of the organization chart, and that was not the principle.

Also the government declared at that time, and I think it has appeared in the facts since then, that it was giving greater emphasis to trade—to Canada as a trading nation—and that the new organization should implement that objective.

The answer to your question from my point of view, and I agree it is subjective, is that trade commissioners, in fact, have a more important role to play, and that the new organization is giving international trade a greater profile than existed before.

[Traduction]

M. Breau: Devenir une république?

M. Darling: ... à l'ambassade des États-Unis et j'imagine que nous pourrions en apprendre davantage même à propos de notre ministère, que ce que veulent bien nous en dire nos propres fonctionnaires. Cela serait-il possible?

M. M. Massé: Dans certains cas, vous auriez du mal.

M. Darling: Peut-être, mais je suis prêt à parier que dans d'autres, ce serait tout à fait du domaine du possible. Cela dit, tout cela n'a rien à voir avec le ministère, mais lorsqu'un de nos comités, et ce n'est qu'un exemple, demandait à connaître le salaire de certains hauts fonctionnaires des sociétés de Couronne, ils se sont butés à un mur alors que j'imagine qu'ils auraient fort bien pu obtenir gain de cause en s'adressant aux Américains.

M. M. Massé: Le système américain est différent du nôtre.

M. Breau: Préconiseriez-vous une république?

Le président: Je vous en prie, c'est M. Darling qui a la parole.

M. Darling: C'est un commentaire que je voulais signaler. Monsieur Massé, me trompais-je en disant qu'avec la réorganisation, le personnel des ambassades et les délégués commerciaux relèvent de votre ministère?

M. M. Massé: C'est exact.

M. Darling: Qu'est-il advenu de leur profil? Leur rôle a-t-il été réduit, a-t-il perdu son importance? Je conçois fort bien que les deux fonctions puissent aller de pair dans le cadre d'une ambassade, mais je me demande si, puisqu'après tout nous sommes une nation commerçante, nous n'y perdons pas un peu. Serait-ce le contraire à votre avis?

M. M. Massé: Je dirais que ce serait plutôt le contraire. La réponse est évidemment très subjective, mais il ne fait aucun doute que l'une des raisons principales pour lesquelles le groupe du commerce international et le groupe des affaires extérieures ont fusionné était que nous voulions précisément relever le rôle et l'importance de la composante commerce international et non pas le contraire. Les délégués commerciaux devaient dès lors avoir un rôle encore plus important à jouer plutôt que le contraire. En d'autres termes, il n'y a pas eu intégration des délégués commerciaux du groupe du commerce international à un autre groupe pré-existant. Si vous consultez l'organigramme, vous verrez que ce n'était pas là l'idée.

Le gouvernement avait également affirmé à l'époque, et la chose a été prouvée, je crois, depuis lors, qu'il allait mettre davantage l'accent sur les échanges commerciaux—le Canada en tant que nation commerçante—et que le nouvel organisme allait devoir agir selon cet objectif.

Pour répondre à votre question dans mon optique personnelle, et je le répète c'est une réponse subjective, les délégués commerciaux ont effectivement un rôle beaucoup plus important à jouer et le nouvel organisme va effectivement rehausser l'importance du commerce international.

[Text]

Mr. Darling: But under the new rules or whatever you call them, the trade commissioner is now under the ambassador or the chief official more than before.

Mr. M. Massé: He is. But a greater number of ambassadors are trade commissioners or ex-trade commissioners. You can say that the trade commissioners are under the ambassador, but you can also say that all the other officials, who previously had nothing to do with trade, are now under an ambassador whose terms of reference give greater importance to trade matters.

• 1100

Mr. Darling: So in other words—we did have a former ambassador here; I do not see him here any more—if an ambassador was trade oriented or if he was one of the old school, just diplomatic relations, the high profile, the trade could suffer in that embassy.

Mr. M. Massé: That is a theoretical possibility, but you should not forget that, first, our ambassadors have terms of reference; that we have dealings with them day in and day out; also that every year the ambassadors are judged, and they are judged by the people who are in charge of international trade, in charge of aid, in charge of immigration and in charge of foreign policy. If an ambassador neglects the international trade part of his duties, first, we know it immediately, because there are transactions he does not do properly, and he is told. Secondly, his evaluations, from which his salary depends and his promotion depends, are made in part by people who are in charge of international trade. So we have built into the system a series of measures that really prevent from happening the possibility that you are mentioning.

Mr. Darling: What you should do is pay him on commission then; if he does not get enough trade he ...

The Chairman: I hear the Prime Minister has that in mind for Cabinet ministers.

Mr. Darling: It might not be a bad idea. I have always said that we have deputy ministers here—and I know that members of Parliament are paid in chicken feed compared to deputy ministers, and the public are not well aware of this—who I would like to see get \$10 million a year instead of their \$100,000, on the basis that they save that money. Put them on a commission. If they cut down on their huge expenditures, we could give them a percentage of it, and we would be money in pocket. I do not expect that to be done.

I have one other question to Mr. Massé. I wonder what the present situation is regarding the proposed Taj Mahal for your predecessor?

[Translation]

M. Darling: Il n'en reste pas moins que depuis cette réorganisation, appelons-là comme cela, les délégués commerciaux relèvent beaucoup plus qu'auparavant de l'ambassadeur ou du représentant principal du gouvernement, n'est-ce pas?

M. M. Massé: C'est exact, mais n'oubliez pas qu'énormément d'ambassadeurs sont également délégués commerciaux ou sont d'anciens délégués commerciaux. On peut dire en effet que les délégués commerciaux relèvent de l'ambassadeur, mais on peut également dire que tous les autres fonctionnaires qui, jadis, ne s'occupaient pas du tout d'échanges commerciaux, relèvent eux aussi désormais d'un ambassadeur dont le mandat attache une importance beaucoup plus grande aux questions à caractère commercial.

M. Darling: En d'autres termes donc, il y avait un ancien ambassadeur dans la salle mais je ne le vois plus, si un ambassadeur appartient à l'ancienne école, axée surtout sur les relations diplomatiques, la vocation commerciale de l'ambassade pourrait avoir à en pâtir.

M. M. Massé: C'est une possibilité théorique, mais il ne faudrait pas oublier qu'en premier lieu nos ambassadeurs ont un mandat, que nous sommes quotidiennement en contact avec eux et également que chaque année, ils sont jugés par les responsables du commerce international, par les responsables de l'aide internationale, par les responsables de l'immigration et de la politique extérieure et que si un ambassadeur néglige la composante commerce international de ses fonctions, d'abord nous le savons immédiatement parce qu'il y a certaines transactions dont il ne s'acquitte pas convenablement, et nous le rappelons à l'ordre. En second lieu, son évaluation de rendement dont dépend son salaire et ses possibilités de carrière sont l'oeuvre de gens qui sont précisément chargés du commerce international. Nous avons donc dans le système une série de mesures intrinsèques qui interdisent cette possibilité que vous évoquiez.

M. Darling: À ce moment-là, il faudrait payer les ambassadeurs à la commission et s'ils ne concluent pas suffisamment de contrats ...

Le président: J'ai entendu dire que le Premier ministre y songeait également dans le cas des ministres du Cabinet.

M. Darling: Ce ne serait peut-être pas une mauvaise idée. J'ai déjà dit que nous avions des sous-ministres, et je sais fort bien que les députés reçoivent un salaire de misère par rapport aux sous-ministres, même si le public n'en a pas beaucoup conscience, des sous-ministres donc que j'aimerais beaucoup voir toucher 10 millions de dollars par an au lieu de 100,000 dollars comme c'est le cas pour l'instant, s'ils faisaient économiser le gouvernement. Payez-les à la commission. S'ils parviennent à réduire leurs colossales dépenses, pourquoi ne pas leur donner un pourcentage car nous sortirions toujours gagnants. Quoi qu'il en soit, je pense que je me fais des illusions.

J'aurais une dernière question à poser à M. Massé. Qu'en est-il du fameux Taj Mahal de votre prédécesseur?

[Texte]

Mr. M. Massé: I am sorry; what is that?

Mr. Darling: I understand there was a building to be built in Washington for External Affairs in the near future, the embassy.

Mr. M. Massé: The proposal is still there. It is going to take a long while to get that embassy built, just because it takes a while, but the project is still going on; it is still part of our plans.

Mr. Darling: There is nothing concrete; nothing was done immediately. There was no tender let, other than we know there is an architect. I heard some rumours that there was an architect hired.

Mr. M. Massé: No, there has not been that I know, I think that is correct, any tender let for the building.

Mr. Darling: Thank you.

Mr. M. Massé: The piece of land is ours as you know.

The Chairman: I thank Mr. Lapierre and Mr. Breau for having withdrawn their names. I will therefore adjourn more quickly.

The hon. member from Hamilton West, Dr. Hudecki.

Mr. Hudecki: Thank you. I just wanted to very quickly give an impression that the three of us had, Mr. McLean, Father Ogle and myself, in visiting the trade fair in El Salvador. I want to point out particularly that it was a fair in which there were three major pavilions; one extolled the virtues of their government and what their government had done. Number two showed the work and the craftsmanship of the people in El Salvador, but the international trade museum was quite unusual in that very, very little product was shown in that particular museum. Russia, for example, had one booth and in that booth was one bottle of vodka, and it had streamers leading to it. The United Kingdom advertised one bottle of scotch. Poland went back to vodka.

An hon. Member: Are you sure they were not in a bar.

Mr. Hudecki: The United States had a greeting from the president and there was one exhibit of cosmetics. Then there were a few farm implements from South America. So it was a very anemic type of an exhibit; it showed practically no political products of the nature one could consider trade.

The second impression I got was the tremendous security they had. You would be walking by and at any time at all you would suddenly be stopped and be frisked.

• 1105

This did not happen to me but it did happen to a Salvadoran walking beside me and before you could get into the pavilion exhibiting foreign products, you had to go through quite a search routine. I really did not feel that this particular trade fair was something worthwhile investing in and that it meant a

[Traduction]

M. M. Massé: Excusez-moi, de quoi voulez-vous parler?

M. Darling: Il me semblait qu'on allait construire une nouvelle ambassade à Washington.

M. M. Massé: La proposition tient toujours, mais il faudra un certain temps pour faire construire notre ambassade car cela ne se fait pas du jour au lendemain, mais il n'en reste pas moins que le projet tient toujours et il fait effectivement partie de nos plans.

M. Darling: Mais il n'y a rien de concret encore et rien n'a été fait immédiatement. Aucun appel d'offres n'a été publié, et nous savons seulement qu'il y a un architecte. Selon certaines rumeurs que j'ai entendues, un architecte aurait déjà été retenu.

M. M. Massé: Si je ne me trompe pas, en effet, aucun appel d'offres n'a encore été publié.

M. Darling: Je vous remercie.

M. M. Massé: Mais comme vous le savez, le terrain nous appartient déjà.

Le président: Je remercie messieurs Lapierre et Breau d'avoir fait rayer leurs noms de la liste et je vais dès lors pouvoir lever la séance plus rapidement.

Le député d'Hamilton-Ouest, monsieur Hudecki.

M. Hudecki: Je vous remercie. Je voulais simplement vous faire part rapidement d'une impression commune à M. McLean, au père Ogle et à moi-même, impression que nous avons dégagée de notre visite à la foire commerciale du Salvador. Je voulais en particulier souligner que cette exposition se centrait dans trois grands pavillons, le premier chantant les louanges du gouvernement et de ses réalisations, le second vantant le travail et l'habileté des Salvadoriens et le troisième, le musée du commerce international, un peu inhabituel en ce sens que les produits exposés y étaient extrêmement rares. Ainsi, la Russie y avait un comptoir où seule une bouteille de vodka était exposée, signalée par des rubans. Le Royaume-Uni n'exposait pour sa part qu'une bouteille de whisky, et la Pologne elle aussi présentait une bouteille de vodka.

Une voix: Vous êtes certain qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'un bar?

M. Hudecki: Les États-Unis exposaient un message du président ainsi que quelques produits de beauté. On y trouvait également quelques instruments aratoires de provenance sud-américaine. L'exposition était donc à ce titre assez anémique, pratiquement aucun produit susceptible d'être exporté ou importé n'y étant exposé.

Le second souvenir que j'ai de cette foire commerciale est l'envergure des mesures de sécurité. A tout moment, en s'y promenant, on pouvait être arrêté et fouillé.

Cela ne m'est pas arrivé, mais j'ai vu un Salvadorien qui marchait à côté de moi se faire fouiller: avant de pouvoir entrer dans le pavillon des produits étrangers, la fouille était de règle. Cette foire commerciale, à mon avis, ne valait pas vraiment la peine d'y investir quoi que ce soit, et elle ne

[Text]

great deal. I think it was intended to show what the government departments have been doing in the second pavillion which was very heavily populated.

The question I want to ask deals with another subject. At that time, we were in a position to hear a formal appeal from the guerillas through Arturo Rivera y Damas, the Archbishop at the time, for dialogue with the government. This was a very important step. At that point, in church during a homily—which is practically the same as a press conference because you have all the ABC, NBC and so on television cameras in church ... he formally ...

The Chairman: Except no one can reply.

Mr. Hudecki: ... asked the government to consider dialogue which would then be a preliminary to an election. I really cannot see how you could have an election without that preliminary discussion back and forth between the government and the guerilla people in order to set-up an election. His objective was that, eventually, there would be a pluralistic type of government.

The question I wanted to ask is: Have we had any official information as to what has happened to that offer of dialogue as a preliminary to an election later on?

The Chairman: Mr. Gorham.

Mr. Hudecki: This was in January of this year.

Mr. Gorham: The question of a dialogue or a discussion between and among the various political elements in El Salvador has been a very topical one. Particularly at the present time, you will have noticed that the various resolutions before the United States Senate and the House of Representatives with regard to approving, to some extent, the request the administration has made for funds, both for economic and military aid, appear to have had a rider attached requiring, as a condition of approval of aid, the Government of El Salvador to undertake some meaningful discussions leading towards a more representative political process. The United States administration has also appointed a special ambassador to undertake contacts with the various groups. It remains to be seen just what results there will be. Our own discussions with the Government of El Salvador and also with representatives of the guerilla forces, indicate a willingness to have a discussion but not an agreement as to what the nature of that discussion will be. The guerilla forces want to have a negotiation to share power without going through an electoral process and seem to be reluctant to engage in a discussion about an electoral process. The Government of El Salvador has established a peace commission which is now working towards the promotion of a dialogue about how to get broader representation in the political process.

A question was raised earlier about the possibility of observers. We have not been asked directly, nor has any other nation; but it is always a possibility that when the elections take place there will be some form of international observation. The position of the Government of Canada has been expressed on several occasions by the minister; we believe that

[Translation]

représentait pas grand-chose. Elle avait, je pense, simplement pour but de montrer, dans le deuxième pavillion, qui était très achalandé, les réalisations du gouvernement.

J'aimerais toutefois poser une question sur un autre sujet. À l'époque où nous y étions, nous avons pu entendre un plaidoyer officiel en faveur d'un dialogue avec le gouvernement, plaidoyer présenté pour les guérilleros par Arturo Rivera y Damas, l'ancien archevêque. Il s'agissait, en l'occurrence, d'une initiative très importante. À l'occasion d'une homélie dite à l'église—pratiquement l'équivalent d'une conférence de presse en raison de la présence des caméras de tous les réseaux américains de télévision—l'archevêque a officiellement ...

Le président: Sauf que personne ne peut répondre.

M. Hudecki: ... demandé au gouvernement d'envisager l'ouverture d'un dialogue en guise de préalable aux élections. Je ne conçois pas qu'il puisse y avoir d'élections sans ces entretiens préalables entre le gouvernement et les guérilleros, afin d'organiser précisément les élections en question. L'objectif poursuivi était la mise en place, en fin de compte, d'un régime à caractère pluraliste.

J'aimerais donc savoir si nous avons eu officiellement vent des suites qui auraient été données à cette proposition de dialogue préalable à la tenue d'élections.

Le président: Monsieur Gorham.

M. Hudecki: Cela remonte au mois de janvier.

M. Gorham: La question du dialogue ou des entretiens entre les diverses factions politiques, au Salvador, est tout à fait d'actualité et elle l'est surtout pour l'instant, car vous aurez sans doute remarqué que les diverses résolutions dont sont saisis le Sénat et la Chambre des représentants américains, visant à autoriser, dans une certaine mesure, la demande de financement déposée par l'administration, financement destiné à l'aide économique et militaire, semblent contenir tout un avenant exigeant, comme condition préliminaire, que le gouvernement du Salvador s'engage à ouvrir des entretiens sérieux en vue de l'établissement d'un régime plus représentatif. L'administration américaine a également nommé un ambassadeur extraordinaire chargé de prendre contact avec les diverses factions. Il reste à voir sur quoi cela débouchera. Nos propres entretiens avec les représentants du gouvernement salvadorien et des guérilleros semblent laisser pointer, de la part des factions, une certaine volonté d'ouvrir les entretiens, sans qu'il y ait toutefois accord quant à la nature de ces entretiens. Les guérilleros veulent un partage des pouvoirs par la négociation, mais sans élection, et ils semblent répugner à discuter d'une formule électorale. Le gouvernement salvadorien a institué une commission pour la paix qui s'efforce actuellement de rallier les factions à l'ouverture d'un dialogue, pour déterminer comment assurer une meilleure représentation au sein des institutions politiques.

La question des observateurs a déjà été évoquée. On ne nous l'a pas demandé directement, pas plus qu'à un autre pays d'ailleurs, mais il est toujours possible, lorsque les élections se dérouleront, qu'il y ait des observateurs internationaux. Le ministre a, à plusieurs reprises, réitéré la position du gouvernement canadien à ce propos: il devrait, selon nous, y avoir une

[Texte]

there should be a process of reconciliation and dialogue leading to a political democratic solution via the electoral route to solve these differences between the various factions. It is easy for us in Canada to say that this should be. It is much more difficult for the parties concerned in the area to bring about that process, because there are strong differences, even among the various factions. We believe one of the reasons why some rather dramatic murders and alleged suicides took place among the leaders of the left wing groups in Salvador was a dispute over to what extent they should engage in political dialogue. The hardliners saying, military solution is the best solution and we are winning, so let us stick with that line. Others, apparently saying, well, perhaps we are losing ground in that respect and we should engage in a dialogue.

• 1110

The Chairman: Thank you for staying, so that I can proceed. Thank you, doctor.

Mr. Robinson, briefly, and one question from Mr. Watson. This way we will terminate the study of our estimates. I will not call a vote on the estimates. I could, because I have a quorum, but it would be unfair, having not announced it.

Mr. Robinson, please.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): I have three short questions.

Mr. Massé, I have some concerns about the Williamsburg summit that will be coming up shortly. If I understand it correctly, last year's summit in Versailles served mainly to disclose the differences—the gap between the thinking in the United States and its partners, Europe, Japan and Canada. Is it your view that what will happen this time at Williamsburg is the task of trying to close that gap so that there would be mutual understanding and co-operation?

Mr. M. Massé: We are hoping that the message that will come out of Williamsburg will be a united message. There is no doubt, if you look at the recent pronouncements by Mr. Mitterand, for instance, that there are a number of areas where the participants will have to discuss in depth if they are to understand each other, but we still hope that they will.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Do you see any specific role for Canada in this?

Mr. M. Massé: Yes. I would hope that Canada would play its usual role of moderator and make that agreement that you are talking about happen.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): And no doubt we will be talking about North-South issues and I understand that basically we will be concerned about the issues in Africa. I am wondering if the issues in South America and Central America will also be on the agenda.

Mr. M. Massé: I do not know if the leaders themselves will decide to discuss in depth on Central America, but I would not

[Traduction]

tentative de conciliation et un dialogue débouchant sur une solution politique démocratique, à caractère électoral, qui permettrait de rapprocher les diverses factions. Évidemment, il nous est toujours facile à nous autres, Canadiens, d'affirmer que c'est ainsi que les choses devraient se passer. Il est beaucoup plus difficile pour les parties concernées dans la région d'amener ce processus, compte tenu de très grandes différences, même parmi les différentes factions. Certains meurtres tragiques, de même que de prétendus suicides, parmi les chefs des groupes de la gauche, au Salvador, avaient, entre autres raisons, un conflit sur la question de savoir dans quelle mesure ils devraient entamer un dialogue politique. Les faucons estiment que la solution militaire est la meilleure, et étant donné qu'ils y gagnent, ils préfèrent s'y tenir. Les autres, estimant perdre du terrain à cet égard, préféreraient entamer un dialogue.

Le président: Je vous remercie de rester, et je peux donc poursuivre. Merci, monsieur.

Monsieur Robinson, brièvement, et une question de M. Watson. Cela terminera l'étude de nos prévisions budgétaires. Je ne vais pas les mettre aux voix. Je le pourrais, parce que nous avons le quorum, mais ce ne serait pas juste, parce que je ne l'ai pas annoncé.

Monsieur Robinson, s'il vous plaît.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Je voudrais poser trois brèves questions.

Monsieur Massé, j'ai certaines préoccupations au sujet du sommet de Williamsburg qui se tiendra très bientôt. D'après ce que j'ai cru comprendre, le sommet de Versailles, tenu l'an dernier, a servi principalement à mettre en lumière les différences, le monde qui sépare la façon de penser des États-Unis et celle de leurs partenaires, l'Europe, le Japon et le Canada. Pensez-vous qu'à Williamsburg, on essaiera de combler ce fossé, afin d'en arriver à une compréhension, ainsi qu'à une coopération réciproque?

M. M. Massé: Nous espérons qu'à l'issue de Williamsburg, le message sera celui de l'unité. Il ne fait aucun doute, si l'on s'en rapporte à ce qu'a dit récemment M. Mitterand, par exemple, que les participants devront discuter en détail d'un certain nombre de questions, afin de se comprendre, mais nous espérons qu'ils y parviendront.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Pensez-vous qu'à cet égard, le Canada pourrait jouer un rôle bien précis?

M. M. Massé: Oui. Nous espérons que le Canada pourra jouer son rôle habituel de modérateur, afin que l'entente dont vous parlez puisse se concrétiser.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Et nous parlerons sans doute des questions Nord-Sud, et je crois savoir qu'essentiellement, nous nous pencherons sur la situation en Afrique. À ce chapitre, l'Amérique du Sud et l'Amérique centrale seront-elles aussi à l'ordre du jour?

M. M. Massé: Je ne sais pas si les chefs politiques voudront analyser la situation de l'Amérique centrale, mais cela ne me

[Text]

be surprised, because they will be talking generally about East-West and peace and disarmament; and the problems of Central America are certainly prominent in the minds of a number of the actors.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Dealing with a different topic altogether, it would appear that there is a great deal of talk recently—of course, there has been in the not too distant past and even in the distant past—of having a Palestinian settlement on the West Bank. From the information I have received in reading the newspapers, it would appear that there are more Palestinians living on the East Bank than the West Bank and, in all likelihood, this is not a realistic solution. Would you care to comment on this?

Mr. M. Massé: I will comment on it in very general terms. There have been discussions on these questions for a long while. There is no doubt that King Hussein himself knows the figures that we are talking about and he knows the difficulties about a settlement. We have to go through it step by step, and I would hope that there is a good chance that the recent agreement between Lebanon and Israel is finally accepted because, if this is, then that would permit the question of settlements on the West Bank and the East Bank to be discussed further and presumably could help to lead towards a settlement.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Surely you do not see any removal of all the settlements that the Israelis are presently building on the West Bank?

The Chairman: Are you asking a question or expressing a wish?

Mr. M. Massé: I do admit that that would be very difficult.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): My last question, then, since we do not have much time, is: Can you tell us something about the situation in Chile at the present time, of the unrest and the possibility that Pinochet may decide to no longer to be the head of the junta?

Mr. M. Massé: That is a subject I know very little about and I would ask, Mr. Chairman, if Mr. Gorham could be asked to comment on this.

The Chairman: Mr. Gorham, followed by Mr. Watson, for one question, and I thank you for staying.

• 1115

Mr. Gorham: To put it very briefly, the situation in Chile has deteriorated. You are aware from the various news reports that the authorities have rounded up a large number of people, allegedly to check for illegal possession of arms. This has been a retrograde step, in our view. We instructed our ambassador to make those comments clearly to the government; and he did so, I think, three or four days ago. He called on the foreign

[Translation]

surprendrait pas, car ils parleront de façon générale des relations Est-Ouest, ainsi que de la paix et du désarmement; il ne fait aucun doute que les problèmes de l'Amérique centrale revêtent une grande importance pour un certain nombre de participants.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Pour parler d'une question tout à fait différente, il semble que l'on ait beaucoup parlé, récemment—comme il y a quelque temps déjà, il n'y a pas trop longtemps, et même auparavant—de la possibilité d'un règlement de la question palestinienne sur la rive occidentale du Jourdain. D'après les renseignements que j'ai obtenus à la lecture des journaux, il semblerait que davantage de Palestiniens vivent sur la rive orientale que sur la rive occidentale, et que, selon toute vraisemblance, cette solution ne serait pas réaliste. Auriez-vous des remarques à faire à ce sujet?

M. M. Massé: Oui, et de façon très générale. Depuis longtemps déjà, des discussions portent sur ces questions. Le roi Hussein doit certainement connaître les chiffres démographiques dont nous sommes en train de parler, et il connaît aussi les difficultés que pose un règlement de la question palestinienne. Nous devons procéder très progressivement, et j'espère que l'accord récent entre le Liban et Israël sera finalement accepté, car il permettrait une discussion plus avant de la question des peuplements des rives occidentale et orientale du Jourdain, ce qui contribuerait à nous rapprocher d'un règlement de la question.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Vous n'envisagez sans doute pas la suppression de toutes les colonies que les Israéliens sont en train de construire sur la rive occidentale?

Le président: Posez-vous une question, ou est-ce que vous exprimez un souhait?

M. M. Massé: Je dois admettre que ce serait là quelque chose de très difficile.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Il ne me reste pas beaucoup de temps, et voici donc ma dernière question: pourriez-vous nous dire quelque chose à propos de la situation actuelle du Chili, de l'agitation qui règne dans ce pays et de la possibilité que Pinochet puisse décider de ne plus être la tête de la junte?

M. M. Massé: C'est une question à laquelle je ne connais pas grand-chose, et avec votre permission, monsieur le président, je voudrais demander à M. Gorham de bien vouloir répondre à cette question.

Le président: Monsieur Gorham, suivi de M. Watson, pour une question, et je vous remercie de rester parmi nous.

M. Gorham: En quelques mots, la situation au Chili s'est détériorée. D'après ce qu'en disent les médias, les autorités ont effectué des rafles massives, sous prétexte de vérifier la possession illégale d'armes. Ce fut là, selon nous, une mesure rétrograde. Nous avons demandé à notre ambassadeur de transmettre ces remarques sans ambages au gouvernement; c'est ce qu'il a fait, je crois, il y a trois ou quatre jours. Il a

[Texte]

minister and expressed the concern on the part of the Government of Canada and the people of Canada about what appeared to be a retrograde step in the conduct of treatment of human rights in that country. Not surprisingly, the reply he was given was that the question of law and order in Chile was the responsibility of Chile and nobody else.

The Chairman: Mr. Watson.

Mr. Watson: Since you have given me one question . . .

The Chairman: Or two; I think my colleagues would not mind.

Mr. Watson: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I do appreciate the opportunity.

But the first question I had in mind—and I will simply make an affirmation instead, if you wish to restrict me to one question—has to do . . .

The Chairman: Or two, knowing your opinions.

Mr. Watson: —with the situation in Cambodia and Canada's behaviour at the United Nations during the last three sessions, I believe, where we voted in favour of the seating of the Pol Pot regime. Of all the things we have done at the United Nations over the years that are questionable, certainly those votes in my mind are the most questionable. Why we could not have simply remained neutral instead of taking a position—which, in theory, we did—to affirm our distaste for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, why we could not have at least remained neutral and abstained from voting on that, I do not know. It did not make any sense to me, and I find it really quite disgraceful that Canada should continue to vote at the United Nations in favour of such a despicable, abhorrent group of people which are represented by the Pol Pot movement. I would just hope, at the fall session, that we at least abstain.

It turns out now that people from, I understand, Indonesia, at least, are making the point that this whole situation in Cambodia, where Vietnam has continually been portrayed as totally in the wrong, is only going to be solved if there is some understanding given to the Vietnamese position, which wishes to at least affirm a certain area of influence in that part of the world.

It would seem to me the Indonesian position is one which Canada should be at least listening to; and if it listens to the Indonesian position, then it will at least abstain the next time around.

I have said what I have to say on that issue. If somebody wishes to give a response to that, fine; otherwise, I will go on to my second question.

It relates to apparently the proposed visit of General Sharon to Canada in the next few days, around the end of May or beginning of June. I guess General Sharon is here to sell Israeli bonds. He wants to give Canadians a chance to invest in world instability and to continuing conflict in the Middle East. This is a very important investment for Canadians to consider. The money going into Israeli bonds will, without question, go into

[Traduction]

communiqué avec le ministre des Affaires étrangères pour lui faire part des préoccupations du gouvernement et du peuple canadien à propos de ce qui semble être une mesure rétrograde au chapitre du traitement des droits de la personne dans ce pays. On lui a répondu, ce qui n'est pas surprenant, que la question de l'ordre public au Chili était la responsabilité de ce pays, et d'aucun autre.

Le président: Monsieur Watson.

M. Watson: Étant donné que vous m'avez accordé une question . . .

Le président: Ou deux; mes collègues ne s'y opposeraient sans doute pas.

M. Watson: Monsieur le président, je vous remercie beaucoup. Je suis très heureux d'avoir cette possibilité.

Mais la première question que j'avais à l'esprit—et si vous voulez me limiter à une question, j'en ferai plutôt une affirmation—concerne . . .

Le président: Ou deux, car je connais bien vos opinions.

M. Watson: . . . la situation au Cambodge et l'attitude du Canada aux Nations Unies au cours des trois dernières sessions, puisque je crois que nous avons voté pour admettre le régime de Pol Pot à siéger. Ces votes sont, selon moi, l'une des choses les plus contestables que nous ayons faites aux Nations Unies, et il y en a eu au fil des ans. Pourquoi ne pas être simplement restés neutres, au lieu de prendre position—ce que nous avons fait en théorie—afin d'affirmer que nous n'apprécions pas l'occupation du Cambodge par le Vietnam; je ne sais vraiment pas pourquoi nous n'avons pas décidé de rester neutres, et de nous abstenir de voter sur cette question. Notre attitude m'a paru absurde, et je trouve très scandaleux que le Canada continue à voter, aux Nations Unies, en faveur d'un groupe aussi ignoble, odieux, représenté par le mouvement de Pol Pot. J'espère qu'à la session d'automne, nous nous abstiendrons de voter.

Maintenant, des Indonésiens avancent le principe selon lequel, dans toute cette situation du Cambodge, où le Vietnam a toujours été décrit de façon péjorative, la seule solution sera de comprendre la position de ce pays, qui souhaite au moins affirmer une certaine région d'influence dans cette partie du monde.

Il me semble que le Canada devrait s'intéresser à la position de l'Indonésie; de cette façon, il pourra au moins s'abstenir de voter la prochaine fois.

J'ai dit ce que je voulais dire sur cette question. Si quelqu'un souhaite apporter quelques commentaires là-dessus, c'est très bien; autrement, je passerai à ma seconde question.

Elle concerne la visite proposée, semble-t-il, du général Sharon au Canada, dans les prochains jours, vers la fin de mai, ou au début de juin. Je crois que le général est ici pour vendre des obligations d'Israël. Il veut donner aux Canadiens la possibilité d'investir dans l'instabilité du monde et dans le maintien du conflit au Moyen-Orient. C'est là un investissement très important, et les Canadiens devraient y réfléchir.

[Text]

supporting the expansion of settlements on the West Bank. This is contrary to Canadian government policy. It is contrary to the policies of every democratic nation in the world. To come here to Canada to encourage Canadians to place money in Israeli bonds that will encourage these West Bank settlements is, in my view, an insult to Canadian intelligence.

• 1120

I would hope that, considering General Sharon's record, particularly his record in his latter days as defense minister, where he handed over the keys as the occupier of prime responsibility in Lebanon, and as one who is bound by the Geneva Convention, which makes the occupying power responsible for the safety and well-being of all persons under the control of that occupier... This man in charge, General Sharon, handed over the keys to a gang of killers, Falangist killers, whose reputation had already been well established during the massacres in 1976, when several thousand Palestinian women and children were massacred along with older men after the overrun of a major refugee camp by the Falangists. General Sharon made arrangements, handed over the keys to these camps, permitted these killers in, and we all know the result. My question is: Has the Canadian government expressed any lack of enthusiasm to the Israeli embassy here, or to the Israeli government about this visit—this obscene visit?

The Chairman: Mr. Delworth, to start—or Mr. Schioler, from the Middle East section.

Mr. Delworth: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Very briefly, by way of reply to the question concerning Cambodian credentials at the United Nations, first of all let me say that the Canadian government position on this particular problem has been governed not by the view of the human rights record of the Pol Pot government, which I think all Canadians and indeed all civilized people around the world find reprehensible. It has been rather more influenced by, and I think one has to be influenced by, juridical and legal procedures in the case of credentials and matters of this sort in the U.N.

When the Lon Nol government fell, after the fall of Saigon, and the Pol Pot government came to power, we regarded the government of Cambodia as the government of Pol Pot. There was no gap in our recognition at that time. We consider that act of recognition has been carried forward to include the formation of the coalition government of Cambodia, which took place, I guess, a year and a half ago, under Prince Sihanouk. It is no longer a government of Pol Pot, although the Khmer Rouge are certainly part of that government. It is a government of three factors, three factions, headed by Prince Sihanouk, the former head of state of Cambodia. It is that political entity which we regard as the legitimate government of Cambodia. To do anything else would be to legitimize juridically the government of Heng Samrin, which is a puppet government installed purely and simply by Vietnamese arms.

[Translation]

L'argent consacré à des obligations israéliennes sera, sans le moindre doute, consacré à appuyer l'expansion de colonies sur la rive occidentale du Jourdain, ce qui est contraire à la politique du gouvernement canadien, de même qu'aux politiques de tous les pays démocratiques du monde. Venir ici, au Canada, pour encourager des Canadiens à investir de l'argent dans des obligations israéliennes qui encourageront la création de colonies sur la rive occidentale constitue, selon moi, une insulte à l'intelligence des Canadiens.

J'espère qu'étant donné les antécédents du général Sharon, en particulier en ce qui concerne ses derniers jours comme ministre de la Défense, puisqu'il avait remis les clefs... or, en tant que représentant suprême de la puissance d'occupation au Liban, il était responsable de la sécurité et du bien-être de toutes les personnes relevant du contrôle de cet occupant... Or, le général Sharon qui était soi-disant responsable a ouvert les portes à un groupe de tueurs, de phalangistes, dont la réputation avait déjà été bien établie au cours des massacres de 1976 où des milliers de femmes, d'enfants et de vieillards avaient été massacrés lors de l'occupation d'un grand camp de réfugiés par les phalangistes. Le général Sharon a pris toutes les dispositions, c'est lui qui a ouvert les portes de ces camps, qui a laissé entrer ces assassins et nous savons tous quels en ont été les résultats. Je voudrais demander ceci: le gouvernement canadien a-t-il exprimé son manque d'enthousiasme à l'ambassade d'Israël ou au gouvernement israélien au sujet de cette visite inadmissible?

Le président: Monsieur Delworth, pour commencer ou monsieur Shioler, de la Section du Moyen-Orient.

M. Delworth: Merci, monsieur le président.

Très brièvement, pour répondre à la question des pouvoirs du Cambodge aux Nations Unies, je voudrais tout d'abord dire que la position du gouvernement canadien à cet égard s'est appuyée non pas sur le «palmarès» du gouvernement Pol Pot au chapitre des droits de la personne, que tous les Canadiens, et même tous les peuples civilisés du monde estiment répréhensible... Mais le Canada a plutôt été influencé, comme il se doit, je crois, par les procédures juridiques touchant la question des pouvoirs et d'autres questions semblables aux Nations Unies.

Après la chute du gouvernement Lon Nol et celle de Saigon, et avec l'émergence du gouvernement Pol Pot, nous avons considéré que ce dernier représentait le gouvernement du Cambodge. À l'époque, notre reconnaissance était absolue. De ce fait, il fallait inclure la formation du gouvernement de coalition qui est intervenue il y a un an et demi, je crois, avec à sa tête le Prince Sihanouk. Il n'est donc plus question d'un gouvernement de Pol Pot, encore que les Khmers Rouges jouent encore un certain rôle. Le gouvernement comprend trois éléments, trois factions, avec à leur tête, encore une fois, le Prince Sihanouk, l'ancien chef d'État du Cambodge. C'est cette entité politique que nous considérons comme le gouvernement légitime de ce pays. Agir autrement reviendrait à légitimer juridiquement le gouvernement de Heng Samrin, gouvernement fantoche installé purement et simplement par

[Texte]

The consequences of switching a vote in those circumstances would, we think, be very grave in juridical terms.

In terms of the political factors playing on this situation, I am not aware of the Indonesian argument to which you are referring; perhaps I have missed this. Our impression has been that the coalition government of Cambodia, headed by Prince Sihanouk, has been very much the favoured vehicle for a settlement in Southeast Asia of the ASEAN group, of which Indonesia is a leading member. Personally, I would be very surprised to learn—I may be wrong in this, but I would be very surprised to learn that there had been any significant shift in the Indonesian position in that respect.

We take note of the views that you have put forward, and certainly they will be considered when the time comes to look at the issue of the Canadian vote in the U.N. this fall. But on the basis of present facts, it looks to me as if the recommendation from officials to the minister would be to continue the established position.

The Chairman: Thank you. The answer to the second question, please.

• 1125

Mr. J.P. Schioler (Director, Middle Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs): The visit of General Sharon is a private visit. No invitation was issued and no permission was sought for his coming to Canada. Provided visitors respect Canadian law and meet the requirements of the issuance of visas, we would not intervene in any way to prevent... The Canadian views on the massacres in Lebanon last fall are well known. They are on the record.

The Chairman: Could someone, out of interest—I am working on that at the moment. I would like to know—this question of the Israel bonds. It is out of your bounds, I suppose, to know if these are tax free, or tax deductible? It is of great interest, because following Mr. Watson's question, if that money that comes out of Canada—and I have no objection; people are free to do what they want with their money—if it is to go to help finance projects with which Canada disagrees... We disagree with the settlement policy of... This is on record. It is not I speaking, or Mr. Watson, or anybody else. We disagree with settlement on the West Bank. But if that money is used, as I would gather from the question from Mr. Watson, in any way to help implement more settlements, therefore making life more difficult to find a peaceful solution... because to achieve a peaceful solution one has to stop implementing settlement, I would imagine—not I would imagine; I am sure... because the more settlements, the more difficult it will be to find a solution.

I do not know if you would like to comment on that.

Mr. Schioler: This is a private Canadian contribution or investment, and certainly our department has no part in that.

[Traduction]

les armes du Vietnam. Dans ces conditions, voter autrement aurait des conséquences juridiques très graves.

En ce qui concerne les facteurs politiques qui interviennent dans cette situation, je ne suis pas au courant de l'argument indonésien que vous avez mentionné; il m'a peut-être échappé. Notre impression, c'est que le gouvernement de coalition du Cambodge, avec à sa tête le Prince Sihanouk, constitue un moyen très privilégié de régler la question du sud-est asiatique dans le groupe de l'ANASE, dont l'Indonésie est un membre très important. Personnellement, je ne serais pas très surpris d'apprendre... je peux me tromper... qu'il y a eu, à cet égard, une modification très importante de la position de l'Indonésie.

Nous prenons note des points de vue que vous avez exprimés, et il en sera certainement tenu compte au moment d'examiner la question du vote du Canada aux Nations Unies cet automne. Mais, compte tenu de la situation actuelle, j'ai l'impression que la recommandation des fonctionnaires au ministre sera de maintenir la position actuelle.

Le président: Merci. La réponse à la seconde question, s'il vous plaît.

M. J.P. Schioler (directeur, Division du Moyen-Orient, ministère des Affaires extérieures): La visite du général Sharon est une visite privée. Aucune invitation ne lui a été envoyée et aucune permission n'a été demandée pour son séjour au Canada. Pourvu que les visiteurs respectent les lois canadiennes de même que les critères de délivrance des visas, nous n'intervenons en aucune façon pour empêcher... Les points de vue du Canada sujet des massacres du Liban à l'automne dernier sont bien connus.

Le président: Quelqu'un pourrait-il m'éclairer parce que je travaille là-dessus pour le moment... J'aimerais savoir, à propos de la question des obligations d'Israël... Cela ne relève sans doute pas de vos attributions, mais savez-vous si elles sont déductibles d'impôts. Cela m'intéresse beaucoup, car à la suite de la question de M. Watson, si cet argent sort du Canada—je n'ai aucune objection là-dessus; les gens sont libres de faire ce qu'ils veulent de leur argent—mais s'il va contribuer à financer des projets que rejette le Canada... Nous n'appuyons pas la politique de colonisation de... C'est une chose officielle. Ce n'est pas moi qui parle ou M. Watson ou n'importe qui d'autres. Nous rejetons le principe de la colonisation de la rive occidentale du Jourdain. Mais si cet argent est utilisé, comme semble l'indiquer la question de M. Watson, pour contribuer à établir davantage de colonies, ce qui rendra plus difficile de trouver une solution acifique—car pour y parvenir il faut sans doute cesser d'installer des colonies, car plus il y en a lus il sera difficile de trouver une solution.

Je ne sais pas si vous voudriez apporter des commentaires à ce sujet.

M. Schioler: Il s'agit de contributions ou d'investissements canadiens privés, et notre ministère n'y participe évidemment pas.

[Text]

About charitable contributions, it is the Department of Finance or National Revenue that would establish the regulations and also provide the licence to any agency that was undertaking any activity.

The Chairman: We will not make your life more miserable this morning.

Mr. Dupras, I think, has a supplementary, and then we will adjourn.

Thank you.

Mr. Dupras: The donations could be made directly to Israel, or to other agencies, or to local synagogues, for instance.

Mr. Schioler: I think there is a distinction between bonds and contributions to charitable agencies. But as I say, I am not an expert in this field.

The Chairman: I know Mr. Watson is working on that.

Mr. Watson: Mr. Chairman, a point of clarification. Israeli bonds are not tax deductible. They are simply treated as an investment, and no special tax advantage is given to people who buy Israeli bonds.

The Chairman: I think it is very fair to put it on record.

Mr. Watson: If on the other hand money is donated, for example to organizations associated with the Jewish National Fund, then there is a possibility that such gifts would have the advantage of tax deductibility, and there is a possibility, of course, that such funds could be used for doing things that are against Canadian official policy, namely, encouraging settlements on the West Bank.

The Chairman: I would encourage Mr. Watson to proceed and give us more exact detail so that we do not spread bad, ill-informed information about this question.

I thank very much the Official Opposition for staying so we could sit.

Thank you, gentlemen and madam. We adjourn until June 7, for the CIDA supplementary estimates.

[Translation]

En ce qui concerne les dons de charité, c'est le ministère des Finances ou celui du Revenu national qui établit les règlements, et qui accorde des autorisations aux organismes qui se chargeraient de ce genre d'activités.

Le président: Nous n'allons pas vous rendre la vie plus compliquée ce matin.

Je crois que M. Dupras a une question supplémentaire, et nous lèverons ensuite la séance.

Merci.

M. Dupras: Les dons peuvent être versés directement à Israel ou à d'autres agences ou à des synagogues locales, par exemple.

M. Schioler: Je pense qu'il existe une distinction entre les obligations et les dons à des organismes de bienfaisance. Mais encore une fois, je ne suis pas spécialiste de cette question.

Le président: Je sais que M. Watson y travaille.

M. Watson: Monsieur le président, je voudrais apporter une précision. Les obligations d'Israel ne sont pas déductibles d'impôts. Elles sont considérées comme un investissement, et ceux qui en achètent ne bénéficient d'aucun traitement fiscal de faveur.

Le président: Il me paraîtrait juste de le dire officiellement.

M. Watson: Si par ailleurs de l'argent est donné par exemple à des organismes associées au Fonds juif unifié, il est alors possible que ces dons bénéficient de la déductibilité d'impôts, et il est aussi possible, bien sûr, que ces fonds soient utilisés pour faire certaines choses qui sont contre la politique officielle du Canada, en particulier encourager l'établissement de colonies sur la rive occidentale du Jourdain.

Le président: J'encouragerais M. Watson à continuer à nous donner d'autres détails exacts, afin que nous ne répondions pas des renseignements erronés et mal informés sur cette question.

Je remercie beaucoup l'Opposition officielle d'être restée afin que nous puissions siéger.

Merci, messieurs, madame. Nous levons la séance, et nous nous reverrons le 7 juin pour l'étude du budget supplémentaire de l'ACDI.

APPENDIX 'EAND-76'

Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

May 18, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs
and National Defence
Room 265 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our File

Dear Mr. Prud'homme:

You may recall that at the meeting of your Committee in December, Mr. Crosbie asked for information regarding the Canada/Kenya Long-Term Economic Planning Conference which had been held in Nairobi in November. Mr. Bruce, who attended that Conference, provided the Committee with a brief explanation of the purpose and the results of the Conference. Mr. Crosbie asked whether a report on that Conference could be made available to the Committee and following your request, I agreed to provide a copy as soon as one was available.

I have now received a copy of the report on the Conference prepared by the Government of Kenya. Since the document is marked "Draft" we have asked for copies of the final text when it becomes available.

I am arranging for the Clerk of the Committee to receive this document as an exhibit in order that it be available for inspection by Honourable Members.

I trust that this information will be useful to Mr. Crosbie and Members of the Committee.

Yours sincerely,

(Original signed by)

Wm McWhinney
Acting President

c.c. Mr. R. Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

May 11, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and National Defence
Room 265 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Dear Mr. Prud'homme:

When I appeared before the Standing Committee on CIDA's Main Estimates 1983-84 on April 21, certain questions were put to me by Honourable Members which I promised to answer at a later date.

Mr. Stan Darling, Member for Parry Sound-Muskoka, asked for details on CIDA's support of a private organization called CESO (Canadian Executive Service Overseas).

CESO operates three programmes, two of which are funded by CIDA, the overseas programme (for which we provide core funding) and the trade development programme (for which we provide project or programme funding).

In 1982-83, CIDA's contribution to CESO was \$2,400,000 which helped field 301 volunteers for tours of duty abroad of up to six months.


All project information and information on volunteers is kept at CESO Headquarters. Following our request, CESO has kindly supplied details on their projects.

I have arranged for the Clerk of the Committee to receive an exhibit copy of this list in order that it may be available for inspection by Honourable Members.

Regarding the effectiveness of CESO's activities abroad we can state that the reports which are received from their clients overseas are nearly always of a very favourable nature. To date CESO has completed more than 3,000 projects overseas at a cost of \$7,975 per volunteer. Therefore, we conclude that their projects are worthwhile and effective.

I trust that this information will be useful to Mr. Darling and Members of the Committee.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Wm McWhinney'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

Wm McWhinney
Acting President

c.c. Mr. R. Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

Deputy Prime Minister
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Vice-premier ministre
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, Ontario
K1A 0G2

May 18, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman
Standing Committee on External
Affairs and National Defence
House of Commons - Room 265WB
Ottawa, Ontario

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to provide you with answers to certain of the questions asked of Mr. Massé, Mr. Marchand and Mr. Johnstone at the meeting of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and Defence (SCEAND) on April 14, 1983.

The Department's reply to the SCEAND Sub-Committee's report on Canada's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean has been completed and will be sent under separate cover.

Referring to Ms. Jewett's question on the procedures followed in publishing orders-in-council in the Canada Gazette, I can only suggest that the question be directed to those responsible for the Privy Council Office. The decision about what is published in the Gazette is not made by this Department.


The question of contributions to the United Nations Association of Canada (UNAC) was raised by Mr. Roche. This Department recently approved an increase of \$145,000 over four years, to the current contribution to UNAC.

A separate reply to Mr. Laniel's question on Articles 3 and 4 of GATT is being prepared.

You will find attached a copy of the Departmental organization chart. I would ask that Mr. Massé's remark that it is at present "unofficial" be kept in mind.

I hope this information is useful to the Committee.

Yours sincerely,




Allan J. MacEachern

ORGANIZATION CHART - ORGANIGRAMME


CHART 1

Chart Title Titre de l'organigramme




ORGANIZATION CHART - ORGANIGRAMME

CHART 2




ORGANIZATION CHART - ORGANIGRAMME




ORGANIZATION CHART - ORGANIGRAMME

CHART 4




ORGANIZATION CHART - ORGANIGRAMME

CHART 5



ORGANIZATION CHART - ORGANIGRAMME

CHART 6




*Continued from Chart 5

ORGANIZATION CHART - ORGANIGRAMME

CHART 7

Chart Title Titre de l'organigramme
 Assistant Deputy Minister
 Sectoral & Economic Relations




ORGANIZATION CHART - ORGANIGRAMME

CHART 8

Chart Title
Titre de l'organigramme
Assistant Deputy Minister
Trade Relations

DMT - PTT



Agence canadienne de
développement internationalCanadian International
Development Agency

May 12, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and National Defence
Room 265 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Dear Mr. Prud'homme:

When I appeared on April 21 before the Standing Committee on CIDA's Main Estimates 1983-84, certain questions were put to me by Honourable Members which I promised to answer at a later date.

Mr. Donald Munro, Member for Esquimalt-Saanich, wanted to know if CIDA maintained stockpiles of food for emergency or regular food aid situations - in particular, herring products from New Brunswick. The answer is that CIDA does not have pre-purchased stocks of food commodities available for regular food aid or emergency food aid. If an emergency develops and a decision is taken to provide Canadian food aid, commodities are purchased as quickly as possible through established procurement procedures.

The Department of National Defence stockpiles food only for their own use. The Emergency Measures Organization stockpiles food which they purchase from the Department of National Defence, but this is for Canadian emergencies only. No food is stockpiled in Canada by international organizations. The Mennonite Central Committee stockpiles wheat for emergency uses, but their stocks are usually low and most wheat collected from the farmers during the year is used in that year. UNICEF stockpiles various commodities in Copenhagen for a number of international organizations.

During the fiscal year 1982-83, 372 tons of canned herring in oil were purchased from New Brunswick for use in the World Food Programme, at a cost of \$1,139,436. During the fiscal year 1981-82, Jamaica purchased under a loan from Canada 684.6 tons of herring in oil, 828.7 tons in tomato sauce and 22 tons in soya sauce. The fish was purchased from New Brunswick and the cost was \$3,044,138.


Concerning the Zamorano project in Honduras which Mr. Munro spoke about, I mentioned in my initial response, that CIDA is primarily a responsive organization rather than a project initiating organization and that for Honduras, their requests so far have been mainly concentrated in natural resources development (agriculture, forestry, energy).

Nevertheless, human resource development is a vital element in project planning and has been incorporated mainly in the form of counterpart training in both the agriculture (Guayape) and forestry programmes presently underway in Honduras. If on the other hand a request for project financing similar to the Zamorano one should be presented, we will certainly give it serious consideration as suggested by Mr. Munro.

There are, to my knowledge, no education projects identical to the Zamorano agricultural school financed by CIDA. The approach to training local farmers comes in many forms in Central America and elsewhere. There has been a distinct movement away from institution building such as Zamorano and towards reinforcing components of training already in place. Thus the Coady Institute training program in Central America has been involved in training local farmers through cooperative institutions. We have also supported local groups who were using training programs similar to the Canadian Radio Farm Forum. Even the "Farmers Almanac" concept has been supported through the Instituto Centroamericano de Extensión de la Cultura in Costa Rica. CIDA is very much involved in training local farmers but does not use the same format or the institutional structure such as found in Zamorano.

I trust that this information will be useful to Mr. Munro and Members of the Committee.

Yours sincerely,



Wm McWhinney
Acting President

c.c. Mr. R. Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

May 12, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and National Defence
Room 265 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Voire référence Your file

Notre référence Our file


Dear-Mr. Prud'homme:

When I appeared before the Standing Committee on April 21 Mr. Donald Munro, Member for Esquimalt-Saanich, put questions to me about the funding that CIDA provides to Canadian groups for development education.

I have arranged for the Clerk of the Committee to receive an exhibit copy listing all of the groups which receive funds from CIDA for their work in development education. I shall provide as well a copy of the criteria for the submission of projects related to this Public Participation Program. These documents in the care of the Clerk will be available for inspection by Honourable Members.

I trust that this information will be useful to Honourable Members.

Yours sincerely,



Wm McWhinney
Acting President

c.c. Mr. R. Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

May 11, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and National Defence
Room 265 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Dear Mr. Prud'homme:

When I appeared before the Standing Committee on April 21 Mr. Douglas Roche, Member for Edmonton South, put questions to me on CIDA's program in India. At the time, both, Mr. A. Wright, our Vice-President for Asia program, and I provided preliminary answers. I would now like to amplify this information and discuss our proposed future bilateral assistance to that country.

The estimates for India for 1983-84 are based on the anticipated cash requirements of the individual elements in the program. While these individual requirements may be subject to some fluctuation during the course of the year, it is not expected that the requirement in total will change significantly. These individual elements of the bilateral program are estimated to require the following amounts:

Committed Projects:

1983-84 Cash Estimates
(\$000)

- | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| (1) Mission Administered Fund | 350 |
| (2) Drylands Agriculture Project | 1,300 |
| - support to the Government of India's agriculture research and training program to increase agricultural production under rainfed conditions. | |

Committed Projects:1983-84 Cash Estimates
(\$000)

| | | |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| (3) | Social Forestry Feasibility, - an examination of CIDA participation in Andhra Pradesh State government program to substantially increase tree planting for increased fuel and fodder. | 15 |
| (4) | Sarva Seva Farms - a bilateral contribution to special programs support of the Association of Sarva Seva Farms - an organization increasing the standard of living of rural poor through reclamation of vacant land for farming. | 600 |
| (5) | Biogas - a bilateral contribution to special programs support of the Canadian Hungar Foundation and the Action for Food Production (AFPRO) promotion of biogas technology and biogas station financing. | 439.9 |
| (6) | Idukki Hydroelectric Project Phase II | |
| | Services | 1,801.0 |
| | Equipment | 18,198.3 |
| | - a project to increase the capacity of the Kerala State Idukki Hydroelectric facility by 320 mega watts through the provision of Canadian equipment and services. | |
| (7) | Lines of Credit to provide Canadian goods and services to India's development efforts in its Oil and Gas Sector, Mineral Sector and Power Sector. | |
| | (a) Oil and Gas I | 784.8 |
| | (b) Oil and Gas II | 14,567.6 |
| | (c) Minerals | 2,000.0 |
| | (d) Power | 4,343.4 |
| | Total required, committed projects | 44,400.0 |


The balance of 1983-84 estimates for the India program is
to provide for the first year's cash requirements of projects

in the advanced planning stage and anticipated to be approved early in this fiscal year.

The figures for India do reflect growth in the program, however, it should be noted that these figures do not include food aid. In practice, Bangladesh's position as a substantially larger recipient of Canadian Development Assistance is maintained with bilateral food aid included in the figures. Food aid to India in 1983-84 is expected to be approximately \$10 million while Bangladesh food aid will be approximately \$60 million.

I trust that this information will be useful to Mr. Roche and the Members of the Committee.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Wm McWhinney', written in a cursive style.

Wm McWhinney
Acting President

c.c. Mr. R. Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

May 12, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and National Defence
Room 265 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Dear Mr. Prud'homme:

When I appeared before the Standing Committee on April 21 on CIDA's Main Estimates 1983-84, certain questions were put to me by Honourable Members which I promised to answer at a later date.

Mr. Ken Robinson, Member for Etobicoke-Lakeshore, requested a listing of the 390 organizations in the private sector which receive funds from CIDA. This reference was contained in the statement of the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs on March 29. I have provided the Clerk of the Committee with the listing requested in order that it will be available for inspection by Mr. Robinson and Members of the Committee.

I am likewise providing the Clerk of the Committee with a listing of the non-governmental organizations which received funds from CIDA for the first time during the fiscal year 1982-83.

With reference to Mr. Robinson's question concerning new countries being added to our bilateral program, I would answer as follows. In 1982-83, no new countries were added to the list for bilateral assistance from those who were eligible in 1981-82. For 1983-84, no decision has been taken to add to the list. There is a special case of Lebanon as indicated at the meeting of the Committee of April 21. This matter is currently under review.

Mr. Robinson also requested information on CIDA's support for CUSO. In this regard the attached table provides details on our support for this non-governmental organization.

I trust that the above information will be useful to Mr. Robinson and the Members of your Committee.

Yours sincerely,



Wm McWhinney
Acting President

c.c. Mr. R. Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

Att

DETAILS OF CIDA'S ASSISTANCE TO CUSO1982-83 and 1983-84

| | | |
|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| 1. | 1982-83 - Commitments to the general program of CUSO | \$10,784,000 |
| | - Disbursements during this fiscal year | \$10,784,000 |
| | - Contributions to specific projects: | |
| | - Thailand | \$929,000 |
| | - Zimbabwe | \$114,100 |
| | - Nicaragua - seeds | \$ 9,750 |
| | - Contributions to Public Participation Program | \$77,652 |
| 2. | 1983-84 - Commitments to the general program of CUSO | \$13,637,000 * |
| | *this figure includes an advance payment of \$2,220,000 which was made in 1982-83 and which was disbursed in that year. | |
| | - Commitments to specific projects: | |
| | - Thailand | \$914,000 |
| | - Zimbabwe | \$198,800 |
| | - Contributions to Public Participation Program | \$19,731 |
| | (additional contributions will be made) | |



Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

Relations
parlementaires

Parliamentary
Relations

May 12, 1983

Mr. R. Vaive:

The attached listing of new NGOs (which first received funding from CIDA in fiscal year 1982-83) was requested by Mr. Robinson during the meeting of the Standing Committee of April 21, 1983.

Jack Shea
Director

Att

1 of 7
1 de 7New NGO's for 82/83 - Nouvelles O.N.G. 82/83

| <u>Organization/Organismes</u> | <u>Head Office Siege social</u> | <u>Project/Projet</u> | <u>Location Emplacement</u> | <u>Total Cost Coût total</u> | <u>CIDA Contribution Contribution du l'ACDI</u> |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| International Family Farm Exchange Association | Charlottetown, PEI | Farmers Helping Farmers | Kenya | \$124,800 | \$ 83,200 |
| Centre amitié de solidarité internationale (CASIRA) | Therford Mines, Qué. | Alimentation en eau | Haïti | 10,025 | 7,290 |
| Fondation Tab | Lac St-Jean, Qué. | Développement communautaire | Haïti | 27,258 | 16,439 |
| L'Aide médicale internationale à l'enfance (L'AMIE) | La Pocatière, Qué. | Éducation, santé, nutrition | Haïti | 52,400 | 30,000 |
| Les amis de l'arche | Noranda, Qué. | Foyers pour déficients mentaux | Haïti | 60,962 | 44,191 |
| L'Institut des frères de St-Gabriel | Montréal, Qué. | Montfort Boy's Town | Fiji | 718,702 | 100,000 |
| Project Concern - Alberta | Edmonton, Alta | Community Based Primary Health Care Delivery | Guatemala | 111,042 | 44,374 |
| International Association for the Transformation of Man | Victoria, B.C. | Toledo Primary Health Care System | Belize | 77,761 | 38,300 |
| Rotary District 536 Development Society | Edmonton, Alta | Kalinga Development Program | Philippines | 35,640 | 17,820 |
| Canada India Village Aid Association | Vancouver, B.C. | Experimental Pottery Project | Kingston, Jamaica | | 23,500 under consideration |
| International Association for Students of Economics and Commerce | Montréal, Qué. | Obstetrical Unit and Midwives Program | India | 45,000 | 18,927 |
| | | International President Meeting | Canada | 68,909 | 20,000 |

2 of 7
2 de 7

| Organization/Organismes | Head Office Siège social | Project/Projet | Location Emplacement | Total Cost Coût total | CIDA Contribution Contribution de l'ACDI |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Association for Native Development in Performing and Visual Arts | Toronto, Ontario | Indigenous Peoples Theatre Celebration | Canada | \$515,900 | \$ 20,000 |
| Agence Latino américaine d'information | Montréal, Québec | Amérique latine documentation systématique | Canada | 19,888 | 14,916 |
| Development Education Coordinating Council of Alberta (DECCA) | Edmonton, Alberta | World Citizens Centre Animation- Lethbridge | Alberta | 7,857 | 5,893 |
| DECCA | | World Citizens Centre Lethbridge 82-83 | Alberta | 32,569 | 24,427 |
| DECCA | | Medicine Hat Community Programming 82-83 | Alberta | 16,126 | 12,065 |
| DECCA | | Medicine Hat Unisphere Core 82-83 | Alberta | 19,726 | 14,788 |
| DECCA | | Arusha General Program | Alberta | 74,000 | 49,000 |
| DECCA | Edmonton, Alberta | Edmonton Learner Centre General Program 82-83 | Alberta | 74,000 | 49,000 |
| DECCA | Edmonton, Alberta | Christian Farmers Federation General Program 82-83 | Alberta | 16,000 | 12,000 |
| Energy Probe | Toronto, Ontario | Reaching Canadians on 3rd World Energy Issues | Canada | 59,290 | 15,000 |
| International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAFSA) funded previously overseas by INGO | Ottawa, Ontario | Development Education Workshop | Canada | 26,942 | 12,000 |

3 of 7
3 de 7

| <u>Organization/Organismes</u> | <u>Head Office</u> <u>Siège social</u> | <u>Project/Projet</u> | <u>Location</u> <u>Emplacement</u> | <u>Total Cost</u> <u>Coût total</u> | <u>CIDA Contribution</u> <u>Contribution de l'ACDI</u> |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| Ailes de l'Espérance funded previously overseas by NGO | Montréal, Québec | Programme d'animation 1982 | Québec | \$ 88,500 | \$ 40,000 |
| Pueblito Canada Inc. | Toronto, Ontario | Teaching Aid for Schools 1982-83 | Ontario | 5,710 | 3,800 |
| Plenty Relief Society | Lanark, Ontario | Hamilton Environment Conference Participation | Ontario | 1,465 | 1,000 |

New NGO's for 82/83 - Nuevelles O.N.C. 82/83

| Organization/Organisations | Head Office Siège social | Project/Projet | Location Emplacement | Total Cost Coût total | CIDA Contribution Contribution de l'ACDI |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Alberta Dental Hygienist | Edmonton | Oral Health Advancement | St-Lucia | \$ 79,612 | \$ 32,462 |
| Canadian Council on Smoking and Health | Ottawa | Participation in Third World Conference on Smoking and Health | Multinational (in Canada) | 990,000 | 30,000 |
| Canadian Dental Association | Ottawa | Dental Preventative & Education Program | St-Kitts | 4,400 | 2,000 |
| Canadian International Hearing Services | Weston | Hearing Loss Prevention Training Program | Multinational (Mont- serrat, Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada) | 26,300 | 7,800 |
| Canadian Organization for Advancement of Computer in Health (COACH) | Edmonton | Health Informatics | Canada | 55,200 | 26,200 |
| Consumers Association of Canada | Ottawa | Jamaican Consumer Development Project | Jamaica | 300,194 | 136,712 |
| Probation Officers Association Ontario Inc. | Toronto | Participation 112th Annual Congress | Jamaica | 4,887 | 3,907 |
| Société Canadienne de Gériatrie Civil | Montreal | Exchange of Civil Engineering Technology | China | 64,710 | 39,680 |
| International Foundation for Training in Penitentiary Medicine & Forensic Psychiatry | Abbotsford B.C. | Congress of Prison Health Care | Canada | 650,000 | 30,000 |
| Canadian Veterinary Medical Association | Ottawa | Veterinary Cooperative Development Project | Multinational (Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize) | 198,780 | 95,540 |

5 of 7
5 de 7EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS PROGRAM

| <u>Organization/Organismes</u> | <u>Head Office Siège social</u> | <u>Project/Project</u> | <u>Location Emplacement</u> | <u>Total Cost Coût total</u> | <u>CIDA Contribution Contribution de l'AUDI</u> |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Athabasca University | Edmonton, Alberta | Feasibility Study Distance Learning | Botswana | \$ 17,936 | \$ 9,197 |
| Bishop University | Lennoxville, P.Q. | Plan Resource Section Natural Museum Library | Singapore | 12,000 | 3,000 |
| University of Regina | Regina, Sask | Nitrogen Fixation | China | 36,000 | 18,000 |
| | | Energex '82 International Energy Conference | Canada | 50,000 | 15,000 |
| | | Energex '82, Post Analysis | Multinational | 112,700 | 70,200 |
| Fairview College | Fairview, Alberta | Tanzanian Beekeeping Technician Training | Tanzania | 498,910 | 103,200 247,180 |
| Malaspina College | Nanaimo, B.C. | Grenada Technical and Vocational Institutional Upgrading Program | Grenada | 255,890 | 127,116 |
| | | Grenada Technical and Vocational Institutional Upgrading Program, Phase II | Grenada | 162,075 | 99,625 177,116 |
| St. Lawrence College | Willowdale, Ont. | Morne Fortune, Trades Technical Teacher Training | Leeward Islands St. Lucia | 551,190 545,051 | 248,910 243,051 |
| Canadian Commission for UNESCO | Ottawa, Ont. | Social Sciences North America: UNESCO Symposium | Québec | 88,000 | 491,961 8,000 |

6 of 7
6 de 7

| <u>Organization/Organismes</u> | <u>Head Office Siège social</u> | <u>Project/Projet</u> | <u>Location Emplacement</u> | <u>Total Cost Coût total</u> | <u>CIDA Contribution Contribution de l'ACDI</u> |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Canadian Associates of Ben Gurian - University of NEGEV | Montreal, P.Q. | Freedom from Hunger Conference May 1983 | Canada | \$200,000 | \$ 11,500 |
| Canadian Student Pugwash | Ottawa, Ontario | Workshop: Technology and the Third World | Canada | 66,609 | 9,123 |
| Council of Ministers of Education | Toronto, Ontario | Special Program for Scholars 1982-1984 | China | 360,980 | 173,980 |
| Educational Foundation for Anthropology and the Public | Vancouver, B.C. | XIth Congress - Anthro- pological/Ethnological | Canada | 100,000 | 15,000 |
| Hospital for sick children | Toronto, Ontario | Paediatric Exchange | China | 76,430 | 31,930 |
| Institut international de la communication | Montréal, Québec | Collaboration avec le CESTI/CPR | Sénégal | 573,400 | 161,575 |
| | | Soutien au Cesti | Sénégal | 391,900 | 165,025 |
| | | Communication de terrain | Sénégal | 536,500 | 170,000 |
| | | Séminaire: année Mondiale Communications | Canada | 262,600 | 75,000 |
| | | Mission enseignement à l'ESSTI | Cameroon | 167,460 | 36,207 607,807 |
| Potash & Phosphate Institute of Canada | Etobicoke, Ontario | Potash Agronomic Development Program Human | China | 1,825,000 | 500,000 |

7 of 7
7 de 7

| <u>Organization/Organismes</u> | <u>Head Office Siège social</u> | <u>Project/Projet</u> | <u>Location Emplacement</u> | <u>Total Cost Coût total</u> | <u>CIDA Contribution Contribution de l'ACDI</u> |
|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| South Asia Council | Brandon, Manitoba | Third World Participation Canadian Asian Studies Conference | Canada | \$ 6,650 | \$ 3,150 |
| Société de recherche en orientation humaine | Montréal, P.Q. | Formation des Conseillers Familiaux | Tunisie | 154,580 | 69,215 |
| TESL Canada | Edmonton, Alberta | Recruitment of ESL Teachers for China | China | 17,660 | 6,060 |

E.D.

Agence canadienne de
développement internationalCanadian International
Development Agency

May 18, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and National Defence
Room 265 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Vos référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Dear Mr. Prud'homme:

When I appeared before the Standing Committee on April 21 on CIDA's Main Estimates 1983-84, Mr. Ron Stewart, Member for Simcoe South, asked me to provide information on the Canadian renewable energy facility that was recently established by CIDA.

The facility was established following the Nairobi Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy held in August 1981. The \$5.0 million new facility was in operation by late 1981 under the administrative responsibility of CIDA's Industrial Cooperation Branch.

Since its inception some seven projects have been accepted for funding with a limit of \$250,000 for any single project.

The objective is to allow Canadian manufacturers and consultants to introduce New and Renewable Energy equipment and systems into the developing countries with a view to eventually having a significant impact on their oil import billings.


The types of projects funded concern solar water heating panels, wind operated equipment, micro hydro electric installations, photovoltaics biogas generators, solar pumps and the like.

Several feasibility studies have also been funded as well as studies bearing on the dissemination of information on these new techniques to popularize application in the developing countries.

The most recently funded project concerns the study of a solar thermal concentration of small scale which may eventually be installed in Jamaica.

I trust that this information will be useful to Mr. Stewart and to the Members of your Committee.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Wm McWhinney', written in dark ink.

Wm McWhinney
Acting President

c.c. Mr. R. Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

May 16, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and National Defence
Room 265 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Dear Mr. Prud'homme:

When I appeared before the Standing Committee on April 21 on CIDA's Main Estimates 1983-84, certain questions were put to me by Honourable Members which I promised to answer at a later date.

Mr. Ian Watson, Member for Châteauguay, requested information on Canadian Government support for the United Nations Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) and support for other international agencies operating in the Middle East.

In the attached table you will find a listing of the contributions to UNRWA made by the Canadian Government from 1978 to the present year.


Also on the attached page you will find a listing of Canadian assistance to Lebanon through international organizations for the period 1981 to 1983.

We have checked with our Embassy in Beirut and learned that, of the 29 Mission Administered Fund projects in 1982-83, none are specifically for Palestinian refugees.

Finally, in answer to Mr. Watson's question about the comparative assistance given to Lebanon by Norway and Canada, I am including on the attached page a listing of Norwegian contributions to Lebanon. This list includes assistance to Norwegian non-governmental organizations.

I trust that this information will be useful to Mr. Watson and the Members of your Committee.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Wm McWhinney'. The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial 'W' and a long, sweeping underline.

Wm McWhinney
Acting President

c.c. Mr. R. Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

Att

A. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES (UNRWA).

(\$ million Cdn)

| Year | Cash-Grant | Food Aid | Total |
|---------|------------|----------|-------|
| 1982-83 | 3.6 | 4.5 | 8.1* |
| 1981-82 | 2.9 | 4.5 | 7.4 |
| 1980-81 | 2.2 | 3.5 | 5.7 |
| 1979-80 | 1.75 | 3.25 | 5.0 |
| 1978-79 | 1.65 | 3.5 | 5.15 |

* plus \$950,000 for Lebanon

B. CANADIAN ASSISTANCE FOR LEBANON.

| Year | Organization | Amount (\$000) |
|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| 1982-83 | - World Council of Churches | 150 |
| | - International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) | 1,000 |
| | - United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) | 950 |
| | - United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) | 450 |
| 1981-82 | - ICRC | 280 |

C. NORWEGIAN ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON - JUNE 6, 1982 TO PRESENT.

| Organization | Amount (\$Cdn 000) |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|
| UNICEF | 956 |
| ICRC | 865 |
| UNRWA | 1,384 |
| Norwegian Red Cross | 1,540 |
| Norwegian Refugee Council | 346 |
| Norwegian Church Fund | 346 |
| Norwegian People's Aid | 778 |
| Norwegian Palestine Committee | 242 |
| Save the Children Fund | 86 |

APPENDICE «EAND-76»

Agence canadienne de Canadian International
développement international Development Agency

Le 18 mai 1983

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
Président du Comité permanent des
Affaires extérieures et de la
Défense nationale
Pièce 265, Édifice de l'Ouest
Chambre des communes
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file
Notre référence Our File

Monsieur le Président:

Vous vous souviendrez peut-être que, lors de la réunion du Comité en décembre, M. Crosbie a demandé des informations au sujet de la Conférence sur la planification économique à long terme Canada/Kenya, qui a eu lieu à Nairobi en novembre. M. Bruce, qui avait participé à la conférence, a alors fourni au Comité une brève explication du but et des résultats de cette rencontre. M. Crosbie a en outre voulu savoir si un rapport à ce sujet pourrait être remis au Comité et, à la suite de votre demande, je me suis engagé à en fournir une copie dès que possible.

J'ai maintenant reçu le rapport préparé par le gouvernement du Kenya. Il ne s'agit toutefois que d'une ébauche et nous avons demandé que la version finale nous soit envoyée lorsqu'elle sera prête.

Je prends donc les dispositions nécessaires pour que le Greffier du Comité reçoive le document afin que les membres puissent le consulter.

J'espère que ces informations seront utiles à M. Crosbie et aux membres du Comité, et je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de mes sentiments les plus distingués.

(Original signé par)
Wm McWhinney
Président par intérim

c.c.: M. R. Vaive
Greffier du Comité

Agence canadienne de développement international
Canadian International Development Agency

Le 11 mai 1983

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
Président du Comité permanent des
Affaires extérieures et de la
Défense nationale
Pièce 265, Edifice de l'Ouest
Chambre des Communes
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Monsieur le Président,

Lorsque j'ai comparu devant le Comité permanent le 21 avril pour l'examen du Budget principal des dépenses de l'ACDI pour 1983-1984, des membres du Comité ont posé certaines questions auxquelles j'avais promis de répondre à une date ultérieure.

Entre autres, M. Stan Darling, député de Parry Sound-Muskoka, a demandé des précisions sur l'appui de l'ACDI à un organisme privé, le SACO (Service administratif canadien outre-mer).

Le SACO réalise trois programmes dont deux sont financés par l'ACDI, soit le programme outre-mer (auquel nous accordons un financement global) et le programme de développement du commerce (dont nous finançons certains projets ou programmes).


La contribution de l'ACDI au SACO en 1982-1983 s'élevait à \$2 400 000, montant à l'aide duquel 301 volontaires ont pu être envoyés à l'étranger pour des affectations allant jusqu'à six mois.

Le siège social du SACO, qui garde toutes les informations sur les volontaires et les projets, a bien voulu accepter de nous les communiquer.

J'ai pris les dispositions nécessaires pour que le Greffier du Comité reçoive à l'appui copie de cette liste afin qu'elle soit mise à la disposition des membres du Comité pour examen.

Quant à l'efficacité des activités du SACO à l'étranger, nous pouvons dire que les commentaires de leurs clients sont **pratiquement** toujours positifs. Jusqu'à présent le SACO a réalisé plus de 3 000 projets à l'étranger, à raison de \$7 975 par volontaire. Il nous apparaît donc que ses **projets** sont valables et efficaces.

Espérant que ces renseignements seront utiles à M. Darling et aux membres du Comité, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de mes sentiments les plus distingués.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Wm McWhinney', written in a cursive style.

Wm McWhinney
Président par intérim

c.c.: M. R. Vaive
Greffier du Comité

Deputy Prime Minister
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Vice-premier ministre
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures
Canada

OTTAWA K1A 0G2

Le 18 mai 1983

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
Président du Comité permanent des
Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale
Chambre des communes - Pièce 265 EO
Ottawa (Ontario)

Monsieur le président,

Je voudrais par la présente vous transmettre les réponses à certaines des questions posées à MM. Massé, Marchand et Johnstone lors de la réunion du Comité permanent des Affaires extérieures et de la Défense tenue le 14 avril 1983.

La préparation de la réponse du Ministère au rapport du sous-comité chargé d'étudier les relations du Canada avec l'Amérique latine et les Caraïbes est maintenant terminée et sera envoyée sous pli distinct.

En ce qui concerne la question de Mme Jewett sur les procédures suivies dans la publication des décrets du conseil dans la Gazette du Canada, je ne puis que proposer que la question soit adressée aux personnes chargées de ces fonctions au Bureau du Conseil privé. Le Ministère ne participe d'aucune façon à la décision relative au matériel publié dans la Gazette.


Monsieur Roche s'est enquis des contributions à l'Association des Nations Unies au Canada. Le ministère des Affaires extérieures a récemment approuvé, en sus de sa contribution actuelle à l'Association, une augmentation de \$145 000 échelonnée sur quatre ans.

Le Ministère s'occupe actuellement de préparer une réponse distincte à la question de M. Laniel sur les articles 3 et 4 du GATT.

Veuillez trouver ci-joint copie de l'organigramme du Ministère. Monsieur Massé ayant indiqué que l'organigramme était "officieux" à l'heure actuelle, je vous saurais gré de garder ce fait présent à l'esprit.


J'espère que cette information sera utile à votre Comité.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le député, l'expression de mes sentiments distingués.



Allan J. MacEachen


TABLEAU 1



Note: (1) L'organigramme indique que UCP et UAL relèvent directement du SSEAE; dans les faits cependant, ces unités travaillent sous la supervision du SM chargé de la politique étrangère.

Secteur de la politique étrangère

TABLEAU 2



* Bureau

Secteur commercial et économique

TABLEAU 3





TABLEAU 4



* Direction centrale

TABLEAU 5





TABLEAU 6





Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

Le 12 mai 1983

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
Président du Comité permanent des
Affaires extérieures et de la
Défense nationale
Edifice de l'Ouest, pièce 265
Chambre des communes
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Monsieur le Président,

Lorsque j'ai comparu devant le Comité permanent le 21 avril au sujet du Budget principal des dépenses de l'ACDI pour 1983-1984, certains membres m'ont posé des questions auxquelles j'ai promis de répondre à une date ultérieure.

M. Donald Munro, député d'Esquimalt-Saanich, voulait savoir si l'ACDI constitue des stocks de denrées pour fournir de l'aide alimentaire dans les situations d'urgence ou dans le cadre de ses opérations courantes, en particulier, des produits du hareng venant du Nouveau-Brunswick. Je dirai donc que l'ACDI ne constitue pas de stocks à l'avance. Si une situation d'urgence se présente et qu'il est décidé de fournir de l'aide alimentaire, les denrées sont achetées le plus rapidement possible, suivant la procédure établie.

Le ministère de la Défense nationale constitue de tels stocks uniquement pour ses propres besoins. L'Organisation des mesures d'urgence en fait autant, en achetant les denrées auprès de la Défense nationale, mais exclusivement pour les situations d'urgence au Canada. Aucune organisation internationale ne stocke des denrées au Canada. Le Mennonite Central Committee se constitue des réserves de blé pour les cas d'urgence, mais ses stocks sont généralement peu considérables et la plus grande

partie est écoulée au cours de l'année même. Il y a également l'UNICEF qui rassemble des stocks de diverses denrées à Copenhague, à l'intention de différentes organisations internationales.

Au cours de l'exercice financier 1982-1983, 372 tonnes de hareng en conserve dans l'huile ont été achetées auprès du Nouveau-Brunswick, au coût de \$1 139 436, pour les besoins du Programme alimentaire mondial. En 1981-1982, la Jamaïque a acheté du Canada, dans le cadre d'un prêt, 684,6 tonnes de hareng en conserve dans l'huile, 828,7 tonnes dans la sauce tomate et 22 tonnes dans la sauce soya. Le poisson a été acheté au Nouveau-Brunswick et il a coûté \$3 044 138.

En ce qui concerne le projet de Zamorano au Honduras, dont a parlé M. Munro, j'ai donné une première réponse à ce sujet en indiquant que l'ACDI est une organisation chargée avant tout de répondre aux demandes, et non appelée à lancer elle-même des initiatives, et que dans le cas du Honduras, les demandes ont surtout porté jusqu'à présent sur le développement des ressources naturelles (agriculture, forêts et énergie).


Le développement des ressources humaines n'en demeure pas moins un élément essentiel de la planification des projets et c'est principalement par la formation du personnel de contrepartie qu'il a été intégré aux projets d'agriculture (Guyape) et de foresterie en cours au Honduras. Si on nous demande par contre de financer un projet semblable à celui de Zamorano, nous accorderons certainement toute la considération voulue à la demande en question, comme l'a suggéré M. Munro.

A ma connaissance, l'ACDI ne finance aucun projet d'éducation identique à celui de l'école d'agriculture de Zamorano. La formation des agriculteurs est prise en charge sous de nombreuses formes en Amérique centrale et ailleurs. Il y a une tendance très nette à s'éloigner de la mise en place d'institutions, comme dans le cas de Zamorano, et à renforcer les structures déjà existantes. Le programme poursuivi par l'Institut Coady en Amérique centrale, par exemple, a consisté à former des agriculteurs par le truchement des coopératives locales. Nous avons également appuyé les efforts de groupes locaux qui se sont inspirés des émissions de radio canadiennes spécialement produites pour les agriculteurs. Et même l'idée d'un "Almanach des agriculteurs" a été encouragée par l'entremise de l'Instituto Centroamericano de Extension de la Cultura au Costa Rica. L'ACDI s'occupe très

activement de la formation des agriculteurs locaux, mais elle n'utilise pas la même formule ou la même structure institutionnelle que l'on retrouve dans le projet de Zamorano.

J'espère que ces renseignements sauront répondre aux questions de M. Munro et des membres du Comité.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, mes salutations distinguées.



Wm McWhinney
Président par intérim

c.c. M.R. Vaive
Greffier du Comité

Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

Le 12 mai 1983

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
Président du Comité permanent des
Affaires extérieures et de la
Défense nationale
Pièce 265, Edifice de l'Ouest
Chambre des communes
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0A6

Votre référence

Votre file

Notre référence


Our file

Monsieur le Président,

Le 21 avril, lorsque j'ai comparu devant le Comité permanent, M. Donald Munro, député d'Esquimalt-Saanich, m'a posé différentes questions sur les fonds versés par l'ACDI à des organisations canadiennes au titre de la sensibilisation au développement.

J'ai demandé que soit envoyée au greffier du Comité une liste de tous les groupes dont l'ACDI subventionne les activités à cet égard. Je me propose également de lui faire parvenir une copie des critères régissant la présentation de projets dans le cadre de ce programme de participation du public. Les documents en question seront ainsi à la disposition des membres du Comité.

En espérant que ces informations seront utiles aux membres du Comité, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma considération distinguée.



Wm McWhinney
Président par intérim

c.c. Monsieur R. Vaive
Greffier du Comité

Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

Le 11 mai 1983

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
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Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Monsieur le Président,

Lorsque j'ai comparu devant le Comité permanent le 21 avril, M. Douglas Roche, député d'Edmonton Sud, m'a posé certaines questions sur le programme de l'ACDI en Inde. A ce moment-là, M. A. Wright, le Vice-président chargé du programme de l'Asie, et moi-même lui avons donné des réponses préliminaires. J'aimerais maintenant compléter ces informations et expliquer quel genre d'aide bilatérale nous comptons octroyer à ce pays.

Le budget de 1983-1984 en ce qui concerne l'Inde se base sur les besoins de fonds prévus pour les différents éléments du programme. Bien que les besoins individuels puissent fluctuer au cours de l'année, les besoins globaux devraient demeurer sensiblement les mêmes. Voici donc les montants en question:

Projets engagés:

Prévisions de 1983-1984
(\$ 000)

- | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|
| 1) Fonds administrés par les missions | 350 |
| 2) Projet d'agriculture en sec | 1 300 |
| - appui au programme de formation et de recherches agricoles du gouvernement indien en vue d'accroître la production agricole en sec. | |

Projets engagés:

Prévisions de 1983-1984
(\$ 000)

| | | |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| 3) | Foresterie sociale - Faisabilité - examen de la participation de l'ACDI au programme du gouvernement de l'Etat d'Andhra Pradesh visant à accroître de manière substantielle la plantation d'arbres pour augmenter la production de combustible et de fourrage. | 15 |
| 4) | Sarva Seva Farms - contribution bilatérale à l'appui des programmes spéciaux de L'"Association of Sarva Seva Farms" - organisme qui travaille à relever le niveau de vie des pauvres en milieu rural grâce à la mise en culture de terrains vagues. | 600 |
| 5) | Biogaz - contribution bilatérale à l'appui de programmes spéciaux de la Fondation canadienne contre la faim et de l'Organisme d'action pour la production alimentaire visant à promouvoir la technologie du biogaz et le financement de stations de biogaz. | 439,9 |
| 6) | Projet hydro-électrique d'Idukki - Phase II | |
| | Services | 1 801 |
| | Equipement | 18 198,3 |
| | - projet consistant à augmenter de 320 mégawatts les capacités des installations hydro-électriques d'Idukki, dans l'Etat de Kerala, grâce à la fourniture d'équipement et de services canadiens. | |
| 7) | Lignes de crédit pour la fourniture de biens et services canadiens en vue du développement des secteurs du pétrole et du gaz, des mines et de l'électricité en Inde. | |
| | a) Pétrole et gaz I | 784,8 |
| | b) Pétrole et gaz II | 14 567,6 |
| | c) Mines | 2 000 |
| | d) Electricité | 4 343,4 |


Total des fonds requis pour les projets
engagés

44 400

Le reste du budget du programme de l'Inde pour 1983-1984 doit servir à satisfaire les besoins de la première année pour les projets qui en sont à une étape de planification avancée et qui devraient être officiellement approuvés au début de la présente année financière.

Les données relatives à l'Inde tiennent effectivement compte de la croissance du programme; il est toutefois à noter que ces chiffres ne comprennent pas l'aide alimentaire. Le Bangladesh demeure donc un bénéficiaire beaucoup plus important de l'aide canadienne au développement si on englobe l'aide alimentaire bilatérale. En effet, l'aide alimentaire à l'Inde pour 1983-1984 devrait s'établir à environ \$10 millions, tandis que celle octroyée au Bangladesh devrait se situer dans les \$60 millions.

Espérant que ces informations seront utiles à M. Roche et aux membres du Comité, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.



Wm McWhinney
Président par intérim

c.c.: M. R. Vaive
Greffier du Comité

Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

Le 12 mai 1983

Votre référence Your file

Montré référence Our file

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
Président du Comité permanent des
Affaires extérieures et de la
Défense nationale
Pièce 265, Edifice de l'Ouest
Chambre des Communes
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0A6

Monsieur le Président,

Le 21 avril, lorsque j'ai comparu devant le Comité permanent relativement au Budget principal de l'ACDI 1983-1984, certains membres m'ont posé des questions auxquelles je me suis engagé à répondre à une date ultérieure.

M. Ken Robinson, député d'Etoibcoke-Lakeshore, avait demandé une liste des 390 organisations du secteur privé qui bénéficient d'un financement de l'ACDI. Ces organisations avaient en effet été mentionnées dans la déclaration faite le 29 mars par le Vice-premier ministre et secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures. J'en ai fourni la liste au Greffier du Comité afin qu'il la mette à la disposition de M. Robinson et aux autres membres.

J'envoie également au Greffier une liste des organisations non gouvernementales auxquelles l'ACDI a accordé pour la première fois une subvention au cours de l'exercice 1982-1983.

A la question de M. Robinson concernant l'intégration de nouveaux pays dans notre programme bilatéral, je répondrai de la façon suivante. En 1982-1983 aucun pays n'a été ajouté à la liste de ceux qui étaient admissibles à l'assistance bilatérale en 1981-1982. Bien que l'on n'ait pas décidé d'allonger cette liste pour 1983-1984, le Liban pourrait, comme il a été signalé lors de la réunion du 21 avril, constituer une exception. Cette question est à l'étude.

M. Robinson ayant également demandé des éclaircissements sur l'appui accordé par l'ACDI à CUSO, vous trouverez ci-joint un tableau contenant les renseignements voulus.

J'espère que ces informations seront utiles à M. Robinson et aux membres du Comité et je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma considération distinguée.



Wm McWhinney
Président par intérim

c.c. M. R. Vaive
Greffier du Comité

P.j.

RENSEIGNEMENTS CONCERNANT L'AIDE APPORTEE PAR L'ACDIA CUSO1982-1983 et 1983-1984

- | | | |
|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| 1. 1982-1983 | - Engagements au titre du programme général de CUSO | \$10 784 000 |
| | - Décaissements au cours de l'exercice | \$10 784 000 |
| | - Contributions pour des projets spéciaux | |
| | - Thaïlande | \$929 000 |
| | - Zimbabwe | \$114 100 |
| | - Nicaragua (semences) | \$ 9 750 |
| | - Contributions pour le Programme de participation du public | \$ 77 652 |
| 2. 1983-1984 | - Engagements au titre du programme général de CUSO | \$13 637 000* |
| | * ce chiffre comprend une avance de \$2 220 000 versée en 1982-1983. | |
| | - Engagements au titre de projets spéciaux: | |
| | - Thaïlande | \$914 000 |
| | - Zimbabwe | \$198 800 |
| | - Contributions pour le Programme de participation du public | \$ 19 731 |

(des contributions supplémentaires sont prévues)

Le 12 mai 1983

M. R. Vaive:

La liste ci-jointe des nouvelles O.N.G. (ayant été initialement financées par l'ACDI durant l'année financière 1982-1983) demandée par M. Robinson lors de la réunion du Comité du 21 avril 1983.

Jack Shea
Directeur

Att

1 of 1
1 de 1

New NGO's for 82/83 - Nouvelles O.N.G. 82/83

| Organization/Organismes | Head Office Siège social | Project/Projet | Location Emplacement | Total Cost Coût total | CIDA Contribution Contribution de l'ACDI |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| International Family Farm Exchange Association | Charlottetown, PEI | Farmers Helping Farmers | Kenya | \$124,800 | \$ 83,200 |
| Centre amitié de solidarité internationale (CASIA) | Theftford Mines, Qué. | Alimentation en eau | Haïti | 10,025 | 7,290 |
| Fondation Tab | Lac St-Jean, Qué. | Développement communautaire | Haïti | 27,258 | 16,439 |
| L'Aide médicale internationale à l'enfance (L'AMIE) | La Pocatière, Qué. | Education, santé, nutrition | Haïti | 52,400 | 30,000 |
| Les amis de l'arche | Noranda, Qué. | Foyers pour déficients mentaux | Haïti | 60,962 | 44,191 |
| L'Institut des frères de St-Gabriel | Montréal, Qué. | Montfort Boy's Town | Fiji | 718,702 | 100,000 |
| Project Concern - Alberta | Edmonton, Alta | Community Based Primary Health Care Delivery | Guatemala | 111,042 | 44,324 |
| International Association for the Transformation of Man | Victoria, B.C. | Toledo Primary Health Care System | Belize | 77,761 | 38,300 |
| Rotary District 536 Development Society | Edmonton, Alta | Kalinga Development Program | Philippines | 35,640 | 17,820 |
| Canada India Village Aid Association | Vancouver, B.C. | Experimental Pottery Project | Kingston, Jamaica | 45,000 | 23,500 under consideration |
| International Association for Students of Economics and Commerce | Montréal, Qué. | Obstetrical Unit and Midwives Program | India | 68,909 | 18,927 |
| | | International President Meeting | Canada | | 20,000 |

2 of 7
2 de 7

| Organization/Organismes | Head Office Siège social | Project/Projet | Location Emplacement | Total Cost Coût total | CIDA Contribution Contribution de l'ACDI |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Association for Native Development in Performing and Visual Arts | Toronto, Ontario | Indigenous Peoples Theatre Celebration | Canada | \$515,900 | \$ 20,000 |
| Agence Latino américaine d'information | Montréal, Québec | Amérique latine documentation systématique | Canada | 19,888 | 14,916 |
| Development Education Coordinating Council of Alberta (DECCA) | Edmonton, Alberta | World Citizens Centre Animation- Lethbridge | Alberta | 7,857 | 5,893 |
| DECCA | | World Citizens Centre Lethbridge 82-83 | Alberta | 32,569 | 24,427 |
| DECCA | | Medicine Hat Community Programming 82-83 | Alberta | 16,126 | 12,065 |
| DECCA | | Medicine Hat Unisphere Core 82-83 | Alberta | 19,726 | 14,788 |
| DECCA | Edmonton, Alberta | Arusha General Program | Alberta | 74,000 | 49,000 |
| DECCA | | Edmonton Learner Centre General Program 82-83 | Alberta | 74,000 | 49,000 |
| DECCA | Edmonton, Alberta | Christian Farmers Federation General Program 82-83 | Alberta | 16,000 | 12,000 |
| Energy Probe | Toronto, Ontario | Reaching Canadians on 3rd World Energy Issues | Canada | 59,290 | 15,000 |
| International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (IDAFSA) Funded previously overseas by INCO | Ottawa, Ontario | Development Education Workshop | Canada | 26,942 | 12,000 |

1 of 7
3 de 7

| <u>Organization/Organismes</u> | <u>Head Office Siège social</u> | <u>Project/Projet</u> | <u>Location Emplacement</u> | <u>Total Cost Coût total</u> | <u>CIDA Contribution Contribution de l'ACDI</u> |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Ailes de l'Espérance founded previously overseas by NGO | Montréal, Québec | Programme d'animation 1982 | Québec | \$ 88,500 | \$ 40,000 |
| Pueblito Canada Inc. | Toronto, Ontario | Teaching Aid for Schools 1982-83 | Ontario | 5,710 | 3,400 |
| Plenty Relief Society | Lanark, Ontario | Hamilton Environment Conference Participation | Ontario | 1,465 | 1,000 |

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New NGO's for 82/83 - Nuevelles O.N.G. 82/83

| Organization/Organismes | Head Office Siège social | Project/Projet | Location Emplacement | Total Cost Coût total | CIDA Contribution Contribution de l'ACDI |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Alberta Dental Hygienist | Edmonton | Oral Health Advancement | St-Lucia | \$ 79,612 | \$ 32,462 |
| Canadian Council on Smoking and Health | Ottawa | Participation in Third World Conference on Smoking and Health | Multinational (in Canada) | 990,000 | 30,000 |
| Canadian Dental Association | Ottawa | Dental Preventative & Education Program | St-Kitts | 4,400 | 2,000 |
| Canadian International Hearing Services | Weston | Hearing Loss Prevention Training Program | Multinational (Mont- serrat, Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada) | 26,300 | 7,800 |
| Canadian Organization for Advancement of Computer in Health (CONCH) | Edmonton | Health Informatics | Canada | 55,200 | 26,200 |
| Consumers Association of Canada | Ottawa | Jamaican Consumer Development Project | Jamaica | 300,194 | 136,712 |
| Probation Officers Association Ontario Inc. | Toronto | Participation 112th Annual Congress | Jamaica | 4,887 | 3,907 |
| Société Canadienne de Génie Civil | Montreal | Exchange of Civil Engineering Technology | China | 64,710 | 39,680 |
| International Foundation for Training in Penitentiary Medicine & Forensic Psychiatry | Abbotsford B.C. | Congress of Prison Health Care | Canada | 650,000 | 30,000 |
| Canadian Veterinary Medical Association | Ottawa | Veterinary Cooperative Development Project | Multinational (Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize) | 198,780 | 95,540 |

5 of 7
5 de 7EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS PROGRAM

| <u>Organization/Organismes</u> | <u>Head Office Siège social</u> | <u>Project/Project</u> | <u>Location Emplacement</u> | <u>Total Cost Coût total</u> | <u>CIDA Contribution Contribution de l'Aide</u> |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| Athabasca University | Edmonton, Alberta | Feasibility Study Distance Learning | Botswana | \$ 17,936 | \$ 9,107 |
| Bishop University | Lennoxville, P.Q. | Plan Resource Section Natural Museum Library | Singapore | 12,000 | 3,000 |
| University of Regina | Regina, Sask | Nitrogen Fixation Energy Conference | China | 36,000 | 18,000 |
| | | Energex '82 Post Analysis | Canada | 50,000 | 15,000 |
| Fairview College | Fairview, Alberta | Tanzanian Beekeeping Technician Training | Multinational | 112,700 | 70,200 |
| Malaspina College | Nanaimo, B.C. | Grenada Technical and Vocational Institutional Upgrading Program | Tanzania | 498,910 | 103,200 |
| | | Grenada Technical and Vocational Institutional Upgrading Program, Phase II | Grenada | 255,890 | 247,180 |
| St. Lawrence College | Willowdale, Ont. | Morne Fortune, Trades Technical Teacher Training | Grenada | 162,075 | 177,116 |
| | | | Leeward Islands | 551,190 | 248,910 |
| Canadian Commission for UNESCO | Ottawa, Ont. | Social Sciences North America: UNESCO Symposium | St. Lucia | 545,051 | 243,051 |
| | | | Québec | 88,000 | 491,961 |

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| <u>Organization/Organismes</u> | <u>Head Office</u> <u>Siège social</u> | <u>Project/Projet</u> | <u>Location</u> <u>Emplacement</u> | <u>Total Cost</u> <u>Coût total</u> | <u>CIWA Contribution</u> <u>Contribution de l'ACDI</u> |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
| Canadian Associates of Ben Gurion - University of NRGV | Montreal, P.Q. | Freedom from Hunger Conference May 1983 | Canada | \$200,000 | \$ 11,500 |
| Canadian Student Pugwash | Ottawa, Ontario | Workshop: Technology and the Third World | Canada | 66,609 | 9,173 |
| Council of Ministers of Education | Toronto, Ontario | Special Program for Scholars 1982-1984 | China | 360,980 | 173,980 |
| Educational Foundation for Anthropology and the Public | Vancouver, B.C. | Xth Congress - Anthro- pological/Ethnological | Canada | 100,000 | 15,000 |
| Hospital for sick children | Toronto, Ontario | Paediatric Exchange | China | 76,430 | 31,930 |
| Institut international de la communication | Montréal, Québec | Collaboration avec le CESTI/CPR | Sénégal | 573,400 | 161,575 |
| | | Soutien au Cesti | Sénégal | 391,900 | 165,025 |
| | | Communication de terrain | Sénégal | 536,500 | 170,000 |
| | | Séminaire: année fondiale Communications | Canada | 262,600 | 75,000 |
| | | Mission enseignement à l'ESSTI | Cameroun | 167,460 | 36,207 607,807 |
| Potash & Phosphate Institute of Canada | Erbicoke, Ontario | Potash Agronomic Development Program Ilunan | China | 1,825,000 | 500,000 |

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| <u>Organization/Organismes</u> | <u>Head Office Siège social</u> | <u>Project/Projet</u> | <u>Location Emplacement</u> | <u>Total Cost Coût total</u> | <u>CIDA Contribution Contribution de l'ACDI</u> |
|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| South Asia Council | Brandon, Manitoba | Third World Participation Canadian Asian Studies Conference | Canada | \$ 6,650 | \$ 3,150 |
| Société de recherche en orientation humaine | Montréal, P.Q. | Formation des Conseillers Familiaux | Tunisia | 154,580 | 69,215 |
| TESL Canada | Edmonton, Alberta | Recruitment of ESL Teachers for China | China | 17,660 | 6,060 |

Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

Le 18 mai 1983

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
Président du Comité permanent des
Affaires extérieures et de la
Défense nationale
Pièce 265, Edifice de l'Ouest
Chambre des Communes
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Monsieur le Président,

Le 21 avril, lorsque j'ai comparu devant le Comité permanent au sujet du Budget principal 1983-1984 de l'ACDI, M. Ron Stewart, député de Simcoe Sud, m'a demandé des renseignements concernant le Mécanisme canadien pour les énergies renouvelables, récemment établi par l'ACDI.

Mis sur pied à la suite de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur les sources d'énergie nouvelles et renouvelables, qui a eu lieu en août 1981 à Nairobi, ce nouveau mécanisme est doté d'un budget de \$5 millions; administré par la Direction de la coopération industrielle de l'ACDI, il est devenu opérationnel à la fin de l'année 1981.

Depuis son lancement, le financement de sept projets a été autorisé, chaque fois dans une limite de \$250 000.

L'objet du mécanisme est de permettre aux fabricants et aux consultants canadiens d'introduire du matériel et des systèmes de production d'énergies nouvelles et renouvelables dans les pays en développement, dans le but d'alléger de façon substantielle la facture pétrolière de ces derniers.


Le matériel en question englobe des panneaux solaires pour le chauffage de l'eau, des appareils mûs par énergie éolienne,

des micro-centrales hydro-électriques, des générateurs biométhane à cellules photovoltaïques des pompes solaires, etc.

Plusieurs études de faisabilité ont également été financées ainsi que des études touchant la diffusion d'informations sur ces nouvelles techniques de façon à en faire connaître les applications dans les pays en développement.

Le projet le plus récent consiste en une étude portant sur l'utilisation de l'énergie solaire à petite échelle que l'on envisage d'introduire en Jamaïque.

Espérant que ces renseignements seront utiles à M. Stewart et aux membres du Comité, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma considération distinguée.



Wm McWhinney
Président par intérim

c.c.: Monsieur R. Vaive
Greffier du Comité

[r^d - Agence canadienne de développement international Canadian International Development Agency

Le 16 mai 1983

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
Président du Comité permanent des
Affaires extérieures et de la
Défense nationale
Pièce 265, Edifice de l'Ouest
Chambre des Communes
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Monsieur le Président,

Le 21 avril, lorsque j'ai comparu devant le Comité permanent au sujet du Budget principal 1983-1984 de l'ACDI, les membres m'ont posé certaines questions auxquelles je m'étais engagé à répondre à une date ultérieure.

Monsieur Ian Watson, député de Châteauguay, avait demandé des renseignements sur la contribution versée par le gouvernement canadien à l'Office de secours et de travaux des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés de Palestine dans le Proche-Orient (UNRWA) et l'appui accordé à d'autres institutions internationales oeuvrant au Moyen-Orient.


Vous trouverez ci-joint un tableau énumérant les contributions versées par le gouvernement canadien à l'UNRWA de 1978 à ce jour.

Ce document détaille également l'aide que le Canada a apporté au Liban par l'intermédiaire des organisations internationales de 1981 à 1983.

D'après notre ambassade de Beyrouth, aucun des 29 projets financés à même les fonds administrés par la mission en 1982-1983 ne s'adressent spécifiquement aux réfugiés palestiniens.

Enfin, pour répondre à la question de M. Watson concernant le volume comparé de l'assistance fournie au Liban par la Norvège et le Canada, j'ai inclus une liste des contributions norvégiennes. A noter que cette liste comprend l'appui aux organisations non gouvernementales norvégiennes.

J'espère que ces informations seront utiles à M. Watson et aux membres du Comité, et je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma considération distinguée.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Wm McWhinney', written in a cursive style.

Wm McWhinney
Président par intérim

c.c.: Monsieur R. Vaive
Greffier du Comité

P.j.

A. CONTRIBUTIONS VERSEES A L'OFFICE DE SECOURS ET DE TRAVAUX DES
NATIONS UNIES POUR LES REFUGIES DE PALESTINE DANS LE
PROCHE-ORIENT (UNRWA)

(en millions de dollars canadiens)

| Année | Contribution en espèces | Aide alimentaire | Total |
|-----------|----------------------------|---------------------|-------|
| 1982-1983 | 3,6 | 4,5 | 8,1* |
| 1981-1982 | 2,9 | 4,5 | 7,4 |
| 1980-1981 | 2,2 | 3,5 | 5,7 |
| 1979-1980 | 1,75 | 3,25 | 5,0 |
| 1978-1979 | 1,65 | 3,5 | 5,15 |

* Plus \$950 000 pour le Liban

B. AIDE ACCORDEE PAR LE CANADA AU LIBAN

| Année | Organisation | Montant (en milliers de \$) |
|-----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1982-1983 | - Conseil oecuménique des Eglises | 150 |
| | - Comité international de la Croix- Rouge (CIRC) | 1 000 |
| | - Office de secours et de travaux des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés de Palestine dans le Proche-Orient (UNRWA) | 950 |
| | - Fonds des Nations Unies pour l'Enfance (UNICEF) | 450 |
| 1981-1982 | - CIRC | 280 |

C. AIDE ACCORDEE PAR LA NORVEGE AU LIBAN - DU 6 JUIN 1982
A CE JOUR

| Organisation | Montant (en milliers de dollars canadiens) |
|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| UNICEF | 956 |
| CIRC | 865 |
| UNRWA | 1 384 |
| Croix-Rouge norvégienne | 1 540 |
| Conseil norvégien pour les réfugiés | 346 |
| Fonds de l'Eglise norvégienne | 346 |
| Association d'aide du peuple norvégien | 778 |
| Comité Norvège-Palestine | 242 |
| Fonds d'aide à l'enfance | 86 |



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WITNESSES—TÉMOINS

From the Department of External Affairs:

Mr. M. Massé, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs;
Mr. W.J. Jenkins, Assistant Deputy Minister, Sectoral and Economic Relations;
Mr. W.T. Delworth, Assistant Deputy Minister, Political Affairs;
Mr. R.V. Gorham, Assistant Under-Secretary, Bureau of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs;
Mr. E.J. Bergbusch, Director, African Affairs Division.

Du ministère des Affaires extérieures:

M. M. Massé, sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures;
M. W.J. Jenkins, sous-ministre adjoint, Relations sectorielles et économiques;
M. W.T. Delworth, sous-ministre adjoint, Affaires politiques;
M. R.V. Gorham, sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint, Bureau des affaires de l'Amérique latine et des Antilles;
M. E.J. Bergbusch, directeur, Direction de l'Afrique anglophone.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 98

Tuesday, June 7, 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 98

Le mardi 7 juin 1983

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

External Affairs and National Defence

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

Supplementary Estimates (A) 1983-84: Votes L36a and L37a—Canadian International Development Agency under External Affairs

CONCERNANT:

Budget supplémentaire (A) 1983-1984: crédits L36a et L37a—Agence canadienne de développement international sous la rubrique Affaires extérieures

WITNESSES:

(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:

(Voir à l'endos)



First Session of the
Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la
trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appolloni

MEMBERS/MEMBRES

Bud Bradley
Maurice Dupras
Stanley Hudecki
Pauline Jewett
Gérald Laniel
Jean Lapierre
Allan B. McKinnon
Donald W. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*)
Jacques Olivier
W. Kenneth Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*)
Douglas Roche
Sinclair Stevens
Terry Sargeant

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES ET DE LA DÉFENSE
NATIONALE

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

Vice-président: Mme Ursula Appolloni

ALTERNATES/SUBSTITUTS

Herb Breau
David M. Collenette
J.-Roland Comtois
Bob Corbett
Stan Darling
Hal T. Herbert
Paul-André Massé
Walter McLean
Lorne Nystrom
Bob Ogle
Irinée Pelletier
Marcel Roy
Ron Stewart
Ian Watson
Robert Wenman

(Quorum 8)

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 1983
(153)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9:39 o'clock a.m., this day, the Vice-Chairman, Mrs. Appolloni, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Dupras, Hudecki, Miss Jewett, Messrs. Laniel, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*) and Roche.

Alternates present: Messrs. Darling and McLean.

Witnesses: From the Canadian International Development Agency: Mr. William McWhinney, Acting President; Mr. Douglas Lindores, Vice-President, Multilateral Programs Branch.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Mr. Claude Majeau, Consultant.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated Wednesday, May 18, 1983 relating to the Supplementary Estimates (A) for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1983 (*See Minutes of Proceedings, May 24, 1983, Issue No. 97*).

By unanimous consent, the Chairman called Votes L36a and L37a—Canadian International Development Agency under EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Mr. McWhinney made a statement, and with Mr. Lindores, answered questions.

The Chairman authorized that the following documents submitted by Mr. McWhinney be appended to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix "EAND-77"*):

—Notes for an introductory statement by Mr. McWhinney at meeting of Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, June 7, 1983

—Reply to Mrs. Appolloni—May 27, 1983

—Reply to Mr. Breau—May 31, 1983

—Reply to Mr. Ogle—May 26, 1983

—Reply to Mr. Roche—May 26, 1983

At 11:00 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE MARDI 7 JUIN 1983
(153)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale se réunit aujourd'hui à 9h39, sous la présidence de M^{me} Appolloni (vice-président).

Membres du Comité présents: M^{me} Appolloni, MM. Dupras, Hudecki, M^{lle} Jewett, MM. Laniel, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*) et Roche.

Substituts présents: MM. Darling et McLean.

Témoins: De l'Agence canadienne de développement international: M. William McWhinney, président par intérim; M. Douglas Lindores, vice-président, Direction générale des programmes multilatéraux.

Aussi présent: Du Centre parlementaire des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur: M. Claude Majeau, conseiller.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 18 mai 1983 portant sur le budget supplémentaire (A) pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1983 (*Voir procès-verbal du 24 mai 1983, fascicule n° 97*).

Du consentement unanime, le président met en délibération les crédits L36a et L37a—Agence canadienne de développement international, sous la rubrique AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES.

M. McWhinney fait une déclaration, puis, avec M. Lindores, répond aux questions.

Le président autorise que les documents suivants, soumis par M. McWhinney, soient joints aux procès-verbal et témoignages de ce jour (*Voir Appendice «EAND-77»*):

—Notes pour une déclaration préliminaire faite par M. McWhinney à la séance du Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale le 7 juin 1983.

—Réponse à M^{me} Appolloni—le 27 mai 1983

—Réponse à M. Breau—le 31 mai 1983

—Réponse à M. Ogle—le 26 mai 1983

—Réponse à M. Roche—le 26 mai 1983

A 11 heures, le Comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

*(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)**[Texte]*

Tuesday, June 7, 1983

• 0933

The Vice-Chairman: Order, please. We are resuming consideration of the committee's order of reference pertaining to the supplementary estimates (A) for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984.

We have before us officials from the Canadian International Development Agency, and I am sure Mr. McWhinney will introduce the other witnesses if and when necessary.

I will now call Votes L36a and L37a.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

B—Canadian International Development Agency

Vote L36a—Payment of \$4,000,000 and the issuance of non-interest bearing, non-negotiable demand notes.....
\$4,000,00

Vote L37a—In accordance with the International Development (Financial Institutions) Continuing Assistance Act.....
\$3,342,000

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: On a point of order, Madam Chairman, I take it that Mr. Prud'homme is not going to be here today. Is that right?

The Vice-Chairman: No, he will be here on Thursday.

Mr. McKinnon: I see. While this is the last scheduled meeting we have booked right now, I would not want you to think that we were ready to pass the CIDA estimates today. We wish to wait until after the weekend's events and after next week's events. There is a possibility we might want to have another meeting on CIDA at a later date. They will automatically pass, of course, I suppose some time around June 25, or some time around then. I just wanted that clearly established before we go on.

• 0935

Mr. Dupras: Madam Chairperson, I would agree with the leader of the Conservative Party on this. I would like also to know the intentions of the Chair in regard to the response published by the ministry in regard to the final report of the subcommittee dealing with Latin American affairs and our relations with Latin America. I wonder whether it is the intention of the Chair to hear the response in the committee before we adjourn on June 30.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: Thank you. That would be entirely satisfactory to us. We certainly agree with you that there is a need for such a meeting. That would not affect CIDA as much as it would affect External Affairs, so . . .

TÉMOIGNAGES

*(Enregistrement électronique)**[Traduction]*

Le mardi 7 juin 1983

Le vice-président: À l'ordre, s'il vous plaît. Nous reprenons l'étude de l'ordre de renvoi du Comité concernant le budget supplémentaire (A) pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984.

Nous accueillons aujourd'hui les hauts fonctionnaires de l'Agence canadienne de développement international, et je suis certain que M. McWhinney voudra présenter les autres témoins, s'il le juge nécessaire.

Je mets en délibération les crédits L36a et L37a.

AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES

B—Agence canadienne de développement international

Crédit L36a—Paiement de \$4,000,000 et délivrance de billets à vue, non productifs d'intérêts et non négociables...
\$4,000,000

Crédit L37a—Conformément à la Loi d'aide au développement international (institutions financières).....\$3,342,000

Le vice-président: Monsieur McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: J'invoque le Règlement, madame le président. Si j'ai bien compris, M. Prud'homme ne sera pas présent aujourd'hui, n'est-ce pas?

Le vice-président: Non, il sera de retour jeudi.

Mr. McKinnon: Je vois. Étant donné qu'il s'agit de la dernière réunion prévue, je ne peux croire que nous soyons prêts à adopter le budget de l'ACDI aujourd'hui. Nous voulons attendre que les événements de la fin de semaine soient passés et ceux de la semaine prochaine. Il est possible que nous voulions tenir une autre réunion concernant l'ACDI un peu plus tard. Il faudra les adopter automatiquement évidemment, vers le 25 juin j'imagine, ou aux environs de cette date. Je voulais que ce soit clairement établi avant que nous poursuivions.

Mr. Dupras: Madame le président, je suis d'accord avec le leader du Parti conservateur à ce sujet. J'aimerais également connaître les intentions de la présidence au sujet de la réponse qu'a publiée le ministre concernant le rapport final du sous-comité sur les Affaires de l'Amérique latine et nos relations avec l'Amérique latine. La présidence a-t-elle l'intention d'étudier cette réponse en Comité avant que nous ajournions le 30 juin?

Le vice-président: Monsieur McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: Merci. Nous serions tout à fait d'accord. Comme vous, nous croyons qu'il faudrait tenir une telle réunion. Cela n'affecterait pas tant l'ACDI que les Affaires extérieures, par conséquent . . .

[*Texte*]

The Vice-Chairman: Could I suggest that we discuss that at the next meeting of the steering committee?

Mr. McKinnon: Right.

Mr. Dupras: I am not a member of the steering committee. I am relatively new in this field.

The Vice-Chairman: I guarantee, Mr. Dupras, that it will be brought up before the steering committee.

Mr. Dupras: Okay.

The Vice-Chairman: I believe Mr. McWhinney has an opening statement. It has already been distributed.

Mr. William McWhinney (Acting President, Canadian International Development Agency): Madam, perhaps I could just make a few very brief remarks.

First of all, since the last meeting of the committee, I wish to indicate to hon. members, we have sent some information to the clerk. I want to refer to this very briefly.

Some hon. members may recall meetings of the committee last December, when there was a request for a copy of the report of the Search Conference in Kenya. This is a document not exclusively of the jurisdiction of the Government of Canada, but it involves the Government of Kenya. A draft copy of the Search Conference report was sent to the clerk during the last two weeks.

In addition, information was provided, as a result of questions asked at the last meeting of this committee, with regard to the renewable energy program... this has been provided to the clerk and to Mr. Roche. Also, there is some additional information for Rev. Father Ogle with regard to activities in the oil and gas sector; some information in response to a question from Mr. Breau with regard to loans; and some information in response to Mrs. Appolloni's question with regard to sectors of activities under the program.

The Vice-Chairman: I just wanted to point out, Mr. Dupras, all these replies will be appended to the minutes of today's meeting.

Mr. Dupras: Fine.

Mr. McWhinney: With regard to the items before the committee this morning, the supplementary estimates A, we have provided a statement, which I believe has been circulated to hon. members. It would not, therefore, be my intention to read the statement into the record.

May I just highlight that these requests have to do with appropriations for Canada's contributions to international financial institutions. They flow out of Bill C-130, which was an act to authorize continuing financial assistance to certain international financial institutions, which received royal assent on March 30. Because of the timing of the legislation, these particular estimates were not included in the main estimates, but I should indicate to hon. members that they were included in the provisions for official development assistance for 1983-1984. I would be happy to answer any questions that hon. members may have on these supplementary estimate requests.

[*Traduction*]

Le vice-président: Puis-je vous suggérer qu'on en discute lors de la prochaine réunion du Comité directeur?

M. McKinnon: Bien.

M. Dupras: Je ne fais pas partie du Comité directeur. Je suis relativement nouveau dans ce domaine.

Le vice-président: Je Vous assure, M. Dupras, que la question sera soulevée au Comité directeur.

M. Dupras: D'accord.

Le vice-président: Je crois que M. McWhinney veut faire une déclaration préliminaire. Elle vous a déjà été distribuée.

M. William McWhinney (président par intérim, Agence canadienne de développement international): Madame, permettez-moi peut-être de faire quelques brèves remarques.

Premièrement, depuis la dernière réunion du Comité, nous avons envoyé au greffier certains renseignements et je tiens à le souligner pour les membres du Comité. Je vais vous en dire quelques mots rapidement.

Certains députés se souviendront peut-être qu'aux réunions de décembre dernier on avait demandé un exemplaire du rapport de la conférence Search au Kenya. Il s'agit d'un document qui n'est pas exclusivement de la compétence du gouvernement du Canada, mais qui implique le gouvernement du Kenya. Une ébauche du rapport de la conférence Search a été transmise au greffier au cours des deux dernières semaines.

En outre, suite aux questions qui ont été posées à la dernière réunion du Comité, nous avons fourni des renseignements concernant le programme d'énergie renouvelable—ces renseignements ont été transmis au greffier et à M. Roche. Des renseignements additionnels ont également été envoyés au révérend père Ogle concernant les activités dans les secteurs du pétrole et du gaz, d'autres renseignements qui font suite à une question posée par M. Breau, concernant les prêts, et certains renseignements suite à la question de M. Appolloni sur les secteurs d'activités relevant du programme.

Le vice-président: Je voulais simplement souligner, monsieur Dupras, que toutes ces réponses seront annexées au procès-verbal du jour.

M. Dupras: Bien.

M. McWhinney: Nous avons présenté une déclaration, qui vous a été distribuée, je crois, concernant les crédits du budget des dépenses supplémentaire A à l'étude au Comité ce matin. Je n'ai donc pas l'intention de lire cette déclaration.

Permettez-moi de souligner que cette demande de crédits concerne la contribution du Canada aux institutions financières internationales. Cela découle du projet de loi C-130, loi qui autorise à continuer l'aide financière à certaines institutions financières internationales; ce projet de loi a reçu la sanction royale le 30 mars. A cause du moment où a été adoptée cette loi, ces prévisions budgétaires n'étaient pas incluses dans le budget des dépenses, et je dois dire aux députés qu'elles étaient comprises dans les dispositions pour l'aide au développement officielle de 1983-1984. Je serai heureux de répondre aux

[Text]

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Roche, followed by Mr. Dupras, please.

Mr. Roche: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

These estimates were, as Mr. McWhinney has remarked, the outcome of an extensive examination given to Bill C-130.

• 0940

Since we supported Bill C-130 at all stages, including the committee, I see no reason to object to these estimates coming before us today, which is really more of a technicality consequential to decisions taken by the government as well as the legislative support for those decisions given previously by Parliament.

So I would confine myself at this moment to reiterating my concern that the Canadian government and CIDA maintain support of multilateral institutions, particularly the international financial institutions. I think it would be appropriate to ask the president to give us an indication of how CIDA is analysing the performance of the IFIs with respect to future commitments. I think that is a reasonable question to put before him today.

Secondly, I want to put on the record again my support for CIDA's appropriations and, indeed, the extra appropriations that have been made possible by a realignment of funds to the United Nations Development Program and to UNICEF. I believe those are two of the international institutions that are performing exceptionally well in today's very difficult economic circumstances.

That leads me to ask also of Mr. McWhinney with respect to the discussions that led up to the Williamsburg summit with respect to action being taken by the economic summit partners as well as the advice of the OECD toward what has been called a second Bretton Woods conference... I ask Mr. McWhinney specifically whether or not CIDA has been requested by the government to prepare any groundwork, any supportive papers, that would enable the Government of Canada to participate in an international financial conference attacking the debt question which is at the centre of North-South relations today—whether or not any groundwork is now being done that would enable the government to participate in such a conference, were that conference indeed to be agreed upon.

I would just put those questions before him and then ask one brief supplementary when he is finished.

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairman, if I may, perhaps I could deal with the second of the questions first, and then I might ask Mr. Douglas Lindores, the Vice-President of Multilateral Programs, to respond to the first question.

[Translation]

questions que les députés voudront bien me poser concernant cette demande de crédits supplémentaires.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur McWhinney.

Monsieur Roche, vous avez la parole, et vous serez suivi de M. Dupras.

M. Roche: Merci, madame le président.

Comme l'a souligné M. McWhinney, ce budget de dépenses fait suite à l'étude en profondeur qui a été faite du projet de loi C-130.

Étant donné que nous avons appuyé le projet de loi C-130 à toutes les étapes, y compris l'étape du comité, je ne vois pas pourquoi je m'opposerais à ce budget que nous étudions aujourd'hui, il s'agit en réalité d'un détail technique qui fait suite aux décisions qu'a prises le gouvernement et également de l'appui législatif que le Parlement a accordé précédemment à ces décisions.

Je me limite donc pour l'instant à rappeler ma préoccupation que le gouvernement canadien et l'ACDI continuent d'appuyer les institutions multilatérales, surtout les institutions financières internationales. Il conviendrait, je crois, de demander au président de nous dire comment l'ACDI analyse le rendement des IFI quant à leurs engagements futurs. Il est raisonnable, je crois, de lui poser la question aujourd'hui.

Deuxièmement, je voudrais de nouveau dire publiquement que j'appuie les crédits de l'ACDI de même que les crédits additionnels qui ont été rendus possibles par le remaniement des fonds accordés au programme des Nations Unies pour le développement et à l'UNICEF. Il s'agit-là de deux institutions internationales dont le rendement est exceptionnel pendant cette période économique très difficile que nous traversons.

Cela me porte à demander également à M. McWhinney, suite aux discussions qui ont précédé le sommet de Williamsburg, quelles mesures ont été prises par les partenaires du sommet économique et quel conseil a donné l'OCDE au sujet de ce qu'on a appelé la deuxième conférence de Bretton Woods... Je voudrais demander plus précisément à M. McWhinney si oui ou non le gouvernement a demandé à l'ACDI de faire une préparation, de présenter des documents à l'appui qui permettraient au gouvernement du Canada de participer à une conférence financière internationale qui s'attaque à la question de la dette, question qui est au centre même des relations nord-sud actuellement—si oui ou non cette préparation se fait afin que le gouvernement puisse participer à une telle conférence, si cette conférence est en fait acceptée.

Je voudrais simplement poser ces questions au témoin et, lorsqu'il aura répondu, je lui en poserai une supplémentaire très courte.

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, si vous me le permettez, je répondrai tout d'abord à la deuxième question et demanderai ensuite à M. Douglas Lindores, le vice-président de la direction générale des programmes multilatéraux de répondre à la première.

[Texte]

With regard to the follow-up to the Williamsburg summit and the particular question of follow-up to the Bretton Woods agreement, I think I am at liberty to say that the agency is aware and is involved but the agency is not the lead agency with regard to that particular item. Within the framework of official development assistance, the lead agency is and has been the Department of Finance; but in terms of interdepartmental involvement, CIDA would be involved in discussions in that regard but does not have the lead role. In addition to our ongoing activities, we are also concerned and have been involved in discussions on the general question of debt and will be, I would expect, playing a role in any follow-up to Williamsburg with regard to that particular item.

Perhaps I might ask your permission, Madam Chairman, to have Mr. Lindores respond to the first question, about analysing the performance of international financial institutions.

• 0945

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Lindores, please.

Mr. Douglas Lindores (Vice-President, Multilateral Programs Branch, Canadian International Development Agency): Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The question of analysing the performance of these institutions is one which has consistently posed a major challenge to us. Hon. members will remember that we did discuss, during the consideration of Bill C-130, steps which CIDA was undertaking to develop a more systematic and institutionalized approach to the evaluation of these institutions. Leaving aside for the time being our basic objectives and strategies in the institutions, I think it is worth recalling that we did commission the Peat Marwick firm to do what we call an "evaluation assessment", which was to identify issues which arose out of our participation in the institutions and which required a further look. The study identified six major issues, some of which were of a domestic bureaucratic nature, some of which dealt with very broad questions, such as basic aid rationale and development impact, and others of which dealt with secondary issues, such as achievement of non-development objectives, i.e. political and commercial objectives, and the institutional effectiveness of the various IFIs.

Where we now stand is that the consultants recommended six major activities for us to consider. We are proceeding with the implementation, on a priority basis, of two of those six, and two or three others have in fact been picked up by other activities which are ongoing within the agency. Specifically to report on where we are, we have carried out, in terms of the commercial objectives of our participation in IFIs, a study on procurement within the institutions, and we are now proceeding to put into place a significantly improved data bank in order that we can monitor our procurement success with the financial institutions; and in co-operation with the Department of External Affairs and in particular the overseas marketing group within that department, we are reviewing structural

[Traduction]

Quant à la suite donnée au sommet de Williamsburg et, en particulier, à la question de la suite donnée à l'accord Bretton Woods, je puis vous répondre que l'agence est au courant et impliquée, mais qu'elle n'est pas le chef de file dans ce domaine. Au sein de la structure de l'aide au développement officiel, l'agence qui est le chef de file est et était le ministère des Finances. Toutefois, pour ce qui est de la participation inter-ministérielle, l'ACDI serait impliquée dans les discussions à ce sujet, mais elle ne joue pas le rôle de chef de file. Quant aux activités permanentes, nous nous en préoccupons également et nous participons aux discussions sur la question générale concernant la dette et nous jouerons, je l'espère, un rôle dans toute suite donnée au sommet de Williamsburg à ce sujet.

Je pourrais peut-être, si vous me le permettez, madame le président, demander à M. Lindores de répondre à la première question au sujet de l'analyse du rendement des institutions financières internationales.

Le vice-président: Monsieur Lindores, s'il vous plaît.

M. Douglas Lindores (vice-président, Direction générale des programmes multilatéraux, Agence canadienne de développement international): Merci, madame le président.

La question de l'analyse du rendement de ces institutions nous a toujours posé un grand défi. Les députés se souviendront que nous avons discuté pendant l'étude du projet de loi C-130 des mesures que prenait l'ACDI pour mettre au point une méthode plus systématique et institutionnalisée pour évaluer ces institutions. Mettons de côté pour le moment nos objectifs et stratégies de base pour ces institutions, il convient de rappeler que nous avions demandé à la maison Peat, Marwick de nous faire ce que nous appelons «une évaluation d'appréciation» pour identifier les questions qui découlent de notre participation à ces institutions et qu'il faudrait étudier davantage. L'étude a souligné six questions importantes, certaines de nature bureaucratique interne, certaines concernant des questions très vastes, par exemple la raison d'être fondamentale de l'aide et les répercussions du développement, et d'autres concernant des questions secondaires, par exemple la réalisation d'objectifs ne se rapportant pas au développement, c'est-à-dire les objectifs politiques et commerciaux, et l'efficacité institutionnelle des diverses IFI.

Voilà où nous en sommes maintenant, les consultants ont recommandé que nous étudions six principales activités. Nous sommes en train de mettre en vigueur, de façon prioritaire, deux de ces six activités, et deux ou trois autres ont été reprises dans le cadre d'autres activités en cours à l'agence. Pour vous dire de façon plus précise où nous en sommes, nous avons fait au sein des institutions une étude sur les achats, pour les objectifs commerciaux relevant de notre participation dans les IFI, et nous sommes en train maintenant de créer une banque des données beaucoup plus perfectionnée afin que nous puissions contrôler nos succès en matière d'achat pour les institutions financières. Pour ce qui est de la coopération avec le ministère des Affaires extérieures et, en particulier, avec le groupe de commercialisation outre-mer au sein de ces ministères

[Text]

mechanisms and processes within Canada by which we can promote our commercial objectives in the institutions.

We have been also involved in an ongoing review of the existing responsibilities between the Department of Finance and CIDA in the management of the IFI program. We have instituted, as part of our measures more to systematize our ability to monitor the performance of the institutions, a much more systematic and improved data-collection system, including computerization of basic financial information, so we can be constantly monitoring evolution in the basic financial indicators of the institutions. Coupled with that, we are soliciting a proposal at this time from the private sector to establish for us a full performance monitoring system so we will be in a position to have a standard framework to apply to all the institutions, which can be updated on a regular basis as we receive new information.

Mr. Roche: Who in the private sector?

Mr. Lindores: I believe we are just in the process at this point of finalizing terms of reference, in which case we will go through our consultant selection committee within CIDA, and the contract will be let according to the normal procedures.

Finally, and particularly in relation to questions raised on a number of occasions by Madam Jewett within this committee, we are well down the road in the preparation of a framework for a paper on the manner in which we are pursuing overall Canadian objectives through our participation in international financial institutions. It is our intention to attempt to find a distinguished Canadian who is familiar with the institutions essentially to write that paper for us, so that it will have an element of independence that will, we believe, make the paper more meaningful.

• 0950

Discussions are continuing. We have listened very carefully to the comments that have been raised about this issue in the past. We have moved it up in our list of priorities and we would hope this task will be completed during the fall of 1983.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Roche.

Mr. Roche: I will just ask one more question this morning, Madam Chairman.

This comes back to the heart of my questioning all spring on CIDA. It concerns the question of a strategy by the government for international development policies and programs, comparable to the strategy of 1975 to 1980. There is some ambiguity in the responses I have received so far, so I want to put the question again.

I draw to your attention the comment made by Minister Lapointe when he appeared before this committee on December 7, when we were considering Bill C-130, which is at the heart of our estimates this morning. When I put the question to him, Mr. Lapointe said:

[Translation]

res, nous examinons les mécanismes et les processus structurels au Canada qui nous permettent de promouvoir nos objectifs commerciaux dans ces institutions.

Nous avons participé à un examen permanent des responsabilités présentes au ministère des Finances et à l'ACDI pour la gestion du programme des IFI. Nous avons créé, et cela fait partie de nos mesures visant à systématiser davantage notre possibilité de contrôler le rendement des institutions, un système de collecte des données amélioré et plus systématique, y compris l'informatisation des renseignements financiers de base, afin que nous puissions surveiller constamment l'évolution des indicateurs financiers de base de ces institutions. En même temps, nous demandons au secteur privé à ce moment-ci d'élaborer pour nous un système de contrôle de rendement complet afin que nous soyons en mesure d'avoir une structure normalisée qui s'appliquera à toutes les institutions, et qui nous permettra une mise à jour régulière au fur et à mesure que nous recevrons de nouveaux renseignements.

M. Roche: De qui s'agit-il dans le secteur privé?

M. Lindores: Nous sommes en train de terminer la rédaction de ce mandat, et par le biais du Comité de sélection des consultants à l'ACDI le contrat sera accordé de la façon normale.

Finalement, et pour répondre plus particulièrement aux questions soulevées à plusieurs reprises par M^{me} Jewett de ce Comité, nous avons réalisé beaucoup de progrès dans la préparation d'une base pour le document sur la façon de poursuivre l'ensemble des objectifs canadiens par notre participation aux institutions financières internationales. Nous tenterons de trouver un Canadien éminent qui connaît bien les activités des institutions, pour lui demander essentiellement de rédiger ce document; ainsi, on ne devrait pas y trouver un esprit partisan, ce qui lui donnera plus de poids.

Les discussions se poursuivent. Nous avons écouté très attentivement les commentaires qui ont déjà été exprimés à ce sujet. Nous avons accordé la plus grande priorité à cette question et nous espérons que ces travaux seront terminés au cours de l'automne 1983.

Le vice-président: Monsieur Roche.

M. Roche: Madame le président, je n'ai qu'une autre question à poser ce matin.

Je reprendrai essentiellement les questions que j'ai posées au sujet de l'ACDI le printemps dernier. Il s'agit d'une stratégie du gouvernement en matière de politiques et de programmes de développement international semblable à la stratégie élaborée pour les années 1975 à 1980. Les réponses que j'ai reçues jusqu'à présent sont quelque peu ambiguës, et j'aimerais reformuler la question encore une fois.

J'attire votre attention sur le commentaire que le ministre Lapointe a fait lors de sa comparution devant ce comité le 7 décembre; nous étudions à ce moment-là le projet de loi C-130, dont il est question dans notre discussion sur les

[Texte]

The government position is that we do not expect to publish such a strategy in the near future.

When I raised it with Mr. MacEachen at the opening of the committee examination of the main estimates for 1983-1984, Mr. MacEachen said at that time he would give consideration to my comments, that it was unrealistic to expect parliamentary and public support for the ongoing CIDA programs in these difficult times without a formal strategy.

So I want to put to Mr. McWhinney this question today: can he tell me whether CIDA at this moment is engaged in preparing documentation for such a strategy? Has any timeframe been put on the preparation of any such material?

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairman, to the hon. member, with regard to a strategy—using the word “strategy” in the context of the hon. member, which I assume is a document analogous to the 1975-1980 document called *A Strategy*, which was published by the government—no decision has been taken by the minister on whether or not to publish a strategy or any other document, policy statement or otherwise.

In the context of whether or not the agency is preparing material for such a strategy, the correct and technical answer to that question is no, the agency is not. On the other hand, the agency is preparing documents all the time. We are in the process, as are other government departments, of completing the strategic overview that is required of departments as part of the annual exercise in government. We are developing and reviewing sectoral policies; so in that sense any ultimate strategy or policy statement, if it were to be issued by the government, would include some of the work we are doing now.

But in terms of actually doing work on a strategy paper, the answer is no, at the present time. No decision has been taken by the government to publish such a strategy or not to publish such a strategy.

Mr. Roche: Finally, I guess it would be unrealistic of me to expect an answer to the question of whether or not CIDA is advising the minister and the government that such a strategy ought to be done.

• 0955

So I will not put this in the form of a question but, rather, a comment, which is that, in my view, the administration of CIDA ought very much to be preparing documentation which ultimately could be called a strategy. I think it is in the interests of CIDA to formulate a sense of direction for the next five years, given the exigencies of the north—south problem, the debt crisis, and how Canada is going to respond to it in these difficult economic times. It is very much in the interests of CIDA to press the political leadership of the government to issue such a document for the guidance of parliamentarians and for the information and/or support of the Canadian taxpayers.

[Traduction]

prévisions budgétaires, ce matin. Lorsque je l'ai interrogé, M. Lapointe a répondu:

La position du gouvernement... est que nous ne nous attendons pas à publier une telle stratégie dans un avenir rapproché.

Lorsque le Comité a commencé son étude du budget principal de 1983-1984, j'ai posé la question à M. MacEachen: A ce moment-là, il a dit qu'il tiendrait compte de mes commentaires, et qu'il n'était pas réaliste d'espérer que le public et le Parlement appuient les programmes permanents de l'ACDI, étant donné les temps difficiles, sans qu'une stratégie officielle soit adoptée.

Je demande donc ceci à M. McWhinney: peut-il me dire si l'ACDI est en train de rédiger de la documentation en prévision d'une telle stratégie? A-t-on prévu un calendrier pour l'élaboration de ces documents?

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, j'utilise le mot «stratégie» dans le même sens que l'honorable député: je suppose qu'il s'agit d'un document semblable à celui visant la période 1975-1980, publié par le gouvernement, et qui, dans son titre, comportait le mot «stratégie»; toujours est-il que le ministre n'a pas décidé s'il faut ou non publier une stratégie, un énoncé de politique, ou tout autre document.

A la question de savoir si l'agence est en train de préparer des documents en vue d'une stratégie, je dois répondre non. Par contre, l'agence est toujours en train de rédiger des documents. A l'instar d'autres ministères, nous sommes en train de terminer l'étude stratégique globale que tous les ministères doivent faire une fois par année. Nous sommes en train d'étudier et d'élaborer des politiques sectorielles; alors, en ce sens, toute déclaration de politique ou de stratégie éventuelle qui serait publiée par le gouvernement tiendrait compte des travaux en cours.

Mais, ces travaux mis à part, nous ne sommes pas en train d'élaborer une stratégie. Le gouvernement n'a pas décidé de publier ou non un tel document.

M. Roche: Je suppose que je ne serais pas réaliste si je m'attendais à recevoir une réponse à cette question: l'ACDI cherche-t-elle à faire comprendre au ministre et au gouvernement qu'une telle stratégie devrait être élaborée?

Alors, je ne poserai pas la question, mais je dirai simplement que tout au moins, l'administration de l'ACDI devrait préparer une documentation qui servirait ultimement à élaborer une stratégie. Il me semble que c'est dans l'intérêt de l'ACDI de donner une orientation pour les cinq prochaines années, étant donné la situation critique du dialogue Nord-Sud, la crise de la dette et la façon dont le gouvernement y réagira dans le contexte économique actuel peu reluisant. C'est tout à fait dans l'intérêt de l'ACDI d'exhorter les dirigeants politiques du gouvernement à publier un document, dans le but d'éclairer les parlementaires, de renseigner les contribuables canadiens et de chercher leur appui.

[Text]

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Roche. Mr. McWhinney's statement, which was circulated to members just before the meeting started, will be appended to the minutes of this meeting.

I now recognize Miss Jewett, please.

Miss Jewett: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Welcome to Mr. McWhinney and the officials from CIDA. Following up on what Doug Roche was just saying, of course, I would urge as well that a long-term strategy be developed. I guess we will really have to persuade the minister of the importance of it on some other occasion, since he is not here now and he is very reluctant to think any further ahead than next week, unless absolutely necessary, I believe.

So we will have to work on him, Doug.

Mr. Roche: Yes. I am trying to think beyond next week.

Miss Jewett: Yes, I know. I was just commenting that the minister has to be persuaded to do the same.

On the performance of IFIs, the main concern at the moment has been procurement and getting a full performance monitoring system, and so on. But then Mr. Lindores mentioned that CIDA was going to get, I think he said, an outstanding Canadian to look at how we do achieve overall Canadian objectives in our participation in IFIs. At least that is the way I wrote it down. I think the phrase he used was "overall Canadian objectives". Perhaps I should ask Mr. McWhinney this, but I wonder if CIDA is any more enlightened than I am about those overall Canadian objectives. I mean, if you are going to get a consultant to look at these, are you giving him an idea of what CIDA or the government thinks should be overall Canadian objectives to guide our participation and our votes in IFIs? Or is the consultant to determine those objectives?

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Lindores, please.

Mr. Lindores: Madam Chairman, as part of our planning processes we do consistently review the objectives which we have for the various elements of our programs. We are not without objectives. We have a set, first of all, of broader multilateral development assistance objectives, which include, for example:

... to develop, maintain, participate in and influence a network of strong multilateral institutions in the fields of technical cooperation and high priority sectors, international development finance, food aid, humanitarian assistance; to complement the activities of other channels, and to participate in countries where we do not participate bilaterally; to contribute to the achievement of other Canadian foreign policy objectives—i.e. political or commercial objectives.

We then refine these by program, and in the case of the international financial institutions, for example, we have a series of specific objectives. Let me read those to you, because

[Translation]

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Roche. La déclaration de M. McWhinney a été distribuée aux membres du Comité avant l'ouverture de la séance; elle sera annexée au compte rendu de la réunion.

Je cède maintenant la parole à M^{lle} Jewett.

Mlle Jewett: Merci, madame le président.

Je souhaite la bienvenue à M. McWhinney et aux représentants de l'ACDI. Je reprends ce que Doug Roche vient de dire: moi aussi, j'estime qu'il faudrait élaborer une stratégie à long terme. Il faudra convaincre le ministre de l'importance de cette question à une autre occasion, puisqu'il n'est pas là maintenant et qu'il se montre très réticent à penser au delà de la semaine prochaine, à moins que ce soit absolument nécessaire.

Il y a donc du travail à faire sur ce plan, Doug.

M. Roche: Oui. J'essaie de penser au delà de la semaine prochaine.

Mlle Jewett: Oui, je sais. Je disais qu'il faudrait persuader le ministre d'en faire autant.

Quant à la performance des institutions financières internationales, on s'est surtout intéressé à l'acquisition et à une application intégrale de mesures de contrôle de la performance, etc. Mais M. Lindores a signalé que l'ACDI tenterait, si j'ai bien compris, de faire appel à un Canadien éminent qui étudierait dans quelle mesure la présence canadienne dans les institutions financières internationales nous permet d'atteindre nos grands objectifs. Du moins, c'est la façon dont je l'ai compris. Je crois qu'il a parlé des objectifs canadiens généraux. C'est peut-être à M. McWhinney que je devrais m'adresser, mais je me demande si l'ACDI est beaucoup plus éclairée que moi au sujet de ces objectifs généraux. Si l'on demande à quelqu'un d'étudier la situation, lui donne-t-on une idée de ce que devraient être, selon l'ACDI ou le gouvernement, les objectifs canadiens qui sous-tendent notre participation et notre vote au sein de ces institutions financières internationales? Ou est-ce au consultant de préciser ces objectifs?

Le vice-président: Monsieur Lindores, je vous prie.

M. Lindores: Madame le président, nos travaux de planification comportent toujours une étude des objectifs des divers éléments de nos programmes. Des objectifs, nous en avons. Tout d'abord, nous avons établi des objectifs plus généraux en ce qui a trait à l'aide multilatérale au développement, dont voici quelques-uns:

... développer, maintenir, encourager et influencer un réseau d'institutions multinationales puissantes dans les domaines de la collaboration technique et les secteurs hautement prioritaires, l'aide au développement international, l'aide alimentaire, l'aide humanitaire; compléter les activités d'autres réseaux, participer aux activités de pays avec lesquels nous n'avons pas conclu d'ententes bilatérales, contribuer à la réalisation d'autres objectifs, soit politiques, soit commerciaux, de la politique étrangère canadienne.

On rend ensuite les objectifs de chaque programme plus précis; dans le cas des institutions financières internationales, nous avons élaboré une série d'objectifs précis. Permettez-moi de

[Texte]

I think it will indicate to you the type of mandate we will be asking this individual to look at:

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To increase the availability of private capital for development purposes through the provision of government guarantees to capital markets . . .

—that is the specific and unique function of a financial institution as opposed to other aid channels . . .

To provide an adequate level of concessional resources as opposed to market level resources to the poorest developing countries through the concessional windows of the international financial institutions;

to develop and maintain a network of financial institutions with a high level of regional expertise and capable of mobilization of regional financial institutions . . .

—and that is what differentiates institutions such as the Asian and African Development Banks from the World Bank and IDA . . .

to contribute to a system which can provide a mechanism for undertaking projects with a risk or concentration of resources element that render such projects unlikely to be funded by other channels.

It is very clear that many bilateral programs cannot undertake projects of the nature that are undertaken by multilateral development banks, simply because the risk involved is so great and the level of resources involved is so large that it is beyond their capacity. We then refine these specific objectives down to a series of specific strategies which evolve from year to year, depending on the major interests or the major problems of the system. I do not think I should take the committee's time to go into all of these, although I am quite prepared to indicate what they are.

So we do have a series of objectives and we are certainly not without a framework which can guide the individual as to our thinking, at least, although he may decide, of course, that our framework is not appropriate or not adequate for the nature of this study.

Miss Jewett: Madam Chairman, I guess I was also thinking of broader objectives, which you will recall I was concerned about before, both in committee and in the House, many of which really came to a head at the time of the Inter-American Development Bank's loan to Guatemala; concerns as to the real uses to which the loan was going to be put, whether in fact we looked at that carefully enough; questions about the relationship of lending institutions to lenders whose governments engage in massive human rights violations; questions relating to the military uses of money, like the South African loans which coincidentally happen to be for exactly the same amount as the increase in their defence budget. That series of questions which several of us have been concerned about: I wondered if they were going to be included in this analysis.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Lindores.

[Traduction]

vous en faire la lecture; cela vous aidera à comprendre le genre de mandat que nous impartirons au consultant:

Améliorer l'accès au capital privé pour des fins de développement, grâce à des garanties données par le gouvernement aux marchés de capitaux . . .

Il s'agit du rôle unique et précis d'une institution financière par rapport à tous les autres mécanismes d'aide . . .

Assurer des capitaux suffisants, à un taux d'intérêt préférentiel par rapport aux taux du marché, aux pays les plus pauvres, par le biais des agences des institutions financières internationales;

Développer et maintenir un réseau d'institutions financières dotées d'un personnel régional très compétent et capable de mobiliser les institutions financières régionales . . .

Voilà ce qui distingue des institutions telles que la Banque asiatique de développement, la Banque africaine de développement, d'autres institutions, comme la Banque mondiale ou l'Association internationale de développement, par exemple . . .

Contribuer à un système capable d'assurer un mécanisme permettant d'entreprendre des projets comportant un risque ou une concentration de ressources telle que ces projets ne seraient probablement pas financés par d'autres moyens.

Il est très clair que bon nombre de programmes bilatéraux ne peuvent pas entreprendre certains projets qui sont parrainés par les banques multilatérales de développement, tout simplement parce que les risques sont trop grands et les capitaux nécessaires trop importants. Nous affinons ces objectifs précis au point qu'ils deviennent des stratégies précises qui évoluent d'une année à l'autre, selon les principaux intérêts ou les principaux problèmes du système. Je ne crois pas qu'il y ait lieu d'en faire la revue à ce moment-ci; toutefois, je suis tout à fait disposé à vous les nommer.

Nous avons donc toute une série d'objectifs et nous avons certainement un cadre qui peut donner au consultant une bonne idée de notre orientation; bien entendu, il se peut que ce consultant décide que notre cadre ne convient pas au genre d'étude que nous envisageons.

Mlle Jewett: Madame le président, je pensais plutôt à des objectifs plus larges dont j'ai déjà parlé, en comité et à la Chambre, dont bon nombre ont été évoqués au moment où la Banque interaméricaine de développement a consenti un prêt au Guatemala; je m'inquiète de l'utilisation précise des sommes consenties; a-t-on suffisamment étudié cette question? Je me pose des questions au sujet des rapports entre les institutions de prêt et des groupes dont les gouvernements sont coupables de violations des droits de la personne sur une grande échelle; au sujet de l'utilisation des sommes pour des fins militaires; par exemple, les prêts consentis à l'Afrique du Sud correspondent exactement à l'augmentation du budget de défense de ce pays. Plusieurs d'entre nous se posent de telles questions; je me demande si cette analyse en tiendra compte.

Le vice-président: Monsieur Lindores.

[Text]

Mr. Lindores: Madam Chairman, I think the answer is yes. It is obvious we would have to address those concerns which have been repeatedly put forward in this committee, and we quite intend to do that.

Miss Jewett: That is very good to hear. Is the consultant going to be found in one of the universities, or can we yet know where you are looking for a consultant?

Mr. Lindores: Madam Chairman, we are considering a number of names. I really do not think it would be appropriate at this point, but the academic area is not the only area at which we are looking. We are looking at figures from international financial areas as well.

Miss Jewett: And it is hoped this appointment will be made fairly soon, because you hope to have a report by fall, you said?

Mr. Lindores: Madam Chairman, it is our hope we would have this completed during the fall.

Miss Jewett: On another matter, whatever happened to the Futures Secretariat? We had a little talk about this up at Mont Ste. Marie, I remember. I am one of the ones who thought there was some hope. I thought it was not a bad idea. I guess it has gone for good, has it, Bill?

• 1005

Mr. McWhinney: Well, I suppose, Madam Chairman, if I were in charge of the organization of the agency I could be a little more categorical in saying yes, it is gone for good, or no, it is not, and what is happening. I have had no further information, I would say, in the last three months on whether the organization is choosing to attempt to resuscitate itself, to continue along the path it originally envisaged or any alternative path.

I really regret, and I say that sincerely, that I have no further information. The agency, at my level certainly, has had no information from them, no request from them, for further funding or things of that nature. But I cannot honestly categorically say whether it is dormant or defunct.

Miss Jewett: A final question. As Mr. McWhinney and others will know, the subcommittee on Canada's relations with the Caribbean and Latin America, and indeed the whole committee, by a majority recommended that Canada join the OAS, although a very significant minority, of which I was a member, felt that it was not a good idea. Well, Dupras and I will argue about this into our respective graves. The response of the minister to the subcommittee's report says that the government still has this on some burner—it does not specify which one—of the stove.

An hon. Member: The front one.

Miss Jewett: I wonder, since we do have development assistance programs in both areas, and indeed have an increasing interest in Central America and South America, as well as our long-term interest in the Caribbean, whether CIDA

[Translation]

M. Lindores: Madame le président, la réponse est oui, à mon avis. De toute évidence, nous devons tenir compte des questions qui ont été soulevées à maintes reprises devant ce comité, et nous avons l'intention de le faire.

Mlle Jewett: Il est bon d'entendre cela. Le consultant sera-t-il recruté dans une université? Pouvons-nous déjà savoir dans quels milieux vous cherchez?

M. Lindores: Madame le président, nous sommes en train d'étudier un certain nombre de candidats. Je ne crois pas qu'il convient d'en dire plus à ce moment-ci, mais le secteur universitaire n'est pas le seul envisagé. Il se pourrait qu'il s'agisse d'un personnage du milieu financier international.

Mlle Jewett: Nous espérons que ce consultant sera nommé bientôt, car vous voulez présenter le rapport à l'automne, n'est-ce pas?

M. Lindores: Madame le président, nous espérons mettre fin à ces travaux au cours de l'automne.

Mlle Jewett: Passons à une autre question: qu'est-il arrivé du Secrétariat de prospective? Je me souviens que nous en avions discuté au Mont Sainte-Marie. Je comptais parmi ceux qui nourrissaient certains espoirs. Ce n'était pas une mauvaise idée, à mon avis. Mais elle a été rejetée une fois pour toutes, n'est-ce pas, Bill?

M. McWhinney: Eh bien, madame le président, si j'étais chargé de l'organisation de l'agence, je pourrais dire un oui ou un non catégorique, ou vous dire ce qu'il en est. Je n'ai pas eu d'autres renseignements à ce sujet depuis trois mois, et je ne sais pas si le secrétariat tente de se ressusciter, de poursuivre l'orientation qu'il s'était donnée au départ, ou une autre.

Je suis vraiment désolé, mais je n'ai pas eu d'autres renseignements à ce sujet. Mes collègues de l'agence n'ont pas obtenu de renseignements, n'ont reçu aucune demande d'aide, par exemple. Je ne peux donc pas affirmer avec certitude que l'idée a été mise en veilleuse ou rejetée.

Mlle Jewett: Une dernière question. M. McWhinney et d'autres savent qu'une majorité des membres du sous-comité chargé d'étudier les relations du Canada avec l'Amérique latine et les Antilles et du comité plénier ont recommandé que le Canada participe à l'Organisation des États américains; par contre, une minorité assez importante, dont je fais partie, a estimé qu'il ne s'agissait pas d'une bonne idée. Eh bien, Dupras et moi mourrons sans nous mettre d'accord là-dessus. En commentant le rapport du sous-comité, le ministre affirme que le gouvernement étudie encore cette question, sans préciser quelle priorité il lui a accordée.

Une voix: Une grande priorité.

Mlle Jewett: Je me demande, puisque nous avons des programmes d'aide au développement dans les deux régions et que nous avons un intérêt croissant envers l'Amérique centrale et l'Amérique latine, sans compter notre intérêt à long terme

[Texte]

itself has provided any guidance to the minister on this subject. Presumably he is collecting guidance.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairman, your reference to graves is rather ominous. I may be down and almost out, but I am not quite sure I want to end up in a grave yet.

Miss Jewett: I only meant Dupras and me.

Mr. McWhinney: We have been, of course, involved, as I indicated in response to a question from an hon. member at a previous meeting, in the discussions within the government in terms of the response to the subcommittee's report. To some extent that has included the question of the OAS, but I must say in all frankness that it is not a major responsibility of the agency, being, as the hon. members well know, primarily a political decision. That matter is still under review at the present time by the government.

In response to your specific question on whether we have provided input, the answer to that question is yes, but in a more general way rather than in a specific way, whether or not the agency feels, from an agency point of view, it is necessary for Canada to be a member of the OAS to meet Canadian official development assistance objectives in Latin America.

Miss Jewett: Thank you.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Dupras, followed by Mr. Munro, please.

Mr. Dupras: Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

I thought when I heard Miss Jewett Sunday at the UN Association symposium telling us that her party was going to consider this question of OAS next July, now the party is more sensitive to its surroundings than ever, and they are going to think about it twice now, and maybe they will join me in supporting Canada's becoming a member of OAS. Anyway, I look for some interesting developments on this question from your party next July, Pauline.

Before I begin dealing with the question of the Canadian objective in the IFIs, I would like to know from Mr. McWhinney—I know that the minister has now gone to UNCTAD VI, to Europe—whether he has followed the well-established tradition of taking one or two members of Parliament who have a visible interest in international development.

• 1010

Has he taken parliamentarians with him? I do not see in the communiqué a list of the members of the delegation.

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Dupras: I am not there.

[Traduction]

envers les Antilles, si l'ACDI a donné des conseils au ministre à ce sujet. Je suppose qu'il demande conseil.

Le vice-président: Monsieur McWhinney.

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, votre allusion à la mort est plutôt sinistre. Je suis peut-être mal en point, mais je ne sais pas si je veux mourir de sitôt.

Mlle Jewett: Je ne parlais que de Dupras et de moi-même.

M. McWhinney: Bien entendu, comme je l'ai dit en répondant à une question d'un honorable député à une réunion précédente, nous avons participé aux discussions tenues par le gouvernement dans le but de répondre au rapport du sous-comité. Dans une certaine mesure, il était question de l'Organisation des États américains, mais, en toute franchise, je tiens à signaler que cela n'est pas une des responsabilités principales de l'agence, puisqu'il s'agit essentiellement d'une question politique, comme vous le savez. À l'heure qu'il est, le gouvernement est encore en train d'étudier la question.

Vous nous avez demandé si nous avons donné des conseils au ministre: à cela, je réponds oui, mais des conseils d'ordre général plutôt que précis; nous lui avons donné le point de vue de l'agence, à savoir si elle estime que le Canada doit faire partie de l'Organisation des États américains pour répondre à ses objectifs d'aide publique en Amérique Latine.

Mlle Jewett: Merci.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur McWhinney.

Je cède maintenant la parole à M. Dupras et, ensuite, à M. Munro.

M. Dupras: Merci beaucoup, madame le président.

Lors d'un colloque tenu par l'Association des Nations Unies, dimanche, il me semble avoir entendu M^{lle} Jewett dire que son parti étudierait cette question de notre participation à l'Organisation des États américains au cours du mois de juillet prochain; son parti est sans doute plus conscient que jamais de ce qui se passe autour de lui et il étudiera la question de façon plus sérieuse maintenant; et peut-être qu'il se joindra à moi pour demander au Canada de devenir membre de l'OEA. De toute façon, Pauline, je m'attends à une évolution intéressante de cette question au sein de votre parti au mois de juillet prochain.

Avant de parler des objectifs canadiens au sein des IFI, j'aimerais parler d'autre chose: Je sais que le ministre s'est maintenant rendu en Europe pour participer à la CNUCED VI; monsieur McWhinney, a-t-il respecté une tradition de longue date en s'y rendant accompagné d'un ou deux députés qui s'intéressent particulièrement à la question du développement international?

Est-il accompagné de parlementaires? Dans le communiqué je ne vois pas la liste des membres de la délégation.

Le vice-président: Monsieur McWhinney.

M. Dupras: Je ne suis pas là.

[Text]

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairperson, I am certainly getting lots of questions outside my area of jurisdiction or responsibility this morning.

I honestly do not know whom he has taken with him, members of Parliament or otherwise. Therefore I cannot, unfortunately, answer the question of the hon. member.

Mr. Dupras: Because of the high tone of international development at the UNCTAD VI conference, I thought perhaps CIDA would be more involved in this.

Mr. McWhinney: I did not mean my reply to sound facetious. Certainly CIDA has been involved. As a matter of fact, CIDA has one member of staff who is there for the full time. I just honestly do not know who the rest of the delegation are, in terms of either the ones who are there fairly full time or the ones who are specifically there for the time that the minister is there. But we have been involved.

Mr. Dupras: I want to get back to the Canadian objective in the IFIs, and some of the comments I already made three or four weeks ago on this question of whether it would be advisable for the ministers responsible to be more involved in the decision-making of these institutions on applications for loans, because I find it difficult to accept that my country is an accomplice to such operations as loans to Guatemala, as recalled by Madam Jewett. I find it difficult to accept that we are involved—indirectly, that is . . . in that kind of operation. I wonder whether the constitution of these institutions could not be reviewed so countries such as Canada which cannot accept being accomplices in that kind of operation should be excluded in these loans. Could you reflect on this, Mr. McWhinney: whether the constitution of these institutions would allow such an exclusion?

Mr. McWhinney: If I may, Madam Chairman, I will ask Mr. Lindores, who is aware of all the details of the organizations . . .

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Lindores.

Mr. Lindores: Thank you, Madam Chairman. This indeed is a complex subject, and one which rightly commands a lot of attention both within this committee and elsewhere.

I believe there were two elements to the question. The first was one of ministerial involvement. First I should note that on all of the international financial institutions we do have resident executive directors, who have been increasingly sensitized over the years to the concern of the general public, Parliament, and our own government administration to some of the issues which have been raised. The difficulty in the question is in coming to grips with such elements, as Madam Jewett referred to, as massive violations of human rights, and how does one go about defining what is massive and then how does one determine who are the parties who would be most likely to suffer from a termination of Canadian assistance.

I think there are certain basic points which try to guide our involvement in human rights questions as far as development co-operation is concerned. In the IFI specifically, we have attempted wherever possible, except in situations of clear

[Translation]

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, ce matin on m'adresse beaucoup de questions sur des sujets qui ne relèvent pas de ma compétence ou de ma responsabilité.

Honnêtement, j'ignore s'il y a des députés ou d'autres personnes qui l'accompagnent. Je ne peux donc malheureusement, pas répondre à la question de l'honorable député.

M. Dupras: Étant donné le haut niveau des pourparlers sur le développement international à la conférence UNCTAD VI, j'ai pensé que peut-être l'ACDI y participerait davantage.

M. McWhinney: Mon intention n'était pas de vous répondre de façon facétieuse, car l'ACDI y participe certainement. En fait, il y a un membre de notre personnel y est en permanence. Mais en toute sincérité j'ignore de qui se compose le reste de la délégation, de ceux qui y sont presque tout le temps ou de ceux qui y accompagnent le ministre. Mais nous y participons.

M. Dupras: Je veux revenir aux institutions internationales de financement et à l'objectif canadien. Il y a déjà trois ou quatre semaines j'ai commenté la question de savoir s'il serait souhaitable que les ministres responsables participent davantage au processus décisionnel de ces institutions en ce qui touche les demandes de prêts, car je trouve difficile à accepter que mon pays soit complice d'opérations comme les prêts accordés au Guatemala, ainsi que l'a rappelé M^{me} Jewett. Je trouve difficile à accepter qu'indirectement, nous soyons impliqués dans ce genre d'opération. Je me demande si l'on ne pourrait pas revoir les chartes de ces institutions afin que des pays comme le Canada, qui n'a pas accepté d'être un complice de ce genre d'opération, soit exclus de ces prêts. Pourriez-vous commenter cela, monsieur McWhinney: Est-ce que la charte de ces institutions permettrait de telles exclusions?

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, puis-je demander à M. Lindores, qui connaît bien ces organisations . . .

Le vice-président: Monsieur Lindores.

M. Lindores: Merci, madame le président. C'est vraiment un sujet complexe qui, à raison, soulève beaucoup l'attention au Comité et ailleurs.

Je pense qu'il faut distinguer deux aspects. Le premier concerne la participation ministérielle. D'abord je dois mentionner que nous avons dans toutes ces institutions internationales de financement, des directeurs généraux résidents, lesquels, au cours des années, ont été de plus en plus sensibilisés aux préoccupations du public en général, du Parlement et de notre propre gouvernement face à certaines questions qui ont été soulevées. La difficulté, c'est l'attitude à adopter devant des circonstances comme celles auxquelles M^{me} Jewett a fait allusion, par exemple la violation massive des droits de la personne. Comme définir ce qu'est une violation massive et, ensuite, comment déterminer qui souffrira le plus du retrait de l'aide canadienne.

Je pense que certains points fondamentaux servent à orienter notre engagement dans ces questions des droits de la personne en rapport avec la coopération au développement. En ce qui touche plus précisément les institutions internationales de

[Texte]

misuse of the resources or except in situations of massive violation of human rights, to take the decisions essentially on the question of the economic return on the project. A multilateral process is one which I always characterize as being essentially shared decision-making. To the extent that individual countries attempt to impose on an excessively detailed level—and I am picking these words carefully, because once again one then has the problem of determining what is an excessively detailed level—but to the extent that national standards are brought to international institutions of this type, the machinery can quickly be frozen into a situation of ongoing bickering over domestic standards applied internationally.

• 1015

It is difficult to judge other countries' policy behaviour on the basis of a single absolute standard, particularly, I guess, if that happens to be a Canadian standard. Perhaps we flatter ourselves by thinking that those standards are extremely high.

There is no doubt about it, also, that human rights conditionality is perceived by many recipient countries as being an unwarranted interference in their internal political affairs. Against that, of course, has to be balanced to a certain extent the adage that he who pays the piper calls the tune. Nevertheless, it is dangerous to constantly use the power of the purse to try and inflict moral standards upon these institutions.

The history would also teach us that by and large psychopathic political behaviour, such as that of the Amin regime in Uganda, is not normally constrained by reductions in foreign aid. In fact, the people who suffer most from those reductions are the most vulnerable.

In essence, Madam Chairman, the conclusion of this is that we examine each case which appears to have these types of factors on an individual basis. When we see elements which cause us concern about a project, it is referred to us by our executive director. To the extent that we feel we understand what the political guidance would be we respond; to the extent that we feel there are new issues raised or the decision is very much a borderline decision we will take it to the minister for appropriate approval and consideration.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Dupras: Thank you.

That notion of shared decision-making has its limits. As you know, the U.S.A. has already used its veto twice, once in the case of Nicaragua and the second time in the case of South Africa. Who else has vetoes over the operation of these institutions? Can Canada object to a policy-making? If it is a shared decision-making, up to what point do we share the decision-making process?

Mr. Lindores: Madam Chairman, there is no international financial institution in which we have the power of the veto. The only institution in which that exists, to the best of my information, is the Fund for Special Activities of the Inter-

[Traduction]

financement, sauf quand il y a manifestement une mauvaise utilisation des ressources ou quand il y a violation massive des droits de la personne, nous avons essayé, dans la mesure du possible, de prendre des décisions en nous fondant essentiellement sur la rentabilité économique du projet. J'ai toujours considéré le processus multilatéral comme étant essentiellement un partage du processus décisionnel. Dans la mesure où des pays essaient d'imposer trop en détail... je choisis mes mots avec prudence, car encore une fois, la difficulté est de déterminer ce que signifie trop en détail... mais dans la mesure où l'on applique des normes nationales à des institutions internationales de ce genre, cela peut provoquer un blocage rapide du mécanisme à cause de querelles sur l'application de normes nationales à une situation internationale.

Il est difficile de juger le comportement politique d'autres pays à partir d'une seule norme absolue, plus particulièrement si cette norme est canadienne, je présume. Nous nous flattons peut-être en pensant que ces normes sont extrêmement élevées.

De plus, il va aussi sans dire que les conditions touchant les droits de la personne sont perçues par beaucoup de pays récipiendaires comme une immixtion non justifiée dans leurs affaires intérieures. Par contre, bien sûr, il faut dans une certaine mesure tenir compte de la vieille règle selon laquelle celui qui paie a le droit de choisir. Néanmoins, il est dangereux de constamment faire appel au pouvoir de l'argent afin d'essayer d'imposer des normes morales à ces institutions.

L'histoire devrait également nous apprendre que généralement la réduction de l'aide étrangère ne limite habituellement pas le comportement politique psychopathe d'un régime comme celui d'Amin Dada en Ouganda. En fait, ceux qui souffrent le plus de ces réductions sont les plus vulnérables.

Essentiellement, madame le président, et en conclusion, nous examinons chaque cas qui semble présenter ce genre d'élément. Lorsque un projet comporte des éléments de préoccupation, notre directeur général nous en fait part. Nous répondons dans la mesure où nous pensons comprendre quelles directives politiques conviennent dans de telles situations; lorsque nous pensons que de nouvelles questions sont soulevées ou que la décision n'est pas très nette, nous en référons au ministre pour qu'il les étudie et donne l'autorisation appropriée.

Merci, madame le président.

M. Dupras: Merci.

La notion du partage du processus décisionnel a ses limites. Comme vous le savez, les États-Unis ont déjà utilisé deux fois leur veto, une fois dans le cas du Nicaragua et une deuxième fois dans le cas de l'Afrique du Sud. Qui d'autre a imposé son veto sur les opérations de ces institutions? Est-ce que le Canada peut s'opposer à l'établissement d'une politique? S'il s'agit de processus décisionnel partagé, jusqu'à quel point le partageons-nous?

M. Lindores: Madame le président, il n'y a aucune institution internationale de financement où nous ayons un droit de veto. À ma connaissance la seule institution où cela existe est le Fonds pour les activités spéciales de la Banque interaméri-

[Text]

American Development Bank, and the United States has in fact used its veto power there on several occasions, as you have very correctly indicated. Canada does not have that power in any institution.

By and large, in non-IFIs the process is more one of decision by consensus, and therefore we tend to have more leverage in those types of institutions. For example, in the approval of projects for the World Food Program, it would be very difficult for that institution to approve a project over Canadian objections or Canadian reservations. In the IFIs, however, where voting is used we clearly cannot veto any projects.

The Vice-Chairman: Your final question, please, Mr. Dupras.

Mr. Dupras: Yes, thank you, Madam Chairperson.

In view of the very difficult situation of many smaller countries of Central America and South America in regard to their international debt, I am worried about the leverage that could be used by the IFIs, under the influence of the U.S.A., for instance, in making decisions that we do not necessarily share. I come back to the case of Nicaragua and the financial needs of some of the neighbouring countries of Nicaragua where they are subject to pressure—could be subjected to pressure—in doing almost anything to satisfy their financial needs. This has many Canadians worried. I cannot accept that decision-making in these institutions is so limited that one country can exercise a veto and drag Canada into this as an accomplice, without the consent and in spite of the political sense of Canadians. I think this should be reviewed.

• 1020

What are the possibilities of changing the constitutions of these institutions so they would be made more democratic?

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. Lindores.

Mr. Lindores: Madam Chairman, if you were to make it more democratic, I assume the only system one could consider, other than the allocation of votes according to the size of the financial participation, would be to go the route of the United Nations, which would be: one vote, one country.

But it must be clearly pointed out that that has some very major and very serious reservations. It is highly unlikely that the major contributors, including Canada, would be prepared to accept that type of arrangement in an international financial institution where the votes of a large number of the countries might often tend to be even more on political grounds than under the existing system, and where we have very large amounts of money at stake, not only in terms of our contributions to soft windows and our paid-in capital but large amounts of callable capital which, in effect, back the very major operations of these institutions.

[Translation]

caine de développement, et les États-Unis y ont en fait utilisé leur droit de veto à de nombreuses occasions, comme vous l'avez dit. Le Canada n'a pas droit de veto dans aucune institution.

De façon générale, dans les organisations autres que les institutions internationales de financement le processus décisionnel fonctionne plutôt par consensus, donc nous avons généralement plus d'influence dans ce genre d'institution. Par exemple, si l'on prend l'approbation de projets pour le Programme mondial de l'alimentation, il serait très difficile à cette institution d'approuver un projet en dépit d'objections ou de réticences canadiennes. Par contre, dans les institutions internationales de financement où on procède par mise aux voix, il est clair que nous ne pouvons imposer de veto sur quelque projet que ce soit.

Le vice-président: Monsieur Dupras, ce sera votre dernière question.

M. Dupras: Oui, merci, madame le président.

Compte tenu de la situation très difficile dans laquelle se trouvent bon nombre de plus petits pays de l'Amérique centrale et du Sud en ce qui touche leur dette internationale, je suis inquiet des pressions que pourraient exercer les institutions internationales de financement, sous l'influence des États-Unis, par exemple, afin de prendre des décisions que nous ne partageons pas nécessairement. Je reviens au cas du Nicaragua et aux besoins financiers de certains pays avoisinant le Nicaragua, qui sont ou pourraient être soumis à des pressions, et feraient n'importe quoi pour satisfaire leurs besoins financiers. Cela inquiète bon nombre de Canadiens. Pour ma part, je ne puis accepter que les décisions se prennent de façon tellement limitée dans ces institutions, qu'un seul pays puisse exercer un droit de veto et faire du Canada son complice à cet égard, et ce sans le consentement et en dépit du sens politique des Canadiens. A mon avis, cela doit être réexaminé.

Quelles sont les possibilités qu'on modifie la constitution de ces institutions de façon à les rendre plus démocratiques?

Le vice-président: Monsieur Lindores.

M. Lindores: Madame le président, si on les rendait plus démocratiques, la seule chose qu'on puisse envisager, je suppose, à part la répartition des votes en proportion de la participation financière est de calquer leur système sur celui des Nations unies, c'est-à-dire d'accorder une voix à chaque pays.

Toutefois, il importe de préciser qu'on a de très sérieuses réserves à cet égard. En effet, il est assez peu probable que les pays qui sont les principaux bailleurs de fonds, y compris le Canada, soient disposés à accepter ce genre d'arrangement pour une institution financière internationale. Cela tient au fait que les votes d'un grand nombre de pays seront souvent pris pour des raisons encore plus politiques qu'à l'heure actuelle, et ce, dans des circonstances où des sommes considérables sont en jeu. Je n'entends pas ici seulement nos contributions à des prêts de faveur, ni encore notre capital d'apport

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I think to consider that type of alternative is an absolute non-starter and would sound the death knell for the multilateral financial institution system.

A second alternative, of course, is to withdraw or else to play such a large role in the institutions that we could manage to garner sufficient votes that we could, in fact, have a power equal to that of the United States. Clearly, the latter option is beyond our financial capability. To withdraw, we believe, is also not a viable option. While there are occasions when some of the decisions of the boards of these institutions pose some difficulty, those are definitely the minority; and consistently, we have been in a position where we have been able to support the mass of the operations of these institutions.

I guess it would be seen, and I would have to describe it, perhaps, as a rather immature temper tantrum if we were to take one or two decisions which go against our own particular policies as a context for withdrawal from the institution.

I think it must also be said, however, because of the quality of Canadian participation in these institutions and the general recognition that we by and large do not play games with our own narrow political interests in the institutions, we do have a tremendous influence on the decision-making process. We are, in fact, able to lobby and to lobby effectively, perhaps to have projects withdrawn rather than going to a formal vote when we have significant difficulties with them—and there are instances in which we have played exactly that role... or to try and convince other countries that the position they are taking may be incorrect and not in the best long-term interests of the institution or of the recipient countries. Of course, we are not always successful in that, but often we can have a very significant influence on the outcome of those decisions.

Mr. Dupras: You have cited two extremes, in fact. I was not thinking of that. I was thinking perhaps of a mechanism that, to exercise one's veto, would require at least the participation of four or five smaller nation members. I was not thinking of making it one country, one vote, because I know what the majority is. Nevertheless, a veto could be exercised if it were supported by a certain number of smaller countries, given a percentage of perhaps 20% of member nations.

The Vice-Chairman: Do you want to comment on that, Mr. Lindores, before we go to Mr. McLean?

Mr. Lindores: Madam Chairman, I just wish to underline that there is only one institution in which a veto power exists, and that is the soft fund of the Inter-American Development Bank. To change that situation would require a constitutional

[Traduction]

mais également des sommes importantes de capital exigible, qui finance les principales activités de ces institutions.

J'ai tendance à penser que ce genre de solution serait non avenue et annoncerait la fin des institutions financières multilatérales.

Comme possibilité, bien entendu, on peut se retirer ou encore jouer un rôle tellement considérable au sein des institutions qu'on pourrait attirer à soi suffisamment de votes pour être aussi puissant que les États-Unis. Or, il ne fait pas de doute que cette dernière voie ne nous est pas ouverte faute de moyens financiers. Par ailleurs, nous ne croyons pas devoir envisager de nous retirer. En effet, bien qu'à certaines occasions, certaines décisions prises par les conseils d'administration de ces institutions nous paraissent difficiles à accepter, ce n'est vrai que dans un très petit nombre de cas; en général, nous avons été en mesure d'appuyer la plupart des activités de ces établissements.

Si nous saisissons le prétexte d'une ou de deux décisions contraires à nos politiques pour nous retirer, je crois qu'on considérerait cela comme une manifestation intempestive d'immaturité, et à mon avis, on aurait raison.

Par ailleurs, il est également important de rappeler qu'à cause de la grande qualité de la participation des Canadiens aux travaux de ces organismes et de la reconnaissance très répandue qu'en général, nous n'essayons pas de promouvoir nos intérêts politiques immédiats et étroits, nous exerçons une influence considérable sur la prise de décision. De fait, lorsque nous avons des réserves importantes envers certains projets, nous sommes en mesure d'exercer des pressions et de le faire efficacement afin qu'on les retire plutôt que d'être obligés de signifier notre position par un vote. Il y a d'ailleurs des cas où c'est précisément ce que nous avons fait. Nous pouvons également nous efforcer de convaincre d'autres pays que leur position est erronée et qu'elle ne sert pas les intérêts à long terme de l'institution, ni même ceux des pays récipiendaires. Bien entendu, nos efforts ne sont pas toujours couronnés de succès, mais souvent nous réussissons à infléchir de façon significative l'orientation des gens et, partant, les décisions.

M. Dupras: Vous avez cité deux extrêmes, alors que ce n'est pas à cela que je songeais. Je pensais plutôt à un mécanisme exigeant la participation d'au moins quatre ou cinq petites nations pour qu'on exerce un droit de veto. Je n'entrevois pas d'accorder un vote pour chaque pays, car je sais bien lesquels constituent la majorité. Néanmoins, il y aurait moyen d'exercer un droit de veto s'il était appuyé par un certain nombre de petits pays, c'est-à-dire environ 20 p. 100 des nations membres.

Le vice-président: Avez-vous quelque chose à dire là-dessus, monsieur Lindores, avant que nous n'accordions la parole à M. McLean?

• 1025

M. Lindores: Madame le président, j'aimerais simplement rappeler qu'il n'y a qu'une institution où existe un droit de veto, il s'agit du fonds pour prêts à conditions de faveur de la Banque interaméricaine de développement. Modifier les

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change for that fund over which the United States would have a veto power.

An hon. Member: Catch 22.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Lindores, Mr. Dupras. Now Mr. McLean, please.

Mr. McLean: Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

The acting president will remember that at one of our earlier meetings I raised a number of questions that hinged upon the government's formal response to the committee's report on Canada's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean. I was particularly concerned at that time about Canada's policy regarding refugees in Central America and was hoping that would be some full acceptance of recommendations 15, 16 and 17 in the committee's report.

We have had, in the last week, the government's response on the report after six months of deliberation on the part of the government. As I review the comments, I am struck by the government's tendency to merely summarize their past record, which seems to me inadequate when, in the light of the growing turmoil in Central America, a definitive statement is necessary during these times which would permit more action.

Recommendations 15, 16 and 17 articulate the subcommittee's desire to see the refugee situation in the Central American conflict assisted in a more meaningful way, and some of this presumably through international financial institutions. These recommendations underline our firm belief that Canada must step up its present activities in the region, and given the difficult political situation that is likely to mean facilitating the work of the NGO community who are tackling many of the problems there.

As at least my expectations of the government's response have not been fulfilled in this reply, I am wondering if the acting president can indicate to the committee whether his consultations on Canada's refugee policy with officials in the department and the minister would suggest that this is the end of the line, or can I and others on the committee reassure concerned and committed Canadian groups that the government may yet come forward with a stronger policy in regard to Central America and the refugee situation?

The Vice-Chairman: Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairman, the agency obviously shares the concern, as has been expressed in previous meetings, about the refugee situation, and within our jurisdiction we are moving to be responsive and to provide funding for groups to assist in this area, including multilateral groups and non-governmental organizations.

We were involved in the process, as I said in response to an earlier question, with preparation of the government's reply to the series of recommendations of the subcommittee, but the thrust of recommendations 15, 16 and 17 are under the

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dispositions concernant ce fonds exigerait un changement constitutionnel sur lequel les États-Unis ont un droit de veto.

Une voix: C'est une situation sans issue.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Lindores, monsieur Dupras. Monsieur McLean, à vous la parole maintenant.

M. McLean: Merci, madame le président.

Le président suppléant se souviendra sans doute que lors d'une de nos réunions précédentes, j'ai soulevé un certain nombre de questions ayant trait à la réponse officielle donnée par le gouvernement au rapport du Comité sur les relations avec l'Amérique latine et la région des Antilles. J'ai alors fait part de ma vive préoccupation au sujet de la politique du Canada par rapport aux réfugiés d'Amérique centrale tout en espérant qu'on accepterait pleinement les recommandations 15, 16 et 17 du rapport du Comité.

Cette dernière semaine, le gouvernement a fait connaître sa réponse au rapport après six mois de discussions. Or, lorsque je réexamine ces remarques, je suis frappé par la tendance qu'a le gouvernement de tout simplement résumer les prises de position qu'il a prises par le passé, ce qui me semble insuffisant, car devant des désordres croissants observés en Amérique centrale, il est nécessaire de se prononcer de façon nette afin de pouvoir intervenir davantage.

Les recommandations 15, 16 et 17 illustrent le désir qu'a le Sous-comité qu'on vienne davantage en aide aux réfugiés d'Amérique centrale, et en partie, je suppose, par le truchement des institutions financières internationales. Ces recommandations soulignent notre ferme conviction que le Canada doit intensifier ses activités dans la région, et étant donné la situation politique actuelle difficile, cela revient vraisemblablement à faciliter le travail des organisations non gouvernementales, directement aux prises avec bon nombre de problèmes qui se posent là-bas.

Étant donné que cette prise de position ne répond pas à mes attentes, le président suppléant peut-il nous dire si ceci est le dernier mot de ses consultations avec les hauts fonctionnaires du ministère et avec le ministre sur la politique du Canada par rapport aux réfugiés? Ou moi-même et d'autres membres du Comité pouvons-nous rassurer les groupes canadiens inquiets et engagés à cet égard, pouvons-nous leur dire que le gouvernement pourrait encore adopter une politique plus forte sur la situation de l'Amérique centrale et des réfugiés de cette région?

Le vice-président: Monsieur McWhinney.

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, il ne fait pas de doute que l'agence partage ces préoccupations. Nous les avons d'ailleurs exprimées au sujet du sort des réfugiés, lors de séances antérieures. D'ailleurs, nous prenons les mesures nécessaires pour financer les groupes qui viennent en aide aux réfugiés, y compris des groupes multilatéraux et des organisations non gouvernementales.

Comme je l'ai dit en réponse à une question posée plus tôt, nous participons au processus en préparant les réponses du gouvernement aux recommandations émanant du Sous-comité, mais la substance des recommandations 15, 16 et 17 relève du

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jurisdiction of the Department of Employment and Immigration and deal with a number of questions of refugee status as distinct from assistance for refugees through a variety of channels.

Primarily in this area, but not exclusively, the agency is responsive. We have responded last year, as I think is on the record—but I will perhaps put it on again—in the order of \$2.5 million to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' activities in the region. We expect we will be responding again during the current fiscal year.

I should also indicate, because it is a bit analogous, although not directly the question of refugees, that we will be announcing today or tomorrow a provision of \$975,000 in humanitarian assistance to the victims of the civil war in El Salvador in response to appeals from the International Committee for the Red Cross. We rely very strongly in our programming on the professional expertise and on-site experience of international multilateral agencies and local agencies affiliated thereto, such as Red Cross and Green Cross, as well as other non-governmental organizations in those countries; and, in addition to what I have just indicated in the broad area through multilateral institutions, we do respond to projects from Canadian non-governmental organizations to assist with refugee work in that and, indeed, other areas around the globe. So it is certainly within the context of particularly the hon. member's question. In Central America, it is a matter of some priority from the agency's point of view, and I see that being maintained and strengthened.

• 1030

Mr. McLean: Just a supplementary to that line of questioning. Given the reports coming out of Central America now, in terms of the escalating tension, and the comments from informed observers that we are likely to move into a more violent situation, rather than less violent, given moves in the administration in the United States despite the concerns of Congress, I am wondering what mechanism you have in place in CIDA for responding to the circumstances as they may develop on almost a day-to-day basis. We all hope that they will not; but given this slow and steady progression of increasing violence in the area and the human tragedy that will surround it, what advance-planning mechanism is there in CIDA so that given tragic circumstance, which may well occur, Canada will be able to say that we are not considering it but are actually are prepared to move and intervene, as the government suggests it is waiting to do, or anxious to do, where appropriate?

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairman, I think in many ways we are in a better position in this regard than we were several years ago. The agency is involved in being aware of the situation, if you will, in several areas. For example, the multilateral division, and more particularly the group which

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ministère de l'Emploi et de l'Immigration et porte sur un certain nombre de questions relatives à la reconnaissance du statut de réfugié par opposition à l'aide accordée aux réfugiés par diverses voies.

L'agence réagit donc à cet aspect de la question, même si elle ne limite pas son intervention à cet aspect. Déjà l'année dernière, nous avons versé des sommes importantes, et même si je l'ai déjà mentionné, précisons qu'il s'agissait de \$2.5 millions accordés au Haut commissariat des Nations Unies pour les activités des réfugiés dans la région. Nous prévoyons d'ailleurs contribuer de nouveau au cours de l'année financière actuelle.

Je devrais également profiter de l'occasion pour vous communiquer que plus tard aujourd'hui, nous allons annoncer le versement de \$975,000 au titre de l'aide humanitaire pour les victimes de la guerre civile au Salvador, en réponse à des demandes provenant du Comité international de la Croix-rouge. Cela ne porte pas directement sur la question des réfugiés, mais est tout de même voisin. Lorsque nous établissons nos programmes, nous nous fions beaucoup aux connaissances professionnelles ainsi qu'à l'expérience acquise sur le terrain par les organismes internationaux multilatéraux et par les organismes locaux qui leur sont affiliés. Je songe ici à la Croix-rouge, à la Croix-verte et également à d'autres organisations non gouvernementales situées dans ces pays. En plus de l'aide que nous accordons par l'entremise d'institutions multilatérales, nous donnons également suite à des projets conçus par des organisations non gouvernementales canadiennes pour appuyer le travail fait en faveur des réfugiés, à la fois dans cette région et dans d'autres, ailleurs dans le monde. Cela a certainement quelque chose à voir avec la question du député. En Amérique centrale, l'agence place cette action haut dans l'échelle prioritaire et je prévois que cela continuera et s'accroîtra.

M. McLean: Je voudrais poser une question complémentaire. Actuellement nous apprenons d'Amérique centrale que la tension s'exacerbe, par ailleurs des observateurs bien renseignés annoncent que la situation va devenir plus violente, au lieu de s'apaiser, et le gouvernement des États-Unis a pris des mesures malgré l'opposition du congrès; dans cette situation quel mécanisme l'ACDI a-t-elle prévu pour répondre à une situation qui risque de s'envenimer de jour en jour? Nous espérons que ce ne sera pas le cas, mais étant donné que la violence s'intensifie de façon longue et constante dans la région et que cela amènera un cortège de souffrances, quel mécanisme l'ACDI a-t-elle prévu pour que, si la situation tourne au tragique, comme on peut s'y attendre, le Canada soit en mesure de réagir et d'intervenir, comme le gouvernement s'est dit prêt à le faire au besoin?

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, à plusieurs égards nous sommes actuellement en meilleure posture qu'il y a plusieurs années. L'agence est au courant de la situation dans plusieurs régions. Par exemple, la division multilatérale, et plus particulièrement le service qui s'occupe de l'aide humanitaire

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concerns itself with humanitarian and emergency relief, are in regular contact with the international agencies involved in the areas in question. I think it is fair to say that the agency has a fairly excellent record in terms of response to international appeals for assistance with regard to refugees or other difficulties requiring a humanitarian response.

In our bilateral area, our people who are responsible for the so-called bilateral program desks—in this case, in the Americas division, dealing with Central America—are not only aware and in constant consultation with our embassies and the recipient governments in terms of bilateral projects, under the so-called country-focus approach within the agency they also have a responsibility for the awareness of the totality of the situation in a given country. I think the response mechanisms are there to handle anything that might come up.

If there were to be difficulties of the kind referred to by the hon. member, the response mechanism is there; and depending on the nature of those difficulties, one would probably see a shift in the nature of Canada's programming, perhaps away from bilateral to other forms of indirect assistance depending on what the circumstances are in the country, that sort of thing. We have seen this historically in the last two or three years with regard to our programming in El Salvador, which was the subject of questions in an earlier meeting of this committee. But I think the mechanisms are in place at the present time to respond to developments as they take place, and I am confident the agency will be able to play its role in that regard.

Mr. McLean: Madam Chairperson, one final comment. I would welcome the acting president's reflections on the minister's announcement last week of his intention to attend the UNCTAD meetings in Belgrade this week. I was interested in the paragraph that outlined our role and objectives at UNCTAD, and which reads as follows:

Canada will emphasize the importance of nurturing the fragile recovery now underway through policies which promote sustainable non-inflationary growth and which support the development efforts of developing countries. In the Canadian view, the conference should serve to set the North-South dialogue on a constructive course and to enhance confidence in the ability of international economic institutions to address the critical problems the world is currently facing.

I am wondering if Mr. McWhinney could share with us his perspective on the UNCTAD meeting. For example, what priorities does he consider most relevant to the ongoing work of CIDA, and how might these meetings influence our Canadian foreign aid policies in relation to the developing world?

• 1035

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairman, that is a good question and a tough question. The UNCTAD meetings in Belgrade, if I remember and understand correctly, are focusing primarily on issues related to trade and international financial matters as distinct from the development assistance, be it

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et d'urgence, est en contact étroit avec les organismes internationaux sur place. Il convient de signaler que l'agence a par le passé réagi de façon irréprochable aux appels internationaux d'aide, que ce soit pour les réfugiés ou dans d'autres circonstances demandant un appui humanitaire.

Du côté bilatéral, nous avons des responsables qui s'occupent de ce que l'on appelle les programmes bilatéraux. Une division est affectée précisément aux Amériques, à l'Amérique centrale notamment. Ces gens sont non seulement au courant de la situation, mais ils sont en contact permanent avec nos ambassades et avec les gouvernements bénéficiaires de l'aide bilatérale, car l'agence a une politique axée sur les pays, qui tient compte de l'ensemble de la situation dans un pays donné. Je pense que les mécanismes de réaction sont en place pour parer à toute éventualité.

Si des difficultés comme celles qu'a évoquées le député surgissaient, le mécanisme de réaction interviendrait. Suivant les circonstances, il y aurait peut-être modification des programmes canadiens, et on remplacerait les programmes bilatéraux par une aide indirecte adaptée aux événements. Depuis deux ou trois ans, nous avons procédé ainsi au Salvador, dont nous avons parlé lors d'une autre réunion. Les mécanismes sont en place actuellement pour parer à toute éventualité et j'ai tout lieu de croire que l'agence pourra jouer un rôle utile.

M. McLean: Madame le président, une dernière remarque. Je voudrais que le président suppléant nous parle de l'annonce faite par le ministre la semaine dernière de son intention d'assister aux réunions de la CNUCED, à Belgrade cette semaine. Le paragraphe qui décrit notre rôle et nos objectifs à la CNUCED m'a intéressé tout particulièrement et je cite:

Le Canada mettra l'accent sur la nécessité d'alimenter la fragile reprise à laquelle nous assistons actuellement, par le biais de politiques non inflationnistes soutenues et favorisant les efforts de développement des pays du tiers monde. De l'avis du Canada, la conférence devrait servir à orienter de façon constructive le dialogue nord-sud et à accroître la confiance dans la capacité des institutions économiques internationales de s'attaquer aux problèmes critiques auxquels le monde fait présentement face.

Je me demande si M. McWhinney pourrait nous dire ce qu'il pense de la CNUCED. Par exemple, quelles sont les priorités qu'il croit les plus pertinentes pour continuer l'oeuvre de l'ACDI et quelle influence pourraient avoir ces réunions sur nos politiques canadiennes d'aide étrangère vis-à-vis du Tiers monde?

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, c'est une bonne question, et il est difficile d'y répondre. Les réunions de la CNUCED, à Belgrade, si ma mémoire est bonne, et si j'ai bien compris la question, portent principalement sur des sujets ayant trait à des questions de commerce et de finances

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official or otherwise. So the agency, as I indicated in response to an earlier question, is involved, but is not the principal player, in this broad North-South meeting that is on at the present time.

Mr. McLean: But I am looking for the spin-off, or your preception of what may be the spin-off.

Mr. McWhinney: I understand that. From the agency's point of view, the government's policy with regard to volumes of ODA—targets of 0.5% of GNP in 1985-1986—has been recently reaffirmed prior to, but also in relation to, the UNCTAD conference. There will be a number of discussions, I understand, with regard to the particular question of debt, but that is rather a complex and—I think I am right in saying—a fairly confused situation internationally, because there are two strata, or substrata, within the debt problem. There is the broader, and much larger in dollar terms, problem of debt primarily of a relatively few middle-income countries and primarily with regard to private sources of debt, on the one hand, and a larger number of countries but a smaller volume of debt represented by the debt of the poorest of the poor countries, including both official debt and private debt.

My understanding is that this is one of the subjects that will attract a lot of attention at UNCTAD. It should—I hope it does—and depending on some of the conclusions at that conference and the government's response at and subsequent to the conference, this may have some bearing on CIDA's policies and programmings, but at this stage I think it is fair to say that it is a little too early to tell.

Mr. McLean: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. McLean. I now have Mr. Laniel, followed by Mr. Munro, please.

M. Laniel: Madame le président, le Budget des dépenses supplémentaire (A) qui est devant nous réfère au paiement de 7,342,000 de dollars à des institutions de développement international, et même s'il n'y a pas de montant attribué à la Banque africaine de développement, j'aimerais poser une question qui s'y rapporte tout de même.

I would like to ask Mr. McWhinney if he has some information about a project that Petro-Canada International has undertaken in co-operation with the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, offshore of Tanzania, for a total amount of \$27 million, which has until now completed one drilling. If so, I would like him to explain to me what the purpose of such drilling projects is, what the relation between CIDA and this project is—is there any co-operation, supervision—and is there also any kind of co-ordination by CIDA when the time comes for Petro-Canada to select such projects, or is Petro-Canada completely independent in its program? I would like to know also: Do we have other comparable development projects, or co-operation projects, in regard to

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internationales, par opposition à l'aide au développement, qu'elles soient officielles ou autres. Donc, l'agence, comme je l'ai dit en réponse à une question précédente, quoiqu'elle n'y joue pas de rôle principal, est tout de même engagée dans cette réunion globale Nord-Sud qui a lieu actuellement.

Mr. McLean: Mais je cherche à savoir quelles en seront les retombées, ou encore, votre perception de ce qu'elles seront.

Mr. McWhinney: Je comprends. Du point de vue de l'agence, la politique du gouvernement pour ce qui concerne l'APD—des objectifs de 0.5 p. 100 du PNB en 1985-1986—a été reconfirmé avant cette conférence de la CNUCED, mais aussi en conjonction avec elle. J'ai cru comprendre qu'il y aurait un certain nombre de débats concernant la question précise de la dette, mais il s'agit d'une question plutôt complexe, et je crois que je suis justifié de le dire, d'une situation plutôt confuse à l'échelle internationale, car il y a deux niveaux, ou sous-niveaux, au problème de la dette. Tout d'abord, en termes de dollars, il y a le problème plus large des dettes auxquelles fait face un nombre relativement restreint de pays à revenu moyen, et le problème se situe surtout au niveau des sources privées de financement, et, d'autre part, il y a un plus grand nombre de pays dont la masse totale de la dette est moindre, et elle est représentée par la dette des pays les plus pauvres parmi les pauvres, et elle comprend à la fois la dette officielle et la dette privée.

Je me suis laissé dire que c'est là un des sujets qui intéresseront au plus haut point la CNUCED. Ce devrait être le cas—j'espère que ce le sera—et tout dépendant de certaines des conclusions auxquelles on en arrivera à cette conférence, ainsi que de la réaction du gouvernement à ce moment-là et lors de conférences futures, les politiques et programmes de l'ACDI pourraient en être modifiés, mais je crois qu'on pourrait dire, pour le moment, qu'il est un peu tôt pour se prononcer à ce sujet.

Mr. McLean: Merci, madame le président.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur McLean. Je cède maintenant la parole à M. Laniel, qui sera suivi de M. Munro.

Mr. Laniel: Madam Chairwoman, the supplementary estimates we have before us refer to the payment of \$7,342,000 to international development institutions and even though there is no amount attributed to the African Development Bank, I would like to put a question on that anyway.

J'aimerais demander à M. McWhinney s'il a quelques renseignements sur un projet entrepris par Petro-Canada International, en collaboration avec la Société de développement du pétrole de la Tanzanie, au large des côtes de la Tanzanie, pour un montant total de 27 millions de dollars, programme en vertu duquel on a réussi à terminer le forage d'un puits déjà. Si c'est le cas, j'aimerais qu'il m'explique le but de tels projets de forage, quel rapport existe entre l'ACDI et ce projet, et s'il y a collaboration ou surveillance, et j'aimerais aussi savoir si l'ACDI assure une certaine coordination lorsque arrive le temps, pour Petro-Canada, de choisir de tels projets, ou si, au contraire, Petro-Canada est indépendant et le seul responsable de ces programmes. J'aimerais aussi

[Text]

hydrocarbon drilling where Canada is a partner? Is this project subsidized by somebody other than Petro-Canada? Is it accounted for in the calculation of our Canadian aid program?

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The Vice-Chairman: Mr. McWhinney.

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, je tenterai de donner de plus amples renseignements à l'honorable député à ce sujet. Je peux peut-être commencer en disant que les activités de Petro-Canada sont incluses dans la totalité de l'aide officielle du Canada. Ils reçoivent des fonds du portefeuille de l'Énergie plutôt que de celui des Affaires extérieures. Ils ne sont pas responsables à l'ACDI mais je dois vous indiquer que le ministère des Affaires étrangères est un membre parmi plusieurs autres qui font partie du conseil d'administration de Petro-Canada International. Dans ce sens-là, toutes les agences, incluant l'ACDI, y sont impliquées, engagées et informées du déroulement des activités de cette agence.

Au cours de la dernière réunion de ce Comité-ci, une lettre de M. Peter Towe avait été soumise et elle est maintenant incluse, je présume, au compte rendu de cette réunion-là. Elle faisait état des autres pays où il existe des activités de cet organisme, dont la Tanzanie, et elle inclut différentes autres questions. Si vous me le permettez, je vous en ferai part dans un mélange d'anglais et de français car la lettre que j'ai devant moi est rédigée en anglais seulement.

Efforts in Tanzania include the drilling of an offshore exploratory well by the drillship *Pelerin* under contract to Petro-Canada, a review of the existing geophysical data from the Rift Valley, and provision of management and operational advisers in training with personnel.

Il y a de plus une espèce de coordination et de consultation au niveau du travail entre l'ACDI et Petro-Canada International. À titre d'exemple, certains projets et activités qui sont entrepris au Pakistan dans ce domaine se font en consultation avec Petro-Canada. Comme je l'avais indiqué à la dernière réunion, l'agence Petro-Canada International a été créée il y a deux ans seulement. À ce moment-ci, l'agence et l'ACDI sont en train de préciser les activités ensemble à savoir, par exemple, où il serait possible, pour Petro-Canada, d'être l'agence d'exécution, le cas échéant, pour certains projets de l'ACDI. En somme, beaucoup de connaissances sont partagées par les deux agences. Il y a plusieurs possibilités d'activités conjointes ou par la piste de Petro-Canada International en tant qu'agent d'exécution. Toutefois, la responsabilité de Petro-Canada International relève de la juridiction du portefeuille de l'Énergie et en particulier du ministre de l'Énergie, des Mines et des Ressources.

M. Laniel: Si je comprends bien, ce genre de projet a comme objectif principal d'aider le pays participant, le pays concerné, non seulement dans le but d'y trouver des hydrocarbures, mais également d'aider à l'entraînement de personnel qualifié,

[Translation]

savoir ce qui suit: y a-t-il d'autres projets de développement comparables, ou des projets de coopération, où le Canada serait engagé, à titre d'associé, à chercher des réserves d'hydrocarbures? Ce projet est-il subventionné par un organisme autre que Petro-Canada? En tient-on compte lorsqu'on calcule les montants accordés en vertu du programme d'aide canadien?

Le vice-président: Monsieur McWhinney.

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairwoman, I will try to give more information to the honourable member on that subject. I could perhaps start by saying that Petro-Canada's activities are included in the total of Canada's official aid. They receive funds from the Energy portfolio rather than from External Affairs. They are not accountable to CIDA, but I should point out that the Department of External Affairs is one member of many who sit on Petro-Canada International's board of directors. As far as that goes, all the organizations, including CIDA, are involved in that and informed about the ongoing activities of that agency.

During the last meeting of this committee, a letter from Mr. Peter Towe was submitted and I presume it is now included in the record of that meeting. It mentioned other countries where that organization has ongoing activities, Tanzania was one of them, and other different questions were also mentioned. If you do not mind, I will switch from French to English and back again because the letter I have in front of me is written in English only.

Les efforts en Tanzanie comprennent les volets suivants: forage d'un puits d'exploration en mer par le navire foréur *Pelerin* lié par contrat à Petro-Canada; étude des données géophysiques actuelles de la *Rift Valley*; et affectation de conseillers administratifs et techniques, en formation avec le personnel.

Furthermore, there are co-ordination and consultation activities at the working level between CIDA and Petro-Canada International. For example, some projects and activities that have been undertaken in Pakistan in that area are being done in consultation with Petro-Canada. As I indicated at the last meeting, Petro-Canada International was set up two years ago only. At this point, that organization and CIDA are consulting on common activities, for example, where would it be possible for Petro-Canada to be the executory agent, if need be, for certain CIDA projects. In brief, a lot of knowledge is being shared by both agencies. There are many joint activity possibilities or possibilities of going through Petro-Canada International as executory agency. However, Petro-Canada International is accountable to the Energy portfolio and, more particularly, to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources.

Mr. Laniel: If I have understood you correctly, this kind of project's main objective is to help the country involved not only with the objective of finding hydrocarbons, but also to help with the training of qualified personnel, experts and profes-

[Texte]

d'experts et de professionnels. Dans les clauses du contrat de la Tanzanie, on semble dire que c'est un bateau de Petro-Canada qui réalisera le projet.

• 1045

La plupart des études sont faites par des entreprises canadiennes et une quinzaine de compagnies canadiennes fournissent du matériel. Je n'ai rien contre cela mais, tout compte fait, pense-t-on que c'est de l'argent bien placé, tant dans l'intérêt du Canada que dans l'intérêt de ces pays-là, sans égard à la situation politique qu'il peut y avoir dans certains de ces pays?

Mr. McWhinney: J'ose penser, madame le président, que la réponse particulière de Petro-Canada International va varier selon la situation dans les pays. Le premier objectif de cette agence-là est d'aider les pays en voie de développement par la recherche d'hydrocarbures et, le cas échéant, de produire ces hydrocarbures particulier, pour réduire sinon éliminer leur dépendance sur les hydrocarbures importés. C'est fort possible, mais je ne connais pas bien la situation particulière. Dans un pays comme la Tanzanie, il n'y a aucune ressource locale pour exercer ces types d'activités, comme l'a expliqué l'honorable député. C'est pourquoi le Canada fait beaucoup plus maintenant que plus tard, ou peut-être plus que dans un autre pays. Mais le projet inclut toujours, si je comprends bien, un aspect de formation et d'embauche de personnel local.

Si vous me permettez, je vais porter à l'attention du président de Petro-Canada International vos questions de ce matin afin qu'il puisse vous donner une réponse plus précise quant à ce projet que je ne connais pas personnellement.

Le vice-président: Ce sera votre dernière question, s'il vous plaît.

Mr. Laniel: Vous avez dit qu'un tel projet ne fait pas partie de l'enveloppe de l'ACDI mais vient plutôt de l'enveloppe du ministère de l'Énergie, des Mines et des Ressources. Est-ce qu'il est identifié dans l'enveloppe d'Énergie, Mines et Ressources ou bien s'il est compris dans le crédit de Petro-Canada en général?

Mr. McWhinney: Madame le président, la question de l'honorable député est intéressante étant donné qu'on en avait une semblable à une autre réunion de ce Comité-ci. À la suite de la dernière réunion, on m'a dit que ce n'était pas facile d'identifier dans les prévisions budgétaires. En ce moment, c'est inclus dans le crédit global de Petro-Canada, si je comprends bien. C'est-à-dire qu'on ne peut pas avoir un crédit indiqué Petro-Canada International dans les crédits du ministère de l'Énergie, des Mines et des Ressources de cette année.

Mr. Laniel: Pouvez-vous demander au président de Petro-Canada de fournir au Comité la liste des projets que Petro-Canada exploite actuellement?

Mr. McWhinney: C'est déjà fait, madame le président, dans la lettre qui est dans le procès-verbal de la dernière réunion.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Laniel.

[Traduction]

sions. In the Tanzania contract clauses, it would seem that it is a Petro-Canada ship that will be carrying out the project.

Most of the studies are done by Canadian firms and about 15 Canadian companies are providing the equipment. I have nothing against that but, in the final analysis, do we think that it is money being well used both in Canada's interest and in those countries' without any concern for the political situation that might be prevalent in some of those countries?

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairwoman, I dare say that the specific response from Petro-Canada International will vary according to the situation in each country. The first objective of that agency is to help developing countries by looking for hydrocarbons and, as the case may be, producing those specific hydrocarbons to diminish if not eliminate complete their dependence on imported hydrocarbons. It is quite possible, but I do not really know what the specific situation is. In a country like Tanzania, there are no local resources to get involved in those kinds of activities as the honourable member explained. That is why Canada is doing more now than later or perhaps more than in another country. But, unless I am mistaken, in that kind of project, there is always included an aspect of training and hiring local personnel.

If you do not mind, I will bring to the attention of Petro-Canada International's president the questions you have put this morning so that he can give you a more specific answer about this project that I do not really have any personal knowledge of.

The Vice-Chairman: This will be your last question, please.

Mr. Laniel: You said that a project like that one is not part of CIDA's envelope but would rather be part of the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources' envelope. Is it identified as such in that Energy, Mines and Resources' envelope or is it included in Petro-Canada's general vote?

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairwoman, the honourable member's question is interesting because we had another one like it at another one of this committee's meetings. After the last meeting, I was told that it was not easy to identify that sort of thing in estimates. At this point, it is included in Petro-Canada's global budget, if I am not mistaken. Which means that you cannot have a vote identified under Petro-Canada International in this year's votes for the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.

Mr. Laniel: Could you ask Petro-Canada's president to give the committee a list of those projects Petro-Canada is involved in presently?

Mr. McWhinney: That has already been done, Madam Chairwoman, in the letter which is part of the record of the last meeting.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Laniel.

[Text]

Now, Mr. Munro, followed by Mr. Hudecki. I must inform my colleagues that we have to vacate this room at 11.00 a.m. Mr. Munro, please.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Madam Chairman, if I may, I would like to follow up that question a little. Mr. Laniel referred to the *Pelerin* as a ship belonging to Petro-Canada International. I wonder if that can be clarified a little more. Is it, in fact, a drill ship under Canadian flag, or is the acting president able to tell us the registry of the *Pelerin*, which is the drill ship working for Petro-Canada International off the shores of Tanzania?

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairman, I think it is a ship under contract to Petro-Canada and the registry is Belgium, I am informed.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): It is a Belgium-registered ship. This raises a couple of other questions in relation to the use of Canadian vessels by Canadian agencies when working abroad; and it is also related, in my mind at least, to what is known as ODA or official development assistance. Would the ODA figure include the operations of Petro-Canada International in this sense, that the official development assistance being offered by Canada to, as I understand the term, countries abroad would include the payment to Belgium of Canadian funds for a purpose of this sort?

• 1050

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairman, if I hesitate, it is really that I am in an area that I am not familiar with Petro-Canada's activities. I really do not know on a day-to-day basis. I do not know even if the registry is Belgian, what the ownership question here is, what the procedures are of Petro-Canada, anything of that kind; but I would be happy to take the question, if I may, refer it to the president of Petro-Canada, both with regard to Mr. Munro's and Mr. Laniel's questions, and ask Mr. Towe... which he has done before—if he would be good enough to respond in writing to the committee in answer to these questions.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I will say that Mr. Towe has been most co-operative in this regard. He reads the minutes or he has the minutes referred to him—I am not quite sure which it is—but he does get the replies back to me.

I think it would also be of interest to know, since it is registered in Belgium, whether it is a ship that was once operating on behalf of Petrofina. That sounds like sort of a great Canadian-Belgian linkage.

My other question relates, if I may go back just a little bit in time, I suppose, to the personnel matters which were outlined in the main estimates. I should make it quite clear that I am referring to main estimate figures, and they, I suppose, will have been deemed to have been passed. But there is a question here which I did not get an opportunity to ask; and that has to do with page 46 of the main estimates, this abrupt increase in the management figures for CIDA from 35 to 80 person-years over the period 1983 to 1984, a figure which looks as though it

[Translation]

Et maintenant, M. Munro suivi de M. Hudecki. Je dois informer mes collègues que nous devons libérer cette salle à 11 heures précises. Monsieur Munro, s'il vous plaît.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Madame le président, si vous me le permettez, j'aimerais continuer un peu sur la même lancée. M. Laniel a dit que le navire *Pelerin* appartenait à Petro-Canada International. J'aimerais avoir quelques éclaircissements à ce sujet. S'agit-il d'un navire de forage battant pavillon canadien ou le président intérimaire pourrait-il nous dire quel est l'enregistrement du *Pelerin*, ce navire de forage qui travaille pour Petro-Canada International au large des côtes de la Tanzanie?

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, je crois que c'est un navire qui travaille à contrat pour Petro-Canada et on me dit que ce navire est enregistré en Belgique.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Ce navire est enregistré en Belgique. Cela soulève quelques autres questions pour ce qui est de l'utilisation de navires canadiens par des organismes canadiens travaillant à l'étranger; à mon avis, cette question a des liens directs avec ce qu'on appelle l'aide officielle au développement ou A.O.D. Les chiffres de l'AOD tiennent-ils compte de Petro Canada International? Autrement dit, l'aide publique canadienne au développement inclut-elle les paiements que le Canada fait à la Belgique dans un cas comme celui-là?

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, j'hésite à répondre parce que je ne connais pas bien les activités de Petro Canada. Je ne suis pas pied à pied les derniers développements. Je ne sais même pas si l'enregistrement est belge, qui est propriétaire ni quelles sont les méthodes de Petro Canada. Si vous le permettez, je prendrai note de la question pour la signaler au président de Petro Canada. J'en ferai autant pour les questions de M. Laniel. Je demanderai à M. Towe, qui du reste l'a déjà fait, de bien vouloir répondre par écrit à ces questions des membres du Comité.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je tiens à dire que M. Towe a toujours fait preuve de la plus grande coopération. Je ne sais pas s'il lit les comptes rendus des séances, mais de toute façon il est au courant, et je suis toujours assuré d'une réponse.

Je crois qu'il serait également intéressant de savoir si la bateau bat pavillon beige et s'il s'agit d'un bâtiment qui appartenait autrefois à Petrofina. Cela ressemble à un super tandem Canada-Belgique.

Je voudrais revenir à des questions de personnel qui figurent dans le budget principal. Je me reporte aux prévisions budgétaires principales qui, je suppose, seront réputées avoir été adoptées. Voici une question que je n'avais pas eu l'occasion de poser. Je me reporte à la page 47 du budget principal où l'on constate que le nombre des gestionnaires de l'ACDI a fait un bond gigantesque, étant passé de 35 à 80 années-personnes, entre 1983 et 1984; il semble qu'on ait tiré entièrement ces années-personnes des directions de l'administration et du

[Texte]

was drawn almost entirely from the administrative and foreign service branches, because there was a 45 person-year decrease in one and a 45 person-year increase in the other. Then looking at the amounts involved, it is sort of a 10% or 11% increase in costs to have this sudden increase in management staff. I wonder if there is any comment that can be made about this. That would be my final question, aside from supplementaries.

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairman, the wording on page 46 of the estimates on this and other items refers to the year-over-the-year increase.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Yes, I see.

Mr. McWhinney: The hon. member may or may not recall supplementary estimates for CIDA with regard to 1982-1983, at which time there were included therein person-years which were approved by Parliament. So the actual increase, since the last time the committee reviewed it, if you will, is something like one PY or zero PY. In other words, it reflects the supplementary estimates that were approved during the year in this particular case historically.

With regard to the 11%, I have tried to . . .

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): In funding.

Mr. McWhinney: In funding, yes. There was a question at a previous meeting about amounts in excess of 6%. My understanding is that the amount in excess of 6% for salaries is within the Treasury Board policy in terms of promotions and some particular contracts for particular groups, but that the non-pay, salary-related items were at 6%. Most of the salary items were at 6%, too, but there were some over that that were within Treasury Board guidelines to give the 11%. I had asked the same question myself. I think I am correct on that.

• 1055

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Yes. Approach or not, I wonder whether there is some other explanation for the sudden . . . *gonflement* is the only word I can think of . . . of the management regime in CIDA from 35 person-years to 80 person-years. It might have been approved by Parliament, but I do not know whether the questions were asked in such detail. But what brought it on? Was it an attempt to overstep the 6%, or was there an actual need to take from the administrative and foreign service people who could be managerial? Were they no longer considered to be directors-general, but they became equivalent to ADMs, or something of that sort?

Mr. McWhinney: This may be a question on the management category, and there may be a definitional question that I tried to deal with at a previous meeting, in the sense that the comparisons made with prior numbers in the category of senior executives with the designation SX—the comparison now with

[Traduction]

service extérieur qui, elles, ont subi un déclin de 45 années-personnes. Pour ce qui est des sommes engagées, cette augmentation subite du nombre des gestionnaires a fait grimper les coûts de 10 à 11 p. 100. Peut-on m'expliquer cela? C'est ma dernière question, mais j'aurais peut-être des questions complémentaires à poser.

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, les postes budgétaires qui figurent à la page 47 du budget ont trait aux augmentations d'année en année.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je vois.

M. McWhinney: Le député se souviendra qu'il y a eu un budget supplémentaire pour l'ACDI pour l'année 1982-1983, à l'occasion duquel le Parlement a approuvé des années-personnes supplémentaires. La véritable augmentation, depuis le dernier examen en comité, est quasiment nul. En d'autres termes, les chiffres que vous voyez là reprennent les prévisions budgétaires supplémentaires qui ont été approuvées l'année dernière.

Pour ce qui est de l'augmentation de 11 p. 100, j'ai essayé de . . .

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Il s'agit d'une augmentation des sommes engagées.

M. McWhinney: En effet. Il y a eu, lors d'une autre réunion, une question concernant les augmentations supérieures à 6 p. 100. Les rémunérations qui ont subi une augmentation supérieure à 6 p. 100 l'ont été conformément à la politique du Conseil du Trésor concernant les promotions et certains contrats spécifiques accordés à divers groupes, tandis que les postes ne concernant pas spécifiquement les rémunérations ont été augmentés de 6 p. 100. La plupart des postes concernant les rémunérations n'ont été augmentés que de 6 p. 100 également, mais dans certains cas, conformément aux directives du Conseil du Trésor, ils l'ont été de 11 p. 100. Moi-même, j'ai posé la question. Je ne pense m'être trompé en vous répondant cela.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Oui. Quelle que soit l'approche, je me demande s'il y a quelque chose d'autre qui explique le gonflement subi—et c'est le seul mot que je puisse trouver—à l'ACDI des cadres, augmentation de 35 à 80 années-personnes. Il est possible que le Parlement l'ait approuvé, mais je ne sais pas si on a posé des questions aussi détaillées. Quelle en est la cause? Est-ce qu'on voulait contourner le 6 p. 100, ou est-ce qu'il était vraiment nécessaire de retirer du personnel de la catégorie administration et service extérieur qui pourrait servir de gestionnaire? Alors on ne les considérerait plus comme directeurs généraux, mais plutôt comme l'équivalent de sous-ministre adjoint, c'est plus ou moins cela?

M. McWhinney: Ceci touche peut-être à la question de la catégorie gestion, et à des définitions que j'ai essayé de traiter à une réunion antérieure, puisqu'il est plutôt difficile de faire des comparaisons entre cette catégorie de la gestion et les chiffres de l'ancienne catégorie SX. Il y a deux raisons pour

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the management category is a bit difficult, for two reasons. First of all, it is a service-wide exercise, not exclusively CIDA, as the hon. member may know; and the management category currently includes executives, or EXs, plus SMs, who are called "senior managers". In essence, the SMs in terms of levels were the former PM-7s and equivalents.

So it is hard to compare apples and oranges, in that sense. Suffice it to say, if I may at this stage, that the exercise CIDA went through with its existing resources was the identical exercise that every other department went through to establish the management category. These were done interdepartmentally and the decision was made by Treasury Board rather than by CIDA. CIDA did not get additional PYs to add to that, but this was an attempt by the government to reflect what are management jobs, and that was the result in CIDA.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. McWhinney.

Mr. Lindores has a very brief comment.

Mr. Lindores: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

When Mr. Roche posed a question about who would carry out the study on the performance measurement system for the IFIs, I indicated this would be the private sector. I have now been advised in fact that we have proceeded beyond that stage and in fact it has been decided that the bureau of management consultants of the Department of Supply and Services will in fact carry out the study on that system.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Lindores.

Mr. Hudecki.

Mr. Hudecki: I have two very short questions, in light of the constraint of time. One is: In light of the situation in Central America, is the United States doing anything positive in picking up any of the refugees or facilitating the move of refugees from, say, El Salvador, Nicaragua, into the United States?

My second question has to do with another subject. Does CIDA have any involvement with international organizations such as the Bilderberg organization and the Trilateral Commission, or are there any cross-appointments on the board of directors of those particular bodies and CIDA?

Those are the only two questions I will ask.

Mr. McWhinney: Madam Chairman, to the hon. member, I believe I am right in saying the answer to the second question is no; but if by chance I find it is different, I will advise the hon. member in the committee.

On the first part of the question, I would like to take that under advisement to find out more details. I do not happen to know, and I am not sure we know exactly what the Americans are doing in this area; but if we can find out some information, I would be happy to refer it to the hon. member in the committee.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Hudecki.

[Translation]

ceci. Tout d'abord, ce système s'applique à tout le gouvernement, et pas uniquement à l'ACDI, comme l'honorable député le sait sans doute; et la catégorie gestion comprend la direction, les EX, ainsi que la gestion supérieure, les SM. En effet, le niveau SM correspond au niveau des anciens PM-7 et de leurs équivalents.

Alors il est difficile de faire une comparaison entre deux choses bien différentes. Je puis dire, néanmoins, à ce stade-ci, que l'ACDI est passée avec ses ressources actuelles par le même processus que tous les autres ministères dans le but d'établir cette catégorie gestion. Ceci a été fait de façon interministérielle et c'est le Conseil du Trésor et non l'ACDI qui a pris la décision. On n'a pas ajouté d'autres années-personnes à l'ACDI mais le gouvernement a essayé de refléter qu'elles sont des positions administratives, et vous en voyez le résultat chez nous.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur McWhinney.

M. Lindores a une courte observation à faire.

M. Lindores: Merci, madame le président.

Quand M. Roche a posé la question de savoir qui mènerait l'étude sur l'évaluation du rendement pour les IFI, j'ai indiqué que ceci serait fait par le secteur privé. On m'informe maintenant qu'on a dépassé ce stade, effectivement, et qu'on a décidé que le bureau des conseillers en gestion au sein du ministère des Approvisionnements et Services mènera cette étude.

Merci, madame le président.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Lindores.

Monsieur Hudecki.

M. Hudecki: J'ai deux questions très courtes, puisqu'il ne nous reste pas beaucoup de temps. Tout d'abord, étant donné la situation qui existe en Amérique centrale, est-ce que les États-Unis ont posé des gestes positifs en acceptant des réfugiés ou les aidant à venir aux États-Unis du Salvador, par exemple, ou du Nicaragua?

Ma deuxième question traite d'un autre sujet. Est-ce que l'ACDI participe à des organisations internationales telles que l'organisation Bilderberg ou la Commission trilatérale, ou est-ce qu'il y a des échanges entre les conseils de direction de ces organismes en particulier et celui de l'ACDI?

Je n'ai pas d'autres questions.

M. McWhinney: Madame le président, pour ce qui est de la deuxième question de l'honorable député, je crois bien que la réponse est non; mais si par hasard je me trompe, j'en informerais l'honorable député au Comité.

Pour ce qui est de la première partie de la question, j'en prendrai note et j'essaierai d'obtenir plus de détails. Je ne connais pas la réponse moi-même, et je ne sais pas si nous sommes tout à fait au courant des activités des Américains à cet égard; mais si on peut obtenir plus de renseignements, je ferai un plaisir de les envoyer à l'honorable député au Comité.

Le vice-président: Merci, monsieur Hudecki.

[Texte]

Mr. Roche.

Mr. Roche: On a brief point of order, Madam Chairman, I have a feeling Mr. McWhinney and I are drawing near the end of our relationship, he as acting president and I as critic for this party. I do not know who is going to go first, but I suspect Mr. McWhinney, and this may be the last meeting in which I will have a chance to tell him personally what a tremendous job Mr. McWhinney has done as the acting president, under what I consider to be overly long circumstances and very difficult circumstances. I would just like him to know personally that he carries away from his role as acting president my congratulations and my thanks for what he has done. He knows that in my role I have asked some tough questions sometimes and have had to do a job, but I consider his personal work to have been really worthy of commendation. I thank him for that.

• 1100

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. I am sure you also expressed the feelings of all committee members.

Mr. McWhinney: May I just thank, through you, Madam Chairman, the hon. member for his thoughtfulness, his courtesy and his decency which I accept, frankly; also on behalf of the agency I want to thank hon. members for the help they have given us in the context and I appreciate it.

The Vice-Chairman: Thank you. I want to thank all the witnesses for being here this morning and for their very lucid answers.

The next meeting of this committee will be at 9.30 a.m. on Thursday; appearing will be the Hon. Gilles Lamontagne.

I now adjourn the meeting to the call of the Chair.

[Traduction]

Monsieur Roche.

M. Roche: Un rappel au Règlement, madame le président, j'ai l'impression que pour M. McWhinney et moi-même, c'est notre dernière réunion dans nos rôles actuels, lui en tant que président intérimaire et moi comme critique du parti. Je ne sais pas qui partira le premier, mais c'est probablement M. McWhinney, et c'est peut-être la dernière occasion que j'aurai de le féliciter de son travail superbe comme président intérimaire, étant donné les circonstances plutôt longues et difficiles. J'aimerais lui offrir mes félicitations et mes remerciements de son travail au moment où il sort de son poste de président intérimaire. Il sait que mon rôle m'a obligé de poser des questions difficiles de temps à autre et que je devais respecter mes fonctions, mais je trouve que son travail personnel mérite des éloges, et je l'en remercie.

Le vice-président: Merci. Je suis sûre que vous parlez au nom de tous les membres du comité.

M. McWhinney: Si vous le permettez, madame le président, j'aimerais remercier l'honorable député de son égard, de sa courtoisie et de son honnêteté, que j'apprécie beaucoup; et au nom de l'Agence, j'aimerais remercier les honorables députés de l'aide qu'ils nous ont apportée dans le contexte actuel, je leur en suis très reconnaissant.

Le vice-président: Merci. J'aimerais remercier tous les témoins de leur présence ce matin et de leurs réponses très claires.

La prochaine réunion du Comité aura lieu jeudi à 09h30; le témoin sera l'honorable Gilles Lamontagne.

La séance est levée.

APPENDIX "EAND-77"

NOTES FOR AN INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE
JUNE 7, 1983

I would like briefly to provide you with some background information on the need for these Supplementary Estimates at this time and to give you a more detailed explanation of the amounts requested.

Members may recall their consideration of Bill C-130, an Act to Authorize Continuing Financial Assistance to be provided to certain International Financial Institutions, which took place in this Committee on December 7, 1982. Royal Assent to Bill C-130 was received on March 30, 1983. As a result, CIDA's Main Estimates for fiscal year 1983/84 did not include budget items seeking authority for new appropriations for the IFI Programme. The Supplementary Estimates before you today are those CIDA would have included in its Main Estimates for 1983/84. The amounts involved were included in the estimated provision of \$1,812 million of Official Development Assistance in 1983-84.

Let me now turn briefly to a more detailed explanation of the amounts involved in the Supplementary Estimates before you. Vote L36(a) would permit CIDA to make a cash payment of \$4M and to issue non-interest bearing, non-negotiable demand notes in an amount not to exceed \$157,500,000.00. These payments would be made to the concessional funds of the regional financial institutions such as the African Development Fund, the InterAmerican Development Bank's Fund for Special Operations and the Asian Development Fund. In addition, provision is made for payments to the Common Fund for Commodities and to the International Fund for Agricultural Development. These amounts are disaggregated in the attached Annex A.

Vote L37(a) would provide authority to take up Canada's capital participation in the African Development Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank. These payments are a mixture of cash and notes, that is \$3,342,000.00 in cash and \$25,642,000.00 in notes. The total non-budgetary cash requirement for the programme in fiscal year 1983/84 is therefore \$7,342,000.00 and a total of \$183,142,000.00 in notes would be issued. A complete detail of the specific capital increases is also attached as Annex B.

ANNEX "A"

The following is a more detailed explanation of the items contained in Votes L36(a) and L37(a).

Vote L36(a) Advances

| | <u>Cash</u> | <u>Notes</u> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 1. <u>Common Fund for Commodities</u> | \$4,000,000 | |
| <p>The Common Fund for Commodities should become operational during the current FY. Canada's share of the initial Second Account pledges of US\$350 million is 2.8% (C\$4,000,000/year for 3 years).</p> | | |
| 2. <u>International Fund for Agriculture Development</u> | | \$14,000,000 |
| <p>This is the second of three annual installments to the current replenishment (1981-83) of IFAD. Canada's share of the US\$1.1B replenishment is 3.2% (C\$42M). Payment is in notes, due July 18, 1983.</p> | | |
| 3. <u>African Development Fund</u> | | \$33,900,000 |
| <p>This is the second of three annual payments to the third replenishment of the AfDF. Canada's share of this FUA 1,008B replenishment is 7.94% (\$100.9M). Payment is in notes, due before March 31, 1984.</p> | | |
| 4. <u>InterAmerican Development Bank-Fund for Special Operations</u> | | |
| <p>This is the first of four annual payments to the sixth replenishment of the BID-FSO. Canada's share of this US\$702.6M replenishment is 5.55% (C\$47.9). Payment is in notes, due October 31, 1983.</p> | | \$12,000,000 |
| <p>This is an amount set aside to meet our maintenance of value obligations with the BID-FSO.</p> | | \$12,000,000 |
| 5. <u>Asian Development Fund</u> | | \$85,600,000 |
| <p>This is the first of four annual payments to the third replenishment of the AsDF. Canada's share of this US\$3.2B replenishment is 8.83% (C\$342.2M). Payment is in notes, due November 1, 1983.</p> | | |
| | <u>\$4,000,000</u> | <u>\$157,500,000</u> |

ANNEX "B"Vote L37(a) Investments

| | <u>Cash</u> | <u>Notes</u> |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| 1. <u>African Development Bank</u> | | \$11,800,000 |
| <p>This is the second of five payments to the initial capital subscription to the AfDB for the purchase of 840 shares. Canada's share of this US\$2.1B capital subscription by non-African states is 9.6%. Paid-in capital amounts to 25% or C\$58.6M.</p> <p>This payment is in notes denominated in C\$ due January 31, 1984.</p> | | |
| 2. <u>InterAmerican Development Bank</u> | | \$9,100,000 |
| <p>This is the first of four payments to the sixth general capital increase of the BID for the purchase of 607 shares. Canada's share of this US\$15.8 capital increase was 4.38%. Our paid-in capital is 4.5% or C\$36.4M.</p> <p>This payment is in notes, denominated in USA\$, due October 31, 1983.</p> | | |
| 3. <u>Caribbean Development Bank</u> | \$442,000 | \$442,000 |
| <p>This is the final payment of the second capital increase of the CDB for the purchase of 146 shares.</p> <p>Canada's share of this US\$50M increase was 17.6%. Our paid-in capital is 40% or C\$4.3M.</p> <p>This payment is half in cash, half in notes, due January 1984.</p> | | |
| 4. <u>Asian Development Bank</u> | \$2,900,000 | \$4,300,000 |
| <p>This is the first of five payments to the third general capital increase (GCI) of the AsDB for the purchase of 474 shares.</p> <p>Canada's share of this US\$9.1B capital increase was 6.305%. Our paid-in capital is 5% or C\$35.2M. 40% of each installment is in cash and 60% in notes, due December 31, 1983</p> | | |
| | <u>\$3,342,000</u> | <u>\$25,642,000</u> |



Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

May 27, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and National Defence
Room 265 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Dear Mr. Prud'homme:

When I appeared before the Standing Committee on May 5, in response to a question put to me by Mrs. U. Appolloni, I offered to supply further details on expenditures by sector of activity under several programmes.


Firstly, with regard to CIDA's bilateral assistance programmes, the attached information provides an estimate of expenditures by sector for 1982-83 and a forecast for 1983-84.

Also attached is a breakout illustrating the total financial contributions through our Institutional Cooperation Development Services Division (ICDS) and through our commitments to Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), by country and by sector, for the fiscal year 1982-83.

With regard to Canadian contributions to International Financial Institutions, and various international organizations, Canada's financial support is pooled with those of other donors and Canada does not earmark its support for specific sectors. However, we are providing you with an analysis of the sectoral distribution of the total activity of these institutions for the most recent year for which data are available.

I trust that this information will be useful to Mrs. Appolloni and Members of the Committee.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Wm McWhinney'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

Wm McWhinney
Acting President

c.c. Mr. R. Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

Attachs

CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCYBILATERAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCEEXPENDITURES BY SECTOR(\$MILLION)

| | <u>ESTIMATED</u> <u>1982-83</u> | <u>FORECAST</u> <u>1983-84</u> |
|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Agriculture and Renewable Natural Resources | 112.2 | 152.7 |
| Social | 68.6 | 117.3 |
| Energy | 99.9 | 127.2 |
| Transport and Infrastructure | 125.4 | 104.2 |
| Industry and Commodities | 49.4 | 58.7 |
| Other | 136.4 | 97.5 |
| | ----- | ----- |
| TOTAL | <u>591.9</u> | <u>657.6</u> |

18/05/83

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)/
International Development Association (IDA)

| <u>SECTOR</u> | <u>Fiscal Year 1982</u> | |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------|
| | <u>US\$</u> | <u>%</u> |
| Agriculture and Rural Development | 3,250 | 25 |
| Energy | 3,380 | 26 |
| Transportation and Telecommunications | 1,820 | 14 |
| Program and Structural Adjustment Lending | 1,300 | 10 |
| Social Sectors | <u>1,430</u> | <u>11</u> |
| Water Supply and Sewerage | 390 | 3 |
| Education | 520 | 4 |
| Population, Health and Nutrition | - | - |
| Urbanization | 390 | 3 |
| Industry and Mining | 520 | 4 |
| Development Finance Corporations, Small-Scale Industry and Other | <u>1,430</u> | <u>11</u> |
| TOTAL | 13,000 | 100 |

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.

18/05/83

INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

| <u>SECTOR</u> | <u>Fiscal Year 1982</u> | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|----------|
| | <u>US\$</u> | <u>%</u> |
| Productive Sectors | | |
| Agriculture and Fisheries | \$ 414 | 15.1 |
| Industry and Mining | 421 | 15.4 |
| Tourism | 27 | 1.0 |
| Physical Infrastructure | | |
| Energy | 797 | 29.0 |
| Transportation and Communications | 208 | 7.6 |
| Social Infrastructure | | |
| Environmental and Public Health | 245 | 8.9 |
| Education, Science and Technology | 261 | 9.5 |
| Urban Development | 190 | 6.9 |
| Other | | |
| Export Financing | 73 | 2.7 |
| Preinvestment | 108 | 3.9 |
| Other | - | - |
| TOTAL | \$ 2,744 | 100.0 |

18/05/83

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

| SECTOR | <u>Fiscal Year 1982</u> | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|
| | <u>US\$</u> | <u>%</u> |
| Agriculture | 92.37 | 25.54 |
| Transport | 61.08 | 16.89 |
| Public Utilities | 100.85 | 30.65 |
| Industry and Development Banks | 76.40 | 21.12 |
| Education and Health | <u>21.00</u> | <u>5.80</u> |
| TOTAL | 361.70 | 100.00 |

18/05/83

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

| <u>SECTOR</u> | <u>Fiscal Year 1982</u> | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------|
| | <u>US\$</u> | <u>%</u> |
| Agriculture | 108.03 | 30.64 |
| Transport | 68.92 | 19.55 |
| Public Utilities | 88.47 | 25.09 |
| Industry and Development Banks | 8.00 | 2.27 |
| Education and Health | <u>79.15</u> | <u>22.45</u> |
| TOTAL | 352.57 | 100.00 |

18/05/83

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

| <u>SECTOR</u> | <u>Fiscal Years 1980-1982</u> | |
|-------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------|
| | <u>US\$</u> | <u>%</u> |
| Agriculture and Agro- Industry | 543.6 | 33.7 |
| Energy | 458.7 | 28.4 |
| Industry and Non-fuel Minerals | 11.8 | 0.7 |
| Development Banks | 159.8 | 9.9 |
| Transport and Communications | 185.3 | 11.5 |
| Social Infrastructure | | |
| Water Supply and Sanitation | 96.3 | 6.0 |
| Urban Development, Education Health and Population | <u>159.1</u> | <u>9.8</u> |
| TOTAL | 1,614.6 | 100.0 |

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)
PROGRAMME DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT (PNUD)
1980

| <u>SECTORS/SECTEURS</u> | <u>EXPENDITURES/DEPENSES</u> | | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|
| | <u>US \$</u> | <u>%</u> | |
| Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries Agriculture, sylviculture, pêche | 170.8 | 25.53 | US \$ 35,000,000 |
| Transport and Communication Transports et communications | 89.9 | 13.42 | |
| Development Policies Politiques relatives au développement | 78.8 | 11.78 | |
| Natural Resources Ressources naturelles | 76.9 | 11.49 | |
| Industry Industrie | 66.4 | 9.92 | |
| Education Enseignement | 47.1 | 7.05 | |
| Employment Emploi | 40.5 | 6.06 | |
| Health Santé | 29.5 | 4.42 | |
| Science and Technology Science et technique | 25.7 | 3.85 | |
| International Trade and Development Finance Commerce international et financement du développement | 15.5 | 2.32 | |

| | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|
| Human Settlements Etablissements humains | 14.4 | 2.16 |
| Culture | 6.1 | .92 |
| Social Conditions and Equity Situation sociale et équit  | 5.3 | .78 |
| Population, Humanitarian Aid, other Population, assistance huma- nitaire, divers | 2.0 | .3 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Total | 668.8 | 100. |

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF)
FONDS DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ENFANCE (FISE)
1981

| <u>SECTORS/SECTEURS</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> US \$ MILLIONS 9.2 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | US \$ MILLIONS | % | |
| Basic Health Santé primaire | 49.1 | 22.6 | |
| Water Supply Approvisionnement en eau | 45.7 | 21.0 | |
| Nutrition | 14.1 | 6.5 | |
| Social Services for children Services sociaux aux enfants | 17.6 | 8.0 | |
| Formal and non-formal Education Education formelle et non-formelle | 32.3 | 14.8 | |
| Planning and Project Support Services Planification et encadrement | 21.3 | 9.8 | |
| Emergency Relief Secours d'urgence | <u>37.9</u> | <u>17.4</u> | |
| Total | 218.0 | 100. | |

COMMONWEALTH FUND FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (CFTC)

FONDS DU COMMONWEALTH POUR LA COOPERATION TECHNIQUE (FCCT)

1981-82

| <u>SECTORS/SECTEURS</u> | <u>EXPENDITURES/DEPENSES</u> | | <u>CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> Cdn \$ 11,000,000 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | <u>£ 000</u> | <u>%</u> | |
| Administration and Planning Administration et planification | 1,856.6 | 15.6 | |
| Education Enseignement | 795.9 | 6.7 | |
| Finance and Taxation Finance et fiscalité | 868.3 | 7.3 | |
| Health and Social Services Santé et services sociaux | 661.1 | 5.6 | |
| Industry Industrie | 2,472.2 | 20.8 | |
| Legal Services juridiques | 397.6 | 3.3 | |
| Agriculture | 1,003.3 | 8.5 | |
| Transportation, Posts, Telecommunication Transports, postes, télé- communications | 521.0 | 4.4 | |
| Energy Energie | 347.7 | 2.9 | |
| International Trade Commerce international | 1,971.2 | 16.6 | |
| Mass Communication Communications de masse | 278.5 | 2.4 | |
| Other Autres | 699.0 | 5.9 | |
| Total | 11,872.4 | 100. | |

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA): TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

AGENCE INTERNATIONALE DE L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE (AIEA): L'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE

1981

| <u>SECTORS/SECTEURS</u> | <u>EXPENDITURES/DEPENSES</u> | | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> US \$ 431,600 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| | <u>US \$ '00</u> | <u>%</u> | |
| General Atomic Energy Development Développement de l'énergie atomique (en général) | 1,630.5 | 7.8 | |
| Nuclear physics Physique nucléaire | 1,606.9 | 7.7 | |
| Nuclear Chemistry Chimie nucléaire | 732.2 | 3.4 | |
| Prospecting, Mining and Processing of Nuclear Materials Prospection, extraction, préparation de matériel nucléaire | 1,849.4 | 8.8 | |
| Nuclear Engineering and Technology Génie et technologie nucléaire | 3,111.3 | 14.8 | |
| Application of Isotopes and Radiation in: Application d'isotopes et de rayonnements en: | | | |
| - Agriculture | 4,860.6 | 23.2 | |
| - Medicine Médecine | 2,551.7 | 12.2 | |
| - Biology Biologie | 361.1 | 1.7 | |
| - Industry and Hydrology Industrie et hydrologie | 1,969.3 | 9.4 | |
| Safety in nuclear Energy Sûreté dans le domaine de l'énergie nucléaire | 2,296.3 | 11.0 | |
| Total: | 20,960.3 | 100 | |

UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR POPULATION ACTIVITIES (UNFPA)
 FONDS DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES ACTIVITES EN MATIERE DE
 POPULATION (FNUAP)

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>US \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT</u> <u>SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| | | | | US \$ 7,250,000 |
| Population | 136,400,000 | | 100 | |

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (IFAD)
 FONDS INTERNATIONAL POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT AGRICOLE (FIDA)

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>US \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT</u> <u>SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| Agriculture | 378,000,000 | | 100 | US \$11,660,000 |

INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE (UNCTAD/GATT)
CENTRE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (CNUCED/GATT)

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>US \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Trade Commerce | 15,700,00 | | 100 | US \$ 518,950 |

CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURE RESEARCH (CGIAR)*
LE GROUPE CONSULTATIF POUR LA RECHERCHE AGRICOLE INTERNATIONALE (GCRAI)*

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>US \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Agriculture | 130,904,000 | | 100 | US \$ 7,550,000 |

* (excluding IFPRI, ISNAR, ILCA)

* (à l'exclusion de IIRPA, SIRAN, CIPEA)

ACCT/SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (PSD)

ACCT/PROGRAMME SPECIAL DE DEVELOPPEMENT (PSD)

1981

BUDGET

| <u>SECTORS/SECTEURS</u> | <u>FF MILLIONS</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> Cdn \$ 1 million |
|----------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Technical Assistance Assistance technique | 5.4 | 60 | |
| Human Resources Ressources humaines | 3.6 | 40 | |
| | <u>9.0</u> | <u>100</u> | |

AUPELF/INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR UNIVERSITY COOPERATION (FICU)

AUPELF/FONDS INTERNATIONAL DE COOPERATION INTERUNIVERSITAIRE (FICU)

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>Cdn \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> Cdn \$ 650,000 |
|----------------------------------------|---------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Human Resources Ressources humaines | 800,000 | 100 | |

ONCHOCERIASIS CONTROL PROGRAMME (OCP)

PROGRAMME DE LUTTE CONTRE L'ONCHOCERCOSE (OCP)

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>US \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Health Santé | 16,600,000 | | 100 | US \$ 917,000 |

SPECIAL PROGRAMME OF TRAINING AND RESEARCH IN TROPICAL DISEASES (TDR)

PROGRAMME SPECIAL RECHERCHE/FORMATION CONCERNANT LES MALADIES TROPICALES (TDR)

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>US \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Health Santé | 25,100,000 | | 100 | US \$ 702,000 |

JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICER (JPO) AND ASSOCIATE EXPERT (AE) PROGRAMME
PROGRAMME DES ADMINISTRATEURS STAGIAIRES (AS) ET PROGRAMME
DES EXPERTS ASSOCIES (EA)
1981

HUMAN RESOURCE SECTOR EXPENDITURES
DEPENSES POUR LE SECTEUR DES RESSOURCES HUMAINES

ORGANIZATION/ORGANISATION

CANADIAN GRANT/SUBVENTION CANADIENNE

| | Cdn \$ |
|-------------|---------|
| UNDP/PNUD | 350,000 |
| UNICEF/FISE | 100,000 |
| FAO | 350,000 |
| CGIAR/GCRAI | 100,000 |
| | <hr/> |
| TOTAL | 900,000 |

CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
A SECTORAL BREAKOUT ILLUSTRATING THE TOTAL FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
THROUGH OUR INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION DEVELOPMENT SERVICES DIVISION
(ICDS) AND THROUGH OUR COMMITMENTS TO CANADIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs) BY COUNTRY AND BY SECTOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
1982-83 (THE CODE BELOW INDICATES THE TYPE OF SECTOR).

AGENCE CANADIENNE DE DEVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL
VENTILATION SECTORIELLE ILLUSTRANT LE MONTANT TOTAL DES CONTRIBUTIONS
ALLUEES, PAR PAYS ET PAR SECTEUR, PAR L'ENTREPRISE DE NOTRE PROGRAMME
DE LA COOPERATION INSTITUTIONNELLE ET DES SERVICES AU DEVELOPPEMENT
(CISD) ET DE NOTRE PROGRAMME DES ORGANISATIONS NON GOUVERNEMENTALES
(ONG) AU COURS DE L'ANNEE FINANCIERE 1982-1983 (LES CODES CI-APRES
INDIQUENT LE GENRE DE SECTEUR).

OVERSEAS SECTORS/SECTEURS OUTRE-MER

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| A - Public utilities Services d'utilité publique | F - Housing Logement |
| B - Community development Développement communautaire | G - Water Eau |
| C - Food production Production alimentaire | H - Coops and small businesses Coop et petites entreprises |
| D - Education | I - Refugees and emergency relief Réfugiés et secours d'urgence |
| E - Health and population Santé et population | J - Programme services Services liés à un programme |

ICDS/NGO COMMITMENTS BY COUNTRY AND SECTOR
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1982/83
CTSD/NGO ENGAGEMENTS PAR PAYS ET SECTEUR
POUR L'ANNEE FINANCIERE 1982/83

FRANCOPHONE AFRICA
AFRIQUE FRANCOPHONE

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-------------------------------------------------------|------------------|--------|-------|---------|---------|---|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Algeria Algérie | - | - | - | 15,000 | - | - | - | 16,125 | - | - | 31,125 |
| Angola Angola | - | - | 6,346 | - | 2,430 | - | - | 52,933 | 19,602 | - | 81,311 |
| Benin Benin | - | 12,000 | 6,464 | 14,450 | 4,050 | - | - | - | - | 82,700 | 99,664 |
| Burundi Burundi | - | 83,315 | 5,775 | 116,044 | 35,000 | - | 83,110 | 20,625 | - | - | 344,649 |
| Cameroon Cameroun | - | 19,351 | 4,740 | 64,734 | 158,054 | - | 396,117 | 549,135 | - | 49,388 | 1,238,391 |
| Cape Verde Cap Vert | - | - | - | - | 13,400 | - | - | - | - | - | 13,400 |
| Central African Republic République Centrafricaine | - | - | 4,650 | 7,300 | 70,000 | - | 3,750 | - | - | - | 85,700 |
| Chad Tchad | - | - | - | 26,088 | 30,246 | - | - | - | - | 50,475 | 106,809 |
| Comoros Comores | - | - | - | 69,800 | 360,000 | - | - | - | - | - | 429,800 |
| Congo Congo | - | - | - | 6,000 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6,000 |
| Djibouti Djibouti | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 15,980 | - | - | 15,980 |

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|---------------------------|------------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-------|---------|--------|---|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Gabon | - | - | - | - | 30,000 | - | - | - | - | - | 30,000 |
| Gambia | - | - | - | 202,190 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 202,190 |
| Guinea | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1,800 | - | - | - | 1,800 |
| Guinea Bissau | - | - | 27,676 | - | 30,000 | - | - | - | - | - | 57,676 |
| Ivory Coast | 900 | - | 2,347 | 102,270 | 198,135 | - | - | 13,132 | - | 505,995 | 902,779 |
| Madagascar | 5,000 | 70,275 | 44,300 | 6,500 | 73,550 | - | 40,275 | - | - | 3,750 | 249,650 |
| Mali | - | 3,303 | 26,300 | 24,395 | 122,104 | - | 396,775 | 23,250 | - | - | 596,077 |
| Mauritania | - | 42,086 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 2,000 | 44,084 |
| Morocco | - | 1,000 | - | 350,082 | 70,000 | - | - | - | - | 1,461 | 422,563 |
| Multinational Frnce. Af. | - | - | 91,700 | 64,170 | - | - | - | 5,736 | - | 33,813 | 195,419 |
| Multinational Afr. France | - | - | 113,440 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 113,440 |
| Niger | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Nigeria | 20,000 | - | 66,712 | 35,124 | - | 8,500 | 78,000 | 46,550 | - | 69,725 | 323,611 |

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SEC'EURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------|-----------|--------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Sao Tome & Principe | - | 5,000 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5,000 |
| Sao Tome & Principe | - | 616,321 | 1,218,310 | 593,889 | 40,592 | - | - | 8,280 | 25,229 | - | 2,702,621 |
| Senegal | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Togo | - | - | - | 25,150 | 113,725 | - | 62,240 | - | - | 3,900 | 205,025 |
| Togo | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Tunisia | - | - | - | 239,745 | 237,226 | - | - | 5,200 | - | 2,500 | 484,671 |
| Tunisie | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Upper Volta | - | 210,389 | 115,857 | 11,797 | 337,395 | - | 131,366 | 825,620 | - | - | 1,632,424 |
| Upper Volta | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Zaire | 16,622 | 28,428 | 59,954 | 173,382 | 400,733 | 1,753 | 49,625 | 457,907 | - | 1,200 | 1,189,604 |
| Zaire | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| TOTAL | 42,522 | 1,297,466 | 1,794,571 | 2,208,110 | 2,126,640 | 10,253 | 1,244,493 | 2,040,533 | 44,931 | 861,890 | 11,871,343 |

COMMONWEALTH AFRICA
AFRIQUE DU COMMONWEALTH

| Country Poys | SECTORS/RECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total in poys |
|--------------------------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Bolawi Bolawana | - | 24,000 | 63,111 | 53,744 | - | - | 22,895 | 56,383 | 60,000 | - | 290,141 |
| Burkina Faso | 6,890 | 909 | - | - | 249,200 | - | - | 38,300 | - | 15,000 | 311,367 |
| Ethiopia Et'hiopia | - | 56,042 | 28,000 | 363,620 | 50,325 | - | 337,500 | 650 | - | 2,125 | 638,262 |
| Ghana Ghana | 4,500 | - | 15,600 | 234,453 | 64,712 | - | 59,475 | 39,500 | - | - | 448,330 |
| Guinea Guinea | - | 31,584 | 231,380 | 733,317 | 151,164 | - | 612,067 | 249,605 | - | 128,442 | 2,137,564 |
| Lesotho Lesotho | 23,221 | 105,064 | 59,941 | 124,466 | 71,847 | 36,855 | 220,010 | 57,465 | - | - | 642,862 |
| Liberia Liberia | - | - | - | - | 3,162 | - | - | 30,240 | - | - | 33,402 |
| Malawi Malawi | - | 30,350 | - | 178,050 | 80,123 | - | 30,325 | 29,900 | - | - | 350,154 |
| Mali Mali | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 38,131 | - | - | 38,133 |
| Mozambique Mozambique | - | 34,740 | - | - | 9,075 | - | 6,000 | 91,763 | - | - | 141,578 |

| Country Pays | SECTEURS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-------|---------|---------|---------|--------|--------------------------------|
| | A | I. | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Multinational Commonwealth Multinational Afrique du Commonwealth | - | 16,850 | - | 65,940 | 3,200 | - | - | 233,754 | 290,237 | 38,205 | 586,166 |
| Burkina Faso | - | - | - | 34,500 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 34,500 |
| Nigeria | - | 42,350 | 45,793 | 150,327 | 11,946 | - | 74,400 | - | - | - | 324,810 |
| Senegal | - | - | - | 30,000 | 27,100 | - | - | 7,034 | - | - | 64,134 |
| Sierra Leone | - | 59,837 | 149,440 | 61,097 | 256,060 | - | - | 130,750 | 348 | - | 892,100 |
| South Africa | - | - | - | 14,932 | 42,187 | - | 400,000 | 37,000 | 7,272 | - | 501,391 |
| South Africa Afrique du Sud | - | 15,275 | 33 | 117,699 | 80,200 | 1,390 | - | 197,600 | - | - | 412,197 |
| Swaziland | 77,048 | 9,263 | 116,250 | 69,556 | 375,521 | - | - | 1,600 | 35,300 | 33,172 | 717,650 |
| Tanzania | - | 30,230 | 7,371 | 170,074 | - | 785 | 36,000 | 10,609 | - | - | 255,069 |
| Tanzania | - | 75,716 | 135,474 | 327,501 | 75,013 | - | 16,250 | 30,000 | 23,405 | 50,775 | 734,214 |

| Country Pays | SECTIONS/SECTIONS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-----------------|-------------------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Uganda | - | 50,000 | 291,517 | 347,900 | 168,500 | - | 23,050 | 4,819 | 512,294 | 327 | 1,358,467 |
| Zambia | - | 31,712 | 98,495 | 84,850 | 25,243 | 17,575 | 19,520 | 75,453 | 2,700 | 4,800 | 360,348 |
| Zimbabwe | 350 | 117,873 | 33,520 | 2,075,995 | 198,990 | - | - | 173,600 | 56,956 | 11,500 | 2,648,784 |
| TOTAL | 112,009 | 730,735 | 1,236,071 | 5,163,021 | 1,944,254 | 56,605 | 1,888,992 | 1,545,168 | 920,540 | 204,346 | 13,088,847 |

| COUNTRY Pays | SECTEURS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|--------------------------|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---|---------|---------|-------|--------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Antigua Antigua | - | 3,700 | 10,000 | 32,543 | 6,900 | - | - | 17,719 | - | - | 70,882 |
| Argentina Argentine | - | 17,750 | 65,925 | 53,000 | - | - | - | 3,000 | - | - | 139,675 |
| Bolivia Bolivians | - | - | - | 6,250 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6,250 |
| Barbados Barbados | - | 14,200 | 198,212 | 59,262 | - | - | - | 230,992 | - | - | 502,466 |
| Belize Belize | - | - | 38,233 | 80,000 | 39,113 | - | - | 100 | - | 72,625 | 229,771 |
| Bolivia Bolivie | - | 448,726 | 256,248 | 80,116 | 247,203 | - | 4,275 | 127,830 | - | 37,200 | 1,201,873 |
| Brazil Brésil | - | 174,005 | 358,759 | 680,648 | 146,450 | - | 38,000 | 21,406 | - | 87,034 | 1,506,302 |
| Chile Chili | - | 65,871 | 55,586 | 313,905 | 40,225 | - | - | 251,221 | - | 12,195 | 759,203 |
| Colombia Colombie | - | 32,728 | 49,861 | 136,755 | 158,384 | - | 410,532 | 123,292 | 90 | 85,763 | 1,297,415 |
| Costa Rica Costa Rica | - | - | - | 23,100 | 54,735 | - | - | 98,275 | 9,342 | - | 186,406 |

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|----------------------------------------------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|----------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | II | I | J | |
| Dominica Dominique | - | 18,648 | 12,912 | 61,930 | 1,109 | - | - | 32,382 | 2,061 | - | 129,702 |
| Dominican Republic République Dominicaine | - | - | 37,210 | 123,190 | 79,068 | - | - | 354,215 | - | 336 | 594,017 |
| Equador Équateur | - | 155,655 | - | 213,005 | 148,642 | 2,000 | 165,000 | 207,177 | - | - | 891,479 |
| El Salvador El Salvador | - | 31,469 | - | 13,340 | 138,655 | - | - | - | 96,300 | - | 279,774 |
| Equatorial Guinea Guinée Équatoriale | - | 24,820 | 15,454 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 40,274 |
| Grenada Grenade | - | 10,666 | 35,807 | 331,552 | 30,690 | - | 9,475 | 71,087 | - | 93 | 491,370 |
| Guatemala Guatemala | - | 46,458 | - | - | 79,419 | - | 180,000 | 72,668 | - | - | 372,545 |
| Guyana Guyane | - | - | 15,000 | 103,339 | 13,796 | - | - | - | - | - | 132,135 |
| Haiti Haïti | 47,400 | 289,298 | 400,990 | 236,916 | 908,311 | 66,424 | 330,690 | 201,722 | 6,575 | 204,800 | 2,689,166 |
| Honduras Honduras | - | 465,059 | 143,059 | 40,057 | 196,292 | - | 656,355 | 181,000 | 3 88,364 | - | 2,000,187 |

| Country Pays | SECTEURS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Jamaica Jamaïque | - | 129,567 | 32,270 | 406,856 | 107,617 | - | - | 0,166 | - | 127 | 684,600 |
| Mexico Mexique | - | 4,500 | 2,585 | 171,678 | 72,976 | 4,687 | - | 65,958 | 82,200 | 16,770 | 424,116 |
| Multinational Americas Multinationales Amériques | 3,750 | 33,983 | 64,945 | 392,660 | 116,159 | - | - | 732,639 | - | 281,149 | 1,696,076 |
| Nicaragua Nicaragua | 15,200 | 44,292 | 144,286 | 558,570 | 1,014,853 | 71,250 | 30,000 | 252,371 | 221,201 | 9,810 | 2,361,833 |
| Panama Panama | - | 1,853 | 110,000 | 41,925 | - | - | - | 282,008 | - | - | 435,786 |
| Paraguay Paraguay | - | 7,300 | 163,020 | 19,000 | 30,000 | - | 173 | 25,555 | - | - | 245,048 |
| Peru Pérou | 143,289 | 203,290 | 257,595 | 913,598 | 302,776 | 7,500 | 474,200 | 135,704 | - | 37,000 | 2,474,913 |
| St-Kitts-Nevis-Nevis St-Christ. Nevis-Aug. | - | - | - | - | 1,900 | - | - | - | - | - | 1,900 |
| St. Lucia St. Lucie | - | 71,414 | - | 236,734 | 30,838 | - | 1,520 | 47,616 | 1,150 | - | 369,273 |
| St. Vincent St. Vincent | - | 4,700 | - | 229,324 | 1,200 | - | 3,150 | 56,373 | - | - | 294,754 |

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-------------------|------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Trinidad & Tobago | - | - | 15,000 | 103,030 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 118,030 |
| Trinité & Tobago | - | - | 15,000 | 103,030 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 118,030 |
| Uruguay | - | 11,400 | - | 82,320 | - | - | - | 17,589 | - | - | 111,309 |
| Uruguay | - | 11,400 | - | 82,320 | - | - | - | 17,589 | - | - | 111,309 |
| Venezuela | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 20,000 | 20,000 |
| Venezuela | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 20,000 | 20,000 |
| TOTAL | 204,430 | 2,305,302 | 2,402,952 | 5,764,691 | 4,267,409 | 151,861 | 2,313,171 | 3,620,815 | 887,883 | 887,779 | 22,787,950 |

| Country: Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-----------------------------------------------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|-------|---------|--------|---------|--------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Lebanon Liban | - | 71,025 | - | 46,800 | 61,845 | - | 9,250 | - | 346,450 | 30,940 | 565,370 |
| Malaysia Malaisie | - | 6,500 | - | 41,650 | 30,000 | - | - | - | - | 3,900 | 82,050 |
| Multinational Asia Multinational Asie | - | 21,775 | - | - | 10,200 | - | - | - | 15,000 | 14,400 | 261,465 |
| Nepal Népal | - | 127,295 | - | 355,819 | 162,966 | - | 41,731 | - | - | - | 687,810 |
| Pakistan Pakistan | - | 114,052 | 2,800 | 89,314 | 646,141 | 7,500 | 302,053 | 1,500 | - | 22,640 | 1,186,008 |
| Papua New Guinea Papouasie Nouvelle-Guinée | - | 41 | - | - | 150,000 | - | - | - | - | 15,300 | 165,341 |
| Philippines Philippines | 8,405 | 275,904 | 5,600 | 207,015 | 315,394 | - | 23,932 | 10,116 | 54,762 | - | 1,201,268 |
| Singapore Singapour | - | 18,155 | - | 2,700 | - | - | - | - | - | 93,300 | 114,155 |
| South Korea Corée du Sud | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 48,500 | - | 64,410 | 112,910 |
| Sri Lanka Sri Lanka | - | 28,332 | 112,085 | 314,303 | 18,528 | - | 5,655 | - | 6,000 | 24,040 | 509,741 |

| Country Pays | SECTEURS / SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Thailand Thaïlande | - | 1,018,267 | 1,189 | 318,918 | 401,555 | - | - | 105,503 | 5,000 | - | 1,850,482 |
| Tonga | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10,000 | - | 10,000 |
| Tuvalu Tuvalu | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 38,000 | - | - | 38,000 |
| Vanuatu Vanuatu | - | - | - | 37,500 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 37,500 |
| TOTAL | 9,599 | 3,165,040 | 1,304,886 | 5,764,370 | 4,633,065 | 178,175 | 981,981 | 879,437 | 588,922 | 758,456 | 18,283,922 * |

MULTI-REGIONAL.
MULTI-REGIONAL.23147-3



Agerice canadienne de
developpement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

May 31, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and National Defence
Room 265 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Dear Mr. Prud'homme:

When I appeared before the Standing Committee on May 5, Mr. Herb Breau asked me to provide an indication of the volume of outstanding loans which were provided on the most generous terms by Canada to developing countries. He also requested an analysis of the real value of these loans. I wish through this letter to provide answers to his questions.

Attached you will find a detailed listing of all loans outstanding with foreign countries under Canada's Official Development Assistance programme. As of March 31, 1983, the total volume of outstanding loans payable to Canada is \$2,695,129,155.94. I should indicate that, while these loans were extended on concessional terms, the loans are recorded at full value and, as amounts payable, are not distinguished from loans made at market rates.

However, the terms of CIDA loans vary significantly from market rates and are much more favourable to the borrower. This subsidized difference is in the form of longer grace periods and maturities, as well as lower or zero interest rates. The combined effect of these softer terms, often referred to as the degree of concessionality, is usually expressed in terms of the grant element of the loan. In other words, the softness of the terms relative to market rates makes a portion of the loan equivalent to a grant.


As the attached list of loans indicates, the two types of loans generally employed by CIDA are:

- a) zero percent interest, 10 years grace and repayment over 50 years from the time the loan becomes effective (0/10/50); and
- b) three percent interest, seven years grace and repayment over 30 years (3/7/30).

To calculate the degree of concessionality, a formula is employed which compares the variance of concessional interest rates, grace periods and maturities from commercial terms. Using this formula (which has been agreed upon by all member countries of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD), the grant element is calculated to be 90.34% for a 0/10/50 loan and 55.2% for a 3/7/30 loan. The concessionality of a loan is thus calculated by multiplying the face value of a loan by its grant element.

I trust that this information will be useful to Mr. Breau and Members of the Standing Committee.

Yours sincerely,



Wm McWhinney
Acting President

c.c.: Mr. R. Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

Att

LOANS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES
UNDER CANADA'S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME
AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING AT MARCH 31, 1983

TYPE OF LOANSAMOUNT AT MARCH 31, 1983

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1) 20 year maturity, 5 year grace period, at 5% interest per annum; maturing September 2000 and March 2001 | |
| Jamaica | 4,500,000.00 |
| Turkey | <u>30,831,019.00</u> |
| Total | <u>\$35,331,019.00</u> |
| (grant element: 33.3%) | |
| 2) 25 year maturity, 5 year grace period, at 6% interest per annum; maturing March 2001 | |
| Nigeria | <u>\$1,323,789.00</u> |
| (grant element: 28.75%) | |
| 3) 30 year maturity, 7 year grace period, at 3% interest per annum; maturing at various dates between March 1997 and September 2011 | |
| Barbados | 17,034,936.33 |
| Brazil | 12,812,790.28 |
| Chile | 2,743,033.82 |
| Colombia | 17,371,693.03 |
| Cuba | 9,557,882.00 |
| Dominican Republic | 2,202,170.54 |

| TYPE OF LOANS <u>30 year loans (cont'd)</u> | <u>AMOUNT AT MARCH 31, 1983</u> |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Egypt | 50,000,000.00 |
| Jamaica | 33,578,874.07 |
| Korea | 608,233.70 |
| Malaysia | 13,793,205.44 |
| Nigeria | 994,485.00 |
| Peru | 406,187.22 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 7,116,001.25 |
| Turkey | <u>9,850,000.00</u> |
| Total | <u>\$178,069,492.68</u> |
| (grant element: 55.20%) | |
| 4) 30 year maturity, 7 year grace period, interest free; maturing March 2010 | |
| El Salvador | <u>\$ 8,642,643.41</u> |
| (grant element: 78.87%) | |
| 5) 35 year maturity, 5 year grace period, interest free; maturing at various dates between April 2001 and November 2005 | |
| El Salvador | <u>\$ 3,476,563.10</u> |
| (grant element: 79.12%) | |
| 6) 40 year maturity, 10 year grace period, interest free; maturing March 2008 | |
| Thailand | <u>\$ 794,986.66</u> |
| (grant element: 87.03%) | |

TYPE OF LOANSAMOUNT AT MARCH 31, 1983

- 7) 50 year maturity, 10 year grace period,
interest free; maturing at various
dates between March 2013 and September 2032

| | |
|----------------------------|----------------|
| Algeria | 27,896,038.84 |
| Antigua | 5,999,797.25 |
| Argentina | 644,000.34 |
| Barbados | 2,327,378.00 |
| Belize | 12,187,863.48 |
| Bolivia | 1,653,407.94 |
| Brazil | 763,345.42 |
| Burma | 8,260,148.80 |
| Cameroun | 100,320,993.05 |
| Chile | 3,511,449.14 |
| Colombia | 21,227,275.70 |
| Congo-Brazzaville | 20,024,955.73 |
| Costa Rica | 2,859,422.32 |
| Dominica | 1,850,001.00 |
| Dominican Republic | 8,578,691.33 |
| East African Community (1) | 47,402,298.00 |
| Ecuador | 11,817,660.12 |
| Egypt | 47,584,799.13 |
| El Salvador | 1,200,000.00 |
| Gabon | 368,036.00 |

| <u>TYPE OF LOANS</u> | <u>AMOUNT AT MARCH 31, 1983</u> |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <u>50 year loans (cont'd)</u> | |
| Ghana | 78,738,512.14 |
| Grenada | 850,000.00 |
| Guatemala | 2,919,633.97 |
| Guyana | 32,828,042.45 |
| Honduras | 14,710,507.14 |
| India | 591,637,809.77 |
| Indonesia | 169,561,337.69 |
| Ivory Coast | 47,093,152.36 |
| Jamaica | 28,483,433.16 |
| Kenya | 97,494,098.56 |
| Madagascar | 21,847,836.37 |
| Malaysia | 351,695.10 |
| Malta | 1,000,000.00 |
| Mauritania | 4,188,280.37 |
| Mexico | 95,617.66 |
| Montserrat | 683,815.00 |
| Morocco | 13,169,890.95 |
| Nicaragua | 1,887,610.00 |
| Nigeria | 45,751,587.00 |
| Pakistan | 527,366,457.91 |
| Paraguay | 679,876.86 |
| Peru | 5,112,241.38 |

| TYPE OF LOANS | AMOUNT AT MARCH 31, 1983 |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <u>50 year loans (cont'd)</u> | |
| Philippines | 3,886,371.00 |
| St-Lucia | 540,625.12 |
| St-Vincent | 1,145,000.00 |
| Senegal | 14,314,093.89 |
| Sri Lanka | 154,755,859.02 |
| Swaziland | 1,393,494.00 |
| Thailand | 29,618,528.86 |
| Togo | 16,676,606.04 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 3,718,599.90 |
| Tunisia | 121,709,913.60 |
| Zaire | 26,195,264.74 |
| Zambia | 65,631,755.58 |
| Zimbabwe | 13,291,360.91 |
| Mali and Senegal (2) | <u>1,684,192.00</u> |
| Total | <u>\$2,467,490,662.09</u> |
| (grant element: 90.34%) | |
| GRAND TOTAL - ALL LOANS | <u>\$2,695,129,155.94</u> |
| (grant element: 87.17%) | |

- (1) Joint project involving Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
- (2) Joint project involving Mali and Senegal.



Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

May 26, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and National Defence
Room 265 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Dear Mr. Prud'homme:

When I appeared before the Standing Committee on May 5, Father Bob Ogle asked me for information on CIDA's involvement in energy exploration. At the time I answered very briefly that we are involved in such exploration but I would like now to amplify my response.

From the context of the exchange in the Committee I conclude that Father Ogle was referring particularly to the oil and gas sectors and, therefore, I will limit my comments to those forms of energy.

Pakistan

Since 1973, there has been a programme of providing various forms of assistance to the state oil company to help find new fields and bring them into production. Major facets of the Canadian programme are the provision of four seismic field units plus a seismic data processing centre, five to seven technical experts in seismic drilling, reservoir studies, production, etc., two drilling crews, two drilling rigs and miscellaneous other small items. The next phase of this programme, which is already regarded as very successful, includes a considerable training component. Total disbursements to date are of the order of \$36 million. The World Bank is collaborating with this programme.

Barbados

A new request has been received but has not yet been analyzed to assist an ongoing exploration and drilling programme with the provision of drilling consumables.

Bangladesh

An energy sector review is being planned which will, among other things, examine opportunities for an exploration project.

India


Under an oil and gas sector line of credit, CIDA has been supplying equipment and services to two agencies of the Government of India. In some cases the equipment supplied has been used by these agencies in exploration work. To date this has been the extent of CIDA's involvement in the exploration phase of the oil and gas sector in India.

Industrial Cooperation Division

The Industrial Cooperation Division of CIDA has funded several projects in the oil and gas sector. However, due to the project requirements for Industrial Cooperation project funding, none have been classified in the "exploration" phase of the oil and gas sector.

I trust that this information will be useful to Father Ogle and Members of the Committee.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Wm McWhinney', written in a cursive style.

Wm McWhinney
Acting President

c.c.: Mr. R. Vaive
Clerk of the Committee



Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

May 26, 1983

Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P.
Chairman of the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and National Defence
Room 265 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Dear Mr. Prud'homme:

When I appeared before the Standing Committee on May 5, Mr. Douglas Roche questioned me about the status of CIDA's support for New and Renewable Energy following a commitment made at a United Nations Conference in 1981.

This matter relates to an announcement which was made by the Prime Minister of Canada at the United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy which was held in Nairobi, Kenya, in August 1981. As a result of this announcement, CIDA was to provide \$30 million, \$25 million through its bilateral programmes, specifically for the New and Renewable Energy programme in Francophone Africa, primarily in the Sahel. The remaining \$5 million was to be administered by CIDA's Industrial Cooperation Division.

In February 1982, the Francophone Africa Branch of CIDA recruited an expert, Dr. Bilgen, to undertake a study on the subject of energy in Canada and in the Sahel countries. The purpose of this study was to assess the Canadian industrial capability, the institutional expertise in the Sahel region, and to delineate the most crucial needs for the use of the available technologies. The final report of the study was submitted to CIDA in April 1982.

In the summer of 1982, the main lines of a programme were elaborated and approval was received to further define the recommended approach. The main lines are:

(i) the most crucial needs to be satisfied by this programme are:

- (a) access to water;
- (b) the deforestation problem.

- (ii) the programme would therefore have two objectives:
 - (a) to facilitate water-pumping by means of new technologies using renewable sources of energy, e.g. solar, wind, hydraulic, etc.
 - (b) to conserve traditional sources of energy, e.g. wood.
- (iii) the target groups would be mainly the isolated rural communities.
- (iv) the programme component for energy generation for water-pumping would proceed in phases:
 - (a) the first phase would consist of technical testing in Canada of the Canadian technologies already available and which appear most appropriate to meet the objectives of the programme. It appears that solar energy, using the photovoltaic technology, is best suited to answer the needs of the target region.
 - (b) the second phase would consist of testing of the technologies in Africa while studying the acceptability of those technologies by the target groups.


In parallel, and most importantly, a training programme would be undertaken, through local African institutes, for the maintenance and the dissemination of the system while constantly monitoring the acceptance by the target groups. A permanent feed-back network will be the main element of this part of the programme.

The programme component for conservation of traditional sources of energy is less complex and could be launched much faster. The activities recommended are aimed primarily at wood conservation and include adapted cooking-stoves, village reforestation, small-scale compacting of vegetable residues, etc. The main requirement is that activities be small-scale as experience has proven that if the target groups are not directly and actively involved, there is little chance of success.

Final approval of the programme should be obtained in the late summer of 1983.

I trust that this information will be useful to Mr. Roche and Members of the Committee.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Wm McWhinney'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of the first and last names being capitalized and prominent.

Wm McWhinney
Acting President

c.c.: Mr. R. Vaive
Clerk of the Committee

APPENDICE "EAND-77"

NOTES POUR UN EXPOSÉ D'INTRODUCTIONCOMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES ET DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALELE 7 JUIN 1983

J'aimerais vous donner quelques renseignements généraux sur le pourquoi de ce budget supplémentaire, de même que des précisions sur les montants qui y sont demandés.

Les membres du Comité se souviendront d'avoir examiné, le 7 décembre 1982, le projet de loi C-130, la Loi autorisant la fourniture d'une aide financière permanente à certaines institutions financières internationales. Comme le projet de loi C-130 n'a reçu la sanction royale que le 30 mars 1983, l'ACDI n'a pas pu demander, dans la présentation de son Budget principal pour 1983-1984, de nouvelles affectations pour le programme des IFI. Les montants dont il est question dans le présent budget supplémentaire auraient donc été intégrés au Budget principal de l'ACDI pour 1983-1984 si cela avait été possible. Ces montants ont été inclus dans les prévisions budgétaires de l'Aide publique au développement (\$1 812 millions) pour 1983-1984.

Permettez-moi maintenant de vous expliquer brièvement les montants demandés dans le cadre de ce budget supplémentaire. Le crédit L36(a) permettrait à l'ACDI de verser un paiement en espèces de \$ 4 millions et d'émettre des billets à vue non productifs d'intérêts et non négociables d'une valeur ne devant pas dépasser \$ 157 500 000. Ces paiements seraient versés aux fonds concessionnels des institutions financières régionales comme le Fonds africain de développement, le Fonds des opérations spéciales de la Banque interaméricaine de développement et le Fonds asiatique de développement. En outre, des paiements sont prévus en faveur du Fonds commun pour les produits de base et du Fonds international pour le développement agricole. Ils sont indiqués à l'Annexe A.

Le crédit L37(a) permettrait de pourvoir à la participation du Canada au capital de la Banque africaine de développement, de la Banque interaméricaine de développement, de la Banque de développement des Caraïbes et de la Banque asiatique de développement. Il s'agit à la fois de paiements en espèces et de billets à vue: \$ 3 342 000 en espèces et \$ 25 642 000 en billets à vue. Le total des fonds non prévus dans le budget nécessaires pour ce programme au cours de 1983-1984 s'élève donc à \$ 7 324 000 en espèces, et à \$ 183 142 000 sous forme de billets à vue. Tous les détails relatifs aux augmentations particulières de capital sont donnés à l'Annexe B.

ANNEXE A

Voici des précisions sur les postes contenus dans les crédits L36(a) et L37(a).

Crédit L36(a) Avances

- | | <u>Espèces</u> | <u>Billets à vue</u> |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------|
| 1. <u>Fonds commun pour les produits de base</u> | \$ 4 000 000 | |
| <p>Le Fonds commun pour les produits de base devrait devenir opérationnel au cours de la présente année financière.</p> <p>La part du Canada dans la contribution initiale du Deuxième guichet, établie à \$ 350 millions EU, est de 2,8 % (\$ 4 millions CAN/année, pendant trois ans).</p> | | |
| 2. <u>Fonds international pour le développement agricole</u> | | \$ 14 000 000 |
| <p>Il s'agit du deuxième de trois versements annuels dans le cadre de l'actuelle reconstitution des ressources du FIDA (1981-1983).</p> <p>La contribution du Canada à cette reconstitution de \$ 1,1 milliard EU représente 3,2 % (\$ 42 millions CAN).</p> <p>Le paiement sera effectué sous forme de billets à vue, dont l'échéance est le 18 juillet 1983.</p> | | |
| 3. <u>Fonds africain de développement</u> | | \$ 33 900 000 |
| <p>Il s'agit du deuxième de trois versements annuels dans le cadre de la troisième reconstitution du Fonds.</p> <p>La contribution du Canada à cette reconstitution de 1 008 milliards d'unités de compte est de 7,94 % (\$ 100,9 millions).</p> | | |

Le paiement sera effectué sous forme de billets à vue, qui doivent être émis avant le 31 mars 1984.

4. Fonds des opérations spéciales de la Banque interaméricaine de développement \$ 12 000 000

Il s'agit du premier de quatre paiements annuels dans le cadre de la sixième reconstitution de la BID-FOS.

La contribution du Canada à cette reconstitution de \$702,6 millions EU s'établit à 5,55 % (\$47,9 millions CAN). Le paiement sera effectué sous forme de billets à vue, dont l'échéance est le 31 octobre 1983.

Il s'agit d'un montant mis de côté afin que nous puissions verser la valeur réelle de nos engagements envers la BID-FOS. \$ 12 000 000

5. Fonds asiatique de développement \$ 85 600 000

Il s'agit du premier de quatre versements annuels dans le cadre de la troisième reconstitution du Fonds.

La contribution du Canada à cette reconstitution de \$ 3,2 milliards EU représente 8,83 % (\$ 342,2 millions CAN). Le paiement se fera sous forme de billets à vue, dont l'échéance est fixée au 1er novembre 1983.

\$ 4 000 000 \$ 157 500 000

ANNEXE BCrédit L37(a) InvestissementsEspècesBillets à vue1. Banque africaine de
développement

\$ 11 800 000

Il s'agit du deuxième de cinq paiements à la souscription initiale de capital de la BAFD pour l'achat de 840 actions.

La contribution du Canada à cette souscription de \$ 2,1 milliards EU versée par des États non africains est de 9,6 %. Les actions versées représentent 25 % ou \$ 58,6 millions CAN.

Ce paiement sera effectué sous forme de billets à vue (\$ CAN), dont l'échéance est fixée au 31 janvier 1984.

2. Banque interaméricaine de
développement

\$ 9 100 000

Il s'agit du premier de quatre versements à la sixième augmentation générale de capital de la BID pour l'achat de 607 actions. La

contribution du Canada à cette augmentation de capital de \$ 15 milliards EU s'établit à 4,38 %. Notre capital versé représente 4,5 % ou \$36,4 millions CAN.

Ce paiement sera effectué sous forme de billets à vue (\$ EU), dont l'échéance est le 31 octobre 1983.

3. Banque de développement des
Caraïbes

\$ 442 000

\$ 442 000

Il s'agit du versement final dans le cadre de la deuxième augmentation de capital de la BDC pour l'achat de 146 actions.

La contritubion du Canada à cette augmentation de \$ 50 millions EU est de 17,6 %. Notre capital versé s'élève à 40 % ou \$ 4,3 millions CAN.

La moitié du paiement est versée en espèces et l'autre sous forme de billets à vue, qui arrivent à échéance en janvier 1984.

4. Banque asiatique de développement

\$ 2 900 000

\$4 300 000

Il s'agit du premier de cinq paiements à la troisième augmentation générale de capital de la BASD pour l'achat de 474 actions.

La part du Canada de cette augmentation de capital de \$ 9,1 milliards EU est de 6,305 %. Notre capital versé représente 5 %, ou \$ 35,2 millions CAN. 40 % de chacun des versements est en espèces, et 60 % sous forme de billets à vue. L'échéance est fixée au 31 décembre 1983.

\$ 3 342 000

\$ 25 642 000



Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

Le 27 mai 1983

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
Président du Comité permanent des
Affaires extérieures et de la
Défense nationale
Pièce 265, Edifice de l'Ouest
Chambre des Communes
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Monsieur le Président,


Lorsque j'ai comparu devant le Comité permanent le 5 mai, j'ai offert de présenter plus tard, en réponse à une question que m'avait posée Mme U. Appolloni, de plus amples renseignements sur les dépenses par secteur d'activité dans le cadre de différents programmes.

Tout d'abord, en ce qui concerne les programmes d'aide bilatérale de l'ACDI, je vous fais parvenir un aperçu des dépenses par secteur en 1982-1983 et des prévisions pour 1983-1984.

Vous trouverez également ci-joint une ventilation illustrant les contributions allouées, par pays et par secteurs au cours de l'exercice 1982-1983, par l'entremise du programme de la coopération institutionnelle et des services au développement (CISD) et du programme des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG).

Quant aux contributions canadiennes aux institutions financières internationales et à diverses organisations internationales, les fonds versés par le Canada sont mis en commun avec ceux des autres donateurs et ils ne sont pas expressément destinés à un secteur en particulier. Nous vous transmettons néanmoins une analyse de la répartition sectorielle de l'activité globale de ces institutions au cours de la dernière année pour laquelle nous disposons de données.

En espérant que ces renseignements seront utiles à
Mme Appolloni et aux membres du Comité, je vous prie
d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, mes salutations
distinguées.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Wm McWhinney', written in a cursive style.

Wm McWhinney
Président par intérim

c.c.: M. R. Vaive
Greffier du Comité

P.j.

AGENCE CANADIENNE DE DEVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONALAIDE BILATERALE AU DEVELOPPEMENTDEPENSES PAR SECTEUR(\$MILLIONS)

| | <u>DEPENSES</u> <u>PREVUES</u> <u>1982-1983</u> | <u>PREVISIONS</u> <u>1983-1984</u> |
|-------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Agriculture et ressources naturelles renouvelables | 112,2 | 152,7 |
| Social | 68,6 | 117,3 |
| Energie | 99,9 | 127,2 |
| Transport et infrastructure | 125,4 | 104,2 |
| Industrie et denrées | 49,4 | 58,7 |
| Autre | 136,4 | 97,5 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| TOTAL | <u>591,9</u> | <u>657,6</u> |

18/05/83

Banque internationale pour la reconstruction
et le développement (BIRD)/Association inter-
nationale de développement (IDA)

| <u>SECTEUR</u> | <u>Année financière 1982</u> | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------|
| | <u>EU\$</u> | <u>%</u> |
| Agriculture et développement rural | 3,250 | 25 |
| Energie | 3,380 | 26 |
| Télécommunications et transports | 1,820 | 14 |
| Hors projet et ajustement structurel | 1,300 | 10 |
| Infrastructure sociale | <u>1,430</u> | <u>11</u> |
| Alimentation en eau et assainissement | 390 | 3 |
| Education | 520 | 4 |
| Population, Santé et nutrition | - | - |
| Urbanisme | 390 | 3 |
| Industrie et mines | 520 | 4 |
| Sociétés financières de développement, petites entreprises et autres | <u>1,430</u> | <u>11</u> |
| TOTAL | 13,000 | 100 |

Note: Le montant total ne correspond pas
toujours à la somme, les chiffres
ayant été arrondis.

18/05/83

BANQUE INTERAMERICAINE DE DEVELOPPEMENT

| <u>SECTEUR</u> | <u>Année financière 1982</u> | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|
| | <u>EU\$</u> | <u>%</u> |
| Secteurs productifs | | |
| Agriculture et pêche | 414 | 15.1 |
| Industrie et mines | 421 | 15.4 |
| Tourisme | 27 | 1.0 |
| Infrastructure physique | | |
| Energie | 797 | 29.0 |
| Transports et communications | 208 | 7.6 |
| Infrastructure sociale | | |
| Santé publique et Environnement | 245 | 8.9 |
| Education, science et technologie | 261 | 9.5 |
| Développement urbain | 190 | 6.9 |
| Autres | | |
| Financement des exportations | 73 | 2.7 |
| Pré-investissement | 108 | 3.9 |
| Autres | - | - |
| <hr/> | | |
| TOTAL | \$2,744 | 100.0 |

18/05/83

BANQUE AFRICAINE DE DEVELOPPEMENT

| <u>SECTEUR</u> | <u>Année financière 1982</u> | |
|------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|
| | <u>EU\$</u> | <u>%</u> |
| Agriculture | 92.37 | 25.54 |
| Transports | 61.08 | 16.89 |
| Services publics | 100.85 | 30.65 |
| Industrie et banques de développement | 76.40 | 21.12 |
| Education et santé | 21.00 | 5.80 |
| | <hr/> | |
| TOTAL | 361.70 | 100.00 |

18/05/83

FONDS AFRICAIN DE DEVELOPPEMENT

| <u>SECTEUR</u> | <u>Année financière 1982</u> | |
|------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|
| | <u>EU\$</u> | <u>%</u> |
| Agriculture | 108.03 | 30.64 |
| Transports | 68.92 | 19.55 |
| Services publics | 88.47 | 25.09 |
| Industrie et banques de développement | 8.00 | 2.27 |
| Education et santé | 79.15 | 22.45 |
| TOTAL | 352.57 | 100.00 |

18/05/83

BANQUE ASIATIQUE DE DEVELOPPEMENT

| <u>SECTEUR</u> | <u>Année financière 1982</u> | |
|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|
| | <u>EUS</u> | <u>%</u> |
| Agriculture et agro-industrie | 543.6 | 33.7 |
| Energie | 458.7 | 28.4 |
| Industrie et minéraux (pétrole exclus) | 11.8 | 0.7 |
| Banques de développement | 159.8 | 9.9 |
| Transports et communications | 185.3 | 11.5 |
| Infrastructure sociale | | |
| Alimentation en eau et assainissement | 96.3 | 6.0 |
| Urbanisme, éducation, santé et population | 159.1 | 9.8 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| TOTAL | 1,614.6 | 100.0 |

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)
 PROGRAMME DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT (PNUD)
 1980

| <u>SECTORS/SECTEURS</u> | <u>EXPENDITURES/DEPENSES</u> | | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|
| | <u>US \$</u> | <u>%</u> | |
| Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries Agriculture, sylviculture, pêche | 170.8 | 25.53 | US \$ 35,000,000 |
| Transport and Communication Transports et communications | 89.9 | 13.42 | |
| Development Policies Politiques relatives au développement | 78.8 | 11.78 | |
| Natural Resources Ressources naturelles | 76.9 | 11.49 | |
| Industry Industrie | 66.4 | 9.92 | |
| Education Enseignement | 47.1 | 7.05 | |
| Employment Emploi | 40.5 | 6.06 | |
| Health Santé | 29.5 | 4.42 | |
| Science and Technology Science et technique | 25.7 | 3.85 | |
| International Trade and Development Finance Commerce international et financement du développement | 15.5 | 2.32 | |

| | | |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|------|
| Human Settlements Etablissements humains | 14.4 | 2.16 |
| Culture | 6.1 | .92 |
| Social Conditions and Equity Situation sociale et équité | 5.3 | ..78 |
| Population, Humanitarian Aid, other Population, assistance huma- nitaire, divers | 2.0 | .3 |
| Total | 668.8 | 100. |

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND (UNICEF)
FONDS DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ENFANCE (FISE)
1981

BUDGET

| <u>SECTORS/SECTEURS</u> | <u>US \$ MILLIONS</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> US \$ MILLIONS 9.2 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Basic Health Santé primaire | 49.1 | 22.6 | |
| Water Supply Approvisionnement en eau | 45.7 | 21.0 | |
| Nutrition | 14.1 | 6.5 | |
| Social Services for children Services sociaux aux enfants | 17.6 | 8.0 | |
| Formal and non-formal Education Education formelle et non-formelle | 32.3 | 14.8 | |
| Planning and Project Support Services Planification et encadrement | 21.3 | 9.8 | |
| Emergency Relief Secours d'urgence | <u>37.9</u> | <u>17.4</u> | |
| Total | 218.0 | 100. | |

COMMONWEALTH FUND FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE (CFTC)

FONDS DU COMMONWEALTH POUR LA COOPERATION TECHNIQUE (FCCT)

1981-82

| <u>SECTORS/SECTEURS</u> | <u>EXPENDITURES/DEPENSES</u> | | <u>CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| | <u>£ 000</u> | <u>%</u> | |
| Administration and Planning Administration et planification | 1,856.6 | 15.6 | Cdn \$ 11,000,000 |
| Education Enseignement | 795.9 | 6.7 | |
| Finance and Taxation Finance et fiscalité | 868.3 | 7.3 | |
| Health and Social Services Santé et services sociaux | 661.1 | 5.6 | |
| Industry Industrie | 2,472.2 | 20.8 | |
| Legal Services juridiques | 397.6 | 3.3 | |
| Agriculture | 1,003.3 | 8.5 | |
| Transportation, Posts, Telecommunication Transports, postes, télé- communications | 521.0 | 4.4 | |
| Energy Energie | 347.7 | 2.9 | |
| International Trade Commerce international | 1,971.2 | 16.6 | |
| Mass Communication Communications de masse | 278.5 | 2.4 | |
| Other Autres | 699.0 | 5.9 | |
| Total | 11,872.4 | 100. | |

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA): TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
 AGENCE INTERNATIONALE DE L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE (AIEA): L'ASSISTANCE TECHNIQUE
 1981

| <u>SECTORS/SECTEURS</u> | <u>EXPENDITURES/DEPENSES</u> | | CANADIAN GRANT <u>SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> US \$ 431,600 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| | <u>US \$ '00</u> | <u>%</u> | |
| General Atomic Energy Development Développement de l'énergie atomique (en général) | 1,630.5 | 7.8 | |
| Nuclear physics Physique nucléaire | 1,606.9 | 7.7 | |
| Nuclear Chemistry Chimie nucléaire | 732.2 | 3.4 | |
| Prospecting, Mining and Processing of Nuclear Materials Prospection, extraction, préparation de matériel nucléaire | 1,849.4 | 8.8 | |
| Nuclear Engineering and Technology Génie et technologie nucléaire | 3,111.3 | 14.8 | |
| Application of Isotopes and Radiation in: Application d'isotopes et de rayonnements en: | | | |
| - Agriculture | 4,860.6 | 23.2 | |
| - Medicine Médecine | 2,551.7 | 12.2 | |
| - Biology Biologie | 361.1 | 1.7 | |
| - Industry and Hydrology Industrie et hydrologie | 1,969.3 | 9.4 | |
| Safety in nuclear Energy Sûreté dans le domaine de l'énergie nucléaire | 2,296.3 | 11.0 | |
| Total: | <u>20,960.3</u> | <u>100</u> | |

UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR POPULATION ACTIVITIES (UNFPA)
 FONDS DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES ACTIVITES EN MATIERE DE
 POPULATION (FNUAP)

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>US \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT</u> <u>SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| | | | | US \$ 7,250,000 |
| Population | 136,400,000 | | 100 | |

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (IFAD)
 FONDS INTERNATIONAL POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT AGRICOLE (FIDA)

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>US \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT</u> <u>SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| Agriculture | 378,000,000 | | 100 | US \$11,660,000 |

INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE (UNCTAD/GATT)
CENTRE DU COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL (CNUCED/GATT)

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>US \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Trade Commerce | 15,700,00 | | 100 | US \$ 518,950 |

CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURE RESEARCH (CGIAR)*
LE GROUPE CONSULTATIF POUR LA RECHERCHE AGRICOLE INTERNATIONALE (GCRAI)*

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>US \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Agriculture | 130,904,000 | | 100 | US \$ 7,550,000 |

* (excluding IFPRI, ISNAR, ILCA)

* (à l'exclusion de IIRPA, SIRAN, CIPEA)

ACCT/SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (PSD)

ACCT/PROGRAMME SPECIAL DE DEVELOPPEMENT (PSD)

1981

BUDGET

| <u>SECTORS/SECTEURS</u> | <u>FF MILLIONS</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> Cdn \$ 1 million |
|----------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Technical Assistance Assistance technique | 5.4 | 60 | |
| Human Resources Ressources humaines | 3.6 | 40 | |
| | <u>9.0</u> | <u>100</u> | |

AUPELF/INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR UNIVERSITY COOPERATION (FICU)

AUPELF/FONDS INTERNATIONAL DE COOPERATION INTERUNIVERSITAIRE (FICU)

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>Cdn \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> Cdn \$ 650,000 |
|----------------------------------------|---------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Human Resources Ressources humaines | 800,000 | 100 | |

ONCHOCERIASIS CONTROL PROGRAMME (OCP)
PROGRAMME DE LUTTE CONTRE L'ONCHOCERCOSE (OCP)

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>US \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Health Santé | 16,600,000 | | 100 | US \$ 917,000 |

SPECIAL PROGRAMME OF TRAINING AND RESEARCH IN TROPICAL DISEASES (TDR)
PROGRAMME SPECIAL RECHERCHE/FORMATION CONCERNANT LES MALADIES TROPICALES (TDR)

1981

| <u>SECTOR/SECTEUR</u> | <u>US \$</u> | <u>BUDGET</u> | <u>%</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|----------|-------------------------------------------------|
| Health Santé | 25,100,000 | | 100 | US \$ 702,000 |

JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICER (JPO) AND ASSOCIATE EXPERT (AE) PROGRAMME
PROGRAMME DES ADMINISTRATEURS STAGIAIRES (AS) ET PROGRAMME
DES EXPERTS ASSOCIES (EA)

1981

HUMAN RESOURCE SECTOR EXPENDITURES
DEPENSES POUR LE SECTEUR DES RESSOURCES HUMAINES

| <u>ORGANIZATION/ORGANISATION</u> | <u>CANADIAN GRANT/SUBVENTION CANADIENNE</u> |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| | Cdn \$ |
| UNDP/PNUD | 350,000 |
| UNICEF/FISE | 100,000 |
| FAO | 350,000 |
| CGIAR/GCRAI | 100,000 |
| | <hr/> |
| TOTAL | 900,000 |

CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

A SECTORAL BREAKOUT ILLUSTRATING THE TOTAL FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS THROUGH OUR INSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION DEVELOPMENT SERVICES DIVISION (ICDS) AND THROUGH OUR COMMITMENTS TO CANADIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs) BY COUNTRY AND BY SECTOR FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1982-83 (THE CODE BELOW INDICATES THE TYPE OF SECTOR).

AGENCE CANADIENNE DE DEVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL
VENTILATION SECTORIELLE ILLUSTRANT LE MONTANT TOTAL DES CONTRIBUTIONS ALLOUÉES, PAR PAYS ET PAR SECTEUR, PAR L'ENTREMISE DE NOTRE PROGRAMME DE LA COOPERATION INSTITUTIONNELLE ET DES SERVICES AU DEVELOPPEMENT (ICSD) ET DE NOTRE PROGRAMME DES ORGANISATIONS NON GOUVERNEMENTALES (ONG) AU COURS DE L'ANNEE FINANCIERE 1982-1983 (LES CODES CI-APRES INDIQUENT LE GENRE DE SECTEUR).

OVERSEAS SECTORS/SECTEURS OUTRE-MER

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
| A - Public utilities Services d'utilité publique | F - Housing Logement |
| B - Community development Développement communautaire | G - Water Eau |
| C - Food production Production alimentaire | H - Coops and small businesses Coop et petites entreprises |
| D - Education | I - Refugees and emergency relief Réfugiés et secours d'urgence |
| E - Health and population Santé et population | J - Programme services Services liés à un programme |

ICIS/NGO COMMITMENTS BY COUNTRY AND SECTOR
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1982/83
CISD/NGO ENGAGEMENTS PAR PAYS ET SECTEUR
POUR L'ANNEE FINANCIERE 1982/83

FRANCOPHONE AFRICA
AFRIQUE FRANCOPHONE

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-------------------------------------------------------|------------------|--------|-------|---------|---------|---|---------|---------|--------|--------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Algeria Algérie | - | - | - | 15,000 | - | - | - | 15,125 | - | - | 31,125 |
| Angola Angola | - | - | 6,346 | - | 2,430 | - | - | 52,933 | 19,632 | - | 81,311 |
| Benin Benin | - | 12,000 | 6,464 | 14,450 | 4,050 | - | - | - | - | 82,700 | 99,664 |
| Burundi Burundi | - | 83,315 | 5,775 | 116,044 | 35,000 | - | 83,870 | 20,625 | - | - | 344,609 |
| Cameroon Cameroun | - | 19,351 | 4,740 | 64,734 | 158,054 | - | 396,517 | 549,335 | - | 45,369 | 1,238,191 |
| Cape Verde Cap Vert | - | - | - | - | 13,400 | - | - | - | - | - | 13,400 |
| Central African Republic République Centrafricaine | - | - | 4,650 | 7,300 | 70,000 | - | 3,750 | - | - | - | 85,700 |
| Chad Tchad | - | - | - | 26,088 | 30,246 | - | - | - | - | 50,475 | 106,809 |
| Comoros Comores | - | - | - | 69,800 | 360,000 | - | - | - | - | - | 429,800 |
| Congo Congo | - | - | - | 6,000 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6,000 |
| Djibouti Djibouti | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 15,975 | - | - | 15,975 |

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------|-----------|--------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Sao Tome & Principe | - | 5,000 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 5,000 |
| Sao Tome & Principe | - | 816,321 | 1,218,310 | 593,889 | 40,592 | - | - | 8,280 | 25,229 | - | 2,702,021 |
| Senegal | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Togo | - | - | - | 25,150 | 113,725 | - | 62,250 | - | - | 3,900 | 201,025 |
| Tunisia | - | - | - | 239,745 | 237,226 | - | - | 5,200 | - | 2,500 | 484,071 |
| Tunisie | - | - | - | 239,745 | 237,226 | - | - | 5,200 | - | 2,500 | 484,071 |
| Upper Volta | - | 210,389 | 115,657 | 11,797 | 337,395 | - | 131,366 | 825,620 | - | - | 1,632,424 |
| Haute Volta | - | 210,389 | 115,657 | 11,797 | 337,395 | - | 131,366 | 825,620 | - | - | 1,632,424 |
| Zaire | 16,822 | 28,428 | 59,054 | 173,382 | 400,713 | 1,753 | 49,625 | 457,907 | - | 1,200 | 1,189,604 |
| Zaire | 16,822 | 28,428 | 59,054 | 173,382 | 400,713 | 1,753 | 49,625 | 457,907 | - | 1,200 | 1,189,604 |
| TOTAL | 42,522 | 1,297,466 | 1,794,571 | 2,208,110 | 2,326,640 | 10,253 | 1,244,458 | 2,120,500 | 44,811 | 461,894 | 11,871,343 |

ILUS/WHO COMMITMENTS BY COUNTRY AND SECTOR
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1982/83
CISD/ONG ENGAGEMENTS PAR PAYS ET SECTEUR
POUR L'ANNEE FINANCIERE 1982/83

COMMUNAUTÉ AFRICAINE
AFRIQUE DU COMMUNEALITH

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-----------------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|--------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Botswana | - | 24,000 | 63,115 | 53,744 | - | - | 22,895 | 66,383 | 60,000 | - | 290,141 |
| Burkina Faso | 6,890 | 908 | - | - | 249,268 | - | - | 39,300 | - | 15,000 | 311,367 |
| Ethiopia | - | 56,042 | 28,000 | 363,020 | 50,325 | - | 337,500 | 850 | - | 2,125 | 838,262 |
| Ghana | 4,500 | - | 15,690 | 234,453 | 64,712 | - | 59,475 | 39,500 | - | - | 448,330 |
| Kenya | - | 31,584 | 231,385 | 733,317 | 151,164 | - | 612,067 | 249,605 | - | 128,442 | 2,137,564 |
| Lesotho | 23,221 | 105,064 | 59,941 | 68,464 | 71,847 | 36,855 | 220,010 | 57,465 | - | - | 642,862 |
| Liberia | - | - | - | - | 3,162 | - | - | 30,240 | - | - | 33,402 |
| Malawi | - | 30,350 | - | 179,050 | 80,123 | - | 39,925 | 29,900 | - | - | 350,354 |
| Mali | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 39,133 | - | - | 39,133 |
| Mozambique | - | 34,740 | - | - | 9,075 | - | 6,000 | 91,763 | - | - | 141,578 |

| Country Pays | SECTEURS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|--------|---------|---------|---------|-------|---------|---------|---------|--------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Multinational Commonwealth Multinational Afrique du Commonwealth | - | 10,850 | - | 65,940 | 3,200 | - | - | 233,734 | 250,217 | 38,205 | 586,106 |
| Norfolk Norfolk | - | - | - | 34,500 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 34,500 |
| Nigeria Nigeria | - | 42,350 | 45,703 | 150,327 | 11,946 | - | 74,400 | - | - | - | 324,810 |
| Psychiatry Psychiatry | - | - | - | 30,000 | 27,100 | - | - | 7,034 | - | - | 64,134 |
| Sierra Leone Sierra Leone | - | 58,837 | 149,480 | 61,077 | 256,660 | - | - | 130,750 | 748 | - | 572,190 |
| Sierra Leone Sierra Leone | - | - | - | 14,932 | 42,187 | - | 400,000 | 17,000 | 7,272 | - | 501,391 |
| South Africa Afrique du Sud | - | 15,275 | 33 | 117,689 | 80,200 | 1,390 | - | 197,600 | - | - | 412,197 |
| Sierra Leone Sierra Leone | 77,048 | 9,203 | 116,250 | 69,556 | 375,521 | - | - | 1,600 | 35,300 | 33,172 | 717,650 |
| Sierra Leone Sierra Leone | - | 30,230 | 7,371 | 170,074 | - | 785 | 30,000 | 10,600 | - | - | 285,069 |
| Tanzania Tanzanie | - | 75,716 | 135,474 | 327,501 | 75,033 | - | 10,250 | 30,000 | 23,445 | 10,775 | 734,214 |

| Country Pays | SECTIONS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-----------------|-------------------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Uganda | - | 50,000 | 251,517 | 347,900 | 168,500 | - | 23,050 | 4,819 | 512,294 | 327 | 1,358,407 |
| Zambia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Zambia | - | 31,712 | 98,495 | 84,850 | 25,243 | 17,575 | 19,520 | 75,453 | 2,700 | 4,800 | 360,348 |
| Zimbabwe | 350 | 117,873 | 33,520 | 2,075,995 | 188,090 | - | - | 173,600 | 56,950 | 11,500 | 2,648,784 |
| Zimbabwe | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| TOTAL | 112,009 | 730,795 | 1,236,073 | 5,163,021 | 1,944,254 | 56,605 | 1,888,092 | 1,945,168 | 928,546 | 204,346 | 13,888,849 |

ICDS/NGO COMMITMENTS BY COUNTRY AND SECTOR
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1984/83
CLD/ING ENGAGEMENTS PAR PAYS ET SECTEUR
POUR L'ANNÉE FINANCIÈRE 1984/83

AMERICAS
AMÉRIQUES

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-----------------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---|---------|---------|-------|--------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Antigua | - | 3,700 | 10,000 | 32,543 | 6,900 | - | - | 17,719 | - | - | 70,862 |
| Argentina | - | 17,750 | 65,925 | 53,000 | - | - | - | 3,000 | - | - | 139,675 |
| Barbados | - | - | - | 6,250 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6,250 |
| Belize | - | 14,200 | 198,212 | 59,262 | - | - | - | 230,982 | - | - | 502,168 |
| Bolivia | - | - | 38,233 | 80,000 | 39,113 | - | - | 100 | - | 77,525 | 229,971 |
| Brazil | - | 448,720 | 256,248 | 80,166 | 247,208 | - | 4,275 | 127,830 | - | 37,200 | 1,201,673 |
| Chile | - | 174,005 | 358,759 | 680,648 | 146,450 | - | 38,000 | 21,406 | - | 87,034 | 1,506,302 |
| Colombia | - | 65,871 | 55,586 | 313,905 | 40,225 | - | - | 251,221 | - | 12,795 | 759,293 |
| Costa Rica | - | 32,728 | 49,861 | 136,755 | 158,384 | - | 410,532 | 121,292 | 981 | 85,763 | 1,297,415 |
| Cuba | - | - | - | 23,100 | 54,735 | - | - | 99,275 | 9,342 | - | 186,406 |

| Country Pays | SECTIONS/SECTIONS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|----------------------------------------------|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|----------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Doelica Dominique | - | 10,648 | 12,912 | 61,510 | 1,169 | - | - | 32,382 | 2,661 | - | 129,702 |
| Dominican Republic République Dominicaine | - | - | 37,210 | 123,190 | 79,068 | - | - | 354,215 | - | 336 | 594,017 |
| Ecuador Equateur | - | 155,655 | - | 213,005 | 148,642 | 2,000 | 165,000 | 207,177 | - | - | 891,479 |
| El Salvador El Salvador | - | 31,469 | - | 13,340 | 138,665 | - | - | - | 96,100 | - | 279,774 |
| Equatorial Guinea Guinée équatoriale | - | 24,820 | 15,454 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 40,271 |
| Grenada Grenade | - | 10,666 | 35,807 | 331,552 | 30,690 | - | 9,675 | 71,887 | - | 93 | 491,110 |
| Guatemala Guatemala | - | 40,458 | - | - | 70,410 | - | 180,000 | 72,068 | - | - | 172,545 |
| Guyana Guyane | - | - | 15,000 | 103,339 | 13,796 | - | - | - | - | - | 132,135 |
| Haiti Haïti | 43,400 | 289,298 | 400,990 | 236,536 | 908,331 | 66,424 | 330,690 | 201,722 | 6,575 | 204,800 | 2,689,166 |
| Honduras Honduras | - | 485,059 | 143,059 | 40,057 | 196,292 | - | 656,155 | 181,000 | 3 88,364 | - | 2,080,187 |

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------|---------|---------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Jamaica Jamaïque | - | 129,587 | 32,270 | 406,956 | 107,617 | - | - | 0,166 | - | 127 | 694,603 |
| Mexico Mexique | - | 4,500 | 2,585 | 171,678 | 72,978 | 4,687 | - | 66,958 | 82,200 | 18,770 | 424,316 |
| Multinational Americas Multinational Amérique | 3,750 | 33,983 | 64,945 | 392,660 | 116,150 | - | - | 732,639 | - | 201,149 | 1,026,076 |
| Nicaragua Nicaragua | 15,200 | 44,292 | 144,286 | 558,570 | 1,014,853 | 71,250 | 30,000 | 252,371 | 221,201 | 9,810 | 2,361,833 |
| Panama Panama | - | 1,853 | 110,000 | 41,925 | - | - | - | 282,008 | - | - | 435,786 |
| Paraguay Paraguay | - | 7,300 | 163,020 | 19,000 | 30,000 | - | 173 | 25,555 | - | - | 245,048 |
| Peru Pérou | 143,289 | 203,290 | 257,595 | 913,518 | 302,776 | 7,500 | 474,200 | 135,704 | - | 37,000 | 2,474,811 |
| St. Christopher-Nevis-Ing. St-Christ. Nevis-Ing. | - | - | - | - | 1,900 | - | - | - | - | - | 1,900 |
| St. Lucia St. Lucie | - | 71,414 | - | 236,734 | 30,839 | - | 1,520 | 47,616 | 1,150 | - | 380,273 |
| St. Vincent St. Vincent | - | 4,700 | - | 220,324 | 1,207 | - | 3,150 | 56,373 | - | - | 294,754 |

| Country Pays | SECTEURS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-------------------|-------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Trinidad & Tobago | - | - | 15,000 | 103,030 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 118,030 |
| Trinité & Tobago | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Uruguay | - | 11,400 | - | 82,320 | - | - | - | 17,589 | - | - | 111,309 |
| Uruguay | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Venezuela | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 20,000 | 20,000 |
| Venezuela | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| TOTAL | 201,430 | 2,305,362 | 3,482,954 | 5,764,694 | 4,267,409 | 151,161 | 2,313,571 | 3,620,815 | 817,483 | 817,775 | 22,787,950 |

ICDS/MCO CC MITMENTS BY COUNTRY AND SECTOR
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1982/83
CISD/ORG ENGAGEMENTS PAR PAYS ET SECTEUR
POUR L'ANNEE FINANCIERE 1982/83

ASIA
ASIE

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|---------|---------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Bangladesh | 1,125 | 164,087 | 661,913 | 595,746 | 236,901 | 11,395 | 9,825 | 141,255 | - | 27,356 | 1,849,600 |
| Bhutan | - | 100 | - | 5,000 | - | - | 5,000 | - | - | - | 10,100 |
| Burma | - | - | - | 155,371 | 232,275 | - | 227,660 | - | - | - | 615,305 |
| China | - | - | 79,773 | 1,544,328 | 159,860 | - | - | - | - | 79,988 | 1,864,096 |
| China | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 15,204 | - | - | 15,200 |
| Cook Islands | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Fiji | - | 863 | - | 153,070 | - | - | - | - | - | 17,080 | 166,739 |
| India | - | 425,226 | 282,453 | 1,857,438 | 1,277,906 | 159,280 | 113,276 | 431,155 | 150,910 | 370,032 | 5,077,076 |
| Indonesia | - | 587,606 | 69,049 | 2,816 | 564,494 | - | 33,474 | 88,204 | - | - | 1,495,647 |
| Israel | - | - | - | - | 45,000 | - | - | - | - | - | 45,000 |
| Jordan | - | - | 80,000 | 36,303 | - | - | 180,125 | - | - | - | 296,488 |
| Laos | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Laos People's Democratic Republic | - | 6,000 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6,000 |
| Laos République Démocratique | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Laos POP | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | |
| Thailand | - | 1,018,267 | 1,189 | 318,938 | 401,555 | - | - | 105,503 | 5,000 | - | 1,850,452 |
| Tonga | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 10,000 | - | 10,000 |
| Turkey | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 30,000 | - | - | 30,000 |
| Vanuatu | - | - | - | 37,500 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 37,500 |
| TOTAL | 9,590 | 3,165,040 | 1,304,886 | 5,764,370 | 4,633,065 | 178,175 | 981,981 | 879,437 | 588,022 | 758,456 | 16,263,022 * |

ICDS/NGO COMMITMENTS BY COUNTRY AND SECTOR
 CSD/ONG ENGAGEMENTS PAR PAYS ET SECTEUR
 POUR L'ANNEE FINANCIERE 1982/83

MULTI-REGIONAL
 MULTI-REGIONAL

| Country Pays | SECTORS/SECTEURS | | | | | | | Country Total Total du pays |
|----------------------------------|------------------|-----------|---------|-----------|---------|--------|---|--------------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | |
| Multi-regional Multi-régional | 117,000 | 1,412,036 | 226,920 | 2,523,651 | 654,805 | 88,270 | - | 38,130,358 |
| TOTAL | 117,000 | 1,412,036 | 226,920 | 2,523,651 | 654,805 | 88,270 | - | 38,130,358 |



Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

Le 31 mai 1983

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
Président du Comité permanent des
Affaires extérieures et de la
Défense nationale
Pièce 265, Edifice de l'Ouest
Chambre des Communes
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Monsieur le Président,

Lorsque j'ai comparu devant le Comité permanent le 5 mai, M. Herb Breau m'a demandé de lui indiquer le volume des prêts non remboursés qui ont été octroyés aux conditions les plus favorables par le Canada à des pays en développement. Il a également demandé une analyse de la valeur réelle de ces prêts. La présente a pour objet de répondre à ses questions.

Vous trouverez en annexe une liste de tous les prêts non remboursés consentis à des pays étrangers dans le cadre du Programme d'aide publique au développement du Canada. Au 31 mars 1983, le volume total des prêts dus au Canada s'établissait à \$2 695 129 155,94. Je dois préciser que, même si ces prêts ont été consentis à des conditions de faveur, ils sont enregistrés à leur pleine valeur et, en tant que montants à recouvrer, ne sont pas différenciés des prêts accordés aux taux du marché.


Toutefois, les conditions rattachées aux prêts de l'ACDI varient considérablement par rapport aux taux du marché et sont beaucoup plus favorables pour l'emprunteur. Cette différence vient de ce que les délais de grâce et de remboursement sont plus longs, et que les taux d'intérêt sont plus faibles, ou encore nuls. L'ensemble de ces conditions plus souples, qu'on appelle souvent le degré de libéralité, constitue l'élément don du prêt. En d'autres termes, il découle de la libéralité des conditions par rapport aux taux du marché qu'une partie du prêt équivaut à une subvention.

Comme l'indique la liste ci-jointe, l'ACDI octroie généralement deux genres de prêts:

- a) taux d'intérêt nul, délai de grâce de 10 ans et période de remboursement de 50 ans à partir du moment où le prêt prend effet (0/10/50); et
- b) taux d'intérêt de 3%, délai de grâce de 7 ans et période de remboursement de 30 ans (3/7/30).

Pour calculer le degré de libéralité, on utilise une formule de comparaison entre les conditions de faveur et les conditions commerciales. A l'aide de cette formule (dont ont convenu tous les pays membres du Comité d'aide au développement de l'OCDE), on a calculé l'élément don à 90,34% pour les prêts 0/10/50 et à 55,2% pour les prêts 3/7/30. La libéralité d'un prêt se calcule donc en multipliant la valeur nominale du prêt par son élément don.

En espérant que ces renseignements seront utiles à M. Breau et aux membres du Comité permanent, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, mes salutations les plus distinguées.



W. McWhinney
Président par intérim

c.c.: M. R. Vaive
Greffier du Comité

P.j.

PRETS A DES PAYS ETRANGERS
SOUS LES PROGRAMMES D'AIDE PUBLIQUE
AU DEVELOPPEMENT DU CANADA
MONTANTS NON REGLES AU 31 MARS 1983

GENRE DE PRETSMONTANT AU 31 MARS 1983

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1) Echéance de 20 ans, période de grâce de 5 ans, taux d'intérêt de 5% par année; venant à échéance en septembre 2000 et en mars 2001 | |
| Jamaïque | 4 500 000,00 |
| Turquie | <u>30 831 019,00</u> |
| Total | \$ <u>35 331 019,00</u> |
| (élément don: 33.3%) | |
| 2) Echéance de 25 ans, période de grâce de 5 ans, taux d'intérêt de 6% par année; venant à échéance en mars 2001 | |
| Nigeria | \$ <u>1 323 789,00</u> |
| (élément don: 28.75%) | |
| 3) Echéance de 30 ans, période de grâce de 7 ans, taux d'intérêt de 3% par année; venant à échéance à des dates diverses entre mars 1997 et septembre 2011 | |
| Barbade | 17 034 936,33 |
| Brésil | 12 812 790,28 |
| Chili | 2 743 033,82 |
| Colombie | 17 371 693,03 |
| Cuba | 9 557 882,00 |
| République Dominicaine | 2 202 170,54 |

GENRE DE PRETSPrêts de 30 ans (suite)MONTANT AU 31 MARS 1983

| | |
|-------------------|-------------------------|
| Egypte | 50 000 000,00 |
| Jamaïque | 33 578 874,07 |
| Corée | 608 233,70 |
| Malaisie | 13 793 205,44 |
| Nigeria | 994 485,00 |
| Pérou | 406 187,22 |
| Trinité et Tobago | 7 116 001,25 |
| Turquie | <u>9 850 000,00</u> |
| Total | <u>\$178 069 492,68</u> |

(élément don: 55.20%)

- 4) Echéance de 30 ans, période de grâce de 7 ans, sans intérêt; venant à échéance en mars 2010

| | |
|-------------|------------------------|
| El Salvador | \$ <u>8 642 643,41</u> |
|-------------|------------------------|

(élément don: 78.87%)

- 5) Echéance de 35 ans, période de grâce de 5 ans, sans intérêt; venant à échéance à des dates diverses entre avril 2001 et novembre 2005

| | |
|-------------|------------------------|
| El Salvador | \$ <u>3 476 563,10</u> |
|-------------|------------------------|

(élément don: 79.12%)

- 6) Echéance de 40 ans, période de grâce de 10 ans, sans intérêt; venant à échéance en mars 2008

| | |
|-----------|----------------------|
| Thaïlande | \$ <u>794 986,66</u> |
|-----------|----------------------|

(élément don: 87.03%)

GENRE DE PRETSMONTANT AU 31 MARS 1983

7) Echéance de 50 ans, période de grâce de
10 ans, sans intérêt; venant à échéance à
des dates diverses entre mars 2013 et
septembre 2032

| | |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|
| Algérie | 27 896 038,84 |
| Antigua | 5 999 797,25 |
| Argentine | 644 000,34 |
| Barbade | 2 327 378,00 |
| Belize | 12 187 863,48 |
| Bolivie | 1 653 407,94 |
| Brésil | 763 345,42 |
| Birmanie | 8 260 148,80 |
| Cameroun | 100 320 993,05 |
| Chili | 3 511 449,14 |
| Colombie | 21 227 275,70 |
| Congo-Brazzaville | 20 024 955,73 |
| Costa Rica | 2 859 422,32 |
| Dominique | 1 850 001,00 |
| République Dominicaine | 8 578 691,33 |
| Communauté de l'Afrique orientale (1) | 47 402 298,00 |
| Equateur | 11 817 660,12 |
| Egypte | 47 584 799,13 |
| El Salvador | 1 200 000,00 |
| Gabon | 368 036,00 |

GENRE DE PRETSPrêts de 50 ans (suite)MONTANT AU 31 MARS 1983

| | |
|---------------|----------------|
| Ghana | 78 738 512,14 |
| Grenade | 850 000,00 |
| Guatemala | 2 919 633,97 |
| Guyana | 32 828 042,45 |
| Honduras | 14 710 507,14 |
| Inde | 591 637 809,77 |
| Indonésie | 169 561 337,69 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 47 093 152,36 |
| Jamaïque | 28 483 433,16 |
| Kenya | 97 494 098,56 |
| Madagascar | 21 847 836,37 |
| Malaisie | 351 695,10 |
| Malte | 1 000 000,00 |
| Mauritanie | 4 188 280,37 |
| Mexique | 95 617,66 |
| Montserrat | 683 815,00 |
| Maroc | 13 169 890,95 |
| Nicaragua | 1 887 610,00 |
| Nigeria | 45 751 587,00 |
| Pakistan | 527 366 457,91 |
| Paraguay | 679 876,86 |
| Pérou | 5 112 241,38 |

GENRE DE PRETSMONTANT AU 31 MARS 1983Prêts de 50 ans (suite)

| | |
|---------------------|---------------------------|
| Philippines | 3 886 371,00 |
| Sainte-Lucie | 540 625,12 |
| St-Vincent | 1 145 000,00 |
| Sénégal | 14 314 093,89 |
| Sri Lanka | 154 755 859,02 |
| Swaziland | 1 393 494,00 |
| Thaïlande | 29 618 528,86 |
| Togo | 16 676 606,04 |
| Trinité et Tobago | 3 718 599,90 |
| Tunisie | 121 709 913,60 |
| Zaïre | 26 195 264,74 |
| Zambie | 65 631 755,58 |
| Zimbabwe | 13 291 360,91 |
| Mali et Sénégal (2) | <u>1 684 192,00</u> |
| Total | <u>\$2 467 490 662,09</u> |

(élément don: 90.34%)

GRAND TOTAL DE TOUS LES PRETS

\$2 695 129 155,94

(élément don: 87.17%)

- (1) Projet conjoint englobant le Kenya, la Tanzanie et l'Ouganda.
- (2) Projet conjoint englobant le Mali et le Sénégal.

Agence canadienne de
développement internationalCanadian International
Development Agency

Le 26 mai 1983

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
Président du Comité permanent des
Affaires extérieures et de la
Défense nationale
Pièce 265, Edifice de l'Ouest
Chambre des Communes
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Monsieur le Président,

Le 5 mai, lorsque j'ai comparu devant le Comité permanent, le Père Bob Ogle m'a demandé certaines informations concernant la participation de l'ACDI à la prospection dans le domaine de l'énergie. Je lui avais alors très brièvement répondu que nous y participions effectivement, mais je voudrais maintenant étoffer ma réponse.

Je conclus de l'orientation générale de la réunion que le Père Ogle avait surtout à l'esprit le pétrole et le gaz, et c'est pourquoi je limiterai mes observations à ces deux types d'énergie.

Pakistan

Depuis 1973, il existe un programme destiné à aider de différentes façons la société pétrolière nationale à prospecter et à exploiter de nouveaux gisements. Le Canada a ainsi mis à la disposition de ce pays quatre installations d'exploration sismique complétées par un centre de traitement des données, cinq à sept spécialistes du forage sismique, des études de réservoir, une aide à la production, etc.; il a en outre consenti les services de deux équipes de forage, deux appareils de sondage et du petit matériel. La phase suivante, que l'on considère déjà très fructueuse, porte dans une large mesure sur la formation. Le montant total des dépenses engagées à ce jour est de l'ordre de \$36 millions. La Banque mondiale collabore à ce programme.

Barbade

Une nouvelle demande, qui n'a pas encore été analysée, requiert de l'aide pour un programme de prospection permanente et de forage comprenant la fourniture de matériels de forage renouvelables.

Bangladesh

Une étude du secteur de l'énergie est en cours de planification dans le cadre de laquelle on examinera, entre autres, la possibilité d'un projet de prospection.


Inde

Dans le cadre d'une ligne de crédit relative au secteur du pétrole et du gaz, l'ACDI a fourni du matériel et des services à deux organismes du gouvernement de l'Inde. Le matériel a, dans certains cas, été utilisé pour la prospection. Jusqu'ici, la participation de l'ACDI à la prospection de pétrole et de gaz en Inde ne s'est pas étendue au-delà de cette ligne de crédit.

Direction de la coopération industrielle

La Direction de la coopération industrielle de l'ACDI a financé plusieurs projets dans le secteur du pétrole et du gaz. Toutefois, compte tenu des conditions régissant le financement des projets de coopération industrielle, aucun de ceux-ci n'a été classé dans la phase de "prospection" du pétrole et du gaz.

J'espère que ces renseignements seront utiles au Père Ogle et aux membres du Comité et je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de ma considération distinguée.



Wm McWhinney
Président par intérim

c.c.: M. R. Vaive
Greffier du Comité



Agence canadienne de
développement international

Canadian International
Development Agency

Le 26 mai 1983

Monsieur Marcel Prud'homme, député
Président du Comité permanent des
Affaires extérieures et de la
Défense nationale
Pièce 265, Edifice de l'Ouest
Chambre des Communes
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0A6

Votre référence Your file

Notre référence Our file

Monsieur le Président,

Lorsque j'ai comparu devant le Comité le 5 mai,
M. Douglas Roche m'a interrogé sur l'appui accordé par
l'ACDI au domaine des énergies nouvelles et renouvelables
à la suite d'un engagement pris lors d'une conférence des
Nations Unies en 1981.

L'engagement en question découle d'une déclaration que le
Premier Ministre du Canada a faite à l'occasion de la
Conférence des Nations Unies sur les sources d'énergies
nouvelles et renouvelables tenue à Nairobi, au Kenya, en
août 1981. L'ACDI devait en effet allouer \$30 millions
à ce chapitre, dont \$25 millions par le biais de ses
programmes bilatéraux, et en particulier du programme
d'énergies nouvelles et renouvelables en Afrique francophone,
surtout au Sahel. Les \$5 millions restants devaient être
administrés par la Direction de la coopération industrielle
de l'ACDI.

En février 1982, la Direction générale de l'Afrique francophone
a recruté un spécialiste, M. Bilgen, chargé d'effectuer
une étude sur la question au Canada et dans les pays du Sahel.
Il devait évaluer les capacités industrielles du Canada,
les compétences institutionnelles du Sahel et, enfin,
délimiter les besoins les plus pressants quant à l'utilisation
des techniques disponibles. Le rapport final de son étude
a été présenté à l'ACDI en avril 1982.

A l'été de 1982, les grandes lignes d'un programme ont été tracées, et on a eu le feu vert pour mieux définir la méthode recommandée. En voici les principaux points.

- i) les besoins les plus pressants concernent:
 - a) l'accès aux ressources en eau;
 - b) le problème du déboisement.
- ii) le programme aurait donc deux objectifs:
 - a) faciliter le pompage de l'eau grâce à des techniques nouvelles utilisant des sources d'énergies renouvelables (énergie solaire, éolienne, hydraulique, etc.)
 - b) conserver les sources traditionnelles d'énergie, par ex. le bois.
- iii) les groupes visés seraient principalement les communautés rurales isolées.
- iv) la composante production d'énergie pour le pompage de l'eau se déroulerait en diverses étapes:
 - a) la première étape consisterait à effectuer au Canada des essais des techniques canadiennes disponibles qui semblent les meilleures pour atteindre les objectifs du programme. L'utilisation de l'énergie solaire, captée par des cellules photovoltaïques, serait la technique la mieux adaptée aux besoins de la région visée.
 - b) la deuxième étape consisterait à mettre à l'essai en Afrique les techniques retenues, et à examiner si les groupes cibles les acceptent.


Parallèlement, et il s'agit là d'un aspect de la plus haute importance, on réaliserait par le biais d'institutions africaines un programme de formation touchant l'entretien et la diffusion du système, tout en suivant de près son adoption par les groupes cibles. Un réseau permanent de rétroaction constituerait le principal élément de cette partie du programme.

La composante conservation des sources traditionnelles d'énergie est moins complexe et pourrait commencer beaucoup plus tôt. Les activités recommandés visent en premier lieu la conservation du bois et englobent l'adaptation des cuisinières, le reboisement des villages, le compactage des résidus végétaux à petite échelle, etc. Mais il faut avant tout que les

activités se réalisent à petite échelle car l'expérience démontre qu'il y a peu de chances de succès si les groupes visés n'y participent pas activement.

L'approbation finale du programme devrait être accordée vers la fin de l'été 1983.

En espérant que ces informations seront utiles à M. Roche et aux Membres du Comité, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Wm McWhinney', written in a cursive style.

Wm McWhinney
Président par intérim

c.c.: M. R. Vaive
Greffier du Comité



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WITNESSES—TÉMOINS

From the Canadian International Development Agency:

Mr. William McWhinney, Acting President;

Mr. Douglas Lindores, Vice-President, Multilateral
Programs Branch.

De l'Agence canadienne de développement international:

M. William McWhinney, président par intérim;

M. Douglas Lindores, vice-président, Direction générale des
programmes multilatéraux.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 99

Thursday, June 9, 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 99

Le jeudi 9 juin 1983

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

External Affairs and National Defence

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

Supplementary Estimates (A) 1983-84: Vote 5a: Capital
Expenditures under NATIONAL DEFENCE

CONCERNANT:

Budget supplémentaire (A) 1983-1984; crédit 5a:
Dépenses en capital sous la rubrique DÉFENSE
NATIONALE

APPEARING:

The Honourable J. Gilles Lamontagne,
Minister of National Defence

COMPARAÎT:

L'honorable J. Gilles Lamontagne,
Ministre de la Défense nationale

WITNESSES:

(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:

(Voir à l'endos)



First Session of the
Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la
trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appolloni

MEMBERS/MEMBRES

Bud Bradley
Herb Breau
Maurice Dupras
Stanley Hudecki
Pauline Jewett
Gérald Laniel
Jean Lapierre
Allan B. McKinnon
Donald W. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*)
W. Kenneth Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*)
Douglas Roche
Sinclair Stevens
Terry Sargeant

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES ET DE LA DÉFENSE
NATIONALE

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

Vice-président: M^{me} Ursula Appolloni

ALTERNATES/SUBSTITUTS

David M. Collenette
J.-Roland Comtois
Bob Corbett
Stan Darling
Pierre Gimaïel
Hal T. Herbert
Paul-André Massé
Walter McLean
Lorne Nystrom
Bob Ogle
Irinée Pelletier
Marcel Roy
Ron Stewart
Ian Watson
Robert Wenman

(Quorum 8)

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

Pursuant to Standing Orders 69(4)(b):

On Thursday, June 9, 1983:

Mr. Gimaïel replaced Mr. Breau

Mr. Breau replaced Mr. Olivier

Conformément à l'article 69(4)b) du Règlement:

Le jeudi 9 juin 1983:

M. Gimaïel remplace M. Breau

M. Breau remplace M. Olivier

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 1983
(154)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 9:35 o'clock a.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Messrs. Dupras, Hudecki, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanish*), Prud'homme, Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*) and Sargeant.

Alternates present: Messrs. Corbett, Darling, Ogle and Stewart.

Appearing: The Honourable J. Gilles Lamontagne, Minister of National Defence.

Witnesses: From the Department of National Defence: Mr. D.B. Dewar, Deputy Minister; Gen. R.M. Withers, Chief of the Defence Staff, Mr. D.W. Digby, Director General Compensation and Benefits; Mr. J.R. Killick, Assistant Deputy Minister (Material); Dr. G.L. Nelms, Deputy Chief of Research and Development.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Mr. Daniel Bon, Consultant.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated Wednesday, May 18, 1983 relating to the Supplementary Estimates (A) for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1983 (*See Minutes of Proceedings, May 24, 1983, Issue No. 97*).

The Chairman called Vote 5a—Capital Expenditures under National Defence.

The Minister made a statement, and with the witnesses, answered questions.

The Chairman authorized that the following documents submitted by the Minister, be appended to this day's Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (*See Appendix "EAND-78"*):

Press Communiqué—NATO—2nd June 1983

Reply to Mrs. Appolloni

Reply to Mr. Bradley

Reply to Mr. Corbett

Replies to Mr. McKinnon (3)

Reply to Mr. Prud'homme

Reply to Mr. Sargeant

Reply to Mr. Stewart

At 11:08 o'clock a.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE JEUDI 9 JUIN 1983
(154)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale se réunit aujourd'hui à 9h35 sous la présidence de M. Marcel Prud'homme (président).

Membres du Comité présents: MM. Dupras, Hudecki, McKinnon, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Prud'homme, Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*) et Sargeant.

Substituts présents: MM. Corbett, Darling, Ogle et Stewart.

Comparait: L'honorable J. Gilles Lamontagne, ministre de la Défense nationale.

Témoins: Du ministère de la Défense nationale: M. D.B. Dewar, sous-ministre; Gén. R.M. Withers, chef de l'État-major de la Défense; M. D.W. Digby, directeur général, Rémunération et avantages sociaux; M. J.R. Killick, sous-ministre adjoint (Matériels); M. G.L. Nelms, sous-chef à la recherche et au développement.

Aussi présent: Du Centre parlementaire des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur: M. Daniel Bon, conseiller.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi du mercredi 18 mai 1983 portant sur le Budget supplémentaire (A) pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1983 (*Voir procès-verbal du 24 mai 1983, fascicule n° 97*).

Le président met en délibération le crédit 5a—Dépenses en capital sous la rubrique Défense nationale.

Le ministre fait une déclaration puis, avec les témoins, répond aux questions.

Le président autorise que les documents suivants soumis par le ministre soient joints aux procès-verbal et témoignages de ce jour (*Voir Appendice «EAND-78»*):

Communiqué de presse—OTAN—2 juin 1983

Réponse à M^{me} Appolloni

Réponse à M. Bradley

Réponse à M. Corbett

Réponses à M. McKinnon (3)

Réponse à M. Prud'homme

Réponse à M. Sargeant

Réponse à M. Stewart

A 11h08, le Comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

*(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)**[Texte]*

Thursday, June 9, 1983

• 0934

The Chairman: Gentlemen, many would like to adjourn at 11.00 o'clock, for all kinds of reasons. The minister has to leave, and I am sure some of our colleagues have other very important matters to attend to, matters about which I wish them the best of success.

• 0935

It is part of our democratic system that major political parties meet. In all fairness, and without any subtle chuckle or smile, I just wish them a very successful weekend for the best of Canada.

The minister has many answers to questions. On two questions there will be some amended version, one question of mine, and one of Mr. Bradley. They will be distributed today just for clarification. We have also important answers to the Hon. Mr. McKinnon, Mr. Sargeant, Mr. Stewart, and also ready for today answers to question asked by the Hon. Mr. McKinnon and Mr. Corbett. All these answers will be annexed to the minutes of the meeting of today.

The minister would like to have a few words, and then we will proceed in our usual fashion.

Hon. J. Gilles Lamontagne (Minister of National Defence): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask the members of the committee to allow me to make a few remarks. Coming back from the NATO meeting in Brussels, I have just a very short highlight of what happened. It might be interesting—just a few notes about it.

As you no doubt realize, I have just returned from NATO headquarters in Brussels on the occasion of the semi-annual meeting of the defence planning committee and a ministerial session. This was a particularly noteworthy meeting following as it did on the heels of the summit of Williamsburg.

In Brussels I had an opportunity to meet and discuss with my colleagues from Norway, Turkey, Denmark and Spain on defence issues and mutual concerns. My Spanish colleague Mr. Narcis Serra, the Minister of Defence of Spain, of course, told me about the decision of Spain to buy seventy-five F-18s, which was good news to us in a way that we have already started to see how in future we could co-ordinate our action in Europe considering that our F-18 will be in Europe and his will be there, so it might be an interesting collaboration.

I would like now to provide some highlights on the issues discussed by defence ministers. First and foremost all members of the alliance stated their determination and resolve to maintain the deterrent strength of the alliance, thereby ensuring the security of its member states. This strength and cohesion is derived from the solidarity of NATO nations and their unity of purpose in pursuing their common objectives.

TÉMOIGNAGES

*(Enregistrement électronique)**[Traduction]*

Le jeudi 9 juin 1983

Le président: Messieurs, plusieurs aimeraient ajourner à 11 heures, pour toutes sortes de raisons. Le ministre doit partir lui aussi, et je suis sûr que certains de nos collègues ont d'autres choses très importantes à faire, et je leur souhaite beaucoup de chance.

Cela fait partie de notre système démocratique que les principaux partis politiques se réunissent. En toute justice, et sans ironie aucune, je souhaite aux députés conservateurs une fin de semaine très réussie pour le mieux être du Canada.

Le ministre a beaucoup de réponses à nous transmettre. Vous sera distribué aujourd'hui pour fin d'élucidation la version modifiée de la réponse à deux questions, l'une de moi et l'autre de M. Bradley. On aura également des réponses importantes aux questions de MM. McKinnon, Sargeant, et Stewart, et on répondra aujourd'hui à des questions posées par MM. McKinnon et Corbett. Toutes ces réponses seront annexées au procès verbal de la réunion d'aujourd'hui.

Le ministre aimerait nous dire quelques mots, ensuite nous procéderons comme nous le faisons d'habitude.

L'honorable J. Gilles Lamontagne (ministre de la Défense nationale): Merci monsieur le président. Si vous me permettez, j'aurais quelques remarques à faire. De retour de la réunion de l'OTAN à Bruxelles, je pourrais vous dire en gros ce qui s'est passé. Simplement quelques remarques au sujet de la réunion.

Comme vous le savez sans doute, j'arrive tout juste du siège de l'OTAN à Bruxelles où se déroulait la réunion semi-annuelle du Comité de planification de la défense ainsi qu'une réunion des ministres de la Défense. C'était une réunion particulièrement importante du fait qu'elle venait immédiatement après le sommet de Williamsburg.

À Bruxelles, j'ai eu l'occasion de rencontrer mes collègues de la Norvège, de la Turquie, du Danemark et de l'Espagne et de discuter avec eux de questions de défense et de questions d'intérêt mutuel. Mon collègue Espagnol M. Narcis Serra, ministre de la Défense de l'Espagne, évidemment, m'a parlé de la décision de son pays d'acheter 75 F-18, ce qui est encourageant pour nous en ce sens que nous avons déjà commencé à voir comment nous pourrions coordonner nos activités en Europe, étant donné la présence de nos F-18 et partant, la possibilité d'une collaboration intéressante.

J'aimerais maintenant vous exposer les grandes lignes des discussions qui ont eu lieu entre les ministres de la Défense. D'abord, tous les membres de l'Alliance ont exprimé leur volonté de maintenir la force de dissuasion de l'Alliance, assurant ainsi la sécurité des pays membres. Cette force et cette cohésion traduisent la solidarité des pays de l'OTAN et la communauté d'intérêt et de but des membres de l'Alliance.

[Texte]

There was some reserve, of course, from the Spanish who are still there as observers. The Greeks also, as usual, have made some reserves for the last few years. The Danes have some difficulties, not in endorsing the two-track decision—as the minister has said, his government is endorsing the two-track decision policy, but he has had a vote in the House which was a nonconfidence vote, and he had to communicate to the members of the alliance the result of that vote, which was a resolution asking for delay of the two-track decision and more negotiation for disarmament and things like that. He told us that his government was not in agreement with the resolution, and his government was still behind the two-track policy.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Sannich): That is Denmark.

Mr. Lamontagne: Yes, that is Denmark. I might add parenthetically that NATO defence ministers were acutely conscious of the discussions that had taken place among summit leaders at Williamsburg throughout our meeting.

The continuing presence of Canadians and American forces, as well as the United States' nuclear umbrella, were again an knowledge to the integral features of the security of NATO regions.

Of the many items on the agenda of the defence ministers perhaps two or three stand out in importance. I have already spoken about the reaffirmation of the two-track decision. In addition ministers also agree to the 1983 ministerial guidance which provides a political, economic, and military basis for NATO defence planning for the future.

An integral part of this document is the resource guidance against which all nations pronounce their willingness to strive towards the NATO 3% resource guidelines.

While on the question of finance, I might add that the committee agreed to augment the existing level of infrastructure funding by some \$150 million infrastructure accounting units which is about \$600 million Canadian. This badly needed infusion of funds will be used to address some of the existing deficiencies of facilities which are constructed on a commonly funded basis.

• 0940

Defence ministers also acknowledge that NATO vital interests could be affected by events occurring outside the NATO area and that alliance nations should be prepared to consider ways of ensuring the protection of these interests. It remains a national decision what should be done if anything happens outside NATO countries.

Lastly, the benefits from both the costs and military-effectiveness points of view of emerging technology was recognized. That was the main issue that has been discussed and stated.

[Traduction]

Certaines réserves ont évidemment été exprimées par l'Espagne qui est toujours là à titre d'observateur. La Grèce, comme elle le fait depuis quelques années, a également exprimé certaines réserves. Le Danemark a eu quelques difficultés non pas à appuyer la décision comportant deux volets; comme le ministre l'a dit, son gouvernement appuie la décision, mais il y a eu un vote de défiance à la Chambre, et il a dû communiquer aux membres de l'Alliance le résultat du vote qui portait sur une résolution demandant de retarder la décision et de poursuivre les négociations concernant le désarmement et autres sujets du genre. Il nous a dit que son gouvernement ne souscrivait pas à la résolution, et qu'il appuyait toujours la politique.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Vous parlez du Danemark.

M. Lamontagne: Du Danemark, oui. Je pourrais ajouter, entre parenthèses, que les ministres de la Défense de l'OTAN étaient très au courant des discussions qui avaient eu lieu au sommet de Williamsburg.

La présence ininterrompue des Forces canadiennes et américaines, de même que le parapluie nucléaire américain ont de nouveau été reconnus comme faisant partie intégrante de la sécurité des régions protégées par l'OTAN.

Il y a peut-être deux ou trois questions qui ressortent parmi les nombreuses questions qui ont été abordées par les ministres de la Défense. J'ai déjà parlé de la réaffirmation de la décision à deux volets. En outre, les ministres ont accepté le document d'orientation de 1983 qui constitue une base politique, économique et militaire de planification de l'OTAN en matière de défense.

Un élément important de ce document porte sur la politique de ressources à l'égard de laquelle tous les pays se sont dit prêts à essayer de respecter la directive de 3 p. 100 des ressources.

Pendant que nous parlons de finances, le Comité a convenu de relever le niveau actuel du financement des infrastructures de quelque 150 millions de dollars en unités de comptabilité, ce qui correspond à environ 600 millions de dollars canadiens. Ces fonds dont on avait grandement besoin serviront à améliorer des installations existantes dont le financement de la construction a été assuré par tous les pays membres.

Les ministres de la Défense ont également reconnu que les intérêts vitaux de l'OTAN pouvaient être affectés par des événements se produisant en dehors des régions protégées par l'OTAN et que les pays de l'Alliance devraient être prêts à envisager des moyens de protéger ces intérêts. En cas d'incident en dehors des pays membres de l'OTAN, la décision quant aux mesures à prendre appartient toujours aux pays en cause.

Dernièrement, on a reconnu l'importance sur le plan des coûts et de l'efficacité militaire des nouvelles technologies. Ce fut le principal sujet de discussion.

[Text]

In general, we were very satisfied with the negotiations going on. Mr. Weinberger gave us an update of the negotiations in Geneva, expressing his views that there is no doubt that Mr. Reagan will be very flexible in his way, and the proof is that yesterday again there were some new propositions made by the United States on the START negotiations and the same thing on the INF negotiations.

So I think we are going in the right direction, and every minister expressed their views that our policy being very firm on this two-track decision until we get some results on these negotiations was the right policy.

This is about what I have to say on that, gentlemen. Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister.

First . . .

Mr. Lamontagne: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I just want to correct something. I am told the Spanish . . . I thought it was 75 aircraft; it is 72 aircraft.

The Chairman: First, this morning the official critic of the Official Opposition, the Hon. Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your remarks about the great convention that is being held at this time in Ottawa. It is a mark of the virility of a party to have these things every so often, a minimum of once every five years. Probably other parties might look with envy upon the strength that our party shows in these things.

I appreciate the remarks of the minister and I trust that they will be appended as part of the minutes of this meeting and I will be able to study them at leisure in the coming days.

While I am talking about minutes, I would like to ask: I have read carefully the minutes of the joint meeting that we had in the Railway Committee Room of the Senate Foreign Affairs committee and the External Affairs committee—that is, in this committee—and I was wondering if in the recording of those minutes they were given verbatim from the words that were given by the interpreters purporting to be Mr. Gorbachev's words, or did you get a written copy of his remarks to put into the minutes?

The Chairman: As you are well aware, I just came back from Hungary last night, but I am informed that the translation was made by someone from the Secretary of State from the Russian text and not from the interpreter.

Mr. McKinnon: Because certainly some of the words that appeared there in English were words that he did not speak. I was just wondering whether the interpretation that we received at the meeting was incompetent or being laundered or what it was. I take it, then, that we accepted his script and put it in as if he had said it.

The Chairman: As you notice—I am advised at the same time, which is not customary for me . . . I will check. I am advised at the moment that there was an editing done strictly concerning the language and not the substance. So, as of now, as I see it now, as I am informed now, the text is not verbatim

[Translation]

De façon générale, nous étions très satisfaits des négociations en cours. M. Weinberger nous a donné les dernières nouvelles concernant les négociations en cours à Genève, et il a opiné qu'il ne faisait aucun doute que M. Reagan sera très souple; à preuve, les nouvelles propositions des États-Unis faites hier au sujet des négociations START et des négociations concernant le F.M.I.

Alors, je pense que nous sommes sur la bonne voie, et chaque ministre s'est dit d'accord avec notre politique de grande fermeté concernant cette décision à deux volets jusqu'à ce que nous ayons des résultats de ces négociations.

C'est à peu près tout ce que j'ai à dire là-dessus, messieurs. Merci.

Le président: Merci beaucoup, monsieur le ministre.

Pour commencer . . .

M. Lamontagne: Excusez-moi, monsieur le président. Je voudrais apporter une correction. On me dit que l'Espagne . . . Je pensais que c'étaient 75 appareils, en fait, c'est 72.

Le président: Pour commencer ce matin, le critique officiel de l'Opposition officielle, l'honorable M. McKinnon.

M. McKinnon: Merci monsieur le président. J'apprécie vos remarques au sujet du grand congrès qui se déroule actuellement à Ottawa. C'est un signe de la virilité d'un parti que de tenir ce genre de congrès de temps à autre, au moins à tous les cinq ans. D'autres partis nous enverront peut-être pour la force de notre parti dans ce genre de chose.

Je remercie le ministre pour ses remarques et je suppose qu'elles seront annexées au compte rendu de la réunion, et que j'aurai l'occasion de les examiner dans les jours qui viennent.

Puisqu'il est question de procès-verbaux, j'aimerais vous poser une question: J'ai lu attentivement le procès-verbal de la réunion mixte du Comité sénatorial des affaires étrangères et du Comité des affaires extérieures à la salle de comité des chemins de fer, et je me demandais si l'on avait enregistré mot à mot les paroles de l'interprète qui devait supposément traduire les propos de M. Gorbachev ou si l'on avait obtenu une copie de sa déclaration pour qu'elle soit consignée au compte rendu?

Le président: Comme vous le savez, je suis rentré de la Hongrie hier soir, mais on me dit que la traduction a été faite par un employé du Secrétariat d'État à partir du texte russe et non à partir de l'interprétation.

M. McKinnon: Parce que certaines paroles qui paraissent dans la version anglaise n'ont pas été dites. Je me demandais si l'interprétation que nous avions reçue à la réunion était bonne, ou si c'était une version diluée ou je ne sais quoi. Alors, nous avons donc accepté le texte écrit, et c'est ce qui a été consigné au compte rendu.

Le président: Comme vous le voyez, on me dit à l'instant, et ce n'est pas dans mes habitudes . . . Je vais vérifier. On me dit à l'instant qu'il y a une édition portant strictement sur la forme et non sur le fond. Donc, d'après ce qu'on me dit, le texte n'est pas une traduction mot à mot de ce qui a été dit, mais bien une

[Texte]

of the translation but a translation done from the Russian text provided by someone at the Secretary of State.

• 0945

That is the best of my information at this minute. It is a surprise question. I know the importance of what was said there, and I would like it to be exactly as was said. But I must admit what we heard, we heard from the translation and not from the text. So I will have to check very carefully if the translation we got is exactly the same as what was said in Russian.

Mr. McKinnon: I trust, then, that you still have the tapes of that meeting, so you can check it.

The Chairman: We have the tapes of that meeting.

Mr. McKinnon: I had assumed what would be reflected in the minutes would be what was said by the interpreter at the meeting, because that is what we had to go on when we were responding to Mr. Gorbachev.

The Chairman: I would assume that should be what appears in the text, because that is how we put our questions, as you rightly said.

Mr. McKinnon: That is not what appeared in the text, I can tell you that right now.

The Chairman: I have not had time, as you can imagine, to read the text.

Mr. McKinnon: I asked at a subsequent meeting that the request proposal for the frigates—if it could be sanitized and if we could receive a copy, and I was assured we could, and I have not yet received it.

The Chairman: The deputy minister, please.

Mr. D.B. Dewar (Deputy Minister, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, as I tried to explain when we met before, the main problem here is the problem of trying to separate those items which can be tabled and are not confidential from those that are. The work is almost complete, but I am afraid I simply could not get it done in time for tabling today. I would like to provide it to the chairman and to Mr. McKinnon just as soon as we can.

Mr. McKinnon: Could you give an estimate of when that would be?

Mr. Dewar: As soon as possible, sir. I cannot be certain.

Mr. McKinnon: Could we now go back to Bill C-38, I hope for the final time this year. I see there is an answer that explains in great detail and in a lot of words why, I take it, we do not have parts II, III, and IV proclaimed. Could whoever is responsible for personnel tell me if that is my right assumption from these five or six pages of answer?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Digby maybe can answer that.

Mr. D.W. Digby (Director General, Compensation and Benefits, Department of National Defence): That is correct, sir.

[Traduction]

traduction faite à partir du texte russe par un employé du Secrétariat d'État.

C'est tout ce que j'en sais pour le moment. C'est une question surprise. Je comprends l'importance de ce qui a été dit à cette réunion, et j'aimerais que ce soit rapporté exactement. Mais ce que nous avons entendu, c'est l'interprétation des paroles de M. Gorbachev et non la traduction de son texte. Alors je vais vérifier très attentivement pour voir si la traduction correspond exactement à ce qui a été dit en russe.

Mr. McKinnon: Vous avez probablement encore les enregistrements de la réunion pour vérifier.

Le président: Nous avons les enregistrements de la réunion.

Mr. McKinnon: J'aurais pensé que l'on retrouverait dans le compte rendu ce que l'interprète nous avait dit à la réunion, parce que nos échanges avec M. Gorbachev reposaient sur l'interprétation.

Le président: C'est ce que nous devrions voir dans le texte, parce que, comme vous l'avez si bien dit, nos questions découlaient de ce que l'interprète nous disait.

Mr. McKinnon: Ce n'est pas ce qui paraît dans le texte, je puis vous le dire tout de suite.

Le président: Comme vous pouvez vous en douter, je n'ai pas eu l'occasion de lire le texte.

Mr. McKinnon: J'ai demandé, lors d'une réunion subséquente, qu'on nous remette une copie révisée de la proposition concernant les frégates, et je n'en ai toujours pas reçue, même si on m'avait assuré que j'en aurais une.

Le président: Le sous-ministre s'il vous plaît.

Mr. D.B. Dewar (sous-ministre, ministère de la Défense nationale): Monsieur le président, comme j'ai tenté de l'expliquer la dernière fois, le gros problème est de séparer l'information qui peut être déposée et qui n'est pas confidentielle de celle qui l'est. Le travail est presque terminé, mais je n'ai tout simplement pas pu l'avoir pour aujourd'hui. J'en enverrai une copie au président et à M. McKinnon dès que possible.

Mr. McKinnon: Pourriez-vous nous donner une idée quand ce sera?

Mr. Dewar: Dès que possible, monsieur. Je ne peux pas vous donner de date précise.

Mr. McKinnon: Pourrions-nous revenir maintenant au projet de loi C-38, pour la dernière fois cette année je l'espère. Je vois qu'il y a une réponse qui explique en détail et en beaucoup de mots pourquoi les parties II, III et IV ne sont toujours pas proclamées. Est-ce que la personne chargée du personnel pourrait me dire si j'ai raison de faire une telle déduction à partir de cette réponse de 5 ou 6 pages?

Mr. Lamontagne: M. Digby peut peut-être répondre à cela.

Mr. D.W. Digby (directeur général, rémunération et avantages sociaux, ministère de la Défense nationale): Vous avez raison monsieur.

[Text]

Mr. McKinnon: I received a letter from the minister the other day, Mr. Chairman, that seemed to indicate a change in attitude, as if the department were going to follow parts II, III, and IV of Bill C-38. It was a case of some woman who was after child support a court had awarded her. The minister gave her directions to get in touch with pay services to get this court order enforced in the form of a diversion of the former serviceman's pensions.

Is this now a policy of the department, then, to grant diversions for people who have court orders and are not receiving the money?

Mr. Digby: That is correct. It has been the policy of the department for the last 30 to 35 years.

Mr. McKinnon: That is not the way I understand it, Mr. Digby.

Mr. Digby: Last year we did almost 100.

Mr. McKinnon: There are some cases where I have not been able to get diversion, on the grounds that the department feels the payments are being made approximately the way the court has ordered. I do not want to go into a specific case. I understand that under the new bill the department will have no choice; if the recipient of the diversion asked for a diversion, the department would be forced to grant it. Is that correct?

• 0950

Mr. Digby: I have been responsible for this operation for the last 10 to 12 years, and I can recall only 1 or 2 cases where diversions were not ordered, and that was because they were not legal court orders. The minister's discretion has been rarely used to turn down a diversion. The practice is that they are ordered.

Mr. McKinnon: Very well. If a court has ordered that the diversion or the ex-wife or a child should receive a certain percentage of the annuity, does the department increase that amount of diversion to keep up with the indexation of the pension?

Mr. Digby: Only if it is so ordered by the court.

Mr. McKinnon: So if they say half the pension, what would be the result of that? If a person has a \$400-a-month pension and half of it is ordered to go to, say, a divorced wife, what happens if the pension increases to \$500 a month?

Mr. Digby: The legal advice we have is that it must be specific amounts.

Mr. McKinnon: In dollars.

Mr. Digby: In dollars. And that can be increased.

Mr. McKinnon: It can be increased by the woman going back to court.

[Translation]

M. McKinnon: J'ai reçu une lettre du ministre l'autre jour, monsieur le président, qui semblait montrer un changement d'attitude, comme si le ministère entendait se conformer aux parties II, III et IV du projet de loi C-38. C'était au sujet d'une femme qui cherchait à faire exécuter une ordonnance de la Cour pour le soutien d'un enfant. Le ministre lui a conseillé de communiquer avec le Service de la paie pour que soit exécuté l'ordonnance du tribunal sous forme de distraction des prestations de pension de l'ancien membre des Forces armées.

Est-ce maintenant la politique du Ministère de distraire une partie des prestations de pension pour les personnes qui ne reçoivent pas l'argent qui leur est dû conformément à une ordonnance du tribunal?

M. Digby: C'est exact. C'est la politique du Ministère depuis les 30 ou 35 dernières années.

M. McKinnon: Ce n'est pas comme cela que je le vois, monsieur Digby.

M. Digby: L'an dernier, nous avons eu presque 100 cas.

M. McKinnon: Dans certains cas, on n'a pas réussi à obtenir une distraction des prestations de pension sous prétexte que le Ministère estime que les paiements sont effectués à peu près comme le tribunal l'a prescrit. Je ne vais pas parler de cas en particulier. Aux termes du nouveau projet de loi, je crois que le ministère n'aura pas le choix; si le bénéficiaire d'une saisie sur le traitement la demande, le ministère serait forcé de l'accorder, n'est-ce pas?

M. Digby: Je m'occupe de cette affaire depuis 10 ou 12 ans et je ne me souviens que d'une seule ou de deux fois où des saisies sur le traitement n'ont pas été acceptées parce qu'elles n'avaient pas été ordonnées par le tribunal. Le ministre a rarement recouru à son pouvoir discrétionnaire en la matière. En général, on donne suite aux demandes de saisie.

M. McKinnon: Très bien. Si un tribunal juge que l'ex-épouse ou enfant d'un pensionné devraient recevoir un certain pourcentage de leur rente, le ministère augmente-t-il cette somme lorsque la pension de retraite est indexée?

M. Digby: Seulement si le tribunal l'ordonne.

M. McKinnon: Donc, si le tribunal ordonne le versement de la moitié de la pension de retraite, qu'en résulte-t-il? Si un pensionné dispose d'une pension de \$400 par mois et que le tribunal ordonne le versement de la moitié de cette somme à une épouse divorcée, que se passe-t-il si la pension passe à \$500 par mois?

M. Digby: D'après les avis juridiques que nous avons reçus en la matière, un montant précis doit être cité.

M. McKinnon: En dollars.

M. Digby: Effectivement. Mais cette somme peut être augmentée.

M. McKinnon: Elle ne peut l'être que si l'épouse en question s'adresse de nouveau au tribunal.

[Texte]

Mr. Digby: Or by a section within the court order saying that it is for \$300 to be increased by the cost of living, or whatever of that nature.

Mr. McKinnon: I can see a great deal of difficulty in the enforcing of this because of that indexation which goes on but does not appear to go to the divorced wife or husband or a neglected child. However, there are some other things I want to get on to. Thank you, Mr. Digby.

You were kind enough to provide the department with a capital projects graph that says a 15-year period—which really turns out to be 14 years—but I wonder why on this one, and as you know I have been getting them on a regular basis over the years, but this one has an extra sentence in the summary note which says:

It should also be noted that not all projects will necessarily be funded in the years shown on the chart.

I wonder why that sentence was put in to apply to this particular chart and not on previous charts.

Mr. L. E. Davies (Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Finance): Mr. Chairman, the sentence is put in merely as a warning that, due to the uncertainties of a program that is prepared 15 years out into the future, at this time we estimate to the best of our ability the price or the cost of projects. But sometimes—not too often, but sometimes—we are wrong, and it may not be that we have sufficient money to start a program in a particular year as shown on the graph, and we would have to let it slip for a year or whatever.

Mr. McKinnon: On the low-level air defence, which in this list is on the “not yet approved” list that you have here, and is shown on the graph as being funded in 1984, can I count on that? If it is not yet approved will it be funded in 1984 and, if not, when is the most likely date that our troops will receive a new low-level air defence weapon?

Mr. Davies: Mr. Chairman, the start of that in 1984 would be the project definition—a small amount of money—to investigate the program. But as to the exact year of starting the total program that would depend, of course, on the cost, the availability and so forth of the equipment, as shown up in the program definition phase.

• 0955

Mr. McKinnon: While you, Mr. Davies, look after the money, I am not sure about whether you get involved in the selection of these things at all, or if somebody else here does, but I would also wish to thank the department information service for providing me with a translation of the article that appeared in *Aeromag* by M. Charpentier about frigates.

I notice, way on in this translation, he is speaking about the French Crotale.

[Traduction]

M. Digby: Ou si dans le jugement rendu par le tribunal figure un article prévoyant le versement d'une somme de \$300 à laquelle il faudra ajouter l'indexation en fonction du coût de la vie ou toute autre chose du même genre.

M. McKinnon: Les difficultés seront nombreuses lorsqu'il faudra appliquer cette disposition car le taux d'indexation ne semble pas être transmis à l'épouse ou au mari divorcé ou à l'enfant négligé. Je voudrais passer à autre chose maintenant. Merci, monsieur Digby.

Vous avez eu l'amabilité d'adresser au Comité un tableau portant sur les projets d'investissements du ministère au cours des 15 prochaines années, et il s'agit en fait des 14 prochaines années, mais je me demande pourquoi figure sur celui-ci, et comme vous le savez je reçois ces tableaux régulièrement depuis un certain nombre d'années, une phrase supplémentaire dont le résumé est ainsi libellé:

Il faudrait également noter que tous ces projets ne sont pas nécessairement financés à la date citée dans le tableau

Je me demande pourquoi cette phrase figure dans ce tableau alors qu'elle était inexistante dans les autres.

M. L.E. Davies (sous-ministre adjoint, Finances, Ministère de la Défense nationale): Monsieur le président, il s'agit simplement d'une mise en garde car, en raison des incertitudes qui planent sur des projets portant sur 15 ans, nous ne pouvons que prévoir approximativement le coût de ces projets. De temps à autre, mais pas très souvent, nous avons tort et il se peut que nous n'ayons pas suffisamment d'argent pour lancer un programme une certaine année comme le montre le tableau et nous devons dans ce cas le retarder d'un an ou simplement le reporter à plus tard.

M. McKinnon: En ce qui concerne la défense aérienne à basse altitude, qui figure sur cette liste sous la rubrique «non encore approuvée», et qui, selon le tableau, doit être financée en 1984, puis-je compter là-dessus? Si ce projet n'est pas encore approuvé, sera-il financé en 1984 et, dans la négative, quand nos troupes peuvent-elles s'attendre à recevoir une nouvelle arme de défense aérienne à basse altitude?

M. Davies: Monsieur le président, en 1984, nous n'entame-rons que l'étude du projet ce qui ne nécessite pas beaucoup d'argent. Mais la date de lancement du programme dépend évidemment du coût, de la disponibilité du matériel, ce que l'étude du programme permettra de définir.

M. McKinnon: Monsieur Davies, alors que vous vous occupez des questions d'argent, je ne suis pas certain que vous ayez votre mot à dire quant à la sélection de ces projets, ou s'il s'agit de quelqu'un d'autre, mais je voudrais également remercier le service d'information du ministère qui m'a adressé une traduction de l'article qui a paru dans le magazine *Aeromag*, article rédigé par M. Charpentier et portant sur les frigates.

Je remarque vers la fin de cette traduction qu'il parle du Crotale français.

[Text]

The French Crotale already in service, has excellent capability against sea-skimming missiles and will be a prime candidate in the upcoming low level air defence system ground-to-air defence program. However, it has been rejected as a solution, for price reasons.

I am just wondering if anybody can tell me anything more than that. How far along are we in selecting it as a prime candidate in the upcoming LLADS ground-to-air defence program, that we have rejected that particular weapon?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, maybe I can say a word about it and ask the Chief of the Defence Staff to complete my answer.

Of course, that question of low level air defence of our airfields in Europe and our troops is a matter of concern to us. We have to go by priority when it comes to capital expenditures. I am just back from Le Bourget aeronautical exhibition, or fair, or call it whatever you want, and I can assure you, as you mentioned, the Crotale, is one of the many systems offered to me or showed to me, and everyone pretends it is much better than the next one.

There is no doubt about it, at one point we will have to make a decision. Maybe the chief can complete this issue which is, I know, one of his concerns also.

Mr. McKinnon: Maybe I could just put in a comment there. It seems to me that in this particular area the need is urgent. We do not have the ability to make a decision as fast as they have the ingenuity to invent new weapons, and we are probably falling behind. Before we can decide on the 1975 weapons they have invented the 1980 weapons. That is just what I would like to say about the minister's comments on the problem. Go ahead.

Gen. R.M. Withers (Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): I would just add, Mr. Chairman, that this is the reason for the project definition phase on low level air defence. As has just been reported, there is a very broad spectrum of systems available to meet this need and the importance of the project is such that we would want to be very, very certain we have taken into consideration all reasonable systems that are available. A number of considerations will have to come into that as well; to quote but one, the business of standardization with our allies. I think that will be an important factor.

Then there is the window of availability, as Mr. McKinnon has said, as to what system is available at what time and what is our estimate of its projected life. So it is going to be a very important project definition. It is not really, I think, until the project definition phase has been carried out that we can say we will accept or reject any of these systems as meeting our needs.

Mr. McKinnon: Mr. Chairman, I must say to the chief that he seems to have a difficulty for every solution. I would like to ask, when do you think they will have suitable air defence in the way of new weaponry in our bases in Europe?

[Translation]

Le Crotale français déjà en service est une arme très puissante qui permet de détruire les missiles rasant l'eau et sera une arme à retenir lorsque le nouveau programme de système de défense aérienne à basse altitude sol-air sera défini. Il a cependant été rejeté pour des raisons financières.

Je voudrais savoir si quelqu'un peut m'en toucher quelques mots. Étant donné qu'il s'agit d'une arme de choix dans le cadre du nouveau programme, comment se fait-il que nous l'avons rejetée?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, permettez-moi de faire quelques observations à ce sujet et je passerai ensuite la parole au chef d'état-major pour qu'il complète ma réponse.

Il est évident que la défense aérienne à basse altitude de nos terrains d'aviation en Europe et de nos troupes nous préoccupe particulièrement. Nous devons cependant définir des priorités de dépenses. Je reviens du Salon aéronautique du Bourget et je puis vous assurer, comme vous l'avez dit, que le Crotale est l'un des nombreux systèmes dont une démonstration m'a été faite et chacun prétend qu'il est meilleur que son voisin.

Il ne fait aucun doute qu'il va falloir à un moment donné ou à un autre prendre une décision à ce sujet. Le chef d'état-major pourrait peut-être compléter ma réponse car je sais qu'il s'agit là d'une des questions qui le préoccupent également.

M. McKinnon: Puis-je auparavant faire une observation. Il me semble que nous en avons un besoin urgent. Apparemment, l'ingénuité déployée pour inventer de nouvelles armes dépasse et de loin notre capacité de prendre une décision et il se peut même que nous accusions un retard. Avant de prendre une décision sur les armes fabriquées en 1975, ils ont déjà inventé des armes pour 1980. Voilà ce que je voulais dire à propos des observations que vient de faire le ministre. Allez-y.

Général R.M. Withers (chef d'état-major, ministère de la Défense nationale): Je voudrais simplement ajouter, monsieur le président, que c'est là la raison pour laquelle nous voulons tout d'abord étudier ce projet de défense aérienne à basse altitude. Comme on vient de le dire, le nombre de systèmes existants en vue de répondre à ce besoin est très vaste et l'importance du projet est telle que nous voulons nous assurer que nous avons étudié à fond toutes les possibilités qui s'offrent à nous. Il va falloir tenir compte également d'autres considérations, comme la normalisation de nos systèmes avec ceux des pays alliés. Ce sera là un facteur important.

Puis comme M. McKinnon l'a dit, il faut également savoir quel système sera disponible à quel moment et quelle sera sa durée de vie. Cette étude sera donc très importante. Ce n'est que lorsqu'elle sera terminée que nous pourrons dire avec certitude que nous acceptons ou que nous rejetons tel ou tel système, et ce, en fonction de nos besoins.

M. McKinnon: Monsieur le président, je dois dire que chaque solution semble présenter des difficultés pour le chef d'état-major. À votre avis, quand nos bases en Europe pourront-elles avoir de nouvelles armes pour disposer d'une défense aérienne convenable?

[Texte]

Gen. Withers: Mr. Chairman, I reckon that will start to be installed in the late 1980s.

Mr. McKinnon: Thank you.

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me, before we go to our next questioner. With the permission of the committee maybe I can table the official press communiqué of the last NATO meeting so everybody can look at it and see what happened there.

The Chairman: It will be appended to the *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* today.

Next on the list, the hon. critic of the New Democratic Party, Mr. Sargeant.

Mr. Sargeant: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to direct a few questions to the minister about my favourite obsession, as he puts it.

• 1000

In particular, since we have a bit more time here than we do in the House of Commons, I would like to know a little bit more about this low angle radar measuring program. Could the minister give us a bit of a history of the project and perhaps a few more details about just what it is about?

Mr. Lamontagne: Yes, Mr. Chairman, maybe I could talk about that. I did expect this question from the hon. member, considering that I said yesterday he had a kind of obsession on these things. But I hope he took it as a friendly remark, as usual.

On these low-angle radar measurements, before I give or ask somebody to give some details about it, I would like to make a remark, which I have prepared here. I think it is very important to de-confuse all these questions of research and testing, call it the low angle radar measurement test or call it the new LANTIRN, which has been requested by the Americans, and all the ones to come and all the ones which happened years back. So I believe it is important to clarify, for members of this committee, the relationship of the Test and Evaluation Agreement, the Umbrella agreement, to the very large body of co-operative military arrangements we now have with the United States.

The Test and Evaluation Agreement was designed to cover a specific type of test; that is, of new weapons systems which are in the process of operational testing. Obviously, research and development projects such as the low-angle measurement studies are outside the terms of the test and evaluation agreement and are covered by memoranda of understanding specific to those projects.

As I mentioned yesterday in the House of Commons, this low angle radar measurement test was signed on November 29, 1979 through a memorandum of understanding.

[Traduction]

Gén Withers: Monsieur le président, je suppose que ces nouvelles armes commenceront à être installées vers la fin des années 1980.

M. McKinnon: Merci.

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, permettez-moi de faire une observation avant de donner la parole à quelqu'un d'autre. Avec la permission du comité, je pourrais peut-être déposer le communiqué de presse officiel de la dernière réunion de l'OTAN pour que chacun puisse le parcourir et savoir ce qui s'y est passé.

Le président: Ce document sera annexé aux procès-verbaux et témoignages de ce jour.

Je passe maintenant la parole au critique officiel du Parti néo-démocrate, M. Sargeant.

M. Sargeant: Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président.

Je voudrais poser quelques questions au ministre au sujet de ma petite obsession préférée, comme il le dit.

Puisque nous avons un peu plus de temps ici qu'à la Chambre des communes, je voudrais en savoir un peu plus sur ce programme de radar à angle réduit. Le ministre pourrait-il nous dire quels sont les antécédents de ce projet et nous donner peut-être un peu plus de détails sur ce que ce projet comporte en réalité?

M. Lamontagne: Oui, monsieur le président, avec plaisir. Je savais que l'honorable député allait me poser cette question étant donné que je lui ai dit hier que ce programme était sa douce obsession. Mais j'espère qu'il a pris cela comme une remarque amicale, comme d'habitude.

Pour ce qui est de ces mesurages, avant que je ne vous en parle plus en détail ou que je demande à quelqu'un d'autre de le faire, je voudrais faire une observation que j'ai préparée ici. Je crois qu'il est très important de soulever toute ambiguïté portant sur ces questions de recherche et d'essai; appelez ce projet comme vous le voulez, évaluation des radars à angle réduit ou nouveau programme LANTIRN, essais effectués à la demande des Américains comme tous les essais suivants et tous les essais qui ont déjà eu lieu. Je pense donc qu'il est important de préciser, pour le compte des membres de ce Comité, que cet accord d'essais d'évaluation, cet accord général, est à mettre en parallèle avec toute la série d'accords militaires que nous avons conclus avec les États-Unis.

L'Accord d'essais d'évaluation porte sur un type d'essais précis, à savoir sur les nouveaux systèmes d'armement en voie de devenir opérationnels. Il est évident que les projets de recherche et de développement comme ceux portant sur le mesurage des radars à angle réduit ne sont pas couverts par l'Accord d'essai et d'évaluation, mais plutôt par des protocoles d'entente portant sur ces projets précis.

Comme je l'ai dit hier à la Chambre des communes, cet accord a été signé le 29 novembre 1979 sous la forme d'un protocole d'entente.

[Text]

I wish to emphasize that this type of co-operation with the United States has been ongoing since World War II and has in the past involved both research and development and operational testing on both sides of the border. These tests have included infra-red systems, development of ammunition, training rounds, chemical detectors, communication equipment, to name just a few.

We, in Canada, derive very useful information from those co-operative endeavours, which would otherwise not be available to us. Also, I would like to add that this testing and research will, in many cases, serve very well the needs of the civilian world as well as the military world.

So I wanted to be very specific that all these questions of testing is not a brand new issue. It has been ongoing for the last 40 years and even before.

As far as this low angle radar measurement test is concerned, maybe I could ask somebody who knows all the technicalities about it and can explain this very well. Does anybody . . . ?

Chief of the Defence Staff, General Withers.

Gen Withers: I do not think we have no one here today who is from the research and development organization. We do? We would ask Dr. Nelms, who is familiar with this one, to . . .

Mr. Lamontagne: Dr. Nelms.

The Chairman: May we have your name, please?

Mr. Leroy Nelms (Acting Deputy Chief, Research and Development Laboratories, Department of National Defence): I am Leroy Nelms. I am Acting Deputy Chief, Research and Development Laboratories, at the moment.

Mr. Sargeant: Specifically, just in response to the comments by the minister, I am quite aware of the history of these testing agreements; and in 99.9% of the cases, I would have no objections. Dr. Nelms, I would . . .

Mr. Lamontagne: Is this a new policy of your party?

Mr. Sargeant: I do not think you will find any policy of my party that questions these tests, except specifically where they might involve weapons development, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Lamontagne: Thank you.

Mr. Sargeant: I will also say I took your comments in the House the other day in very good spirit; and indeed, I even saved the headline that called me obsessed.

Dr. Nelms, I would just like to know a bit of . . . Well, I think we have the history of this particular program; but could you tell us a bit about it, what they are doing, what they are hoping to find out, and then specifically, what was agreed to in the memorandum of understanding?

Mr. Nelms: Yes. The purpose of the measurements are to get very basic information for designers of radars and radar

[Translation]

Je voudrais préciser que ce type de coopération avec les États-Unis dure depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale et qu'il comprend tant des projets de recherche et de développement que des essais opérationnels, et ce, des deux côtés de la frontière. Ces essais comprennent l'étude de systèmes infra-rouges, le perfectionnement de munitions, les munitions d'entraînement, les détecteurs de produits chimiques, le matériel de communication et ainsi de suite.

Nous obtenons des renseignements très utiles de ces efforts en groupe, renseignements que nous ne pourrions pas obtenir autrement. Je voudrais également dire que ces essais et cette recherche permettront, dans de nombreux cas, de répondre tout autant aux besoins du monde civil qu'à l'armée.

Tous ces essais ne sont donc pas une nouveauté. C'est un effort de collaboration qui dure depuis 40 ans et même plus.

Pour ce qui est de cet essai de mesurage de radar à angle réduit, je pourrais peut-être demander à quelqu'un qui en sait davantage de vous l'expliquer.

Le chef d'état-major, le général Withers.

Gén Withers: Je ne pense pas que nous ayons ici quelqu'un qui s'occupe de la recherche et du développement. Il y a quelqu'un? Nous allons donc demander à M. Nelms, qui est au courant de cette affaire, de . . .

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur Nelms.

Le président: Pouvez-vous vous identifier, s'il vous plaît?

M. Leroy Nelms (sous-chef intérimaire, Laboratoires de recherche et de développement, ministère de la Défense nationale): Je m'appelle Leroy Nelms, je suis sous-chef intérimaire responsable pour l'instant des laboratoires de recherche et de développement.

M. Sargeant: Pour répondre aux observations faites par le ministre, je suis tout à fait au courant de l'historique de ces accords d'essais et, dans 99.9 p. 100 des cas, je n'y verrais aucune objection. Monsieur Nelms, je voudrais . . .

M. Lamontagne: Est-ce là une nouvelle politique qu'a adoptée votre parti?

M. Sargeant: Mon parti ne s'est jamais opposé à ces essais, sauf si des armes nucléaires sont en cause, monsieur le ministre.

M. Lamontagne: Merci.

M. Sargeant: Je voudrais également dire que ce que vous avez dit à la Chambre l'autre jour m'a amusé; et d'ailleurs, j'ai même découpé la manchette de l'article du journal qui me qualifiait d'obsédé.

Monsieur Nelms, nous savons maintenant quelle est l'historique de ce programme mais pourriez-vous nous en parler davantage, nous dire ce que ce programme comporte, ce qu'on espère découvrir et quelles étaient les modalités du protocole d'entente?

M. Nelms: Avec plaisir. Ces essais sont effectués dans le but d'obtenir des renseignements de base qui permettraient

[Texte]

systems, whether the systems are based on the ground or in aircraft—information that we collectively in the world community have not accumulated yet. And that information is, what types of reflections are obtained from objects that may interfere with the operation of the radar, the prime operation of any radar, to detect and identify a wanted object? These data, in the detail that is needed to help the designer of the radar, are not available at the present time for all the conditions that one finds.

• 1005

Mr. Sargeant: I can quite understand the need for that type of information and, indeed, when I wrote the minister—oh, what was it?—13 months or so ago about this issue, he responded to me that that is what they were doing. I had no problem with that. I fully realize that that can be knowledge that the world community could put to good use. But then there have been stories coming out of Alberta in the last few weeks, I suppose even the last week or so, that a group from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology called the Cruise Missile Technology Group is involved in this program. That raises an alarm in my mind and I would think in the minds of many Canadians who are opposed to cruise missile testing in this country, that somehow or other we may be getting involved through the back door with some kind of cruise missile technology development. Can you tell us how long this Cruise Missile Technology Group has been involved in this program and to what extent they are involved in the program?

Mr. Nelms: I do not know to what extent that particular group of that terminology is involved in the program. Our measurement program is with DARDA—the Defence Advanced Research and Development Agency. They have contracted with Lincoln Labs of MIT to actually go out and do the work for them. I am not personally aware of what background connections may be there with their contractor which is Lincoln Labs.

Mr. Sargeant: As I understand it, the Cruise Missile Technology Group is part of Lincoln Labs. It is a group within Lincoln Labs.

Is the Canadian government aware of this link to the cruise missile and, if so, for how long has the government been aware of that?

Mr. Nelms: I am not aware of this connection to the cruise. It is not a part of the memorandum of understanding, that we have to undertake these measurements. The connections that may be back in the U.S. are . . .

Mr. Sargeant: There is nothing . . .

Mr. Nelms: They are not part of the . . .

Mr. Sargeant: There is nothing in the memorandum of understanding?

Mr. Nelms: Nothing whatsoever.

Mr. Sargeant: One of the MIT scientists said last week, I assume in an interview with *The Calgary Herald* reporter, that what they were doing was trying to develop better software for

[Traduction]

d'améliorer la fabrication de radars et de systèmes de radar, que ces systèmes soient au sol ou aéroportés, renseignements que personne au monde n'a accumulés encore. Par exemple, quel type de réflexions proviennent d'objets qui pourraient empêcher le radar de détecter et d'identifier un objet voulu? Ces données détaillées qui sont essentielles à la fabrication du radar n'existent pas à l'heure actuelle compte tenu de toutes les circonstances dans lesquelles on peut se trouver.

M. Sargeant: Je comprends très bien que nous ayons besoin de ce type de renseignements et, d'ailleurs, lorsque j'ai écrit au ministre, il y a environ 13 mois, à ce propos, il m'a répondu que c'est ce qu'il faisait. Je n'y vois aucune difficulté. Je me rends pleinement compte que la communauté mondiale pourrait utiliser à bon escient ces renseignements. Mais, au cours des dernières semaines, et même la semaine dernière, certaines rumeurs circulent en Alberta selon lesquelles un groupe appartenant au *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, groupe dénommé Groupe de travail sur la technologie du missile de croisière, participe à ce programme. Cela m'effraie et je suppose que cela effraie tous les Canadiens qui s'opposent à l'essai de missiles de croisière dans ce pays, car nous allons peut-être participer au perfectionnement des missiles de croisière en coulisses. Pouvez-vous nous dire depuis combien de temps ce groupe de travail participe à ce programme et si sa participation est importante ou non?

M. Nelms: Je ne sais pas si ce groupe participe activement ou non au programme. Notre programme d'essais se fait en collaboration avec DARDA, *Defence Advanced Research and Development Agency* (Agence de recherche et de développement avancé en matière de défense). Cette agence a sous-traité ce travail aux laboratoires Lincoln du MIT. Je ne suis personnellement pas au courant des rapports occultes qu'ils pourraient avoir avec les laboratoires Lincoln.

M. Sargeant: Si je comprends bien, ce groupe de travail sur la technologie du missile de croisière fait partie des Laboratoires Lincoln.

Le gouvernement canadien est-il au courant de ce lien avec le missile de croisière et, dans l'affirmative, depuis combien de temps le sait-il?

M. Nelms: Je ne suis pas au courant des liens qu'il pourrait exister avec le missile de croisière. Cela ne fait pas partie du protocole d'entente que nous avons signé dans le but d'effectuer ces mesures. Les rapports qu'il pourrait y avoir aux États-Unis sont . . .

M. Sargeant: Il n'y a rien . . .

M. Nelms: Ils ne font pas partie du . . .

M. Sargeant: Il n'y a rien dans le protocole d'entente?

M. Nelms: Absolument rien.

M. Sargeant: Un des savants du MIT a dit la semaine dernière, dans une entrevue accordée, je crois, à un journaliste du *Calgary Herald* qu'ils essayaient de fabriquer de meilleurs

[Text]

the cruise missiles, for the flight of the cruise missile, and that they were using the information gained from this low angle radar measurement program to do that. Another person, a Canadian consultant attached to the program, said that the major spin-off from this program would be for the cruise missile development and, specifically, to aid in the survivability of that missile. You are not aware of this aspect of the program at all?

Mr. Nelms: I think what I should say is that, because we are collecting a set of very basic clutter data, very basic radar data, obviously the data that are collected—data are unclassified; it is an unclassified project—have a variety of applications, and one can think of many places where they will be used.

• 1010

They are very valuable data for designers of ground-based radar, civil radar, for anyone who is designing a radar or who is choosing a radar, or designing a system that will use a radar. So in that sense it does not surprise me that the data will have application in the civil community. It will have application certainly in the defence community, if we are designing radars for airborne use or ground-based detection, and so on. The data are going to be extremely valuable for anyone who has to design a radar or a radar system that will operate over land areas. So in that sense I am not surprised that it will have application to anyone who is worried about the cruise, in addition to anyone who is worried about any other type of radar.

Mr. Sargeant: I can appreciate those comments, sir. I suppose my concern, then, would be that the fact that this Cruise Missile Technology Group has come into the country and is working in this country perhaps not under the spirit of the memorandum of understanding, garnering information for their own use from a program that, as you say, has as many widespread uses.

I would like to add that I learned this morning from a source that the American air force and another person from the Lincoln labs have said that this project was connected with the cruise missile program right from the beginning. I take your word for it that it is not in the memorandum of understanding signed with Canada—but that that was part of the intentions of the program right from the start.

Could I ask the minister, would it be possible to have the memorandum of understanding tabled? Is it confidential, or...?

Mr. Lamontagne: I can have a look at it. You would understand that I do not want to table a document which is a joint document with the United States. But I will inquire, and if it is unclassified or there is nothing objectionable, I would be glad to do it. I would say most of it would be unclassified, so...

Mr. McKinnon: I have a point of order. I hope to add to your time, Mr. Sargeant.

[Translation]

logiciels destinés aux missiles de croisière, à leur vol, et qu'ils utilisaient les renseignements tirés de ce programme d'évaluation des radars à angle réduit pour y parvenir. Une autre personne, un expert-conseil canadien qui travaille à ce programme, a dit que ses principales retombées permettraient de perfectionner le missile de croisière et, plus précisément, d'en prolonger la durée de vie. N'êtes-vous pas au courant de cet aspect du programme?

M. Nelms: Étant donné que nous sommes en train de regrouper toute une série de données de base sur les radars, ces données ne sont pas confidentielles; il s'agit d'un projet non confidentiel qui aura de nombreuses répercussions et dont les applications sont infinies.

Il s'agit de données fort importantes pour la fabrication des radars terrestres, des radars civils, pour quiconque fabrique un radar ou en choisit un ou conçoit un système dans lequel un radar sera utilisé. Dans ce sens, cela ne me surprend donc pas que ces données trouveront des applications dans le monde civil. Il y en aura également dans le monde militaire, si nous fabriquons des radars destinés aux avions ou à la détection au sol et ainsi de suite. Ces données vont être d'une importance considérable pour quiconque chargé de fabriquer un radar ou un système de radars terrestres. Je ne suis donc pas surpris que ces données puissent servir au missile de croisière et que cela en préoccupe beaucoup comme pour n'importe quel autre type de radar.

M. Sargeant: Je comprends, monsieur. Ce qui me préoccupe alors, c'est que ce groupe de travail sur la technologie du missile de croisière se soit installé ici, travaille et recueille des renseignements d'un programme qui, comme vous le dites, a autant d'applications, et ce sans correspondance avec l'esprit du protocole d'entente.

Je voudrais ajouter que j'ai appris ce matin que l'armée de l'air américaine et qu'une autre personne travaillant pour les Laboratoires Lincoln ont dit que ce projet était lié au missile de croisière dès le début. Je vous crois lorsque vous dites que cela ne figure pas dans le protocole d'entente signé avec le Canada, mais cela faisait partie des intentions du programme dès le départ.

Pourrais-je demander au ministre si ce protocole d'entente pourrait être déposé? Est-il confidentiel?

M. Lamontagne: Je peux le parcourir. Vous comprenez que je ne voudrais pas déposer un document qui est en fait un document commun avec les États-Unis. Mais je me renseignerai et, si ce document n'est pas confidentiel et s'il ne renferme rien qui puisse prêter à controverse, c'est avec plaisir que je vous le ferai parvenir. Je pense que l'essentiel de ce programme n'est pas confidentiel...

M. McKinnon: Je voudrais soulever un rappel au Règlement. Je voudrais ne pas gaspiller votre temps, monsieur Sargeant.

[Texte]

That M of U was signed while I was the Minister of National Defence, so I accept responsibility for it. It is part of the ministerial responsibility. I have a copy of the M of U, and if Mr. Sargeant would like to see it, I would be glad to show it to him, if that would satisfy the rest of the committee. I think I can show it to you, Mr. Chairman, if you like.

As the witness has said, it really makes no provision—the word “guidance” does not appear in it; the words “guided missile” do not appear in it. It had no connection with the cruise missile.

Mr. Sargeant: I appreciate those comments, Mr. McKinnon. I would not mind having a look at it at some time or other.

Mr. McKinnon: I will bring it to the Chamber this afternoon, if you like.

The Chairman: There is a request, there is an offer, so I think the Hon. Mr. McKinnon can accede to the request and show the necessary paper to Mr. Sargeant.

The minister.

Mr. Lamontagne: I would object to the effect that the member has mentioned that maybe we are doing things which would be involving cruise missile testing and doing it by the back door. I think if we sign a memorandum of understanding and we have an umbrella agreement, when it is time to judge about the testing of the Cruise missile it will be done through an open door, and there is no intention of this government or myself to go through the back door. We are convinced in our views on that, and when the judgment will be made, it will be a judgment of the government by the front door.

Mr. Sargeant: Let me correct that. If I made a wrong impression, that is not what I meant to say, sir. I am saying that perhaps this group is in the country right now unbeknownst to the Canadian government in any official capacity.

That was going to be my final comment or question. I would like to ask the minister if he could undertake to determine just what this particular group called the Cruise Missile Technology Group is up to, and if he could report to me by letter, or to the committee, at some time in the future.

Mr. Lamontagne: I will be glad to give you the information.

Mr. Sargeant: Thank you.

• 1015

Le président: L'honorable député de Labelle, M. Dupras.

M. Dupras: Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président, et bienvenue à Ottawa.

Monsieur le ministre, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, M. MacEachen, a fait une déclaration aux Nations-Unies, il y a une dizaine de jours, sur notre présence à Chypre. Des démarches ont-elles été amorcées pour rapatrier les troupes canadiennes qui sont à Chypre depuis 1964? Est-ce que nos associés, nos partenaires qui sont à Chypre ont la

[Traduction]

Ce protocole d'entente a été signé alors que j'étais ministre de la Défense nationale et j'en accepte donc la responsabilité. Cela fait partie de la responsabilité ministérielle. J'ai un exemplaire de ce protocole d'entente et si M. Sargeant veut le voir, je serais heureux de le lui montrer si le reste du Comité est d'accord. Je crois que je peux vous le montrer, monsieur le président, si vous le voulez.

Comme l'a dit le témoin, aucune disposition dans ce sens n'y figure; les termes «guidage» ou «missile guidé» n'y figurent pas. Aucune mention n'est faite du missile de croisière.

M. Sargeant: Merci, monsieur McKinnon. Je le parcourrai avec plaisir à un moment ou à un autre.

M. McKinnon: Je l'emmènerai à la Chambre cet après-midi, si vous le désirez.

Le président: Je pense que l'honorable M. McKinnon peut donner suite à la requête de M. Sargeant et lui montrer le document en question.

Monsieur le ministre.

M. Lamontagne: Je m'oppose à ce qu'a dit le député, à savoir que nous procédons peut-être à des essais sur le missile de croisière et que nous le faisons en coulisses. Je crois que, si nous signons un protocole d'entente et si nous avons un accord général, lorsque le moment viendra de prendre une décision à propos des essais du missile de croisière, cela se fera toutes portes ouvertes et ni ce gouvernement ni moi-même n'avons l'intention de le faire en coulisses. Nous sommes d'accord là-dessus et, lorsque le moment viendra de prendre une décision à ce sujet, ce sera fait au grand jour.

M. Sargeant: Permettez-moi de faire une correction. Si je vous ai donné cette impression, elle est fausse, car ce n'est pas ce que je voulais dire. Je disais que ce groupe était peut-être implanté dans ce pays sans que le gouvernement canadien le sache.

Cela allait être ma dernière question. Je voudrais demander au ministre s'il pourrait découvrir ce que ce groupe dénommé Groupe de travail sur la technologie du missile de croisière fait et s'il pouvait m'en faire part par lettre, ou en faire part au Comité à un moment ou à un autre.

M. Lamontagne: C'est avec plaisir que je vous transmettrai ces renseignements.

M. Sargeant: Merci.

The Chairman: The honourable member from Labelle, Mr. Dupras.

Mr. Dupras: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to Ottawa.

Mr. Minister, about 10 days ago, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. MacEachen, made a statement at the United Nations on our presence in Cyprus. Have steps been taken to begin repatriating the Canadian troops who have been in Cyprus since 1964? Do our associates, our partners in Cyprus intend to leave Cyprus as well? I certainly understand

[Text]

même intention de quitter Chypre? Bien sûr, je comprends l'importance du rôle de négociateur de la paix et de médiateur que les troupes canadiennes ont joué à Chypre pendant tant d'années. Les troupes canadiennes ont fait l'orgueil de tout le Canada par la grande distinction avec laquelle elles se sont acquittées de cette délicate tâche. Maintenant, après bientôt 20 ans, l'état de l'économie à Chypre est bon; l'industrie touristique va très bien. Il y a donc toutes sortes de facteurs qui militent en faveur de la libération de ce pays de l'occupation canadienne.

Monsieur le ministre, est-ce que des dispositions ont été prises au ministère pour rapatrier les troupes?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, aucune disposition n'a été prise pour rapatrier les troupes de Chypre. Au contraire, je pense qu'on vient de signer un prolongement pour les six prochains mois.

Ce que vous venez de dire, monsieur Dupras, est exact. Je pense que c'est une opération de paix qui est excessivement délicate. C'est un pays où il y a certainement des conflits d'une extrême délicatesse entre les Turcs et les Chypriotes grecs qui ont des relations avec leur mère patrie aussi. Il y a des négociations au niveau communal qui se font depuis plusieurs années. Nous sommes là depuis vingt ans. Si, comme vous dites, le tourisme, l'économie et le reste semblent progresser de façon exceptionnelle dans cette île, on se demande si ce n'est pas justement à cause de notre présence et de celle de nos alliés qui sont là avec nous afin de préserver cette paix qu'ils ont depuis plusieurs années.

Evidemment, cela ne peut pas durer éternellement. Je pense que la remarque du ministre des Affaires extérieures est un peu celle que j'ai faite il y a peut-être une couple d'années. En fin de compte, nous espérons que les négociations entre les différentes parties qui sont impliquées dans ces différends sur l'île de Chypre vont s'activer ou que les Nations-Unies vont essayer de faire en sorte que les négociations, quelles qu'elles soient, soient plus actives afin d'arriver à une solution. Vous savez bien qu'on ne peut pas rester encore vingt ans sans voir des résultats concrets à notre action. À certains moments, on se sent un peu inutiles, étant donné qu'il n'y a pas de progrès dans les négociations pour régler la situation entre les Grecs chypriotes et l'élément turc.

On ne voudrait pas non plus être la cause du début d'un nouveau conflit, par notre départ ou le départ de nos alliés. Disons que c'est tout simplement peut-être une incitation aux parties concernées à négocier un peu plus activement, de façon plus constructive. Je prends les remarques de M. MacEachen dans ce sens-là.

Comme vous dites, pour nos troupes, c'est une expérience exceptionnelle. Elles ont rempli leur rôle de pacifistes dans ce coin-là de façon exceptionnelle. C'est un exercice de diplomatie qui est aussi très valable pour nos troupes, mais même si c'est valable pour le Canada, cela ne veut pas dire qu'il faut y rester éternellement et éviter, en fin de compte, une solution. Ce que nous voulons, c'est que la solution se trouve le plus rapidement possible. C'est le sens de la déclaration de M. MacEachen.

[Translation]

how important Canadian troops have been to that country in their role as peace negotiators and mediators for so many years. The distinguished way in which they carried out their delicate task has made the Canadian troops the pride of all of Canada. Now, after almost 20 years, the state of the economy in Cyprus is good and the tourist industry is quite healthy. There are so many factors that weigh in favour of liberating this country from Canadian occupation.

Mr. Minister, have steps been taken by your department to repatriate the troops?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, no steps have been taken yet. In fact, I believe we just signed an agreement for six months' extension.

What you say is correct, Mr. Dupras. The peace operation is an extremely delicate one. It is a country where the conflicts between the Turks and the Greek Cypriots, who have ties with their mother country as well, are extremely tendentious. Negotiations have been taking place at the local level for several years now. We have been there for 20 years. If, as you say, tourism and the economy and what have you seem to be progressing quite well on the island, perhaps it is precisely because of our presence as well as that of our allies who are there to preserve the peace that has reigned for several years.

Obviously, this could not last indefinitely. The remarks made by the Minister of External Affairs are similar to mine a couple of years ago. We hope that the negotiations among the parties involved in these differences on the island of Cyprus will get a move on or that the United Nations will try to intensify the talks so that a solution may be reached. We cannot stay there another 20 years if our efforts are not bearing concrete results. At times, we feel somewhat useless, especially since there is no progress being made in the negotiations aimed at solving this conflict between the Greek Cypriots and the Turks.

However, we would not wish our departure or that of our allies to trigger a new conflict. Perhaps the suggestion was simply meant to encourage the parties involved to negotiate more intensely and more constructively. That is how I take Mr. MacEachen's remarks.

As you have mentioned, this has been an exceptional experience for our troops. They have surpassed themselves in their role as peacemakers in the area. The diplomatic exercise has been very valuable for our troops as well as for Canada but this does not mean that we are to prolong our stay indefinitely, thus avoiding a solution. We want the solution to be found as quickly as possible. That is what Mr. MacEachen meant.

[Texte]

M. Dupras: Justement, monsieur le ministre, peut-être que le fait que les Canadiens et les autres ne manifestent pas d'impatience contribue à prolonger cet état de choses, bien que l'économie soit normalisée et que l'industrie touristique et les autres activités sociales soient pratiquement revenues à la normale.

• 1020

L'autre question que je désire poser à M. Lamontagne, monsieur le président, a trait à la méthodologie employée dans l'évaluation de la force de frappe de la Russie. On s'attarde beaucoup à cette force de frappe soviétique et on en a publié, dernièrement, tout un relevé. Comment en arrive-t-on ou quelle méthodologie emploie-t-on pour dénombrer, c'est-à-dire en termes numériques, la force de frappe? Tient-on compte de la force de ces engins? Est-ce que les engins de la France et d'Israël sont joints à ceux de l'OTAN? Comment arrive-t-on à ce chiffre et quelle est la contribution du Canada? Quelle est notre source d'information? N'existe-t-il qu'une seule source d'information dans l'établissement de ce relevé ou du décompte des engins que possèdent les Russes ou d'autres pays en ont-ils également? La France se sert-elle d'une méthodologie particulière pour faire l'évaluation? En fait, sur quoi base-t-on la valeur de ces chiffres?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, ce sont des questions excessivement intéressantes. Je demanderai au chef de la Défense d'y répondre. En tant que membre du comité militaire de l'OTAN, il possède de précieuses informations qui lui permettront de répondre aux différentes questions que vous avez posées.

General Withers.

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, not only the assessment of the Soviet nuclear forces, but also the whole spectrum of Soviet forces through the conventional, is done on a regular basis in a NATO forum, which is known by the title MC-161, and annually the representatives of each one of the nations, pooling their information, provide an assessment.

Of course, there is considerable Canadian input to this; we take part in the process every year. If we were to dissent from that on the basis of our assessments, we would so state. But at the moment there is an agreed position throughout the alliance on the assessment of those forces.

Mr. Dupras: My question included also whether or not the arms of France and Israel would be included. I do not recall having seen any mention of the Exocet before they were used in the Falkland crisis, for instance. I wonder why it was left out in the inventory or in the shopping list, and whether there are other arms that are unknown belonging to a member of NATO, or to France or Israel, that is not on our list, and whether there is a list of arms of the Russian side that do not appear on that list.

Do we also take into consideration arms that have been retired, or do we maintain these on the list of active arms? Of course, we retired the Bomarc some years ago. Have the Russians maintained this equipment on their list as to a

[Traduction]

Mr. Dupras: Precisely, Mr. Minister. Perhaps the fact that the Canadians and their allies are not showing more impatience prolongs this state of affairs although the economy, the tourist industry and other social activities are practically back to normal.

The other question I would like to ask Mr. Lamontagne, Mr. Chairman, concerns the methods used in assessing the strike force of the USSR. A lot of attention is given to the Soviet strike force and, recently, a complete account of their military capabilities was published. What method is used to translate the strike force into figures? Is the force of the engines of war taken into account? Are France and Israel included in NATO's figures? How is the figure arrived at and what is Canada's part? Where do we get our information? Is only one source of information used in this detailed account or breakdown of the engines of war in the USSR as well as in other countries? Does France use any particular method in her evaluation? How is the value of these figures arrived at?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, these questions are very interesting. I would ask the Chief of Defence to answer them. As a member of the military committee of NATO, he is privy to precious information that will enable him to answer your various questions.

Général Withers.

Gén Withers: Monsieur le président, non seulement la force de frappe nucléaire de l'URSS, mais toute la gamme de ses engins jusqu'aux plus conventionnels sont évaluées régulièrement au sein de l'OTAN. Cette évaluation porte le titre MC-161 et la mise en commun des données fournies annuellement par les représentants de chaque pays en font partie.

Bien sûr, il y a une participation active de la part des Canadiens. Nous participons au processus annuellement, si nous devons différer d'opinions au sujet de l'évaluation, nous le dirions. Toutefois, à l'heure actuelle, les membres de l'Alliance ont une position commune par rapport à l'évaluation des forces de frappe.

M. Dupras: Je voulais également savoir si les armes de la France et d'Israël entraient en ligne de compte. Que je sache, on n'avait jamais fait allusion à l'Exocet avant qu'il ne soit déployé lors de la guerre des Malouines. Ainsi, je me suis demandé pourquoi cela ne figurait pas dans l'inventaire et si l'on laissait de côté les armes appartenant à un membre de l'OTAN, ou à la France ou à Israël. Je me demandais si les Soviétiques possédaient des armes qui ne figurent pas dans la liste.

Est-ce que les armes mis hors service entrent en ligne de compte? Sont-ils compris dans la liste des armes en service? Il y a plusieurs années, nous avons mis le Bomarc hors service. Les Soviétiques auront-ils supprimé cet engin du relevé des

[Text]

devaluation of what we have, or do we do likewise? Do we retire their arms as soon as they do, or do we maintain them on the list? How is this done?

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, the annual assessments do consider... Thinking that you are mainly describing the East-West balance, I restricted it to NATO, within our own assessments we, indeed, do consider all the weapon systems that are existing in the world. Now, whether they be Israeli or developed by some other nation, in terms of when do you strike a weapon system from the inventory, you only do that when you have positive proof that it is in fact gone.

• 1025

Indeed, it has been the policy of the Soviet Union, when withdrawing equipments, to put them into reserve; and I might use the case of the tanks. The Soviet Union still has in stock the T-34 tank which essentially is a World War Two model and also was involved in the Korean conflict. It has generally been their policy, when re-equipping the group of Soviet forces in Germany, for example, to withdraw the items, refurbish them and put them into storage. Indeed, we have seen those same weapon systems subsequently delivered to other Third World client states. So we do keep a tab on them until we have absolute, positive identification that they no longer exist.

Mr. Lamontagne: I would say that the Russians do not waste any of their weapons; they use them for all kinds of other uses.

Mr. Dupras: But if the T-34 is still on our list as this being an active arm, would they still have the old Centurions we had?

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, we sold our old Centurions; we declared them surplus. Some of them we used as targets. Others were disposed of to, I think, Austria, but Mr. Killick could perhaps answer.

Mr. J.R. Killick (Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), Department of National Defence): Certain of the tanks went to Austria and certain components went to Switzerland.

The Chairman: Your last question, please.

Mr. Dupras: We keep tabs on the movements of arms, either retired, destroyed or sold to another country. So every time Israel or France makes an important sale of arms, this is taken care of and taken into consideration. Is that so?

Gen Withers: That is so, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dupras: I would like to know if you could tell us now, Mr. Minister, if you have the list of the arms this time supposedly to Nicaragua but intercepted in Recife, Brazil, about a month ago. Do we now have the list of the arms contained in those four aircraft?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, the inventory of those arms was made by the Brazilian government, and at this moment I am uncertain as to whether or not the Brazilian

[Translation]

armes de l'OTAN? Faisons-nous la même chose en ce qui concerne les engins soviétiques? Sont-ils supprimés de nos listes aussitôt qu'ils sont mis hors service? Comment fait-on?

Gén Withers: Monsieur le président, croyant que vous décrieriez l'équilibre Est-Ouest, je me suis limité aux évaluations de l'OTAN qui tiennent compte de tous les systèmes d'armements au monde. Or, qu'il ait été mis au point par l'Israël ou par un autre pays, un système d'armements n'est supprimé de l'inventaire qu'au moment où nous avons la preuve positive qu'il a été effectivement mis hors service.

En fait, l'Union soviétique a comme politique lors du retrait d'équipement, de mettre celui-ci en réserve; je peux peut-être parler des chars d'assaut comme exemple. L'Union soviétique a toujours des chars d'assaut T-34, essentiellement un modèle de la Seconde Guerre mondiale ainsi que du conflit en Corée. D'une façon générale, leur politique a été, lorsque l'on rééquipe les forces soviétiques en Allemagne par exemple, de retirer le vieux équipement, de le remettre à neuf, et de l'entreposer. À vrai dire, nous avons constaté que ces mêmes armes étaient par la suite livrées à d'autres États clients du Tiers monde. Nous surveillons donc le mouvement de l'équipement jusqu'à ce que nous soyons absolument et positivement sûrs que cet équipement n'existe plus.

M. Lamontagne: Je dirais que les Soviétiques ne gaspillent aucune de leurs armes; ils s'en servent pour toutes sortes d'autres choses.

M. Dupras: Si le T-34 figure toujours sur notre liste d'armement en usage, est-ce qu'ils ont toujours sur leur liste nos vieux Centurions?

Gén Withers: Monsieur le président, nous avons vendu nos vieux Centurions; nous les avons déclarés excédentaires. Certains nous ont servi de cibles. D'autres ont été écoulés, je crois, en Autriche, mais peut-être M. Killick pourrait-il répondre.

M. J.R. Killick (sous-ministre adjoint (Équipement), ministère de la Défense nationale): On a envoyé certains chars d'assaut en Autriche et certaines pièces à la Suisse.

Le président: Votre dernière question, s'il vous plaît.

M. Dupras: Nous surveillons le mouvement des armes retirées, détruites ou vendues à un autre pays. Chaque fois donc que Israël ou la France réalise une vente importante d'armes, on en tient compte, n'est-ce pas?

Gén Withers: En effet, monsieur le président.

M. Dupras: Pourriez-vous nous dire, monsieur le Ministre, si vous avez la liste des armes qu'on prétendait destiner au Nicaragua mais qui ont été interceptées à Recife, au Brésil, il y a environ un mois. Avez-vous la liste des armes que contenaient les quatre avions?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, c'est le gouvernement brésilien qui a dressé l'inventaire de ces armes, et à l'heure actuelle, je ne sais pas au juste s'il a ou non autorisé la publication des détails.

[Texte]

government has authorized the release of the specifics of that information.

Mr. Dupras: Why would they refuse to make it public?

Gen Withers: Ask them. I do not know.

The Chairman: Thank you. Next is the hon. member for Parry Sound—Muskoka, Mr. Darling, followed by the hon. member for Esquimalt—Saanich and Mr. Corbett.

Mr. Darling: Mr. Chairman, to the minister or to General Withers, I just received a letter this morning from one of the schools in my riding, which I had addressed a week or so ago, and they state that there are Cruise missiles in place in NATO countries, and these are land based. The model the U.S. wishes to test in Canada is an air-launched model intended for North American continental defence, not for use with NATO in Europe. Is that correct?

Mr. Lamontagne: General Withers.

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, first of all, referring to the ground-launched Cruise missile, there are none yet installed in Europe. The initial operational capability will be established late this year.

Dealing with the question of testing in Canada, of course we have not yet received a request, but it is our understanding that the request would be for the air-launched Cruise missile.

I would also point out that whether it be air-launched, ground-launched or submarine-launched, we are essentially speaking about the same guidance system, the TERCOM guidance system.

Mr. Darling: Thank you very much. I believe Mr. McKinnon did mention the frigate program, and I understand it is down to two consortia, or whatever you call them, and it was supposed to be within a reasonable time. I am just wondering whether you can come up with any information, Mr. Minister, as to when that grand decision will be made. Also, when it is made, is it going to be all or nothing—if you know what I mean—rather than dividing it like a Christian?

• 1030

Mr. Lamontagne: All I can say, Mr. Darling, is that as far as I am concerned, as Minister of National Defence, for the sake of our navy I do hope the decision is taken as soon as possible. I think it is known that we are still under negotiation with the two consortia. We have asked them to give us a last proposition to make sure that negotiations with both consortia have been as objective as possible, that they are satisfied with the information they asked us to give them so they can make their propositions. These propositions are supposed to be in this week. This is supposed to be the final proposition. Then, as you know, there will be a series of discussions at the different levels; that is, at the committee level, Cabinet committee and then the Cabinet. I do hope, as much as you do, that a decision will be taken. My objective was that it be before we adjourn—

[Traduction]

M. Dupras: Pourquoi refuserait-il de les publier?

Gén Withers: Demandez-lui, je n'en sais rien.

Le président: Merci. Maintenant, l'honorable député de Parry Sound—Muskoka, M. Darling, suivi de l'honorable député pour Esquimalt—Saanich et de M. Corbett.

M. Darling: Monsieur le président, ma question s'adresse au ministre ou au général Withers; j'ai reçu, ce matin même, une lettre d'une école de ma circonscription où j'ai pris la parole il y a environ une semaine, et dans cette lettre, on déclare qu'on a installé des missiles Cruise dans les pays de l'OTAN, des missiles à lancement terrestre. Le modèle que les États-Unis souhaitent mettre à l'essai au Canada en est un à lancement aérien destiné à la défense continentale de l'Amérique du Nord et non pas à l'intention de l'OTAN en Europe. Est-ce exact?

M. Lamontagne: Général Withers.

Gén Withers: Monsieur le président, tout d'abord, pour ce qui est des missiles Cruise à lancement terrestre, aucun n'a encore été installé en Europe. Ce n'est que plus tard cette année qu'ils seront mis en place.

Quant aux essais au Canada, évidemment, nous n'en n'avons pas encore reçu la demande, mais à notre connaissance, cette demande visera les missiles Cruise à lancement aérien.

J'aimerais également souligner que l'on parle de missiles à lancement aérien, à lancement terrestre ou à lancement sous-marin essentiellement, il est question du même système de direction, le système TERCOM.

M. Darling: Merci beaucoup. Je crois que M. McKinnon a mentionné le programme des frégates et si je comprends bien, on est rendu à deux consortiums, enfin quel que soit leur nom, et que le programme devait être mis en place dans des délais raisonnables. Je me demande si vous pouvez nous donner le moindre renseignement, monsieur le Ministre, sur la date à laquelle on prendra cette grande décision. J'aimerais en outre savoir, une fois la décision prise, si ce sera tout ou rien—vous savez ce que je veux dire—plutôt que de partager comme un chrétien?

M. Lamontagne: Je ne puis que dire, monsieur Darling, qu'en ce qui me concerne, à titre de ministre de la Défense, pour l'amour de notre marine, j'espère que la décision se prendra le plus tôt possible. Je crois qu'on sait que nous sommes toujours en cours de négociations avec les deux consortiums. Nous leur avons demandé de nous fournir une dernière proposition afin de nous assurer que les négociations avec les deux ont été aussi objectives que possible et qu'ils sont satisfaits des renseignements qu'ils nous avaient demandé de leur fournir afin de leur permettre de rédiger leurs propositions. Celles-ci sont censées être présentées cette semaine. Il est censé s'agir de la proposition définitive. Ensuite comme vous le savez, il y aura toute une série de discussions à différents niveaux; c'est-à-dire au niveau du Comité, du comité du Cabinet et ensuite du Cabinet. Autant que vous, j'espère

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I do hope it is possible—if not, as soon as possible after adjournment.

Mr. McKinnon: I have a supplementary for that, at the end of this.

Mr. Darling: So it is just still the same word, "soon".

Mr. Lamontagne: The only words I can say are, "as soon as possible". I am aware, as much as my department and yourself and any of the others—even from the Conservative Party—that these six frigates... get going as fast as we can so that we can replace them, considering the age of some of our ships. All this is well known and has been written, so all I can tell you is that.

As far as your question is concerned as to what kind of decision will be taken by Cabinet about sharing the work or splitting the contracts, or whatever it is, this is a decision that will be in the hands of the Cabinet when the time comes to make a decision. There is a whole area of possibilities with a contract like this and I cannot tell you what the decision will be.

Mr. Darling: Coming back to the "soon" idea, Mr. Minister, you, as the Minister of Defence, could issue an ultimatum and tell them to get off their rear ends and that you want the decision by June 18 at 8.00 p.m.; and if they could not do it in eight hours, they could work 16 hours; and if they could not do it in 16 hours, they could work a little longer.

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, I think when you realize the immense amount of work in the evaluation of these propositions, when each proposition comprises something like many tens of thousands of pages that have to be taken into consideration and then you have negotiations with each consortium, which asks for some information and asks for some decision as far as our requirements are concerned, I do not think we have been sleeping on it—far from it. As Minister of Defence, I can assure you that some of my Cabinet colleagues find me a little annoying sometimes when I say: Let us do it as fast as we can, let us press it. I think everything is being done at the moment to get it, again, "as soon as possible".

Mr. Darling: Mr. Chairman, to the minister, again, I have been on this committee for a number of years and I cannot remember when that frigate program first came in. It was seven or eight years ago; you could probably tell better than I can.

Mr. Lamontagne: That started I think in 1977, and you could have taken a decision in 1979.

Mr. Darling: All right. We are supposed to make decisions in the 37 days in which Parliament sat under the Clark government, as compared with this government, which under you and previous ministers, has been dealing with it and dealing with it. I am assuming that our Minister of National Defence, in that very brief period, was certainly exploring it.

[Translation]

que l'on prendra la décision. Je m'étais fixé comme objectif avant l'ajournement—j'espère que c'est possible—sinon, le plus tôt possible après l'ajournement.

M. McKinnon: J'aurais une question supplémentaire sur ce sujet, lorsque vous aurez terminé.

M. Darling: C'est donc toujours le même mot «bientôt».

M. Lamontagne: Tout ce que je peux dire, c'est «aussitôt que possible». Je sais pertinemment, tout comme mon ministère et vous-même et d'autres députés—même du parti conservateur—que ces six frégates... qu'il faut faire le plus vite possible pour les remplacer, compte tenu de l'âge de certains de nos navires. C'est bien connu, on l'a écrit, et donc c'est tout ce que je peux vous dire.

Quant à votre question sur le genre de décision que prendra le Cabinet relativement au partage du travail ou à la répartition des contrats, c'est au Cabinet qu'il reviendra d'en décider le moment venu. Un contrat semblable offre toute une gamme de possibilités, et donc je ne saurais vous dire quelle sera la décision.

M. Darling: Pour revenir à cette idée de «bientôt», monsieur le Ministre, en votre qualité de ministre de la Défense, vous pourriez leur donner un ultimatum et leur dire de se bouger, que vous voulez la décision à 20 heures le 18 juin; s'ils ne pouvaient faire le travail nécessaire en 8 heures, ils pourraient travailler 16 heures; et si c'était impossible en 16 heures, ils pourraient travailler un peu plus longtemps.

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, je crois que lorsqu'on comprend le travail considérable qu'il faut pour évaluer ces propositions, lorsque l'on sait que chaque proposition se compose de dizaines de milliers de pages qu'il faut étudier et qu'ensuite il faut entreprendre des négociations avec chaque consortium, lesquels nous réclament des renseignements et nous demandent de prendre certaines décisions quant à nos besoins, je ne crois pas qu'on puisse dire que nous nous sommes trainés les pieds—au contraire. Comme ministre de la Défense, je puis vous avouer que certains de mes collègues au Cabinet me trouvent parfois un peu assommant lorsque je dis: «Agressons le plus rapidement possible, allons de l'avant.» Je crois que tout est en oeuvre, en ce moment, pour obtenir la décision, encore une fois, «le plus tôt possible».

M. Darling: Monsieur le président, permettez-moi de dire au ministre, encore une fois, que je fais partie du présent Comité depuis nombre d'années, et je n'arrive plus à me rappeler quand on a d'abord parlé de ce programme de remplacement des frégates. C'était il y a 7 ou 8 ans; vous pouvez probablement nous le dire plus exactement.

M. Lamontagne: Cela remonte, je crois, à 1977, et vous auriez pu prendre la décision en 1979.

M. Darling: Très bien. Nous étions censés prendre des décisions au cours des 37 jours pendant lesquels nous avons siégé sous le gouvernement Clark, comparé au présent gouvernement, lequel sous votre égide et celle des ministres précédents, s'en est occupé, occupé, et occupé. Je présume que notre ministre de la Défense nationale, au cours de cette très

[Texte]

Of course, you just cannot go in, after coming in cold, and then be able to make a decision. With all the hard work in the thousands of pages, sure they are working steadily, but they sure as hell must be resting now and again and meditating. You would think they would do a little more working and less of the other.

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, I do not think they are meditating. I can assure you it was not a question of criticizing the former Minister of National Defence under the Conservative Party. I think he did a wonderful job when he was there as defence minister. I can say that without any partisanship on my part.

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We have made a lot of decisions since I have been there. The F-18 is one, and many other decisions have been taken. Our budget has been increased reasonably every year, despite some economic difficulties, so I think we have done very well.

Again, Mr. Darling, I can assure you that I am doing everything I can, and your remarks today might help the Minister of National Defence to press for a decision as soon as possible.

Mr. Darling: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. I appreciate what you have to do. You have to sell it to the Cabinet, I am quite well aware.

I also appreciate your very kind remarks about your predecessor, Mr. McKinnon, and all I can say is they are very well deserved.

Mr. McKinnon: I must be near the end or something.

The Chairman: A supplementary.

Mr. Lamontagne: Maybe I can say, Mr. McKinnon, you are going to the Senate.

Mr. McKinnon: That is a great place for ex-ministers.

The Chairman: A supplementary.

Mr. McKinnon: I feel like going on with the present conversation.

However, seriously, Mr. Minister, I got the impression from questions that were put in the House on this that the subject had been sent to Cabinet some time ago and that we were awaiting a Cabinet decision, that the department had turned their recommendations over to you and you had sent it to Cabinet. Maybe I misunderstood it or something, or else the Cabinet has sent it back to you and told you to go back to the consortia and tell them to sharpen their pencils or something and bring in a lower bid. Is that what has happened?

Mr. Lamontagne: It is the fact in a way that when I presented it to the committee the Cabinet discussion happened there. As you know, the administration of the whole agreement or the whole proposition is done with DSS and IT&C involvement, and Defence, and the three of us agreed that maybe some further evaluation and further negotiations should be done with the consortia. As I said previously, I think this

[Traduction]

brève période, a certainement examiné la question. Evidemment, il n'est pas possible d'arriver, comme ça, à froid, et de pouvoir prendre une décision. Vu cette tâche énorme, des milliers de pages, je veux bien croire qu'ils travaillent régulièrement, mais ils doivent certainement se reposer de temps à autre et méditer. On pourrait espérer qu'ils feraient un peu plus d'ouvrage et un peu moins de méditation.

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, je ne crois pas qu'ils fassent de la méditation. Je vous assure que je ne critiquais pas l'ancien ministre de la Défense nationale du gouvernement conservateur. Je crois qu'il a fait un travail merveilleux lorsqu'il était ministre de la Défense. Je le dis sans la moindre partisanerie.

Nous avons pris beaucoup de décisions depuis que je suis entré en fonctions. Une parmi tant d'autres portait sur le F-18. Malgré des difficultés économiques, nous nous sommes vu accorder une augmentation budgétaire raisonnable tous les ans, donc je crois que nous nous en sommes bien tirés.

Encore une fois, monsieur Darling, je vous assure que je fais de mon mieux. Vos commentaires pourront peut-être aider le ministre de la Défense nationale à faire pression pour obtenir une décision rapide.

M. Darling: Merci beaucoup, monsieur le ministre. J'apprécie vos efforts. Je sais très bien que vous êtes obligé de faire valoir vos arguments auprès du Cabinet.

J'apprécie également vos observations aimables à propos de votre prédécesseur, M. McKinnon. Il les mérite pleinement.

M. McKinnon: Je suis presque fini, on dirait.

Le président: Une question supplémentaire.

M. Lamontagne: Cela veut dire que vous serez nommé sénateur, monsieur McKinnon.

M. McKinnon: C'est un havre pour les anciens ministres.

Le président: Une question supplémentaire.

M. McKinnon: J'ai envie de poursuivre cette question davantage.

Pour être sérieux maintenant, monsieur le ministre, des questions posées en Chambre à ce sujet m'ont laissé croire que la question avait été soumise au Cabinet et que nous ne faisons qu'attendre sa décision. Je croyais que le ministère vous avait fait parvenir des recommandations que vous aviez expédiées au Cabinet. Peut-être que j'ai mal compris ou peut-être que le Cabinet vous les avait renvoyées en vous chargeant de dire au consortium de réduire la soumission. Est-ce que c'est ce qui s'est passé?

M. Lamontagne: La discussion a eu lieu au moment où je les ai soumises au Comité du Cabinet. Vous n'êtes pas sans savoir que l'administration de l'accord se fait en collaboration avec le MAS et le ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce. Tous les trois, nous avons convenu que des évaluations et des négociations ultérieures s'imposaient avec le consortium. Comme je

[Text]

should be finalized this week, and then we can go ahead and take the proper decision.

Mr. McKinnon: I will look over that Hansard and see if there are any further questions I might want to ask in another place.

The Chairman: The hon. member from Esquimalt—Saanich, Mr. Munro.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to come back to the point of order raised by Mr. McKinnon earlier. It was not clear to me whether the text of Mr. Gorbachev's statement, as appearing in the proceedings, was derived from his written text or from the verbal text in Russian; the tape, in other words. Is there any way of determining that?

I have a related question whether there is a tape carrying the Russian, another tape carrying the French and a third tape carrying the English.

Le président: Eh bien, j'ai préparé une réponse pendant que vous parliez. Je vais l'expliquer pour qu'on se comprenne bien. J'aurai une réponse écrite pour M. l'honorable McKinnon et les autres qui en voudront.

La langue du parquet à la réunion est enregistrée et transcrite. Nous avons donc l'enregistrement et la transcription. L'interprétation n'est pas enregistrée. Ce matin, l'interprétation n'est pas enregistrée.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je ne le savais pas.

Le président: C'est une traduction simultanée et donc pas nécessairement de qualité à être publiée. Le russe parlé à la réunion fut transcrit *verbatim* par la section de l'interprétation multilingue du Secrétariat d'État. Cette transcription russe fut ensuite traduite du russe au français et du russe à l'anglais par la section de l'interprétation multilingue du Secrétariat d'État. Le tout fut ensuite examiné par un réviseur pour assurer la bonne qualité du français et de l'anglais et la bonne concordance des langues.

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Nous disposons de toutes les transcriptions. Toutefois, le compte rendu de cette réunion, dont j'ai copie en main, n'est pas nécessairement le produit de l'interprétation faite à ce moment-là, mais bien la transcription assurée par nos machines électroniques, le tout sous la surveillance du Secrétariat d'État. Donc, s'il n'y pas concordance, eh bien, nous pouvons toujours nous référer aux enregistrements du moment.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Vous les avez en votre possession?

Le président: On m'assure de la chose. Je ne les détient pas à mon bureau, mais on m'assure qu'ils ont été gardés.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): On doit les garder! D'autre part, est-ce que le texte de la présentation initiale de M. Gorbachev a été remis à notre service ou non?

[Translation]

I'ai dit auparavant, ces pourparlers devraient prendre fin cette semaine et nous pourrions alors prendre la décision appropriée.

M. McKinnon: Je vais parcourir le Hansard pour voir s'il n'y a pas lieu de poser d'autres questions ailleurs.

Le président: L'honorable député d'Esquimalt—Saanich, M. Munro.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci.

D'abord, monsieur le président, je reviens au rappel au Règlement invoqué tout à l'heure par M. McKinnon. Il n'était pas clair dans mon esprit si le texte de la déclaration de M. Gorbachev tel que reproduit dans le compte rendu, était la traduction de son texte écrit ou de sa déclaration orale en russe. Peut-on répondre à cette question?

Toujours au même sujet, je voudrais savoir si l'on a enregistré trois bandes, une portant le russe, une deuxième, le français et la troisième, l'anglais.

The Chairman: I was preparing the answer as you spoke. I will explain this clearly but I will have a written reply for Mr. McKinnon and any others who wish it.

The language used on the floor of the meeting is recorded and transcribed. So, we have the recording and the transcription. The interpretation is not recorded. This morning, for instance, the interpretation of this meeting is not being recorded.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I did not realize that.

The Chairman: It is a simultaneous translation and not necessarily of publishing quality. The Russian spoken at the meeting was transcribed *verbatim* by the Multilingual Interpretation Service of the Secretary of State. The Russian transcription was then translated from Russian into French and from Russian into English by the Multilingual Interpretation section of the Secretary of State. Everything was then revised to make sure that the French and the English were good and that the texts corresponded.

We have all the transcriptions. However, the proceedings of the meeting, of which I have a copy here, are not necessarily based on the interpretation of that meeting but on the transcription made by our electronic machines under the surveillance of the Secretary of State. So, if the texts do not correspond, we can always refer to the recordings.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): You have them?

The Chairman: I am assured that we do. I do not have them in my office, but I am told they are being kept.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): They have to be kept! Also, do we have the initial text presented by Mr. Gorbachev?

[Texte]

Le président: On m'informe que nous n'avons pas le texte, mais plutôt l'enregistrement en russe de ses propos.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Ah bon!

Le président: Donc, c'est précis.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Très bien. J'ai même remarqué qu'il avait contourné le texte et qu'il avait prononcé certaines phrases hors texte.

Le président: On a l'enregistrement, la traduction et la transcription en russe.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: I hope I am not taking up too much time.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): This is still on the point of order, anyway.

Mr. McKinnon: He could not have had a prepared text to answer some of the questions that were asked him.

The Chairman: That is right. So we have the transcript of the answers in Russian.

Mr. McKinnon: So we have the transcript, but the point I think we are both trying to make is what we heard is not what we read in the minutes. It is not what we heard in English at the meeting.

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, I think what they mean is that we have the translation, but is the translation in concurrence with the Russian meaning?

The Chairman: Well, one thing is sure, we have the text of everything that was said in Russian; we have a copy.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Good.

The Chairman: So we know that if we want to revise now...

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): And lock it up.

Mr. McKinnon: What I heard in English that day is not what I read in English in the minutes.

The Chairman: But what you read in English is an interpretation.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): That is right. What you heard...

The Chairman: But the interpretation that you heard in English is not the transcript, because the transcript comes from the machine and not from the interpretation. Like this morning, while we talk, this is not what—and I want the clerk to correct me—but this is not the practice. What we are now saying to each other is not going to be necessarily... What is going to be in this is the direct transcript from the machine.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I think with all due respect to those who do...

The Chairman: I think I had better do a triple check, not a double but a triple check.

[Traduction]

The Chairman: I am told that we do not, but that we have the recording of his remarks in Russian.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I see!

The Chairman: So we have quite an exact record of what was said.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Fine. I noticed that he departed from the text and spoke ad lib at times.

The Chairman: We have the recording, the translation and the transcription in Russian.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci beaucoup.

Le président: Monsieur McKinnon.

M. McKinnon: Je n'accapare pas trop de votre temps, j'espère.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Il s'agit d'un rappel au Règlement de toute façon.

M. McKinnon: De toute façon, il n'aurait pas pu préparer d'avance les réponses aux questions que nous lui avons posées.

Le président: C'est juste. Nous avons la transcription de ses réponses en russe.

M. McKinnon: Nous savons maintenant que la transcription est disponible, mais nous essayons de faire comprendre que ce que nous avons entendu ne correspond pas à ce que nous avons lu dans le compte rendu. Cela ne correspond pas à ce que nous avons entendu en anglais à la réunion.

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, il voudrait dire que nous avons la traduction, mais que la traduction ne correspond peut-être pas à l'original, n'est-ce pas?

Le président: Il est certain que nous avons le texte de tout ce qui a été dit en russe. Nous en avons un exemplaire.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Très bien.

Le président: Donc, si nous voulons modifier...

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Et mettez-le sous clé.

M. McKinnon: Ce que j'ai entendu en anglais ce jour-là ne correspond pas à ce que je lis en anglais dans le compte rendu.

Le président: Ce que vous lisez en anglais est une interprétation.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): C'est exact. Ce que vous avez entendu...

Le président: L'interprétation anglaise ne figure pas dans la transcription car la transcription est faite par machine et non pas à partir de l'interprétation. Ce matin, par exemple, ce que nous disons, et le greffier me corrigera si j'ai tort... Nos propos ne seront pas nécessairement... Le compte rendu sera la transcription directe à partir de la machine d'enregistrement.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Avec tout le respect que je dois à ceux qui...

Le président: Il faudrait que je contre-vérifie le tout.

[Text]

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Yes, you have three languages to work through.

But to give due credit to those who interpret our proceedings, they are acting on the instant like that and they do an excellent job.

The Chairman: Exactly.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): And I think they did an excellent job then.

The Chairman: That is right.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): But to do the translation, as distinct from interpretation, that really brings out the distinction between translation and interpretation.

The Chairman: But may I say that while you were talking, and you raised the issue as always, I do not wait until the end of the meeting.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Bravo!

The Chairman: At 9.55 a.m. this morning the entire establishment of the transcription is working on your point of view and Mr. McKinnon's queries.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Thank you. Now I will come to my question, but I would like just a little comment about the minister's front door. I presume that when he is talking about the front door for all the open-handedness, it is the front door of the Langevin Block as much as anything, the front door he was speaking of.

There was one point of clarification I would like from the minister, if I may; that is, when he was speaking about Greece's reservations, the reservations which Greece made. He said they had been making them for several years. Now, was that in comparable terms with the reservations which France has with respect to its participation on the military committee, or is it Greece's reservations with respect to the whole of the alliance?

Mr. Lamontagne: No. I think if I am correct, Mr. Chairman, Greece was part of NATO, entirely part of NATO, with the previous government.

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When the government changed about two years ago or two and a half years ago, then the NATO question was put to the population and was put to discussion in Parliament. At that point they decided to stay within NATO as an observer in a way that they wanted to clarify the policy of NATO, they wanted to discuss within their own Parliament all these policies. Since then, they have come to every meeting of NATO, discussing the issue. On some of the policies of NATO they have made some reservations, considering, as they say, they are there as an observer; and until there is a clear-cut agreement to stay in NATO and no question in the Greek Parliament about it, they would like to stay in that status.

As you know, the Minister of Defence of Greece is Mr. Papandreou himself. He has come to a few meetings himself, and at other meetings he has delegated somebody. I can assure

[Translation]

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Après tout, il y a trois langues qui entrent en ligne de compte.

Il faut faire remarquer à la décharge des interprètes de nos délibérations, qu'ils agissent sur le coup et qu'ils font du très bon travail.

Le président: Précisément.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Et ils ont fait du très bon travail ce jour-là également.

Le président: C'est exact.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Mais lire la traduction et écouter l'interprétation font ressortir la distinction qu'il faut faire entre la traduction et l'interprétation.

Le président: C'est vous qui, comme d'habitude, avez soulevé la question et je n'ai pas cru bon d'attendre la fin de la réunion pour en discuter.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Bravo!

Le président: À 9h55, tout le service de transcription travaillait pour reproduire votre point de vue et les questions de M. McKinnon.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Merci. Avant d'arriver à ma question, j'aimerais commenter l'esprit d'ouverture du ministre. Lorsqu'il dit que la porte est ouverte aux interlocuteurs, il s'agit de la porte principale de l'édifice Langevin plus qu'autre chose, sans doute.

Si vous me permettez, je demanderais au ministre de tirer au clair une remarque sur les réserves émises par la Grèce. Elle les émet depuis plusieurs années, nous annonce-t-il. Or, s'agit-il de réserves comparables à celles de la France à l'égard de la participation au comité militaire ou s'agit-il plutôt de réserves concernant toute la question de l'Alliance?

M. Lamontagne: Non. Si je ne m'abuse, monsieur le président, sous l'ancien régime, la Grèce était membre de l'OTAN à part entière.

Lorsque le gouvernement a changé, il y a deux ans ou deux ans et demi, on a soumis l'appartenance à l'OTAN à la population et on en a discuté au Parlement. Les Grecs ont décidé de rester au sein de l'OTAN comme observateurs parce qu'ils tenaient à préciser les politiques de l'OTAN, et qu'ils voulaient en discuter au Parlement. Depuis lors, ils ont assisté à toutes les réunions de l'OTAN, et ils ont discuté de la question. Ils ont exprimé certaines réserves face à certaines des politiques de l'OTAN, compte tenu du fait, comme ils le disent, qu'ils sont là comme observateurs; jusqu'à ce qu'ils acceptent clairement de rester au sein de l'OTAN, et jusqu'à ce qu'on ne s'interroge plus au Parlement grec à ce sujet, ils préfèrent garder ce statut.

Comme vous le savez, le ministre de la Défense de la Grèce est M. Papandreou lui-même. Il a assisté lui-même à quelques réunions, et aux autres, il a délégué quelqu'un. Je puis vous

[Texte]

you that Greece is collaborating with us very much within NATO. When it comes to a communiqué or statement by NATO, there are a few issues on which they are very ticklish, and they prefer, without rejecting them, just to make a kind of reserve, saying that on that issue they do not disagree, but they do not agree. It is kind of a compromise with Greece, which I think is the best situation we can handle at the moment.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): But they maintain their own defence of their own borders with the East bloc.

Mr. Lamontagne: Oh, yes.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): There are no non-Greek forces . . .

Mr. Lamontagne: No.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): —and they have resisted any attempts that there might have been.

Mr. Lamontagne: Yes.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I do not know whether there have been or not, but there might have been to have placed non-Greek forces on their territory to assist them in the defence . . .

Mr. Lamontagne: No, except with the agreement they have with the United States, an agreement on bases or something like that, which I do not know if they have settled yet. Maybe you can be more precise on that, General Withers.

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, I would just add that perhaps Mr. Munro is referring to the Rogers plan that was developed for the reintegration of Greek forces into the military structure. The Rogers plan, to all intents and purposes, is in abeyance over this period.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I see. That is part of their reservations . . .

Gen Withers: Yes.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): —until they have made up their mind they are . . .

Mr. Lamontagne: Maybe I should add, too, that the situation is becoming very delicate because of the relations between the Turks and the Greeks.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Of course.

Mr. Lamontagne: But I think it is a good thing that both of these countries are part of NATO. NATO for these two countries seems to be a moderator.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): We can all remember the time when there was a gap.

Mr. Lamontagne: Yes. So I think it is good that both are with us and that we are there with them.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): If I may come back to the frigate program just for a bit, the two, two and two formula has been put forward; and I am wondering whether the minister could tell us whether the proposals that will come

[Traduction]

assurer que la Grèce collabore très étroitement avec nous au sein de l'OTAN. Lorsque vient le moment de publier un communiqué ou une déclaration de l'OTAN, parce qu'ils sont très chateouilleux sur quelques questions, ils préfèrent, sans les rejeter, exprimer un genre de réserve, précisant qu'ils ne sont pas en désaccord sur cette question, mais qu'ils ne sont pas d'accord. C'est un genre de compromis avec la Grèce, la meilleure solution, à mon avis, pour l'instant.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Mais la Grèce maintient ses propres défenses le long de ses frontières le long des pays du bloc de l'Est.

M. Lamontagne: Oh oui!

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Il n'y a aucune force autre que grecque . . .

M. Lamontagne: Non.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): —et ils se sont opposés à toute tentative en ce sens.

M. Lamontagne: Oui.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je ne sais pas s'il y a eu ou non de telles tentatives, mais il aurait pu y en avoir afin d'installer des forces autres que grecques sur leur territoire afin de les aider dans la défense . . .

M. Lamontagne: Non, sauf dans le cadre de l'entente qu'ils ont avec les États-Unis, entente qui porte sur les bases ou quelque chose du genre, et à ce sujet, je ne sais pas s'ils se sont entendus. Peut-être pourriez-vous nous donner plus de précisions, général Withers.

Le général Withers: Monsieur le président, peut-être M. Munro veut-il parler du plan Rogers conçu afin de réintégrer les forces grecques dans la structure militaire. Le plan Rogers, à toutes fins pratiques, est suspendu pour cette période.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je vois. Cela fait partie de leurs réserves . . .

Le général Withers: Oui.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): —jusqu'à ce qu'ils aient décidé s'ils . . .

M. Lamontagne: Peut-être devrais-je également ajouter que la situation devient très délicate à cause des relations entre les Turcs et les Grecs.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Évidemment.

M. Lamontagne: Toutefois, j'estime excellent que ces deux pays fassent partie de l'OTAN. L'OTAN semble jouer un rôle modérateur.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Nous pouvons tous nous rappeler de l'époque où il y avait un fossé entre les deux.

M. Lamontagne: Oui. Je crois donc que c'est excellent que les deux soient avec nous et que nous soyons là avec eux.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Permettez-moi de reparler un instant du programme de remplacement des frégates, on a avancé la formule des deux, des deux et des deux; le ministre pourrait-il nous dire si, dans les propositions

[Text]

forward next week have been explicitly requested in terms of a split of that sort, or whether they are for a single shipyard. Would the estimates vary, in other words, if they were for one shipyard, as opposed to, say, three or four shipyards across Canada? Is that two, two and two business in the proposals, or is it just a unit of the frigate, wherever built?

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Munro is a very wise man. He will probably want me to say what is in the document or proposition or evaluation.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I asked a question.

Mr. McKinnon: What is he . . . us up with?

Mr. Lamontagne: I say you are a very wise man in asking a question like that. All I can tell you is that on a different proposition which has been put forward, I exclude no alternative. It could be any kind of solution; it could be any kind of sharing. At this time, we do not exclude any possibility. This judgment will have to be made after the evaluation of the last proposition and after discussion at Cabinet committee and at the Cabinet.

• 1050

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): May I put my question this way, then? Is it possible that two sets of estimates are coming forward next week to the Cabinet, one with all units being built in one shipyard and another on a two, two and two, or some other such distribution—two, two, one and one, let us say—so as to have a comparison, if there is a comparison? I do not know whether it would be enough.

Mr. Lamontagne: First of all, I think when we asked for a proposal we asked that the six ships be built in one yard. Then we did add to that, give us information about different alternatives . . .

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Which yard?

Mr. Lamontagne: —which could be one, one, one one, one, one; two, two, two; three, three—or something like that.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): But when it was all one yard, which yard? Any yard?

Mr. Lamontagne: That depends, any yard; it all depends on the consortium's commitment with yards. It could be east or west.

The Chairman: The last questioner, and I may give two minutes more. Mr. Dupras would like the floor again. I recognize the hon. member from Fundy—Royal, Mr. Corbett.

Mr. Corbett: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A few weeks ago I brought up the matter of the Sussex rifle range. The committee was told at that time that the weapons that would be restricted would be in the utilization of the 7.62 millimetre shell—or whatever, ammunition. There is some

[Translation]

qu'il recevra la semaine prochaine, il a été demandé expressément qu'on prévoi ce genre de partage ou si les travaux ne visent qu'un chantier naval? Y aurait-il une différence dans les devis si, en d'autres termes, on avait recours à un chantier naval plutôt qu'à deux ou trois à travers le Canada? Cette répartition par deux figure-t-elle dans les propositions ou s'agit-il simplement d'une unité de frégate, quel que soit le lieu de construction?

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, M. Munro est un homme très sage. Il veut probablement que je dise ce qui figure dans le document, proposition ou évaluation.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): J'ai posé une question.

M. McKinnon: Qu'est-ce qu'il nous . . .

M. Lamontagne: Je dis qu'il est très sage d'avoir posé une telle question. Tout ce que je peux vous dire, c'est que je n'exclus aucune possibilité dans le cadre de la proposition différente qui a été présentée. Il pourrait y avoir toutes sortes de solutions; n'importe quelle répartition des tâches. Pour l'instant, nous n'excluons aucune possibilité. Ce n'est qu'après l'évaluation de la proposition définitive et après discussion au Comité du Cabinet et au Cabinet que cette décision sera prise.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Puis-je alors reformuler ainsi ma question? Est-il possible que le cabinet recevra deux jeux de devis la semaine prochaine, un prévoyant la construction de toutes les unités dans un chantier naval et l'autre prévoyant une répartition, deux, deux et deux, ou encore deux, deux, une et une, disons . . . de façon à permettre la comparaison, si comparaison il y a. Je ne sais pas si cela suffirait.

M. Lamontagne: Tout d'abord, je crois que, lorsque nous avons demandé des propositions, nous avions demandé que les six navires soient construits dans le même chantier. Ensuite, nous avons demandé qu'on nous donne des renseignements sur d'autres solutions . . .

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Quel chantier?

M. Lamontagne: . . . il pourrait s'agir d'une, une, une et une et une et une; deux, deux, deux; trois, trois . . . ou quelque chose de semblable.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Mais lorsqu'il n'était question que d'un chantier, de quel chantier s'agissait-il? N'importe quel?

M. Lamontagne: Tout dépend, n'importe quel chantier; tout dépend de l'engagement du consortium auprès des chantiers. Il pourrait s'agir de ceux de l'Est ou de l'Ouest.

Le président: Le dernier intervenant, et j'accorderai peut-être encore deux minutes. M. Dupras aimerait savoir la parole. Je cède pour l'instant la parole à l'honorable député de Fundy—Royal, M. Corbett.

M. Corbett: Merci, monsieur le président.

Il y a quelques semaines, j'avais soulevé la question du champ de tir Sussex. On avait précisé au Comité alors que les armes interdites seraient celles qui utilisent des balles de calibre 7.62 millimètres, ou enfin je ne sais plus. On s'interroge

[Texte]

question in the area as to whether or not that is a commitment. I would just like that confirmed today.

Mr. Lamontagne: I think we have tabled an answer, Mr. Corbett. Maybe, if you want a further commitment on that, I will have the chief of staff answer and give the commitment.

Mr. Corbett: That is fine. I have it here now, thank you.

I would like to deal with the testing of the infra-red radar that is going to take place in Gagetown, I understand. I was wondering if the committee could be advised as to the type of plane that will be used, the numbers involved, the timeframe and where these planes will be based.

Mr. Lamontagne: Maybe the chief of staff can answer that. This is about what is called a low altitude navigational tactical infra-red for night, for which the acronym is LANTIRN. The first test has been requested by the United States, so maybe the chief of staff can explain the details.

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, we are working on the request right now. This is the initial request. A great many details still have to be worked out to finalize the test, so we do not have that kind of detail right now.

Mr. Corbett: What period are we looking at? When is this testing apt to take place?

Mr. Lamontagne: It is very hard to know how long it is going to take. When we have a request like that, you know very well we have to evaluate according to the umbrella agreement and the memorandum of understanding, if it is according to these requirements. Then the technician gets into it to see if everything is ready for it. We have data, of course, from the United States to see how they can operate such a test. Depending on what the request is, depending on what information they want to have, how long it takes to negotiate the cost, who takes responsibility for this and that, it can be a lengthy negotiation before we say okay.

Mr. Corbett: When has the request indicated they would like the testing to take place?

Mr. Lamontagne: The chief has maybe a little more information he can give you on that.

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, the request indicates that the program would start in October 1984.

Mr. Corbett: What sort of aircraft does the request suggest will be utilized?

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, it would be the current inventory of attack aircraft in the U.S. Air Force; namely, the A-10 and the F-16.

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Mr. Corbett: And where is it envisioned that during the period of time that the tests are being conducted that these aircraft will be based?

[Traduction]

dans la région si c'était là ou non un engagement. J'aimerais simplement confirmation aujourd'hui.

M. Lamontagne: Je crois que nous avons déposé une réponse, monsieur Corbett. Mais si vous voulez un engagement plus précis, je vais demander au chef de l'état-major de répondre et de vous donner cet engagement.

M. Corbett: C'est parfait. Je l'ai ici maintenant, merci.

J'aimerais maintenant parler des essais du radar infra-rouge qui auront lieu à Gagetown, si je comprends bien. Pourrait-on dire au Comité de quel genre d'avions il s'agit, de combien d'avions il s'agit, de l'échéancier et de la base d'où partiront ces avions?

M. Lamontagne: Peut-être que le chef de l'état-major pourrait vous répondre. Il s'agit de ce que l'on appelle l'infra-rouge tactique pour la navigation à faible altitude de nuit, dont l'acronyme anglais est LANTIRN. Ce sont les États-Unis qui ont demandé les premiers essais et peut-être que le chef de l'état-major pourrait vous en donner les détails.

Gen Withers: Monsieur le président, nous travaillons actuellement sur la demande. C'est la première demande. Il reste encore un grand nombre de détails à mettre au point avant que les essais ne soient décidés et, donc, nous n'avons pas encore ces détails.

M. Corbett: Quel délai envisagez-vous? Quand pourrions avoir lieu ces essais?

M. Lamontagne: Il est très difficile de savoir combien de temps il faudra. Lorsque nous recevons une demande de ce genre, vous savez fort bien qu'il nous faut l'évaluer dans le cadre d'une entente paraphée et d'un protocole d'entente, pour savoir si la demande se conforme aux normes prévues. Ensuite, les techniciens doivent voir si tout est prêt. Les États-Unis, évidemment, nous fournissent les données qui nous permettent de voir comment ils peuvent effectuer un tel essai. Tout dépend de la demande, tout dépend des renseignements qu'on veut tirer de ces essais, du temps qu'il faut pour en négocier les coûts, qui assume la responsabilité de ceci ou de cela, le tout peut prendre de longues négociations avant que nous ne donnions notre autorisation.

M. Corbett: Précise-t-on dans la demande quand on veut effectuer les essais?

M. Lamontagne: Le chef de l'état-major a peut-être un peu plus de renseignements qu'il peut vous transmettre.

Gen Withers: Monsieur le président, la demande précise que le programme commencerait au mois d'octobre 1984.

M. Corbett: De quel avion est-il question dans la demande?

Gen Withers: Monsieur le président, il s'agirait d'un chasseur faisant actuellement partie de l'inventaire des Forces aériennes des États-Unis, à savoir le A-10 et le F-16.

M. Corbett: Et sur quelle base envisage-t-on garder ces avions pendant la période des essais?

[Text]

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, once again these are details that are going to have to be worked out. There is a great deal, as the minister has indicated, of technical detail to be worked out. Just off the top of my head, I imagine they would be based at a U.S. air force base in New England.

Mr. Corbett: And at this particular time you have no idea of the numbers that might be involved, nor the duration of the testing?

Gen Withers: No, we are evaluating the request right now.

Mr. Corbett: Okay. It has been mentioned that this testing is to test the radar for low-altitude flying—in the minister's words just a moment or two ago.

Gen Withers: It is not radar, Mr. Chairman, it is infra-red.

Mr. Corbett: Infra-red—I am sorry; I am not familiar with the technicalities—infra-red low-flying altitude. When they talk about low flying, how low are we talking?

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, the tactical mission is usually in the neighbourhood of about 500 feet and under above ground level.

Mr. Corbett: I am sure the officials are aware of the geographical factors of Gagetown and the fact that the perimeter of Gagetown is surrounded by civilian population. There have been on occasions in the past, just last year as a matter of fact, several instances where there have been low-flying aircraft conducting tests of some sort or another in the Camp Gagetown area that have been very disturbing and distressing from a point of view of noise to the surrounding population.

My concern is, if there is going to be intensive tests of this sort of nature being conducted in Gagetown at a low altitude, indeed, this is going to intensify, in your negotiations with the United States, is it possible for you to impress upon them the necessity of ensuring that the civilian population is disturbed to the least amount possible? I suppose there are bound to be some disturbances, because just by virtue of the geographical confines of the base they apparently cannot stay just in that area, they have to fly over civilian areas. If they are flying at 500 feet, I suggest it is going to be one heck of a disturbance to the local population, and I would certainly hope that in your negotiations with the United States that you stress the importance of the local population factor.

Mr. Lamontagne: Mr. Chairman, I think the concern of the hon. member will be well stressed to our American friends when we discuss these matters. I can assure him that I doubt it very much that there will be any permission given to fly at 500 feet over urban areas. We have arranged that for that purpose and they will stay within the range, period. But your concern will be stressed and will be taken up administratively.

[Translation]

Gén Withers: Monsieur le président, encore une fois, il va nous falloir mettre au point ces détails. Il y a, comme l'a souligné le ministre, beaucoup de détails techniques à mettre au point. Comme ça sans avoir vérifié, je dirais qu'ils seront dans une base des forces aériennes américaines en Nouvelle-Angleterre.

M. Corbett: Et à l'heure actuelle, vous n'avez aucune idée du nombre d'avions, ni de la durée des essais?

Gén Withers: Non, nous étudions actuellement la demande.

M. Corbett: Très bien. Il a été mentionné que ces essais devaient porter sur le radar de vol à faible altitude—pour reprendre les paroles du ministre il y a un instant ou deux.

Gén Withers: Il ne s'agit pas de radar, monsieur le président, mais de détection par infrarouge.

M. Corbett: Infrarouge—excusez-moi; je ne m'y connais pas en technique—infrarouge pour les vols à faible altitude. Lorsque l'on parle de faible altitude, de quoi parlons-nous au juste?

Gén Withers: Monsieur le président, une mission tactique se fait en général à 500 pieds ou moins du sol.

M. Corbett: Je suis persuadé que les responsables connaissent la géographie autour de Gagetown et le fait que Gagetown est entouré d'une population civile. Il y a eu des occasions par le passé, à vrai dire à peine l'an dernier, plusieurs cas où des avions volant à faible altitude qui effectuaient des essais d'une sorte ou d'une autre dans la région du camp de Gagetown ont beaucoup dérangé et inquiété la population environnante à cause du bruit.

Je m'inquiète s'il doit y avoir des essais nombreux semblables à ceux déjà réalisés à Gagetown à faible altitude; si en fait, il doit y en avoir un plus grand nombre, pourriez-vous, dans le cadre de vos négociations avec les États-Unis, faire comprendre aux Américains qu'il faut s'assurer que la population civile sera le moins possible dérangée? Je suppose qu'il y aura certes certains dérangements, simplement à cause de la géographie autour de la base on ne peut apparemment pas rester uniquement au-dessus de cette région, il faut également survoler les régions peuplées. Si l'on vole à 500 pieds, je dirais qu'il va y avoir beaucoup de bruit pour la population locale, et j'ose espérer qu'au cours de vos négociations avec les États-Unis, vous accentuerez l'importance de ménager la population locale.

M. Lamontagne: Monsieur le président, je crois que nous ferons certainement part à nos amis américains lors de nos discussions de ces questions des préoccupations de l'honorable député. Je puis lui promettre que je doute fort qu'on accordera la permission de voler à 500 pieds au-dessus des régions urbaines. Nous avons prévu le champ de tir à cette fin, et ils y resteront. Mais nous soulignerons vos préoccupations et on en discutera avec l'administration.

[Texte]

Mr. Corbett: I would not want you to stress too much the urban factor, because the fact of the matter is it is mostly rural. But I appreciate that.

Thank you.

The Chairman: Before I adjourn, the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs has sent us an invitation to listen to the Mayor of Bethlehem next Tuesday at 4.00 p.m. He will be a witness relating to the examination of Canadian relations with countries in the Middle East and north Africa. I shall send you all an invitation.

Mr. McKinnon: Are you about to adjourn now?

The Chairman: No, I promised to recognize very briefly Mr. Dupras; and I will go back to you, but very briefly.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I have a point of order.

The Chairman: If everybody has a point of order, I may as well go quickly.

Mr. Dupras: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

The Chairman: Faster then.

Mr. Dupras: Yes.

I want to get back to one of the answers the chief of staff gave me on the Centurions being sold to Switzerland, the Centurions that we retired and replaced by the Leopard tanks. I would like to know: When we do that, is Switzerland the ultimate user of these machines? I would like to ask the General if, when we sell ammunition to other countries, we make sure that they are the ultimate users. Last week, discovered and photographed were cases of ammunition in Honduras, used by the Somozista, to operate a revolution in Nicaragua and the boxes were clearly printed "Made in Canada". Well, we know that Israel is a large supplier of arms to Honduras. I would like to know whether the original or first purchaser of this ammunition was Israel and whether we have dispositions to stop that kind of thing.

• 1100

Gen Withers: Mr. Chairman, my information is that the Department of External Affairs is investigating that particular report.

I would add that any and all exportation of weapons systems does involve end-user safeguards as you describe. It is not a decision taken solely by one department of the government, but made in consultation with all those involved such as External Affairs, Industry, Trade and Commerce, ourselves.

Mr. Dupras: So then, Mr. Chairman, we should expect that a full report on this incident will be furnished to the committee?

Mr. Lamontagne: We will see what happens through External Affairs. It is their investigation and I think they should be the ones to decide what to do with it.

[Traduction]

M. Corbett: Je ne veux pas que vous souligniez trop le facteur urbain, puisqu'en fait il s'agit surtout d'une région rurale. Mais je vous en remercie.

Merci.

Le président: Avant de lever la séance, le Comité permanent du Sénat sur les affaires extérieures nous a fait parvenir une invitation à entendre le maire de Bethléem, mardi prochain à 16h00. Il témoignera dans le cadre de l'étude des relations du Canada avec les pays du Moyen-Orient et l'Afrique du Nord. Je vous ferai tous parvenir une invitation.

M. McKinnon: Avez-vous l'intention de lever la séance maintenant?

Le président: Non, j'ai promis de donner la parole brièvement à M. Dupras; et ensuite très brièvement, nous vous reviendrons.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): J'invoque le Règlement.

Le président: Si chacun veut invoquer le Règlement, je ferai bien d'y aller rapidement.

M. Dupras: Monsieur le président, merci beaucoup.

Le président: Plus rapidement.

M. Dupras: Oui.

J'aimerais revenir à l'une des réponses que m'a donnée le chef d'état-major au sujet des Centurions vendus à la Suisse, les Centurions retirés de service et remplacés par des chars d'assaut Léopards. J'aimerais savoir si, dans un tel cas, la Suisse sera le dernier utilisateur de cet équipement. J'aimerais demander au général si, quand nous vendons des munitions à d'autres pays, nous nous assurons que c'est bien eux qui les utiliseront. La semaine dernière, on a découvert et photographié au Honduras des caisses de munition utilisées par les Somozistes pour faire la révolution au Nicaragua, et les boîtes étaient clairement marquées *Made in Canada*. Nous savons qu'Israël fournit des armes au Honduras. J'aimerais savoir si l'acheteur original de ces munitions était Israël et s'il n'y aurait pas moyen d'arrêter cela.

Le gen. Withers: Monsieur le président, selon mes informations, le ministère des Affaires extérieures est en train de faire une enquête là-dessus.

J'ajouterais que tous les systèmes d'exportation d'armes comprennent des garanties comme celles que vous avez décrites concernant l'utilisateur ultime des armes. Ce n'est pas une décision qui est prise uniquement par un seul ministère du gouvernement; la décision est prise en consultation avec tous les ministères intéressés; c'est-à-dire les Affaires extérieures, Industrie et Commerce et la Défense nationale.

M. Dupras: Alors monsieur le président, nous pouvons nous attendre à ce que le Comité reçoive un rapport complet sur cet incident?

M. Lamontagne: Nous veillerons à ce que vous en obteniez un des Affaires extérieures. L'enquête relève de ce ministère et je pense que c'est à lui de décider ce qu'il en fera.

[Text]

Mr. Dupras: Okay. Thank you.

The Chairman: A point of order by the Hon. Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. McKinnon: Yes, Mr. Chairman. We live in very uncertain times these days and we do not know whether we will be meeting again this summer or not. If we do not meet in June, this will probably be the Chief of the Defence Staff's last appearance before this committee; and I would simply like to give a fond soldier's farewell. Also, I would like to express our appreciation on this side for his patience and the testimony he has given here over the years with his unflinching civil manner and good humour. It is appreciated and if, like Sarah Bernhardt, you have another farewell appearance next week, I hope that I will be here to do this again.

The Chairman: I thought that if this were to be the case, I spoke to the Minister very briefly and he said most probably we will have a chance to thank the generals. But I would like to say to the chief of staff on your behalf that yes, indeed, it is sad to see him go. However, I do not think we will let him go in a nutshell like this; we will certainly do it in a very pleasant way some time before the end of June.

Mr. Lamontagne: And all members of the committee are invited.

The Chairman: All members of the committee will be invited. It was already agreed between the minister and I. Mr. Munro?

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): On a short point of order, Mr. Chairman, a question that I asked of Mr. Gorbachev about the timing of the placement of the SS-20s has not yet been replied to. I have reminded the Soviet ambassador that he was to have given me some information. I asked this question in committee, and when it is available I will certainly pass it on to the committee.

I have an administrative point of order, if I may. We have been sitting in this room with these tables disposed in this way, where everybody who has to go behind the chairs has to trip over other peoples' feet. Surely there is some way of pushing these tables closer together so that there is more passage, back and front.

An hon. Member: Here, here!

The Chairman: May I say to Mr. Munro—and it seems that I can predict all the time what members will say—but I just had a long conversation with the clerk prior to this meeting as to the composition of the room and the seating, because I cannot accept . . .

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): No. It is just intolerable.

The Chairman:—witnesses who have to come or move between members to answer questions. I have already given a sketch to the clerk as to a better, more pleasant way of working.

[Translation]

M. Dupras: Merci.

Le président: Un rappel au Règlement de la part de l'honorable M. McKinnon.

M. McKinnon: Oui, monsieur le président. C'est la grande incertitude ces temps-ci, et nous ne savons pas si nous nous réunirons de nouveau cet été. S'il n'y a pas d'autres réunions en juin, ce sera probablement la dernière fois que le chef de l'État major de la défense comparaitra devant le Comité; et j'aimerais simplement lui faire mes adieux. De plus, j'aimerais le remercier au nom des députés de ce côté-ci de la table pour sa patience et pour les témoignages qu'il nous a donnés au cours des années, à sa manière toujours polie et plaisante. Nous vous remercions et si comme Sarah Bernhardt vous revenez la semaine prochaine, j'espère que j'y serai pour vous présenter de nouveau mes adieux.

Le président: Si c'était notre dernière réunion, je me suis entretenu très brièvement avec le ministre, et il m'a dit que nous aurions fort probablement l'occasion de présenter nos remerciements aux généraux. Mais, en votre nom, j'aimerais dire au chef de l'État major que nous sommes effectivement peinés de le voir partir. Cependant, je ne crois pas que nous le laisserons partir comme cela; nous aurons certainement l'occasion de lui faire nos adieux de façon très agréable d'ici la fin juin.

M. Lamontagne: Et tous les membres du Comité sont invités.

Le président: Tous les membres du Comité seront invités. Cela a déjà été arrangé entre le ministre et moi-même. Monsieur Munro?

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Un bref rappel au Règlement, monsieur le président, au sujet d'une question que j'ai posée à M. Gorbachev concernant la date du déploiement des SS-20 à laquelle je n'ai toujours pas eu de réponse. J'ai rappelé à l'ambassadeur soviétique qu'il devait me transmettre de l'information à ce sujet. J'ai posé la question en Comité, et dès que j'aurai la réponse je la lui communiquerai.

Si vous me permettez, j'ai une question d'ordre administratif. Nous siégeons dans cette salle, les tables disposées de cette façon, et il est très difficile de circuler derrière nous sans trébucher sur les pieds de quelqu'un. Il doit sûrement y avoir moyen de rapprocher les tables pour faciliter la circulation à l'avant et à l'arrière.

Une voix: Bravo! bravo!

Le président: Je pense que je réussis toujours à prévoir ce que les députés vont dire et, M. Munro, je viens justement d'avoir une longue conversation avec le greffier avant la présente réunion au sujet de l'aménagement et de la disposition de la salle, parce que je ne peux pas accepter . . .

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Non. C'est intolérable.

Le président: . . . que les témoins aient à se glisser entre deux députés pour répondre aux questions. J'ai déjà remis au greffier un croquis d'une nouvelle disposition de la salle où il sera plus agréable de travailler.

[Texte]

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Bravo!

The Chairman: I also read the testimony of the meeting of last week. There was a point raised by the Hon. Mr. McKinnon and Mr. Dupras, and I am working on it. As you know, today is the twelfth opposition day; there is only one opposition day left. And this committee has to terminate its work three days prior to the last day of the opposition days. So we will know today when the last opposition day is; and if it is next Tuesday, it will mean that today is the last meeting. But I will try to find a way to accommodate the requests made both by Mr. McKinnon and Mr. Dupras.

• 1105

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): It is a silly rule.

The Chairman: Thank you. *Merci.*

[Traduction]

M. Muno (Esquimalt—Saanich): Bravo!

Le président: J'ai également lu le témoignage de la réunion de la semaine dernière. Messieurs McKinnon et Dupras avaient soulevé une question, et je suis en train d'y réfléchir. Comme vous le savez, aujourd'hui c'est la douzième journée de l'Opposition; et il n'en reste qu'une autre. Le Comité doit terminer ses travaux trois jours avant la dernière journée de l'Opposition. Nous saurons aujourd'hui quand aura lieu la dernière journée de l'Opposition et, si c'est mardi prochain, cela voudra dire qu'aujourd'hui c'est notre dernière réunion. Je tenterai de faire droit aux demandes de MM. McKinnon et Dupras.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): C'est une règle ridicule.

Le président: *Merci. Thank you.*

APPENDIX "EAND-78"

N A T O ———  ——— O T A N

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PRESS COMMUNIQUE M-DPC-1(83)8For Immediate Release
2nd June, 1983FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 1st and 2nd June, 1983.

2. Ministers reaffirmed that a strong and cohesive Alliance remains indispensable to guarantee the security of its members and to foster stable international relations; the strength and cohesion of the Alliance derive from the solidarity of its members and their unity of purpose in pursuing common objectives.

3. The security of NATO is ensured through the deterrence of aggression by means of a strong defence and vigorous efforts to reach agreement on militarily significant, equitable and verifiable arms reductions. Deterrence and arms control are thus integral parts of the security policy of the Alliance. Both are fundamental to NATO's long-standing objectives of strengthening the peace and pursuing, through dialogue and mutually advantageous co-operation, a constructive East-West relationship aimed at genuine detente. Ministers expressed their resolve to modernize their forces and pursue arms control as representing the most effective way of enhancing the security of the Alliance at lower levels of forces. In this context, and also referring to the relevant statement of Heads of State and Government at Williamsburg, Ministers re-emphasized their determination to move forward with the double-track decision of December 1979 on intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) modernization and arms control(1).

4. NATO's strategic concept of flexible response and forward defence remains valid and continues to be the basis for NATO defence. The undiminished presence of the United States and Canadian armed forces in Europe and the United States strategic nuclear commitment to Europe remain integral to the security of the Alliance as a whole. Of equal importance are the maintenance and continued improvement of the deterrence and defence capabilities

(1) Greece reserves its position on the last two sentences.

of the European members of the Alliance. Ministers expressed their determination to continue to provide the resources and to take the measures necessary in a fair and equitable way to ensure the effectiveness of NATO's deterrent. Ministers noted the extent to which Greece, Portugal and Turkey rely on adequate Allied assistance to carry out their missions more effectively to the advantage of all. Ministers agreed to continue to explore the possibilities for further support and assistance.

5. The prospects for continued peace and stable political relations between East and West depend on the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the legitimate security requirements of other nations, the maintenance of an overall military balance and on Soviet willingness to contribute to the creation of a climate of confidence. In this respect, Ministers noted with concern the continuing build-up of Warsaw Pact forces across the entire spectrum - strategic to conventional. The Soviet Union continues to allocate very substantial national resources to the research, development and production capabilities needed to sustain the build-up of its military strength which goes far beyond its defensive needs. This growth of military strength, particularly the increased global mobility of its forces, allows the Soviet Union to exert pressure in many parts of the world. Furthermore, Soviet pressures on Poland and the Soviet invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan point out that the Soviet Union is willing to threaten or to use force beyond its own frontiers.

6. Ministers recalled their common interest in the security, stability and sovereign independence of countries outside the NATO area and their conviction that respect for genuine non-alignment is important for international stability. While recognizing that the purpose of NATO is to preserve the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area, Ministers once again acknowledged that developments beyond the NATO area might threaten the vital interests of members of the Alliance. They agreed to take full account of the effect of such developments on NATO security, defence capabilities and the national interests of member countries and recalled the Bonn Summit at which the need to consult and to share assessments on the basis of commonly identified objectives was reaffirmed.

7. Recognizing that the policies which nations adopt outside the NATO area are a matter for national decision, Ministers stated that those countries, such as the United States, which have the means to take action, should do so in timely consultation with their Allies, as defined in the Bonn Summit documents. In this context, Ministers acknowledged that there could be cases where other individual Allied nations, on the basis of national decision, would make an important contribution to the security of the Alliance by making available facilities to assist deployments needed to strengthen deterrence in such areas. They agreed that member nations, as they may decide, have a wide and diverse range of possibilities from which to choose in making useful contributions to promote stability and deterrence in regions outside the Treaty area involving vital Western interests.

8. Ministers reviewed progress on a study by the NATO Military Authorities on the implications for the defence of the NATO area of the United States plans for its rapidly deployable forces. It will be necessary to establish on the basis of the NATO Military Authorities' Final Report the measures to be taken.

9. It is against this overall political and strategic background that the new Ministerial Guidance, the major political directive for defence planning both by nations and the NATO Military Authorities, has been developed. This Guidance which has today been approved by Ministers addresses what needs to be done to ensure the continued viability of NATO's deterrent strategy. In particular, it gives direction for the preparation of NATO force goals for 1985-1990. Notwithstanding current improvements to Alliance defence capabilities, it is clear that sustained Alliance efforts are necessary in order to ensure the continued credibility of NATO's strategy of deterrence. This challenge must be faced on a collective basis.

10. If the Alliance is to be able to implement its agreed strategy the necessary resources will have to be provided. Ministers reaffirmed the current resource guidance formula aiming at real increases in defence expenditure in the order of 3% annually for the nations of the Alliance in general. In the light of the growing disparity between the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Allies have also agreed to continue to do their utmost to make available all the resources needed to provide the requisite strengthening of their deterrent and defence forces.

11. The Guidance emphasizes that nations must take the steps necessary to improve the capabilities of NATO's forces in order for them to be able to perform more effectively their required missions. It is particularly important to increase the combat capability and effectiveness of NATO's conventional forces. Improvements should include modernization, better readiness and sustainability of in-place forces, fulfilment of the requirements of SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan, the provision of a more effective air defence and the provision of additional reserve units.

12. Recalling the 1982 Bonn Summit initiative for exploring ways to take advantage both technically and economically of emerging technologies, Ministers noted the significant potential offered thereby to make substantial improvements in the conventional defence of the Alliance and agreed on the future work in this area. Having in mind the objectives of military and cost effectiveness, they acknowledged the progress made in the appropriate NATO bodies towards co-ordinating national efforts in ensuring the successful exploitation of emerging technologies. They urged that in their future planning nations should take account of NATO defence planning initiatives for further progress in this field, including opportunities for transatlantic co-operation.

13. Ministers endorsed the need to seek ways to redress escalating defence costs by more effective application of national resources to defence. They noted ongoing work in improving co-ordination of defence planning in NATO as well as emphasizing the special importance which they attach to armaments co-operation within the scope of the transatlantic dialogue.

14. Effective steps undertaken to restrict the transfer of militarily relevant technology to the Warsaw Pact serve to preserve the West's technological advantage, particularly in the development of conventional armaments. Nations should continue to consult and exchange information within NATO to identify militarily relevant technology in order to assist international consultations on this subject, thereby ensuring better protection of such technologies by national governments.

15. Another matter to which the Alliance is currently giving increased attention concerns the provision of adequate infrastructure funds. To meet the most urgent requirements, they agreed to an increase to the financial ceiling of the current five-year NATO Infrastructure Programme.

16. Stressing the importance of arms control as a necessary complement to the maintenance of an adequate defence posture in each area of NATO's interlocking triad of forces, Ministers underlined that the stability and security of all countries concerned would be greatly enhanced by an equitable and verifiable agreement leading to substantial reductions in strategic weapons, as proposed by the United States at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). They also re-emphasized their support for the United States negotiating position in the INF negotiations, including the proposal for an interim agreement, which has been developed in close consultation with the Alliance(1). In this context, Ministers reiterated that for these arms control negotiations to be successful, the Soviets must be convinced that NATO is determined to deploy its INF missiles as planned and that, in the absence of a concrete agreement obviating the need for deployments, these deployments would begin at the end of 1983(1). Ministers welcomed the fact that the United States would continue to maintain an active and flexible negotiating position. They stressed that the Alliance commitment to negotiations would, if necessary, continue even after initial deployment.

17. In the general context of arms control, Ministers also welcomed the United States proposals to the Soviet Union for negotiating confidence-building measures aimed at enhancing international stability and reducing the risk of war. Recalling

(1) Greece reserves its position on the second and third sentences.

the Bonn Summit initiatives on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), the shortcomings of the East's February 1983 proposal and the tabling of a draft Western Treaty in Vienna, Ministers expressed the hope that the East would respond further in a serious and constructive manner.

18. Defence and security policy in democratic societies is based on broad consent. The dialogue on questions of security concerns all our citizens. Ministers welcomed the public attention that is being given to the Alliance and its deterrent strategy. A strong Alliance has helped to maintain peace for more than three decades and will continue to provide the basis on which to ensure both peace and freedom for its members, while improving peaceful relations through dialogue and negotiation. NATO is a defensive Alliance: its weapons will never be used except in response to an attack.

* * *

The Spanish Minister of Defence informed the Defence Planning Committee of the present state of the review that the Spanish Government is undertaking, regarding its participation in the Alliance, pending which he reserved his Government's position on the Communiqué. At the same time, however, the Spanish Minister stated that his Government shares in the Communiqué in so far as it may reflect positions in the relations of Spain with the member countries of the Alliance.

The Danish Minister of Defence repeated Danish Government support for the double track decision but at the same time he presented to his colleagues the motion passed by the Folketing on May 26.

RESPONSE TO MRS. APPOLLONI'S QUESTION CONCERNING THE STAGE REACHED IN PREPOSITIONING OF EQUIPMENT IN NORWAY AS PART OF THE CANADIAN AIR-SEA TRANSPORTABLE FORCE COMMITTED FOR USE IN NORTH NORWAY

Two storage sites at different locations are now being used for Canadian equipment in Norway and a total of 57 vehicles have so far been prepositioned between the two sites. The following vehicles make up this initial prepositioning:

| | |
|---------------|-------------|
| Jeps ¼ ton | 12 |
| Trucks 1½ ton | 24 |
| Trucks 2½ ton | <u>21</u> |
| Total | 57 vehicles |

RESPONSE TO QUESTION BY MR. BRADLEY CONCERNING THE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF THE BRIGADE IN EUROPE AND THE ACTUAL STRENGTH AND THE AUGMENTATION FROM THE RESERVES

1. The authorized strength of the Brigade in Europe is 5,405 and the actual strength as of 3 May 83 was 5,505. The reason for the higher actual strength over authorized strength is because starting now is the annual posting season and this in itself causes a certain amount of overlap. In addition there is often a requirement for both an incumbent and his successor to be available during the turnover period.

2. Current reserve augmentation to CFE is:

- | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| a. Naval Reserve | - 2 |
| b. Militia | - 10 |
| c. Air Reserve | - 2 (expected to increase to 10 by Aug 83) |
| d. Communication Reserve | - 11 (expected to increase to 15 by Aug 83) |

3. In addition there is an annual flyover of reservists in support of Exercises which for 1983 will amount to 306 reservists.

RESPONSE TO QUESTION RAISED BY MR. CORBETT (FUNDY-ROYAL) ON THE
CLOSING AND THE REOPENING OF THE SUSSEX N.B. FIRING RANGE AT THE
MEETING OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND
NATIONAL DEFENCE (SCEAND) ON 12 MAY 83

BACKGROUND

An incident occurred on the Sussex rifle range on 16 Aug 82 when two 7.62mm rounds struck the house of a Mr. Burke, 2230 metres down range and outside the range danger zone.

The Commander of Canadian Forces Base Moncton, immediately prohibited the firing of 7.62mm ammo and, subsequently, upon direction from National Defence Headquarters and Maritime Command, closed the range for all firing on 30 Nov 82.

A summary investigation was subsequently completed and following a detailed review of the investigation report, National Defence Headquarters issued the following direction:

- a. A technical board is to examine all data pertaining to ballistics, survey and construction and make recommendations as to the requirements for the safe firing of 7.62mm ammunition.
- b. A survey of the Sussex range is to be conducted
- c. Two categories of shooting at the Sussex range may be authorized in the interim:
 - (1) .22, .38 cal, 9mm and shotgun for all agencies.
 - (ii) 7.62mm, non-automatic fire for teams training for national competition and personnel attending Sniper courses.

This direction and the conditions for re-opening the Sussex range were to be made public and, accordingly, the Commander, CFB Moncton held a press conference on 12 May.

Finally, the Technical Board met and viewed Sussex Range, as directed. Its final report will be submitted by 30 June 82.

CURRENT STATUS

Following its preliminary investigation on 1 June, the Technical Board determined that Sussex Range does not meet the construction criteria specified in the Range Safety Manual.

In view of this finding, the following NDHQ direction was issued:

- a. The firing of all 7.62mm weapons is prohibited at Sussex Range, until further notice;
- b. Because the ballistic range of 9mm and .22 cal ammunition does not exceed 1830M and, therefore, does not endanger the public, these calibre of weapons may be fired, conditional to warning signs being erected around the perimeter of the danger area.

As of this date (6 June 83), the range has not been re-opened. Because the signing of the danger area relies on the cooperation of the local landowners, it is unlikely that the range will open for live firing until the results of the Technical Board have been fully evaluated.

RESPONSE TO MR. MCKINNON'S QUESTION WHETHER CONSIDERATION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO SUBSIDIZING THE MAGAZINE AEROMAG TO ASSIST THEM TO PUBLISH AGAIN IN A BILINGUAL FORMAT RATHER THAN IN FRENCH ONLY

The Department of National Defence is not aware that the magazine AeroMag has ever been published in a bilingual form. Up to October 1981 this magazine was known as "Aviation Québec" and was published in French only. However, in order to enhance its appeal it broadened its orientation and began publishing as a new french language air-oriented magazine entitled "AeroMag".

The Department has advertised in the magazine and has purchased subscriptions for Canadian Forces Librairies. However, subsidizing the magazine in order to have it published in English as well as French has not been considered.

RESPONSE TO QUESTION BY MR. MCKINNON CONCERNING THE REVERSAL
OF A COURT MARTIAL CONVICTION OF OFFICER CADET MURPHY AT
ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE

1. The review process in Officer Cadet Murphy's case followed the normal procedure applicable after each and every court martial trial where a conviction on any charge has been recorded. The procedure is as follows:

- a. Upon completion of the verbatim minutes of proceedings by the court reporter, the Judge Advocate at trial reviews the minutes to certify that they correctly reflect the proceedings of the court.
- b. The minutes are then delivered to the convening authority, which in the case of Officer Cadet Murphy was the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance), for his review and decision whether or not to exercise his statutory authority under section 179 of the National Defence Act (NDA) - Quashing of Findings, section 180 of the NDA - Substitution of Findings, or section 183 of the NDA - Mitigation, Commutation and Remission of Punishments.

2. In the case of Officer Cadet Murphy, the convening authority after a complete review of the minutes of the proceedings and after obtaining legal advice, determined that there was no evidence in proof of one essential element in each of the following charges as laid:

a. First Charge Section 120 NDA

An offence punishable under section 120 of the National Defence Act, that is to say, trafficking in a substance held out by her to be a narcotic contrary to section 4(1) of the Narcotic Control Act.

Particulars: In that she on or about 2 February 1983 at Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, did unlawfully give a quantity of a substance held out by her to be Cannabis Sativa in the form of Cannabis (marihuana) to 474 870 367 Officer Cadet SCHILBE, Keith Harvey.

b. Second Charge Section 119 NDA

Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline
Particulars: In that she on or about 21 December 1982 at the City of Kingston, Ontario, did use a substance she believed to be Cannabis (marihuana).

c. Third Charge Section 119 NDA

Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline
Particulars: In that she on or about 2 February 1983 at Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, did use a substance she believed to be Cannabis (marihuana).

In particular, there was no evidence on the first charge as to what Officer Cadet Murphy held out the substance to be and no evidence on the second and third charges as to what Officer Cadet Murphy herself believed the substances to be. As it would not be proper to allow the convictions to stand in these circumstances, the convening authority exercised his discretionary power under section 179 NDA and quashed the findings of guilty on all three charges.

3. In the proceedings the prosecutor, in proof of the charges, intended to lead certain evidence of statements obtained in the course of the investigation into the matter. However, following a voir dire the Judge Advocate at trial ruled for the court that such evidence was not in law admissible and accordingly as such evidence was not before the court it is not evidence in the case at trial or on review.

RESPONSE TO MR. MCKINNON'S QUESTION CONCERNING THE GARNISHMENT,
ATTACHMENT AND PENSION DIVERSION ACT ON 12 AND 19 MAY 83 AT
STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE
MEETINGS

The Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act was given Royal Assent on 22 June 1982. The purpose of Parts II, III and IV of the Act is to provide for the diversion of pension benefits.

Part I of the Act, which deals with Garnishments, was proclaimed on 11 March 1983.

The proclamation of Parts II, III and IV of the Act dealing with the diversion of pension benefits has been delayed pending approval by the Privy Council Office of the regulations authorized by and required under the Act.

Since August 1982, an interdepartmental committee has worked on the drafting of the regulations required to implement the diversion provision of the Act. The committee was chaired by a solicitor from the Department of Justice with representation from the Treasury Board, the Department of Supply and Services, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Department of National Defence. The Minister of Justice will recommend to The Governor in Council the date of proclamation for the diversion provisions.

The diversion provisions of the Act (Parts II, III and IV) are a replacement for the diversion provisions presently existing in the various federal Superannuation Acts.

The new diversion legislation provides for the diversion of an annuity or pension to satisfy a family support order for the maintenance alimony or support of a spouse, ex-spouse or children. The order must be made pursuant to the Divorce Act or pursuant to the law of a province relating to family financial support. The diversion of the annuity or pension will be automatic and the amount to be diverted will depend on the provincial laws on the garnishment, attachment or diversion of pensions for the enforcement of financial support orders. In the absence of provincial legislation, the Act provides that the diversion will be for 50% of the net pension benefit.

The new diversion legislation is a departure from the present diversion process as contained in the various federal Superannuation Acts. The Canadian Forces Superannuation Act contains the following provision for the diversion of an annuity:

"15(2) Where any court in Canada of competent jurisdiction has made an order requiring a recipient

to pay an amount to his spouse, former spouse, child or other dependent and the Minister has received a certified copy of that order, the amount specified in the order or any lesser amount specified by the Minister shall, if the Minister so directs, be deducted either in a lump sum or in instalments from any amount that is or is about to become payable to the recipient under this Act and shall be paid to the person named in the order."

The Minister's authority is a discretionary one.

Some years a Ministerial Policy Guide was developed within the Department of National Defence. The highlights of the Policy Guide are as follows:

- a. The Minister must receive a certified copy of a valid court order issued out of a Canadian court either under the Divorce Act or under a provincial law dealing with the maintenance or support of wives, ex-wives and children;
- b. The order must order the annuitant to pay a specified amount to his wife, ex-wife or children for their maintenance or support;

- c. The monthly amount to be diverted will not normally exceed 50% of the net annuity; and
- d. Although the Ministerial authority is discretionary the normal practice is to order a diversion. In fact, it would be unusual if the diversion was not ordered.

The present system has worked very well since its inception and requests for diversions are still being received and actioned under this system.

Under the new system, the procedures to be followed will be uniform throughout the Federal Government. The current practice under the present Ministerial Policy Guide will be replaced by a more detailed Act and regulations and, in the initial stages at least, requests for diversions will receive very careful scrutiny to ensure that the Act and regulations have been complied with. As a result, the process may be somewhat slower than at present. There is a provision in the Act that when an application for diversion has been duly completed, the Minister shall, no later than the first day of the fourth month following the month in which the application was duly completed, order a diversion.

One of the outstanding differences between the old and the new system is the determination of the amount of net benefit upon which the diversion will be based. At the present time, under the Canadian Forces Superannuation Act, the net benefit means the monthly amount payable to the annuitant, less three deductions, if applicable. The deductions are for any unpaid instalments for prior pensionable service, the recovery of any debit balance in the pay account of the former member and deductions from an annuity because of disability payments under the Canada Pension Plan. With the new legislation, the following deductions will be made from the benefit to arrive at the net benefit subject to diversion:

Prescription of Deductions from Pension Benefits

13. For the purposes of the definition "net pension benefit" in subsection 22(1) of the Act, the prescribed deductions shall be

- (a) any amount of income tax that would be deducted from the recipient's pension benefit based on the basic person exemption for income tax applicable for the taxation year in which the diversion is being made;

- (b) any amount deducted from the recipient's pension benefit for shortage of current pension contributions, arrears of contributions for elective service and shortage of arrears of pension contributions;
- (c) any amount deducted from the recipient's pension benefit pursuant to an Act of Parliament, other than Part II of the Act;
- (d) any amount deducted from the recipient's pension benefit as premium payment for a health care or hospital insurance plan;
- (e) any amount deducted from the recipient's pension benefit as a premium payment for a group life insurance plan listed in the schedule; and
- (f) any amount deducted from the recipient's pension benefit for supplementary death benefit contributions or shortages of such contributions.

This means that in many cases, there will be less money available to be diverted than in the case with the present legislation.

RESPONSE TO QUESTION BY MR. PRUD'HOMME, CHAIRMAN OF SCEAND,
CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE TURNED DOWN FOR SUMMER TRAINING

1. DND does not maintain information on the unsuccessful applicants to the Summer Youth Employment Program. To gain this information all commands and the Canadian Forces Training System would have to be surveyed. This action is now taking place and the answer will be forthcoming as soon as possible. In any event the information will not be definitive but can only be considered as order of magnitude.
2. An increase in funding has been considered in order to allow DND to rent more accommodation and, thereby increase the number of students who could be employed. This would not be practicable. At present the program has reached its optimum level where the resources available in terms of instructors, equipment and accommodation are fully utilized. Thus DND would not be able to provide more instructors and equipment even if funds were found with which to provide accommodation.

RESPONSE TO QUESTION CONCERNING COST AND BUDGET OF THE
INFORMATION PROGRAM ON NATO, NORAD, DISARMAMENT, AND
NUCLEAR WEAPONS RAISED BY MR. SARGEANT

The Department of National Defence anticipates that much of the information material required is already available and would be organized and reproduced and distributed within its existing budget. To date, the only resource made available for this particular information program is the sum of \$25,000. which is considered sufficient to engage the services of one additional officer for a few months to perform co-ordinating duties. This sum was made available from the existing DND budget.

RESPONSE TO QUESTION RAISED BY MR. STEWART (SIMCOE SOUTH)
CONCERNING RESEARCH FELLOWSHIPS-EMERGENCY PLANNING \$60,000.00

National Defence Estimates-1983-84, page 17-22

The Emergency Planning Research Fellowships are for Canadian students in disaster oriented research. They are sponsored by Emergency Planning Canada. The recipients must be graduates of a University of recognized standing with a degree at the Masters' level. They must have demonstrated interest in research with respect to Civil emergencies. The work will normally be carried out at a Canadian University under an approved member of the University faculty. The maximum level awarded to any recipient shall not exceed \$10,000 per year plus:

- tuition and compulsory fees
- a family allowance \$2,000.00
- economy air fare

Price adjustments to discretionary items are subject to Departmental approval.

The fellowships are administered by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada and apply for a period of four academic years.

The following students have been appointed so far:

Edward J. Huebert - Winnipeg, Man.

Alan Smart - Toronto, Ontario.

APPENDICE "EAND-78"

N A T O ——— O T A N

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COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE M-DPC-1(83)8Pour diffusion immédiate
Le 2 juin 1983COMMUNIQUE FINAL

Le Comité des plans de défense de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord s'est réuni en session ministérielle à Bruxelles les 1er et 2 juin 1983.

2. Les Ministres ont réaffirmé que la force et la cohésion de l'Alliance demeurent indispensables pour garantir la sécurité de ses membres et contribuer à la stabilité des relations internationales ; cette force et cette cohésion découlent de la solidarité des pays et de leur identité de vues dans la poursuite d'objectifs communs.

3. Pour assurer sa sécurité, l'OTAN vise à décourager l'agression en se dotant de solides moyens de défense et en recherchant activement des accords sur des réductions d'armements qui soient militairement significatives, équitables et vérifiables. Dissuasion et maîtrise des armements font ainsi partie intégrante de la politique de sécurité de l'Alliance. Toutes deux sont fondamentales dans la poursuite des objectifs traditionnels de l'OTAN : renforcer la paix et établir, par le dialogue et une coopération mutuellement avantageuse, des relations Est-Ouest constructives favorisant une détente véritable. Les Ministres sont résolus à moderniser les forces et à poursuivre la maîtrise des armements, méthode la plus efficace pour accroître la sécurité de l'Alliance à des niveaux de forces moindres. Dans ce contexte, et évoquant également ce que des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement ont déclaré à ce sujet à Williamsburg, les Ministres ont rappelé leur détermination de mettre en oeuvre la double décision de décembre 1979 sur la modernisation des forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire (FNI) et la maîtrise des armements (1).

(1) La Grèce réserve sa position sur les deux dernières phrases

4. Le concept stratégique allié de la riposte graduée et de la défense en avant est toujours actuel et demeure la base de la défense de l'OTAN. La présence en Europe de forces armées des Etats-Unis et du Canada, maintenues à un même niveau, et l'engagement stratégique nucléaire des Etats-Unis envers l'Europe restent essentiels pour la sécurité de l'Alliance tout entière. La même importance s'attache au maintien et à l'amélioration incessante des moyens de dissuasion et de défense des membres européens de l'Alliance. Les Ministres ont affirmé qu'ils entendent continuer, dans des conditions justes et équitables, à fournir les ressources et prendre les mesures qui sont nécessaires pour préserver l'efficacité du dispositif de dissuasion de l'OTAN. Ils ont noté à quel point la Grèce, le Portugal et la Turquie sont tributaires d'une aide adéquate de leurs Alliés pour remplir leurs missions plus efficacement au bénéfice de tous. Les Ministres sont convenus de poursuivre l'étude des moyens propres à leur conserver ce soutien et cette aide.

5. Les perspectives d'une paix durable et de relations politiques stables entre l'Est et l'Ouest dépendent de la reconnaissance par Moscou de la légitimité des impératifs de sécurité des autres pays, du maintien d'un équilibre militaire global et de la volonté des Soviétiques de contribuer à la création d'un climat de confiance. A cet égard, les Ministres ont noté avec préoccupation que le Pacte de Varsovie accroit sans relâche toute la gamme de ses forces, des forces stratégiques aux forces classiques. L'Union soviétique continue d'affecter une part très considérable de ses ressources à la recherche, au développement et aux moyens de production requis pour soutenir cet effort militaire qui dépasse largement les besoins de sa défense. L'augmentation de sa puissance militaire, en particulier la mobilité plus grande de ses forces dans le monde, permet à l'URSS de faire peser son influence en de nombreux points du globe. Qui plus est, les pressions exercées sur la Pologne, de même que l'invasion de l'Afghanistan et la persistance de son occupation par l'Union soviétique, montrent que celle-ci est résolue à utiliser la menace ou la force hors de ses frontières.

6. Les Ministres ont rappelé que leurs pays ont un intérêt commun à la sécurité, à la stabilité et à l'indépendance des nations souveraines extérieures à la zone de l'OTAN et ont exprimé à nouveau leur conviction que le respect du non-alignement authentique est important pour la stabilité internationale. Tout en reconnaissant que la raison d'être de l'OTAN est de préserver la sécurité dans la zone de l'Atlantique Nord, les Ministres ont observé une fois encore que des

événements survenant hors de cette zone peuvent menacer les intérêts vitaux de membres de l'Alliance. Ils ont décidé de tenir pleinement compte des incidences de tels événements sur la sécurité et sur les moyens de défense de l'OTAN ainsi que sur les intérêts nationaux des pays membres, et ils ont fait état du Sommet de Bonn où ils avaient insisté sur la nécessité de se consulter et de confronter les analyses sur la base d'objectifs définis en commun.

7. Reconnaissant que les politiques que les pays adoptent en dehors de la zone de l'OTAN relèvent de décisions nationales, les Ministres ont déclaré que les pays qui, comme les Etats-Unis, ont les moyens de prendre des mesures devraient le faire en procédant en temps utile à des consultations avec leurs Alliés, selon les termes des documents du Sommet de Bonn. Ils ont observé, dans ce contexte, qu'il pourrait y avoir des circonstances où d'autres pays apporteraient, sur la base de décisions nationales, une contribution individuelle importante à la sécurité de l'Alliance en fournissant des moyens qui faciliteraient les déploiements nécessaires pour renforcer la dissuasion dans ces régions du monde. Ils ont constaté que les pays membres, libres de leur décision, disposent d'une gamme large et diversifiée d'options entre lesquelles choisir pour oeuvrer utilement à la stabilité et à la dissuasion dans des régions extérieures à la zone du traité où les intérêts vitaux de l'Ouest sont impliqués.

8. Les Ministres ont passé en revue les progrès d'une étude des autorités militaires sur les conséquences, pour la défense de la zone de l'OTAN, des plans des Etats-Unis relatifs à leurs forces à déploiement rapide. Il y aura lieu, à partir du rapport final des autorités militaires de l'OTAN, de déterminer les mesures à prendre.

9. C'est en fonction de cet ensemble de considérations politiques et stratégiques qu'a été élaborée la nouvelle directive ministérielle, orientation politique fondamentale à suivre par les pays et les autorités militaires de l'OTAN pour établir les plans de défense. Cette directive, qui vient d'être adoptée aujourd'hui par les Ministres, porte sur ce qu'il est nécessaire de faire pour que la stratégie de dissuasion de l'OTAN reste viable. Elle énonce en particulier des principes directeurs pour la préparation des objectifs de forces de l'OTAN pour la période 1985-1990. Indépendamment des améliorations que l'Alliance apporte à ses moyens de défense, il est évident qu'elle doit poursuivre ses efforts afin de garder toute sa crédibilité à sa stratégie de dissuasion. C'est collectivement que les Alliés doivent faire face à cette tâche.

10. Pour que l'Alliance puisse mettre en oeuvre sa stratégie agréée, il faudra dégager les ressources qui s'imposent. Les Ministres ont réaffirmé leur adhésion à la formule actuelle de la directive sur les ressources, qui fixe pour objectif une augmentation des dépenses de défense de l'ordre de 3% par an en valeur réelle dans les pays de l'Alliance en général. Etant donné la disparité grandissante des forces de l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie, les Alliés sont également convenus de continuer à faire tout leur possible pour fournir toutes les ressources nécessaires pour assurer le renforcement requis de leurs forces de dissuasion et de défense.

11. La directive fait valoir que les pays doivent prendre les dispositions voulues pour donner aux forces de l'OTAN des moyens améliorés qui leur permettent de mieux exécuter les missions qui leur sont fixées. Il importe particulièrement d'augmenter l'aptitude et l'efficacité au combat des forces classiques de l'OTAN. Dans le cadre de ces améliorations, il faudrait moderniser, relever le niveau de préparation des forces en place et accroître leurs possibilités de soutien continu, répondre aux impératifs découlant du plan de renforcement rapide du SACEUR, mettre sur pied une défense antiaérienne plus efficace et constituer des unités de réserve supplémentaires.

12. Rappelant l'initiative prise au Sommet de Bonn en 1982 d'étudier les moyens de tirer profit des technologies nouvelles, sur les plans technique et économique, les Ministres ont relevé les nombreuses possibilités qu'elles offrent pour moderniser très sensiblement la défense classique de l'Alliance et sont convenus d'organiser les travaux dans ce secteur. Tenant compte de leurs objectifs d'efficacité militaire et financière, ils ont reconnu les progrès réalisés par les organes compétents de l'OTAN en vue de coordonner les efforts menés au niveau national pour exploiter avec succès les technologies nouvelles. Ils ont instamment invité les pays à tenir désormais compte dans leurs plans des initiatives de l'OTAN en matière de planification de la défense, afin d'avancer encore dans cette voie, en usant notamment des perspectives de coopération transatlantique.

13. Les Ministres ont admis qu'il est indispensable de rechercher des solutions à l'escalade des coûts de la défense par une utilisation plus judicieuse des budgets militaires. Ils ont pris note des travaux en cours pour renforcer la coordination des plans de défense de l'OTAN et souligné l'importance particulière qu'ils attachent à la coopération en matière d'armements dans le cadre du dialogue transatlantique.

14. Les mesures effectives adoptées pour limiter les transferts aux pays du Pacte de Varsovie de technologies susceptibles d'applications militaires contribuent à préserver l'avantage technologique des Occidentaux, en particulier dans le développement des armements classiques. Les pays devraient continuer à se consulter et à échanger des informations au sein de l'OTAN pour déterminer les technologies susceptibles d'applications militaires, afin de faciliter les concertations internationales sur ce sujet, assurant ainsi une meilleure protection de ces technologies par les gouvernements.

15. Parmi les autres questions auxquelles l'Alliance porte pour le moment une attention accrue, il faut mentionner l'affectation de fonds suffisants à l'infrastructure. Pour répondre aux besoins les plus urgents, les Ministres ont décidé de relever le plafond de financement de l'actuel programme quinquennal d'infrastructure de l'OTAN.

16. Insistant sur l'importance de la maîtrise des armements, complément indispensable au maintien d'un potentiel de défense adéquat dans chacun des éléments de l'indissociable triade de forces de l'OTAN, les Ministres ont souligné que la stabilité et la sécurité de tous les pays intéressés seraient nettement améliorées par un accord équitable et vérifiable conduisant à des réductions substantielles des armements stratégiques, suivant les propositions faites par les Etats-Unis aux conversations sur la réduction des armements stratégiques (START). Ils ont aussi réaffirmé leur appui à la position que les Etats-Unis ont prise dans les négociations sur les forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire (FNI), notamment à la proposition d'accord intérimaire, définie en étroite consultation avec l'Alliance (1). A ce propos, les Ministres ont rappelé que, si l'on veut que ces négociations sur la maîtrise des armements aboutissent, il faut que les Soviétiques aient la conviction que l'OTAN est déterminée à déployer ses missiles FNI comme prévu et qu'en l'absence d'un accord concret les rendent inutiles, ces déploiements commenceront à la fin de 1983 (1). Les Ministres ont noté avec satisfaction que les Etats-Unis continueront à faire preuve de dynamisme et de souplesse dans les négociations. Ils ont souligné que l'Alliance persistera à rechercher la négociation, le cas échéant, même après les premiers déploiements.

17. Dans le contexte général de la maîtrise des armements, les Ministres se sont également félicités des

(1) La Grèce réserve sa position sur les deuxième et troisième phrases.

propositions adressées par les Etats-Unis à l'Union soviétique en vue de négociations sur des mesures de confiance visant à renforcer la stabilité internationale et à réduire les risques de guerre. Evoquant les initiatives lancées au Sommet de Bonn au sujet des réductions mutuelles et équilibrées de forces (MBFR), les insuffisances de la proposition avancée par l'Est en février 1983 et la présentation à Vienne par les Occidentaux d'un projet de traité, les Ministres ont exprimé l'espoir de voir l'Est répondre maintenant dans un esprit sérieux et constructif.

18. Dans les pays démocratiques, la politique de défense et de sécurité repose sur un large consensus social. Le dialogue sur les questions de sécurité concerne tous les citoyens. Les Ministres se sont plu à constater l'attention que le public porte actuellement à l'Alliance et à sa stratégie de dissuasion. Une Alliance forte contribue à maintenir la paix depuis plus de trente ans et restera le gage de la paix comme de la liberté de ses membres, tout en affermissant des relations pacifiques par le dialogue et la négociation. L'OTAN est une alliance défensive : elle ne fera jamais usage de ses armes, sauf pour riposter à une attaque.

* * *

Le Ministre espagnol de la défense a informé le Comité des plans de défense de l'état actuel de la révision que son Gouvernement entreprend quant à sa participation à l'Alliance, ce qui motive la réserve de son Gouvernement sur le présent communiqué. Cependant, le Ministre espagnol a tenu en même temps à signaler que son Gouvernement partage les positions exprimées dans le communiqué, dans la mesure où elles peuvent refléter celles de l'Espagne dans ses relations avec les pays membres de l'Alliance.

Le Ministre de la défense du Danemark a répété que la double décision avait l'appui de son Gouvernement ; cependant, il a en même temps présenté à ses homologues la motion que le Folketing avait adoptée le 26 mai.

REPONSE A LA QUESTION DE MME APPOLLONI A SAVOIR A QUELLE ETAPE EN EST RENDUE LA MISE EN PLACE, EN NORVEGE, DE MATERIEL UTILISE PAR LA FORCE CANADIENNE TRANSPORTABLE AIR-MER DANS LE NORD DE LA NORVEGE?

Le matériel canadien gardé en Norvège est actuellement entreposé à deux endroits distincts et un total de 57 véhicules ont jusqu'à maintenant été mis en place entre ces deux lieux. Il s'agit de:

| | |
|-----------|---------------------------------|
| 12 | jeeps d'un quart de tonne |
| 24 | camions d'une tonne et quart |
| <u>21</u> | camions de deux tonnes et quart |
| 57 | véhicules |

REPONSE A LA QUESTION DE M. BRADLEY, A SAVOIR QUEL EST L'EFFECTIF AUTORISE DE LA BRIGADE EN POSTE EN EUROPE, QUEL EN EST SON EFFECTIF REEL ET DANS QUELLE MESURE DES MEMBRES DES FORCES DE LA RESERVE VIENNENT-ILS EN GONFLER LES RANGS?

1. L'effectif autorisé de la brigade en poste en Europe est de 5 405 militaires, et l'effectif réel, relevé le 3 mai 1983, était de 5 505 militaires. L'effectif réel dépasse les normes autorisées car les Forces canadiennes commencent leur période annuelle d'affectations, et qu'il en résulte inévitablement un certain chevauchement. De plus, il est souvent nécessaire que le titulaire et son remplaçant soient sur place durant la période de rotation du personnel.
2. Membres des forces de la Réserve en service auprès des FCE
 - a. Réserve navale - 2
 - b. Milice - 10
 - c. Réserve aérienne - 2 (devant atteindre 10 d'ici août 1983)
 - d. Réserve des transmissions - 11 (devant atteindre 15 d'ici août 1983)
3. De plus, chaque année des réservistes sont transportés par avion et participent aux activités de soutien dans le cadre des exercices. Les autorités prévoient la présence, à cet égard, de 306 réservistes en 1983.

RÉPONSE À LA QUESTION POSÉE PAR M. CORBETT (FUNDY-ROYAL), AU SUJET DE LA FERMETURE ET DE LA RÉOUVERTURE DU CHAMP DE TIR DE SUSSEX (N.-B.), LORS DE LA RÉUNION DU COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES ET DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE (CPAEDN) TENUE LE 12 MAI 1983

DONNÉES PRÉLIMINAIRES

Un incident s'est produit au champ de tir situé à Sussex, le 16 août 1982.

Deux cartouches de 7,62 mm ont percuté sur la demeure d'un certain M. Burke, 2230 mètres plus loin, soit hors de la zone dangereuse.

Le commandant de la base des Forces canadiennes Moncton a sur-le-champ prohibé le tir de munitions de 7,62 mm et, par la suite, sur les directives du Quartier général de la Défense nationale et du Commandement maritime, a interdit toute séance de tir dans les limites du champ de tir, le 30 novembre 1982.

Une enquête sommaire a subséquemment été menée. Par suite de l'étude approfondie du rapport de ladite enquête, le Quartier général de la Défense nationale a émis les directives suivantes:

- a. Un comité technique doit être mis sur pied afin d'examiner toutes les données touchant la balistique, l'arpentage et les permis de construction et de formuler des recommandations quant aux exigences à respecter pour assurer la sécurité lors des séances de tir de munitions de 7,62 mm.
- b. On doit arpenter le champ de tir de Sussex.
- c. Dans l'intervalle, deux catégories de tir peuvent être autorisées à Sussex:
 - (i) les munitions de calibre .22, .38, 9 mm et le tir au fusil, dans le cas de tous les particuliers.
 - (ii) les armes à tir non automatique de 7,62 mm, dans le cas des équipes à l'entraînement en vue de compétitions nationales et dans le cas des participants aux cours de tir d'embuscade (Sniper).

Les mesures énoncées ci-dessus et les conditions imposées pour la réouverture du champ de tir de Sussex devaient être rendues publiques, et, conséquemment, le commandant de la BFC Moncton a tenu une conférence de presse le 12 mai.

Finalement, le comité technique s'est réuni et il a visité, comme il en avait reçu l'ordre, le champ de tir de Sussex. Son rapport final sera soumis au plus tard le 30 juin 1982.

SITUATION ACTUELLE

Suite à son enquête préliminaire le 1^{er} juin, le comité technique a déterminé que le champ de tir de Sussex ne satisfaisait aux normes de construction énoncées dans le manuel de sécurité des champs de tir (Range Safety Manual).

Suite à cette constatation, la directive suivante du QGDN a été émise:

- a. le tir de toutes les armes de 7,62 mm est interdit au champ de tir de Sussex, jusqu'à avis contraire.
- b. la portée balistique des munitions de 9 mm et de calibre .22 ne dépassant pas 1 830 M, et ne mettant donc pas en danger la sécurité du public, ces types de munitions peuvent être utilisés, à la condition que des panneaux avertisseurs de danger soient mis en place autour du périmètre dangereux.

A l'heure actuelle, soit au 6 juin 1983, le champ de tir demeure fermé. La mise en place des panneaux avertisseurs de danger dépendant de la coopération des propriétaires fonciers de la localité, il est peu probable que des séances de tir avec munitions véritables aient lieu au champ de tir avant que les résultats de l'enquête du comité technique aient été pleinement évalués.

REPONSE A LA QUESTION DE M. MCKINNON A SAVOIR LES PERSONNES COMPETENTES ONT-ELLES EXAMINE LA POSSIBILITE DE SUBVENTIONNER LA REVUE "AEROMAG" POUR QUE LE DOCUMENT SOIT PUBLIE DE NOUVEAU DANS LES DEUX LANGUES OFFICIELLES PLUTOT QU'UNIQUEMENT EN FRANCAIS?

Le ministère de la Défense nationale n'est pas au courant que la revue "Aéromag" a déjà été publiée dans les deux langues officielles. Jusqu'en octobre 1981, cet ouvrage était connu sous le nom d'"Aviation Québec" et était publié uniquement en français. Cependant, afin d'accroître sa popularité, les rédacteurs ont élargi sa portée et ont entrepris la publication d'une revue de langue française consacrée aux questions aéronautiques et ayant pour titre "Aéromag".

Le Ministère a déjà fait paraître de la réclame dans cette revue et a souscrit des abonnements pour les bibliothèques des Forces canadiennes. Cependant, il n'a pas envisagé la possibilité de subventionner la revue afin d'assurer sa publication en anglais aussi bien qu'en français.

REPONSE A UNE QUESTION POSEE PAR M. MCKINNON AU SUJET DE L'ARRET
D'ANNULATION DE LA CONDAMNATION DE L'ELEVE-OFFICIER MURPHY PRONONCEE
PAR UNE COUR MARTIALE AU ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE

1. Dans le cas de l'élève-officier Murphy, le processus de révision s'est déroulé conformément à la marche à suivre suivante, qui est généralement de rigueur après tout procès devant une cour martiale lorsqu'une condamnation prononcée à la suite d'un chef d'accusation quelconque a été enregistrée:

- a. Après que le sténographe de la cour a terminé le compte-rendu intégral du procès, le juge-avocat de première instance examine le procès-verbal pour s'assurer qu'il reflète fidèlement le procès qui s'est déroulé devant la cour.
- b. Le procès-verbal est ensuite soumis à l'étude de l'autorité convocatrice, soit, dans le cas de l'élève-officier Murphy, le Sous-ministre adjoint associé (Finances), qui décide si oui ou non il doit exercer son autorisation statutaire en vertu de l'article 179 de la Loi sur la Défense nationale (LDN) intitulé Annulation de verdicts, de l'article 180 de la LDN intitulé Substitution de verdicts, ou de l'article 183 de la LDN intitulé Mitigation, commutation et remise de peines.

2. Dans le cas de l'élève-officier Murphy, l'autorité convocatrice a conclu, après avoir soigneusement étudié le procès-verbal du procès et après avoir obtenu un avis juridique, qu'il n'y avait pas de preuves à l'appui d'un élément essentiel de chacun des chefs d'accusation suivants:

a. Première accusation - Article 120 de la LDN

Infraction punissable en vertu de l'article 120 de la Loi sur la Défense nationale, c'est-à-dire le trafic d'une substance que l'accusée estimait être un stupéfiant en violation du paragraphe 4(1) de la Loi sur les stupéfiants.

Chef d'accusation: Le ou vers le 2 février 1983, au Royal Military College, Kingston (Ontario), elle a donné, en violation de la loi, une certaine quantité d'une substance qu'elle estimait être de la cannabis sativa sous forme de cannabis (marihuana) à l'élève-officier SCHILBE, Keith Harvey, 474 870 367.

b. Deuxième accusation - Article 119 de la LDN

Conduite préjudiciable au bon ordre et à la discipline.

Chef d'accusation: Le ou vers le 21 décembre 1982, dans la ville de Kingston (Ontario), elle a fait usage d'une substance qu'elle croyait être du cannabis (marihuana).

c. Troisième accusation - Article 119 de la LDN

Conduite préjudiciable au bon ordre et à la discipline

Chef d'accusation: Le ou vers le 2 février 1983, au Royal Military College, Kingston (Ontario), elle a fait usage d'une substance qu'elle croyait être du cannabis (marihuana).

Plus précisément, pour ce qui est du premier chef d'accusation, il n'y avait aucune preuve pouvant permettre de déterminer ce que l'élève-officier Murphy estimait être la substance en question, et, pour ce qui est des deuxième et troisième chefs d'accusation, il n'y avait aucune preuve pouvant permettre de déterminer ce qu'elle croyait être les substances en question. Comme il ne s'agissait pas de maintenir les chefs d'accusation dans ces circonstances, l'autorité convocatrice a exercé son pouvoir discrétionnaire en vertu de l'article 179 de la LDN et a annulé le verdict de culpabilité concernant les trois chefs d'accusation.

3. Pendant le procès, le poursuivant, comme preuve à l'appui des chefs d'accusation, avait l'intention de présenter certains éléments de preuve tirés de déclarations obtenues au cours de l'enquête menée sur cette affaire. Cependant, après un voir dire,

le juge-avocat de première instance a décidé pour la cour que de telles preuves n'étaient pas légalement admissibles et que, par conséquent, comme ces preuves n'avaient pas été présentées à la cour, elles ne pouvaient servir dans le cas faisant l'objet du procès ou de la révision.

REPONSE A LA QUESTION DE M. MCKINNON CONCERNANT LA LOI SUR
LA SAISIE-ARRET ET LA DISTRACTION DE PENSIONS POSEE LES 12
ET 19 MAI 1983 LORS DES REUNIONS DU COMITE PERMANENT DES
AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES ET DE LA DEFENSE

La Loi sur la saisie-arrêt et la distraction de pensions a reçu la sanction royale le 22 juin 1982. Les parties II, III et IV de la Loi ont pour objet de prévoir une distraction des prestations de pension.

La partie I de la Loi, qui traite de la saisie-arrêt, a été promulguée le 11 mars 1983.

La promulgation des parties II, III et IV de la Loi portant sur la distraction des pensions a été retardée en attendant que le bureau du Conseil privé approuve les règlements autorisés et stipulés par la Loi.

Depuis août 1982, un comité interministériel s'est attaché à la rédaction des règlements requis pour mettre en oeuvre les dispositions de la Loi relatives à la distraction des pensions. Le Comité, présidé, par un avocat du ministère de la Justice, était constitué de représentants du Conseil du Trésor, d'Approvisionnements et Service, de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada et du ministère de la Défense nationale. Le ministre de la Justice recommandera au Gouverneur en conseil

une date pour la promulgation des dispositions relatives à la distraction des pensions .

Les dispositions de la Loi relatives à la distraction des pensions (parties II, III et IV), remplacent les clauses de distraction figurant actuellement dans les diverses lois fédérales relatives au fonds de pension.

Les nouveaux textes sur la distraction des pensions prévoient la distraction d'une rente ou d'une pension pour respecter un jugement relatif au versement d'une pension alimentaire à un conjoint, à un ancien conjoint ou à des enfants. Le jugement doit être rendu à la suite de la Loi sur le divorce, ou à la suite de la Loi d'une province relative au soutien financier d'une famille. La distraction d'une rente ou d'une pension se fera automatiquement, et le montant devant faire l'objet de la distraction sera établi en fonction des lois provinciales sur la saisie-arrêt ou la distraction des pensions en vue de la mise en application d'une ordonnance relative au soutien financier. En l'absence de loi provinciale, la Loi stipule que le montant de la distraction s'élèvera à 50 p. cent du montant net de la pension.

La nouvelle Loi sur la distraction des pensions s'écarte du processus actuel régissant la distraction tel qu'il figure dans les diverses lois fédérales sur le fonds de pension. La Loi sur la pension de retraite des Forces canadiennes contient la clause suivante à l'égard de la distraction d'une pension:

"15(2) Lorsqu'une cour compétente au Canada a rendu une ordonnance enjoignant un prestataire de verser une somme à son conjoint ou ancien conjoint, à son enfant ou autre personne à charge, et que le Ministre a reçu une copie certifiée de cette ordonnance, le montant spécifié dans l'ordonnance ou tout montant moindre que détermine le Ministre doit, si celui-ci l'ordonne, être déduit, soit en une somme globale, soit par versements, de tout montant payable ou qui va devenir payable au prestataire sous le régime de la présente loi et doit être versée à la personne nommée dans l'ordonnance."

L'autorité du Ministre est de nature discrétionnaire.

Il y a quelques années de cela, un guide de politiques ministérielles a été mis au point au sein du ministère de la Défense nationale. En voici les points saillants:

- a. le Ministre doit recevoir une copie authentifiée d'une ordonnance de la cour valable, émise par une cour canadienne, soit dans le cadre de la Loi sur le divorce soit dans le cadre d'une loi provinciale portant sur les frais de subsistance ou le soutien d'épouses, d'anciennes épouses et d'enfants;
- b. l'ordonnance doit enjoindre le pensionné à verser un montant déterminé à son épouse, à son ancienne épouse ou à ses enfants, pour assurer leur frais de subsistance ou leur soutien;
- c. le montant à distraire mensuellement ne doit pas en principe, dépasser 50 p. cent de la prestation nette;
- d. même si l'autorité ministérielle est de caractère discrétionnaire, il est d'usage d'ordonner une distraction du fonds de pension. En fait, il serait inhabituel de ne pas le faire.

Le système actuel a très bien fonctionné depuis qu'il a été instauré, et on continue à recevoir des demandes de distraction de fonds de pension et à leur donner suite en vertu de ce système.

Dans le cadre du nouveau système, la marche à suivre sera uniforme dans l'ensemble de la Fonction publique fédérale. La pratique actuelle, établie conformément au guide de politiques ministérielles, sera remplacée par une loi et des règlements plus détaillés, et, au début du moins, les demandes de distraction de pensions seront examinées de très près pour s'assurer que la Loi et les règlements sont respectés. Par conséquent, le processus pourrait être quelque peu plus lent qu'actuellement. La Loi prévoit que lorsqu'une demande de distraction a été dûment remplie, le Ministre doit, au plus tard le premier jour du quatrième mois suivant le mois au cours duquel la demande a été dûment remplie, ordonner une distraction.

L'une des différences essentielles entre l'ancien et le nouveau système repose sur la détermination du montant de la prestation nette sur laquelle la distraction sera fondée. Actuellement, en vertu de la Loi sur la pension des Forces canadiennes, la prestation nette correspond aux montants mensuels payables au pensionné, moins trois déductions, s'il y a lieu: tout paiement dû pour service antérieur ouvrant droit à pension, le recouvrement de tout solde débiteur dans le compte de solde d'un ancien militaire et toute déduction en

raison du versement d'une pension d'invalidité en vertu du régime de pensions du Canada. Avec la nouvelle Loi, les déductions suivantes seront retenues du montant de la prestation pour en arriver à la prestation nette assujettie à une distraction:

Prescription relative aux déductions des prestations de pension

13. Aux fins de la définition de "prestation de pension nette" au paragraphe 22(1) de la Loi, les déductions prescrites seront:

(a) tout montant d'impôt sur le revenu pouvant être déduit de la prestation de pension du bénéficiaire, fondé sur l'exemption personnelle de base à l'égard de l'impôt sur le revenu applicable pour l'année fiscale au cours de laquelle la distraction est effectuée;

(b) tout montant déduit de la pension du bénéficiaire en raison d'une cotisation insuffisante au fonds de pension, d'arrérages de cotisations à l'égard de service optionnel, et d'un manque à payer à l'égard d'arrérages de cotisations au fonds de pension;

(c) tout montant déduit de la pension du bénéficiaire en vertu d'une Loi, autre que la partie II de la Loi;

(d) tout montant déduit de la pension du bénéficiaire en tant que prime d'un régime d'assurance-maladie ou d'hospitalisation;

(e) tout montant déduit de la pension du bénéficiaire en tant que prime d'un régime d'assurance-vie figurant en annexe;

(f) tout montant déduit de la pension du bénéficiaire en tant que cotisations supplémentaires de décès ou manque à cotiser au régime prestations .

Cela signifie que dans de nombreux cas, le montant de la distraction sera moindre que ce n'est actuellement le cas dans le cadre des règlements en vigueur.

RÉPONSE À UNE QUESTION SOULEVÉE PAR M. PRUD'HOMME, PRÉSIDENT DU CPAEDN,
AU SUJET DU NOMBRE DE PERSONNES DONT LA DEMANDE A ÉTÉ REJETÉE EN VUE DE
L'INSTRUCTION D'ÉTÉ

1. Le MDN ne conserve aucun renseignement sur le nombre de gens dont la demande de participation au Programme d'emploi d'été pour les jeunes a été rejetée. Pour recueillir ce genre de renseignements, il faudrait consulter les autorités compétentes de tous les commandements et du Service de l'Instruction des Forces canadiennes. Cette démarche a déjà été entreprise et la réponse sera communiquée le plus tôt possible. Quoi qu'il en soit, les chiffres fournis ne seront en aucun cas définitifs; ils ne serviront qu'à donner un aperçu de la situation.

2. La possibilité d'accroître les fonds à ce chapitre a été prise en considération afin de permettre au MDN de louer un plus grand nombre de locaux et, ainsi, d'embaucher un plus grand nombre d'étudiants. Sur le plan purement pratique, cette solution ne serait pas réalisable. En effet, le programme a maintenant atteint son niveau optimal en ce sens que les ressources disponibles, c'est-à-dire les instructeurs, le matériel et les locaux, sont utilisées à pleine capacité. Il s'ensuit donc que le MDN ne pourrait affecter au Programme un plus grand nombre d'instructeurs et plus de matériel même si des fonds étaient débloqués pour la location de locaux.

RÉPONSE À UNE QUESTION DE M. SARGEANT CONCERNANT LE COÛT ET LE
BUDGET DU PROGRAMME D'INFORMATION SUR L'OTAN, LE NORAD, LE
DÉSARMEMENT ET LES ARMES NUCLÉAIRES

Le ministère de la Défense nationale compte bien que la plupart des renseignements nécessaires à ce titre ont déjà été recueillis et pourront être organisés, reproduits et diffusés dans les limites de son budget actuel. À l'heure actuelle, \$25 000 ont été affectés au titre de ce programme d'information en particulier; on considère que cette somme suffira à permettre de retenir pendant quelques mois les services d'un officier/agent supplémentaire, à qui seront confiées des fonctions de coordination. Cette somme a été prélevée à même le budget courant du MDN.

RÉPONSE À LA QUESTION POSÉE PAR M. STEWART (SIMCOE SUD) CONCERNANT LES
BOURSES DE RECHERCHE - PLANIFICATION D'URGENCE - 60 000 DOLLARS

Budget de la Défense nationale pour 1983-1984, page 17-22

Les bourses de recherche accordées par Planification d'urgence s'adressent aux étudiants canadiens prenant part à des recherches axées sur les catastrophes. Ces bourses de recherche sont subventionnées par Planification d'urgence Canada. Les boursiers doivent être diplômés d'une université reconnue, au niveau de la maîtrise. Ils doivent avoir démontré de l'intérêt pour la recherche, en ce qui a trait plus précisément aux situations d'urgence. Le travail de recherche s'effectue normalement à une université canadienne, sous la direction d'un membre approuvé de la faculté universitaire visée. Le montant maximal accordé ne doit pas dépasser \$10 000 par année, plus:

- le remboursement des frais de scolarité et des frais obligatoires
- une allocation familiale de \$2 000
- des billets d'avion à prix réduit

Tout rajustement financier à apporter aux articles discrétionnaires doit être approuvé par le Ministère.

Les formalités administratives touchant les bourses de recherche incombent à l'Association des collèges et universités au Canada. Ces bourses sont accordées pour une période de quatre années d'études.

Le candidats suivant ont été désignés:

Edward J. Huebert - Winnipeg, (Manitoba)

Alan Smart - Toronto (Ontario)



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WITNESSES—TÉMOINS

From the Department of National Defence:

Mr. D.B. Dewar, Deputy Minister;
Gen. R.M. Withers, Chief of the Defence Staff;
Mr. D.W. Digby, Director General Compensation and Benefits;
Mr. J.R. Killick, Assistant Deputy Minister (Material);
Dr. G.L. Nelms, Deputy Chief of Research and Development.

Du ministère de la Défense nationale:

M. D.B. Dewar, Sous-Ministre;
Gén R.M. Withers, Chef de l'état-major de la Défense;
M. D.W. Digby, Directeur général—Rémunération et avantages sociaux;
M. J.R. Killick, Sous-Ministre adjoint (Matériels);
Dr G.L. Nelms, Sous-chef à la recherche et au développement.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 100

Tuesday, November 22, 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 100

Le mardi 22 novembre 1983

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

External Affairs and National Defence

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

Supplementary Estimates (B) 1983-84: Votes 1b, 5b,
10b, 15b and 16b under EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONCERNANT:

Budget supplémentaire (B) 1983-1984: crédits 1b, 5b,
10b, 15b et 16b sous la rubrique AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES

APPEARING:

The Honourable A.J. MacEachen,
Secretary of State for External Affairs and Deputy
Prime Minister

COMPARAÎT:

L'honorable A.J. MacEachen,
Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et vice-
premier ministre

WITNESSES:

(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:

(Voir à l'endos)



First Session of the
Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la
trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appoloni

MEMBERS/MEMBRES

Harvie Andre
John Bosley
Herb Breau
Maurice Dupras
Stanley Hudecki
Pauline Jewett
David Kilgour
Gérald Laniel
Jean Lapierre
Ken Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*)
Terry Sargeant
Sinclair Stevens
Robert Wenman

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES ET DE LA DÉFENSE
NATIONALE

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

Vice-président: M^{me} Ursula Appoloni

ALTERNATES/SUBSTITUTS

Suzanne Beauchamp-Niquet
J.-Roland Comtois
Stan Darling
Pierre Gimaïel
Hal Herbert
Fred King
Paul-André Massé
Walter McLean
Donald W. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*)
Lorne Nystrom
Bob Ogle
Irénee Pelletier
Doug Roche
Marcel Roy
Ian Watson—(30)

(Quorum 8)

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

Pursuant to Standing Orders 69(4)(b):

On Tuesday, September 20, 1983:

Mr. Andre replaced Mr. Bradley;
Mr. Bosley replaced Mr. McKinnon;
Mr. Wenman replaced Mr. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*);
Mr. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*) replaced Mr. Wenman;
Mr. Kilgour replaced Mr. Roche;
Mr. King replaced Mr. Corbett;
Mr. Roche replaced Mr. Stewart;
Mr. Lachance replaced Mr. Collettette.

On Wednesday, November 2, 1983:

Mrs. Beauchamp-Niquet replaced Mr. Lachance.

Conformément à l'article 69(4)b) du Règlement:

Le mardi 20 septembre 1983:

M. Andre remplace M. Bradley;
M. Bosley remplace M. McKinnon;
M. Wenman remplace M. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*);
M. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*) remplace M. Wenman;
M. Kilgour remplace M. Roche;
M. King remplace M. Corbett;
M. Roche remplace M. Stewart;
M. Lachance remplace M. Collettette.

Le mercredi 2 novembre 1983:

M^{me} Beauchamp-Niquet remplace M. Lachance.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

Thursday, November 3, 1983

ORDERED,—That External Affairs Votes 1b, 5b, 10b, 15b and 16b; and

That National Defence Vote 5b for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984, be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

ATTEST

ORDRE DE RENVOI

Le jeudi 3 novembre 1983

IL EST ORDONNÉ,—Que les crédits 1b, 5b, 10b, 15b et 16b, Affaires extérieures; et

Que le crédit 5b, Défense nationale, pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984, soient déferés au Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale.

ATTESTÉ

Le Greffier de la Chambre des communes

C.B. KOESTER

The Clerk of the House of Commons

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1983
(155)

[Text]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:40 o'clock p.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Bosley, Dupras, Hudecki, Miss Jewett, Messrs. Prud'homme, Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*), Stevens and Wenman.

Alternates present: Mrs. Beauchamp-Niquet, Messrs. Darling, King, Massé, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Roy and Watson.

Other Members present: Messrs. de Corneille, Forrestall and McRae.

Appearing: The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister.

Witnesses: From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Deputy Minister, Political Affairs; Mr. G. Shortliffe, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy Coordination; Mr. Joseph S. Stanford, Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and Middle East Branch.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Mr. Robert Miller, Research Adviser.

The Order of Reference dated Thursday, November 3, 1983, being read as follows:

ORDERED,—That External Affairs Votes 1b, 5b, 10b, 15b and 16b; and That National Defence Vote 5b for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984, be referred to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence.

By unanimous consent, the Chairman called Votes 1b, 5b, 10b, 15b and 16b under EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

The Minister made a statement and, with the witnesses, answered questions.

It was agreed,—That the Committee meet according to the following schedule:

Supplementary Estimates (B) 1983-84:

Thursday, November 24, 1983, 11:00 a.m.:

Hon. Jean-Jacques Blais, Minister of National Defence

Annual Report for the Department of External Affairs-1981:

Tuesday, November 29, 1983, 8:00 p.m.:

Hon. Allan J. MacEachen, Secretary of State for External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister;

and/or Ministers of State responsible for international affairs;

and/or Senior Officials from the Department

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE MARDI 22 NOVEMBRE 1983
(155)

[Traduction]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale se réunit, ce jour à 15h40, sous la présidence de M. Marcel Prud'homme (président).

Membres du Comité présents: M^{me} Appolloni, MM. Bosley, Dupras, Hudecki, M^{lle} Jewett, MM. Prud'homme, Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*), Stevens et Wenman.

Substituts présents: M^{me} Beauchamp-Niquet, MM. Darling, King, Massé, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*), Roy et Watson.

Autres députés présents: MM. de Corneille, Forrestall et McRae.

Comparaît: L'honorable Allan J. MacEachen, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et vice-premier ministre.

Témoins: Du ministère des Affaires extérieures: M. de Montigny Marchand, sous-ministre, Affaires politiques; M. G. Shortliffe, sous-ministre adjoint, Coordination des politiques; M. Joseph S. Stanford, sous-ministre adjoint, Secteur de l'Afrique et du Moyen-Orient.

Aussi présent: Du Service de recherche de la Bibliothèque du Parlement: M. Robert Miller, chargé de recherche.

L'ordre de renvoi du jeudi 3 novembre 1983 se lit comme il suit:

IL EST ORDONNÉ,—Que les crédits 1b, 5b, 10b, 15b et 16b, Affaires extérieures; et Que le crédit 5b, Défense nationale, pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984, soient déferés au Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale.

Par consentement unanime, le président met en délibération les crédits 1b, 5b, 10b, 15b et 16b inscrits sous la rubrique AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES.

Le Ministre fait une déclaration et, assisté par les témoins, répond aux questions.

Il est convenu,—Que le Comité se réunisse aux jours suivants:

Budget supplémentaire (B) 1983-1984:

Le jeudi 24 novembre 1983, à 11 heures:

L'honorable Jean-Jacques Blais, ministre de la Défense nationale.

Rapport annuel du ministère des Affaires extérieures—1981:

Le mardi 29 novembre 1983, à 20 heures:

L'honorable Allan J. MacEachen, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et vice-premier ministre;

ou les ministres d'État chargés des affaires internationales, ou les deux à la fois;

et/ou les hauts fonctionnaires du Ministère.

Tuesday, December 6, 1983, 9:30 a.m.:

Senior Officials from CIDA

At 5:45 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Le mardi 6 décembre 1983, à 9h30:

Les hauts fonctionnaires de l'ACDI.

A 17h45, le Comité suspend les travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

*(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)**[Texte]*

Tuesday, November 22, 1983

• 1538

The Chairman: Today the steering committee met, and after a long deliberation and many difficulties, because we were supposed to meet until next week, the sixth, but then the House Leader made an agreement that there were supposed to be three opposition days this week—Monday, Tuesday, Thursday—we almost ran the chance of not meeting at all, because we are supposed to meet no more than three days prior to the last opposition day. So that is too complicated. Anyway, that means yesterday. Then a later agreement between House Leaders—and I was informed of that the same day—allowed me to sit this week under the supplementary estimates by agreement of the House Leaders. Therefore, I proceed with my agenda.

My agenda is that we were supposed to meet this morning, but the minister was busy. So I insisted that the minister at your request appear as a main witness for the supplementary estimates and general discussion, especially for those who are so interested in the Grenada question—I hope they will all show up during this meeting—and the Cyprus question and the Lebanese question. But I had to delay, unfortunately, until now because the minister has been here since 3.30 sharp, and I am sorry, but the minister will leave, by agreement, at 4.30 p.m. So if those members quarrel it will be just too bad.

• 1540

Anyway, the minister is here today. I can announce that because he is there. So that is part of your steering committee report.

The second part of your steering committee is that the Minister of External Defence will be here on Thursday at 11.00 a.m. instead of during the afternoon. These two meetings I can do under the supplementary estimates.

As for the future meetings, I have decided from now on to use the Department of External Affairs annual report, which was tabled in the House of Commons and gives me the privilege of meeting if it is the wish of the steering committee so to recommend to the full committee. Therefore I intend to call later this week a steering committee to see as to the future activities of this committee, most likely to have at least a meeting with the new chairman of CIDA, Mrs. Catley-Carlson, most likely next week or the following week according to her agenda. If we could arrange such a meeting either Tuesday next week—that seems to be very difficult—or December 1 or 6. But we all know what is going on in the House so we cannot forget that we are part of the House and at that time there may have been an adjournment or not; I do not know. So I am in your hands.

TÉMOIGNAGES

*(Enregistrement électronique)**[Traduction]*

Le mardi 22 novembre 1983

Le président: C'est après de longues délibérations et de nombreuses difficultés que le comité directeur peut se réunir aujourd'hui. En effet, nous devons nous réunir jusqu'à la semaine prochaine, c'est-à-dire la sixième de notre série de réunions, mais les leaders de la Chambre décideront qu'il devait y avoir trois journées d'opposition cette semaine, à savoir lundi, mardi et jeudi, c'est pourquoi nous avons bien failli ne pas nous réunir du tout car nous ne sommes pas censés nous réunir moins de trois jours avant le dernier jour d'opposition. Cela a l'air très compliqué. De toutes façons, cette journée tombait hier et suite à un accord entre les leaders à la Chambre, dont j'ai été avisé le même jour, nous avons pu nous réunir cette semaine en vertu des prévisions budgétaires supplémentaires. Je vais donc maintenant passer à mon ordre du jour.

D'après celui-ci, nous devons nous réunir ce matin mais le ministre était occupé. J'ai donc insisté pour que le ministre à votre demande se présente devant nous à titre de témoin principal pour les prévisions supplémentaires et le débat général, plus particulièrement pour ce qui touche la question de l'invasion de la Grenade, l'affaire de Chypre et la question libanaise. J'espère que tout le monde se présentera au cours de cette réunion. J'ai dû malheureusement retardé cette réunion jusqu'à présent car le ministre est ici depuis 15h30 exactement, et il devra partir après accord à 16h30. Ainsi, si les membres se disputent ce sera bien dommage.

De toutes les façons, nous avons la présence du ministre. Je peux le dire puisqu'il est ici et cela fera partie du rapport de votre comité.

Pour la deuxième partie de votre comité directeur, le ministre de la Défense nationale sera présent le jeudi à 11 heures au lieu de cet après-midi. Je peux organiser ces deux réunions en vertu des prévisions supplémentaires.

Comme pour les prochaines réunions, j'ai décidé à partir de maintenant de me servir du rapport annuel du ministère des Affaires extérieures qui a été présenté à la Chambre des communes et qui me donne le privilège d'organiser une réunion si tel est le désir du comité directeur d'en faire la recommandation au comité plénier. J'ai par conséquent l'intention de convoquer un peu plus tard cette semaine un comité directeur afin de me pencher sur les activités futures de ce comité, et probablement afin d'organiser au moins une réunion avec la nouvelle présidente de l'ACDI, Madame Catley-Carlson, certainement la semaine prochaine ou la semaine suivante selon son emploi du temps. Nous essaierons d'organiser cette réunion soit mardi prochain, ce qui semble être très difficile, soit le 1^{er} ou le 6 décembre. Nous savons tous ce qui se passe à la Chambre, aussi nous ne pouvons ignorer le fait que nous

[Texte]

I think we should stop discussion today and get right into the minister's statement.

The minister will make a statement and I will proceed as to my usual fashion. I do not see why I should change what has functioned very well over the years. I always recognize first the honourable critic of the Official Opposition, whoever he may be or she may be, followed by the honourable critic of the New Democratic Party—that has been for many years Dr. Pauline Jewett, who is present—followed by a Liberal who so indicates to me, and then I alternate. I already have a list.

May I say not to discourage anybody it is also a custom of this committee . . . I do not want it to look as though I am making a personal friendship with the committee . . . The rules are long established by this committee. The minister is not restricted to simply the estimates, but by agreement over the years we have allowed the minister to make a general statement, even on estimates, supplementary estimates, where he should be limited strictly to the object of the request of the money. Also, members of the committee, like any other committees, have first priority to question. If there is time available, at the wish of the Chair I may recognize other members.

So, Mr. Minister, you have now the floor, and I will, after you take a picture of the new critic of the Official Opposition on matters of external affairs, kindly say that for a first . . .

Please, gentlemen and lady of the press, you know the rules. I said I will start today breaking the rules, but I do not know how far I want to go. So you take your seat, sir; but the meeting has started and I am sorry, but we could not wait longer. So I will tell you later on what we have decided.

Mr. Minister.

Hon. Allan J. MacEachen (Secretary of State for External Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have, I think, a very brief statement that I want to make. I understand there has been a good deal of interest by members of the committee on the question of Grenada, and I thought I would make a statement and use it to explain at least in general terms the situation as the government sees it. It may lead you to questioning, or you may want to move into other fields.

Of course, there are many angles from which we could approach the question of Grenada. One of them would be to assess the impact of recent events on our own relationships with the Caribbean and with the United States of America; another concerns the practical steps we should take to meet the new situation in Grenada; and of course the third perspective would be a wider vision, an assessment of the possible impact of Grenada on broader questions of regional and global security.

[Traduction]

faisons partie de la Chambre et qu'à cette date il se pourrait qu'il y ait un ajournement.

Je pense que nous devrions cesser aujourd'hui les discussions et passer directement à la déclaration du ministre.

Le ministre fera en effet une déclaration et je procéderai comme j'en ai l'habitude. Je ne vois pas pourquoi je changerai ce qui semble fonctionner très bien depuis des années. Je donne toujours en premier lieu la parole au critique de l'opposition officielle, quel qu'il soit, puis au critique du Nouveau Parti Démocratique, qui a été depuis des années Pauline Jewett et qui est présente, puis à un libéral, puis j'alterne le roulement. J'ai déjà une liste en ma possession.

Afin de ne décourager personne, je tiens à dire que c'est l'habitude qu'a prise ce comité. Je ne veux pas que l'on se dise que j'essaie de me faire des amis au sein du comité. Les règles sont en place depuis bien longtemps. Le ministre n'est pas limité tout simplement aux prévisions budgétaires, mais après accord nous avons permis au ministre de faire une déclaration d'ensemble, même sur les prévisions et strictement à la question de la demande de fonds. D'autre part, les membres du comité, comme tout autre comité, ont la priorité pour poser des questions. S'il reste du temps, selon les souhaits du président, je donnerai la parole à d'autres membres.

Monsieur le ministre, vous avez maintenant la parole et je dirai, après que vous ayez vu le nouveau critique de l'opposition officielle sur les Affaires extérieures, je dirai donc que pour une première . . .

Mesdames et messieurs des organes d'information vous connaissez les règles. J'ai dit que je commencerai aujourd'hui à modifier ces règles, mais je ne sais pas jusqu'où j'irai. Veuillez vous asseoir, monsieur. La réunion a dû commencer je m'en excuse mais nous ne pouvions plus attendre. Je vous dirai donc un peu plus tard les points sur lesquels nous avons pris des décisions.

Monsieur le ministre, c'est à vous.

L'honorable Allan J. MacEachen (secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures et vice-premier ministre): Merci, monsieur le président.

Je voudrais faire une très brève déclaration. Je crois savoir que les membres du comité se sont beaucoup intéressés à la question de l'invasion de la Grenade et j'ai donc pensé que je devrais faire une déclaration afin d'expliquer tout au moins en termes généraux la situation telle que la voit le gouvernement. Nous pourrions ensuite passer à des questions ou si vous le préférez à d'autres points.

La question pourrait être abordée sous de nombreux aspects. On pourrait par exemple évaluer l'incidence des événements récents sur notre relation avec les Antilles et les États-Unis. On pourrait également étudier les mesures pratiques à prendre devant la nouvelle situation. La troisième approche, plus large, consisterait en une évaluation de l'incidence possible de l'affaire de Grenade sur des questions plus vastes de sécurité régionale et globale.

[Text]

• 1545

I believe it would be more constructive to look ahead rather than conduct a post-mortem. Nevertheless, I make no bones of it that the government regrets that adequate consultations did not take place before the military intervention. What we believed were well-established methods of dialogue and consultation did not work. The Prime Minister made plain in the House that it may well be they did not work because the governments concerned knew from our public position that we would not endorse an invasion in these circumstances.

This is not much consolation, and it compels us to reassess with our friends and partners abroad our wish to maintain a frank and candid dialogue in all matters of common interest. A dialogue that shuns contentious issues and concentrates only in areas of known or presumed mutual accord is a diplomatic dance, not a genuine dialogue.

We should be constructive and pragmatic in these discussions, though. We did not and do not believe now that the military intervention in Grenada was justified. We expect foreign military forces on the Island to be withdrawn as soon as possible. In this respect, we are reassured by President Reagan's statement that American troops will be withdrawn before Christmas. We are confident that all governments concerned will wish to see that the return to normal government and elections is not clouded by charges that an occupying presence compromises their legitimacy. We hope that a truly democratic, open and free society can be brought back to Grenada. There is no disagreement about this objective. I made these points to the Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Dam, on his visit to Ottawa last week and I do not intend to belabour them here.

We might ask what the impact of the Grenada crisis was on our relationship with the Commonwealth Caribbean. It is my view that the basic premises for the relationship between Canada and the region, as we defined them in 1980, have been shaken, but have not changed in any fundamental way.

You will remember that these premises were that the Commonwealth Caribbean was a centre of interest for Canadian investors, a source of immigrants and seasonal workers, and that the area shares with Canada a community of language and political institutions. The Commonwealth Caribbean is the closest part of the Third World to Canada and the one most familiar to Canadians. It is also the region where Canada can play a substantive role in economic and social development through important CIDA-financed projects. I believe these premises are still valid. We see no reason to change the priority given to the Commonwealth Caribbean in our foreign policy. We see no reason to change our decision to develop and implement a regional policy focussed on economic co-operation and aimed at maintaining stability, economic growth and fostering regional co-operation among the states of the Commonwealth Caribbean.

[Translation]

Il serait plus positif de regarder vers l'avenir plutôt que d'analyser les événements passés. Mais je ne vous cacherai pas le regret du gouvernement que des consultations adéquates n'aient pas été menées avant l'intervention militaire. Les mécanismes de dialogue et de consultation que nous croyions bien établis n'ont pas fonctionné. Comme le déclarait le Premier ministre à la Chambre, il se pourrait bien qu'ils n'aient pas fonctionné parce que les gouvernements en cause savaient fort bien que nous n'allions pas endosser une invasion dans ces circonstances.

Ce n'est pas une grande consolation, et nous nous voyons forcés de rappeler à nos amis et partenaires à l'étranger notre désir de maintenir un dialogue franc et ouvert sur toutes les questions d'intérêt commun. Un dialogue qui évite les questions litigieuses pour ne se concentrer que sur les points sur lesquels on sait ou on présume qu'il y a accord mutuel est une gavotte diplomatique—et non un dialogue véritable.

Mais nous devrions être positifs et pragmatiques dans ces discussions. Nous n'avons jamais cru, et ne croyons toujours pas, que l'intervention militaire à la Grenade était justifiée. Nous espérons que les forces militaires étrangères sur l'île seront retirées le plus tôt possible. À cet égard, nous sommes rassurés par la déclaration du Président Reagan selon laquelle les troupes américaines seront retirées avant Noël. Nous sommes confiants que tous les gouvernements concernés voudront s'assurer que le retour à un mode de gouvernement normal et la préparation d'élections ne sont pas assombris par des allégations selon lesquelles une présence occupante compromet leur légitimité. Nous espérons que la Grenade retrouvera une société véritablement démocratique, ouverte et libre. Il n'y a aucune mésentente sur cet objectif. J'ai fait part de ces points au sous-secrétaire d'État Dam, la semaine dernière. Je n'ai pas l'intention d'insister là-dessus.

Quelle a été l'incidence de la crise de Grenade sur nos relations avec les Antilles du Commonwealth? Je suis d'avis que les postulats de base de la relation entre le Canada et la région, tels que définis en 1980, ont été ébranlés mais non modifiés de façon fondamentale.

Ces postulats étaient les suivants: les Antilles du Commonwealth sont un centre d'intérêt pour les investisseurs canadiens, une source d'immigrants et de travailleurs saisonniers, ainsi qu'une région partageant avec le Canada une même langue et des institutions politiques semblables. Les Antilles du Commonwealth constituent la région du tiers monde la plus rapprochée du Canada, et aussi celle que connaissent le mieux les Canadiens. C'est également une région dont le développement économique et social peut être sensiblement appuyé par d'importants projets financés par l'ACDI. Je crois que ces grands postulats sont toujours valables. Nous ne voyons aucune raison de changer la priorité accordée aux Antilles du Commonwealth dans notre politique étrangère. Nous ne voyons aucune raison de modifier notre décision d'élaborer et d'appliquer une politique régionale centrée sur la coopération économique et visant à maintenir la stabilité et la croissance économique et à favoriser la coopération entre les États des Antilles du Commonwealth.

[Texte]

Of course, the question of security co-operation has been put in special focus by recent events. The 1980 policy also focused on building stability, on assistance to the internal security of the Islands and the protection of territorial waters. In no way did that commitment engage the Canadian government to use military force to help resolve regional or local conflicts.

All in all, therefore, I believe our relationship has not been affected in a profound way by the intervention. An opportune time to assess this will of course be at the Commonwealth heads of government meeting in New Delhi later this week.

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Presumably, the meeting begins tomorrow in New Delhi. The Prime Minister will meet, of course, with his Caribbean colleagues. He will continue the practice he began at the last such meeting in Melbourne by hosting a Canada-Caribbean lunch on November 24.

As for the impact the military intervention in Grenada has had on Canada-U.S. relations, I cannot deny that one major element affected is the expectation that we will be fully informed by the U.S.A. of events in which we have an identifiable interest. The absence of full consultations before the intervention led us to register our disappointment over the apparent failure of the consultative mechanism which we thought was in place.

I reiterated our concern to Mr. Dam last week. He acknowledged that more consultation would have been desirable. He also agreed with me that the problem should not be allowed to affect our overall relationship. Through my regular meetings with Secretary Shultz and through ongoing meetings between officials of each country, we intend to stress the importance of consultations. As well, it is important to underline that the commitments and objectives we share globally with the United States of America and other members of the western alliance remain unchanged.

What shall we be doing in the immediate future to maintain and build our relationship with Grenada and the other countries of the area?

As you know, in Grenada a new interim head of government has been appointed. We certainly wish Mr. McIntyre well in the very difficult task ahead. We acknowledge that a basic premise for the stability of the country will be the holding of free and open elections. We understand that all political sectors will be called upon to participate in the electoral process. We have indicated our willingness to consider assistance in the organization of these elections. And if a scheme to supervise these elections is put forward, and our presence is sought, we will consider that too.

In the meantime, subject to the wishes of Grenada and the circumstances, we are disposed to assist Grenada in re-establishing its constabulary and police force. At this time it is not clear if this program would be sponsored by the Common-

[Traduction]

Bien sûr, la question de la coopération en matière de sécurité a été mise en relief par les événements récents. La politique de 1980 visait également la stabilisation de la région, le renforcement de la sécurité intérieure des îles ainsi que la protection de leurs eaux territoriales. Cet engagement ne forçait nullement le gouvernement canadien à user de la force militaire pour aider à régler des conflits régionaux ou locaux.

Somme toute, je crois par conséquent que notre relation n'a pas été sensiblement touchée par l'intervention. La Réunion des Chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth qui se tiendra à New Delhi cette semaine sera bien sûr une occasion opportune de nous en assurer, car le Premier ministre y rencontrera ses collègues des Antilles.

Il poursuivra aussi la pratique qu'il a établie à la dernière réunion à Melbourne en 1981 en offrant un déjeuner en l'honneur des représentants du Canada et des Antilles le 24 novembre.

En ce qui touche l'incidence que l'intervention militaire à la Grenade a eue sur la relation canado-américaine, je ne peux nier que nous nous attendons à être pleinement informés par les États-Unis d'événements dans lesquels nous avons un intérêt évident. L'absence de pléines consultations avant l'intervention nous a amenés à manifester notre déception devant l'apparent échec du mécanisme de consultation que nous croyions bien en place.

J'ai fait part de notre préoccupation à M. Dam la semaine dernière. Il a reconnu que d'autres consultations auraient été souhaitables. Il a également convenu avec moi que le problème ne devrait pas pouvoir affecter notre relation globale. Lors de mes contacts périodiques avec le secrétaire Shultz et dans les rencontres entre représentants de nos pays, nous soulignerons l'importance de ces consultations. Il est de même important de rappeler que les engagements et objectifs que nous partageons globalement avec les États-Unis et les autres membres de l'Alliance occidentale restent inchangés.

Pour ce qui est de l'avenir immédiat, que ferons-nous pour maintenir et renforcer notre relation avec la Grenade et les autres pays de la région?

A la Grenade, un nouveau chef de gouvernement intérimaire a été désigné. Nous souhaitons certainement du succès à M. McIntyre dans la tâche très difficile qui l'attend. Nous reconnaissons que la tenue d'élections libres et ouvertes est une condition essentielle à la stabilité du pays. Nous comprenons que tous les éléments politiques seront appelés à participer au processus électoral. Nous avons fait savoir que nous étions disposés à envisager une assistance à l'organisation de ces élections. Et si un plan de supervision des élections est proposé et que notre présence est recherchée, nous en étudierons également la possibilité.

Entre temps, selon ce que seront les souhaits de la Grenade et les circonstances, nous sommes disposés à aider ce pays à rétablir sa force constabulaire et policière. Nous ne savons pas encore si un tel programme serait parrainé par le Secrétaire

[Text]

wealth Secretary General. It could be established directly with Grenada. We will have to wait until we hear from the new government in Grenada.

As honourable members know, especially from their visits and studies of the area, Canada has developed a substantial and significant program of assistance in the Caribbean. Of course, this included Grenada. The three main Canadian projects—cocoa rehabilitation and expansion, construction of a central garage unit and a port cargo handling facility—have been in suspense since mid-October. These projects will be restarted as soon as possible. Other ongoing programs, such as Canada Training Awards and Technical Assistance to the Planning Ministry, will be maintained if that is the wish of the new government.

I intend to look constructively at other requests. These may be in the areas of public service management training, airport management and temporary financial assistance to meet the local costs of some of these projects.

We are concerned about the fall-out of the Grenada crisis for the Commonwealth Caribbean at large and about its divisive effects. Commonwealth Caribbean economies are small and vulnerable. One of the central objectives of the Commonwealth Caribbean has been to overcome the disadvantages of size through increasing economic and commercial integration. This process is of fundamental importance to the region and that is why we have been supporting it. We intend to continue that support.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I want to say by way of a beginning and in view of the wishes of other members of the committee to ask questions and make their points.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Minister. As I said, I see no objection to the press staying. It is on a trial basis, and I will ask them kindly not to move around. Once you are in a spot, stay in that spot. Otherwise, I am sure members will kindly ask you to leave.

• 1555

I usually recognize the official critic of the Official Opposition, but I always look at him first to see whether he decides to take his turn or leave it to someone else. So the honourable critic of the Official Opposition, the Hon. Sinclair Stevens, followed by Mr. King and Dr. Hudecki. Mr. Sinclair Stevens, please.

Mr. Stevens: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Minister, we certainly thank you for your statement made with particular reference to the Grenadian situation. I was wondering if you could go a little further on your observations with respect to the consultative mechanism that took place prior to the intervention by the rescue forces. You have stated that:

The absence of full consultations before the intervention led us to register our disappointment over the apparent failure

[Translation]

général du Commonwealth. Il pourrait être établi directement avec la Grenade. Il nous faudra attendre d'être contactés par le nouveau gouvernement de la Grenade.

Comme le savent les honorables députés, surtout par leurs visites et leurs études de la région, le Canada a mis sur pied un important programme d'aide aux Antilles, qui englobe bien sûr la Grenade. Les trois grands projets canadiens (valorisation du cacao et élargissement des plantations, construction d'un garage central et aménagement d'une installation portuaire de manutention des marchandises) sont en suspens depuis la mi-octobre. Ces projets seront remis en marche le plus tôt possible. D'autres programmes en cours comme les bourses de perfectionnement et l'assistance technique au ministère du Plan seront maintenus si tel est le souhait du nouveau gouvernement de la Grenade.

J'entends étudier favorablement les autres requêtes qui nous seront présentées. Ces demandes pourraient englober la formation de cadres publics, la gestion aéroportuaire et une assistance financière temporaire pour défrayer les dépenses locales de certains de nos projets.

Nous nous inquiétons des retombées de la crise de Grenade pour les Antilles du Commonwealth, ainsi que des divisions qu'elle pourrait créer. Les économies antillaises sont petites et vulnérables. L'un des objectifs centraux des Antilles du Commonwealth a été de surmonter les désavantages de leur taille par une meilleure intégration économique et commerciale. Ce processus est d'une importance fondamentale pour la région: c'est pourquoi nous l'avons appuyé. Nous entendons maintenir cet appui.

Monsieur le Président, c'est tout ce que je voulais dire en guise d'introduction et je suis prêt maintenant à satisfaire les désirs des autres membres du comité et à répondre à leurs questions.

Le président: Merci, monsieur le ministre. Comme je l'ai dit un peu plus tôt, je ne vois aucune objection à ce que tous les membres de la presse restent, à titre d'essai, dans la salle. Je leur demanderai donc de ne pas se déplacer. Veuillez donc rester là où vous êtes. Autrement, je suis sûr que les membres vous demanderont gentiment de bien vouloir quitter la pièce.

Je donne d'habitude la parole au critique de l'opposition officielle mais je commence toujours par l'observer pour savoir s'il décide de prendre son tour ou de le laisser à quelqu'un d'autre. Ainsi le critique de l'opposition officielle, l'hon. Sinclair Stevens, sera suivi par MM. King et Hudecki. M. Sinclair Stevens, vous avez la parole.

M. Stevens: Merci, monsieur le Président. Monsieur le ministre, nous tenons à vous remercier pour votre exposé qui mettait l'accent sur la situation à Grenade. Je me demandais si vous pouviez aller un peu plus avant dans vos observations quant aux mécanismes de consultation qui ont eu lieu avant l'entrée en action des forces d'intervention. Vous avez déclaré que:

L'absence de pleines consultations avant l'intervention nous a amenés à manifester notre déception devant l'apparent

[Texte]

of the consultative mechanism which we thought was in place.

As you will recall, Mr. Minister, our ambassador in Washington, Mr. Allan Gotlieb, when he spoke to Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam—with whom you have subsequently been able to meet yourself—stated, and this is a direct quote, that:

The lack of information coming to Canada was because of concerns on the security side that the invasion should not be too widely known.

Mr. Minister, can you tell us what, in fact, Mr. Dam's explanation has been as to why this question of security would have loomed large in their minds in not wanting to take us into their confidence with respect to their responding to an invitation to join in this rescue operation in Grenada?

Mr. MacEachen: On that point, Mr. Sinclair, may I say that I did not probe this particular comment attributed to Mr. Dam at our meeting in Ottawa last week. I take it for granted that the American authorities were determined not to—or were reluctant to . . . —communicate with other countries in order to preserve this exercise, or maintain it as a military exercise.

I do not think Canada was treated much differently, or indeed differently, from any other country. I believe the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, for example, has expressed her disappointment. You may recall that the day before the invasion the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom in the British House of Commons gave an assurance, in answer to a question, that there was no question of an invasion. So he, like the authorities in Canada, was taken by surprise. I think it is clear that the Americans wanted to keep this well within their own circle of powers that were involved in the invasion. I think the reasons one can speculate upon, but I did not think it would be productive to probe that with Mr. Dam.

Mr. Stevens: Through you, Mr. Chairman, to the minister: Mr. Minister, now that so many facts are known and we have the great advantage of hindsight, it appears that the vast majority of Grenadians have welcomed this rescue operation. It appears that not only was Prime Minister Bishop murdered and certain of his cabinet colleagues were murdered, but perhaps something over 100 other civilians were killed during the interlude between the initial coup and the rescue operation.

In view of the fact that there has been general acquiescence, if not outright agreement, with respect to the various Commonwealth countries concerning what has happened in Grenada, in view of the fact of the Soviet presence there, which is now well documented, the Cuban presence, would you still hold to your position that the intervention was wrong, that there should have been in effect no rescue operation of the nature that took place?

[Traduction]

échec du mécanisme de consultation que nous croyions bien en place.

Comme vous vous en souviendrez, monsieur le ministre, notre ambassadeur à Washington, M. Allan Gotlieb, lorsqu'il a parlé avec le secrétaire d'État adjoint Kenneth Dam—que vous avez vous-même pu rencontrer par la suite—a déclaré, et je cite, que:

Le manque d'information envers le Canada était dû à un souci de sécurité, l'invasion ne devant pas être trop largement connue.

Monsieur le ministre, pouvez-vous nous dire quelle a été, en réalité, l'explication de M. Dam quant à savoir pourquoi cette question de sécurité aurait été au premier plan de leurs préoccupations et pourquoi n'ont-ils pas voulu nous accorder leur confiance et nous inviter à participer à cette intervention à Grenade?

M. MacEachen: À ce sujet, M. Sinclair, puis-je dire que je n'ai pas examiné ce commentaire particulier attribué à M. Dam lors de notre réunion à Ottawa la semaine dernière. Je tiens pour certain que les autorités américaines étaient déterminées à ne pas communiquer avec d'autres pays, ou tout au moins peu désireuses de la faire, afin de protéger cette manœuvre, ou de la limiter à une manœuvre militaire.

Je ne pense pas que le Canada ait été traité très différemment, ou vraiment différemment, que tout autre pays. Je crois que le premier ministre du Royaume-Uni, par exemple, a exprimé sa déception. Vous vous rappellerez que le jour précédant l'invasion le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Royaume-Uni, à la Chambre des communes, a donné l'assurance, en réponse à une question, qu'une invasion n'était pas envisagée. Ainsi, comme les autorités canadiennes, a-t-il été pris par surprise. Je pense qu'il est évident que les Américains souhaitaient garder cette opération à l'intérieur de leur sphère de compétence. Je pense que l'on peut spéculer sur les raisons, mais je ne crois pas qu'il aurait été fructueux d'examiner cela avec M. Dam.

M. Stevens: Par votre intermédiaire, monsieur le président, je m'adresse au ministre: Monsieur le ministre, maintenant que la plupart des faits sont connus et que nous avons l'énorme avantage de les examiner rétrospectivement, il semble que la grande majorité des Grenadiens ait bien accueilli cette intervention. Il semble que non seulement le premier ministre Bishop et certains des membres de son Cabinet aient été assassinés mais que peut-être plus de cent autres civils aient été tués pendant la période entre le coup d'état initial et l'intervention.

Étant donné qu'il y a eu un consentement général, sinon un accord total, en ce qui concerne les différents pays du Commonwealth au sujet de ce qui s'est passé à Grenade, étant donné la présence soviétique qui est maintenant prouvée, la présence cubaine, pourriez-vous toujours soutenir que l'intervention était une erreur, qu'il n'y aurait dû y avoir une intervention de cette nature?

[Text]

Mr. MacEachen: I have considered that question, Mr. Sinclair, in the course of my meeting with Mr. Dam and since, and I have heard nothing that would cause the government to now say that the invasion was justified. We do attempt to subscribe to the principles of international law. Surely an invasion by one country of another is an event that cannot be explained away by a series of circumstances, no matter how unpleasant, that are occurring in one country and are disliked by its neighbours. If that were the principle of international law, I think all of us would be potential victims of invasion.

I think it is important for a country like Canada to take a very strong stand on that principle. I agree with you that there are certain circumstances that one has to acknowledge. One circumstance, of course, is the fact that, as you say, it appears that the majority of the Grenadian people are in favour of the American presence.

In reply to your question, the answer is that we have not now found it possible to say: Yes, we think this invasion was justified, and therefore we support it. We are quite concerned at the present time to contribute constructively to what can be done in the future in Grenada, and certainly what can be done to distance what has happened in Grenada from other international events, which we have roundly criticized.

We have, in various areas of the world, opposed interventions. We have opposed, and still do, occupations of countries by other countries. It would seem to me that the sooner the Americans would find it possible to leave Grenada, the better it would be for all of us—and certainly, in my view, the better it would be for the United States.

Mr. Stevens: Through you, Mr. Chairman, to the minister, who I appreciate accepts that something over 50%, some estimate even 90%, of the Grenadians are quite in agreement with the intervention, welcome it, call it a rescue operation; others say that freedom has been restored to them: In that context, Mr. Minister, could you tell the committee who you really feel could speak for Grenada during this period of virtual anarchy? Was it Governor General Scoon, or was it Mr. Coard, or perhaps Mr. Austin? Who do you feel, when you use that term invasion, was really the government, if you like, or the only remnant of whatever government was left on Grenada at the time the invitation by Mr. Scoon was extended for help, and the response on the part of the Caribbean nations and the United States led to the intervention?

Mr. MacEachen: Well, I do not think there was a government in the normal sense. As I understand the situation, Mr. Bishop was the Prime Minister. He had a cabinet and that constituted the Government of Grenada. He was subsequently deposed and murdered, and I would not regard the successor group as a government. We certainly did not recognize the government, nor did anybody else. So I just take a very practical view and say that there was no government on Grenada in the normal sense. Now, was there any constitutional authority? Was there any personage who could speak with whatever authority which existed? Presumably one could

[Translation]

M. MacEachen: J'ai examiné cette question, M. Sinclair, au cours de ma réunion avec M. Dam et par la suite, et je n'ai rien entendu qui permettrait au gouvernement de dire maintenant que l'invasion était justifiée. Nous essayons de souscrire aux principes du droit international. L'invasion d'un pays par un autre est assurément un événement qui ne peut être expliqué par une série de circonstances, si déplaisantes soient-elles, qui surviennent dans un pays et dérangent ses voisins. Si cela constituait les principes du droit international, je pense que nous serions tous des victimes potentielles d'une invasion.

Je crois qu'il est important pour un pays comme le Canada d'adopter une attitude très ferme envers ces principes. Je suis d'accord avec vous qu'il y a certaines circonstances dont il faut tenir compte. L'une d'elles, bien sûr, est le fait que, comme vous l'avez dit, la majorité du peuple de Grenade semble en faveur de la présence américaine.

En réponse à votre question, je dirai qu'il ne nous est pas possible de dire maintenant: oui, nous pensons que l'invasion était justifiée et, donc, nous la soutenons. À l'heure actuelle, nous nous préoccupons de contribuer de façon constructive à ce qui peut être fait dans l'avenir à Grenade et certainement à ce qui peut être fait pour distinguer ce qui est arrivé à Grenade d'autres événements internationaux que nous avons vertement critiqués.

Nous nous sommes opposés aux interventions dans différentes parties du monde. Nous nous sommes opposés, et nous le faisons toujours, à l'occupation de pays par d'autres pays. Il me semble que plus tôt les Américains trouveront possible de quitter Grenade, mieux cela sera pour nous tous—et assurément, selon moi, mieux cela sera pour les États-Unis.

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, j'apprécie que le ministre admette que plus de 50 p. 100, certains disent même 90 p. 100, des Grenadiens sont tout à fait d'accord avec l'intervention, l'ont très bien accueillie, la qualifient d'opération de secours; d'autres disent que la liberté leur a été rendue. Dans ce contexte, monsieur le ministre, pourriez-vous dire au comité qui pensez-vous réellement pouvait parler pour Grenade pendant cette période d'anarchie de fait? Était-ce le Gouverneur général Scoon, ou était-ce M. Coard, ou peut-être M. Austin? Qui pensez-vous, lorsque vous utilisez le terme d'invasion, exerçait vraiment le gouvernement, ou le semblant de quelque gouvernement que ce soit à Grenade au moment où M. Scoon a demandé de l'aide et que la réponse des nations des Caraïbes et des États-Unis a conduit à l'intervention?

M. MacEachen: Eh bien, je ne pense pas que c'était un gouvernement tel qu'on l'entend normalement. À ce que je sache, M. Bishop était le premier ministre. Il présidait un cabinet qui constituait le gouvernement de la Grenade. Il a été par la suite destitué et assassiné et je ne considère pas le groupe qui lui a succédé comme un gouvernement. Nous n'avons certainement pas reconnu officiellement ce gouvernement et personne d'autre ne l'a fait. C'est pourquoi j'adopte une attitude très pragmatique en déclarant qu'il n'y avait pas de gouvernement à la Grenade, au sens normal du terme. Mais existait-il une autorité constitutionnelle? Y avait-il quelqu'un représentant ce qu'il restait d'autorité? On pourrait présumer

[Texte]

say that the governor general was such a person. But I would not say that he was the government.

• 1605

Mr. Stevens: Through you, Mr. Chairman: Then whether we call it the government, Mr. Minister, or the constitutional authority, or whatever terminology you want to use, my question was: Who did you feel had the right to speak for Grenada? I think you are perhaps indicating your answer . . .

If you read the Grenadian Constitution, which I am sure you have, you will see that the clauses that Governor General Scoon invoked do appear to give him residual power in certain circumstances. What I am saying to you is to ask: How can you persist in using this word "invasion" when those who went in felt they were responding to the last, if you like, constitutional authority, or to the person who at least appeared to be able to speak for the people of Grenada?

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Chairman, suppose we both acknowledge that the governor general did occupy a position of authority or of constitutional status. I have been very interested in knowing in what form, and when, an alleged request from the governor general was transitted, to whom, and in what form. I must say that has not been made clear at all. I certainly asked Mr. Dam that question and to provide some details about in what form and when the request for an invasion was made, and I still regard myself rather in the dark on that point.

The Chairman: Your last question for this time, Mr. Stevens.

Mr. Stevens: Okay, maybe I could make it a two-pronged question, partly as the result of the minister's comment.

Mr. Minister, have you had an opportunity to review the task force report of the Secretary General of the United Nations with respect to Grenada? There he specifically deals with the very thing you say you have no knowledge of. That is how Governor General Scoon spoke for Grenada, and he sets out photostatic copies of their constitution. I am sure you will find, if you have not already read it, that it is most helpful in bringing you up to speed on what actually took place there.

My second question is this: In the context in which we have been discussing this matter, I would like you to now reflect on what your associate, Mr. Pepin, said when we asked him, prior to the intervention, what were the intentions of the Government of Canada with respect to recognizing the government, or whatever was going to be constituted as a government in Grenada. These are his direct words in reply, and I quote: "After a period of time the facts of life are accepted and recognition is given".

[Traduction]

que le gouverneur général remplissait un tel rôle, mais je ne dirais pas qu'il constituait le gouvernement.

M. Stevens: Je pose cette question par votre entremise, monsieur le président. Quel que soit le terme employé, monsieur le ministre, que l'on parle de gouvernement, d'autorité constitutionnelle ou de quoi que ce soit d'autre, ma question était la suivante: Selon vous, qui était habilité à représenter la Grenade? Je crois que vous indiquez peut-être dans votre réponse . . .

Dans la constitution de la Grenade, que vous avez certainement lue, on constate que les articles évoqués par le gouverneur général Scoon semblent effectivement lui accorder le pouvoir résiduel en certaines circonstances. Ce que je vous demande en fait, c'est pourquoi vous persistez à parler d'une invasion, alors que les gens qui ont débarqué étaient d'avis qu'ils répondaient à un appel de la dernière autorité constitutionnelle, pour reprendre votre expression, ou à tout le moins à un appel de la personne qui semblait habilitée à représenter le peuple de la Grenade?

M. MacEachen: Monsieur le président, prenons tous les deux pour acquis que le gouverneur général représentait effectivement l'autorité ou qu'il occupait un poste reconnu par la constitution. J'aurais beaucoup aimé savoir quand et de quelle manière un supposé message du gouverneur général aurait été transmis et à qui il l'aurait été. Je dois avouer que cela n'a pas du tout été expliqué. J'ai posé cette question à M. Dam, pour obtenir des détails sur la façon dont une demande d'invasion avait été formulée et quand elle aurait été transmise et je n'en sais toujours pas plus long.

Le président: Votre dernière question pour le moment, monsieur Stevens.

M. Stevens: Très bien, j'aimerais peut-être poser une question en deux volets, en partie à cause de la réponse du Ministre.

Monsieur le ministre, avez-vous eu l'occasion de lire le rapport du groupe de travail du secrétaire général des Nations Unies sur la Grenade? On y traite précisément de cette question même au sujet de laquelle vous dites ne rien savoir. C'est la façon dont le gouverneur général Scoon a parlé au nom de la Grenade et il y a des photocopies de leur constitution. Si vous ne l'avez pas déjà lu, je suis certain que vous pourriez très rapidement vous mettre à jour sur ce qui s'est réellement déroulé là-bas.

Ma deuxième question est la suivante: dans le cadre des présentes discussions, j'aimerais avoir votre opinion sur les déclarations de votre collègue, M. Pépin, à qui nous avons demandé, avant l'intervention, quelles étaient les intentions du gouvernement du Canada à l'égard de la reconnaissance éventuelle du gouvernement ou de ce qui constituerait un gouvernement à la Grenade. Il nous a répondu textuellement qu'après un certain temps, il faut accepter la réalité et reconnaître les gouvernements.

[Text]

• 1610

I would like you to perhaps tell the committee if you agree with Mr. Pepin's statement that it was, in fact, likely that after a decent period of time, as he indicated, those who had pulled the coup in Grenada would be recognized by Canada. If you feel that, perhaps you can tell us how you could ever have justified that, when we now learn of the brutal murdering of various cabinet ministers and civilians that took place on that island, the method by which they seized power, and of course the presence of the Cuban and Soviet military to the extent that presumably people were not aware of, to the degree at least prior to the intervention.

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Chairman, on the first point, the member referred to the report of the Secretary General of the United Nations . . .

Mr. Stevens: No, his task force.

Mr. MacEachen: —or his task force. I do not think there is in that report any clarification of how the invitation or an alleged invitation from Governor General Scoon was made and in what form. But I will be happy to review it again.

It is a fact of life, as the Minister of State for External Affairs says, that ultimately even those who take power by force, because they are in effective control of the country, are recognized. I do not know if that would take place in this case. I think you are asking me to speculate upon a series of events which have not taken place.

But I think there are a number of countries, if one examined the situation closely, where you would find we and other countries have recognized heads of government or governments which have come into power by coups and by deposing their predecessors. So I do not think, on the general principle, Mr. Pepin should be criticized or condemned. What would have happened in this particular case is unknown.

Mr. Dupras: Could I have a supplementary on this question of consultation, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: A very short supplementary, otherwise it is a free-for-all.

Mr. Dupras: Yes. I wonder if the minister would tell us whether it contravenes the dispositions of the NATO charter for a country to invade another country without consultation with members of the region. Furthermore, does it contravene also the understanding between the nations of what are the dispositions of the U.N. Charter and whether or not it would be expected from an ally such as the U.S. to consult Canada before invading another country of the Commonwealth?

Mr. MacEachen: My legal advisers in the department have stated that in their view the action taken by the United States could not be justified in international law. That is their view.

[Translation]

J'aimerais que vous disiez au Comité si vous étiez d'accord avec la déclaration de M. Pépin, soit qu'en fait, il est probable qu'après un intervalle raisonnable, le Canada reconnaisse officiellement l'autorité des auteurs du coup d'État à la Grenade. Si vous étiez de cet avis, vous pourriez peut-être nous expliquer de quelle façon vous croyez pouvoir jamais justifier une telle position, maintenant que nous sommes au courant de l'assassinat brutal de plusieurs membres du cabinet et de civils, de la méthode utilisée pour saisir le pouvoir et bien sûr de la présence de militaires soviétiques et cubains dans une proportion que les gens ne connaissaient présument pas, du moins jusqu'à l'intervention.

M. MacEachen: Monsieur le président, en premier lieu, le député a mentionné le rapport du secrétaire général des Nations Unies . . .

M. Stevens: Non, de son groupe de travail.

M. MacEachen: . . . ou de son groupe de travail. Je ne crois pas que ce rapport nous donne des éclaircissements quelconques sur l'invitation ou la présumée invitation lancée par le gouverneur général Scoon et sur sa forme, mais je serai heureux de le relire.

Comme le déclarait le ministre d'État aux Affaires extérieures, c'est une réalité de la vie que l'on finit par reconnaître officiellement les gouvernements, même ceux des personnes qui ont pris le pouvoir par la force, car ce sont eux qui contrôlent effectivement le pays. Je ne sais pas si nous agissons ainsi dans la situation qui nous occupe, car je crois que vous me demandez de spéculer sur des événements qui ne se sont pas encore déroulés.

Néanmoins, je crois qu'il existe plusieurs pays, à bien y penser, dont le chef d'État ou le gouvernement est arrivé au pouvoir par un coup d'État ou en destituant leur prédécesseur et qui ont été reconnus officiellement par notre pays et d'autres. Je ne crois donc pas que l'on puisse condamner ou critiquer M. Pépin quant au principe général de la chose. Nous ne savons pas encore ce qui se produira dans le cas particulier qui nous occupe.

M. Dupras: Monsieur le président, puis-je poser une question supplémentaire sur cette question de la consultation?

Le président: Une très brève question, sinon nous sombrons dans l'anarchie.

M. Dupras: Merci. J'aimerais savoir du ministre s'il va à l'encontre des dispositions de la charte de l'OTAN qu'un pays en envahisse un autre sans consulter les pays membres de la région. De plus, est-ce qu'une telle situation va à l'encontre de l'interprétation acceptée des dispositions de la charte de l'ONU et devrait-on s'attendre à ce qu'un allié, tel que les États-Unis, consulte le Canada avant d'envahir un autre pays membre du Commonwealth?

M. MacEachen: Les conseillers juridiques de mon ministère m'ont déclaré que les mesures prises par les États-Unis ne se justifient pas sur le plan du droit international. C'est là leur avis.

[Texte]

Mr. Dupras: It is mine also.

Mr. MacEachen: One ought to say in fairness that Mr. Dam, the under-secretary in the United States, takes a different view. He attempts to make a case that it was legal. I believe the legal case that has been built by my officers, and which I have not read in the last week or two, refers to the Charter of the United Nations, refers to the organization and the rules of the organization in the eastern Caribbean, that these do not justify the action.

I think the legality is a very important question, but I think there is also a political question to ask: Is it a good thing in this world, where we are attempting to establish conduct and mutual respect, to acknowledge that one country has the right to go into another and take over? That is a rather profound admission to make, and I personally do not want to make it.

• 1615

Mr. Stevens: But a coup is okay.

Mr. MacEachen: I deplore coups, Mr. Stevens. I would deplore one very much at the present time in Canada. But they do happen.

Mr. Stevens: Well, that one might be all right.

The Chairman: Thank you.

It is a good practice of this committee to recognize special guests. I have done that for many years, and I do recognize in the room many very distinguished members of the diplomatic corps. I welcome them very warmly: the ambassador of Somalia, the ambassador of Algeria, the ambassador of Iraq, the ambassador of the Arab League, representatives of the Egyptian, Lebanese, and Palestinian offices. So I welcome you all, gentlemen. I recognize everybody on an equal footing. I have no favourite. I am deeply honoured that you follow our activities so closely.

The next on our list is the honourable critic of the New Democratic Party, Dr. Pauline Jewett, please.

Miss Jewett: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I too thank the minister for being with us today, although I would have hoped it could have been for three hours rather than one, since there are so many things we would like to discuss with him, and since answers often are rather convoluted and therefore one has to repeat one's questions sometimes, Mr. Chairman. I say this, of course, in a spirit of friendliness to the minister, but also frustration.

On this question of invasion, of course there has been some history of American invasion in this part of the world, and particularly in Central America. Indeed, as I documented in a speech I made in the House the other day, there was a plan for the invasion of Grenada some time ago, three years ago—Ocean Venture was the code name...—and indeed the purpose then was to remove the government of Maurice Bishop and the New Jewel Movement. So it is not anything new.

[Traduction]

M. Dupras: C'est également le mien.

M. MacEachen: En toute justice, je dois préciser que M. Dam, le sous-secrétaire américain, est d'avis différent et qu'il tente de prouver que ces mesures se justifient juridiquement. Je crois que l'argument de mes conseillers juridiques, que je n'ai pas relu depuis une semaine ou deux, se fonde sur la charte des Nations Unies et sur l'organisation et les règles d'organisation des Petites Antilles et que dans ce contexte, les mesures ne se justifient pas.

Je crois que l'aspect juridique revêt une grande importance, mais je crois que nous devons également nous poser une question politique: dans ce monde où nous tentons d'en arriver à un respect mutuel, est-il bien d'admettre qu'un pays a le droit d'aller dans un autre pays et d'en prendre le contrôle? C'est une question très grave et personnellement, je ne désire pas avoir à y répondre.

M. Stevens: Mais un coup d'état est acceptable.

M. MacEachen: Je déplore l'existence des coups d'état, monsieur Stevens. Je serais très malheureux s'il y avait maintenant un coup d'état au Canada, mais ce sont des choses qui arrivent.

M. Stevens: Ce ne serait peut-être pas si mal.

Le président: Merci.

Ce comité a l'heureuse habitude de saluer des invités spéciaux. Je le fais depuis plusieurs années et je reconnais dans la salle plusieurs membres éminents du corps diplomatique. Je souhaite donc chaleureusement la bienvenue à l'ambassadeur de Somalie, à l'ambassadeur d'Algérie, à l'ambassadeur de l'Iraq, à l'ambassadeur de la Ligue arabe et aux représentants des délégations égyptienne, libanaise et palestinienne. Je vous salue donc tous, messieurs, sur un pied d'égalité, sans favoritisme. C'est un grand honneur pour moi de vous voir suivre nos activités de si près.

L'intervenant suivant sur notre liste est l'honorable critique du nouveau parti démocratique, M^{lle} Pauline Jewett. Je vous laisse la parole.

Mlle Jewett: Merci, monsieur le président.

J'aimerais moi aussi remercier le ministre d'être venu aujourd'hui, même si j'avais espéré qu'il reste trois heures plutôt qu'une seule, car nous avons de nombreux sujets à aborder avec lui et les réponses sont souvent compliquées, monsieur le président, ce qui nous oblige parfois à répéter nos questions. Évidemment, mes remarques partent d'un sentiment amical à l'endroit du ministre, mais également d'un sentiment de frustration.

Sur cette question d'invasion, il existe évidemment certains précédents d'invasions américaines dans cette partie du monde, en particulier en Amérique centrale. En fait, dans mes recherches en vue de mon discours en Chambre l'autre jour, j'ai découvert qu'il existait un plan pour une invasion de la Grenade il y a trois ans, portant le nom de code *Ocean Venture*, et dont l'objectif était de déposer le gouvernement de

[Text]

The reason Grenadians—they would never have welcomed it had it come while Maurice Bishop was still in power, I can assure you. They welcome it now, as Susan White of Oxfam said—and this was reported in *The Citizen* yesterday—they welcomed the end of the ruling military council's reign of terror, but they do not welcome the end of the socialist revolution inspired by the former Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop. I would hope the government would keep us quite fully informed of the degree to which the U.S. military is in effect undermining some of the goals that had already been reached by the socialist revolution, by the former prime minister, in what is effectively their military administration of the country. I would have hoped we would have some assurance that the aid program, for example, from the U.S., which is now being overseen by the U.S. military, would pursue the directions that the very popular New Jewel Movement was itself pursuing.

Secondly, when the minister talks about the fallout of the Grenada crisis in his prepared remarks, he talks about the fallout on the Commonwealth Caribbean, and of course that is a matter with which we are all concerned. But I wonder if he has also addressed himself—I am sure he has, if he will share his thoughts with us—to two other aspects of the fall-out of the invasion of Grenada.

One is the enormous increase in U.S. presidential power in this matter of using its military forces to invade another country—Congress itself, of course, as the minister knows, is increasingly concerned about this, as we gather over the discussion of the War Powers Act—the enormous increase in presidential and military power without any of the checks and balances operating that usually do operate in the American system: their power, for example, to close the whole operation to the media for the first two or three days, which the media itself, of course, in the United States is very concerned about; the power to decide not to consult Canada; all the other things that have happened.

Is the minister, in his talks with Mr. Shultz, expressing any of our concerns, concerns we share with many members of the U.S. Congress, about this enormous increase in power? It makes everything a fait accompli. We cannot really have any democratic input, given the trend of the use of presidential power and military invasion. I would hope that our concern would have been expressed about that, just as Congress has expressed its concern.

• 1620

The second aspect of the fall-out of the invasion of Grenada about which I would like the minister to discuss deals with the implications for further destabilization and a possible invasion of Nicaragua. At the same time, just as there was a plan, many years ago, for the invasion of Grenada by the United States or by forces inspired by the United States, so now there is very probably a plan to inspire an invasion of Nicaragua. U.S. military aid to the Contras is growing and increasing.

[Translation]

Maurice Bishop et d'éliminer le *New Jewel Movement*. Il n'y a donc rien de nouveau dans cette initiative.

Cependant, je puis vous assurer que les Grenadins n'auraient jamais accueilli favorablement une telle invasion si Maurice Bishop était toujours au pouvoir. Comme l'indiquait Susan White d'Oxfam, et comme on le rapportait dans le *Citizen* d'hier, les gens ont bien accueilli la fin du régime de terreur du conseil militaire, et non la fin de la révolution socialiste inspirée par le regretté premier ministre, Maurice Bishop. J'espère que le gouvernement nous tiendra pleinement au courant de la mesure dans laquelle les militaires américains mineront concrètement certains des objectifs déjà atteints par la révolution socialiste du regretté premier ministre, dans le cadre de ce qui est en fait une administration militaire du pays. Ainsi, j'aurais aimé que l'on nous assure que le programme d'aide maintenant supervisé par l'armée américaine et comportant entre autres une aide américaine ira dans le même sens que celui du très populaire *New Jewel Movement*.

En deuxième lieu, lorsque le ministre traitait dans son exposé des retombées de la crise de la Grenade, il visait les retombées pour les Antilles du Commonwealth et cette question nous préoccupe tous évidemment. Mais je me demandais s'il avait aussi étudié deux autres aspects des retombées de l'invasion de la Grenade. Je suis certain qu'il l'a fait et j'aimerais qu'il nous fasse part de son opinion.

Le premier aspect est celui de l'accroissement énorme des pouvoirs présidentiels américains dans ce recours aux forces militaires pour l'invasion d'un autre pays—comme le ministre le sait, le Congrès est de plus en plus préoccupé par cette question, au moment d'étudier le *War Powers Act*—cet énorme accroissement du pouvoir présidentiel et militaire sans aucun des contrôles habituels du système américain; par exemple, le pouvoir de cacher toute l'opération aux médias pendant les deux ou trois premiers jours, ce qui inquiète évidemment beaucoup les médias américains, le pouvoir de décider de ne pas consulter le Canada et toutes les autres choses qui se sont produites.

Dans ses conversations avec M. Shultz, est-ce que le ministre exprime nos inquiétudes à l'égard de cet énorme accroissement de pouvoir, inquiétudes que nous partageons avec plusieurs membres du Congrès américain? Cette façon de procéder nous place devant un fait accompli. Le jeu de la démocratie ne peut pas vraiment s'exercer, avec cette tendance du recours aux pouvoirs présidentiels et à l'invasion militaire. J'espère que nos préoccupations à cet égard ont été communiquées, tout comme le Congrès a exprimé les siennes.

Le deuxième aspect des retombées de l'invasion de la Grenade, que j'aimerais voir aborder par le Ministre, touche son incidence sur une déstabilisation accrue et la possibilité d'une invasion au Nicaragua. Tout comme il y avait il y a quelques années un plan pour l'invasion de la Grenade par les États-Unis ou des forces soutenues par les Américains, il existe maintenant fort probablement un plan portant sur une invasion du Nicaragua. L'aide militaire américaine aux Contras ne cesse de croître.

[Texte]

Will the minister tell us what he is doing in his discussions not only with the U.S., but also with the neighbouring countries, particularly Venezuela and Panama? Panama is in the unusual position of being a member of both the contadora group and of the condeca group—one hoping to find peace in the region and the other making military plans in the region. I am told that although Venezuela is only a member of the contadora group, it also is involved and has been involved in condeca group meetings. So I would like to know what communications the minister or his department have had, particularly with Venezuela and Panama.

Finally . . .

The Chairman: Which question do you want first?

Miss Jewett: They are all highly related. I understand that an evacuation plan for Canadian nationals in Nicaragua has been devised in conjunction with the United States embassy in Managua and the Canadians have been asked to submit details of their residences, including maps and so on. Can the minister tell us why Canada is working with the U.S. embassy in Managua to presumably, at some point that may not be all that far away, evacuate our nationals in Nicaragua?

The Chairman: *Monsieur le ministre.*

Mr. MacEachen: The fall-out on the Commonwealth Caribbean is of interest, as you pointed out. There has been a division of opinion within the region. There were those states who participated in the invasion and those which opposed it. Presumably, if the process of economic and political co-operation is to proceed and continue, there has to be a process of healing. I hope this process will begin with the Commonwealth heads of government, where all the main actors will be present and where they will have an opportunity at least to attempt to resolve their differences.

I must say, Mr. Chairman, that what Dr. Jewett describes as the enormous increase in presidential power is not something for me to raise with the United States authorities. They have a constitution and they should be left with the responsibility of sorting out these trends within their own country. I think it would be a bit presumptuous to blow the whistle and tell Mr. Shultz: Hey, the president is taking too much power from the Senate and the Congress. I have other things that I have to deal with where I do have a greater right to intervene, but I would not feel very comfortable on that point. Maybe I am wrong, but this is how I think about it.

You asked about the possibility of a further destabilization of Central America and what particularly would happen with respect to Nicaragua. I think the action in Grenada did raise concerns in that part of the world. It was following Grenada that the Mexican foreign minister visited Ottawa, and he certainly was concerned about what the impact would be, and indeed whether the prospects were increased for any American action against Nicaragua.

[Traduction]

Le Ministre peut-il nous dire ce qu'il en est de ses discussions non seulement avec les États-Unis, mais également avec les pays voisins, en particulier le Venezuela et Panama? Le Panama se trouve dans la situation bizarre de faire partie à la fois du groupe condeca, l'un essayant de promouvoir la paix dans la région et l'autre mettant au point des plans militaires. J'ai appris que bien que le Venezuela ne soit membre que du groupe contadora, il participe également à des réunions du groupe condeca. J'aimerais donc savoir ce qu'a appris le Ministre ou son ministère, en particulier du Venezuela et du Panama.

Finalement . . .

Le président: Quelle question désirez-vous poser en premier lieu?

Mlle Jewett: Elles sont toutes très liées. J'ai appris qu'un plan d'évacuation des ressortissants canadiens au Nicaragua avait été mis au point en collaboration avec l'ambassade américaine à Managua et que l'on avait demandé à des Canadiens des détails sur leurs résidences, avec des cartes et autres détails du genre. Le Ministre peut-il nous dire pourquoi le Canada travaille-t-il avec l'ambassade américaine à Managua en vue présumément, dans un avenir peut-être proche, d'évacuer nos ressortissants au Nicaragua?

Le président: Mr. Minister

M. MacEachen: Comme vous l'avez dit, les retombées pour les Antilles du Commonwealth présentent un intérêt certain. Les avis sont partagés dans la région. Certains états ont participé à l'invasion et les autres s'y sont opposés. On peut présumer que si le processus de coopération économique et politique se maintient, la situation reviendra à la normale. J'espère que ce processus débutera avec les chefs des états membres du Commonwealth, en présence de tous les intervenants avec au moins la possibilité de tenter d'aplanir leurs divergences d'opinion.

Je dois déclarer, M. le Président, que ce que M^{me} Jewett décrit comme un accroissement énorme des pouvoirs présidentiels ne constitue pas une question qu'il me revient de soulever auprès des autorités américaines. Ils ont leur constitution et c'est à eux qu'il revient de s'occuper de ces tendances dans leur propre pays. Je crois qu'il serait présomptueux de notre part de lancer un cri d'alarme et de dire à M. Schultz, attention, votre président enlève trop de pouvoir au Congrès et au Sénat. J'ai d'autres problèmes à régler qui relèvent plus de mon ressort et je ne serais pas très à l'aise pour aborder ce point. J'ai peut-être tort, mais c'est là mon opinion.

Vous avez mentionné la possibilité d'une déstabilisation accrue en Amérique centrale, en particulier la situation au Nicaragua. Je crois que l'intervention à la Grenade a en effet suscité des inquiétudes dans cette partie du monde. C'est après cette intervention que le ministre des Affaires extérieures du Mexique a visité Ottawa et il était certainement préoccupé par les répercussions éventuelles de ces mesures et même en effet sur la possibilité accrue de mesures américaines visant le Nicaragua.

[Text]

• 1625

I had a chance to ask Mr. Dam that question last Tuesday, and he made very much the same general point; namely, I hope this is not a prelude to an invasion of Nicaragua. I was assured there were no plans to take that action. In fact, Mr. Dam gave me a speech he had recently given, in which he supported very strongly the contadora initiative, and I think that is where the emphasis ought to be: on that initiative and the hope it can succeed so that demilitarization in Central America would occur.

So on that point . . .

You raise the question of co-operation with the American embassy in Managua. I will have to get information on that, because I do not have any information on that.

Mr. Bosley: Why do you not just ask the official to say it, Mr. Minister?

Mr. MacEachen: Well, it is very brief and I will say it for him. I am assured it is normal consular practice to co-operate with friendly governments if there is any possible danger or disaster or threat to Canadian lives. I think that is a fairly sensible precaution.

Miss Jewett: That is not very satisfactory. What about Venezuela and Panama?

Mr. MacEachen: Well, if you ask me about Venezuela and Panama, I have not had any contacts personally with either of these authorities since my visit to the U.N. General Assembly in New York earlier in the fall. I did have a very long conversation with the contadora ministers, including Panama, about the situation in Central America, but beyond that, I have not had recent contacts. But I would be happy to hear from the member as to what she has in mind as to how we might benefit or what we might put to these countries.

Miss Jewett: It is concerning the condeca group, this newly discovered group . . .

The Chairman: Please, louder, Miss Jewett.

Miss Jewett: I particularly ask about the information you have received about the activities of what is called the condeca group, which is Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador and Panama, and I am told even Venezuela was present at their meetings.

Mr. MacEachen: I take it the member is concerned about this renewed military organization . . .

Miss Jewett: Yes.

Mr. MacEachen: —or at least renewal—revival is probably a better word—of this particular group. Probably the three countries she has mentioned are the principal ones. I do not think Panama is involved, but I can inquire.

I think overshadowing or hopefully overcoming this particular manifestation would be the efforts that are being made by the contadora group. Certainly the Mexican foreign minister had some optimism, at least to the point where he felt

[Translation]

J'ai eu l'occasion de poser cette question à M. Dam mardi dernier et il m'a répondu dans le même sens, c'est-à-dire qu'il espère que cette intervention n'est pas un prélude à une invasion du Nicaragua. Il m'a assuré qu'il n'existait aucun plan à cet effet et il m'a même remis une copie d'un discours qu'il avait prononcé récemment, dans lequel il appuyait fermement l'initiative contadora et je crois que c'est en ce sens qu'il faut agir, c'est-à-dire encourager cette initiative et espérer son succès en vue d'une démilitarisation de l'Amérique centrale.

A ce sujet donc . . .

Vous soulevez la question de la collaboration avec l'ambassade américaine à Managua. Il faudra que je me renseigne à ce sujet car je ne suis pas au courant.

M. Bosley: Pourquoi ne le demandez-vous pas à votre fonctionnaire?

M. MacEachen: La réponse est très brève et je puis la donner en son nom. On m'assure qu'il s'agit d'une pratique consulaire courante que de collaborer avec des gouvernements amis s'il existe un danger quelconque, une possibilité de désastre ou une menace à l'endroit de la vie de Canadiens. Je crois qu'il s'agit là d'une précaution bien logique.

Mlle Jewett: Votre réponse n'est pas très satisfaisante. Pouvez-vous nous parler du Venezuela et de Panama.

M. MacEachen: Eh bien, quant à Panama et au Venezuela, je n'ai pas eu de contacts personnels avec leurs autorités respectives depuis ma visite à l'assemblée générale des Nations Unies à New York, plus tôt cet automne. J'ai alors discuté très longuement de la situation en Amérique centrale avec les ministres contadora, dont celui de Panama, mais je n'ai pas eu d'autres contacts depuis. Je serai cependant heureux d'entendre votre avis sur ce que nous pourrions apporter ou suggérer à ces pays.

Mlle Jewett: Il s'agit du groupe condeca, dont l'existence a été apprise récemment . . .

Le président: Un peu plus fort, s'il vous plaît, M^{lle} Jewett.

Mlle Jewett: J'aimerais plus particulièrement savoir ce que vous avez appris sur les activités du groupe dit condeca, qui comprend le Guatemala, le Honduras, le Salvador et Panama, et j'ai appris que même le Venezuela assistait à leurs réunions.

M. MacEachen: Je suppose que vous vous préoccupez de renouveau de cette organisation militaire . . .

Mlle Jewett: En effet.

M. MacEachen: —ou plutôt, ce que l'on pourrait mieux qualifier de résurrection de ce groupe particulier. Les trois premiers pays mentionnés sont probablement les principaux membres. Je ne crois pas que le Panama en fasse partie, mais je peux me renseigner.

Je crois que les efforts du groupe contadora pourraient limiter et même, espérons-le, annuler ceux de cette organisation. En tout cas, le ministre mexicain des Affaires extérieures a manifesté un certain optimisme, allant jusqu'à estimer qu'il

[Texte]

it was an effort that required support. He appreciated the support we were giving to the contadora group politically, and intimated that if assistance were required from Canada they would come to Canada. But up to the present they did not have any concrete proposals to put before us.

• 1630

The Chairman: A very last short question, Dr. Jewett.

Miss Jewett: What further measures does the minister feel Canada can take to halt what looks like increasing militarization being proceeded with by chiefly the United States, but in conjunction with others in Central America through this condeca group? Is he not taken somewhat by the urgency of the situation? We do not once again to wake up and find an invasion has taken place.

Mr. MacEachen: Well, I agree with the hon. member. What we would not like is to find another invasion; I think it would be further evidence of breakdown. I think my answer has to be precisely the same to the hon. member in that we can assist by getting behind the only credible regional effort that has a chance of success.

As the hon. member knows, there has been worked out a very detailed set of principles to which all countries have subscribed, including the Central American countries. What is required now is to attempt to have these principles implemented. One of the principles, as the hon. member also knows, is the process of military demilitarization. I believe that what we can do, and what other countries can do, is to try to get behind and give more international support to that process. You know, the President of the United States in April, in an address to Congress, said they were ready to withdraw when others were ready and they could be assured that others would move out. I find it surprising that since that time there has not been stronger international pressure to have that effort continued or that commitment realized. But I do not think there are any new ways, Mr. Chairman, to help that situation.

The Chairman: Thank you both. Next questioner is the vice-chairman of the committee, Madam Appolloni, please. The second questioner for the Liberals will be Mr. Dupras, and then I will recognize a member of the Official Opposition, as I have indicated. Madam Appolloni, please.

Mrs. Appolloni: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In view of the very deep interest on the part of all of us here in the Grenadian situation, I almost hesitate to change the subject. But because of your timetable, Mr. Minister, we do not get a chance to meet with you as often as most of us would like. Therefore, I wonder if I could direct your thoughts to another hemisphere, and discuss for a few moments the Pacific rim, Mr. Minister.

As you are probably aware, in October of this year there was a joint meeting of the Senate Standing Committee on

[Traduction]

s'agit d'une initiative digne d'encouragement. Il a apprécié l'appui politique accordé par le Canada au groupe contadora et laissé entendre que s'ils avaient besoin d'une aide du Canada, ils viendraient la demander. Toutefois, maintenant, ils ne nous ont pas présenté de propositions concrètes.

Le président: Une dernière question très brève, mademoiselle Jewett.

Mlle Jewett: Selon le ministre, quelles autres mesures pourrait prendre le Canada pour freiner ce qui semble une militarisation accrue, surtout stimulée par les États-Unis, mais en collaboration avec d'autres éléments en Amérique centrale par l'entremise de ce groupe condeca? N'est-il pas impressionné par le caractère urgent de la situation? Nous ne voulons pas nous réveiller un autre matin pour découvrir qu'il y a une nouvelle invasion.

M. MacEachen: Je suis d'accord avec madame le député. Nous ne voudrions pas découvrir une nouvelle invasion, je crois qu'il s'agirait d'un symptôme encore plus grave de détérioration de la situation. Je crois que je ne puis donner que la même réponse, soit que nous pouvons contribuer en appuyant le seul effort régional crédible qui ait des chances de réussite.

Comme vous le savez, on a mis au point un ensemble de principes très précis qui a été accepté par tous les pays, y compris ceux de l'Amérique centrale. Il faut maintenant trouver un moyen de faire mettre en pratique ces principes. Comme vous le savez également, la démilitarisation constitue l'un de ces principes. Je crois que ce que notre pays et d'autres peuvent faire, c'est d'appuyer ce processus et de lui donner un plus grand soutien international. Vous savez, dans un discours prononcé devant le Congrès en avril, le président américain a déclaré qu'ils étaient prêts à se retirer lorsqu'ils seraient assurés que les autres le feraient. Je trouve surprenant que depuis cette déclaration, il n'y ait pas eu de plus fortes pressions internationales pour le maintien de cet effort ou la réalisation de cet engagement. Mais je ne crois pas, monsieur le président, qu'il existe de nouvelles façons de remédier à la situation.

Le président: Je vous remercie tous les deux. Je cède maintenant la parole à M^{me} Appolloni, vice-présidente du Comité, qui sera suivie du deuxième intervenant pour les libéraux, M. Dupras, et je donnerai ensuite la parole à un membre de l'opposition officielle, comme je l'ai indiqué. Madame Appolloni, s'il vous plaît.

Mme Appolloni: Merci, monsieur le président.

Compte tenu de notre intérêt commun très marqué à l'endroit de la situation de la Grenade, j'hésite presque à changer de sujet. Toutefois, monsieur le ministre, votre horaire ne nous donne pas l'occasion de vous rencontrer aussi souvent que nous le souhaiterions. Par conséquent, je me demande si vous ne pourriez pas vous concentrer sur l'autre hémisphère et discuter quelques moments avec nous de la ceinture du Pacifique, monsieur le ministre.

Comme vous le savez probablement, notre Comité a tenu une réunion conjointe avec le Comité permanent du Sénat sur

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Foreign Affairs and our own committee here, at which we met with Derek Davies, editor of the very influential *Far Eastern Economic Review*. During that meeting with us, Mr. Minister, Mr. Davies recited quite a long litany of what he termed "Canada's long list of lost trade opportunities" with regard to the Pacific rim. Now obviously we are aware of the foundation that has been set up for the Pacific rim. Many of us wonder what is going to happen to that foundation. Is it going to get more authority? Is it going to get more money?

When he was reciting our inability to meet what he called "the challenges of Asia"—particularly the region in terms of growth and why Canada should not be more aggressive in investing in the growth he sees in Asia, as opposed to Europe particularly, and in being more aggressive in our trade opportunities—he particularly mentioned Taiwan. If I may quote some of his sayings, as regards Taiwan he started with China and felt that:

It seems to me that after the impetus provided by the recognition of China Canada seems to have lost the economic thrust towards China.

He was particularly mentioning the opportunities lost by Canada partly as a result of a lack of government direction vis-à-vis China in trade matters. He mentioned particularly our protectionist policies as regards textiles and footwear, again speaking of failed opportunities.

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He regretted the lack of government thrust in setting up consortia to help small Canadian business people do more business with China and with the Pacific rim in general, but when he came to Taiwan—and here again I would like to quote him; I do not want to misquote him—he mentioned that even though the Chinese may not be very happy if Canada were to make more overtures toward Taiwan... He felt, however, that the Americans and the Japanese have been able to get away with putting in offices, which they call offices of cultural exchange, which basically, however, perform all the functions of embassies without calling themselves such, and the Americans and the Japanese get away with it very well.

My question to you in the Taiwanese situation, Mr. Minister, was whether or not this whole question of opening any office in Taiwan, irrespective of what it might be called, would be brought up in January when the Prime Minister of China visits Canada.

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Chairman, the member has asked whether when the Chinese Prime Minister comes to Canada we might raise the possibility of opening an official office in Taiwan to promote trade. That is possible. I certainly would not recommend it because I think the reaction of the Chinese Prime Minister would be immediate and direct because if there is any price we have had to pay, if you want to put it that way, for opening relations with the People's Republic of China that price is to refrain from in any way recognizing officially Taiwan. I think that in my experience in this job, now and

[Translation]

les affaires étrangères en octobre dernier et nous y avons rencontré M. Derek Davies, éditeur de la très influente *Far Eastern Economic Review*. Au cours de la réunion, M. Davies nous a récité une très longue liste de ce qu'il appelle des possibilités commerciales gaspillées par le Canada dans la ceinture du Pacifique. Nous savons maintenant que nous avons jeté les bases pour le commerce avec la ceinture du Pacifique et plusieurs d'entre nous se demandent ce que l'on fera de ces bases. Est-ce que ce secteur prendra de l'importance? Est-ce que l'on y consacrera plus d'argent?

Lorsqu'il récitait sa liste des occasions ratées de relever ce qu'il appelait les défis de l'Asie, en particulier la croissance de la région et le manque de dynamisme du Canada dans l'investissement dans cette croissance qu'il perçoit en Asie, plutôt qu'en Europe en particulier, il a mentionné plus précisément Taiwan. Si je peux me permettre de citer certaines de ses paroles, pour ce qui est de Taiwan, il a commencé par la Chine en disant:

Il me semble que le Canada a perdu son orientation économique envers la Chine après l'enthousiasme que la reconnaissance de ce pays a créé.

Il mentionnait en particulier les occasions manquées par le Canada en partie à cause de l'absence de direction du gouvernement vis-à-vis de la Chine en matière de commerce. Il visait particulièrement nos politiques protectionnistes sur les textiles et la chaussure, parlant encore une fois d'occasions manquées.

Il regrettait le manque d'initiative du gouvernement dans la mise sur pied d'un consortium qui aurait aidé la petite entreprise canadienne à traiter plus d'affaires avec la Chine et avec l'Asie en général, mais pour Taiwan—et j'aimerais le citer encore une fois; je ne veux pas le citer de travers—il a mentionné que même si les Chinois n'aimeraient pas beaucoup voir le Canada faire des ouvertures à Taiwan... Il croyait cependant que les Américains et les Japonais ont réussi à ouvrir des bureaux, qu'ils appellent des bureaux d'échanges culturels, mais qui sont en fait des ambassades sans en porter le nom, et les Américains et les Japonais ont réussi à ouvrir des bureaux, qu'ils appellent des bureaux d'échanges culturels, mais qui sont en fait des ambassades sans en porter le nom, et les Américains et les Japonais s'en sauvent très bien.

La question que je vous pose sur la situation de Taiwan, M. le ministre, est de savoir si oui ou non la question de l'ouverture d'un bureau à Taiwan, sans égard à ce qu'on l'appellera, sera soulevée en janvier lors de la visite du premier ministre de Chine au Canada?

M. MacEachen: Monsieur le président, le député a demandé si, lors de la visite du premier ministre de Chine au Canada, nous soulèverions la possibilité d'ouvrir un bureau officiel à Taiwan afin de promouvoir le commerce. C'est possible. Je ne le recommanderais certainement pas parce que je crois que la réaction du premier ministre chinois serait immédiate et directe, parce que si nous avons dû payer un prix, pour m'exprimer ainsi, pour ouvrir des relations avec la République populaire de Chine, ce prix était d'éviter de reconnaître officiellement Taiwan, d'une façon ou d'une autre. D'après

[Texte]

earlier, the Chinese have been very vigilant on that front. So I do not think there is any way we can make that proposal.

We do not raise objections to a chamber of commerce, which is a private organization in Canada, establishing an office in Taiwan to promote trade. There is substantial trade between Canada and Taiwan at present. It is not as if the field is totally uncultivated. But I think we have to face the fact that we cannot, if we want to maintain our relations with the People's Republic of China, depart from the commitments we made when we had that big negotiation with China in the 1970s.

The Asia Pacific Foundation is in place to the extent that we have provided seed money of I think \$500,000 to get it under way. We have selected a board of directors and a chairman, Mr. Brock, who is responsible to put in place the organization and to recommend sources of financial support for the Asia Pacific Foundation. So that is very much a live operation. I will be meeting with Mr. Brock, I hope, as soon as I can find the time, because he is eager to meet and to discuss the progress he has made up to the present time.

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Mrs. Appolloni: Just again on the Taiwan situation, Mr. Minister, you may be interested to hear that our guest said that by and large the Chinese are pragmatic; they realize that Taiwan exists. And further on he said: I think Canada has been far too doctrinaire in cutting off relations as far as it has with Taiwan. However, it is just the opinion of one, albeit very influential, person who lives in the Far East.

Mr. Minister, in view of the opportunities that do exist in the Pacific rim, would you consider giving this committee an order of reference to study the many, many routes that could be taken without any acrimony, political or otherwise, with the Pacific rim countries?

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Chairman, we attach a great deal of importance to the Pacific rim and to increasing our trade and commercial contacts, our cultural contacts. It is a part of the world in which we are concentrating, and to which we pay a lot of attention. We could say very much more about it in this discussion today, but if the committee is deeply concerned and interested in studying the Pacific rim and how our policy has evolved and what more we can do, then I would consider that. I have already, as you know, intimated that I would be prepared to make a reference, or to support a reference, to this committee to examine the overall question of peacekeeping. I am certainly open to that. I think that is an excellent topic.

Mr. Bosley: We knew that from the chairman.

Mr. MacEachen: And you have added a second one, the Pacific rim. You have been interested in Grenada, and I have suggested that I would sponsor a number of members to go there to fact-find or to gain impressions or draw conclusions,

[Traduction]

mon expérience dans cet emploi, actuelle et antérieure, les Chinois ont été très vigilants sur cette question. Je ne crois donc pas que nous puissions faire cette proposition.

Nous ne nous objectons pas à ce qu'une Chambre de commerce, qui serait une organisation privée au Canada, établisse un bureau de promotion commerciale à Taiwan. Il existe déjà un commerce important entre le Canada et Taiwan. Mais je crois que nous devons accepter le fait que, si nous voulons maintenir nos relations avec la République populaire de Chine, nous ne pouvons renier les engagements pris au moment des négociations avec la Chine dans les années 1970.

La Fondation de l'Asie du Pacifique n'existe que dans la mesure où nous avons avancé 500,000\$, je crois, pour la mettre sur pied. Nous avons choisi un Comité de direction et un président, M. Brock, qui est responsable de la mise sur pied de l'organisation et de recommander des sources de soutien financier pour la Fondation de l'Asie du Pacifique. C'est donc là une opération très active. J'espère rencontrer M. Brock aussitôt que j'en aurai le temps parce qu'il a hâte de me rencontrer pour discuter des progrès réalisés jusqu'à maintenant.

Mme Appolloni: Toujours sur la situation de Taiwan, monsieur le ministre, vous serez peut-être intéressé de savoir que notre invité disait qu'en général, les Chinois sont des pragmatiques: ils sont conscients que Taiwan existe. Et il a ajouté: Je crois que le Canada a été beaucoup trop dogmatique en coupant les liens aussi complètement avec Taiwan. Ce n'est là cependant l'opinion que d'une personne, bien que très influente, qui vit en Extrême-Orient.

Monsieur le ministre, étant donné les possibilités qui existent sur le littoral du Pacifique, accepteriez-vous de donner à ce Comité un mandat pour étudier les nombreuses voies qui pourraient être prises pour les pays du littoral du Pacifique sans créer de tensions, politiques ou autres?

M. MacEachen: Monsieur le président, nous attachons beaucoup d'importance au littoral du Pacifique et à l'augmentation du commerce et des contacts commerciaux, de nos contacts culturels. C'est une partie du monde sur laquelle nous nous concentrons et à laquelle nous donnons beaucoup d'attention. Nous pourrions en dire beaucoup plus dans cette discussion d'aujourd'hui, mais si le Comité est très préoccupé et intéressé par l'étude du littoral du Pacifique, de l'évolution de notre politique et de ce que nous pouvons faire de plus, je pourrais étudier cette question. Comme vous le savez, j'ai déjà dit que je serais prêt à donner un mandat, à appuyer un mandat, à ce Comité pour étudier toute la question du maintien de la paix. Je suis certainement ouvert à cela. Je crois que c'est là un excellent sujet.

M. Bosley: Le président nous avait dit cela.

M. MacEachen: Et vous en avez ajouté un second, le littoral du Pacifique. Vous vous êtes intéressés à Grenade, et j'ai suggéré que je recommanderais qu'un certain nombre de députés soient envoyés là-bas pour trouver les faits, obtenir des

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and I am still open to that, because I want the committee to be an active committee, and I have co-operated with it to the fullest.

The Chairman: Your last question, madam.

Mrs. Appolloni: If a delegation of parliamentarians were to go to Grenada, either now or in the very near future, Mr. Minister, according to you, how would you envisage that delegation reporting back to Parliament?

Mr. MacEachen: I think I got a question from a distinguished member who suggested that I agree to send a number of members to Grenada. I consulted and said, yes, I would be happy to send that group. I had suggested three or four, a representative from each party at least, and that group could go and report back. You ask how it could report to Parliament. I think there are ways of doing that. If that is the obstacle there would be a way of doing that; we could find a way.

The Chairman: Just to keep you up to date, yes, we have discussed, sir, in steering committee these two other references since June. I am prepared to act, but there have been so many changes from one party at least as to what we should study, but we are prepared to consider right away—I am prepared. I am waiting for a reply from one party to go ahead with the peacekeeping operation, and I think now the urgency of that is clear to everybody after the events in Cyprus. So I hope I will have unanimous consent, at least early on in the new session.

The Pacific rim was also a suggestion of mine in June. There was a lot of interest manifested. I see Mr. Wenman, and I thank him for acknowledging, because there are so many members from the west on this committee now. I think there is a great interest. I am ready to act, but I am ready to act only if I receive unanimous consent to put it to the minister. But now that I see he is receptive, I think we will act very promptly.

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Having said that, the minister said earlier on that I would have to wait 10 minutes, because I could proceed in the absence of the Official Opposition, unless I decided it was a general boycott. Then I would have to take my responsibility. But the minister had said he would stay until 4.30 p.m. Now I know he will kindly accept to stay at least until 5.00 p.m.

Mr. MacEachen: No, at 5.00 p.m. I have to go, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you. That is not bad. It is better than I expected. I will recognize...

Mr. Wenman: Mr. Chairman, in view of his time constraints, perhaps one question from each person could be considered, hoping that everyone will have an opportunity to pose a question or that he could stay at least that long.

Mr. Dupras: I am sorry; I disagree with this provision.

The Chairman: Okay, I have at least two on my list for sure.

[Translation]

impressions et élaborer des conclusions; je suis toujours ouvert à cela parce que je veux que ce Comité soit actif, et j'ai collaboré avec ce Comité au maximum.

Le président: Votre dernière question, madame.

Mme Appolloni: Monsieur le ministre, si une délégation de députés allait à Grenade, maintenant ou dans un avenir rapproché, à votre avis, comment pensez-vous que cette délégation pourrait faire son rapport au Parlement?

M. MacEachen: Je crois qu'un honorable député m'a demandé d'accepter d'envoyer un certain nombre de députés à Grenade. J'ai consulté et j'ai dit que oui, je serais heureux d'envoyer ce groupe. J'ai suggéré trois ou quatre, au moins un représentant de chaque parti, et ce groupe pouvait y aller et faire rapport ensuite. Vous demandez comment il pourrait faire rapport au Parlement. Je crois qu'il y a des façons de le faire. Si c'est un obstacle, il y aurait une façon de le faire; nous trouverions un moyen.

Le président: Pour vous tenir au fait, oui, nous avons discuté en Comité d'orientation ces deux autres mandats depuis juin. Je suis prêt à agir, mais il y a eu tellement de changements dans au moins un des partis quant à ce que nous devrions étudier, mais nous sommes prêts à décider dès maintenant—je suis prêt. J'attends la réponse d'un parti pour aller de l'avant avec cette mission de maintien de la paix, et je crois que son urgence est claire pour tout le monde après les événements de Chypre. J'espère donc obtenir un consentement unanime, au moins au début de la nouvelle session.

J'ai également suggéré le littoral du Pacifique en juin. On avait manifesté beaucoup d'intérêt. Je vois M. Wenman et je le remercie de sa reconnaissance parce qu'il y a tant de députés de l'Ouest maintenant sur ce Comité. Je crois qu'il y a beaucoup d'intérêt. Je suis prêt à agir, mais je ne peux agir qu'avec un consentement unanime pour le présenter au ministre. Maintenant que je vois qu'il est ouvert à cela, je crois que je vais agir très rapidement.

Ceci dit, le ministre a dit plus tôt que je devrais attendre 10 minutes parce que je ne peux procéder en l'absence de l'Opposition officielle, à moins que je ne décide que c'est un boycottage général. Je devrai alors prendre mes responsabilités. Mais le ministre avait dit qu'il resterait jusqu'à 16h30; je sais maintenant qu'il accepte de rester au moins jusqu'à 17h00.

M. MacEachen: Non, je dois partir à 17h00, monsieur le président.

Le président: Merci. Ce n'est pas si mal. C'est mieux que je n'espérais. Je reconnaitrai...

M. Wenman: Monsieur le président, étant donné ces limites de temps, peut-être pourrions-nous avoir une question de chaque personne, espérant ainsi que chacun aura l'occasion de poser une question ou qu'il pourra rester au moins pendant ce temps.

M. Dupras: Je regrette; je ne suis pas d'accord avec cette mesure.

Le président: C'est bien, j'en ai au moins deux sur ma liste.

[Texte]

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): On the same point of order, Mr. Chairman, I think that is an excellent idea. It would give all the members an opportunity to . . .

The Chairman: The Chairman will make a consensus. I am sorry, but if there is no agreement you will lose your time, 15 minutes left.

Mr. Bosley, please.

Mr. Bosley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Mr. Bosley, followed by Mr. Dupras. I will give them at least five minutes each.

Mr. Bosley: I will try very hard to be less than five minutes.

I thank the minister for being here. I want to pursue with the minister the comments he made about the governor general's alleged request. I found that most peculiar. The reason I am interested in it is I would like to know if in fact there was a request from the governor general if would that affect the government's view of the matter. Excepting the minister's statement that he does not know whether there was a request, if there was, would that change your view?

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Chairman, to reply to the hon. member I would have to know much more about the request than I do presently or than I have been able to find out. I would have to know what the request was.

It is one thing to say there was a request for help made, and another thing to say there was a request for an invasion. I can foresee a request for help that would be legitimate, without calling for an invasion at the same time. I am not saying for a moment that I would be prepared to change my mind in those circumstances, even if there were a very carefully phrased and formal request. There is no evidence of that.

Mr. Bosley: Mr. Chairman, through you to the minister, the implication that I . . .

Mr. MacEachen: I will take a couple of words the next time. I am trying to accommodate the member, rather than give him the brush-off.

Mr. Bosley: The implication of what you are saying, Mr. Minister, is that if somebody internally took over Parliament, shut it down, shot the Prime Minister and several members of the Cabinet, and ran the country through military means, and Mr. Schreyer called somebody in the Commonwealth and said please help to restore order and democracy, your political or governmental view would be that they should not come. Is that your view?

Mr. MacEachen: I have not said that, because I do not think that situation will ever occur.

Mr. Bosley: Since I take it you are prepared to at least accept sending some members of Parliament to Grenada, whether or not they are of this committee, given the opportunity that exists for us to see the case from this point on at least through to what hopefully will be fair and open elections, and given the importance of those elections being seen to be fair,

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M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Sur ce rappel au Règlement, monsieur le président, je crois que c'est une excellente idée. Cela donnerait à tous les membres une occasion de . . .

Le président: Le président fera le consensus. Je regrette, mais s'il n'y a pas d'entente, vous perdrez votre temps: il reste 15 minutes.

Monsieur Bosley, s'il vous plaît.

M. Bosley: Merci, monsieur le président.

Le président: Monsieur Bosley, suivi de Monsieur Dupras. Je leur donne au moins cinq minutes chacun.

M. Bosley: Je ferai un effort pour prendre moins de cinq minutes.

Je remercie le ministre pour sa présence ici. Je veux poursuivre avec le ministre sur les commentaires qu'il a fait sur la supposée requête du gouverneur général. J'ai trouvé ça très curieux. Ceci m'intéresse parce que je voudrais savoir s'il y a eu une telle requête du gouverneur général et si cela influencerait l'opinion du gouvernement sur la question. Faisant exception de la déclaration du ministre à l'effet qu'il ne sait pas s'il y a eu une telle requête, s'il y en a eu une, cela changerait-il votre opinion?

M. MacEachen: Monsieur le président, pour répondre à l'honorable député, il me faudrait en savoir beaucoup plus sur la requête que j'en sais présentement ou que j'en ai pu trouver. Il me faudrait savoir quelle était la requête.

Dire qu'une demande d'aide a été faite est une chose, mais dire qu'une demande d'invasion a été faite en est une autre. Je peux imaginer une demande d'aide qui soit légitime, sans pourtant impliquer une invasion au même moment. Je ne dis pas du tout que je serais prêt à changer d'idée dans ces circonstances, même s'il y avait eu une demande formelle et très prudemment formulée. Il n'y a pas de preuves de cela.

M. Bosley: Monsieur le président, en passant par vous, les implications . . .

M. MacEachen: J'utiliserai quelques mots la prochaine fois. J'essaie d'accommoder le député plutôt que de l'envoyer promener.

M. Bosley: Ce que vous dites implique, monsieur le ministre, que si quelqu'un de l'intérieur renversait le Parlement, le fermerait, tuait le premier ministre et quelques membres du Cabinet et dirigeait le pays par des moyens militaires, et que M. Schreyer demandait l'aide du Commonwealth pour restaurer l'ordre et la démocratie, votre opinion politique et gouvernementale serait qu'il ne devrait pas venir. Est-ce là votre opinion?

M. MacEachen: Je n'ai pas dit cela parce que je ne crois pas que la situation se présentera jamais.

M. Bosley: Puisque vous êtes prêt à accepter au moins que des députés du Parlement soient envoyés à Grenade, qu'ils soient de ce Comité ou non, étant donné que nous avons l'occasion de voir ce cas au moins jusqu'aux élections ouvertes et justes, du moins nous l'espérons, et étant donné l'importance que ces élections soient perçues comme étant justes; étant

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and given the importance of our role in the Commonwealth, and also given the difficulty that members face if they are not in an official capacity under a committee structure, may I ask if you would be opposed to a reference to this committee that this committee in fact conduct a study from here to at least the end of the Grenada situation in the same way as it might conduct a peacekeeping inquiry?

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Chairman, I would not support a general reference to this committee on the Grenada subject. I am prepared to support a group of members going on a fact-finding mission, but I believe that the committee, if it is to be asked by the government to put all its resources into an effort, should be a subject of more general application, like peace-keeping or the Pacific rim. This is one particular incident, which is very important, but I think it could be handled without bringing on the whole committee and giving it a reference. That is my view.

• 1650

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Bosley.

The hon. member from Labelle, and then I will go back to the hon. member from Esquimalt—Saarnich. I will try to accommodate everybody, including Reverend Roland de Corneille, who is not a member of the committee, but I may recognize him at the very end if it is the wish of the committee.

Monsieur Dupras, si vous plaît.

Mr. Dupras: Mr. Minister, what prompted some of us to inquire as to the possibility of sending observers to Grenada came following the meeting of the group of CUSO members from Grenada on October 31. One of the group, Miss Barbara Thomas, said—and I am going to quote her, and we are going to be meeting with her tonight later on:

First, with respect to the coverage of the events in Grenada, there is very little resemblance to what we have experienced and seen. We know that Canadian reporters have been denied access to the situation; in fact, the American reporters have had trouble getting in as well. The information has been heavily controlled by the military of the U.S. in Grenada.

This was enough to awaken my curiosity and go to Grenada, but now after a month or so, I wonder if all the evidence has not been covered. So I do not know what effect it might have to find some of the events that preceded the assassination of Maurice Bishop and follow it up to the last few days.

But this being said, Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the minister whether in our alliance with the Americans—that is to say, NORAD; we share the protection of the continent with them and we are partners in NATO—I wonder if we are trustworthy partners, since they can invade a country of the Commonwealth without even consulting with their Canadian partners in so many alliances. Has this been discussed with Mr. Dam—and I think it should be discussed with the President of the U.S.A.—whether we are trustworthy enough to be partners with them in NATO and NORAD?

[Translation]

donné l'importance de notre rôle au sein du Commonwealth et la difficulté qu'auront les membres s'ils n'ont pas l'autorité officielle d'un comité derrière eux, puis-je demander si vous vous opposeriez à ce que ce Comité ait le mandat de mener une étude d'ici à la fin de la crise de Grenade de la même façon qu'elle mènerait une enquête sur le maintien de la paix?

M. MacEachen: Monsieur le président, je n'appuierais pas un mandat général de ce Comité sur la question de Grenade. Je suis prêt à appuyer le fait qu'un groupe de députés aillent en mission de reconnaissance, mais je crois que le Comité, si le gouvernement lui demandait de concentrer ses ressources sur un effort, devrait s'appliquer à un sujet plus général, comme le maintien de la paix ou le littoral du Pacifique. Il s'agit là d'un incident particulier, très important, mais qui peut être traité sans y consacrer tout le comité ou lui donner un mandat. C'est là mon avis.

Le président: Merci, monsieur Bosley.

L'honorable député de Labelle et je reviendrai ensuite à l'honorable député de Esquimalt—Saarnich. J'essaierai d'accommoder tout le monde, y compris le Révérend Roland de Corneille qui n'est pas membre du comité, mais je pourrai le reconnaître à la toute fin si c'est là le désir du comité.

Mr. Dupras, please.

M. Dupras: Monsieur le ministre, ce qui a incité certains d'entre nous à s'enquérir quant à la possibilité d'envoyer des observateurs à Grenade est la réunion du groupe des membres du SUCO de Grenade le 31 octobre. Un membre du groupe, M^{lle} Barbara Thomas, a dit—je la cite et nous la rencontrerons plus tard dans la soirée:

D'abord, quant à ce qui a transpiré des événements de Grenade, cela ressemble très peu à ce que nous avons vécu et vu. Nous savons que les reporters canadiens n'ont pas eu accès à la situation; en fait, les reporters américains ont aussi eu de la difficulté à entrer. L'information était étroitement contrôlée par les militaires U.S. à Grenade.

C'était suffisant pour piquer ma curiosité et aller à Grenade, mais après un mois à peu près, je me demande si toutes les preuves n'ont pas été dissimulées. Je ne sais donc pas quelle influence pourrait avoir le fait de connaître certains événements qui ont précédé l'assassinat de Maurice Bishop et de les suivre jusqu'aux derniers jours.

Ceci dit, monsieur le président, je veux demander au ministre si dans notre alliance avec les américains—c'est-à-dire la NORAD; nous partageons avec eux la protection du continent et nous sommes partenaires de l'OTAN—je me demande si nous sommes des partenaires fiables, puisqu'ils peuvent envahir un pays du Commonwealth sans même consulter leur partenaire canadien dans autant d'alliances. Cela a-t-il été discuté avec M. Dam—et je crois que ce devrait l'être avec le président des États-Unis—à savoir si nous sommes assez fiables pour être leur partenaire de la NORAD et de l'OTAN?

[Texte]

Mr. MacEachen: I certainly would not ask them to make a comment on whether Canada is trustworthy. I think Canada is fully trustworthy and has demonstrated its trustworthiness in many situations. I think that would be a legitimate question, Mr. Chairman, if Canada were singled out and were treated differently than other allies, but the fact of the matter is that the other allies were treated in no better way, and some less better, if I may use that expression, than Canada.

Mr. Dupras: To finish, Mr. Chairman—I realize time is flying fast—in October the contadora group succeeded in getting the agreement and support of the Nicaraguan government in a series of treaties which were quite comprehensive and complete as to bringing peace to Central America. The American administration brushed off the proposals without even having a look at it. What effort are you prepared to make to force the Americans to have another look at the treaties that contadora succeeded in getting Nicaragua to support and agree upon?

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Chairman, I certainly got a clear assurance from Mr. Dam that the American government was supportive of the contadora effort.

Mr. Dupras: They just brushed off the treaties presented by Nicaragua.

Mr. MacEachen: That may be a separate question, but on the general effort the Americans have assured us they support it, and Mr. Shultz has done so as well. We took the view that one of the questions we ought to raise with Mr. Shultz in Halifax was Central America and the contadora initiative, and I believe we did that and got a very positive response, amen.

Mr. Dupras: But why the resistance from the U.S. administration to support and agree to abide by the treaties submitted by Nicaragua and accept the recommendations and the dispositions of the treaties?

• 1655

Mr. MacEachen: I cannot answer for the United States, Mr. Dupras, but I will attempt to ask them why in the particular case of these treaties they were negative, and get an answer for you.

Mr. Dupras: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you. I am getting so many directions, I am getting confused. I will proceed as I have been so far. A very faithful member of the committee, I will exercise my authority. The The hon. member from Parry Sound—Muskoka, Mr. Stan Darling.

Mr. Darling: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: One of my most faithful members of the committee.

Mr. Darling: Mr. Minister, one thing that comes under your jurisdiction—which may be minimal, but they do not have to travel too far, and to me it is one of the most important things—is the acid rain problem. As a member of the Subcommittee on Acid Rain, I certainly have a great interest in our neighbours to the south. I will give you full marks, and the

[Traduction]

M. MacEachen: Je ne leur demanderai certainement pas de faire des commentaires sur la loyauté du Canada. Je crois que le Canada est digne de confiance et qu'il en a fait la preuve dans plusieurs situations. Je crois que cette question serait justifiée, monsieur le président, si le Canada était traité différemment des autres alliés, mais le fait est que les autres alliés n'ont pas été mieux traités, et certains ont été moins bien traités, si je peux utiliser cette expression, que le Canada.

M. Dupras: Pour finir, monsieur le président, je suis conscient que le temps passe, en octobre, le groupe contadora a réussi à obtenir l'accord et l'appui du gouvernement de Nicaragua pour une série de traités d'ensemble et assez complets afin d'amener la paix en Amérique Centrale. L'administration américaine a repoussé ces propositions sans même les examiner. Qu'êtes-vous prêt à faire pour forcer les Américains à examiner ces traités que la contadora a réussi à obtenir du gouvernement nicaraguayen?

M. MacEachen: Monsieur le président, j'ai obtenu une assurance claire de M. Dam à l'effet que le gouvernement américain appuyait l'effort de la contadora.

M. Dupras: Ils ont simplement repoussé les traités proposés par le Nicaragua.

M. MacEachen: C'est peut-être là une question distincte, mais les Américains nous ont assuré qu'ils appuient l'effort général; M. Schultz a fait de même. Nous étions d'avis qu'une des questions que nous devons soulever avec M. Schultz à Halifax était l'Amérique Centrale et l'initiative de la contadora; je crois que nous avons fait cela et que nous avons obtenu une réponse très positive, ainsi soit-il.

M. Dupras: Mais pourquoi la résistance de l'administration américaine à appuyer et à entériner les traités soumis par le Nicaragua alors qu'ils acceptent les recommandations et les dispositions des traités?

M. MacEachen: Je ne peux pas répondre pour les États-Unis, monsieur Dupras, mais je vais essayer de leur demander pourquoi ils ont répondu négativement dans le cas particulier de ces traités et obtenir ainsi une réponse pour vous.

M. Dupras: Merci, monsieur le président.

Le président: Merci. J'obtiens tant d'instructions que je suis confus. Je vais procéder comme je l'ai fait jusqu'ici. Je vais exercer mon autorité en membre fidèle de ce Comité. L'honorable député de Parry Sound—Muskoka, M. Stan Darling.

M. Darling: Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président.

Le président: Un des membres les plus fidèles du Comité.

M. Darling: Monsieur le ministre, une des choses qui est sous votre juridiction... qui peut être insignifiante, mais ils ne doivent pas voyager très loin et c'est pour moi une des plus importantes questions... est le problème des pluies acides. A titre de membre du Sous-comité sur les pluies acides, je suis très intéressé à nos voisins du Sud. Je vous donne raison ainsi

[Text]

Minister of the Environment too, but it is like between a rock and a hard place. I am just wondering if you are going to have any impact with Mr. Shultz, who is your counterpart. I know Mr. Ruckelshaus is probably sympathetic to try to get things through, but he is not getting very darn far. I would just appreciate what you see on the horizon for some meaningful talks, and getting it down on paper as to what is going to happen with regulations for acid rain between Canada and the United States. At least we are fortunate, we are only two countries. It is not like in Europe, where there are probably 15 or 20 to work out a deal with.

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Chairman, I believe the situation has moved on acid rain from the first discussions I had with Mr. Shultz, where there was dispute as to the scientific evidence with respect to the impact of sulphur emissions. We had established scientific peer groups in each country to work out the scientific disagreements. Fortunately, by the time we got to Halifax for our meeting that obstacle was taken away. I thought that was progress.

There is no doubt that Mr. Shultz and Mr. Ruckelshaus are deeply committed to making progress on this environmental question. I have no doubt about that. But they have not been able within their own administration to sort out the problem so that they have an agreed administration position. It is as simple as that.

Mr. Darling: But what is the timetable?

Mr. MacEachen: From the Canadian point of view, the timetable is urgent. We have said that it is a very urgent question. Unfortunately, at our meetings in Halifax Mr. Ruckelshaus could not give us a deadline when he would be able to sort this out. There are obviously disagreements as to what ought to be done in the United States. I am encouraged by the atmosphere, if I am at the same time disappointed by the limited results.

Mr. Darling: But you are going to be putting the pressure on them continually, I hope.

Mr. MacEachen: Yes. Everytime we meet, acid rain is at the top of the list.

Mr. Darling: A steady rain soaks in, Mr. Minister, you know . . . —acid rain, or the other too.

Mr. MacEachen: I take your advice on that point.

The Chairman: I will take the authority to take one question from Mr. Robinson. Then, Mr. Robinson, we will proceed with the officials, because we said the meeting is with the minister and the officials. One question, Mr. Robinson. Then, to be fair to both sides, the minister will go. Then I will continue the meeting until 5.20 p.m. or 5.30 p.m.—unless you all leave.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): I will be short, and I hope the minister will listen carefully.

In your statement you talked about maintaining stability. I would like to know how stability was to be maintained if the invasion did not take place.

[Translation]

qu'au ministre de l'Environnement, mais c'est une position très inconfortable. Je me demande si vous aurez la moindre influence sur M. Schultz, votre homologue. Je sais que M. Ruckelshaus est sans doute sympathique et qu'il essaie de passer le message, mais il ne va pas très loin. J'aimerais savoir ce que vous prévoyez comme discussions et comme entente sur ce qu'il adviendra des règlements sur les pluies acides entre le Canada et les États-Unis. Nous sommes chanceux, nous ne sommes que deux pays. Ce n'est pas comme en Europe où ils sont 15 ou 20 pour en arriver à une entente.

M. MacEachen: Monsieur le président, je crois que la situation a évolué sur les pluies acides depuis mes premières discussions avec M. Schultz, alors qu'on contestait les preuves scientifiques de l'effet des émissions de soufre. Nous avons établi des groupes scientifiques dans chaque pays pour éliminer les désaccords scientifiques. Heureusement, cet obstacle était retiré avant que nous ne nous rencontrions à Halifax. Je crois que c'est là un progrès.

Il n'y a aucun doute que M. Schultz et M. Ruckelshaus sont profondément engagés à faire progresser cette question d'environnement. Mais, au sein de leur propre administration, ils ont été incapables de délimiter le problème de façon à établir une position officielle. C'est aussi simple que cela.

M. Darling: Mais quel est l'échéancier?

M. MacEachen: Du point de vue canadien, le temps presse. Nous avons dit que c'est une question très urgente. Malheureusement, à notre rencontre à Halifax, M. Ruckelshaus n'a pas pu nous donner de date limite pour venir à bout de ce problème. On ne s'entend pas quant à ce qui devrait être fait aux États-Unis. L'atmosphère m'encourage, mais les résultats limités me déçoivent.

M. Darling: Mais vous allez continuer de faire pression sur eux, j'espère.

M. MacEachen: Oui. Chaque fois que nous nous rencontrons, les pluies acides sont en tête de liste.

M. Darling: Une pluie continue finit par pénétrer, vous savez, monsieur le ministre . . . une pluie acide ou autre.

M. MacEachen: Je suivrai vos conseils sur ce point.

Le président: J'accorderai une question à M. Robinson. Ensuite, monsieur Robinson, nous procéderons avec les représentants puisque nous avons dit que la rencontre était avec le ministre et les représentants. Une question, monsieur Robinson. Ensuite, afin d'être juste pour les deux partis, le ministre partira. Je poursuivrai la réunion jusqu'à 17h20 ou 17h30 . . . à moins que vous ne partiez tous.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Je serai bref et j'espère que le ministre sera attentif.

Dans votre déclaration, vous avez parlé du maintien d'une stabilité. J'aimerais savoir comment la stabilité aurait été maintenue si l'invasion n'avait pas eu lieu.

[Texte]

The Chairman: Please do not make noise as you leave.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): I would like to know if Grenada is going to be represented at New Delhi. Also, will Canada finish the airport in Grenada? Do you not feel that this experience would indicate that maybe it is time for the Caribbean federation to be once again considered in the interests of protection, security, and stability?

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Chairman, it is not known. I am not certain whether Grenada will be at the Commonwealth, but certainly it will not be the head of the interim government, Mr. McIntyre; he will not be there.

You asked a question about the airport?

• 1700

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Yes. Are we going to finish the airport, as well as the projects?

Mr. MacEachen: We have, as I remember, bowed out of that operation. I understand the Americans have decided that they are going to complete the airport. I gather you would look favourably upon that if we decided to complete the airport.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): I would.

Mr. MacEachen: When I talked about stability I talked about stability among the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, and I would say that the invasion... No situation is simple; it is complex. No doubt the situation in Grenada was worrying to neighbours, but the solution is also worrying and now that the invasion has happened we have expressed our views to the United States. I have told Mr. Dam that it is not my intention to harp on this subject every time we meet to express our disappointment. We have determined to work in a constructive way to help in the future, not only to help Grenada but I think to give some help to the United States as well. I think there are certain ways in which we can help. Maybe they do not understand that fully yet, but there are.

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): And the Caribbean federation for protection, security and stability?

Mr. MacEachen: And the...?

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): A Caribbean federation to be reconstituted in some form for the security and protection and stability in the area.

Mr. MacEachen: If you refer to military security, I do not think Canada would be in that game. I think it would be a major development in Canadian policy to make commitments for the security of the Caribbean. That is a major one. Maybe the committee would like to study that.

Mr. Wenman: One more, then the opposition is finished.

The Chairman: You know me; I am always yes, but the commitments were made and we started 15 minutes late. If the minister wants to stay...

Mr. Wenman: I would ask the minister to stay just three more minutes.

[Traduction]

Le président: S'il vous plaît, ne faites pas de bruit en partant.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): J'aimerais savoir si Grenade sera représentée à New Delhi. De même, le Canada achèvera-t-il l'aéroport à Grenade? Ne croyez-vous pas que cette expérience indique qu'il est peut-être temps qu'on considère la Fédération des Antilles pour la protection, la sécurité et la stabilité?

M. MacEachen: Monsieur le président, on ne sait pas. Je ne suis pas certain que Grenade sera au Commonwealth, mais elle ne sera certainement pas représentée par le chef du gouvernement intérimaire, M. McIntyre; il ne sera pas présent.

Vous avez posé une question sur l'aéroport?

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Achèverons-nous l'aéroport et les autres projets?

M. MacEachen: Si je me souviens bien, nous nous sommes retirés de cette opération. Je crois que les Américains ont décidé d'achever l'aéroport. Dois-je comprendre que vous seriez favorable à une décision d'achever l'aéroport?

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Oui.

M. MacEachen: Lorsque j'ai parlé de stabilité, je me référais à une stabilité au sein des pays des Antilles membres du Commonwealth et je dirais que l'invasion... Il n'y a pas de situation simple; c'est complexe. La situation à Grenade inquiétait sans aucun doute nos voisins, mais la solution inquiète aussi et maintenant que l'invasion a eu lieu, nous avons fait connaître notre point de vue aux États-Unis. J'ai dit à M. Dam que je n'avais pas l'intention de toujours revenir sur notre déception à chacune de nos rencontres. Nous avons décidé de travailler de façon constructive afin d'aider à l'avenir, non seulement Grenade, mais les États-Unis aussi bien. Je crois qu'il y a certaines façons de les aider. Ils ne comprennent peut-être pas bien cela encore, mais il y a des façons.

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Et la Fédération antillaise pour la protection, la sécurité et la stabilité?

M. MacEachen: Et la...?

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): Une fédération antillaise qui serait constituée sous une forme quelconque pour la sécurité, la protection et la stabilité de cette région.

M. MacEachen: Si vous parlez d'une sécurité militaire, je ne crois pas que le Canada en soit. Je crois que ce serait un changement important de la politique canadienne de s'engager dans la sécurité des Antilles. Peut-être le comité voudrait-il étudier cela.

M. Wenman: Un autre et puis l'opposition aura terminé.

Le président: Vous me connaissez; je dis toujours oui, mais des engagements ont été pris et nous avons commencé 15 minutes en retard. Si le Ministre veut rester...

M. Wenman: Je demanderais au Ministre de rester trois minutes de plus.

[Text]

Mr. MacEachen: Look, I am . . . I will answer one more question . . .

The Chairman: I think it is unfair to . . .

Mr. MacEachen: —but it is up to you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Well, if it is up to me, you know me. I think I made a commitment. If I want the minister back, I had better hold to my commitment.

How long is your question?

Mr. Wenman: Two minutes. One minute.

The Chairman: That is too long.

So I will excuse the minister, because I know I will not get him next time.

An hon. Member: Say yes.

The Chairman: You see, they always win. That is my way.

So quickly, please. Mr. Wenman.

Mr. Wenman: I would like to register my concern regarding the escalation of violence and the escalation of the use of force being legitimized. I would like to reflect that today is the 20th anniversary of John F. Kennedy's death. John F. Kennedy said that the Americans are only 6% of the world's population and they cannot impose their will upon the other 94% of mankind, that they cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.

I think with this escalation of force—and it does not matter whether it is from the violence of force against an individual or force of nation to nation, be it Grenada or any other area—this is the area of focus that we should in fact be carrying forward both here and in the issues of Grenada and be looking at that.

If we are going to go to Grenada, as you have suggested, as a committee, I hope we will not go looking back; I hope we will go looking forward to what we can do to assure that self-determination and freedom and democracy return to that nation in every way possible. The relationship of Canada as a peacekeeping force is can we have a role there. So let us go, if we go, and look forward in that process, and I hope that you would agree under the terms of reference to focus us in that particular way.

That is really a positive kind of conclusion that I would like you to leave us on, and I would like you to seek that reference and I would like you to proceed with our committee doing that kind of thing and I wanted to support that process.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Mr. Minister, I am sure you agree with that.

[Translation]

M. MacEachen: Ecoutez, je suis . . . Je répondrai à une autre question . . .

Le président: Je crois qu'il est injuste de . . .

M. MacEachen: . . . mais il n'en tient qu'à vous, monsieur le président.

Le président: Si ça ne tient qu'à moi, vous me connaissez. Je me suis engagé. Si je veux que le Ministre revienne, je suis mieux de m'en tenir à mon engagement.

Combien de temps pour votre question?

M. Wenman: Deux minutes. Une minute.

Le président: C'est trop long.

J'excuserai donc le Ministre parce que je sais qu'il ne reviendra pas la prochaine fois.

Une voix: Dites oui.

Le président: Vous voyez, ils gagnent toujours. C'est ma manière.

Rapidement, s'il vous plaît, monsieur Wenman.

M. Wenman: J'aimerais exprimer mon inquiétude quant à l'escalade de la violence et à l'escalade du recours à la force qu'on légitime après coup. J'aimerais souligner que c'est aujourd'hui le 20ème anniversaire de la mort de John F. Kennedy. John F. Kennedy a dit que les Américains ne représentent que 6 p. 100 de la population mondiale et qu'ils ne peuvent pas imposer leur volonté aux autres 94 p. 100 de l'humanité, qu'ils ne peuvent faire un bien de chaque mal ou renverser tous les obstacles et que, par conséquent, il ne peut y avoir une solution américaine à chacun des problèmes mondiaux.

Je crois que cette escalade de la force—et il importe peu que ce soit la violence de la force contre un individu ou la force d'une nation à une autre, que ce soit à Grenade ou dans une autre région—c'est là le sujet que nous devrions traiter et exprimer, ici et dans les événements de Grenade.

Si nous allons à Grenade, comme vous l'avez suggéré, à titre de comité, j'espère que nous n'irons pas pour contempler le passé, mais plutôt pour voir ce que nous pouvons faire pour assurer que l'auto-détermination, la liberté et la démocratie soient réinstaurées dans cette nation par tous les moyens possibles. La relation du Canada à titre de force de maintien de la paix est de savoir si nous avons un rôle à jouer là. Allons-y donc, si nous devons y aller, et examinons ce processus, et j'espère que vous seriez d'accord pour que les conditions fixées soient concentrées sur ce point.

C'est là un genre de conclusion positive sur laquelle nous devrions terminer et j'aimerais que vous essayiez d'obtenir ce mandat et j'aimerais que vous alliez de l'avant pour que ce comité fasse ce genre de chose et j'ai voulu appuyer ce processus.

Le président: Merci.

Monsieur le Ministre, je suis certain que vous êtes d'accord avec cela.

[Texte]

• 1705

Mr. MacEachen: Yes, I think it is particularly appropriate that the member has drawn to our attention the memory of the late President of the United States and has quoted very eloquent words from him.

Secondly, I agree also 100% that we ought to look ahead and build from here in Granada and attempt to repair the situation constructively. I would give further thought to his proposal about a reference, though I believe my proposal would satisfy his requirements very well.

Mr. Wenman: The problem is that when there are power backings, since only the Soviet Union and the United States are left to second those backings, that is why the role of Canada becomes important, or should become more important—to counterbalance that.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Minister.

M. Massé: J'invoque le Règlement, monsieur le président.

The Chairman: I will take a point of order. The meeting is not adjourned. I did not call an end to it. Officials of the department are here at your disposal, unless you want to adjourn.

M. Massé: Un rappel au Règlement, monsieur le président!

Le président: Monsieur Massé, s'il vous plaît.

M. Massé: Monsieur le président, j'ai trouvé intéressante l'intervention de mon collègue conservateur, M. Wenman. Cependant, quoique nous soyons tous d'accord avec lui, je me demande s'il pourrait nous préciser sa position, à savoir si sa position est également celle de son parti politique. Il serait important de le savoir.

The Chairman: I am sure Mr. Stevens will read the very noble sentiment expressed by Mr. Wenman and we shall see by the days to come, weeks to come, if they so agree.

There is one meeting I want to announce officially, on Thursday at 11.00 a.m., on national defence. The minister will be there. That was another difficult assignment you gave me; but he is there. It is a change, though, of hour and of room: 209 West Block, and it is 11.00 a.m. and not 3.30 p.m.

Mr. Sinclair Stevens, please.

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman, what is our full timetable, then?

The Chairman: I said so at the beginning of the meeting, sir. I will repeat it. As you know, and I want this to be very clear, we have made a series of meetings thinking the estimates would be finished no later than December 6. That was the work that you worked on at the steering committee.

Secondly, while I was about to report to all the colleagues of the committee, it was announced in the House that there will be three opposition days this week, therefore terminating the study of the estimates on Monday. But while I was taking measures with the clerk, because I thought it was absolute nonsense, it was announced in the House that an agreement

[Traduction]

M. MacEachen: Oui, je pense qu'il est très approprié que le député ait rappelé à notre mémoire l'ancien président des États-Unis; dont il a cité des propos très éloquentes.

En second lieu, je conviens tout à fait que nous devrions nous tourner vers l'avenir et nous mettre à reconstruire à Grenade, en cherchant à réparer constructivement la situation. J'aimerais réfléchir encore à sa proposition au sujet d'un renvoi, mais je pense bien que ma proposition répondrait très bien à ses exigences.

M. Wenman: Le problème, c'est que lorsqu'il y a des appuis, puisqu'il ne reste plus que l'Union soviétique et les États-Unis pour soutenir ces appuis, le rôle du Canada devient important, ou devrait devenir plus important—pour compenser.

Le président: Merci, monsieur le ministre.

Mr. Massé: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman.

Le président: On invoque le Règlement. La séance n'est pas levée. Je n'ai pas prononcé l'ajournement. Les fonctionnaires du ministère sont ici à votre disposition, à moins que vous ne souhaitiez l'ajournement.

Mr. Massé: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: Mr. Massé, please.

Mr. Massé: Mr. Chairman, I was very interested by the comments of my Conservative colleague, Mr. Wenman. However, while we agree with him, I wonder whether he could make his position clear, whether his position is also his party's. It would be important to know.

Le président: Je suis sûr que M. Stevens saura déceler le sentiment très noble qui anime M. Wenman et nous verrons dans les jours et les semaines à venir s'ils sont d'accord.

Il y a une réunion que je veux annoncer officiellement, jeudi à 11 heures, sur la défense nationale. Le ministre sera là. C'est une autre tâche difficile que vous m'avez confiée; il est là. Cependant, il y a un changement d'heure et de salle: 209, édifice de l'Ouest, à 11 heures plutôt qu'à 15h30.

Monsieur Sinclair Stevens, s'il vous plaît.

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, quel est notre calendrier complet, alors?

Le président: Je l'ai dit au début de la réunion, monsieur. Je vais le répéter. Comme vous le savez, et je tiens à ce que ce soit très clair, nous avons prévu une série de réunions en croyant que nous en aurions fini avec les crédits au plus tard le 6 décembre. C'est ce sur quoi vous avez travaillé au comité directeur.

En second lieu, au moment où j'allais faire rapport à tous les collègues du Comité, on a annoncé à la Chambre qu'il y aura trois journées de l'Opposition cette semaine, ce qui mettra fin à l'étude des crédits lundi. Mais pendant que je prenais des mesures avec le greffier, parce que j'ai cru que cela n'avait absolument pas de sens, on a annoncé à la Chambre que les

[Text]

took place among the three House Leaders that even though the last opposition day would be Thursday, we would still go on studying the estimates at least until this week. So that is why I put back the meeting.

So there is one today with the minister. He was present and stayed 35 minutes longer. The Minister of National Defence is still on for Thursday. This you and I and all the committee had agreed to, so it is still on.

What we have to decide is what we do next week. There are no more supplementary estimates, so I may go back and use other procedures to call in officials of External Affairs and CIDA. But as you know, we have contacted now, officially, Madam Catley-Carson, and she is not able next week, but she will be the following week. But the following week happened to be the week where most likely the House will not sit. But I am prepared to call on her on December 6. She could come as President of CIDA by December 6. If there is no House or if there is a new session, you know the rule as well as I. But I am prepared. I have done all the necessary movement for that.

As for defence, I have no order of reference and no report that I could relate our work to. For External Affairs I dragged out an old report that could give me the authority to call back people from External Affairs and CIDA—even CIDA; by a stretch of the imagination, I found something in the report that deals with CIDA. It is on page 25, in English.

• 1710

So I can officially report that there is one official from with National Defence coming Thursday. If it is so wished by the committee, I could use the 1981 annual report of External Affairs to call back the chairman of CIDA on December 6. If there is no House, there is no meeting. And I could use the same tools. If there were a House sitting, I could by agreement do the same.

But, sir, I said earlier on, just prior to your arrival—I waited for 30 minutes to announce that, but then I had to proceed. I want you to know that I said that I did not want to proceed in the absence of the official opposition, but there were people of your party present.

So I said that instead of having all this discussion here, I would rather call a meeting of the steering committee tomorrow afternoon to see what we could report on Thursday. If that is your and Dr. Jewett's wish, I would rather do that privately than have a long discussion here leading nowhere.

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that there is one difficulty with that. It is unfortunate that we cannot hear somebody tomorrow and some additional External people Thursday, in that we still have the supplementary estimates before us. Was any attempt made to have the Minister or, for

[Translation]

trois leaders s'étaient mis d'accord pour que nous puissions poursuivre l'étude des crédits au moins jusqu'à cette semaine, même si le dernier jour de l'Opposition serait jeudi. C'est pourquoi j'ai reporté la réunion.

Il y en a donc un aujourd'hui avec le ministre. Il était là et il est resté 35 minutes de plus que prévu. Le ministre de la Défense nationale est toujours inscrit pour jeudi. Vous et moi et tout le Comité en sommes convenus, et il n'y a rien de changé.

Il nous reste à décider ce que nous ferons la semaine prochaine. Il n'y a pas de crédits supplémentaires, et je recourrai peut-être à d'autres procédures pour convoquer les fonctionnaires des Affaires extérieures et de l'ACDI. Mais comme vous le savez, nous avons maintenant pris contact, officiellement, avec M^{me} Catley-Carson, qui ne pourra pas être là la semaine prochaine, mais la semaine suivante. Or, il se trouve que la semaine suivante est celle où la Chambre ne siègera très probablement pas. Mais je suis disposé à la convoquer pour le 6 décembre. Elle pourrait venir en tant que présidente de l'ACDI pour le 6 décembre. S'il n'y a pas de Chambre ou s'il y a une nouvelle session, vous connaissez la règle aussi bien que moi. Mais je suis prêt. J'ai pris toutes les mesures nécessaires pour cela.

En ce qui concerne la défense, je n'ai pas d'ordre de renvoi ni de rapport auquel raccrocher notre travail. Pour les Affaires extérieures, j'ai déniché un vieux rapport qui pourrait m'autoriser à rappeler les représentants des Affaires extérieures et de l'ACDI... même de l'ACDI; en faisant travailler un peu mes ménages, j'ai trouvé quelque chose dans le rapport qui concerne l'ACDI. C'est à la page 25 en anglais.

Je puis donc dire officiellement qu'il y aura un représentant de la Défense nationale jeudi. Si le Comité le désirait, je pourrais utiliser le rapport annuel de 1981 des Affaires extérieures pour rappeler la présidente de l'ACDI le 6 décembre. Si la Chambre ne siégeait pas, il n'y aura pas de réunion. Et je pourrais utiliser les mêmes instruments. S'il y avait une séance de la Chambre, je pourrais, avec votre accord, faire de même.

Mais, monsieur, comme je l'ai dit plus tôt, ju-te avant votre arrivée—j'ai attendu vingt minutes pour l'annoncer, mais j'ai dû procéder. Il faut que vous sachiez que j'ai déclaré en pas vouloir procéder en l'absence de l'Opposition officielle, mais il y avait des représentants de votre parti ici.

J'ai donc dit que, plutôt que d'avoir toute cette discussion ici, je préférerais convoquer une réunion du Comité directeur pour demain après-midi pour voir ce que nous pourrions dire jeudi. Si c'était là votre désir et celui de M^{lle} Jewett, j'aimerais mieux le faire en privé plutôt que de nous lancer ici dans un long débat qui ne mènerait nulle part.

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, j'y vois une difficulté. Il est malheureux que nous ne puissions recevoir quelqu'un demain et avoir d'autres représentants des Affaires extérieures jeudi, étant donné que nous sommes toujours saisis du budget supplémentaire. A-t-on cherché à obtenir la présence du

[Texte]

that matter, any one of the three before us tomorrow, Thursday or Friday?

The Chairman: Let me tell you, if you want to sit on Friday, you can, but the members had better be there. I have offered to sit on Fridays. Just to be on the record, I have offered to sit on Fridays—you were not present—but people decided by agreement not to sit on Friday.

You know that I always want to sit on Friday at 9.30 a.m., so I would be prepared to consider that. But tomorrow I have to call a steering committee for that. I cannot decide here as to our next order of reference or next order of the day. I am ready to do it, but I do not think it is functional.

Miss Jewett.

Miss Jewett: Mr. Chairman, if the House is sitting next week, I think we should meet on Monday. I gather there will be a lot of votes Monday, and that we should have the minister back...

The Chairman: I am trying, Madam.

Miss Jewett: I do not think we really need to have a pretext for this. The minister would be willing to come back, and we originally planned to have the minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, twice.

The Chairman: The minister and/or next week.

Miss Jewett: Yes, so I think we should stick to that.

The Chairman: Yes.

Miss Jewett: If the president of CIDA is not able to be here next week, then we should definitely agree that she come on December 6, if we are still sitting. The reason I am mentioning this now is that unfortunately neither I nor Father Bob can be here for a steering committee tomorrow. So I would like to make those two points: that the Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, be with us again...

The Chairman: I have that. I said under supplementary estimates that Tuesday, today, was the minister; Thursday, the Minister of National Defence; next Tuesday, November 29, Mr. MacEachen and/or senior officials from the department and on Tuesday, December 6, under the annual report from the Department of External Affairs. So I have that. I am willing and prepared. I do not see what is the problem.

Miss Jewett: I understood there would be...

The Chairman: I am trying to convince you that if there is no House there are no meetings.

Miss Jewett: That is what I am saying as well.

The Chairman: Next Tuesday the minister and/or—I cannot vouch and promise publicly and arrive with no minister. I got him today and you know how...

Miss Jewett: Do you agree on one more meeting with defence officials as well, if the House is sitting?

[Traduction]

ministre ou encore de l'un ou l'autre des trois pour demain, jeudi ou vendredi?

Le président: Si vous vouliez siéger vendredi, vous le pouvez, mais les membres feraient mieux d'être ici. J'ai offert de siéger le vendredi. Je le dis pour le compte rendu: j'ai offert de siéger le vendredi—vous n'y étiez pas—mais les membres se sont mis d'accord pour ne pas siéger vendredi.

Vous savez que je veux toujours siéger le vendredi à 9h30; je suis donc disposé à l'envisager. Mais demain, je dois convoquer un Comité directeur pour cela. Je ne peux pas décider ici quel sera notre prochain ordre de renvoi ou notre prochain ordre du jour. Je suis prêt à le faire, mais je ne pense pas que ce soit fonctionnel.

Mademoiselle Jewett.

Mlle Jewett: Monsieur le président, si la Chambre siégeait la semaine prochaine, je pense que nous devrions nous réunir lundi. Je crois comprendre qu'il y aura une foule de votes lundi, et que nous devrions revoir le ministre...

Le président: J'essaie, madame.

Mlle Jewett: Je ne pense pas qu'il nous faille vraiment avoir un prétexte pour cela. Le ministre serait disposé à revenir, et nous avions prévu au départ avoir le ministre, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, deux fois.

Le président: Le ministre et (ou) la semaine prochaine.

Mlle Jewett: Oui, et je pense que nous devrions nous en tenir à cela.

Le président: Oui.

Mlle Jewett: Si la présidente de l'ACDI ne pouvait venir la semaine prochaine, alors pourrions certes convenir de la recevoir le 6 décembre, si nous siégeons toujours. La raison pour laquelle je le mentionne maintenant, c'est que malheureusement ni le Père Bob ni moi ne pourrions être ici pour un Comité directeur demain. J'aimerais donc faire valoir ces points: que le ministre, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, nous revienne...

Le président: J'ai cela. J'ai dit, à propos du budget supplémentaire, que mardi, aujourd'hui, était pour le ministre; jeudi, pour le ministre de la Défense nationale; mardi prochain, le 29 novembre, M. MacEachen et (ou) des hauts fonctionnaires du ministère, et le mardi 6 décembre, pour le rapport annuel du ministère des Affaires extérieures. J'ai cela. Je suis disposé et prêt. Je ne vois pas le problème.

Mlle Jewett: J'avais cru comprendre qu'il y aurait...

Le président: J'essaie de vous convaincre que s'il n'y a pas de Chambre, il n'y a pas de réunion.

Mlle Jewett: C'est ce que je dis également.

Le président: Mardi prochain, le ministre et (ou)—je ne puis donner de garantie ni de promesse publiquement, quitte à me retrouver sans ministre. Je l'ai eu aujourd'hui et vous savez comment...

Mlle Jewett: Êtes-vous d'accord pour une autre réunion avec les fonctionnaires de la Défense également, si la Chambre siégeait?

[Text]

The Chairman: Madam, The difficulty on the defence officials is that I have no order of reference and no report dealing with that. If there are no more supplementary estimates, I cannot. . .

Miss Jewett: Just appeal to their generosity of spirit.

The Chairman: You know, I started to give you a few things, and I am willing to consider it. I think . . .

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman . . .

The Chairman: The official critic of the Official Opposition.

Mr. Stevens: Before we adjourn . . . Prior to the meeting, I requested from Mr. Marchand that he perhaps give us a revised version of the External envelope, reflecting the trade picture and how much money we have within the envelope for all the activities that now may be constituted under the reorganized department. I think he felt he could probably give that to us. Mr. Chairman, I was wondering if we could give him an opportunity to tell us if he has that; if so, maybe we could append it to our minutes.

The Chairman: Mr. Marchand. The meeting is still on; I did not adjourn, so it is still recorded.

• 1715

Mr. de Montigny Marchand (Deputy Minister, Political Affairs, Department of External Affairs): Yes, Mr. Chairman. Indeed, the Leader of the Opposition has asked for that and we have obtained the information he is seeking. With your permission I would ask Glen Shortliffe, the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for policy co-ordination, to give the answer. He has been able to put the figures together.

Mr. G. Shortliffe (Assistant Deputy Minister for Policy Co-ordination, Department of External Affairs): Mr. Chairman, I understand that Mr. Stevens was asking for a breakdown of the envelope levels shown in the fiscal plan tabled by the Minister of Finance in April of this year. We did some hurried research on it, and these figures are as accurate as we could make them in the course of the afternoon.

In the documentation tabled by the Minister of Finance on page 23, it shows under table 2.11, a summary of the External Affairs and aid envelope, a breakdown between official development assistance and other assistance. Under the "other" category come the main estimates of the Department of External Affairs. For 1983-1984, this totalled \$688 million. The breakdown of the amount which had been transferred into the department to cover trade functions coming out of the reorganization of the department was \$173 million of that \$688 million. In terms of person-years, the reorganization of January, 1982, transferred to the Department of External Affairs approximately 860 former employees of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce and about 203 locally-engaged staff serving abroad who had been working in the trade function prior to January, 1982.

[Translation]

Le président: Madame, le problème pour ce qui est des fonctionnaires de la Défense, c'est que je n'ai pas d'ordre de renvoi et pas de rapport à ce sujet. S'il n'y a plus de crédits supplémentaires, je ne puis . . .

Mlle Jewett: Faites appel à leur générosité.

Le président: Vous savez, j'ai commencé à vous donner certaines choses, et je suis disposé à l'envisager. Je pense . . .

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président . . .

Le président: Le critique officiel de l'Opposition officielle.

M. Stevens: Avant de lever la séance . . . Avant la réunion, j'ai demandé à M. Marchand s'il pourrait peut-être nous donner une version révisée de l'enveloppe des Affaires extérieures, qui refléterait la situation commerciale et les sommes que renferme l'enveloppe pour l'ensemble des activités regroupées dans le ministère réorganisé. Sauf erreur, il croyait qu'il pourrait probablement le faire. Monsieur le président, je me demandais si nous pouvions lui donner l'occasion de nous dire si c'était fait; si oui, nous pourrions peut-être l'annexer à notre procès-verbal.

Le président: Monsieur Marchand. La réunion n'est pas terminée; je n'ai pas levé la séance, c'est donc au compte rendu.

M. de Montigny Marchand (sous-ministre, Politique étrangère, ministère des Affaires extérieures): Oui, monsieur le président. Il est vrai que le leader de l'Opposition a demandé cela et nous avons obtenu les renseignements qu'il cherche. Avec votre permission, je demanderais à Glen Shortliffe, le sous-ministre adjoint responsable de la coordination des politiques, de donner la réponse. C'est lui qui a rassemblé les données.

M. G. Shortliffe (sous-ministre adjoint, Coordination des politiques, ministère des Affaires extérieures): Monsieur le président, M. Stevens a demandé une ventilation de l'enveloppe indiquée dans le plan budgétaire déposé par le ministre des Finances en avril de cette année. Nous avons fait quelques recherches rapides à ce sujet, et les chiffres que nous présentons sont aussi précis qu'il a été possible de les rendre pendant l'après-midi.

Dans la documentation déposée par le ministre des Finances, on trouve à la page 23, au tableau 2.11, un résumé de l'enveloppe des Affaires extérieures et de l'aide extérieure, une répartition en aide officielle au développement et autre aide. Sous la catégorie «Autre», on trouve le budget principal du ministère des Affaires extérieures. Pour 1983-1984, ce budget atteignait 688 millions de dollars. De ce montant, 173 millions de dollars ont été transférés au ministère pour couvrir les fonctions commerciales venant de la réorganisation du ministère. Du point de vue des années-personnes, la réorganisation de janvier 1982 a transféré au ministère des Affaires extérieures environ 860 anciens employés du ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce et environ 203 personnes embauchées sur place, en poste à l'étranger, qui travaillaient à la fonction commerciale avant janvier 1982.

[Texte]

Of the total amount of person-years in the department, as shown in main estimates—approximately 4,000 person-years for 1983-1984—the transfer element into the department of Canada-based person-years represented 860.

The Chairman: Mr. Stevens, please.

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman, for clarification, I was wondering if the officials could, in effect, give us their new version of table 2.11 as a result of the reorganization and, in other words, project ahead through to 1986-1987, just as they have done on page 23 of the fiscal plan?

Mr. Shortliffe: We could prepare one and send it to the hon. member, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Send it to me and I will distribute it.

Any other questions, Mr. Stevens?

I have one. Members receive a lot of requests from various diplomatic friends as to exactly what is the new *organigramme*, with people responsible and if possible the full number. I can assure you the members will appreciate knowing how to get by without having to lose time or call my office all the time. If we could get that, I will assure a very heavy distribution. This will be very helpful to everybody.

Mr. Marchand: Mr. Chairman, last year you had the same request because we were in the throws of a fresh, recent reorganization of . . .

The Chairman: I have to say it this year, because at every number I try someone else answers.

Mr. Marchand: I certainly sympathize with your predicament. Mr. Shortliffe advises me that a new organigram is in the making.

Some hon. Members: Ha!

Mr. Marchand: There is no reason for us to drag our feet, because the organization is clear. It is just a matter of drawing it up. It is not a matter of trying to make one.

Mr. Bosley: *The Gazette* was wrong, was it? You actually can designate one?

The Chairman: With all kindness, I recognize an opposition member for a second round. Madam Appolloni would like a question. May I kindly ask you to stay so we have a quorum?

Madam Appolloni. I have many, many questions on the Middle East, but I will abstain.

Mrs. Appolloni: If you do not mind, I want to discuss the Middle East.

The Chairman: Oh, sure.

Mrs. Appolloni: I want to preface my remarks as strongly as I can, Mr. Marchand, by saying that they are propelled by neither pro nor anti-Syrian, neither pro- nor anti-Israeli opinions. I do not want to get into that argument. I will say, however, that I am very pro-Lebanon. I feel that its sover-

[Traduction]

Les années-personnes basées au Canada et transférées au ministère représentaient 860 du nombre total d'années-personnes du ministère, selon les indications du budget principal—environ 4000 années-personnes pour 1983-1984.

Le président: Monsieur Stevens, s'il vous plaît.

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, pour plus de précision, je me demandais si les fonctionnaires pouvaient nous donner leur nouvelle version du tableau 2.11 découlant de la réorganisation et, en d'autres termes, faire des projections jusqu'en 1986-1987, comme ils l'ont fait à la page 23 du plan budgétaire?

M. Shortliffe: Monsieur le président, nous pourrions en préparer un et l'envoyer au député.

Le président: Envoyez-le moi et je le distribuerai.

Avez-vous d'autres questions, monsieur Stevens?

J'en ai une. Les membres reçoivent beaucoup de demandes de divers amis diplomatiques à propos du nouvel organigramme. On veut savoir qui sont les personnes responsables et, si possible, leur nombre total. Je vous assure que les membres seraient heureux de pouvoir se débrouiller sans perdre de temps ou devoir constamment appeler mon bureau. Si nous pouvions en avoir un, je vous assure que j'en ferais une très grande diffusion. Cela serait utile à tous.

M. Marchand: Monsieur le président, l'an passé vous avez fait la même demande parce que nous étions en plein milieu d'une nouvelle réorganisation récente de . . .

Le président: Il faut que j'en parle cette année parce que chaque fois que j'essaie de rejoindre quelqu'un, c'est une autre personne qui répond.

M. Marchand: Je comprends bien votre situation. M. Shortliffe m'a informé qu'on est en train de préparer un nouvel organigramme.

Des voix: Ha!

M. Marchand: Nous n'essayons pas de gagner du temps, parce que l'organisation est claire. Il s'agit tout simplement de dessiner l'organigramme, et non pas d'essayer d'établir une structure à illustrer.

M. Bosley: Alors la *Gazette* avait tort? Vous pouvez réellement en désigner un?

Le président: Je vous en prie, messieurs, je donne la parole à un membre de l'Opposition pour le second tour. Madame Appolloni aimerait poser une question. Je vous demanderais de rester afin que nous ayons quorum.

Mme Appolloni. J'ai beaucoup, beaucoup de questions sur le Moyen-Orient, mais je vais m'abstenir.

Mme Appolloni: Si vous me le permettez, j'aimerais discuter du Moyen-Orient.

Le président: Allez-y.

Mme Appolloni: Avant de commencer, je voudrais bien souligner, monsieur Marchand, que mes remarques ne sont motivées ni par des sentiments pro ou anti-syriens, ni par des sentiments pro ou anti-Israéliens. Je ne veux pas déclencher un débat à ce sujet. Toutefois, je peux affirmer que je suis très

[Text]

eignty has been smashed by all sides. I also feel extremely bitter about the fate of women and children who happen to be Arab and whose fathers, or husbands, or whatever, may be fighting for the PLO. I have my own feelings about the so-called terrorist organizations. I wonder when one becomes a terrorist and when one becomes a patriot. It depends very much on which side you are standing, I guess.

• 1720

I want to know how Canada treats the unfortunate victims of these kinds of massacres, which are continuing probably even as we speak. Innocent, helpless people are being shattered. Have we stepped up our efforts to offer some kind of refugee status to them without looking into their backgrounds to see who their parents were, or what not? Are we, as I hope we are, continuing our well-known humane practices towards people who have been left homeless through no fault of their own?

The Chairman: *Monsieur.*

Mr. Marchand: Mr. Chairman, I think the minister is on the record, as recently as yesterday in the House, in answer to questions from Mr. Stevens—and I believe, Mr. Bosley, on the general topic of the Middle East, but more particularly on the government's position with regard to Lebanon's sovereignty and integrity. I think the hon. member will recall that on at least two, and maybe more, occasions during his recent trip to the Middle East he has in press conferences made it quite clear where he and his government stand on the matter of Lebanon's sovereignty and integrity.

As to what the current state of play is with regard to the people who are the victims of this state of affairs and the various ways and means of alleviating their agony, with your permission I would ask Mr. Stanford, the ADM responsible for that part of the world, to respond.

The Chairman: The new ADM, as it is called. I do not like acronyms for the record, so he is the new . . .

Mr. Marchand: Assistant deputy minister.

The Chairman: The new assistant deputy minister is, I think, well prepared. He was one of our distinguished ambassadors in Israel prior to holding this position now. We are listening. I can assure you that the chairman is absolutely listening.

Mr. Joseph S. Stanford (Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and Middle East Branch, Department of External Affairs): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In response to the question concerning what aid and assistance the Canadian government is providing to alleviate the situation of the refugees, there are three elements, Mr. Chairman. We are continuing our support to UNRWA, which maintains the refugee camps that have existed in that region for many, many years. We are providing additional humanitarian aid, through the Red Cross primarily, to meet the

[Translation]

partisane du Liban. Je suis d'avis qu'on a attaqué sa souveraineté de tous les côtés. Je ressens aussi beaucoup d'amertume face à la destinée des femmes et des enfants qui ont le malheur d'être arabes et dont les pères, ou les époux, ou quoi que ce soit, se battent peut-être pour l'OLP. J'ai des opinions bien arrêtées au sujet des organisations dites terroristes. Je me demande quand on devient terroriste et quand on devient patriote. Je suppose que cela dépend beaucoup de quel camp on est.

Je veux savoir comment le Canada traite les malheureuses victimes de ces massacres, qui se poursuivent probablement au moment même où je parle. On anéantit des personnes innocentes et impuissantes. Avons-nous intensifié nos efforts en vue de leur offrir un statut quelconque de réfugié, sans creuser dans leur passé pour voir qui étaient leurs parents, et je ne sais quoi encore? Est-ce que nous continuons, et je l'espère, à faire preuve de notre humanisme bien connu envers les gens qui se retrouvent sans abri sans que ce soit leur faute?

Le président: Monsieur.

M. Marchand: Monsieur le président, je crois que le ministre a, hier seulement à la Chambre, répondu aux questions de M. Stevens—et, je crois, de M. Bosley—au sujet du Moyen-Orient en général, et plus particulièrement au sujet de la position du gouvernement vis-à-vis la souveraineté et l'intégrité du Liban. Je crois que l'honorable député se souviendra qu'à au moins deux reprises, sinon plus, au cours de son récent voyage au Moyen-Orient, il a, lors de conférences de presse, indiqué assez clairement sa position et celle de son gouvernement au sujet de la souveraineté et de l'intégrité du Liban.

Pour ce qui est de la situation actuelle en ce qui a trait aux victimes de cet état de choses et aux divers moyens d'atténuer leur misère, j'aimerais, avec votre permission, demander à M. Stanford, le SMA responsable de cette partie-là du monde, de bien vouloir répondre.

Le président: Le nouveau SMA, qu'on appelle cette fonction. Je n'aime pas les acronymes dans les comptes rendus; alors il est le nouveau . . .

M. Marchand: Sous-ministre adjoint.

Le président: Le nouveau sous-ministre adjoint est, je crois, bien préparé. Il a été un de nos distingués ambassadeurs en Israël avant d'occuper son poste actuel. Nous écoutons. Je vous assure que le président vous écoute de toutes ses oreilles.

M. Joseph S. Stanford (sous-ministre adjoint, Direction de l'Afrique et du Moyen-Orient, ministère des Affaires extérieures): Merci, monsieur le président.

En réponse à la question concernant l'aide que le gouvernement canadien fournit pour améliorer la situation des réfugiés, je peux dire qu'elle comprend trois composantes, monsieur le président. Nous continuons à appuyer l'UNRWA, qui maintient les camps de réfugiés qui existent dans cette région depuis de nombreuses années. Nous fournissons une aide humanitaire supplémentaire, surtout par l'intermédiaire de la

[Texte]

particularly urgent needs of those who are suffering from the violence in that region. Also, the government has announced its intention to contribute—I think the sum is \$5 million, but I would have to go back and check that... a significant sum of money to the reconstruction of Lebanon when circumstances in the region permit that reconstruction to begin.

Mrs. Appolloni: May I be allowed another question?

The Chairman: Yes, I will allow a supplementary.

Mrs. Appolloni: Mr. Stanford, thank you for your information, but the information we get from the media here leads us to believe those refugees are far from safe in the so-called camps that are being set up by UNRWA. I am not saying that we should not help to set up the camps, but if, as in the case not too long ago, people are imperilled even in the camps, has any move been made, on the part of either the Lebanese government or anybody else, to Canada to accept some of the people now living in those camps—such as we have done, say, from the Austrian camp when we had the Polish exodus?

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Mr. Stanford: Mr. Chairman, there are some refugees who come to Canada, but not very many. I think the aspirations of these people are not to find a home somewhere else in the world—in Canada or elsewhere—but to be allowed to pursue their activities in their own homeland. And it is in support of that effort, Mr. Chairman, that the government's activities have been directed.

The Chairman: I know Mr. Wenman wants to have a question or two on this.

Is it not one of the greatest difficulties—I never understood—that we are strong supporters of UNRWA? We provide aid to the Palestinian camp; the Palestinian camp gets destroyed; we rebuild the Palestinian camp; we help the Palestinians. Is it not true that the real reason is the way the western world refuses to address itself to the very root of the problem—what to do with the Palestinians so that they get out of Lebanon and leave Lebanon and the Lebanese people to try to find a way to their own solution? Why is it so difficult to recognize that as long as we do not address ourselves to the very root of the problem, what to do with the Palestinians...

Are they not entitled to a country like any other civilized people? Are they ready to get out someday, hopefully soon? First, of course, militarily from Lebanon, the PLO out of Lebanon, the Syrians out of Lebanon, the Iranians out of Lebanon, the Israelis out of Lebanon, but then the Palestinians will still be in Lebanon. You cannot take hundreds of thousands people overnight—you have to find a country for them, where to put them. Why is it so difficult?

I understand in Canada—we saw that last week, with the immense publicity—how difficult and how touchy the subject is. I think it is probably unfair to put it to you as your first

[Traduction]

Croix-Rouge, pour répondre aux besoins particulièrement urgents de ceux qui souffrent de la violence dans cette région. De plus, le gouvernement a annoncé l'intention de contribuer—je crois que la somme est de 5 millions de dollars, mais il faudrait que je vérifie—une somme d'argent importante pour la reconstruction du Liban lorsque la situation dans cette région permettra d'entreprendre cette reconstruction.

Mme Appolloni: Puis-je poser une autre question?

Le président: Oui, je permettrai une question supplémentaire.

Mme appolloni: Monsieur Stanford, je vous remercie de vos renseignements, mais l'information que nous communiquent les médias ici au pays nous porte à croire que ces réfugiés sont loin d'être en sécurité dans les soi-disant camps que l'UNRWA établit dans la région. Je ne dis pas que nous ne devrions pas aider à établir ces camps, mais si, comme ce fut le cas il n'y a pas si longtemps, des vies sont mises en péril même dans ces camps, est-ce que le gouvernement libanais ou un autre organisme a entrepris des démarches pour demander au Canada d'accueillir une partie des personnes vivant maintenant dans ces camps—comme nous l'avons fait pour les réfugiés du camp autrichien lorsqu'il y a eu l'exode de la Pologne?

M. Stanford: Monsieur le président, il y a un certain nombre de réfugiés qui viennent au Canada, mais ils ne sont pas nombreux. Je crois que leurs aspirations ne sont pas de trouver un chez eux ailleurs au monde—que ce soit au Canada ou ailleurs—mais plutôt qu'on leur permette de mener une vie normale dans leur propre patrie. Et c'est vers ce but, monsieur le président, que tendent les efforts du gouvernement.

Le président: M. Wenman aimerait poser une question ou deux à ce sujet.

N'est-ce pas là un grand problème—je n'ai jamais compris—que nous soyons de forts partisans de l'U.N.R.W.A.? Nous fournissons de l'aide au camp palestinien; le camp palestinien se fait détruire; nous reconstruisons le camp palestinien; nous aidons les Palestiniens. N'est-il pas vrai que la véritable raison est la façon dont le monde occidental refuse de s'attaquer au cœur même du problème: que faire des Palestiniens afin qu'ils sortent du Liban et qu'ils laissent le Liban et le peuple libanais libres de trouver eux-mêmes une solution? Pourquoi est-il si difficile de reconnaître que tant que nous ne nous attaquons pas au cœur même du problème, que faire des Palestiniens...

N'ont-ils pas droit à un pays comme tout autre peuple civilisé? Seront-ils prêts à sortir du pays un jour, et, on l'espère, bientôt? Premièrement, bien sûr, sortir les militaires du Liban, puis l'O.L.P., les Syriens, les Iraniens, les Israéliens, mais ensuite, les Palestiniens seront encore au Liban. On ne peut pas évacuer des centaines de milliers de personnes du jour au lendemain—il faut leur trouver un pays, savoir où les mettre. Pourquoi est-ce si difficile?

Au Canada—nous l'avons vu la semaine passée, avec toute la publicité qu'il y a eu—le sujet est devenu épineux et explosif. Il est probablement injuste de vous poser le problème

[Text]

appearance here. It is more political, I am sure, than bureaucratic, because if we were to follow bureaucracy, for once I would be happy to say that we had a solution. But probably it is the political decision.

But is it not true, sir, that the true reason is what to do with the Palestinians? Are they entitled—yes or no—to a country? The government recognizes, what, a homeland? What is the official Canadian position on the Palestinians? We will put it on the record again.

Mr. Marchand: I will ask Mr. Stanford to give you the sacramental formula. I think it is a well-documented state of Canada's policy in the region to recognize the centrality of the Palestinian issue in the regional crisis that we are living in that part of the world. The minister has found a number of occasions during his last tour of five countries in the area to reiterate, to explain, and to indeed answer questions on what are the various features of Canada's policy in the generality of its approach to the region, but also particularly with regard to the Palestinian issue and its centrality. He has had numerous discussions at the highest level; that includes King Hussein, Prime Minister Shamir, and the Syrian authorities.

Joe, would you care to repeat the words that describe the substance of the position on . . .

• 1730

Mr. Stanford: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Minister has stated on a number of occasions that the Canadian government supports a homeland for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The government has not taken a position on the constitutional nature of the homeland, believing that is something to be resolved in the course of negotiations. But unlike the position of the United States, the position of the Canadian government does not rule out the possibility of an independent Palestinian state in that region.

The Chairman: Supplementary by Mr. Wenman.

Mr. Wenman: I have found over the years that what is so difficult about the subject as it relates to government policy is to find out whether there has in fact been a substantive change or whether it is just rhetorical. Now, in order to solve that problem I asked for answers in writing about what the particular positions were on the major questions. I got those answers just as we broke last summer. Now, having received those answers, what I want to know today—and I would like it in writing—is whether there has been any change from that written policy as a result of the minister's visit . . .

The Chairman: As a result of his meeting last week.

Mr. Wenman: —or as a result of his meetings, or whatever. If there has been a change in the policy, a shift or a leaning one way, I would like to know about it. If there has not, what are we talking about? So could I request that the officials review the stated policy as they gave it to me in response to my questions? All I want to hear is whether it is the same or whether there is review or something different. If it is different, I would like to know.

[Translation]

la première fois que vous vous présentez ici. Je suis certain que le problème est davantage politique que bureaucratique, parce que si nous suivions les pratiques bureaucratiques, je serais heureux de dire que, pour une fois, nous avons une solution. Mais tout cela relève probablement d'une décision politique.

Mais n'est-il pas vrai, monsieur, que la vraie raison est de savoir que faire des Palestiniens? Ont-ils droit—oui ou non—à un pays? Le gouvernement reconnaît quoi: une patrie? Quelle est la position officielle du Canada sur les Palestiniens? Nous la ferons figurer une fois de plus au compte rendu.

M. Marchand: Je vais demander à M. Stanford de prononcer les paroles sacramentelles. Je crois qu'on a bien documenté la position du Canada sur cette région, celle de reconnaître la centralité de la question palestinienne dans la crise régionale dans ce coin du monde. Le ministre a pu, à plusieurs occasions au cours de sa dernière tournée dans cinq pays de la région, réitérer et expliquer sa position et répondre à des questions sur les divers aspects de la politique générale du Canada à l'égard de cette région, mais aussi, de façon particulière, à l'égard de la question palestinienne et de sa centralité. Il a eu de nombreuses discussions aux niveaux les plus élevés; cela comprend le roi Hussein, le premier ministre Shamir, et les autorités syriennes.

Joe, pourriez-vous répéter les paroles qui décrivent l'essentiel de la position sur . . .

M. Stanford: Merci, monsieur le président. Le ministre a déclaré à plusieurs reprises que le gouvernement canadien est en faveur d'une patrie pour les Palestiniens en Cisjordanie et dans le Gaza. Le gouvernement n'a pas pris position sur la nature constitutionnelle de la patrie, jugeant que c'est là une question à régler au cours des négociations. Mais contrairement à la position des États-Unis, la position du gouvernement canadien n'écarte pas la possibilité d'un État palestinien indépendant dans cette région.

Le président: Question supplémentaire de M. Wenman.

M. Wenman: J'ai trouvé au fil des ans que ce qui rend le sujet si difficile en ce qui a trait à la politique gouvernementale, c'est de trouver s'il y a réellement eu un changement considérable ou s'il est seulement rhétorique. Afin de régler ce problème, j'ai demandé des réponses par écrit au sujet des positions particulières sur les grandes questions. J'ai obtenu ces réponses au moment de l'ajournement l'été passé. Ayant reçu ces réponses, je voudrais savoir aujourd'hui—et j'aimerais obtenir les réponses par écrit—s'il y a eu des changements à cette politique écrite par suite de la visite du ministre . . .

Le président: Suite à sa réunion la semaine passée.

M. Wenman: . . . ou par suite de ces réunions, et ainsi de suite. S'il y a eu un changement de politique, un changement d'orientation, j'aimerais en être au courant. S'il n'y en a pas eu, de quoi parlons-nous? Alors, puis-je demander que les fonctionnaires renvoient la politique annoncée comme ils l'ont décrite en réponse à mes questions? Je veux savoir si elle est la même ou si elle a été modifiée ou s'il y a eu un changement quelconque. Si elle est différente, j'aimerais le savoir.

[Texte]

The Chairman: May I ask, Mr. Wenman, if you would rather render a service to the committee, if you could write again to the department this series of questions—the same ones. The department will answer, and I shall of course use my responsibility and my—I do not like to say my power, but I will add them as an addendum to the minutes of today's proceeding. These answers will be added to today's meeting, as we have done in the past.

Mr. Wenman: Do I need to? I am here in the committee making an official request. The questions are questions that are before the committee. They are in our records. Can I not just ask that they be answered again in the light of the minister's visit? Do you need an official letter?

The Chairman: Well, I will see how they react, if it is the wish of this committee.

Mr. Marchand: Well, Mr. Chairman, if it is the wish of the committee that this constitutes a request, we are on the receiving end of a request.

Mr. Wenman: Thank you. I would hope that it will not take the same length of time it took to get the response from the last ones, in view of the fact that you have a headstart in the answers already. How long might I anticipate that it might take?

The Chairman: If the answer arrives after the House has adjourned, then it terminates everything...—like Bill S-31 in the Senate. That terminates everything.

Mr. Wenman: Could we anticipate a week or so? Would that be inappropriate for an update? Would a week be inappropriate? We could then catch it for our final meeting before the break.

Mr. Marchand: I take it that the last response that you received was under the signature of the minister, was it not?

Mr. Wenman: From the department. It is an official representation.

Mr. Marchand: Was it from the department or the minister?

Mr. Wenman: The minister signed the letter.

Mr. Marchand: Well, I guess you would expect the minister to sign the letter again. Would you?

Mr. Wenman: It would certainly make it far more official.

The Chairman: Yes, but the problem is that, as I say...

Mr. Wenman: But if that means it takes extra time, I would be pleased to accept this.

Mr. Marchand: I am not saying, Mr. Chairman, that it will. All I am saying is that the letter...

Mr. Bosley: There is a way around it.

[Traduction]

Le président: Puis-je vous demander, monsieur Wenman, si vous voudriez rendre service au comité en adressant de nouveau au ministère cette série de questions—les mêmes. Le ministère répondra et il va sans dire que je ferai appel à ma responsabilité et à—je n'aime pas dire mon pouvoir, mais je les ajouterai en *addendum* au compte rendu de la séance d'aujourd'hui. Ces réponses seront ajoutées au compte rendu de la réunion d'aujourd'hui, comme nous l'avons fait dans le passé.

Mr. Wenman: Est-ce bien nécessaire? Je suis ici, au sein du comité, en train de faire une demande officielle. Les questions sont des questions posées devant le comité. Elles figurent dans nos comptes rendus. Ne puis-je pas tout simplement demander qu'on y réponde de nouveau à la lumière de la visite du ministre? Avez-vous besoin d'une lettre officielle?

Le président: Eh bien, je verrai comment ils réagiront, si c'est le désir de ce comité.

Mr. Marchand: Eh bien, monsieur le président, si le comité désire que ce soit-là une demande, nous venons de la recevoir.

Mr. Wenman: Merci. J'espère que cela ne prendra pas autant de temps que la dernière fois, étant donné que vous avez déjà pris de l'avance pour répondre à ces questions. Combien de temps pensez-vous que cela prendra?

Le président: Si la réponse arrive après l'ajournement de la Chambre, cela arrête tout—comme le projet de loi S-31 au Sénat. Cela met fin à tout.

Mr. Wenman: Pouvons-nous nous attendre à une réponse dans environ une semaine? Est-ce que cela serait suffisant pour une mise à jour? Une semaine serait-elle insuffisante? Comme cela, nous pourrions l'avoir à notre dernière séance avant l'ajournement.

Mr. Marchand: Je suppose que la dernière réponse que vous avez reçue portait la signature du ministre, n'est-ce pas?

Mr. Wenman: Du ministère. C'est un document officiel.

Mr. Marchand: Était-elle du ministère ou du ministre?

Mr. Wenman: Le ministre a signé la lettre.

Mr. Marchand: Alors, je suppose que vous vous attendez que le ministre signe aussi cette lettre, n'est-ce pas?

Mr. Wenman: Il est évident que cela la rendrait beaucoup plus officielle.

Le président: Oui, mais le problème, c'est que, comme je disais...

Mr. Wenman: Mais si cela veut dire que cela prendra plus de temps, je me contenterais d'accepter ceci.

Mr. Marchand: Je ne dis pas, monsieur le président, que cela prendrait plus de temps. Tout ce que je dis, c'est que la lettre...

Mr. Bosley: Il y a une façon de contourner la difficulté.

[Text]

The Chairman: Mr. Bosley.

Mr. Bosley: Go back to his original suggestion. I think he can write a letter as an MP or you can simply take it as a verbal request and reply to him. He can bring those two responses to the committee in whatever form the committee is sitting, under a new session or under this session, and you can agree to it.

The Chairman: Good.

Mr. Wenman: I could ask that it be tabled and we can have a discussion of it there.

Mr. Bosley: I know the minister is not going to write to him in any other capacity.

Mr. Wenman: The policy is one and the same. Surely what we would state would have the concurrence of the minister. Surely you are not going to state something that does not have his concurrence.

The Chairman: Madam Appolloni, please.

Mrs. Appolloni: I would challenge any fair-minded person to query the legitimate right of any people to want their own homeland. I mean, it is so basic to most of our thinking. But, particularly in view of recent events in the Middle East, I cannot imagine how homeland can be discussed without the parties most concerned being party to those discussions, to those negotiations and what not. So my question really would be: Who would represent the Palestinian people? It seems absolutely wrong for other nations to decide the future of a whole people. Therefore, who would represent the Palestinians, assuming we could get down to negotiating such a basic right?

• 1735

The Chairman: Mr. Stanford, please.

Mr. Stanford: Mr. Chairman, it is of course for the Palestinians to determine who would represent them. The Camp David Agreement provided a framework within which such a negotiation might commence, and that is one in which Palestinian representatives would appear at the negotiation as part of the Jordanian participation.

The Chairman: I am sorry, but time is running out for me probably, so when I say the time is running out I mean it in many ways.

It is all very well to say that it is for the Palestinians to decide who speaks for them. That is good. I agree. But then we should give the Palestinians a chance to express themselves democratically as we brag about so much in the world, so they can choose who will speak for them.

How can we on one hand say that it is not for us to say, that it is for the Palestinians to decide who speaks for the Palestinians, and deprive them of the elective process of choosing their own people? They have chosen mayors, but because they do not fit too well with the power of the Israeli government, they are taken aside; they have no right to exercise their authority. As soon as someone is elected, who seems to say things that are

[Translation]

Le président: Monsieur Bosley.

M. Bosley: Retournons à sa première question. Je crois qu'il peut écrire une lettre comme député ou que vous pouvez tout simplement l'accepter comme une demande verbale et lui répondre. Il peut présenter les deux réponses au comité à n'importe quelle séance, lors d'une nouvelle session ou lors de la session en cours, et vous pourrez les approuver.

Le président: Bon.

M. Wenman: Je peux demander qu'on le dépose à la Chambre et qu'on en discute à ce moment-là.

M. Bosley: Je sais que le ministre ne lui écrira pas à quelque autre titre que ce soit.

M. Wenman: La politique est la même. De toute évidence, ce que nous déclarerions recevrait l'approbation du ministre. Je suis certain que vous ne feriez pas une déclaration sur laquelle le ministre ne serait pas d'accord.

Le président: Madame Appolloni, s'il vous plaît.

Mme Appolloni: Je défie toute personne impartiale à mettre en question le droit légitime de tout peuple de vouloir sa propre patrie. Ce que je veux dire, c'est que cela est si fondamental à notre façon de penser. Mais, surtout à la lumière des événements récents au Moyen-Orient, je ne sais pas comment on peut parler de patrie sans que les principaux intéressés participent à ces discussions et à ces négociations. Ma question véritable serait donc: Qui représenterait les Palestiniens? Il m'apparaît absolument mauvais que d'autres nations décident de l'avenir de tout un peuple. Donc, qui représenterait les Palestiniens, en supposant que nous puissions arriver à négocier un droit aussi fondamental?

Le président: Monsieur Stanford, s'il vous plaît.

M. Stanford: Monsieur le président, il appartient évidemment aux Palestiniens de déterminer qui les représenterait. L'accord de Camp David a donné un cadre dans lequel cette négociation pourrait s'amorcer, et c'est un cadre où les représentants de la Palestine interviendraient dans les négociations dans le cadre de la participation de la Jordanie.

Le président: Excusez-moi, mais mon temps achève, probablement, et lorsque je dis que le temps achève cela a plusieurs sens.

C'est très bien de dire qu'il appartient aux Palestiniens de décider qui est leur porte-parole. Parfait. Je suis d'accord. Mais ensuite nous devrions donner aux Palestiniens la chance de s'exprimer démocratiquement, selon un processus qui fait notre orgueil dans le monde entier, pour leur permettre de choisir qui sera leur porte-parole.

Comment pouvons-nous, d'un côté, dire qu'il ne nous appartient pas de décider, c'est-à-dire qu'il revient aux Palestiniens de décider qui parle pour eux, et les priver du processus électif pour le choix de leurs propres représentants? Ils ont choisi des maires, mais parce que ces derniers ne cadrent pas très bien avec la puissance du gouvernement d'Israël, on les a mis de côté; ils n'ont pas le droit d'exercer

[Texte]

unacceptable, he is not allowed to pursue his responsibility. So when are we going to stop . . .

I am not, in any shape or form, being rude to you, I assure you. I want to extend to you the utmost courtesy as a new ADM, and I respect your great knowledge. I am not hitting you in any way, shape, or form. I want this to be very clear for the record. I have a great hope to talk with you on this question, but I am amazed. I have asked that same question to Edgar Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress of New York, when he appeared recently in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee studying the Middle East. It is for the Palestinians to decide who will speak for them. When are we going to give the Palestinians a chance to decide democratically who they want? Then we could say the PLO is not or is representative, or is the sole spokesman or others could be. But if we never give them a chance, how the hell can we know who speaks for the Palestinians?

Mr. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): [Inaudible—Editor]

The Chairman: Well, the same process. At least the PLO is elected. I am not going to defend the PLO on the their national day of Lebanon. As you know, there is a big ceremony tonight—Lebanon Day. I wanted to terminate on that. God knows how many people do not understand the action of some. We stand for the total sovereignty of Lebanon. We stand for the unity of Lebanon. We stand for one government in Lebanon and please out, out the others so that maybe—I am not sure—but maybe if we leave the Lebanese to themselves they may find some solution to their problem: butt out all these foreigners who are trying to mix up the situation there.

That is how I stand, but I am still not satisfied that I know who speaks for them. How can we, if we do not give them the chance. We say the PLO is not. Maybe they are not, but we do not know; we cannot test it because there is no election. If there were an election on the West Bank, in Gaza—say come on, there is a free election as we like to run in Israel and in Canada, choose whoever you want, anybody can run—why not? God knows it is not Mr. Shamir who can tell us how to run democratic elections. I am sure it is the same Shamir of yesterday who is now prime minister, so he should understand the democratic process. He became democratic, but he was not always democratic that I know of—and I am very kind when I say that.

So I do not know, sir; I have no answer. I suppose I will live a very long time without an answer to that very difficult situation. I will put my question in clear English: How can we decide who speaks for them if we do not give them a chance to choose democratically who speaks for them?

• 1740

Mr. Stanford: Well . . .

[Traduction]

leur pouvoir. Dès qu'on élit quelqu'un qui semble dire des choses inacceptables, il ne peut plus s'acquitter de sa responsabilité. Quand allons-nous chercher . . .

Loin de moi l'idée de vous malmenier, je vous assure. Je veux vous traiter avec la plus grande courtoisie, en tant que nouveau SMA, et je respecte vos immenses connaissances. Je ne vous attaque pas, d'aucune façon. Je veux que ce soit très clair au compte rendu. J'ai le grand espoir de pouvoir vous parler de cette question, mais je suis étonné. J'ai posé la même question à M. Bronfman, lors d'une récente comparution devant le Comité sénatorial qui traite du Moyen-Orient. Il appartient aux Palestiniens de décider qui sera leur porte-parole. Quand allons-nous donner aux Palestiniens la chance de décider démocratiquement ce qu'ils veulent? Alors nous pourrions dire que l'OLP est ou n'est pas représentative, ou qu'elle est le seul porte-parole ou qu'il pourrait y en avoir d'autres. Mais si nous ne leur donnons jamais la chance, comment diable saurons-nous qui parle pour les Palestiniens?

M. Robinson (Etobicoke—Lakeshore): [Inaudible—Note de l'éditeur]

Le président: Ma foi, le même processus. Au moins l'OLP est élue. Je ne veux pas défendre l'OLP à l'occasion de la journée nationale du Liban. Comme vous le savez, il y a une grande cérémonie ce soir. Je voulais terminer là-dessus. Dieu sait combien de gens ne comprennent pas l'action de certains. Nous sommes pour la souveraineté totale du Liban. Nous sommes pour l'unité du Liban. Nous sommes pour un gouvernement unique au Liban et pour que les autres partent au plus vite de manière que peut-être, je ne suis pas sûr, mais que peut-être, si nous laissons les Libanais à eux-mêmes, ils puissent trouver une solution à leur problème: foutons dehors tous ces étrangers qui cherchent à mêler les cartes là-bas.

C'est là ma position, mais je ne suis pas encore sûr de savoir qui parle en leur nom. Comment le saurions-nous, si nous ne leur donnons pas la chance. Nous disons que ce n'est pas l'OLP. C'est peut-être vrai, mais nous ne savons pas; nous ne pouvons pas le vérifier, parce qu'il n'y a pas d'élections. S'il y avait des élections en Cisjordanie, à Gaza . . . nous dirions: Venez, il y a des élections libres comme nous aimons en faire en Israël et au Canada, choisissez qui vous voudrez, tout le monde peut être candidat . . . Pourquoi pas? Dieu sait que ce n'est pas M. Shamir qui peut nous dire comment faire des élections démocratiques. Je suis sûr que c'est le même Shamir d'hier qui est maintenant premier ministre, de sorte qu'il devrait comprendre le processus démocratique. Il est devenu démocratique, mais il ne l'a pas toujours été, que je sache, et je fais preuve d'une grande modération en disant cela.

Par conséquent, je ne sais pas, monsieur; je n'ai pas de réponse. Je suppose que je devrai vivre longtemps sans réponse à cette situation extrêmement difficile. Je vais poser ma question en termes très clairs: comment pouvons-nous décider qui parle pour eux si nous ne leur donnons pas la chance de choisir démocratiquement leur porte-parole?

M. Stanford: Eh bien . . .

[Text]

The Chairman: You could enlighten me.

Mr. Stanford: The situation . . .

The Chairman: If it is political, I will accept that you do not answer.

Mr. Stanford: I will try to confine myself, Mr. Chairman, to the bureaucratic domain. The situation of course is very complex. It has a great deal to do with the question of Israeli practices on the West Bank, which as you are aware is one of the areas of difference between the Government of Canada and the Government of Israel.

One of the elements of the Camp David Agreement that made it so attractive to Canada and why Canada supported it and continues to support it is that it did provide a mechanism for the creation of a democratically elected group on the West Bank, which would be created according to the terms of Camp David for the specific purposes of that agreement, but would have provided an elected framework of Palestinian representation. This, as I say, was one of the features of Camp David that made it so attractive. Unfortunately, it has not been pursued.

The Chairman: I do not know if I could say it in English. The irony of all that is that I am asked here in Canada to support Camp David. I may say yes; I may say okay, I give in, I will support Camp David. Yet the actual Prime Minister of Israel—and you correct me—did not even vote for it. So it is good enough for me, Marcel Prud'homme, and Canadians to accept, but it was not good enough for the man who is today Prime Minister of Israel. How can we be asked to support Camp David? I am willing, I do not give up. I may consider; I may say finally yes, I do—even though it is very late now, I think. But we are asking Canadians and everybody to support Camp David, that it may be the beginning of something. Yet the actual prime minister—I want you, Mr. Bosley, to know that—the actual prime minister did not even vote for it, and he is now Prime Minister of Israel. Of course I understand a little bit more, but I prefer to say I do not understand anything any more.

Mr. Wenman: I think, Mr. Chairman, you should . . .

The Chairman: So I think we should adjourn.

Mr. Wenman: I think you should step out of the Chair when Mr. MacEachen returns briefly, and you should have your opportunity to pose your questions in this area.

The Chairman: I am dying for that, but the session will die before.

Mr. Wenman: I regret we did not do that today. I would have made that motion had it occurred to me. I would hope you will avail yourself of that opportunity . . .

The Chairman: Well, that is the frustration of being chairman in the British parliamentary system. The chairman chairs, and does not question.

[Translation]

Le président: Vous pourriez m'éclairer.

M. Stanford: La situation . . .

Le président: Si c'est politique, je vais accepter que vous ne répondiez pas.

M. Stanford: Je vais tâcher de m'en tenir, monsieur le président, au domaine bureaucratique. Naturellement, la situation est très complexe. Cela a beaucoup à voir avec la question des pratiques d'Israël en Cisjordanie, qui, vous le savez, sont une pomme de discorde entre le gouvernement du Canada et le gouvernement d'Israël.

Un des éléments de l'accord de Camp David que le Canada a particulièrement affectionnés, et pour lesquels le Canada a donné et continue de donner son appui, c'est qu'il prévoyait un mécanisme pour la création d'un groupe démocratiquement élu en Cisjordanie, qui pourrait être créé selon les modalités de Camp David pour les fins précises de cet accord, mais qui aurait assuré un cadre électif pour la représentation palestinienne. Je le répète, c'était là un des grands attraits de Camp David. Malheureusement, on n'y a pas donné suite.

Le président: J'ignore si je pourrais le dire en anglais. L'ironie de tout cela, c'est qu'on me demande ici au Canada d'appuyer Camp David. Je dirai peut-être oui; je dirai peut-être: d'accord, je cède, j'appuierai Camp David. Et pourtant, l'actuel premier ministre d'Israël . . . et vous pouvez me corriger . . . n'a même pas voté pour. Il est donc assez bon pour que moi, Marcel Prud'homme, et les Canadiens l'acceptons, mais il n'est pas assez bon pour celui qui est aujourd'hui premier ministre d'Israël. Comment peut-on nous demander d'appuyer Camp David? Je veux bien, je n'abandonne pas. J'y songerai; je finirai peut-être par dire oui, même s'il est très tard, je pense. Mais nous demandons aux Canadiens et à tout le monde d'appuyer Camp David en disant que c'est peut-être le début de quelque chose de nouveau. Et pourtant, l'actuel premier ministre n'a même pas voté pour, et il est maintenant premier ministre d'Israël. Naturellement, je comprends un peu plus, mais je préfère dire que je ne comprends plus rien du tout.

M. Wenman: Je pense, monsieur le président, que vous devriez . . .

Le président: Je pense donc que nous devrions lever la séance.

M. Wenman: Je pense que vous devriez quitter le fauteuil de la présidence lorsque M. MacEachen reviendra brièvement, et que vous devriez avoir l'occasion de poser vos questions là-dessus.

Le président: J'en meurs d'envie, mais la session mourra auparavant.

M. Wenman: Je regrette que nous ne l'ayons pas fait aujourd'hui. J'aurais présenté cette motion si j'y avais pensé. J'espère que vous profiterez de cette occasion . . .

Le président: Ma foi, c'est là la frustration que connaissent les présidents dans le parlementarisme britannique. Le président préside: il ne pose pas de questions.

[Texte]

Mrs. Appolloni: I would hope our new ADM has not been too embarrassed by our questions. I would also hope he realizes there is among members of Parliament a very deep conscience about what is happening in the Middle East. There are those of us—many of us—who feel we do not seem to have applied the same standards of international justice equally.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear.

The Chairman: May I just conclude by saying that there are also, sir, members of Parliament who have pride; they do not like very much their minister being called to order to explain when he is defending Canada's interests in all of the Middle East. I did not appreciate very much my minister being called in and having to explain his statement. I think it is about time some people spoke up for the interests of all of Canada.

I thank you very much.

Mr. Wenman: I wish you had said that.

The Chairman: Oh, it is on record, that is why.

The meeting is adjourned—Thursday, 11.00 a.m.

[Traduction]

Mme Appolloni: J'espère que nous n'avons pas trop embarrassé notre nouveau S.M.A. par nos questions. J'espère qu'il comprendra que les députés ont une très vive conscience de ce qui se passe au Moyen-Orient. Il y en a parmi nous... beaucoup... qui estiment que nous n'avons peut-être pas appliqué les mêmes normes de justice internationale à tout le monde.

Des voix: Bravo!

Le président: Permettez-moi de terminer en disant qu'il y a aussi, monsieur, des députés qui ont leur fierté; ils n'aiment pas beaucoup que leur ministre soit sommé de s'expliquer lorsqu'il défend les intérêts du Canada dans l'ensemble du Moyen-Orient. Je n'ai pas beaucoup aimé que mon ministre soit convoqué et ait à expliquer sa déclaration. Je pense qu'il est à peu près temps que certaines personnes élèvent la voix dans les intérêts de tout le Canada.

Je vous remercie beaucoup.

M. Wenman: J'aurais bien aimé que vous disiez cela.

Le président: Oh, c'est au compte rendu, voilà.

La séance est ajournée à jeudi, 11h00.



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WITNESSES—TÉMOINS

From the Department of External Affairs:

Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Deputy Minister, Political Affairs;

Mr. G. Shortliffe, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy Coordination;

Mr. Joseph S. Stanford, Assistant Deputy Minister, Africa and Middle East Branch.

Du ministère des affaires extérieures:

M. de Montigny Marchand, sous-ministre, Affaires politiques;

M. G. Shortliffe, sous-ministre adjoint, Coordination des politiques;

M. Joseph S. Stanford, sous-ministre adjoint, Secteur de l'Afrique et du Moyen-Orient.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

Issue No. 101

Thursday, November 24, 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Fascicule n° 101

Le jeudi 24 novembre 1983

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

External Affairs and National Defence

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

Supplementary Estimates (B) 1983-84: Vote 5b under
NATIONAL DEFENCE

CONCERNANT:

Budget supplémentaire (B) 1983-1984: crédit 5b sous la
rubrique DÉFENSE NATIONALE

APPEARING:

The Honourable Jean-Jacques Blais, Minister of
National Defence

COMPARAÎT:

L'honorable Jean-Jacques Blais, Ministre de la Défense
nationale

WITNESSES:

(See back cover)

TÉMOINS:

(Voir à l'endos)



First Session of the
Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la
trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appolloni

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Bill Blaikie
John Bosley
Herb Breau
Maurice Dupras
Stanley Hudecki
Pauline Jewett
David Kilgour
Gérald Laniel
Jean Lapierre
Ken Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*)
Sinclair Stevens
Robert Wenman

COMITÉ PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES ET DE LA DÉFENSE
NATIONALE

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Vice-président: M^{me} Ursula Appolloni

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J.-Roland Comtois
Stan Darling
Pierre Gimaiel
Hal Herbert
Fred King
Paul-André Massé
Walter McLean
Donald W. Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*)
Lorne Nystrom
Bob Ogle
Irinée Pelletier
Doug Roche
Marcel Roy
Ian Watson—(30)

(Quorum 8)

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

Pursuant to Standing Orders 69(4)(b):

On Wednesday, November 23, 1983:

Mr. Blaikie replaced Mr. Sargeant.

Conformément à l'article 69(4)b) du Règlement:

Le mercredi 23 novembre 1983:

M. Blaikie remplace M. Sargeant.

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE JEUDI 24 NOVEMBRE 1983

(156)

[Texte]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale se réunit aujourd'hui à 11h10, sous la présidence de M. Marcel Prud'homme (président).

Membres du Comité présents: M. Andre, M^{me} Appolloni, MM. Blaikie, Hudecki, Prud'homme, Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*), Stevens et Wenman.

Substituts présents: M^{me} Beauchamp-Niquet, MM. Darling, Gimaïel, King, Massé, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*) et Roy.

Autres députés présents: MM. Bradley et Robinson (*Burnaby*).

Comparait: L'honorable Jean-Jacques Blais, Ministre de la Défense nationale.

Témoins: Du ministère de la Défense nationale: Gén G.C.E. Thériault, chef de l'État-major de la défense; Cmdre E.J. Healey, bureau de projet, Frégate canadienne de patrouille; Lgén J.E. Vance, sous-ministre adjoint (Personnel); Bgén A.C. Brown, directeur général, Plans militaires et opérations.

Aussi présents: Du Centre parlementaire des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur: M. Roger Hill, directeur adjoint; M. Daniel Bon, conseiller.

Le Comité reprend l'étude de son ordre de renvoi du jeudi 3 novembre 1983 portant sur le Budget supplémentaire (B) pour l'année financière se terminant le 31 mars 1984. (*Voir procès-verbal du mardi 22 novembre 1983, fascicule n° 100*).

Le président met en délibération le crédit 5b sous la rubrique DÉFENSE NATIONALE.

Le ministre fait une déclaration et, avec les témoins, répond aux questions.

A 13h09, le Comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1983

(156)

[Translation]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 11:10 o'clock a.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mr. Andre, Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Blaikie, Hudecki, Prud'homme, Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*), Stevens and Wenman.

Alternates present: Mrs. Beauchamp-Niquet, Messrs. Darling, Gimaïel, King, Massé, Munro (*Esquimalt—Saanich*) and Roy.

Other Members present: Messrs. Bradley and Robinson (*Burnaby*).

Appearing: The Honorable Jean-Jacques Blais, Minister of National Defence.

Witnesses: From the Department of National Defence: Gen. G.C.E. Thériault, Chief of the Defence Staff; Cmdr E.J. Healey, Project Manager, Canadian Patrol Frigate; LGén J.E. Vance, Assistant Deputy Minister (Personnel); and Bgen A.C. Brown, Director General, Military Plans and Operations.

Also present: From the Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade: Mr. Roger Hill, Assistant Director; Mr. Daniel Bon, Adviser.

The Committee resumed consideration of its Order of Reference dated Thursday, November 3, 1983 relating to the Supplementary Estimates (B) for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984. (*See Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence dated Tuesday, November 22, 1983, Issue No. 100*).

The Chairman called NATIONAL DEFENCE—Vote 5b.

The Minister made a statement and, with the witnesses, answered questions.

At 1:09 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)

[Texte]

Thursday, November 24, 1983

Le président: À l'ordre!

Bonjour madame, messieurs. Ce matin nous recevons le nouveau ministre de la Défense nationale, l'honorable Jean-Jacques Blais, qui est accompagné du sous-ministre, M. D.B. Dewar et du chef de l'État-major de la Défense, M. le général G.C.E. Thériault. J'ai déjà eu d'ailleurs le plaisir de vous présenter M. Dewar et je vous présente maintenant le nouveau chef d'État-major, le général Thériault, que je félicite en votre nom. Je lui souhaite la bienvenue parmi nous dans ses nouvelles fonctions.

• 1109

Nous connaissons tous son grand dévouement et sa franchise. Je suis persuadé que sa contribution à nos travaux sera à la hauteur de sa réputation.

Now I would like to say a few words of welcome to a new Progressive Conservative member of this committee, Harvie Andre. I am sure I can speak on behalf of the committee as a whole in saying that I am delighted to see him here today, and we wish him good luck and a long career with us. We all know M. Andre has a tough act to follow. I refer here to the great service rendered to this committee over the past years by his predecessor, the Honourable Allan McKinnon, former Minister of National Defence and former Defence critic.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear!

The Chairman: We will all remember Allan McKinnon. When I say I want to say a few words, it is not because he is not in the House any more, but he is not in this committee, it seems. You all know how well we worked together. So I want to say that we will all remember Allan McKinnon, first of all, as a fine gentleman who was ready to work together with colleagues of all parties when we had major common enterprises before us. I think in particular about the very intensive study we carried out on security and disarmament in the winter of 1982. I want to say Allan McKinnon was a key figure in bringing our work to a successful conclusion.

Of course Allan McKinnon is also a very determined and well informed man when it comes to putting forward his own point of view or examining the statements of others. One would expect no less in a former minister and official spokesman for a major party. We simply hope the kind of relationship we have had with him will continue in the future, so this committee can advance to new achievements in the examination of foreign and defence affairs.

I am very delighted on your behalf also to welcome as our witness today the new Minister of National Defence. I doubt very much if he needs a lot of presentation. He has been

TÉMOIGNAGES

(Enregistrement électronique)

[Traduction]

Le jeudi 24 novembre 1983

The Chairman: Order, please!

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. This morning we welcome the new Minister of National Defence, the hon. Jean Jacques Blais, who is accompanied by the Deputy Minister, Mr. D.B. Dewar, and the Chief of Staff for Defence, General G.C.E. Thériault. I have already had the pleasure of introducing Mr. Dewar to you and I now present the new Chief of Staff, General Thériault, whom I congratulate on your behalf. I welcome him and wish him luck in his new duties.

We all know him for his great dedication and his openness. I am sure that his contribution to the committee will be as great as his reputation.

J'aimerais maintenant dire quelques mots pour souhaiter la bienvenue à un nouveau membre progressiste-conservateur du Comité, M. Harvie André. Je suis sûr que je parle au nom du Comité quand je dis que je suis heureux de le voir ici aujourd'hui; nous lui souhaitons bonne chance et longue vie avec nous. Nous savons tous que M. Andre remplace quelqu'un qui a eu une grande place au comité. Je parle de l'honorable Allan McKinnon, ancien ministre de la Défense et ancien critique de la Défense, qui a grandement rendu service au Comité au cours des dernières années.

Des voix: Bravo, bravo!

Le président: Nous garderons tous un bon souvenir d'Allan McKinnon. Si je parlais de lui, ce n'est pas parce qu'il n'est plus à la Chambre des communes, mais simplement parce qu'il n'est plus membre du Comité. Vous savez tous comment nous travaillons ensemble. Nous nous souviendrons tous d'Allan McKinnon d'abord comme un *gentleman*, qui était toujours prêt à travailler avec ses collègues de tous les partis lorsqu'il y avait un travail important à accomplir. Je pense en particulier à notre étude très approfondie sur la sécurité et le désarmement durant l'hiver de 1982. Je tiens à dire qu'Allan McKinnon a été un des principaux membres du Comité qui ont contribué au succès de l'étude.

Allan McKinnon est également un homme déterminé et bien informé lorsque vient le temps de présenter son point de vue ou d'analyser celui des autres. On ne saurait s'attendre à moins d'un ancien ministre et porte-parole officiel d'un parti important. Nous espérons simplement que les rapports que nous entretenons avec lui se poursuivront à l'avenir, pour que le Comité puisse continuer à réaliser des progrès dans l'analyse des affaires étrangères et de la défense.

Je suis très heureux de souhaiter la bienvenue, en votre nom, à notre témoin aujourd'hui, le nouveau ministre de la Défense nationale. Je doute que l'on ait besoin d'un long exposé pour

[Texte]

minister of four portfolios until he was appointed as defence minister last August.

The minister will make a statement, and as is our custom, I think there is only M. Andre, and I should say also Madam Beauchamp-Niquet, whom I forgot to welcome very warmly. It seems I have an inclination to look towards my left. I must say we also have on this committee a new member in the person of Madam Suzanne Beauchamp-Niquet, a new parliamentary secretary to the Minister of External Affairs, and I welcome her equally.

Some hon. Members: Hear, hear!

The Chairman: So we would proceed, M. Andre, in the usual fashion. The minister makes a statement, and I recognize always the official critic of the Official Opposition first, or whomever he may indicate. I take names; I recognize the New Democratic Party, followed by the government side; and then I go around, with less time for the number two than for the number ones. Also, as a custom, when it is supplementary estimates, I do not follow the rule that would oblige me to limit the members discussing only the supplementary estimates. We have over the years—and I see M. Darling, my always faithful supporter, saying yes—we allow, of course, general discussion, and I shall do so. So without any other interruption, I will recognize the Minister of National Defence, M. Blais.

Hon. J.J. Blais (Minister of National Defence): *Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président.*

I am sorry if I was late. In fact, I just came back from my initial flight in the CF-18. That is why, if hon. members will look under the table, I still have my flight boots on. I have not had time to remove them. I can tell you that it was a super flight. I even flew the thing myself; and that manifests a very high level of trust when the...

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Does the general know about this?

Mr. Blais: —Minister of National Defence can do a complete roll off the left wing and a complete roll off the right wing.

The Chairman: That is an expensive risk.

Mr. Blais: I want to tell you that we did that...

Mr. Wenman: Is our plane insured?

[Traduction]

vous le présenter. Il a été ministre de quatre portefeuilles avant d'être nommé ministre de la Défense en août dernier.

Le ministre fera une déclaration et, comme d'habitude, je pense qu'il y a seulement M. Andre... et il y a aussi M^{me} Beauchamp-Niquet, que j'ai oublié de saluer chaleureusement. J'ai l'impression que j'ai tendance à regarder à ma gauche. Le Comité accueille un autre nouveau membre en la personne de M^{me} Suzanne Beauchamp-Niquet, nouvelle secrétaire parlementaire du ministre des Affaires extérieures, et je lui souhaite la bienvenue.

Des voix: Bravo, bravo!

Le président: Alors nous fonctionnerons, monsieur Andre, comme d'habitude. Le ministre fait une déclaration, ensuite je donne la parole au critique officiel de l'Opposition officielle ou à quelqu'un de son choix. Je prends des noms, je donne la parole au Nouveau parti démocratique, ensuite au gouvernement. Après, je fais le tour et les personnes qui suivent ont moins de temps à leur disposition. De plus, comme à la coutume, lorsqu'il s'agit de budget des dépenses supplémentaire, je ne me conforme pas au règlement qui exigerait que les membres discutent uniquement du budget supplémentaire. Depuis bien des années, et je vois M. Darling, mon fidèle supporteur, faire signe que oui, nous permettons évidemment une discussion générale, et nous ferons de même ce matin. Alors sans plus tarder, je cède la parole au ministre de la Défense nationale, M. Blais.

L'honorable J.J. Blais (ministre de la Défense nationale): *Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.*

Je m'excuse d'être arrivé en retard. En fait, je viens de faire mon premier essai du CF-18. C'est pourquoi, honorables députés, si vous regardez sous la table, vous verriez que j'ai encore mes bottes d'aviateur. Je n'ai pas eu le temps de les enlever. Je peux vous dire que cela a été un vol fantastique. J'ai même piloté l'appareil moi-même, et c'est une marque de très grande confiance lorsque...

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Le général est-il au courant?

M. Blais: ... le ministre de la Défense nationale peut faire un tour complet sur la gauche et un tour complet sur la droite.

Le président: C'est un risque coûteux.

M. Blais: Je veux vous dire que nous avons fait cela...

M. Wenman: Notre avion est-il assuré?

• 1115

Mr. Blais: We did that from 20,000 feet so there was ample room for any recovery of course, which was not required in any way.

Having said that, I want to say to you that I am very pleased to be here. As you have heard from my colleague Mr. MacEachen, there is a good deal going on in the world of concern to Canadians and to the Canadian government. I do not intend to go over the ground already covered but want to assure members of this committee that my department is in close

M. Blais: Nous avons fait cet exercice à une altitude de 20,000 pieds, alors il y avait beaucoup d'espace pour une reprise, si nécessaire.

Ceci dit, j'aimerais ajouter que je suis très content d'être ici ce matin. Comme vous le savez déjà par mon collègue, M. MacEachen, beaucoup de choses se passent dans le monde actuel qui sont une source de préoccupation pour les Canadiens et pour le gouvernement fédéral. Je n'ai pas l'intention de répéter ce qu'il a déjà dit, mais je tiens à assurer aux membres

[Text]

touch with the Department of External Affairs to provide advice and to be of assistance when this is possible and appropriate.

Comme vous le savez, monsieur le président, nous devons prévoir longtemps à l'avance et faire ce que nous pouvons avec les ressources dont nous disposons, afin de contribuer de façon continue et tangible pour éviter un conflit. Nous continuons de fonder notre politique de défense et nos décisions sur l'hypothèse qu'une guerre dans laquelle serait entraîné le Canada ne peut être évitée que par une participation active à une entente de défense collective qui unit les efforts de dissuasion aux efforts déployés pour en arriver à des ententes de contrôle vérifiable des armements et de désarmement.

Le gouvernement n'a pas l'intention de modifier ses engagements envers l'OTAN, ni a-t-il l'intention de modifier la structure fondamentale de ses Forces aériennes, terrestres et maritimes. Au contraire, nous voulons plutôt continuer d'améliorer notre potentiel militaire, de sorte que les Forces canadiennes puissent s'acquitter, de façon efficace et responsable, de leurs tâches au pays et de nos engagements envers la défense collective.

Notre principale contribution militaire à la dissuasion et à la défense en Europe est constituée de formations terrestres et aériennes basées en Allemagne et affectées au commandement allié en Europe. Ces forces, comme vous le savez, sont le 4^e Groupe-brigade mécanisé du Canada, le 1^{er} Groupe aérien du Canada (3 escadrons) et le soutien dont ces formations ont besoin. En outre, nous nous sommes engagés à renforcer les forces alliées en Norvège avec un groupe-brigade transportable par air et par mer, stationné au Canada et avec deux escadrons aériens.

En ce qui concerne la défense maritime, toutes les Forces maritimes du Canada, y compris celles se trouvant sur la Côte ouest, demeurent affectées à la défense de l'alliance. Aussi, nous contribuons à l'alliance en participant au système de défense aérospatiale nord-américain. L'entraînement de nos forces et le soutien que nous accordons à ces engagements demeurent indéfectibles et je puis vous assurer que nos engagements seront respectés par des forces aériennes, terrestres et maritimes extrêmement compétentes et dévouées.

I might point out that I was very pleased at the report made two days ago which quotes NATO officials, which officials have recognized the value of the professionalism and the competence as well as the high level of morale of Canadian forces in Europe.

The government has made a constant effort to meet the NATO goal of 3% real growth in defence expenditures since this target was adopted by the alliance in 1977. Projections for the next five years indicate continued real growth in the defence budgets of at least 3% annually after the national inflation is taken into account. While certainly I would like even more, these defence budget levels will enable us to continue the equipment modernization program on which we are well launched.

The proportion of the defence budget allocated to capital stands at 24% this current fiscal year, or about \$1.8 billion. I

[Translation]

du Comité que mon ministère maintient des liens très étroits avec le ministère des Affaires extérieures afin de lui fournir conseils et aide quand cela s'avère approprié.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, we must plan a long time in advance and do what we can with the resources available in order to contribute in an ongoing and tangible way to the prevention of a conflict. We continue to base our defence policy and decisions on the assumption that any war in which Canada would be involved cannot be avoided except through active participation in a collective defence agreement which unites efforts of dissuasion with efforts to reach a verifiable armed control and disarmament agreements.

The government does not have the intention of changing our NATO commitments, nor does it have the intention of changing the basic structure of the air, land or naval forces. On the contrary, we would prefer to continue to improve our military potential, so that the Canadian Armed Forces may acquire themselves of their responsibilities to the country and our commitment in collective defence in an effective and responsible way.

Our main military contribution to dissuasion and defence in Europe is based on land and air units stationed in Germany and assigned to the Allied Command in Europe. As you know, these forces are the fourth Canadian Force Mechanized Brigade, the Canadian First Air Group (3 squadrons) and the support that these units require. Moreover, we are committed to reinforcing the Allied Forces in Norway with an air and sea transport brigade, stationed in Canada, and with two Air Force squadrons.

With respect to naval defence, all the naval forces in Canada, including those on the west coast, remain assigned to the defence of the alliance. So, we contribute to NATO by participating in the North American airspace defence system. The training of our forces and the support we give to our commitments remain unswerving and I can assure you that our commitments will be respected by our extremely and devoted air, land and naval forces.

J'aimerais souligner que j'ai été très content du rapport paru il y a deux jours, selon lequel les responsables de l'OTAN ont reconnu le professionnalisme, la compétence et le haut moral des Forces canadiennes en Europe.

Notre gouvernement a fait un effort continu pour atteindre l'objectif fixé par l'OTAN en 1977, qui était une augmentation réelle de 3 p. 100 des dépenses de la défense. Selon les prévisions pour les cinq années à venir, il y aura une augmentation réelle dans le budget de la défense d'au moins 3 p. 100 par année, en tenant compte du taux d'inflation nationale. Même si j'aurais aimé avoir encore plus, ce budget nous permettra de continuer le programme de modernisation de l'équipement.

Vingt-quatre pour cent du budget de l'année financière sont alloués aux dépenses d'immobilisation, c'est-à-dire 1.8 milliard

[Texte]

intend to increase this proportion to 26% next year, and it is my intention eventually to reach 30%.

Before I give you a status report on some of the major capital initiatives to modernize our forces, I would like to say a few words on the Prime Minister's peace mission and the relationship with our defence policy, especially in Europe.

As some of you may have read in this week's *Citizen*, General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, endorsed the Prime Minister's efforts to raise the nuclear threshold. I think his comments indicate that Canada's insistence in concert with our allies on the two-track policy is correct.

• 1120

On the one hand, General Rogers agreed with the Prime Minister's thrust that we must have successful arms negotiations while, at the same time, striving to enhance both qualitatively and quantitatively our conventional forces in Europe. I was very pleased by the comments of General Rogers and those of his deputy, General Chalupa, who said that our contribution is valued because of its very high combat power, combat effectiveness and very high state of morale.

I will not go into the details of our modernization program, but I believe it might be helpful to bring you up-to-date on some of the projects. Where I mention cost figures these are in budget-year dollars. I might point out to you that the supplementary estimate, which gives rise to this hearing, deals with the capital program in the sense that we have made close to \$90 million in savings on the operations side of the house that we are seeking to transfer over to the capital acquisition side of the house in order to infuse funds into the frigate program.

First of all, the CF-18 fighter—\$5.2 billion. Performance of that aircraft—as I witnessed myself this morning—is proving to be superb and its capability against other aircraft in simulated combat has been greater than expected. We have now taken possession of 21 aircraft and operations to date have confirmed the excellent maintainability and reliability of the weapon system.

The Canadian Patrol Frigate program is proceeding on schedule. The ILTIS one-quarter ton truck, for \$250 million—that is the total value of the contract of course—to be built by Bombardier, represents another state-of-the-art technology in this field of 4x4 cross-country vehicles. As you know, I have attended recently, with Bombardier, in order to sign a contract for 1,900 of these vehicles. I hope, as well, to be in a position to announce the small arms program which, in effect, will be going forward as rapidly as details can be worked out in terms of the contract with the chosen contractor. We are also currently involved in negotiations with the United States Defense Department on the components of a modernized North American air defense system and our respective responsibilities in, and shares of, its costs.

[Traduction]

de dollars. J'ai l'intention d'augmenter ce pourcentage l'année prochaine et de le faire passer à 26 p. 100, pour qu'il atteigne finalement un niveau de 30 p. 100.

Avant de vous donner un rapport sur la modernisation de nos forces armées, j'aimerais faire quelques commentaires sur la mission de paix du Premier ministre, et sur sa relation avec notre politique de défense, surtout en Europe.

Comme vous l'avez peut-être lu dans le *Citizen* de cette semaine, le Général Rogers, Commandant suprême des Forces alliées en Europe, a appuyé les efforts du Premier ministre sur l'augmentation de seuil nucléaire. À mon avis, sa réaction nous montre que le Canada et nos alliés ont raison d'insister sur la politique à deux voies.

D'un côté, le Général Rogers convient avec le Premier ministre qu'il faut négocier une entente concernant les armements et, en même temps, travailler à renforcer, tant qualitativement que quantitativement, nos forces conventionnelles en Europe. J'ai été très heureux d'apprendre que Général Rogers et son adjoint, le Général Chalupa, estiment notre contribution utile à cause de notre puissance de combat très élevée, de notre efficacité de combat et de notre très bon moral.

Je ne vous exposerai pas en détail notre programme de modernisation, mais je pense qu'il serait utile que je vous parle de certains projets. Lorsque je mentionne des coûts, il s'agit de coûts exprimés en dollars de l'année budgétaire. Je vous ferai remarquer que le budget supplémentaire faisant l'objet de la réunion ce matin porte sur le programme de capitalisation découlant d'économies de près de 90 millions de dollars que nous avons réalisées au chapitre des opérations et que nous voulons transférer au titre des immobilisations afin d'apporter des fonds au programme des frégates.

Pour commencer, le programme de 5,2 milliards de dollars de l'avion de combat CF-18. Comme je l'ai vu ce matin, la performance de cet avion est superbe et sa capacité d'action contre d'autres avions dans des combats simulés dépasse les attentes. Nous avons déjà pris possession de 21 avions, et d'après les opérations que nous avons menées jusqu'à présent, le système d'armes est très fiable et exige peu d'entretien.

Pour ce qui est du programme canadien de frégates de patrouille, tout fonctionne selon le calendrier. Le camion ILTIS d'un quart de tonne dont le contrat global s'élève à 250 millions de dollars, et qui doit être fabriqué par Bombardier représente le summum de la technologie des véhicules à quatre roues motrices. Comme vous le savez, j'ai travaillé dernièrement avec Bombardier à la signature d'un contrat de fabrication de 1,900 véhicules. J'espère aussi pouvoir être en mesure d'annoncer l'établissement d'un programme d'armes légères qui sera effectivement lancé dès que les détails en seront négociés avec l'entrepreneur choisi. Nous sommes également en train de négocier avec le ministère de la Défense des États-Unis au sujet de nouveaux éléments d'un système modernisé de défense aérienne nord-américain; il s'agit d'établir les responsabilités et la participation financière de chaque pays.

[Text]

Over the next few years, we expect to move forward on the second phase of the ship replacement program and an extensive range of programs including those related to submarines, helicopters, low level air defense, tactical and strategic command and control facilities as well as training in transport aircraft. As well, I can confirm the news story that I noted this morning in the press clippings to the effect that Cabinet has recently approved a low level air defence program in principle and we will be going to the marketplace in order to solicit bids through the normal process of contract management which has proved so successful in the past.

All the effort I have described is parallel and complementary to the initiative which the Prime Minister is pursuing with our allies, our Commonwealth friends and with our potential adversaries. I might point out again—the problem reading news clippings this morning—that the reaction at the Commonwealth conference to the Prime Minister's peace initiative is very, very positive. I am pleased, I am sure as all Canadians are, at the progress that is being made in that regard. The government is determined to pursue with vigour both the provision of a useful contribution to deterrence and to defence while, at the same time, trying by every means open to it to enhance our security by changing the downward trend lines in international relations and by improving the prospects for successful arms control and disarmament negotiations.

I had the opportunity to make this point in my recent conversation with other NATO defence ministers at the meeting of the NATO nuclear planning group in Montebello and last week, when I was in Washington for a meeting with the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger.

Conversations in Washington were, incidentally, forthright and mutually beneficial. Progress was made in several areas which I hope will have the effect of facilitating mutual defence programs and opening new opportunities for Canadian industries to compete for contracts in technically advanced defence projects. We discussed the improved Distant Early Warning Line or North Warning System which will be largely based on Canadian territory and will be a principal component in our Air Defence Modernization Program. I confirmed the Canadian commitment to participate meaningfully and share in the program and the necessity for Canadian industrial benefits as a result of our expenditures, and that principle of Canadian industrial benefits was accepted as a principle within the negotiations.

We also discussed defence production, including the contract placed in Canada for LAVs, or light armoured vehicles, for the U.S. forces. I expressed Canadian concerns about the restrictions on technology transfers to Canadian manufacturers. The Americans do have concerns relating to leakage of high technology to people we would prefer did not have that technology. As an indication of that, the very recent

[Translation]

Au cours des prochaines années, nous prévoyons d'entrer dans la seconde phase du programme de remplacement des navires et de lancer une série de programmes portant notamment sur les sous-marins, les hélicoptères, la défense aérienne à faible altitude, les installations de contrôle et de commande tactique et stratégique, de même que des programmes d'entraînement pour les avions de transport. Je peux en outre confirmer la nouvelle qui a paru ce matin dans les journaux selon laquelle le Cabinet vient d'approuver en principe un programme de défense aérienne à faible altitude, et nous procéderons à un appel d'offre sur le marché selon la méthode normale de gestion des contrats, qui nous a donné tant de satisfaction par le passé.

Tous les programmes que je viens de vous décrire cadrent avec l'initiative de paix qu'a entreprise le Premier ministre auprès de nos alliés, de nos amis du Commonwealth et de nos adversaires éventuels. J'aimerais vous faire remarquer aussi, à la lumière des manchettes des journaux ce matin, que la réaction des membres du Commonwealth à l'initiative de paix du Premier ministre est très positive. Je suis heureux, comme tous les Canadiens sans doute, des progrès réalisés à cet égard. Le gouvernement est décidé à continuer à contribuer utilement à la dissuasion et à la défense, et en même temps, à essayer par tous les moyens d'améliorer notre sécurité en renversant les tendances négatives actuelles dans les relations internationales et en améliorant les perspectives de succès des négociations sur le contrôle des armes et le désarmement.

J'ai eu l'occasion d'exposer ce point de vue dans mes discussions récentes avec d'autres ministres de la Défense de l'OTAN lors de la réunion du groupe de planification stratégique nucléaire de l'OTAN à Montebello, et la semaine dernière également lorsque j'ai rencontré à Washington le secrétaire de la Défense M. Weinberger.

Soit dit en passant, les discussions à Washington ont été ouvertes et utiles pour les deux parties. On a fait avancer plusieurs dossiers, qui permettront, j'espère, de favoriser des programmes de défense mutuelle et de créer de nouvelles possibilités pour l'industrie canadienne afin qu'elle puisse obtenir des contrats pour des projets de défense techniquement avancés. Nous avons discuté du système d'alerte avancé amélioré ainsi que du système d'alerte dans le Nord qui seront établis en grande partie en territoire canadien et qui constitueront un des éléments principaux de notre programme de modernisation de défense aérienne. J'ai confirmé l'engagement du Canada à participer de façon significative au programme, et la nécessité de retombées économiques pour l'industrie canadienne découlant de nos dépenses, et cela a été accepté en principe dans les négociations.

Nous avons également discuté de production de la défense, y compris le contrat canadien de fabrication de véhicules blindés légers pour les Forces armées américaines. J'ai parlé de la préoccupation du Canada concernant les restrictions sur les transferts de technologie aux manufacturiers canadiens. Les américains s'inquiètent des fuites de haute technologie vers des pays auxquels nous préférons ne pas la donner. Par exemple,

[Texte]

impounding of high tech computers that were being shipped through Sweden to the Soviet Union is an illustration. However, our relationship with the United States warrants special consideration, and Secretary Weinberger indicated he would like to see any problems rectified.

Those are my initial comments, ladies and gentlemen and Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to receive any questions.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): On a point of order, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Yes, please, Mr. Munro.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I know it is quite usual, Mr. Chairman, to have the public display of television and recording of the proceedings of this committee—not usual, but I mean it is permissive. This is the second committee I have attended of External Affairs and National Defence in which the television cameras have remained. I do not know whether it is becoming the practice or whether it has been decided in the steering committee that this should go on, or whether the arrangements were made by the minister's office to have the television cameras here for this particular occasion. Perhaps it has been done by the chairman, or it might have been done . . .

The Chairman: No, no, no. I can assure you your chairman is old enough; he does not take clues from our minister's office. No, I do not. This week, as a matter of fact, when television started taking their pictures, as I suppose their job requires, I did not interrupt; nobody asked me, so I let them proceed. I said during the meeting that if someone raised the question, of course the Chair would have to take that into consideration and refer it back to the steering committee. It was no decision of the steering committee. Nobody asked me, and I did not ask anybody. I just let them go on until someone attracted my attention. Now you have done so. With the British parliamentary system, you know, I learned that many years ago . . . I like that system, where a precedent sometimes becomes law. So if some members object, I will kindly ask them to leave. If nobody objects, I am ready, though, since you have raised a question, to let them go on today and raise that in the steering committee as to whether they think it is a good practice or not.

Mr. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): I am curious, and I just wondered . . .

The Chairman: Well, your curiosity is now met. I have not asked them; they have not asked me. I have just said, as the practice is to say: Well, gentlemen, 30 seconds more and would you leave? I have not interrupted them, so they went on. I thought it was a good practice, so I did the same today. But if some members want to make a debate, well, I will ask them to leave. I think it is a good practice. I think it is time we modernized a little bit. I think it is part of the new reform in the House.

I see the Hon. Mr. Sinclair Stevens, Mr. Blaikie, and Mr. Massé. Mr. Sinclair Stevens .

[Traduction]

des ordinateurs très avancés ont été expédiés récemment vers l'Union soviétique en passant par la Suède. Toutefois, notre relation avec les États-Unis justifie un traitement spécial, et le secrétaire Weinberger a fait savoir qu'il fallait trouver une solution à ces problèmes.

Voilà mes déclarations liminaires, mesdames et messieurs et monsieur le président. Je suis prêt à répondre à vos questions.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Un rappel au règlement, monsieur le président.

Le président: Oui, monsieur Munro, je vous en prie.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je sais qu'il est tout à fait normal, monsieur le président, que les délibérations du Comité soient télévisées et enregistrées; peut-être pas normal, mais autorisé. C'est la deuxième fois que les caméras de la télévision enregistrent une réunion du Comité des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale. Je ne sais pas si cela va devenir pratique courante, s'il en a été décidé ainsi par le Comité directeur, ou si le bureau du ministre a pris des arrangements avec la télévision pour cette occasion. C'est peut-être le président, ou peut-être . . .

Le président: Non, non, non. Je vous assure que votre président est assez grand pour ne pas se laisser influencer par le bureau du ministre. Non. Cette semaine, en fait, lorsque la presse électronique a commencé à prendre des photos, comme c'est son devoir de le faire, je ne l'ai pas interrompue, personne ne m'a demandé de le faire, alors je l'ai laissée continuer. J'ai dit, durant la réunion, que si quelqu'un soulevait la question, le président devrait en tenir compte et en parler au Comité de direction. Celui-ci n'a pris aucune décision. Personne ne me l'a demandé, et je ne l'ai demandé à personne. Je laisse tout simplement faire jusqu'à ce que quelqu'un soulève la question. C'est ce que vous venez de faire. Dans le système parlementaire britannique, comme vous le savez, et comme je l'ai appris il y a longtemps (j'aime ce système), un précédent peut parfois devenir loi. Alors si certains membres ont des objections, je demanderai poliment à la télévision de sortir. Si personne ne s'y oppose, je suis prêt à laisser les médias rester aujourd'hui et à soulever devant le comité de direction la question de savoir si c'est une bonne chose ou non.

M. Munro (Esquimalt—Saanich): Je suis curieux, et je me demandais simplement . . .

Le président: Eh bien, votre curiosité est maintenant satisfaite. Je n'ai pas demandé à la télévision d'être là, et elle ne me l'a pas demandé non plus. J'ai dit comme d'habitude qu'il lui restait 30 secondes, c'est tout. Je ne l'ai pas empêchée de continuer, et elle ne s'est pas arrêtée. J'ai pensé que c'était bien comme cela, c'est pourquoi on a recommencé aujourd'hui. Mais si certains membres ne sont pas d'accord, je vais demander à la télévision de sortir. Je pense que c'est une bonne chose. Je pense que c'est le temps de se moderniser un peu. Cela fait partie de la nouvelle réforme à la Chambre.

Je vois l'honorable M. Sinclair Stevens, M. Blaikie et M. Massé. Monsieur Sinclair Stevens.

[Text]

Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman, I would hope there would not be any prolonged discussion of it. I felt you were following the correct course in simply allowing it to be treated as an experiment and let us see how it works out. I felt at the last meeting that the press was no problem at all—be it TV or radio. I would just hope we could carry on and see how it works out over the next few meetings. I would like to see us get on with our questioning now, though.

Some hon. Members: Agreed.

The Chairman: But in all kindness, a quick . . . I must say that they have listened to me. I said: Listen, if it is going to be an experiment, please do not run around the next meeting—as they did the first meeting; already it is more orderly . . . and then I will try to see how we can accommodate the radio for the next time.

• 1130

Please, Mr. Blaikie, but very briefly; otherwise I will ask to make an end to it.

Mr. Blaikie: Mr. Chairman, I am not a regular member of the committee so I do not feel I have much business in making much comment, but as one who is concerned about parliamentary reform and as a member of the Special Committee on Standing Orders and Procedure I would like to say that there has been no consensus on that committee—or, for that matter, in the House—with regard to the televising of committees. I am not going to take it upon myself formally to object today in the context of a committee that I am not a permanent member on, but I regret, shall we say, the fact that the committee is going ahead without this having been discussed in the House because this is a committee of the House of Commons and there has been no discussion or decision by the House of Commons as to whether or not committees ought to be televised and if they were to be televised in what manner they would be televised.

So I want you to know that I do not approve of what is going on, but because I am not a permanent member of the committee I am not about to object.

The Chairman: Thank you. That is very kind of you, but this is the senior committee of the House, I think . . . It is, in my view, one of the senior . . . I think if I wait for the House to tell us what to do we will wait a hell of a long time.

Monsieur Massé, je vous cède la parole, mais essayez d'être bref, s'il vous plaît.

M. Massé: Monsieur le président, je croyais, au départ, que ces gens-là étaient ici pour une raison très particulière, c'est-à-dire pour tenter de commencer la préparation d'un document pour la Défense ou pour la Chambre.

Je dois vous dire que je ne m'oppose pas à l'information publique, car je crois que les citoyens canadiens ont le droit de savoir ce qui se passe ici. Cependant j'ai de fortes objections vis-à-vis la télédiffusion et l'enregistrement en direct des débats. J'ai la même opinion, d'ailleurs, pour ce qui se passe à la Chambre des communes. Selon moi, la présence des médias,

[Translation]

M. Stevens: Monsieur le président, j'espère qu'on n'en disputera pas trop longtemps. Je pense que c'est une expérience et que nous devons voir comment cela fonctionnera. À la dernière réunion, la presse n'était pas un problème, ni la télévision ni la radio. J'espère que cela pourra continuer, et on verra comment cela marche au cours des prochaines réunions. J'aimerais maintenant aborder la question du jour.

Des voix: D'accord.

Le président: Mais en toute justice . . . Je dois dire que la presse m'a écouté. J'ai dit: «Écoutez, s'il s'agit d'une expérience, ne courez pas partout pendant la prochaine réunion»—c'est ce qu'ils ont fait pendant la première, mais il y a déjà plus d'ordre—et j'essaierai de voir comment recevoir la radio la prochaine fois.

A vous, monsieur Blaikie, mais très brièvement, autrement j'y mettrai fin.

M. Blaikie: Monsieur le président, je ne suis pas membre régulier du Comité, donc je n'ai pas le droit de faire des commentaires, mais en tant que personne qui se préoccupe de la réforme parlementaire, et en tant que membre du Comité spécial sur les règlements et la procédure, j'aimerais dire qu'il n'existe pas de consensus à ce dernier—ou à la Chambre—en ce qui concerne le reportage télévisé des comités. Je ne ferai pas une objection formelle, étant donné que je ne suis pas membre permanent du Comité, mais je regrette, disons, que le Comité procède de cette façon sans en avoir discuté à la Chambre, car c'est un Comité de la Chambre des communes, et il n'y a pas eu de discussion ni de décision par la Chambre des communes sur le reportage télévisé des comités et la façon de le faire.

Alors j'aimerais vous dire que je ne suis pas d'accord, mais puisque je ne suis pas membre permanent du Comité je ne ferai pas d'objection formelle.

Le président: Merci. Vous êtes très aimable, mais puisqu'il s'agit du premier Comité de la Chambre, je pense . . . À mon avis, le Comité est le premier . . . Je pense que si nous attendions la décision de la Chambre, il nous faudrait attendre très longtemps.

Mr. Massé, you have the floor, but please try to be brief.

Mr. Massé: Mr. Chairman, I believed at the beginning that these people were here for a very specific reason, namely to attempt to begin preparation of a document for defence or for the House.

I must tell you that I am not opposed to public information, because I believe Canadian citizens have a right to know what is going on here. However, I have very strong objections with respect to the direct recording and televising of debates. I might say in passing that I have the same opinion of what is going on in the House of Commons. In my opinion, the

[Texte]

au Comité, ne nous faciliterait ou ne nous simplifierait pas la tâche lors de débats ou d'échanges mais risquerait, à un moment donné, de transmettre un genre de spectacle, comme nous en voyons parfois à la Chambre des communes. Personnellement, je m'objecte à la présence des médias au Comité.

Le président: Si vous vous objectez maintenant . . .

M. Massé: Je m'y objecte en principe, mais je ne suis qu'un membre substitut à ce Comité!

Le président: Je vois.

M. Massé: Donc, je ne voudrais quand même pas nuire à l'expérience. Toutefois, je préférerais qu'on ne le fasse pas et j'espère que cela ne se produira pas, sinon je ne me présenterai plus aux séances du Comité.

Le président: Je soumettrai votre point de vue au Comité directeur.

I shall submit that to the steering committee. In all fairness, if someone has a strong view . . .

Mrs. Appolloni.

Mrs. Appolloni: Mr. Chairman, the ministry has given us a tremendous shopping list of questions. Could we please get on with it?

The Chairman: Exactly my intention, Madam. Thank you. But, in all fairness, I shall submit that now to the steering committee. Besides, there is only one more committee coming before the end of this session, in my evaluation.

By the way, take note that I succeeded in getting a minister next week. That will be of great interest to you. The Hon. Mr. Regan will be in attendance next Tuesday for our next meeting with officials of External Affairs because Mr. MacEachen is absent.

I recognize for his first time in his first round of questioning—order, please—the hon. member from Calgary Centre, Mr. Andre.

Mr. Andre: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dupras: Mr. Chairman, if I may just . . . we do not have any copy of the speech.

The Chairman: No. There is none yet. Sorry, sir.

Mr. Andre, please.

Mr. Andre: Mr. Chairman, a question for the minister. I am pleased he enjoyed his CF-18 flight. Perhaps he could bring us up to date on what is happened to those CF-18s that have cracks in their engine mounts and whether they are still grounded, whether they have been repaired and whether the repairs are going to last and who is paying for the repairs.

Mr. Blais: As I indicated in the House to a question by Allan McKinnon, McDonnell Douglas is paying for the changes and for the repairs. A redesigned engine mount is being incorporated within aircraft number 53, which now has entered into the production line. In terms of the aircraft that

[Traduction]

presence of the media in committees does not assist or simplify our task during debates or exchanges, but instead raises the possibility, at some point, of transmitting some kind of spectacle, just as we see sometimes at the House of Commons. Personally, I object to the presence of the media in the committee.

The Chairman: If you object now . . .

Mr. Massé: I object in principle, but I am only a substitute member of the committee!

The Chairman: I see.

Mr. Massé: Therefore, I do not want to hinder the experiment. However, I would prefer that it not be done, and I hope that it will not happen again, because if it does, I will not come to the committee meetings.

The Chairman: I will present your point of view to the steering committee.

Je soumettrai votre point de vue au Comité directeur. Afin d'être équitable, si quelqu'un avait un point de vue très fort . . .

Madame Appolloni.

Mme Appolloni: Monsieur le président, le ministère nous a donné une grande liste des questions. Pouvons-nous poursuivre?

Le président: C'est exactement mon intention, madame, merci. Mais, afin d'être équitable, je soumettrai la question au Comité directeur. Selon moi, il n'y aura qu'un autre Comité avant la fin de cette session.

En passant, j'aimerais vous dire que j'ai réussi à obtenir un ministre dans la semaine qui vient. Cela vous sera d'un grand intérêt. L'honorable M. Regan comparaitra devant nous mardi prochain ou à notre prochaine réunion avec les hauts fonctionnaires du ministère des Affaires extérieures, car M. MacEachen sera absent.

A l'ordre, s'il vous plaît. L'honorable membre de Calgary-Centre, M. Andre, a la parole pour le premier tour.

M. Andre: Merci, monsieur le président.

M. Dupras: Monsieur le président, si vous permettez . . . nous n'avons pas de copie du discours.

Le président: Non. Il n'y en a pas. Je regrette, monsieur.

Monsieur Andre, s'il vous plaît.

M. Andre: Monsieur le président, j'ai une question pour le ministre. Je suis très content qu'il ait aimé son vol en CF-18. Peut-être pourrait-il nous mettre au courant des derniers développements en ce qui concerne les fissures dans le support du moteur CR-18, et nous dire si ces avions sont toujours hors de service, s'ils ont été réparés, si les réparations vont durer, et qui va payer ces réparations.

M. Blais: Comme je l'ai dit à la Chambre en réponse à une question de M. Allan McKinnon, la McDonnell Douglas va payer les changements et les réparations. Un nouveau support du moteur va être incorporé à l'avion n° 53, qui est maintenant à la production. Pour ce qui est des avions dont on a pris

[Text]

have been delivered, they are doing a number of verifications in terms of exactly what fix is going to be included. I am not an engineer, Mr. Andre. I believe you are. I really do not understand all of the technical aspects. But we want to make sure that the fix is one that is adequate and will not interfere with the operations of the aircraft until such time as we can, on a regular and pre-scheduled basis, replace all of the defective engine mounts.

• 1135

The engine mounts, I might point out to you, are not the only support for the aircraft engines, so that even if there was a complete failure of that mount, there is still support for the aircraft engine. So, there is no immediate nor even a projected difficulty with the cracks as they find themselves now.

Mr. Andre: Are the planes that were grounded airworthy and being used now? Or are they still grounded?

Mr. Blais: They are still, as I understand it, the ones that are now grounded and there is an attempt to find a fix in order to rectify the crack on the short term until such time as the mounts themselves are replaced.

Le président: Je donne maintenant la parole au général Thériault, le chef d'État-major.

Gen. G.C.E. Thériault (Chief of the Defence Staff, National Defence): Mr. Chairman, it just so happens that the senior review board on this project returned from St. Louis yesterday and were able to give us some update on this item, Mr. Minister, that we were not able to get to you. The gist of the situation is that the technical problem is simply not of the gravity that has been conveyed in the press. As a matter of fact, on looking at it in greater depth, a definitive decision on a correction, or indeed as to whether a correction is required, has not been made. The cracks are very, very light. They are in the nature of about one-thousandth of an inch in what is a heavily-milled stainless steel part, and they were detected on the test article aircraft which has undergone some 12,000 hours of equivalent flight testing.

As the minister implied, there is a secondary engine mounting system and, in fact, the engine has been run at full power without the Ford engine mounts altogether, without any consequences of any kind. So, there are no safety implications at this time that are discernible, Mr. Chairman. The United States Navy is not doing anything about it at this time. The aircraft are not grounded. The two aircraft on which we have found cracks are not flying yet, simply for the reason that they have not been put together yet—the engines have not been reinstalled—but they will be, and they will resume operation shortly.

Mr. Andre: So we can expect all the CF-18s to be flying and usable very shortly?

Gen Thériault: Yes, sir.

Mr. Andre: The permanent repairs, if required, will be paid by McDonnell Douglas?

[Translation]

livraison, on est en train d'effectuer un certain nombre de vérifications pour déterminer exactement quel support il faudra installer. Je ne suis pas ingénieur, Monsieur André. Je pense que, vous, vous l'êtes. Je ne comprends pas vraiment tous les aspects techniques. Mais nous voulons nous assurer que le support est adéquat et qu'il ne nuira pas au fonctionnement de l'avion en attendant qu'il soit possible d'établir un programme de remplacement de tous les supports défectueux du moteur.

Je vous ferai remarquer que ces supports du moteur ne sont pas les seuls et que, même s'ils étaient complètement brisés, il y en a d'autres qui font le même travail. Alors, les fissures qu'on a décelées ne présentent aucune difficulté immédiate ou éventuelle.

M. Andre: Les avions qui ont été rappelés peuvent-ils fonctionner et sont-ils utilisés maintenant? Ou sont-ils toujours au sol?

M. Blais: Ils y sont toujours, et on essaie de trouver un moyen de réparer la fissure en attendant de remplacer les supports eux-mêmes.

The Chairman: I will now recognize General Thériault, Chief of the Defence Staff.

Le général G.C.E. Thériault (Chef d'état major, Défense Nationale): Monsieur le président, le Comité principal d'examen est revenu de Saint-Louis hier et nous a fait, monsieur le ministre, un rapport sur cette question, que nous n'avons pu vous transmettre encore. Essentiellement, le problème technique n'est tout simplement pas aussi grave que l'a rapporté la presse. En fait, après une analyse plus en profondeur, on n'a pas encore décidé définitivement ni des correctifs à apporter ni de l'opportunité d'un correctif. Les fissures sont très très fines. Il s'agit de fissures d'environ un millième de pouce dans une pièce d'acier inoxydable très fort, et elles ont été décelées à la suite d'essais équivalant à 12 000 heures de vol.

Comme le ministre l'a laissé entendre, il y a un système de supports secondaires du moteur, et, en fait, le moteur a été mis à l'essai, à sa pleine puissance, sans les supports Ford, et il n'y a pas eu de problème. Alors, monsieur le président, il ne semble pas y avoir pour le moment de risques pour la sécurité. La marine américaine ne prend aucune mesure spéciale à cet égard. L'avion demeure en service. Les deux avions sur lesquels on a décelé des fissures ne sont pas encore en service pour la simple raison qu'ils n'ont pas encore été assemblés, les moteurs n'ont pas été réinstallés, mais ils seront mis en service très prochainement.

M. Andre: Alors nous pouvons nous attendre à ce que tous les CF-18 soient en service très prochainement?

Gén Thériault: Oui, monsieur.

M. Andre: Les réparations permanentes, le cas échéant, seront payées par la McDonnell Douglas?

[*Texte*]

Gen Thériault: I would suggest that it is safe to surmise that, sir, but I cannot be definitive about that. It does not appear to be a major problem.

Mr. Andre: Well, I hope that is the case. There was some concern, in reading the contract, about the 180-day warranty, which is a lot less than my wife got on her new Tempo.

An hon. member: On her what?

Mr. Andre: Tempo.

Mr. Blais: Let us put it in terms of the question of the warranty which is to permit delivery of the aircraft and verification of individual aircraft. But that would not include engineering changes that are required as a result of the experience we are having with the aircraft. There is a provision within the agreement that envisages the engineering changes that are required.

Mr. Andre: Okay. In another area . . .

Mr. Blais: I will be damned if I am going to be charged for those repairs.

Mr. Andre: Mr. Chairman . . .

The Chairman: We shall remember that phrase. It is very essential.

Mr. Andre: It is on the record. I have recorded that.

Let us deal with the Pinetree radar line. According to press reports, the United States has cut off funding, its 49% of the \$180 million a year operating costs of the radar line. I referred to the Pinetree Line in Canada. Putting in doubt the continuity of that line, causes some concern to the 3,700-odd employees, many of them in very small communities where that radar facility is in fact the only facility. My understanding is that the U.S. has cut off the funding because of their feeling that they are not getting defence value for the expenditure. Yet without the continuation of that line or some replacement, indeed even with the line, there are great gaping holes in Canada's capability to survey our territory.

• 1140

I wonder if the Minister can indicate how it is that we have got to the point where the funding has been cut off without a decision being taken by the Department of Defence. If I am wrong in that, just what decision has been taken? Are we going to close down the line? Are we going to update it with modern replacements for the vacuum-tube technology that is now in place or are we going to go for some entirely different system for surveilling Canadian territory?

Mr. Blais: As I indicated before, Mr. Andre, we are presently involved in negotiating total modernization of the North Warning System with the United States. Of course, the CADIN-Pinetree Line is part and parcel of those negotiations. The story that you quoted from is not exact, in the sense that it implies that somehow the CADIN-Pinetree is not part and parcel of the North Warning modernization negotiations. It is very much part of those negotiations. You can rest assured

[*Traduction*]

Gén Thériault: Je pense qu'on peut bien le présumer, mais je ne peux pas être catégorique. Cela ne semble pas poser de problème majeur.

Mr. Andre: J'espère que c'est bien le cas. La garantie de 180 jours stipulée dans le contrat n'est pas très rassurante, c'est bien moins que la garantie que mon épouse a eue sur sa nouvelle Tempo.

Une voix: Sur sa quoi?

Mr. Andre: Sa Tempo.

Mr. Blais: La garantie couvre la livraison de l'avion et la vérification de chaque appareil. Mais cela ne comprend pas les modifications techniques rendues nécessaires par suite de notre expérience avec l'avion. Le contrat renferme une clause là-dessus.

Mr. Andre: Très bien. Dans un autre ordre d'idée . . .

Mr. Blais: Je voudrais bien voir qu'on me facture ces réparations.

Mr. Andre: Monsieur le président . . .

Le président: Nous nous souviendrons de cela. C'est très essentiel.

Mr. Andre: C'est consigné au compte rendu. J'en ai pris bonne note.

Parlons de la ligne de radar Pinetree. Selon les rapports de la presse, les États-Unis ont réduit leur financement, leur 49 p. 100 des 189 000 000\$ de frais d'exploitation de la ligne de radar. Je parle de la ligne Pinetree au Canada. La remise en question de cette ligne crée de l'inquiétude chez ces quelque 3,700 employés, dont la plupart sont issus de petites localités où cette ligne de radar est la seule activité. Si je comprends bien, les États-Unis mettent fin à leur financement parce qu'ils estiment ne pas en avoir pour leur argent. Il y a déjà des problèmes actuellement avec l'existence de cette ligne, mais ce sera encore pire si elle disparaît, cela laissera des trous béants dans la capacité du Canada de surveiller son territoire.

Je voudrais que le ministre me dise comment nous avons pu en arriver à supprimer le financement sans une décision du ministère de la Défense nationale. S'il y a eu une décision, quelle est-elle? La ligne doit-elle être abandonnée? Sa technologie de type à lampe doit-elle être modernisée ou doit-elle être remplacée par un système entièrement nouveau de surveillance du territoire canadien?

M. Blais: Comme je l'ai déjà indiqué, monsieur Andre, nous négocions actuellement avec les États-Unis la modernisation globale du système d'alerte du Nord. Dans le cadre de ces négociations, il est évidemment question de la ligne CADIN-Pinetree. L'article que vous citez est inexact en ce sens qu'il laisse entendre que la ligne CADIN-Pinetree n'entre pas dans les négociations sur la modernisation du système d'alerte du Nord. Elle en fait définitivement partie. Vous pouvez être

[Text]

that there is no decision relating to the CADIN-Pinetree Line and there will not be such a decision until the total package on the North modernization has been negotiated with the Americans.

I might indicate to you that the Americans are funding the maintenance of the CADIN-Pinetree and will continue to fund their portion of the CADIN-Pinetree until such time as the negotiations are completed and arrangements are made relating to the continuation of that line, or such other arrangements as may be negotiated between the parties.

Mr. Andre: The news article I have here of November 17 quotes a Canadian forces spokesman as saying the Americans stopped paying their 49% of the share of the \$180 million-a-year defence network effective October 1.

Mr. Blais: Well, that spokesman evidently was ill-informed, unless the reporter misinterpreted what the spokesman said.

Mr. Andre: We will pursue that, but obviously . . .

Mr. Blais: Yes. I invite all members of this committee, as well as members of the House, to pay very close attention to the North Warning modernization program and the ongoing negotiations.

Mr. Andre: When might we expect a decision in this regard? It is my understanding that the Americans are promoting the replacement of much of the radar facilities with these airborne systems, the AWACS Systems. Should that be the case, there will obviously be some disruption to the personnel involved in manning the existing systems. In order to minimize that disruption in some communities, because of their size it becomes pretty profound, as much warning as possible is highly desirable.

Mr. Blais: Yes, I am very mindful of that. I have already approached the subject personally with representatives of UNDE. They have made me aware of their concerns. Of course, I am very sensitive to the question of personnel within the radar sites. We have undertaken to advise them as early as possible in the event of any change.

Of course, I am also in a negotiating stance. I would not want to do anything or to say anything while we are engaged in negotiations that would weaken our position because, in effect, there are conflicting interests of necessity when negotiations of that magnitude are undertaken. I would hope that we would be very wary and very concerned about the successful conclusion of the negotiations, and hold our fire as to such time as we find some advantage in making statements.

• 1145

Mr. Andre: Then the minister would indicate, I presume, that there is no truth to the rumour he is delaying any decision until after an election to minimize electoral consequences to the communities concerned.

Mr. Blais: I have not heard that rumour, Mr. Andre.

[Translation]

certain qu'aucune décision ne sera prise relativement à ligne CADIN-Pinetree avant la conclusion des négociations avec les Américains sur la modernisation globale du système d'alerte du Nord.

Je puis vous assurer que les Américains financent leur part d'entretien de la ligne CADIN-Pinetree et continueront de le faire tant que les négociations ne seront pas terminées et que des dispositions n'aurent pas été prises sur le maintien de la ligne ou son remplacement par un autre système.

M. Andre: D'après l'article du 17 novembre, un porte-parole des Forces canadiennes aurait affirmé que les Américains avaient, à compter du 1^{er} octobre, cessé de payer leur part de 49 p. 100 de ce système de défense évalué à 180 millions de dollars par année.

M. Blais: Ou le porte-parole était mal informé, ou le journaliste l'a mal compris.

M. Andre: Nous pourrions y revenir, mais . . .

M. Blais: J'invite d'ores et déjà tous les membres du Comité, comme tous les députés de la Chambre, à suivre de près le programme de modernisation du système d'alerte du Nord ainsi que les négociations qui se poursuivent à ce sujet.

M. Andre: Quand pouvons-nous nous attendre à une décision à ce sujet? Je crois comprendre que les Américains souhaitent le remplacement d'une grande partie de ces installations de radar par des systèmes aéroportés de type AWAC. Dans ce cas, le personnel qui travaille sur la ligne risque d'être gravement touché. Pour minimiser les effets, qui, sur certaines localités, risquent d'être profonds, il convient de donner le plus long préavis possible.

M. Blais: J'en suis parfaitement conscient. J'ai déjà communiqué personnellement avec les représentants de l'Union des employés de la Défense nationale à ce sujet. Ils ont eu l'occasion de me faire part de leurs préoccupations. Je connais la situation du personnel qui travaille dans les postes de radar. Nous nous sommes définitivement engagés à les informer de tout changement dans la situation le plus tôt possible.

Par ailleurs, je suis en négociation. Je ne veux rien dire ni faire qui mette en péril leur déroulement. Dans ce genre de situation, il y a toujours certains conflits d'intérêts. J'espère que nous pourrions être vigilants jusqu'à la conclusion satisfaisante de ces négociations et que nous serons nous taire en attendant, sauf si c'est à notre avantage de faire des déclarations.

M. Andre: Dans ce cas, le ministre est sûrement prêt à nier la rumeur selon laquelle il attend après les élections pour prendre une décision afin de minimiser les conséquences politiques dans les localités concernées.

M. Blais: Je n'ai pas entendu cette rumeur, monsieur Andre.

[Texte]

Mr. Andre: I have. I am glad you are able to put an end to it, that is all.

Mr. Blais: Well, I have not heard the rumour, Mr. Andre.

The Chairman: There are lots of rumours going around.

Mr. Andre: I would like to leave other colleagues an opportunity, Mr. Chairman, so I have one last question to the minister. It has to do with a story on CTV television news last night to the effect that there is a shortage of some 250 marine engineers required to complete the Canadian patrol frigate construction and that this shortage of marine engineers may cause a serious delay in that program. Given the state of our naval capabilities, that seems to be a pretty serious problem, since the frigate program itself is only a small step in what must be a series of steps to bring the navy up to full capability.

Can the minister comment, whether he is aware of this problem and what remedial action he is contemplating.

Mr. Blais: Well, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Andre, of course, right from the beginning of the CPF program there was a recognition that, because it is a completely new program, a completely new experience—the first time that a major contract of this nature is negotiated with a Canadian-based company—that there were bound to be some glitches and there were bound to be some difficulties in putting a total team together. That is why there was immense encouragement and very constructive encouragement even during the contract definition stages, to ensure that the competitors, both Scan Marine Inc. and Saint John Shipbuilding were developing a highly competent marine engineering team. In effect, once the identification of the successful contractor was made, we fully expected that there would be some cross-pollination in the sense that some of the engineers from the losing contractor would migrate towards the successful contractor; that, I am sure, has taken place. I do not have all of the identification of the various engineers but I am confident that, while there may be some temporary glitches and undoubtedly it will create some stories for the press, they in my view, are not serious. As I understand it, there is bound to be some raiding, and there has been some raiding, of various shipyards in Canada relating to some personnel that may be required for the total frigate program; but, on the whole, the program is on schedule. We are very pleased with the progress that is being made and there is nothing that is not unexpected in the developments that we have experienced to date.

Commander Healey is there. He is at the back. I am sure he would be able to come forward and confirm what I have said or add any additional information that he may wish.

The Chairman: Commander Healey, project Manager, Canadian Patrol Frigate.

Mr. Blais: I am sorry, it is my error again. It is Commodore Healey.

The Chairman: Commodore.

[Traduction]

M. Andre: Moi, je l'ai entendue. Je suis heureux que vous puissiez la nier.

M. Blais: Je n'en ai vraiment pas eu connaissance, monsieur Andre.

Le président: Il y a beaucoup de rumeurs qui courent ces temps-ci.

M. Andre: Je veux donner l'occasion à mes collègues de poser des questions. Je vais donc m'en tenir à cette dernière question, monsieur le ministre. Elle a trait à cette information livrée au réseau C.T.V. hier soir et voulant qu'il y ait une pénurie de quelque 250 ingénieurs maritimes dans le cadre du programme de construction des frégates canadiennes de patrouille. Cette pénurie d'ingénieurs maritimes risquerait de retarder le déroulement du programme. Compte tenu de l'état de notre capacité navale, c'est un problème qui pourrait être grave. Le programme de frégates lui-même n'est censé être qu'une étape dans le processus destiné à redonner à notre marine sa pleine capacité.

Le ministre peut-il indiquer s'il est au courant du problème et s'il a pris des mesures correctives?

M. Blais: Dès le départ, monsieur le président, monsieur Andre, il a été convenu que le Programme des frégates canadiennes de patrouille était un programme tout à fait nouveau, une expérience tout à fait nouvelle. C'est le premier contrat de ce genre qui a été négocié au Canada, avec une compagnie canadienne. Il fallait s'attendre à ce que la constitution d'une équipe entraîne des problèmes. C'est pourquoi même au cours de la définition des contrats, les concurrents, dans *Scan Marine Inc.* et *Saint John Shipbuilding*, ont été fortement encouragés à constituer des équipes d'ingénieurs maritimes très compétents. Nous savions qu'une fois l'heureux entrepreneur choisi, il y aurait un certain mouvement d'ingénieurs vers lui. Je suis sûr que c'est ce qui se passe actuellement. Je ne suis pas en mesure d'identifier les ingénieurs en cause, mais je suis sûr qu'il y a certains accrochages temporaires, et que ces accrochages sont relatés dans les journaux. Cependant, je ne crois pas qu'ils soient très graves. Comme je l'ai indiqué, il y est normal qu'il y ait des *raids* dans divers chantiers maritimes du Canada pour ce qui est du personnel qui sera requis dans le cadre du programme des frégates canadiennes de patrouille. Il n'en demeure pas moins que le programme se déroule comme il a été prévu. Nous sommes très satisfaits des progrès réalisés jusqu'ici et il n'y a absolument pas de surprise.

Le commandant Healey est ici. Je suis sûr qu'il est en mesure de confirmer ou de compléter ce que je viens de dire.

Le président: Le commandant Healey est directeur de projet pour le programme des frégates canadiennes de patrouille.

M. Blais: Je m'excuse, c'est le commodore Healey.

Le président: Commodore.

[Text]

Mr. Blais: Well you know, when you come from a place just on the shores of Lake Nipissing you "ain't" seen guys with that sort of rank before.

Mr. Andre: Now if he were dressed in blue you could tell.

Comdre E.J. Healey (Project Manager Canadian Patrol Frigate): I might say, sir, that I am a marine engineer as well.

Mr. Blais: You are a marine engineer as well. There we go.

Comdre Healey: The story derived from a spokesman from Saint John who stated that he needed a total of about 250 marine-type engineers throughout Canada to do the CPF project. I think, unfortunately, it got interpreted into saying that there was a shortage of 250 marine engineers.

They have to date been able to hire approximately 50% or 60% of their requirements from within Canada and they are progressing with further interviews and further applicants. There is no doubt that they will have difficulty getting all the people as fully qualified as they need. As the minister had suggested, we had anticipated this problem, but they are progressing with the hiring. They are finding the people somewhat more difficult than they had hoped, but we feel that the people will be there and they will not have to go offshore for any particular number.

• 1150

They are finding the people somewhat more difficult than they had hoped; but we feel the people will be there and that they not have to go offshore for any particular number, maybe the odd specialist here and there. Most of them will be available from within Canada.

Mr. Blais: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Munro has said there are some on the West Coast. If Mr. Munro would care to be of any assistance in that regard, I am sure Saint John would be pleased to hear from him.

The Chairman: Next on the list, speaking on behalf of the New Democratic Party, the hon. Member from Winnipeg—Birds Hill. Is that the right pronunciation? Mr. Blaikie will be followed by the vice-chairman of the committee. Mr. Blaikie, please.

Mr. Blaikie: Mr. Chairman, my questioning to the Minister will not have to do with that which falls within the supplementary estimates, but as you have already indicated, that is permissible under the rules...

The Chairman: Yes, you can examine him if you like.

Mr. Blaikie: It does not have to do with that; it has to do with a tragic incident on August 21, this summer, when two members of the Canadian militia were killed on their way home from Dundurn to Winnipeg. The vehicle in which they were driving rolled, and two of the young men were killed. One of them happened to have been a constituent of mine.

I want to begin by saying to the Minister and those present from the defence staff that I appreciated the swiftness with

[Translation]

M. Blais: Vous savez, je viens des rives du lac Nipissing; je ne suis pas habitué à voir des gens de rang aussi élevé.

M. Andre: S'il était habillé en bleu, vous pourriez voir la différence.

Le commodore E.J. Healey (directeur de projet, Frégate canadienne de patrouille): Je vous signale que je suis également ingénieur maritime.

M. Blais: Vous êtes ingénieur maritime. Voilà.

Comdre Healey: L'origine de l'article est un porte-parole de la *Saint John*, qui indiquait qu'il faudrait environ 250 ingénieurs maritimes et ingénieurs semblables pour réaliser le programme des frégates canadiennes de patrouille. Malheureusement, ce que l'on a compris, c'est qu'il y avait une pénurie de 250 ingénieurs maritimes.

Jusqu'à présent, on a pu embaucher environ 50 ou 60 p. 100 du personnel au Canada et on continue d'avoir des entrevues et de recevoir des candidats. Il ne fait aucun doute que le recrutement de tout le personnel qualifié nécessaire posera certains problèmes. Comme le ministre l'a indiqué, il fallait s'y attendre. Il n'en demeure pas moins que des progrès ont été réalisés. Le personnel est un peu plus difficile que ce à quoi on s'attendait, mais on espère bien le trouver sur place. On n'envisage pas d'aller à l'extérieur.

Si on s'adressait à l'extérieur, ce serait seulement pour y trouver quelques spécialistes rares. La plus grande partie du personnel sera recrutée au Canada.

M. Blais: M. Munro a indiqué qu'il y avait des ingénieurs sur la côte ouest. Si les prêts aidaient à résoudre ce problème, je suis sûr que la *Saint John* lui en saurait gré.

Le président: Le tour suivant est le représentant du nouveau parti démocratique, l'honorable député de Winnipeg—*Birds Hill*... C'est la bonne prononciation? M. Blaikie sera suivi du vice-président du Comité.

M. Blaikie: Monsieur le président, mes questions au ministre ne concernent pas les prévisions supplémentaires, mais comme vous l'avez indiqué, vous êtes prêt à permettre cette façon de procéder...

Le président: Vous pouvez y aller.

M. Blaikie: Il concerne un incident tragique survenu le 21 août cet été, lorsque deux membres de la milice canadienne ont perdu la vie entre Dundurn et Winnipeg. Le véhicule dans lequel ils se trouvaient a capoté. Les victimes étaient deux jeunes hommes, dont l'un était un de mes électeurs.

Je voudrais d'abord dire au ministre et au personnel de la Défense nationale que j'apprécie la rapidité avec laquelle j'ai

[Texte]

which I was informed of the incident, as Private Krosney's member of Parliament. I heard within three days from the defence staff and have taken an interest in the event. Largely because of the continuing uncertainty and questions that remain in the minds of the parents as a result of this accident, I have written to the Minister. The Minister has answered me on this; so I am in a way following up some correspondence between us on this.

It appears to be a long-standing policy of the Canadian forces that military investigations are not to be released to the public. I asked the Minister for a copy of the inquest into the accident, and this is the reply I received. It is claimed that this policy has been maintained so that frank and willing statements may be obtained from witnesses.

I would like to publicly question that policy on two grounds, one, because it is not strictly a military event, particularly when it comes to a traffic accident on a public highway, and secondly, the criterion that one ought not to release the reports because it would jeopardize frank and willing statements is a principle of investigation that would cripple all forms of investigation if it were to be held as a general principle.

I would like to give you the opportunity to either defend or change—hopefully change—that policy, because I, as a member of Parliament, felt I should have access to that inquest. I know that many questions remain unanswered in the minds of the parents. I wish they might also have access to it.

Mr. Blais: I get that request regularly. I happen to have sent a reply this morning, as a matter of interest, to another parent who made enquiries relating to one of his children who died in an unfortunate event. In that instance, I referred to the policy I referred you to in the letter I addressed to you.

However, I might point out, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Blaikie, that we do have the Freedom of Information Act now, which perhaps casts a different light on our own national defence policy.

• 1155

I would be pleased to review my reply to you in light of the Access of Information Act. Perhaps I might ask for your cooperation in that you may wish to proceed under that act in order to make your request so that we might be able to deal with it since you have raised it in public as perhaps being a test case of the application of the act in light of the policy that we follow, now, traditionally.

Mr. Blaikie: Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that the minister seems willing to entertain the possibility that this long standing policy might be reviewed in light of the Access to Information Act. I will proceed along those lines. I think it would be an opportunity for those who are concerned about this particular incident to find out the details and satisfy themselves, to the extent that anybody can be satisfied with such an event, in terms of the explanation. A lot of questions remain outstanding as to the questions of adequate supervision of the event—those who were in charge were reported to have already been

[Traduction]

été informé de l'incident en tant que député du parlement représentant le soldat Krosney. J'ai été mis au courant dans les trois jours qui ont suivi l'incident, et c'est ainsi que j'y ai pris un intérêt particulier. Un certain nombre de doutes et de questions subsistent dans l'esprit des parents, j'ai écrit au ministre. Celui-ci m'a répondu. Je voudrais ici poursuivre ce dialogue entrepris entre lui et moi.

Il semble que ce soit une politique de longue date des Forces canadiennes de ne pas rendre public les résultats d'enquêtes militaires. C'est la réponse que j'ai eue lorsque j'ai demandé au ministre un exemplaire du rapport sur l'incident. Il semble que la raison de cette politique soit d'encourager des réponses franches et libres des témoins.

Je voudrais mettre en doute publiquement le bien fondé de cette politique, et ce pour deux raisons. D'abord, dans ce cas, il ne s'agit pas à strictement parler d'un incident militaire puisqu'il est survenu sur une route publique. Deuxièmement, si le fait de rendre les rapports sur ce genre d'incident empêche les témoins de faire des déclarations franches et libres, le principe vaudrait dans les autres cas, dans les autres enquêtes.

Je voudrais ici vous donner l'occasion soit de défendre soit de modifier cette politique, parce qu'en tant que député au parlement, j'estime avoir le droit de prendre connaissance des résultats de cette enquête. Je sais que les parents des victimes se posent encore beaucoup de questions. Je pense qu'ils devraient également avoir accès au rapport de l'enquête.

M. Blais: Je reçois ce genre de demande constamment. Je viens justement ce matin d'envoyer une réponse à quelqu'un qui voulait avoir des détails sur la mort d'un de ses enfants survenue dans des circonstances malheureuses. J'ai dû dans ce cas comme dans le vôtre invoquer cette politique.

Je tiens cependant à vous faire remarquer, monsieur le président, monsieur Blaikie, qu'il existe maintenant la loi sur l'accès à l'information. Elle influe peut-être sur cette politique de la Défense nationale.

Je suis prêt à revoir ma réponse en fonction de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information. À cet égard, je demande votre coopération. Vous voudriez peut-être faire votre demande en vertu de cette Loi. Nous verrons ce que nous pouvons faire. Nous en ferons peut-être une cause-type, qui nous permettra de voir si nous pouvons maintenir notre politique compte tenu de cette loi.

M. Blaikie: Je suis heureux d'entendre le ministre évoquer la possibilité que cette politique de longue date soit réexaminée à la lumière de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information. Je procéderai donc de cette façon. Ce serait une façon pour les personnes concernées par cet incident d'en connaître les détails et d'obtenir satisfaction, dans la mesure évidemment où il est possible pour elles d'obtenir satisfaction dans ce genre de circonstance. Beaucoup de questions se posent encore au sujet de la surveillance qui était exercée au moment de l'incident. Il semble que les responsables se trouvaient déjà à Winnipeg à ce

[Text]

in Winnipeg; it was originally understood that the fellows who went out to Dundurn were flown out there and it was understood they would be flown back, but, somehow, they ended up driving a convoy of equipment. This particular fellow with only two weeks experience as a driver, no co-driver, driving for six hours, probably after the last night on the base, the last night of camp... A lot of things would indicate, at least, reason for wanting to know more about just how strictly supervised this particular operation of the militia was. I want to ask the minister about one of the things the parents are trying to do immediately. They are concerned about whether or not their son was actually qualified to drive the vehicle that he was driving. The minister indicated to me in his letter that he was, although the selection process for the driving was done on a volunteer basis. Having been in the militia myself, I know there is always a group of guys who are willing to drive any vehicle if you give them the chance. I am somewhat sceptical about the volunteer process for getting people to drive vehicles. The militia in Winnipeg will not release to the parents a copy of the drivers license that was on Private Krosney when he was killed. They would very much like to see a copy of that drivers license and to this day they have been unable to obtain either a copy or the original of that drivers license. This would put their minds at ease about this one particular question, as to whether or not he was qualified. You claim in your letter that he was. If somebody would simply show them the drivers license...

Mr. Blais: Yes.

Mr. Blaikie: Why can that not happen?

Mr. Blais: Let me see what we can do about that Mr. Blaikie. I trust you understand that I would not be in a position to reply to it today.

Mr. Blaikie: Yes. That is all I wanted to raise Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you. You can come back. The honourable Member for York South—Weston, the Vice-Chairman of our committee, Madam Appolloni.

Mrs. Appolloni: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am just following up on what Mr. Blaikie said. I hope the public will not get the wrong impression about whether or not the kids are qualified to drive. In my own case, I can assure you my sons have been right through the Air Cadet movement and one of them drives what he calls a deuce-and-a-half. He did have to have quite stringent tests before he was allowed to drive it so I do not think it is fair to give the impression that any kid who wants to drive a big truck can just go and do it. Mr. Minister, I have four main questions, so perhaps in the interest of brevity I will give you the four questions and then you can answer as you will.

The Chairman: Do you want them to be answered in writing if you like?

Mrs. Appolloni: No. I would prefer an answer now.

[Translation]

moment là. Par ailleurs, les jeunes avaient été envoyés à Dundurn par avion. Ils étaient censés revenir par avion, mais se sont retrouvés dans un convoi de matériel. Un des jeunes n'avait que deux semaines d'expérience en tant que conducteur, il n'avait pas de copilote et a dû conduire pendant six heures. Il relevait de sa dernière nuit passée au camp... Beaucoup de questions se posent, en tout cas, il est permis de se demander s'il y avait suffisamment de surveillance dans le cas de cette opération particulière de la milice. Il y a une chose que les parents cherchent à déterminer tout de suite. J'aimerais interroger le ministre à ce sujet. Ils veulent savoir si leur fils était apte à conduire le véhicule qu'il conduisait. Le ministre a indiqué dans sa lettre qu'il l'était, même si on a fait appel à des volontaires pour conduire le véhicule. J'ai fait partie de la milice moi-même, je sais qu'il y a toujours des volontaires pour conduire des véhicules, quel qu'en soit le type. Je suis donc quelque peu sceptique sur le procédé qui consiste à demander des volontaires pour la conduite de véhicules. Les autorités de la milice de Winnipeg ne veulent pas remettre aux parents une copie du permis de conduire du soldat Krosney tué lors de l'accident. Or, à ce jour ils n'ont pu obtenir de copie du permis de conduire, encore moins le permis de conduire lui-même. C'est quelque chose qui les rassurerait dans les circonstances, le fait de savoir s'il était apte ou non à conduire le véhicule. Dans votre lettre, monsieur le ministre, vous indiquez que c'était le cas. Il suffirait de montrer aux parents le permis de conduire...

M. Blais: Je comprends.

M. Blaikie: Pourquoi n'est-ce pas possible?

M. Blais: Je vais voir ce que je peux faire, monsieur Blaikie. Vous devez comprendre que je ne suis pas en mesure de vous répondre aujourd'hui.

M. Blaikie: Très bien, c'est tout, monsieur le président.

Le président: Merci. Vous pourrez reprendre plus tard si vous le désirez. Pour l'instant, c'est l'honorable député de York South—Weston, le vice président du Comité, Madame Appolloni.

Mme Appolloni: Merci, monsieur le président. Pour faire suite à ce que M. Blaikie vient de dire, je ne voudrais pas que le public se pose des questions au sujet de l'aptitude des jeunes à conduire dans ces circonstances. Mes fils font partie des Cadets de l'air. Il y en a un qui conduit ce qu'il appelle un deux tonnes et demie. Il a dû subir des épreuves très strictes avant de pouvoir conduire ce véhicule. Je ne voudrais pas que le public ait l'impression que n'importe quel jeune qui veut conduire un gros camion peut le faire dans ce genre de circonstance. Pour ce qui est de mes questions, j'en ai quatre, monsieur le ministre. Pour sauver du temps, je vais vous les poser les unes après les autres. Vous y répondrez comme bon vous semblera.

Le président: Vous voulez une réponse par écrit?

Mme Appolloni: Non, je préfère avoir une réponse maintenant.

[Texte]

The Chairman: Fine. Thank you. Thank you.

Mrs. Appolloni: I will be short in my questions to give him more time to answer them.

The Chairman: Please do.

Mrs. Appolloni: Mr. Minister, I had correspondence with your predecessor about my own personal concerns about the lack of a Low Level Air Defense System, particularly in Lahr. I felt that it was a minimum kind of insurance that was required for the time when we are going to put the F-18s in Baden. I am now delighted to see this press release, but I am wondering if the system will be in place before the F-18s are switched to Baden. That is the first question.

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The second one: In view of the recent declaration by the Turkish Cypriots, can the minister tell us whether there has been any heightened tension noticed by our peace-keeping troops in Cyprus?

The third: This morning in *The Globe and Mail* there was a rather contradictory report on the concern expressed by NATO officials over the breakdown of the disarmament talks in Geneva. On the one hand, the NATO officials in Brussels seem to be concerned; on the other hand, the U.S. seemed very anxious to downplay this concern. I was wondering what the minister's own feeling is about it.

Finally, could I have a status report on the special one-year program for young people, Mr. Minister—how many kids are actually on it, and in which trades are they working at the moment? The final part of that question: Do you intend to repeat it next year?

Thank you.

Mr. Blais: Relating to the first question, the low level air defence: While we are striving to proceed with that program, and it will be largely off-the-shelf equipment, the chances are that we will not be in a position to have the low level air defence in place prior to the deployment of the CF-18 squadrons. We are looking at 1987-1988 before the deployment takes place. That is of the low level air defence—and the CF-18, of course, is going to be going in by 1985. So that is the first reply.

In terms of your second reply, of course there was an increased level of alert as a result of the UDI in Cyprus. So all of the UN forces were put on increased alert, but there has not been any visible manifestation of increased hostilities or tension. Of course there is bound to be some pretty close inspection of all manifestations from one side or the other of any activity at all, and of course that is the case.

I am planning to go to Cyprus during the winter break, during the January break. I will be there during the first and second weeks of January in order to view the circumstances and of course to introduce myself to the troops. Hopefully I will be in a better position once I come back to provide you with any additional information you may request. But my information is that while there is an increase in the level of

[Traduction]

Le président: Très bien.

Mme Appolloni: Je serai brève, de façon à permettre au ministre d'y répondre.

Le président: Je vous en sais gré.

Mme Appolloni: J'avais écrit à votre prédécesseur au sujet de mes préoccupations sur l'absence d'un système de défense aérienne à faible altitude en particulier à Lahr. J'estimais que c'était une garantie minimum à obtenir au moment de déployer les F-18 à Baden. Aussi, j'ai été heureuse de voir le communiqué de presse. Je me demande cependant si le système sera en place avant que les F-18 soient transférés à Baden. Ma première question.

Je voudrais également savoir si après la déclaration récente des Chypriotes turcs le ministre est en mesure de dire si la tension s'est accrue de façon perceptible pour nos troupes de maintien de la paix à Chypre?

Troisièmement, le *Globe and Mail* de ce matin fait état de réactions assez contradictoires des autorités de l'OTAN concernant la rupture des entretiens sur le désarmement à Genève. D'une part, les autorités de l'OTAN à Bruxelles semblent préoccupées. D'autre part, les États-Unis semblent désireux de minimiser ces préoccupations. Je me demande ce qu'en pense le ministre personnellement.

Enfin, j'aimerais avoir un rapport sur les progrès du programme spécial d'un an pour les jeunes. Combien de jeunes y participent et dans quels métiers travaillent-ils? Également, monsieur le ministre, avez-vous l'intention de reprendre ce programme l'année prochaine?

Merci.

M. Blais: En ce qui concerne votre première question, le système de défense aérienne à faible altitude, nous faisons de grands efforts pour le mettre en place, soit dit en passant, il fait appel, dans une large mesure, à du matériel existant, mais nous doutons de pouvoir y arriver avant le déploiement des escadrons de CF-18. La mise en place du système de défense aérienne à faible altitude doit survenir en 1987-1988, alors que le déploiement des CF-18 est prévu pour 1985. Voilà donc pour votre première question.

Pour ce qui est de votre deuxième question, il est évident que la déclaration unilatérale d'indépendance à Chypre a eu pour résultat d'accroître le niveau d'alerte. Toutes les forces des Nations Unies, donc, sont à un niveau accru d'alerte, même s'il n'y a pas eu de façon manifeste augmentation des hostilités ou des tensions. Il y a une inspection serrée de tout ce qui se passe d'un côté comme de l'autre.

J'ai l'intention de me rendre moi-même à Chypre au cours du congé d'hiver, en janvier. Je serai donc sur place la première et la deuxième semaine de janvier afin d'examiner la situation et de me présenter aux troupes. À mon retour, je serai sûrement mieux en mesure de vous donner des réponses plus précises. Pour l'instant, les rapports indiquent que même s'il y a une augmentation du niveau d'alerte il n'y a pas eu manifestement de nouvelles tensions chez les parties.

[Text]

alertness, there is no manifest increase in the level of tensions between the two parties.

I might just add on that one that really the situation is . . . The UDI has been a formal declaration; it has not done anything in terms of the physical separation of the parties, nor has it increased the level of arms or preparedness either on the Turkish Cypriot side or on the Greek Cypriot side.

On your third question, in terms of the NFI talks, of course there is concern, and there is concern about the walk-out of the USSR negotiators. But that was not unexpected; they had indicated that before. When I received my colleagues in Montebello, the subject was breached. At that time there was indication that the Russians might well do that in the event of deployment. It is not a coincidence that they walked out the day after the Bundestag made its decision—with a substantial majority, I might point out.

So it is part of the negotiations, in my view, and hopefully they will be back. Again, they are testing the resolve of the NATO allies. Therefore our resolve must be unwaivering, and hopefully they will be back in the near future.

• 1205

In terms of the special program, the YTEP program, I might indicate to you, Madam Appolloni, that is one program that in certain quarters has been named the Appolloni program. I am very thankful to you for your inspiration in setting up that program. Of course, there is no decision ready to be announced relating to the continuation of it, but my information is that at the present time we are expecting 4,700 individual participants within the program, and we are hopeful. We are holding our breath.

Mrs. Appolloni: What trades are they in, Mr. Minister? We are short 300, by the way.

Mr. Blais: Yes. I would ask General Brown if he might not want to advance the general classification of the trades. General Brown.

The Chairman: Please identify yourself for the record. Then I will give you the list of the members. I would like to have a full round of members this morning, and the minister has agreed to stay, I am sure.

Please, General Brown, Director General, Military Plans and Operations.

BGen A.C. Brown (Director General, Military Plans and Operations, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chairman, in answer to Mrs. Appolloni's questions, like my predecessor I have some information which we could not get to the minister in time. In fact, we have some additional members in.

The original target was for 4,700 participants. We have, in fact, enrolled to this date 4,962, with another planned enrolment of 267, with an overall enrolment to the end of the year, January 1, of 5,229. From this should be taken planned attrition, young Canadians finding jobs, some choosing not to

[Translation]

A ce sujet, je voudrais ajouter que la déclaration a été strictement une déclaration officielle. Il n'y pas eu de séparation, comme telle, entre les parties; ni les Chypriotes turcs, ni les Chypriotes grecs ne se sont armés ou ne se sont préparés davantage.

Pour ce qui est de votre troisième question, concernant les missiles de portée intermédiaire, le départ des négociateurs de l'U.R.S.S. suscite évidemment des inquiétudes. Cependant, il était attendu. Lorsque j'ai reçu mes collègues à Montebello, le sujet a été abordé. Les Russes avaient déjà indiqué leur intention à ce moment-là de se retirer en cas de déploiement. Il n'est donc pas surprenant qu'ils soient partis le lendemain de la décision du Bundestag, décision fortement majoritaire, d'ailleurs.

Tout cela entre dans le jeu des négociations, à mon avis, de sorte que je m'attends à ce qu'ils retournent. Ils veulent mettre la détermination des alliés de l'OTAN à l'épreuve. Aussi, nous devons nous montrer fermes. Il est à espérer qu'ils reviendront à la table des négociations dans un avenir rapproché.

En ce qui concerne le Programme spécial d'emploi des jeunes stagiaires, je tiens à indiquer, madame Appolloni, qu'il est connu en certains endroits comme le programme Appolloni. Je vous suis très reconnaissant du rôle que vous avez joué dans l'établissement de ce programme. Aucune décision ne peut encore être annoncée relativement à son maintien, mais d'après les rapports 4,700 participants sont attendus. Nous avons hâte de pouvoir vérifier.

Mme Appolloni: Dans quels métiers travaillent-ils? Soit dit en passant, monsieur le ministre, il en manque encore 300.

M. Blais: Je demanderais au Général Brown s'il est en mesure d'indiquer des catégories de métier.

Le président: Veuillez vous identifier, s'il vous plaît. Quand vous aurez terminé, je donnerai la liste des membres du Comité qui désirent poser des questions. Ils sont nombreux, ce matin, mais je suis sûr que le ministre voudra rester.

Le Général Brown, directeur général, Plans militaires et opérations.

Le brigadier-général A.C. Brown (directeur général, Plans militaires et opérations, ministère de la Défense nationale): En réponse aux questions de Mme Appolloni, je voudrais indiquer que je dispose, comme mon prédécesseur, de renseignements que je n'ai pas eu le temps de faire parvenir au ministre. J'ai eu d'autres participants qui sont venus se joindre au programme.

Le premier objectif était 4,700 participants. Or, à ce jour, nous avons enrôlé 4,962 participants, auxquels doivent se joindre 267 autres, pour un total, d'ici la fin de l'année, d'ici au 1^{er} janvier, de 5,229. Il faut y soustraire les départs normaux, les jeunes qui trouveront de l'emploi, ou qui choisiront

[*Texte*]

continue in the program. We estimate approximately some 800 will drop out throughout the entire life of the program. We planned to top up, and we will be arriving almost bang on target on the military portion, as the minister has stated, with approximately 4,770 military participants. To this must be added the young Canadians on the civilian side, approximately 300 in number, who will be hired to support the program.

So indeed, the figure of 5,000 has been well targeted and reached.

The trades: Currently, the 4,700 members will be engaged in 46 different trades, and they span the entire spectrum of Canadian Forces trades activity. Perhaps three or four examples may be of use: trades such as vehicle technicians; linemen in the communications trades; structures technicians, which is a military term for carpenters, masons, plumbers; medical assistants; junior dental technicians; military police; finance clerks; administrative clerks; and of course, the military trades, infantry, armoured, the sea-going trades.

Mrs. Appolloni, I hope that perhaps will give you a representation of the wide field of activity, of training that is being taken.

Mrs. Appolloni: Do I have any more time, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman: May I kindly ask for a very . . . ? When I say supplementary now, it would be more . . . Mr. Bradley, one of your colleagues, has a supplementary, a short supplementary.

Mr. Bradley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Brown, have any provisions been made to afford these trainees an opportunity to go into either the regular force or the reserve force following their program?

BGen Brown: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bradley, the answer is yes. The quality of the young Canadian is superb. He has undertaken exactly the same training as a regular force applicant would have taken. It is obviously very prudent, considering the quality of the individual, his aspiration—for those who wish to join—and the training he has taken, in fact to make provision, should he wish to do so and should he be acceptable, for him to enroll in the regular force upon completion of the Youth Training and Employment Program.

• 1210

As to the second half of your question, with respect to the reserves, we would welcome him in the reserves. By virtue of his regular force training, he would be extremely well placed in terms of advancement, compared with the type of training undertaken by a similar young Canadian during this same one-year period. Indeed, it could only bring benefit to him in terms of his personal advancement in the reserve force.

[*Traduction*]

d'abandonner le programme. Nous nous attendons à ce qu'environ 800 d'entre eux abandonnent le programme avant la fin. Nous avons l'intention de compléter les effectifs, de sorte que nous atteindrons presque exactement l'objectif fixé du côté militaire, soit 4,770, comme le ministre l'a indiqué. Il faut y ajouter les jeunes participants du côté civil qui seront au nombre de 300 environ. Ils constitueront l'appui au programme.

Donc, le chiffre de 5,000 prévu sera atteint.

Pour ce qui est des métiers, maintenant, les 4,700 participants travailleront dans 46 métiers différents, représentant l'éventail des métiers dans les Forces canadiennes. Je puis vous donner quelques exemples: techniciens de véhicule, poseurs de ligne, dans les métiers des communications, techniciens de structure, l'expression militaire pour menuisiers, maçons, plombiers, infirmiers auxiliaires, techniciens dentaires subalternes, policiers militaires, commis aux finances, commis à l'administration, ainsi que les métiers militaires dans l'infanterie, les blindés et la marine.

J'espère que cela vous donne une idée de l'éventail de la formation qui est offerte, madame Appolloni.

Mme Appolloni: Est-ce qu'il me reste du temps, monsieur le président?

Le président: Puis-je vous demander . . . Il y a une question supplémentaire . . . M. Bradley, un de vos collègues, a une question supplémentaire très brève.

M. Bradley: Merci, monsieur le président.

Des dispositions ont-elles été prises, Général Brown, afin que ces stagiaires aient l'occasion d'entrer dans les forces régulières ou la force de réserve à la fin du programme?

BGen Brown: La réponse à la question de M. Bradley est oui, monsieur le président. Ces jeunes sont d'un excellent calibre. Ils suivent exactement la même formation que seraient appelés à suivre des candidats des forces régulières. Il serait manifestement très prudent, compte tenu de la qualité des individus, de leurs aspirations—pour ceux désireux de se joindre aux forces armées—et compte tenu de la formation qu'ils ont reçue, de faire les démarches nécessaires, s'ils le souhaitent, et si leur candidature est acceptable, pour s'inscrire dans les forces régulières à la fin du Programme d'emploi des jeunes stagiaires.

Quant à la deuxième partie de votre question, au sujet des forces de réserve, c'est avec plaisir que nous les y accueillons. À cause de leur formation dans les forces régulières, ils se trouveraient extrêmement bien placés du point de vue des promotions, comparé au genre de formation qu'auraient reçue d'autres jeunes Canadiens au cours de la même période d'un an. En fait, cela ne saurait que leur profiter du point de vue de leur promotion dans les forces de réserve.

[Text]

Mr. Bradley: Will the recruitment level for the year be changed to accept this?

BGen Brown: I do not have that information.

Mr. Bradley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Next on my list is the hon. member from Fraser Valley and a professional on this committee, Mr. Wenman.

Mr. Wenman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. During the Minister of Defence's recent meetings in New York on November 17 and 18, I have heard of the Minister of Defence's defence of defence, but what I am really interesting in hearing from him this morning is not that same defence, but instead what representations he received from the United States defence staff regarding Mr. Trudeau's peace proposals. What were the objections? What concerns specifically were registered by his United States counterparts to those proposals?

Mr. Blais: I might indicate to Mr. Wenman that the Prime Minister's initiative was a subject that was initially raised by Mr. Weinberger in Washington. The subject was not raised with me in New York when I addressed the Americas Society, it was raised by journalists after the speech that I gave—which, by the way, I trust has been delivered to all of your offices. It is a very good speech with a very thorough, historical perspective.

Mr. Stevens: That is a first.

Mr. Blais: Oh, no, this was inspired by yours truly, Mr. Chairman. In effect, I . . .

Mr. Wenman: Let us leave that up to others.

Mr. Blais: I would want the honourable gentleman to review it very carefully.

The Chairman: I will not take that time off yours.

Mr. Blais: Why not?

The Chairman: His time.

Mr. Blais: In terms of Mr. Weinberger's exchange with me on the Prime Minister, he indicated that he wanted me to provide him with an overview of the Prime Minister's initiative to that time, which I did. There were a number of questions relating to the reaction that he had met in Europe and I provided them with the information that I had obtained in that regard. There was also an indication of a positive outlook relating to the Prime Minister's initiative. Of course, Secretary Weinberger had been in Montebello on the Thursday when the Prime Minister launched his initiative in Guelph and, therefore, knew that the Prime Minister was launching the initiative and also was aware of what the speech was going to say and what it was not going to say. At that time, of course, he wanted to review the speech, which he evidently had done, together with the President and the response was a positive one.

Mr. Wenman: You mean there were no concerns expressed to you by your American counterparts regarding the Prime

[Translation]

M. Bradley: Va-t-on modifier le niveau de recrutement cette année afin d'accueillir de tels jeunes?

Bgén Brown: Je n'ai pas ces renseignements.

M. Bradley: Merci, monsieur le président.

Le président: Le suivant sur ma liste est l'honorable député de Fraser Valley, et un professionnel de notre Comité, M. Wenman.

M. Wenman: Merci, monsieur le président. Au cours des rencontres récentes du ministre de la Défense à New York, les 17 et 18 novembre, j'ai entendu parler de la défense des défenses du ministre de la Défense, mais ce qu'il m'intéresserait vraiment d'entendre ce matin, ce n'est pas la même défense, mais plutôt j'aimerais apprendre ce que les militaires des États-Unis lui ont dit au sujet des propositions de paix de M. Trudeau. Y a-t-il eu des objections? Quelles préoccupations précises ses homologues aux États-Unis lui ont-ils transmises?

M. Blais: Je pourrais peut-être mentionner à M. Wenman que l'initiative du premier ministre a d'abord été abordée par M. Weinberger à Washington. On n'a pas abordé cette question avec moi à New York lorsque j'ai pris la parole devant la *Americas Society*, ce sont les journalistes qui ont abordé la question après le discours que j'y avais prononcé—lequel, je l'espère, a été distribué à tous vos bureaux. Il s'agit d'un excellent discours dont la perspective historique est des plus approfondies.

M. Stevens: C'est une première.

M. Blais: Non, l'inspiration m'en est venue, monsieur le président . . . En fait, je . . .

M. Wenman: Laissons cela à d'autres.

M. Blais: J'aimerais que l'honorable député l'étudie avec grand soin.

Le président: Je ne vais pas déduire cela de votre temps.

M. Blais: Pourquoi pas?

Le président: De son temps.

M. Blais: Quant à mon échange de propos avec M. Weinberger sur le premier ministre, il m'a demandé de lui fournir un aperçu de ce qu'avait donné l'initiative du premier ministre jusqu'à ce moment-là, ce que j'ai fait. Il m'a posé plusieurs questions sur la réaction que M. Trudeau avait obtenue en Europe, et je lui ai fourni les renseignements que j'avais reçus à ce sujet. Il y avait également des indices que l'initiative du premier ministre avait été accueillie de façon positive. Évidemment, le secrétaire Weinberger se trouvait à Montebello le jeudi où le premier ministre a lancé son initiative à Guelph, et par conséquent, il savait que le premier ministre lançait cette initiative tout comme il savait ce qu'il dirait dans son discours et ce qu'il ne dirait pas. À l'époque, bien sûr, il voulait étudier le discours, ce qu'il a manifestement fait, ainsi que celui du président, et sa réaction a été positive.

M. Wenman: Voulez-vous dire que vos homologues américains ne vous ont fait part d'aucune préoccupation en ce qui

[Texte]

Minister's peace proposal in any way, shape or form? There were no concerns?

Mr. Blais: No, there were no concerns expressed, it was simply a question of wanting to have information on the proposals.

Mr. Wenman: What was the Prime Minister responding to, when he dismissed our United States allies with a sort of contemptuous, arrogant kind of response. What was that all about? What was he responding to so...? What was the reaction to?

Mr. Blais: First of all, quite to the contrary, the Prime Minister identified the fact that the American administration supported his peace initiative. The Prime Minister had received correspondence from the President of the United States that identified a positive reaction to his initiative. What the Prime Minister was reacting to were press interpretations of something that had been reported out of New York during the Americas Society's seminar. Those comments were taken out of context and, of course, the Prime Minister had not seen the original context, had not seen the original comments made, had not been part of that seminar. What emerged from that seminar were really reports from reporters who were there and were subsequently interpreted by reporters who were following the Prime Minister. So, you are dealing with once, twice, three times removed.

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Mr. Wenman: The Prime Minister was therefore incorrect in his slap at the Pentagon. He was reacting on wrong information.

Mr. Blais: No. He was given information relating to some middle level Pentagon officials, what they were alleged to have said in a seminar in New York.

Mr. Wenman: Alleged. He was commenting on allegations. Fine.

Second factor. You have mentioned that there are major new NORAD programs—both programs—the nature of those programs, and there is major new sharings. You talked about negotiations of that magnitude. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am very upset and concerned about the minister's attitude because this is the second time we have been around this one and if it is of that negotiation, if negotiations are of that magnitude and it affects new programs, new agreements with the United States, there was a very strong recommendation from this committee on two previous NORAD reports that matters of this nature should come before this committee. Now, the minister may not want these discussions to be public. But with major new programs, it was to be brought before us. Now we are getting another couple of years and we have another review. Again, we have not started. We are going to be on after the fact—an after-the-fact discussion. Agreements will all be made and there will have been no input from this committee. I think that is very, very unfortunate.

[Traduction]

concerne la proposition de paix du premier ministre, d'aucune façon ou forme? Qu'il n'y avait aucune préoccupation?

M. Blais: Non, on ne m'a fait part d'aucune préoccupation, il s'agissait simplement de vouloir avoir des renseignements sur les propositions.

M. Wenman: À qui répondait donc le premier ministre, lorsqu'il a écarté les propos de nos alliés américains d'une façon dédaigneuse et arrogante. De quoi s'agissait-il? À quoi répondait-il d'une façon aussi...? À quoi réagissait-il?

M. Blais: Tout d'abord, tout à fait au contraire, le premier ministre a relevé le fait que l'administration américaine appuyait son initiative de paix. Le premier ministre avait reçu une lettre du président des États-Unis qui révélait une réaction positive à son initiative. Le premier ministre en fait réagissait à l'interprétation donnée par la presse à quelque chose qui avait été rapporté à New York au cours du séminaire de l'*Americas Society*. Ces remarques avaient été publiées hors contexte et bien sûr, le premier ministre n'en avait pas vu l'original et donc n'avait pas vu les remarques originales et n'avait pas participé à ce séminaire. Ce qui est sorti de ce séminaire, en fait, ça a été des rapports de journalistes qui y étaient et qui ont par la suite été interprétés par des journalistes qui suivaient le périple du premier ministre. Donc il s'agissait de rapports de troisième main.

M. Wenman: Donc le premier ministre n'avait pas raison dans son attaque du Pentagone. Il réagissait à de faux renseignements.

M. Blais: Non. On lui avait fait rapport de ce que des cadres moyens du Pentagone étaient censés avoir dit au séminaire à New York.

M. Wenman: Censés. Il répondait à des allégations. Parfait.

Deuxième facteur. Vous avez mentionné qu'il y a de nouveaux programmes d'envergure dans le cadre de NORAD... deux programmes... la nature de ces programmes, ainsi que le fait qu'il y a un nouveau partage d'envergure. Vous avez parlé de négociations de cette envergure. Eh bien, monsieur le président, je suis très préoccupé par l'attitude du ministre, car c'est la deuxième fois que cette question revient, et s'il y a des négociations, des négociations de cette envergure, qui touchent de nouveaux programmes, de nouvelles ententes avec les États-Unis, il existe une recommandation très ferme du présent Comité dans deux rapports précédents sur le NORAD que des questions de ce genre soient soumises au présent Comité. Or le ministre ne veut peut-être pas tenir ces discussions en public. Mais vu ces nouveaux programmes importants, on aurait dû nous soumettre la chose. Maintenant on peut compter encore quelques années avant une autre évaluation. Encore une fois, nous n'avons pas commencé. Nous allons nous intéresser à la question après coup... une discussion après le fait. On aura conclu les ententes, et le présent Comité n'y aura pas contribué. Je crois que c'est extrêmement malheureux.

[Text]

Now, specifically, other than the same thing he said last time he was at this committee as he repeated again in this piece of material that he provided for us . . .

Mr. Blais: I was not here. This is my first time in this committee.

Mr. Wenman: All right, previous minister. I am sorry.

Mr. Blais: I am not responsible for my predecessors. Well, Mr. Chairman . . .

Mr. Wenman: All right. There is no new information. There is no new information then in this particular one.

Now, I want to know particularly about the industrial offsets that may result in more jobs for Canadians. I am wondering if in these projections of great magnitude there are a substantial number of new jobs and if there is any estimate of the new jobs that may emerge from the package that is currently being negotiated with the United States.

I would also like to have a least some broad figures about the amount of money we are talking about. After all, we are sitting here talking about estimates. I want to know where in the estimates . . . Is there anything provided in these estimates for those negotiations for that discussion in the projection of estimates that you in fact make for us? Where do we find the dollars that relate to the new DEW line project? What type of money are we talking about, without being too specific? Also, what will that result be in terms of jobs for Canadians?

Mr. Blais: Yes. Mr. Chairman, I might indicate first of all, as I said to Mr. Andre before, I would hope that Mr. Wenman would understand that I would want to be as circumspect as possible relating to any information I transmit in public because of the fact that we are in negotiations. They are very sensitive negotiations.

Mr. Wenman: Do you wish to go into camera?

Mr. Blais: I may do that when I feel that it may be helpful in terms of getting support of members, both members of the House and members of this committee. In terms of the negotiations themselves, they are highly sensitive. There are a number of facets to the negotiations. There are various elements within the negotiations and they tend to be complex. I am not in a position today to identify the potential number of jobs, nor the total numbers that I am looking at in terms of the Canadian contribution because I want to hold fire relating to the size of the Canadian contribution, depending upon the sort of exchanges that can be generated resulting from that contribution that Canada may wish to make.

The Chairman: Last question, Mr. Wenman, please. I have to be fair to other members. It is the first time we have the minister and I want to give them all a chance, and I have many.

Mr. Wenman: Okay. Within the industrial offset package. From earlier negotiations with the United States, Litton Systems Canada Limited was created, for example, and with it

[Translation]

Maintenant, plus précisément, outre les mêmes choses qu'il nous avait dites la dernière fois qu'il a comparu devant le Comité et qu'il a répétées encore dans ce document qu'il nous a fourni . . .

M. Blais: Je n'étais pas ici. C'est la première fois que je viens devant le Comité.

M. Wenman: Le ministre précédent. Excusez-moi.

M. Blais: Je ne suis pas responsable de mes prédécesseurs. Eh bien, monsieur le président . . .

M. Wenman: Très bien. Il n'y a aucun nouveau renseignement dans ce document particulier.

Or j'aimerais savoir plus particulièrement quelles seront les retombées industrielles qui entraîneraient un plus grand nombre d'emplois pour les Canadiens. Je me demande si compte tenu de ces prévisions d'envergure, il y aura un nombre considérable de nouveaux emplois et si l'on a évalué le nombre de nouveaux emplois qui pourraient sortir de ce que l'on négocie actuellement avec les États-Unis.

J'aimerais également avoir au moins quelques chiffres d'ordre général sur les sommes dont nous parlons. Après tout, nous sommes ici à discuter des prévisions budgétaires. Je veux savoir où dans les prévisions . . . Trouve-t-on quelque chose dans ces prévisions destiné aux négociations ou discussions compte tenu des prévisions que vous nous faites? Où trouve-t-on les crédits affectés à ce nouveau projet de la ligne DEW? De combien parlons-nous, sans être trop précis? En outre, quel sera le résultat du point de vue des emplois destinés aux Canadiens?

M. Blais: Oui. Monsieur le président, je pourrais peut-être dire tout d'abord, comme je l'ai dit auparavant à M. Andre, que j'ose espérer que M. Wenman comprendra que je dois me montrer le plus circonspect possible en donnant des renseignements en public puisque nous sommes en négociation. Il s'agit de négociations très délicates.

M. Wenman: Souhaitez-vous que nous siégions à huis clos?

M. Blais: Je le demanderai peut-être lorsque j'estimerai que cela pourrait être utile pour m'obtenir l'appui des députés, et des députés à la Chambre et des membres de ce Comité. Quant aux négociations elles-mêmes, elles sont très délicates. Elles comportent plusieurs aspects. Elles comportent plusieurs éléments qui ont tendance à être compliqués. Je ne suis pas en mesure aujourd'hui de vous donner le nombre éventuel d'emplois, ni le montant global de la contribution canadienne, car je veux garder en réserve la taille de la contribution canadienne, afin de la fonder sur le genre d'échanges que pourrait produire la contribution que le Canada pourrait souhaiter faire.

Le président: Dernière question, monsieur Wenman, s'il vous plaît. Je dois me montrer juste à l'égard des autres membres. C'est la première fois que nous accueillons le ministre, et je veux donner à tous la chance de l'interroger, et j'ai de nombreux noms.

M. Wenman: Très bien. Parlons des retombées industrielles. *Litton Systems Canada Limited* est sorti de négociations précédentes avec les États-Unis par exemple, entraînant la

[Texte]

a tremendous number of new jobs, a whole new technological industry with technological exchange. Is the Minister optimistic that maybe just one more such type of industrial offset, as it relates particularly to defence, will be established? Secondly, can he give us some assurances that there may be, as well as defence industry offsets, offsets in non-defence-related industries?

• 1220

Mr. Blais: First of all, Mr. Chairman, I want to make it clear that, as Minister of National Defence, my responsibility is primarily a responsibility to ensure the security of Canada and the protection of Canada's sovereignty. That is my first responsibility. I am of course interested in industrial offsets, but my primary responsibility remains the question of securing the defence of the country. That is of course done through our NORAD arrangement in terms of the continental North American context. That, of course, is still the primary consideration.

However, the honourable gentleman knows that, in my former responsibility, I had some dealings with offsets. Canada has been relatively successful in negotiating offsets, so much so that now it is creating some pressure from our European NATO allies. Having said that, we were able to secure substantial offsets from the Aurora program, from the CF-18 team program, indeed from the Leopard tank program, and now from the foreign component of the frigate program as well. So we have been very, very successful in that regard.

There is no reason for us to change our attitude in these present negotiations, but there are other considerations that have to be taken into account. Until such time as I am ready to come forward and identify those considerations for the committee at a time when it may be helpful to do so, I would want to reserve comments.

The Chairman: Thank you both.

C'est maintenant à l'honorable député de Lac-Saint-Jean, M. Gimaïel.

M. Gimaïel: Merci, monsieur le président.

The Chairman: Pierre Gimaïel, like a great name in Lebanon.

M. Gimaïel: Bienvenue à la presse, en passant. C'est très intéressant de les voir ici.

Monsieur le ministre, une première question.

Une voix: C'est mieux quand les lumières sont allumées.

M. Gimaïel: Oui, je sais. C'est mieux qu'en Chambre. En Chambre, on ne sait jamais quand ils sont sur nous.

On parle d'instrumentation et d'appareils militaires depuis le début de la période des questions. Cela m'amène à un autre élément qui est important dans les Forces armées canadiennes. Il s'agit de l'élément humain.

Au cours des deux ou trois dernières années, parce qu'on avait trop tardé à moderniser les Forces armées canadiennes, il a fallu se concentrer strictement ou très fortement sur l'équipage, l'appareillage des Forces armées canadiennes. Je

[Traduction]

création d'un nombre énorme de nouveaux emplois, une nouvelle industrie technologique et des échanges technologiques. Le ministre a-t-il confiance qu'il y aura des retombées industrielles, surtout pour la défense? Deuxièmement, peut-il nous donner des assurances qu'il y aura non seulement des retombées pour la défense, mais aussi pour les industries qui ne sont pas liées à la défense?

M. Blais: D'abord, monsieur le président, j'aimerais souligner qu'en tant que ministre de la Défense nationale, ma responsabilité première est d'assurer la sécurité du Canada et la protection de notre souveraineté. C'est ma première responsabilité. Je m'intéresse naturellement aux retombées industrielles, mais ma responsabilité première est la défense du pays. Dans le contexte de l'Amérique du Nord, cela veut dire l'arrangement de NORAD. C'est la priorité.

Cependant, comme le sait l'honorable député, dans mon poste antérieur, j'avais affaire avec les retombées. Le Canada a eu quelques réussites à ce niveau, au point que nos alliés de l'OTAN en Europe font maintenant pression. Cela dit, nous avons réussi à obtenir des compensations pour le programme Aurora, et pour le programme du CF-18, pour le programme du char d'assaut Leopard, et maintenant pour la partie étrangère du programme frégates. Nous avons donc eu beaucoup de réussites à cet égard.

Il n'y a aucune raison pour changer notre attitude dans les négociations actuelles, mais il faut tenir compte d'autres considérations. J'aimerais réserver mes commentaires jusqu'au moment où je serai prêt à identifier ces considérations pour le Comité.

Le président: Merci à vous deux.

Now the hon. member from Lac-Saint-Jean, Mr. Gimaïel.

Mr. Gimaïel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Le président: Pierre Gimaïel, comme un grand nom au Liban.

Mr. Gimaïel: In passing, I would like to welcome the press. It is very interesting to have them here.

Mr. Minister, my first question.

An hon. Member: It is better when the lights are on.

Mr. Gimaïel: Yes, I know. It is better than in the House. In the House you never know when they are focusing on us.

We have been talking about instruments and military apparatus from the beginning of the Question Period. This leads me to mention another element which is important in the Canadian Armed Forces. And that is the human element.

During the last two or three years, because we have been too slow in modernizing the Canadian Armed Forces, we have had to concentrate entirely, or almost entirely, on equipment for the Canadian Armed Forces. I know that at the present time

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sais que, présentement, votre ministère met le paquet pour essayer de rattraper le retard des 20 dernières années, pour équiper nos gens adéquatement, pour en faire une bonne force armée, bien que la qualité de nos soldats ait toujours été reconnue dans le monde entier.

Ma question est la suivante, et c'est pour moi une source d'inquiétude. Je crois remarquer que le recrutement diminue depuis quelques mois. Je parle des recrues normales des Forces armées canadiennes et non pas des programmes spéciaux.

Quelle est la moyenne d'âge dans les Forces armées canadiennes présentement? C'est que je ne voudrais pas qu'on se retrouve dans cinq ans avec un autre problème parce qu'on a consacré une trop grande partie de nos budgets à l'armement, sans tenir compte du remplacement de nos soldats ou de notre main-d'œuvre. Les départs sont très nombreux; les soldats canadiens prennent leur retraite passablement jeunes, vers 45 ou 50 ans pour la plupart. On peut donc se retrouver dans une espèce de cul-de-sac au niveau humain. Ce ne sont pas des frégates; cela ne se construit pas sur demande. Les bons soldats se forment avec le temps, avec les années. Je pense que cette qualité des Forces armées canadiennes, qui demeure notre principale marque de commerce, vient justement de la force et de la qualité du niveau humain qu'on a toujours rencontrées dans nos Forces. Je ne voudrais pas qu'il y ait une diminution dans l'embauche qui fasse que dans cinq ou dix ans, on se retrouve avec un paquet de jeunes qu'on sera obligé d'entrer en vitesse et qui ne seront peut-être pas assez formés par les années pour devenir les *leaders* dont on aura besoin à ce moment-là.

• 1225

M. Blais: Votre question, monsieur Gimaïel, est très à propos. Il faut être capable de prévoir non seulement les problèmes auxquels on fait face maintenant, mais aussi, évidemment, les problèmes à long terme. Pour le moment, il n'y a pas de difficulté du point de vue du recrutement. Il y a tellement peu de gens qui laissent les Forces avant le moment prédéterminé de leur retraite qu'il y a un surplus de demandes. Donc, le recrutement se fait plus difficilement parce qu'il y a plus de demandes que de postes à offrir. C'est pour cela que nous avons eu tellement peu de difficulté dans le programme temporaire d'emplois. Nous avons, comme l'indiquait le général Brown, plus de 5,000 participants à ce programme-là.

Maintenant, comme vous le savez, nous augmentons notre effectif d'à peu près 400 personnes par année pour arriver à 83,000. Nous sommes maintenant à 81,000. Donc, il y a non seulement ceux qui quittent le service, mais aussi ceux qui sont ajoutés à cause de la politique du gouvernement.

Maintenant, en ce qui touche un avenir plus éloigné, je suis très sensible à vos représentations. C'est une chose que nous examinons régulièrement. Pour le moment, il n'y a pas de préoccupation, mais je puis vous assurer que nos projections sont revues régulièrement afin qu'on puisse surmonter tout inconvénient qui pourrait se présenter dans un avenir prochain mais, pour le moment, on n'en voit pas.

M. Gimaïel: Quelle est la moyenne d'âge de vos troupes présentement? Avez-vous une idée?

[Translation]

your department is attempting to make up for the time lost over the last 20 years, in order to equip our people adequately, and to give us solid armed forces, although the quality of our soldiers has always been recognized throughout the world.

My question is the following, and it is one that concerns me a great deal. I believe that recruiting has decreased in the last few months. I am talking about normal recruits for the Canadian Armed Forces and not about special programs.

What is the average age of the Canadian Armed Forces at the present time? In five years I would not like to see us in the situation of having allocated too much of our budget to armament, without taking into consideration the replacement of our soldiers and manpower. There are many departures: Canadian soldiers retire fairly young, around 45 or 50 years old for the most part. We might find ourselves in some sort of human deadend. They are not frigates and cannot be constructed on demand. It takes time to train good soldiers, and they grow better with the years. I think that the quality of the Canadian Armed Forces, which is our principal trademark, is in precise relation to the quality of people we have always had in the forces. I do not want to see a decrease in hiring in the next five or ten years, and then find ourselves in the situation of having to take on a bunch of young people who will perhaps not have had enough training over the years to become the leaders that we will require at some point.

Mr. Blais: Your question is very timely, Mr. Gimaïel. We must be capable of foreseeing not only the problems facing us at the moment, but also the problems over the long term. For the time being, there is no difficulty from a recruiting point of view. There are so few people leaving the forces before their planned retirement, that there is a surplus of demand. So recruiting is more difficult because there are more demands than there are positions. That is why we had so little difficulty in the temporary employment program. As General Brown stated, we have more than 5,000 participants in this program.

Now, as you know, we are increasing our staff by about 400 person-years to about 83,000. Right now we have 81,000. Therefore, not only are those who are leaving the service, but those who will be added because of the government policy.

As far as the more distant future goes, I am very aware of your concerns. This is something that we study regularly. For the time being, there is no reason for concern, but I can assure you that our projections are reviewed regularly so that we can overcome any possible difficulty in the close future, but for the time being we do not see any.

Mr. Gimaïel: What is the average age of your troops at the present time? Do you have any idea?

[Texte]

Mr. Blais: General Vance, what is the average age of our military personnel?

Lieutenant-General J.E. Vance (Assistant Deputy Minister, Personnel, Department of National Defence): I think, sir, in gross terms, it is about 25 years of age.

Mr. Blais: Twenty-five years.

LGen Vance: All ranks considered.

Mr. Blais: But you do not forecast any... General Vance, would you identify for Mr. Gimiél, as to whether...

LGen Vance: Averaging out the ages of all 81,000 members of the regular force, I would estimate that it is probably about 25 years of age at this time. We do not anticipate any marked increase in aging, if you like, in the forces. But as the minister said, it is something we have to watch very closely.

The Chairman: Thank you, General.

Mr. Blais: Thank you, General.

The Chairman: Your last question.

M. Gimiél: Ma dernière question, monsieur le président, concerne l'implication des Forces armées canadiennes dans le *testing* du missile Cruise qui va se faire ici au Canada. Est-ce que les Forces armées canadiennes seront directement impliquées?

Mr. Blais: Evidemment, nous voulons maintenir un certain contrôle sur tout le *testing*, et il y a du personnel canadien qui est impliqué dans le *testing* lui-même. Il y aura un officier à bord de l'aéronef qui effectuera le contrôle sur la missile Cruise et qui sera en tout temps capable d'émettre des directives concernant la continuation ou la terminaison du *testing*.

M. Gimiél: Une autre question pour terminer. La navette spatiale est, à mes yeux, un outil militaire, en tout cas en partie. L'implication canadienne, pour le *Canadarm*, est très forte. Est-ce qu'il y a des gens du ministère de la Défense nationale canadien qui travaillent en collaboration avec la NASA en ce qui regarde le développement de cet outil qu'est la navette spatiale, que ce soit au niveau militaire ou à un autre niveau?

Mr. Blais: Comme vous le savez, le Canada, par l'entremise de Spar Aerospace Limited, qui est une société canadienne, a construit le bras, qui s'appelle le *Canadarm*, et a contribué et continue de contribuer au travail sur la navette spatiale. Il y a des échanges qui se font, et qui se sont toujours faits, entre des sociétés et les autorités canadiennes et les autorités et des sociétés américaines dans les programmes de l'espace. Le Canada, comme vous le savez, a été le troisième pays au monde à mettre des satellites dans l'espace. Nous avons encore des satellites qui fonctionnent pleinement et qui assurent les communications au Canada, et cela va se poursuivre.

• 1230

Le président: Merci, monsieur Gimiél.

My hon. friend from Parry Sound—Muskoka, Mr. Darling, please.

[Traduction]

M. Blais: Général Vance, quelle est la moyenne d'âge de notre personnel militaire?

Le lieutenant-général J.E. Vance (sous-ministre adjoint, Personnel, ministère de la Défense nationale): Je pense, monsieur, *grosso modo*, qu'elle est de 25 ans.

M. Blais: Vingt-cinq ans.

Lgén Vance: En tenant compte de tous les échelons.

M. Blais: Mais vous ne prévoyez pas de... Général Vance, voulez-vous dire à M. Gimiél s'il y a...

Lgén Vance: Si l'on prend l'ensemble des 81,000 membres de nos forces régulières, j'estime que l'âge moyen est de 25 ans en ce moment. Nous ne prévoyons pas une augmentation de l'âge moyen dans les forces. Mais comme l'a dit le ministre, c'est quelque chose que nous devons examiner de très près.

Le président: Merci, général.

M. Blais: Merci, général.

Le président: Votre dernière question.

Mr. Gimiél: My last question, Mr. Chairman, concerns the involvement of the Canadian Armed Forces in the Cruise missile testing which is going to be carried out here in Canada. Will the Canadian Armed Forces be directly involved?

Mr. Blais: Obviously, we are going to maintain some control on all the testing, and there is Canadian personnel involved in the testing itself. There will be an officer on board the aircraft which will carry out the control of the Cruise missile and which will be capable of sending out directives at all times with respect to the continuation or termination of the testing.

Mr. Gimiél: One question to conclude. The space shuttle is, in my opinion, a military tool, at least to some extent. We have been very involved in the *Canadarm*. Are there people in the Department of National Defence who are working in co-operation with NASA for the development of the space shuttle, either on a military or other level?

Mr. Blais: As you know, Canada has been involved through Spar Aerospace Limited which is a Canadian company, in constructing the arm called the *Canadarm*, and has contributed and continues to contribute work on the space shuttle. Exchanges are going on, and have always gone on, between Canadian companies and authorities, and American companies and authorities in space programs. Canada, as you know, was the third country in the world to send satellites into space. We still have satellites that are fully operational and which provide communications to Canada. This will continue.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Gimiél.

Mon honorable collègue de Parry Sound—Muskoka, monsieur Darling, s'il vous plaît.

[Text]

Mr. Darling: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First I would like to congratulate my neighbouring member of Parliament on his new responsibility as Minister of National Defence. I was delighted to get a copy of his speech of November 17. I had a particular interest in that speech, and I am sorry I could not hear it all in detail. I noted the various comments.

One, of course, did raise my eyebrows a bit, Mr. Minister. On page 18 you were talking about the strength of our armed forces, well trained, respected for their proficiency; and I think we all agree 100%, they consistently rank with the best. I agree with that. And then the last—you are looking at me wondering why.

Mr. Blais: Those are words of wisdom.

Mr. Darling: Yes, but I question this last wisdom:

And the single green uniform, so controversial at the time it was introduced is now a point of distinctiveness and I think a source of conscious pride.

Mr. Minister, do you not think it would have been more appropriate if you had said a source of unconscious pride? Your home, Mr. Minister, right where the NORAD headquarters are—I am very familiar with North Bay—and of course I have taken maybe slight exception to the green uniform; I liked the distinctive uniforms, especially in one particular department, and I see all the air force insignia—but I do see Commodore Healey, and I am hoping that we can get away from that one distinctiveness that we have: the only navy in the whole bloody world in green.

The Chairman: Put them in red, soon.

Mr. Darling: Navy blue is the colour, period.

The other thing is—and I have asked this question before—the latest information is we have 81,000 troops, give or take personnel, and I think we have 100 generals or their equivalent, more or less, which is 1 for each 800. Mr. Minister, this is the first time that you have been here; I am going to ask you; you can get a special star in your crown, you see, because no...

Mr. Blais: A few hairs will do.

Mr. Darling: Well, all right. I ask again—and General Theriault knows exactly what I am going to say—when are you going to recognize the importance of the female portion of your armed forces and appoint a female general, or counterpart? The highest rank now is a full colonel. I know I was told—and I do not need that any more—that the present colonel is quite happy to remain a colonel. I say somebody should be there. That is the special thing.

On those two things, I would appreciate your comments.

The Chairman: Mr. Minister, before you answer, I want you to know that Mr. Stan Darling is a fighter for that, and he has the support of all the committee.

Mr. Blais: You mean on the women generals.

[Translation]

M. Darling: Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président.

J'aimerais d'abord féliciter mon voisin à la Chambre pour sa nouvelle responsabilité comme ministre de la Défense nationale. J'ai été ravi de recevoir copie de son discours du 17 novembre. Je portais un intérêt particulier à ce discours, et je regrette de ne pas l'avoir entendu en détail. J'ai pris note des divers commentaires.

J'ai été surpris d'une chose, monsieur le ministre. À la page 18, vous parlez de la puissance de nos forces armées, vous dites qu'elles sont bien entraînées et respectées pour leur efficacité. Je pense que nous sommes tous d'accord qu'elles sont les meilleures. Je suis d'accord. Maintenant, vous me jetez un coup d'oeil perplexe.

M. Blais: Ce sont des mots très sages.

M. Darling: Oui, mais je me pose une question sur cette dernière phrase sage:

Et cet uniforme vert et unique, si controversé au moment où il a été introduit, est maintenant un point de distinction et une source de fierté consciente.

Monsieur le ministre, n'êtes-vous pas d'avis que vous auriez dû dire une source de fierté inconsciente? Monsieur le ministre, votre maison se trouve dans la même ville où est située l'administration centrale du NORAD, je suis très au courant de North Bay, et je suis peut-être un petit peu contre cet uniforme vert. J'aime les uniformes distincts, surtout dans un ministère donné, et je constate que beaucoup de personnes ici portent les insignes des Forces aériennes. Mais je ne vois pas le commodore Healey, et j'espère que nous pourrions éliminer un trait distinctif particulier, c'est-à-dire que nous avons la seule marine au monde qui porte un uniforme vert.

Le président: Mettez-les en rouge bientôt.

M. Darling: Le bleu marine, un point c'est tout.

J'ai déjà posé cette question auparavant, c'est-à-dire que sur environ 81,000 militaires nous avons 100 généraux ou à peu près, c'est-à-dire une proportion de 1 sur 800. Monsieur le ministre, puisque c'est la première fois que vous êtes ici, je vais vous demander... Vous pourriez gagner une étoile spéciale sur votre couronne, parce que...

M. Blais: Je serais content de quelques cheveux.

M. Darling: D'accord. Je vous demande encore, et le Général Theriault sait exactement ce que je veux demander, quand est-ce que vous allez reconnaître l'importance des femmes dans vos Forces armées et nommer une femme général, ou l'équivalent? Le rang le plus élevé qu'a atteint une femme, c'est le rang de colonel. On m'a dit, et je n'ai pas besoin de l'entendre de nouveau, que le colonel actuel est très content de rester colonel. Il faut avoir une femme général.

J'aimerais entendre vos commentaires sur ces deux choses.

Le président: Monsieur le ministre, avant de répondre, je dois vous faire savoir que M. Stan Darling lutte pour cette nomination, et il a le soutien de tout le Comité.

M. Blais: Vous voulez dire des femmes généraux.

[Texte]

The Chairman: On the question of women in the armed forces. Again we see the sea of men accompanying you. I would not blame you, but it is the wish of the committee, the wish of all members, to see that an improvement takes place there.

Mr. Blais: I am very pleased, because, Mr. Darling, if I might be so formal, if you have reviewed some of my statements, I have indicated that it is my intention to have a general officer who is a woman appointed during my period as Minister of National Defence. Of course, I intend fully to be Minister of National Defence after the next election. But having said that...

Mr. Darling: That is going to be unusual.

Mr. Blais: —but having said that, I have made that statement. I was not aware that you had been an advocate of that position, nor that this committee had been, but I am very pleased to receive that sort of support from members of the committee, and I would like to underline that support having been received for the superior officers within the Canadian forces. That is a subject I have raised with my officials, and it is one I hold to heart.

That is the good news, Stan.

• 1235

The bad news is, as far as you are concerned, I have looked at the question of distinctive uniforms, and I am aware of the pressure that is coming from certain quarters, primarily outside of the forces relating to the return to the navy blue, and I have addressed that question in the House, and I have said that upon consideration I feel that we are not going to take a retrograde step in that regard. The unification of the Canadian forces is working very well. It is permitting us to effect the increase in our capital program that we have been able to experience since 1974, while maintaining a very high level of income for our personnel as well. Our forces, our military, are the highest paid in the world and they benefit from the availability of funds that are made available as the result of the savings that we have effected through unification.

There has been, as you know, the Fyffe report that was commissioned by my predecessor in the Clark government. We have reviewed that issue, and I am satisfied that the decision we have taken is the proper one.

In terms of the distinctiveness of the uniform, it is distinctive.

Mr. Darling: It sure as hell is.

Mr. Blais: Stan, you and I have participated in the November 11 ceremonies now for a long period of time. I can tell you that the pride with which that uniform is worn in those parades, and the way that the uniform is displayed by those personnel who wear it on every parade that I have had the pleasure of participating in, is an indication that it is not only unconscious pride, it is conscious pride for that uniform and its distinctive nature. It is typically Canadian and we ought to crow about it right off the rooftops, as opposed to taking some

[Traduction]

Le président: Sur la question du rôle des femmes dans les Forces armées. Nous constatons encore une fois que nous sommes inondés d'hommes. Je ne vous blâme pas, mais c'est le désir du Comité et le désir de tous les membres de voir une amélioration.

M. Blais: Je suis très content, car, monsieur Darling, si vous avez lu mes déclarations, j'ai dit que j'ai l'intention de nommer une femme officier général pendant mon mandat de ministre de la Défense nationale. C'est évident que j'ai la pleine intention de rester ministre de la Défense nationale après la prochaine élection. Mais cela dit...

M. Darling: Ce sera un peu anormal.

M. Blais: ... cela dit, j'ai fait cette déclaration. Je n'étais pas au courant du fait que vous luttez pour cette nomination, ni le Comité aussi, mais je suis très content de recevoir l'appui des membres de ce Comité, et je dois souligner que j'ai reçu l'appui des officiers supérieurs dans les Forces canadiennes. J'ai déjà soulevé ce sujet avec les fonctionnaires, et j'y tiens.

Ce sont les bonnes nouvelles, Stan.

Mais voici une nouvelle qui vous enchantera moins; j'ai étudié la question des uniformes distinctifs; je suis au courant des pressions exercées par certaines personnes, dont la plupart ne font pas partie des Forces armées, et qui insistent pour que l'on reprenne les uniformes bleu marine; j'ai soulevé la question à la Chambre en disant qu'à la suite d'une étude, nous avions décidé de ne pas revenir en arrière. L'unification des Forces armées donne de très bons résultats. Elle nous a permis, depuis 1974, d'augmenter notre programme de dépenses, tout en assurant un niveau de salaire très élevé pour le personnel qui compte parmi les membres des Forces armées les mieux rémunérés au monde et ils ont pu bénéficier des économies réalisées grâce à l'unification.

Comme vous le savez, mon prédécesseur dans le gouvernement Clark avait commandé l'étude Fyffe. Nous avons étudié la question et je suis convaincu que notre décision est la bonne.

Quant à l'uniforme, il se distingue.

M. Darling: Diable, oui!

M. Blais: Stan, vous et moi participons aux cérémonies du 11 novembre depuis longtemps. Dans ce genre de défilé auquel j'ai eu l'honneur de participer, les militaires portent cet uniforme avec une fierté manifeste qui témoigne du caractère distinctif de l'uniforme. L'uniforme est typiquement canadien et il devrait être une source de très grande fierté, il ne faudrait pas prendre une attitude négative par rapport à une caractéristique très distinctive des Forces canadiennes.

[Text]

sort of negative attitude towards that very, very distinctive mark of the Canadian forces.

I, for one, am very pleased and very proud with the way the Canadian forces are displaying both the symbolism of their distinctiveness and that indication that they have of their competence and their high level of professionalism.

Mr. Darling: Thank you very much, Mr. Minister. Certainly they wear the uniform with pride. They would create quite a sensation if they did not wear their uniforms on parade.

Mr. Blais: Stan, do not make light of it. The question is that...

Mr. Darling: No, I certainly am not, J.J.

Mr. Blais: Yes, but the fact is that if you had a situation where the uniform was not worn with pride, if they did not like the uniform, it would be manifest in the way they deported themselves. You look at the way the military are turned out, they are all well turned out...

An hon. Member: Not bad.

Mr. Blais: —all the time, and they have a uniform that does not belong to anybody else. It belongs to Canada and to Canadians, and I am proud of it.

Mr. Darling: One other question, Mr. Chairman. It has been brought to our attention, and you received a copy of this letter dated October 10 from a Mrs. Diane Robinson. It is regarding a very tragic accident, and I would like to put these questions regarding the action of the department after this accident at Lac La Biche, Alberta, September 30, where three young soldiers, reservists, were killed. I and members of the committee are indebted to Mrs. Diane Robinson of Lousana, Alberta, who was a neighbour and friend of Mr. and Mrs. Ian McKinnon whose son was one of the soldiers tragically killed. They lost their 17-year old son, Rick, in this accident.

Mr. Minister, in light of these revelations have you done, or will you do anything to investigate the rather callous, if not, incompetent handling of this tragic incident?

I would like to point out that Mrs. Robinson has also written to you, to her member of Parliament, to the Prime Minister, and to the Leader of Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition. Has anything been done to establish why the department acted in the way it did, which we certainly think was without compassion and certainly little or no sensitivity? We were wondering if you, Mr. Minister, will provide the names and addresses of the families of the two other deceased.

Now, some of the questions were: Why was an army padre not the one to inform the parents of their son's decease?

• 1240

Why was the family kept in limbo for a day and a half waiting on pins and needles to hear when their son's body would be sent to Red Deer...

[Translation]

Pour ma part, je suis heureux de voir les membres des Forces armées porter cet uniforme symbolique qui témoigne de leur compétence et de leur très grand professionnalisme.

M. Darling: Merci beaucoup, monsieur le ministre. Bien sûr, ils portent l'uniforme avec fierté. Ce serait un scandale s'ils ne le portaient pas au cours d'un défilé.

M. Blais: Stan, ne prenez pas cela à la légère. Il s'agit de...

M. Darling: Non, je ne le prends certainement pas à la légère, Jean-Jacques.

M. Blais: D'accord; mais si l'uniforme n'était pas porté avec fierté, si les militaires n'aimaient pas l'uniforme, on le verrait à leur comportement. L'uniforme sied aux militaires, à tous les militaires...

Une voix: Il n'est pas mal.

M. Blais: ... et ils ont un uniforme qui leur est propre. C'est l'uniforme du Canada et des Canadiens, et j'en suis fier.

M. Darling: Une autre question, monsieur le président. Nous avons été saisis d'une question. Vous avez reçu copie d'une lettre de M^{me} Diane Robinson datée du 10 novembre. Elle relate un accident tragique et j'aimerais poser des questions au sujet des mesures prises par le ministère à la suite de cet accident survenu à Lac La Biche, en Alberta, le 30 septembre; trois jeunes réservistes ont été tués. Les membres du Comité et moi-même avons une dette envers M^{me} Diane Robinson de Lousana, en Alberta; elle est voisine et amie de M. et M^{me} Ian McKinnon dont le fils était l'un des soldats qui ont connu cette fin tragique. Les McKinnon ont perdu Rick, leur fils de 17 ans, dans cet accident.

Monsieur le ministre, à la lumière de ces faits, avez-vous demandé ou demanderez-vous qu'il soit procédé à une enquête pour savoir comment l'on a pu procéder de façon si indélicate, voire incompétente, à la suite de cet accident tragique?

Je signale que M^{me} Robinson a adressé des lettres à vous, à son député, au premier ministre et au chef de l'Opposition loyale de Sa Majesté. A-t-on cherché à savoir pourquoi l'on a agi comme on l'a fait, sans compassion et avec peu ou pas de sensibilité? Monsieur le ministre, est-ce que vous pouvez nous donner les noms et adresses des familles des deux autres victimes?

Voici quelles sont les autres questions: pourquoi l'aumônier de l'armée n'a-t-il pas lui-même avisé les parents de la mort de leur fils?

Pourquoi la famille a-t-elle dû attendre anxieusement pendant un jour et demi pour savoir quand on enverrait à Red Deer le corps de leur fils...

[Texte]

Then it goes on: "Why did the army personnel keep making making promises and then they turned around and broke them." For instance, they were told they could see their son's remains on a certain day, and they arrived there and then were told, no, they would have to wait almost another 24 hours.

Now, I do not want to take too long on this, Mr. Minister, but I would hope you would look into this—and I am quite sure you will—and provide satisfactory answers to the committee and also to the parents of this young man and the parents of the other two as well.

Mr. Blais: Mr. Chairman, the first thing I want to say is that, whenever events such as the Lac La Biche event takes place, of course it imposes upon the families of the deceased an immense amount of pressure. Of course, the level of bereavement is very high because you are dealing with young people, usually, in full state of health, and it comes as a shock, especially in peacetime. So therefore, there is immense pressure within the families themselves.

That imposes on the Department of National Defence and all the personnel a very, very heavy burden to deal with each one of these instances and with all the bereaved with the utmost sensitivity, and that is the policy that is implemented. I have reviewed the policy and I have reviewed the methods that are utilized, and I find our approach relating to advising the next of kin is beyond reproach. Mr. Blaikie has himself, at the beginning of this meeting, identified how he was satisfied with what has taken place.

Now, in any system or in any method that is identified, there is bound to be from time to time some perception on the part of the bereaved of the sort of lack of sensitivity which that letter has attempted to describe. I have looked into it. That matter was raised in the House, if you recall, by Gordon Towers, if my memory serves. Gordon raised the issue, and it was subsequently a matter of a late show intervention. At that time, there was an explanation of the events from the point of view of the military and from the Department of National Defence.

I have reviewed those events. They were a series of unavoidable *contretemps* that led to the complaints that have come forward. Having said and having recognized that there were some *contretemps*, I am still satisfied that the best efforts were utilized on the part of the Department of National Defence in contacting the next of kin, in attempting to satisfy the requests of the next of kin and of the bereaved. However, there is always room for improvement in certain instances, and of course, we communicate with all our personnel on a regular basis—and we are doing it through this exercise now—the necessity of exhibiting at all times the utmost in sensitivity and concern for those people involved.

Mr. Darling: Mr. Minister, you have the letter dated October 30, with the questions documented. Could you provide the parents, and I presume, the neighbour, who has written the letter, with the answer to those questions? I just wanted to bring it up and present it to you so it would at least be documented and something could be looked into in further detail.

[Traduction]

Puis, on demande: «Pourquoi le personnel de l'armée a-t-il continué à faire des promesses et à ne jamais respecter ses engagements?» Par exemple, on a dit aux parents qu'ils pourraient voir leur fils à une certaine date; ils s'y sont rendus; on leur a dit qu'ils devaient attendre à peu près 24 heures encore.

Or, je ne veux pas m'éterniser sur ce point, monsieur le ministre; mais j'espère, je suis convaincu que vous étudierez la question, que vous donnerez des réponses satisfaisantes au Comité et aux parents de ce jeune homme et aux parents des deux autres victimes.

M. Blais: Monsieur le président, tout d'abord, permettez-moi de dire que des événements comme celui survenu au Lac La Biche suscitent toujours beaucoup de tension chez les familles éprouvées. Bien entendu, le deuil est d'autant plus grand qu'il s'agit de jeunes personnes qui sont en principe en pleine santé; pareil accident cause un choc, d'autant plus que nous ne sommes pas en temps de guerre. Par conséquent, la famille est très tendue.

Le ministère de la Défense nationale et ses fonctionnaires ont donc la très lourde tâche de communiquer avec toutes les personnes éprouvées en faisant preuve de la plus grande sensibilité possible; c'est la politique du ministère. J'ai étudié à nouveau cette politique, j'ai étudié les mesures auxquelles on a fait appel; j'en ai conclu que nous avons averti les familles immédiates d'une façon irréprochable. Par ailleurs, M. Blaikie, au début de cette réunion, a lui-même dit qu'il était satisfait de la façon dont on avait agi.

Or, quels que soient le système ou les mesures utilisés, de temps à autre, les personnes éprouvées auront l'impression qu'on s'est conduit envers eux d'une façon indelicat; cette lettre tend à le démontrer. J'ai étudié la question. Vous vous souviendrez que Gordon Towers, il me semble, l'a soulevée à la Chambre. Gordon mettait surtout l'accent sur les retards ou l'intervention tardive. A ce moment-là, l'explication donnée tenait compte des points de vue des militaires et des fonctionnaires du ministère de la Défense nationale.

J'ai étudié à nouveau ces événements. Il y a eu une série de *contretemps* inévitables, ce qui explique le genre de plaintes formulées. Je reconnais qu'il y a eu certains *contretemps*; toutefois, je reconnais encore que les fonctionnaires du ministère ont déployé tous les efforts possibles pour communiquer avec les familles et répondre aux besoins des familles et des personnes en deuil. Toutefois, il y a souvent lieu d'améliorer certaines choses; bien entendu, nous tentons régulièrement d'inculquer à notre personnel, comme on le fait maintenant, le souci de faire preuve d'une très grande sensibilité envers les personnes éprouvées.

M. Darling: Monsieur le ministre, vous avez reçu une lettre datée du 30 octobre qui soulève les questions. Ne pourriez-vous pas communiquer avec les parents ou avec la voisine qui a rédigé la lettre, pour répondre aux questions? Si j'ai soulevé cela, c'était pour prouver que la question a été soulevée et qu'on l'étudierait davantage.

[Text]

Mr. Blais: Yes, of course, Mr. Darling.

The Chairman: Thank you both.

Now, I have finished the first *tour*. It is customary in this committee, if a member who is not a member wants to question, that I recognize him at the last of the first *tour*. But I must say, keeping record, that Mr. Blaikie, who is the official critic for the NDP, had given ample time. He sent me a note saying he took only eight minutes out of his fifteen that I usually give for the first *tour*.

So if you would see fit, I would allow another member of his party who is not a member today of the committee, Mr. Svend Robinson, to ask a question or two. Then I will go for a second *tour* with Mr. Wenman, and we will adjourn to next Tuesday for Minister Regan, unless others indicate they would like to question. Do you agree?

So Mr. Svend Robinson, the hon. member for Burnaby in British Columbia.

Mr. Robinson (Burnaby): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should thank the committee as well for its indulgence in order to ask a couple of questions.

• 1245

My questions, Mr. Minister, through the Chair, relate to the Canadian force's policy, Order 1920, regarding the treatment of homosexuals and lesbians within the Canadian Armed Forces. The minister may be aware of the fact that I raised a similar matter at another meeting of this committee before his predecessor concerning a young woman who was harassed and who was in fact subject to lengthy investigation and treated in many ways like a criminal because of an allegation, which turned out to be unfounded, that she was a lesbian. She is no longer in the forces.

Since I raised this issue in this committee about a year or more ago I have received many letters from current members of the armed forces, as well as former members of the forces—at many different ranks, I might add—who have detailed the personal trauma and hardship that this particular policy, which I regard as an offensive and degrading policy, has caused them in their lives.

In one case, for example, the SIU read through personal letters of an individual in question, and then contacted all of the people who were named in those letters. I have spoken, Mr. Chairman, through you to the minister, to base chaplains who have talked of attempted suicides and actual suicides as a result of the hardship caused by this policy.

Mr. Minister, I would suggest to you through the Chair that surely the time has come when members of the armed forces should be judged on their merits and their merits alone. I might add that many of the individuals who have contacted me have outstanding records in the armed forces, and they should not be judged in any way on the basis of their sexual orientation. I have spoken as well, I might add, with a number of senior officials within the minister's department since I first

[Translation]

M. Blais: Oui, bien sûr, monsieur Darling.

Le président: Je vous remercie tous les deux.

Cela met fin au premier tour. Dans ce Comité, nous avons l'habitude de céder la parole à la fin du premier tour aux membres du Comité qui ne sont pas députés. Mais je tiens à préciser que M. Blaikie, le porte-parole officiel du NPD, a été généreux. Il m'a envoyé une note selon laquelle il n'a pris que huit minutes des quinze que j'accorde habituellement pour le premier tour.

Alors, si vous le permettez, je donnerai à un autre membre de son parti qui n'est pas membre du Comité proprement dit, M. Svend Robinson, de poser une question ou deux. Puis, M. Wenman commencera un deuxième tour de questions; ensuite nous leverons la séance jusqu'à mardi prochain où nous accueillerons le ministre Regan, à moins que d'autres membres du Comité ne veuillent prendre la parole. Êtes-vous d'accord?

Bien; je cède maintenant la parole à M. Svend Robinson, l'honorable député de Burnaby en Colombie-Britannique.

M. Robinson (Burnaby): Merci, monsieur le président. Je remercie les membres du Comité de me permettre de poser une ou deux questions.

Monsieur le ministre, ma question porte sur l'ordonnance 1920 des Forces armées concernant le traitement réservé aux homosexuels et aux lesbiennes au sein des Forces armées canadiennes. Le ministre sait peut-être que j'ai soulevé une question semblable à une autre réunion de ce Comité avant que lui-même ne soit nommé ministre; il s'agissait d'une jeune femme qui était harcelée ou qui faisait l'objet d'une enquête prolongée et qui était ni plus ni moins traitée de criminelle car on l'avait dite lesbienne, allégation qui avait été réfutée par la suite. Elle ne fait plus partie des Forces.

J'ai soulevé cette question à une réunion de ce Comité il y a un peu plus d'un an; depuis, j'ai reçu bon nombre de lettres de membres actuels ou d'anciens membres des forces armées, de personnes de divers rangs, qui m'exposent les traumatismes et les difficultés suscités par la politique en question, que j'estime choquante et humiliante.

Dans un cas, par exemple, l'unité des enquêtes spéciales a parcouru les lettres personnelles d'un individu; puis, on a communiqué avec toutes les personnes nommées dans ces lettres. Monsieur le président, j'ai discuté avec des aumôniers des bases qui m'ont parlé de tentatives de suicide ou de suicides liés aux difficultés suscitées par cette politique.

Monsieur le ministre, il me semble que l'heure est sans doute venue de juger les membres des forces armées en nous fondant uniquement sur leurs mérites personnels. Je vous signale que bon nombre des personnes qui ont communiqué avec moi ont une cote excellente; il ne faudrait pas du tout tenir compte de leur orientation sexuelle. Par ailleurs, j'ai discuté avec un certain nombre de hauts fonctionnaires du ministère depuis; on semble beaucoup appuyer l'idée d'une révision de cette politique.

[Texte]

raised this question, and there would appear to be a good deal of sympathy for a review of this policy.

I would like to ask the minister then, given the personal hardship caused to many individuals—both within the forces, who fear dismissal in the event of this fact becoming known, or those others who have suffered such hardship—is the minister prepared to indicate what the basis is for this present policy? More importantly, would he be prepared to undertake a thorough review of this outdated policy and put an end to what certainly many of us consider to be a very glaring injustice?

The Chairman: Mr. Minister.

Mr. Blais: Mr. Chairman, I have had occasion to deal with this issue before. It is one I have looked at very seriously, because in effect I, like the honourable gentleman, am very concerned about sensitivities and the potential for discrimination that can take place as a result of a large number of reasons, including sexual orientation.

However, having reviewed the policy, I am not of the view that there is a need to change that policy. The role of the military, of course, is a very specific one; it involves operations that are very demanding in circumstances that are unusual. On an operational basis we have considered the question of sexual orientation, and find that it would be contrary to the very vocation of the military forces to accept a change in the policy so as to permit homosexuality to be an acceptable, evident, and commonplace characteristic that would find itself within the forces. I am of that view; I am still of that view. Unfortunately, the honourable gentleman may feel that is a tendency toward discrimination. That is not the intent. The intent here is to provide for the operational requirements of a military institution. There is to be no change in the policy.

Mr. Robinson (Burnaby): Could the minister indicate in what way homosexuality or lesbianism could in any way interfere with the the tough requirements for demanding operations in unusual circumstances? What possible relationship could there be between one's sexual orientation and one's ability to perform tough military operations?

Mr. Blais: It may not have anything to do with the ability to perform a given task. It is a fact, though, that a military context is a context where there has to be an interchange between individuals, and heterosexuality is really the normal environment within which our society lives. In that context there tends to be negative reaction that comes from the presence of homosexuals within a given context, and that creates discipline problems and it creates operational problems, and that is why we want to avoid it as much as is humanly possible.

• 1250

Mr. Robinson (Burnaby): Could the minister clarify what he is saying? What sorts of problems could arise in a disciplinary sense in the presence of homosexuals or lesbians who are otherwise outstanding soldiers within the armed forces? What possible problems could arise?

[Traduction]

Vu les difficultés personnelles que doivent supporter bon nombre de membres actuels des forces armées qui craignent d'être remerciés de leurs services si leur orientation sexuelle est révélée, vu le nombre de personnes qui ont déjà subi les conséquences de cette politique, le ministre est-il disposé à nous expliquer le principe qui sous-tend la politique actuelle? Et même, ce qui est plus important, est-il disposé à entreprendre une étude approfondie de cette politique désuète pour supprimer ce que bon nombre d'entre nous estiment être une injustice flagrante?

Le président: Monsieur le ministre.

M. Blais: Monsieur le président, j'ai déjà discuté de cette question. Je l'ai étudiée de façon sérieuse car, à l'instar de l'honorable député, je me préoccupe beaucoup des sensibilités et des possibilités de discrimination fondée sur toutes sortes de motifs, y compris l'orientation sexuelle.

Toutefois, à la lumière des études que j'ai entreprises, je ne suis pas d'avis qu'il soit nécessaire de modifier la politique. Bien entendu, le rôle des militaires est très précis: les militaires doivent participer à des activités très exigeantes dans des circonstances peu communes. Nous avons étudié la question de l'orientation sexuelle dans ce contexte; nous avons conclu qu'il serait contraire à la vocation même des forces militaires d'accepter toute modification à la politique qui permettrait aux homosexuels d'être acceptés, reconnus et nombreux dans les forces armées. Je suis toujours du même avis. Malheureusement, l'honorable député estime peut-être que j'ai des tendances discriminatoires. La question n'est pas là. Il s'agit de respecter les exigences d'activités entreprises dans un cadre militaire. On ne doit pas modifier cette politique.

M. Robinson (Burnaby): Le ministre peut-il nous dire comment l'homosexualité ou le lesbianisme pourrait être en contradiction avec les exigences rigoureuses des dures activités dans des circonstances exceptionnelles? Quel rapport peut-il bien y avoir entre l'orientation sexuelle et l'aptitude à participer à des activités militaires rigoureuses?

M. Blais: Cela n'a peut-être rien à voir avec l'aptitude à participer à une activité donnée. Il n'en demeure pas moins que dans un contexte militaire, il faut assurer un climat d'interrelations et nous vivons dans un cadre social hétérosexuel. Dans un contexte donné, la présence d'homosexuels suscite une réaction négative; elle soulève des problèmes de discipline qui se répercutent sur les activités; dans la mesure du possible, nous voulons éviter cette situation.

M. Robinson (Burnaby): Le ministre pourrait-il nous donner plus de précisions? Quelles sortes de problèmes de discipline la présence d'homosexuels ou de lesbiennes pourrait-elle soulever si ces mêmes personnes sont considérées comme d'excellents

[Text]

Mr. Blais: When you are dealing with males in a context of relative isolation, aboard submarines or on board ships or in isolated posts, I just put it to you that if one heterosexual male is approached by a homosexual male in such an environment it tends to create difficulties. If the honourable gentleman wishes for me to be more explicit, I am sure that I could be; but I am sure that the honourable gentleman recognizes that it creates confrontations, and those confrontations lead sometimes to some physical reactions, some physical violence, which is not conducive to the making of some proper discipline within units.

Mr. Robinson (Burnaby): Mr. Chairman, surely the minister recognizes that steps can be taken to prevent unwanted advances within the armed forces. There are women, as I understand it, who are members of the armed forces as well, and it is theoretically within the realm of possibility that women might be approached on a sexual basis as well, but the minister has not used this as a rationale for excluding women from the armed forces. How on earth can the minister suggest that it is any more likely that homosexuals are going to be making sexual advances on men or lesbians on women than it is that heterosexuals are going to be making similar advances on women?

Mr. Blais: That is true. We have methods to prevent harassment by males of females, or vice versa in certain instances. The question is, however, that the honourable gentleman will recognize that operationally we will not put women in situations where they become, because of proximity to males, subject to harassment on an ongoing basis. However, you cannot do that when you are dealing with the male of the species because the differences are not often very evident as between sexual orientation, whether it is homosexual or heterosexual, and in that context you may have males within one context and you have no knowledge that one of them may be a homosexual and it creates the difficulties that I have described.

I am not speaking of something that is dealt with lightly. This is as a result of long experience within the military dealing with tendencies that have occurred in the past of homosexuality within the heterosexual male environment. We are not dealing with something that is just arising as a result of your bringing up the question. Homosexuality within males, even though it is not commonplace within the military, has taken place before and has created disciplinary problems.

Mr. Robinson (Burnaby): Mr. Chairman, the effect of this policy, which is, in my view, absolutely disgraceful in this day and age, is simply to ensure that those homosexuals and lesbians who are within the armed forces can continue to live in an atmosphere of increased trauma, and I think the minister should be ashamed actually to defend this policy in the terms in which he has attempted . . .

Mr. Blais: I am not ashamed at all.

Mr. Robinson (Burnaby): —to defend it.

[Translation]

membres des Forces armées? De quel genre de problèmes parle-t-il?

M. Blais: Souvent, les hommes doivent vivre dans une situation d'isolation relative, à bord de sous-marins ou de navires ou même dans des endroits éloignés; vous pouvez vous imaginer les difficultés qui seraient créées si un homosexuel accostait un hétérosexuel. Si l'honorable député veut de plus amples précisions, je pourrai lui en donner; mais il conviendrait sans doute que la situation pourrait donner lieu à des conflits, conflits qui pourraient dégénérer en violence; cela n'aidait en rien à maintenir une bonne discipline dans les unités.

M. Robinson (Burnaby): Monsieur le président, le ministre reconnaît sans doute qu'on peut prendre des mesures pour éviter de pareilles avances dans les Forces armées. On trouve également des femmes dans les Forces armées, si je ne m'abuse; on peut supposer qu'on puisse également s'intéresser à elles sur le plan sexuel; et pourtant, le ministre n'a pas évoqué cette raison pour exclure les femmes des Forces armées. Comment le ministre peut-il prétendre qu'il est plus probable qu'un homosexuel abordera un hétérosexuel ou une lesbienne une hétérosexuelle que les hétérosexuels les femmes membres des Forces armées?

M. Blais: C'est vrai. Nous avons des moyens pour empêcher les hommes de harceler les femmes ou vice versa. Toutefois, l'honorable député reconnaîtra que dans nos opérations, nous ne plaçons pas des femmes dans des situations qui, en raison de la proximité des hommes, pourraient les exposer à un harcèlement continu. Toutefois, on ne peut pas procéder ainsi lorsqu'il s'agit uniquement d'hommes, car on ne peut pas deviner l'orientation sexuelle de chaque individu; dans ce contexte, il est possible de trouver un homosexuel parmi un groupe d'hommes et sa présence créerait des problèmes, comme je l'ai dit.

Nous n'avons pas pris de décision à la légère. Nous avons tenu compte de la longue expérience des militaires qui tiennent compte de ce que l'on a observé par le passé lorsqu'un homosexuel était placé parmi un groupe d'hommes hétérosexuels. Vous savez, ce n'est pas uniquement parce que vous avez soulevé cette question que nous l'avons étudiée. Même si l'homosexualité n'est pas monnaie courante chez les militaires, nous avons déjà compté des homosexuels parmi nos rangs; leur présence a créé des problèmes de discipline.

M. Robinson (Burnaby): Monsieur le président, cette politique tout à fait humiliante dans le contexte social actuel n'a qu'un but: faire en sorte que les homosexuels et les lesbiennes qui sont actuellement dans les Forces armées puissent continuer de vivre dans une situation encore plus traumatisante; il me semble que le ministre devrait avoir honte de défendre cette politique, étant donné qu'il a tenté . . .

M. Blais: Je ne ressens aucune honte.

M. Robinson (Burnaby): . . . de la défendre.

[Texte]

My final question relates to a separate issue, and that is with respect to the Communications Security Establishment. Would the minister indicate to this committee what the purpose and nature of the Communications Security Establishment is, whether in fact it intercepts Canadian communications and what the total number of members of that body is as well as its annual budget?

Mr. Blais: On the CSE, this matter has been dealt with by my colleague before the Senate committee reviewing Bill C-157. He identified there that the CSE has a role to offer advice on the protection of federal communications and is involved as well in signals intelligence. Beyond that, there has been an indication in the past that the activities are of a highly sensitive nature and deal with the protection of Canada's sovereignty and its national security and are not subject of further comment either in terms of budget or of personnel.

• 1255

Mr. Robinson (Burnaby): Thank you.

The Chairman: I, unfortunately, saw him as having questioned but you only had a supplementary question so I took you as having been questioning. I always like to be gracious to all members so, if Mr. Wenman would not mind, I will recognize and will adjourn because I see everybody is getting impatient, but I ask for patience only once a year. It is not abusing of the time of ministers or high officials. The hon. member for Haldimand—Norfolk, Mr. Bradley. Most likely, if we all agree, we could adjourn. We will see. Please be brief, Mr. Bradley. I apologize.

Mr. Bradley: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have quite a few questions I would like to ask but I will not. I will zero in on one area that is a major concern to me at the present time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Minister, in considering the fact that the naval program at the present time puts us in a position of having six new frigates under construction, which I applaud the government for, and also having some refitting of our present vessels, this will put us, in the 1990s, in a position where we have, effectively, some 10 to 12 or maybe 15, at the outside, effective fighting units when the frigate program is completed. I wonder if the minister could look into his 15-year forecast ball and tell us what he has in plans, personally, for the Canadian navy. I would like him to address directly whether we will be continuing on the present frigate program, constructing more after the initial six, whether we will be putting our attention to the NATO frigate program, which I understand we are a signatory of, and whether or not he proposes us to become involved in a submarine or an anti-mine role of hunting and sweeping mines.

Mr. Blais: First of all, it is not only my decision, nor only the government's decision, in terms of what the Canadian forces role will be in the Maritime Command. It is also a question of what role is assigned to us within the NATO

[Traduction]

Je veux soulever une tout autre question qui porte sur le Centre de la sécurité des communications. Le ministre pourrait-il nous dire quels sont le but et la nature de ce Centre de la sécurité des communications et nous expliquer s'il chevauche le Service canadien des communications; par ailleurs, combien de personnes y sont embauchées et quel est son budget annuel?

M. Blais: Mon collègue a discuté du CST lorsqu'il a comparu devant un comité du Sénat étudiant le projet de loi C-157. Il a dit que le CST doit donner des conseils au sujet de la protection des communications fédérales; ce centre s'intéresse également à des opérations de décodage. Par le passé, on a indiqué que ces opérations très délicates visent à protéger la souveraineté et la sécurité canadiennes et, par conséquent, le personnel ne doit pas en discuter et elles ne doivent pas être discutées dans le cadre de l'étude du budget.

M. Robinson (Burnaby): Merci.

Le président: Malheureusement, je l'ai vu poser des questions, mais vous n'aviez qu'une question supplémentaire et j'ai pensé que vous étiez déjà intervenu. Je tiens toujours à faire preuve de bonne volonté envers tous les membres du Comité et avec la permission de M. Wenman, je lui accorderai la parole et nous leverons ensuite la séance parce que je vois que tout le monde s'impatiente et que je ne vous demande votre patience qu'une seule fois par an. Nous ne voudrions pas abuser du temps du ministre ni des hauts fonctionnaires. Le député de Haldimand—Norfolk, monsieur Bradley. Si vous êtes tous d'accord, nous pourrions ensuite lever sans doute la séance. Nous verrons. Je vous prierais d'être bref, monsieur Bradley. Je m'en excuse.

M. Bradley: Merci, monsieur le président.

Je pourrais poser un certain nombre de questions, mais je m'en tiendrai à un seul domaine qui me préoccupe beaucoup actuellement, monsieur le président.

Monsieur le ministre, étant donné qu'en vertu du programme naval actuel, nous aurons six nouvelles frégates en construction, ce dont je félicite le gouvernement, et que nous ferons aussi moderniser nos bâtiments actuels, dans les années 1990, nous aurons en fait quelque 10, 12 ou peut-être 15 unités de combat efficaces lorsque le programme des frégates sera terminé. Le ministre pourrait-il envisager ces prévisions pour les quinze prochaines années à venir et nous dire si, pour sa part, il a certains plans concernant la Marine canadienne. Pourrait-il nous dire si nous allons poursuivre notre programme actuel relatif aux frégates, et en construire plus que les six déjà prévues, si nous allons nous intéresser au programme des frégates de l'OTAN, dont je crois savoir que nous sommes signataires, et s'il propose que nous ayons des activités sous-marines ou antimines pour le balayage et le dragage des mines.

M. Blais: Tout d'abord, le rôle des Forces canadiennes dans le commandement maritime ne relève pas seulement ni de ma décision ni de celle du gouvernement. Cela fait aussi intervenir le rôle qui nous est confié dans le cadre de l'OTAN, question

[Text]

context, and that, of course, is something that is constantly under review between my officials and NATO officials. As you know, we have got the Anti-Submarine Warfare role now that has been given to us. We are complying with that commitment in terms of the Long-Range Patrol Aircraft and the construction of the frigates, the TRUMP update as well as the DELEX. But I do take issue with the hon. gentleman when he states that we will only have 15 frigates by the 1990s. It is always our intention to maintain 20 frigates in service. We will be maintaining those 20 frigates in service. We will be modernizing and replacing those frigates on a ongoing basis. This is fully the intention of my department and, indeed, of the government.

In terms of other roles, of course, the question of submarine roles is something that is under consideration and under review on an ongoing basis. In effect, technology is developing to such an extent that submersibles have a tendency of offering less of a target than surface fleets. That is something again that is self-evident to one who has little knowledge of navy strategy as I said, coming from Lake Nipissing, just north of Parry Sound. It becomes evident that with a higher ability to pinpoint missiles and with the Exocet experience in the Falklands and so on, there is a review that is ongoing in terms of utilization of maritime forces. In that context, I do not want to go any further than what I have said, except to say to you that we are meeting commitments, we will continue to meet commitments and we are in constant consultation with NATO allies.

Mr. Bradley: A short supplementary, Mr. Chairman.

One of my concerns is that I think the harbour master in Hamilton harbour on some days can send more vessels out through the mouth of the harbour than the admiral of the fleet is allowed to send out through Halifax. The minister mentioned we are going to maintain the fighting ships in the forces through replacement, through attrition. I would like to know whether he plans on doing this through the Canadian Frigate Continuation Program construction or through a NATO frigate program. Secondly, he did not address the point I asked about the anti-mine role considering the Soviets can now assault harbours by air, surface or subsurface vessels. Since the Falklands . . . has shown us that we cannot rely only on the roles we are given by NATO, is any active consideration being given to some sort of anti-mine role in the Canadian Navy?

• 1300

Mr. Blais: We have, on a biennial basis, a review of the technology in terms of mine identification, mine sweeping and mine removal. We have, as you know, within our research and development establishment, a capacity and an ongoing program to develop magnetic readings, sonar readings in relation to the presence of objects including mines. As you know, that is, again, a technology that is in full flight, in full evolution and it may well be that we would be able to remove mines and to sweep mines with substantially reduced investments. We are at the study stage, on an ongoing basis reviewing the evolution of the technology and keeping abreast of that

[Translation]

que revoient constamment mes fonctionnaires et ceux de l'OTAN. Comme vous le savez, le rôle de lutte anti-sous-marine nous a été confié et pour répondre à cet engagement, nous avons mis au point les patrouilleurs à grande autonomie, nous avons construit les frégates et mis en oeuvre des projets de modernisation et de prolongement de la durée de vie des destroyers. Mais je ne suis pas d'accord lorsque l'intervenant dit que nous n'aurons que quinze frégates d'ici à 1990. Nous avons toujours l'intention d'avoir vingt frégates en service et nous respecterons cet engagement. Nous allons moderniser et remplacer certaines frégates de façon permanente. Telle est vraiment l'intention de mon ministère et du gouvernement.

Quant aux autres rôles, naturellement la question des sous-marins est étudiée de façon permanente. En effet, la technologie évolue à tel point que les sous-marins ont tendance à être moins vulnérables que les flottes de surface. C'est encore quelque chose d'évident pour quelqu'un qui connaît un peu la stratégie maritime, venant de lac Nipissing, juste au nord de Parry Sound. Il devient évident qu'avec une plus grande capacité de détection des missiles et compte tenu de l'expérience avec les Exocets dans les Malouines, et ainsi de suite, on examine actuellement l'utilisation des forces maritimes. À cet égard, je ne veux pas ajouter autre chose à ce que j'ai déjà dit, sauf pour ajouter que nous répondons à nos engagements, que nous continuerons de le faire et que nous consultons de façon permanente nos alliés de l'OTAN.

M. Bradley: Une brève question supplémentaire, monsieur le président.

Ce qui me préoccupe, c'est que certains jours, le capitaine du port de Hamilton peut faire sortir davantage de bâtiments par l'embouchure du port que ne peut le faire l'amiral de la flotte de Halifax. Le ministre a dit que le nombre de navires de combat allait rester le même puisqu'on remplace ceux qui ne sont plus en état de service. Envisage-t-il de procéder ainsi au moyen du Programme canadien de construction des frégates ou d'un programme semblable de l'OTAN? Par ailleurs, il n'a pas parlé de la question que j'ai posée au sujet de la lutte antinavires, étant donné qu'actuellement les Soviétiques peuvent attaquer des ports par air, navires de surface ou sous-marins. Étant donné que les Malouines . . . nous ont montré que nous ne pouvons pas uniquement compter sur les rôles que l'OTAN nous a attribués, envisage-t-on sérieusement d'accorder un certain rôle anti-mine à la marine canadienne?

M. Blais: Tous les deux ans nous examinons la technologie de dépiégeage, de dragage et de retrait des mines. Comme vous le savez, notre centre de recherche et de développement a mis au point des programmes de détection magnétique qui utilisent aussi de l'équipement sonore pour détecter certains objets, y compris les mines. Encore une fois, cette technologie actuellement de pointe est en pleine évolution et il se peut fort bien que nous puissions enlever des mines et les draguer en investissant beaucoup moins d'argent. Nous en sommes à l'étape théorique et nous examinons constamment l'évolution de la technologie pour ne pas nous laisser dépasser. Je suis optimiste et je sais

[Texte]

technology. I am not concerned with our present state in terms of being able, within a relatively brief period of time, to deal with any mine countermeasures or countermeasure activity.

In conclusion, I simply want to take issue with the honourable gentleman's trying to do as his leader has done, that is, trying to classify the Canadian Navy as being somewhat akin to a tugboat fleet or some inner harbour Hamilton operation. I think that does him an injustice, it does his country an injustice, but, most of all, it does an injustice to the people who are professionals within the Canadian Forces who have a great deal of pride in their service. They have a great deal of pride in the task that they have been assigned by their allies and are discharging their responsibilities with a great deal of competence and professionalism.

Mr. Bradley: Mr. Chairman, I cannot leave it on that note. The minister knows that I did not make any comments pertaining to the standard of personnel in the navy or the use they make of the equipment they have.

The minister still has not answered the original question I asked and I would just like to have one short answer. In order to maintain your fleet of 20 frigates, you are going to have to construct 10 more between 1992 and 1995, because of the attrition we have in our present vessels. This would mean, in order to maintain that fleet, that we are going to have to produce or acquire three per year. Where does the minister propose to get these frigates? Is he planning to continue the present frigate program we have in the Canadian shipbuilding industry, or is he going to try to acquire NATO frigates if they come on stream, or is he going to procure them somewhere else, or is he talking through his hat?

Mr. Blais: That is one area that I did not address specifically, the question of our participation within the NATO program.

As you know, NATO is looking at a frigate program. That is one of the areas we are looking at in terms of effecting a contribution, or in having them accept a contribution, from the Canadian shipbuilding industry. I am very interested in seeing that the capacity we are putting in place with the present frigate program is maintained on an ongoing basis, not necessarily in one shipyard, but within the Canadian establishment. I say that not because I am not satisfied with the way that Saint John is performing; quite to the contrary, I am very pleased with the way they are performing. But, as we proceed further down the pike in terms of the frigate replacement program, we are going to be going out to the marketplace again and we would want to see the evolution and the development of a superior Canadian capacity in naval construction.

In that context, we are pleased with the evolution of the dossier, such as it is, and would want to see further development in that regard. I do not want to be tied down in terms, specifically, of exactly where we are going to go, how many we are going to build, when they are going to be built, of what type and what tonnage they are going to be.

An hon. Member: You do not have long to decide.

[Traduction]

que dans relativement peu de temps nous pourrions prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires en cas d'agression par mine.

Pour terminer, je voudrais simplement réagir à ce qu'a dit l'intervenant qui a essayé d'imiter son chef, en considérant que la marine canadienne est extrêmement primitive ou limitée à de petites opérations au port de Hamilton. Il est dans l'erreur, et il se montre injuste envers son pays, et surtout envers ceux qui sont des professionnels dans les Forces canadiennes et qui s'enorgueillissent beaucoup de leurs services. Ils sont en effet très fiers de la tâche que leur ont confiée leurs alliés, tâche dont ils s'acquittent avec beaucoup de compétence et de dévouement.

M. Bradley: Monsieur le président, je ne voudrais pas en rester là. Le ministre sait que je n'ai pas fait de remarque sur la qualité du personnel de la marine ou sur l'utilisation qu'il fait de l'équipement mis à sa disposition.

Le ministre n'a pas encore répondu à la question que je lui ai posée et j'aimerais une brève réponse. Pour que la flotte de frégates se maintienne à 20 navires, vous devrez en construire 10 de plus en 1992 et 1995 en raison du taux d'usure de nos navires actuels. Autrement dit, pour que cette flotte se maintienne, nous devons produire ou acquérir trois navires par an. Qu'entend faire le ministre pour obtenir ces frégates? Envisage-t-il de poursuivre le programme actuel qui existe dans l'industrie canadienne de la construction de navires ou est-ce qu'il va essayer d'acquérir des frégates de l'OTAN s'il est possible de s'en procurer, ou va-t-il en acheter ailleurs, ou est-ce qu'il parle à l'aveuglette?

M. Blais: Je ne me suis pas précisément penché sur la question de notre participation au programme de l'OTAN.

Comme vous le savez, l'OTAN envisage un programme de frégates. C'est ce que nous examinons pour voir s'il faudrait apporter une contribution ou demander que l'OTAN accepte une contribution de la part de l'Industrie canadienne de la construction navale. Il me paraît très important de voir que la capacité que nous mettons en place dans le programme actuel des frégates se maintienne sur une base continue, pas nécessairement dans un chantier, mais dans l'ensemble de la société canadienne. Je dis cela non pas parce que je suis mécontent des activités de Saint-Jean; bien au contraire, je suis très heureux de ce qui se fait là-bas. Mais en progressant davantage dans ce programme de remplacement des frégates, nous devons nous adresser encore une fois au marché, et nous voudrions que progressivement la capacité du Canada en matière de construction navale atteigne un niveau supérieur.

A cet égard, nous sommes satisfaits de l'évolution du dossier, dans l'état actuel des choses, et nous voudrions voir d'autres progrès dans ce contexte. Je ne voudrais pas donner de réponse définitive à propos de ce que nous allons faire, du nombre de frégates qui seront construites, de l'endroit où elles le seront, de leur type ou de leur tonnage.

Une voix: Vous devrez prendre une décision sous peu.

[Text]

Mr. Blais: This is something we are looking at now. We are living the experience of the first six and we have just started living the experience of the first six. I am very mindful of getting a bang for the buck. We have done that to date and will continue so to do. I am thankful that you have clarified your initial comments relating to the professionalism of the the Canadian Maritime Forces.

• 1305

The Chairman: Before we end up, I will allow Mr. Wenman to put his question, which will be answered by writing. Otherwise, I will adjourn the meeting. Will that meet your concerns?

Mr. Wenman: That meets with my approval.

The Chairman: But I do not want a shopping list of questions, please.

Mr. Wenman: The main purpose of the meeting today was to examine the supplementary estimates, which in fact show the direction the department is going by the way it is spending its money.

This estimate includes a transfer of \$90 million from operating expenditures to capital expenditures, basically for the frigate program, with 85 man-years. The \$90 million is available from operating budgets, we understand, due to program adjustments and reduced price forecast of fuel.

A specific thing that I would like to know is the priority list that has been established for the program adjustments. I would be concerned, for example, if the cardboard trucks from the Gagetown operations were suddenly to turn into pretend and these kinds of things, or lack of fuel, all the problems that are experienced in the operations side.

The second thing I would like to know is, as far as the capital side—we understand that the interdepartmental studies group on defence is really looking at this matter—what will not be done in order to accommodate the frigate programs? Obviously you have a series of priorities that will be done. Then there is a cut-off line. I would like to know from just the top of that cut-off line what, from capital, will not be done, not what will be done, but will not be done at the top of the priority list where we go down. If I could have those in writing because I would not want to hear that small arms weapons, for example, are being cut back or delayed, or something along that line.

Mr. Blais: Not to worry.

Mr. Wenman: Fine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: I thank very much the Minister and the ADM and the Chief of Staff, the new members. Thank you very much. Next meeting is next Tuesday in the afternoon, in the usual room next door. Instead of Mr. Allan MacEachen, the Minister of External Affairs, it will be the Honourable Mr. Regan. We will pursue our study of External Affairs in general.

[Translation]

M. Blais: C'est ce que nous sommes en train d'examiner. Nous avons commencé avec les six premières. Je fais très attention à la rentabilité. C'est d'ailleurs ce qui s'est fait jusqu'à présent et nous poursuivrons cet effort. Je suis heureux que vous ayez précisé vos remarques initiales concernant le dévouement des Forces maritimes canadiennes.

Le président: Avant que nous ne terminions je vais autoriser M. Wenman à poser sa question dont la réponse sera donnée par écrit. Autrement je pourrais lever la séance. Êtes-vous d'accord?

M. Wenman: Oui.

Le président: Mais je ne voudrais pas une série de questions, s'il vous plaît.

M. Wenman: L'objectif principal de cette réunion d'aujourd'hui était d'examiner le budget supplémentaire, qui indique en fait l'orientation que se propose le ministère dans ses dépenses.

Cet article de dépenses prévoit le transfert de 90 millions de dollars des dépenses de fonctionnement, dépenses d'immobilisation concernant essentiellement le programme de frégates avec 85 années-personnes. Les 90 millions de dollars proviennent des budgets de fonctionnement découlant des rajustements du programme et d'une réduction du prix qui avait été prévu pour le carburant.

J'aimerais savoir précisément quelle liste prioritaire a été établie pour les rajustements du programme. Il ne faudrait pas par exemple que les camions de carton des opérations de Gagetown soient tout à coup utilisés, ou que l'on invoque par exemple le manque de carburant et tous les problèmes qui existent du côté des opérations.

J'aimerais savoir en second lieu, en ce qui concerne les immobilisations, nous croyons savoir que le groupe d'étude interministériel sur la défense examine en fait cette question, ce qui ne se fera pas en raison des programmes des frégates. De toute évidence vous avez une série des priorités à réaliser. Il y a ensuite une ligne de démarcation. Quelles dépenses d'immobilisation ne fera-t-on pas au-dessus de cette ligne de démarcation, et je parle bien sûr de cette liste des priorités? Pourriez-vous me répondre par écrit car je ne voudrais pas entendre dire que de petits armements sont supprimés ou remis à plus tard ou autre chose de ce genre?

M. Blais: Ne vous en faites pas.

M. Wenman: Très bien. Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président.

Le président: Je remercie beaucoup le ministre, le sous-ministre adjoint, le chef d'état-major et les nouveaux membres. Merci beaucoup. La prochaine séance aura lieu mardi prochain dans l'après-midi, dans la salle habituelle à côté de celle-ci. Nous aurons l'honorable M. Regan au lieu de M. MacEachen, ministre des Affaires extérieures. Nous poursuivrons notre étude des Affaires extérieures en général.

[Texte]

Mr. Wenman: Do you think we will ever see this Defence Minister again before this committee?

The Chairman: He will come at the next session, I am sure. He will come at the next session and at the next parliament too, I am sure. Thank you. Meeting adjourned.

[Traduction]

M. Wenman: Pensez-vous que nous reverrons un jour ce ministre de la Défense devant le Comité?

Le président: Je suis sûr qu'il viendra lors de la prochaine session et aussi de la prochaine législature, j'en suis convaincu. La séance est levée.



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WITNESSES—TÉMOINS

From the Department of National Defence:

Gen C.G.E. Thériault, Chief of the Defence Staff;
Cmdre E.J. Healey, Project Manager, Canadian Patrol
Frigate;
LGen J.E. Vance, Assistant Deputy Minister, (Personnel);
BGen A.C. Brown, Director General, Military Plans and
Operations.

Du ministère de la Défense nationale:

Gén C.G.E. Thériault, chef de l'État-major de la défense;
Cmdre E.J. Healey, bureau de projet, Frégate canadienne
de patrouille;
Lgén J.E. Vance, sous-ministre adjoint, (Personnel);
Bgén A.C. Brown, directeur général, Plans militaires et
opérations.

HOUSE OF COMMONS

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

Issue No. 102

Fascicule n° 102

Tuesday, November 29, 1983

Le mardi 29 novembre 1983

Chairman: Mr. Marcel Prud'homme

Président: M. Marcel Prud'homme

*Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence
of the Standing Committee on*

*Procès-verbaux et témoignages
du Comité permanent des*

External Affairs and National Defence

Affaires extérieures et de la Défense nationale

RESPECTING:

CONCERNANT:

Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs—
1981

Rapport annuel du ministère des Affaires extérieures—
1981

APPEARING:

COMPARAÎT:

The Honourable Gerald Regan,
Minister of State (International Trade)

L'honorable Gerald Regan,
Ministre d'État (Commerce international)

WITNESSES:

TÉMOINS:

(See back cover)

(Voir à l'endos)



First Session of the
Thirty-second Parliament, 1980-81-82-83

Première session de la
trente-deuxième législature, 1980-1981-1982-1983

STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

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Vice-Chairman: Mrs. Ursula Appolloni

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Herb Breau
Maurice Dupras
Stanley Hudecki
Pauline Jewett
David Kilgour
Gerald Laniel
Jean Lapierre
Ken Robinson (*Etobicoke—Lakeshore*)
Terry Sargeant
Sinclair Stevens
Robert Wenman

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Vice-président: M^{me} Ursula Appolloni

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Lorne Nystrom
Bob Ogle
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Doug Roche
Marcel Roy
Ian Watson—(30)

(Quorum 8)

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

Pursuant to Standing Orders 69(4)(b):

On Monday, November 28, 1983:

Mr. Sargeant replaced Mr. Blaikie.

Conformément à l'article 69(4)b) du Règlement:

Le lundi 28 novembre 1983:

M. Sargeant remplace M. Blaikie.

ORDER OF REFERENCE

Pursuant to Standing Order 46(4), the following paper was deemed referred to the Committee:

Wednesday, March 30, 1983

—Report of the Department of External Affairs for the year 1981, pursuant to section 6 of the Department of External Affairs Act, chapter E-20, R.S.C., 1970.—Sessional Paper No. 321-1/10B.

ORDRE DE RENVOI

Conformément aux dispositions de l'article 46(4) du Règlement, le document suivant était réputé déferé au Comité:

Le mercredi 30 mars 1983

—Rapport du ministère des Affaires extérieures, pour l'année 1981, conformément à l'article 6 de la Loi sur le ministère des Affaires extérieures, chapitre E-20, S.R.C., n° 321-1/10B.

PROCÈS-VERBAL

LE MARDI 29 NOVEMBRE 1983

(157)

[Texte]

Le Comité permanent des affaires extérieures et de la défense nationale se réunit aujourd'hui à 15h36, sous la présidence de M. Marcel Prud'homme (président).

Membres du Comité présents: M^{me} Appolloni, MM. Bosley, Hudecki, Kilgour, Laniel, Prud'homme et Stevens.

Substituts présents: M^{me} Beauchamp-Niquet, MM. Darling, Gimaiel, Herbert, McLean, Ogle et Watson.

Autres députés présents: MM. Jelinek, McKnight et Stewart.

Comparaît: L'honorable Gerald Regan, ministre d'État (Commerce international).

Témoins: Du ministère des Affaires extérieures: M. Robert Johnstone, sous-ministre, Commerce international et coordonnateur des relations économiques internationales; M. de Montigny Marchand, sous-ministre, Affaires politiques.

Aussi présent: Du Centre parlementaire des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur: M. Roger Hill, directeur adjoint.

Conformément à l'article 46(4) du Règlement, le Comité entreprend l'étude du rapport du ministère des Affaires extérieures pour l'année 1981, conformément à l'article 6 de la Loi sur le ministère des Affaires extérieures, chapitre E-20, S.R.C. 1970—Document parlementaire n° 321-1/10B (*considéré comme renvoyé le mercredi 30 mars 1983*).

Le Ministre et les témoins répondent aux questions.

A 17h49, le Comité suspend ses travaux jusqu'à nouvelle convocation du président.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1983

(157)

[Translation]

The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence met at 3:36 o'clock p.m., this day, the Chairman, Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, presiding.

Members of the Committee present: Mrs. Appolloni, Messrs. Bosley, Hudecki, Kilgour, Laniel, Prud'homme and Stevens.

Alternates present: Mrs. Beauchamp-Niquet, Messrs. Darling, Gimaiel, Herbert, McLean, Ogle and Watson.

Other Members present: Messrs. Jelinek, McKnight and Stewart.

Appearing: The Honorable Gerald Regan, Minister of State (International Trade).

Witnesses: From the Department of External Affairs: Mr. Robert Johnstone, Deputy Minister, International Trade and Coordinator, International Economic Relations; Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Deputy Minister, Political Affairs.

In attendance: From the Parliamentary Centre for External Affairs and Foreign Trade: Mr. Roger Hill, Assistant Director.

Pursuant to Standing Order 46(4) the Committee resumed consideration of the Report of the Department of External Affairs for the year 1981, pursuant to section 6 of the Department of External Affairs Act, chapter E-20, R.S.C. 1970—Sessional Paper No. 321-1/10B (*considered as deferred to Wednesday, March 30, 1983*).

The Minister with the witnesses answered questions.

At 5:49 o'clock p.m., the Committee adjourned to the call of the Chair.

Le greffier du Comité

Robert Vaive

Clerk of the Committee

EVIDENCE

*(Recorded by Electronic Apparatus)**[Texte]*

Tuesday, November 29, 1983

• 1535

The Chairman: Order, please.

Today we will continue hearing various witnesses. We have the Hon. Gerald Regan, Minister of State for International Trade. The minister has no statement, so we could go directly to the questioning of the minister.

I will therefore proceed. As is the practice in this committee—for the new members I will repeat that, but I will not repeat it often—the first questioner will be the official spokesman of the Official Opposition, unless he bows to someone else—I do not know; that has not been indicated to me... the hon. member from York—Peel, official critic of the Official Opposition, the Hon. Mr. Sinclair Stevens. It is 10 to 12 minutes each, and then we will come back; we have ample time.

Mr. Stevens, please.

Mr. Stevens: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly, on behalf of my colleagues and colleagues generally on the committee, welcome the minister here. As I understand our procedure today, it being a reference with respect to the annual report of External Affairs, while our minister is specifically responsible for international trade, questions generally with respect to the report and the department in general will be in order.

If I may, I would like to ask the minister a general question, because I think it is prompted very much by the report. It is that the report, while it deals with the calendar year 1981, seems to deal, I think exclusively, with more or less activities or administrative matters and at no place is there really an analysis of Canada's foreign policy or Canada's role in an international world. I was wondering if the minister could indicate to us why the government has so studiously avoided really coming up with a meaningful statement on foreign policy for Canada. I believe it is, what, 12 years now, or maybe even longer, since any attempt was made to identify what you, as the government of the day, feel is a suitable foreign policy for Canada.

• 1540

Hon. Gerald Regan (Minister of State (International Trade): Mr. Stevens, may I first of all say, of course, that the annual report of the department, as of any department, is intended to be for a very different purpose from that suggested in your question.

Certainly, in the course of it, it deals with many policy items. If you glance at the table of contents, it really is an examination of north-south relations, of international law, of Canada in the international order, world affairs during the year. In part B, of course, it deals in detail with Canada and its

TÉMOIGNAGES

*(Enregistrement électronique)**[Traduction]*

Le mardi 29 novembre 1983

Le président: À l'ordre, s'il vous plaît.

Nous allons continuer, aujourd'hui, à entendre divers témoins. Nous avons parmi nous l'honorable Gerald Regan, ministre d'État chargé du commerce international. Il n'a pas de déclaration préliminaire à faire, et nous pouvons donc, sans tarder, lui poser des questions.

Pour commencer, je rappellerai, à l'intention des nouveaux membres du Comité—mais je ne le répéterai pas souvent—que le premier intervenant sera le porte-parole officiel de l'Opposition officielle, à moins qu'il ne cède son tour à quelqu'un d'autre—je ne sais pas, je n'en ai pas été avisé—l'honorable député de York—Peel, porte-parole officiel de l'Opposition officielle, l'honorable Sinclair Stevens. Vous avez chacun 10 à 12 minutes, et nous reviendrons pour un second tour; nous avons énormément de temps.

Monsieur Stevens, s'il vous plaît.

M. Stevens: Merci, monsieur le président.

Au nom de mes collègues et de l'ensemble du Comité, je voudrais souhaiter la bienvenue au ministre. Sauf erreur, étant donné que nous étudions aujourd'hui le rapport annuel des Affaires extérieures, bien que notre ministre soit chargé du commerce international, il sera possible de poser des questions sur le rapport, aussi bien que sur le ministère en général.

Permettez-moi de poser au ministre une question générale que ce rapport me semble imposer. En effet, bien qu'il concerne l'année civile 1981, il semble traiter exclusivement d'activités ou de questions administratives, sans analyser vraiment, où que ce soit, la politique étrangère du Canada ou le rôle de notre pays sur la scène internationale. Le ministre pourrait-il nous dire pourquoi le gouvernement a si soigneusement évité de se prononcer vraiment sur la politique étrangère du Canada? C'est seulement il y a 12 ans, ou peut-être plus, que vous avez essayé, comme gouvernement au pouvoir, de définir quelle politique conviendrait à cet égard pour notre pays.

L'honorable Gerald Regan (ministre d'État chargé du commerce international): Monsieur Stevens, puis-je dire tout d'abord, bien sûr, que le rapport annuel du ministère, comme celui de tout autre ministère, d'ailleurs, se propose un objectif très différent de celui que suggère votre question.

Le rapport aborde, bien sûr, de nombreuses questions de politique. Si vous examinez la table des matières, vous verrez que sont examinés les relations Nord-Sud, le droit international, la place du Canada dans l'ordre international, et les questions mondiales au cours de cette année. Évidemment, la

[Text]

regional interests, and in part C with cultural exchanges and information and foreign relations and so on. A perusal of the report certainly would give one a very considerable insight into the state of Canada's external policies, but the report is obviously not intended to be for the purpose of a restatement, in a comprehensive way, of Canada's overall foreign policy.

I guess I would have to say that I am not aware of how many years have passed since there has been any comprehensive statement of that type... 1971; 12 years—but I would be happy to bring your suggestion in that regard to the attention of the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Mr. Stevens: Thank you for that answer, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Minister, speaking as the, if you like, second in command in the department to the minister, do you personally feel it would be a good idea perhaps to come up with some meaningful review, first of all, of foreign policy, and also hopefully a statement as to just what the government does see as a proper foreign policy for the nation?

Mr. Regan: No, I do not see any particular pertinence at the present time in such a comprehensive undertaking. I think our policy is constantly being stated and restated as it is modified in view of changing circumstances in the world and the time and attention of our officials would probably be better addressed to that question at this time; but it is a matter that could be taken under consideration in the longer term.

Mr. Stevens: In effect you are saying, then, that the 12-year policy, if it could be called a policy, the kind of touch-and-feel foreign approach... in that there are no guidelines, you are just stumbling here and there—is preferable to trying to come up with some meaningful thrust.

Let me be specific, because we have an example of how your touch-and-feel approach works in Grenada, where I think you would surely agree, from some of the embarrassments you lived with, that it was hardly a thing to be proud of, as far as Canada was concerned. Could you tell us, has the government finally committed, as Britain has done, as the United Kingdom has done, a specific sum of money to help Grenada re-establish itself as the democratic republic that it hopes to be? Have you committed any money? Have you committed any of Canada's resources to helping out with, if you like, the reconstruction phase that that country now so anxiously wants to undertake?

Mr. Regan: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Stevens, as the veteran, experienced, able parliamentarian that he is, would recognize that I must make some reference to the earlier part of his question before turning to Grenada and say that I am in total disagreement with everything that he said by way of preamble.

• 1545

I believe, indeed, that the vast majority of the Canadian public not only have been comfortable with the stance that Canada has taken in international relations but also have been very supportive of our membership in NATO, which has been

[Translation]

partie B analyse en détail les intérêts régionaux du Canada, la partie C traite des échanges culturels de l'information, des relations étrangères, et ainsi de suite. Une lecture du rapport permettrait donc d'avoir une très bonne idée de la situation des politiques extérieures du Canada, mais ce document n'est évidemment pas censé définir à nouveau de façon exhaustive toute cette politique.

Je devrais peut-être dire que je ne sais pas depuis combien d'années on n'a pas défini en détail ce—1971; 12 ans—mais je serais heureux de soumettre votre suggestion à cet égard à l'attention du Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.

M. Stevens: Merci de cette réponse, monsieur le ministre.

Monsieur le ministre, étant donné que vous êtes en quelque sorte second maître à bord du ministère, après le ministre, estimez-vous personnellement que cela serait peut-être une bonne idée d'examiner soigneusement tout d'abord la politique étrangère et d'amener le gouvernement à définir—du moins faut-il l'espérer—quelle politique lui paraît convenir à cet égard à la nation?

M. Regan: Non, une entreprise aussi exhaustive ne me semble pas pertinente pour le moment. Je pense que notre politique est constamment définie et redéfinie lorsqu'elle est modifiée en fonction de l'évolution de la conjoncture mondiale, et c'est alors que le temps et l'attention de nos fonctionnaires pourraient être utilisés à meilleur escient que vous ne le proposez; mais cette question pourrait être envisagée à plus long terme.

M. Stevens: Êtes-vous donc en train de nous dire que la politique en place depuis 12 ans—si on peut qualifier de politique ces tâtonnements, ces trébuchements en l'absence de directives—que cette «politique» est préférable à une orientation rigoureuse qu'il serait possible de définir?

Permettez-moi d'être précis, car nous avons un exemple du fonctionnement de votre politique de tâtonnements à la Grenade, où vous conviendrez sans doute, en raison des embarras dont vous avez dû vous accommoder, que c'était quelque chose dont le Canada était loin de pouvoir s'enorgueillir. Pouvez-vous nous dire si, comme l'a fait la Grande-Bretagne, le Royaume-Uni, le gouvernement a finalement engagé une somme précise pour aider la Grenade à redevenir, comme elle le souhaite, une république démocratique? Avez-vous engagé des fonds? Avez-vous engagé des ressources de notre pays afin de contribuer à la phase de reconstruction que ce pays est maintenant très impatient d'amorcer?

M. Regan: Monsieur le président, en tant que parlementaire expérimenté, M. Stevens admettra que je dois d'abord revenir à ce qu'il disait au début de sa question avant d'aborder le problème de la Grenade, pour dire que je rejette catégoriquement tous les propos qu'il a tenus en guise d'introduction.

Je crois en fait que la grande majorité des Canadiens ont été satisfaits de la position qu'a adoptée le Canada dans ses relations internationales, et de plus, ils ont beaucoup appuyé notre participation à l'OTAN, laquelle a joué un très grand

[Texte]

a very important part of our international posture, of our excellent relations with our American neighbours.

I guess I should not use the time of the committee to review all the tenets of our relations, unless you want to be specific in the question. Let it suffice for me to say that our foreign policies not only are well known internationally but are quite clear to the Canadian public, and I believe are broadly supported.

The fact that we are supportive of peace measures, the fact that we support all efforts at disarmament, characterizes the Canadian approach, and I would hope we would continue to do so in any future foreign policy Canada has.

Turning to the subject of Grenada, quite to the contrary, I did not find any aspect of my involvement as acting foreign minister to be—I think the word you used was “embarrassing”. I think our position was clear-cut and proper from the first involvement in any knowledge of an invasion in that area.

I will skip over that, then, to come to the specific of your question and say that we have taken steps to re-establish, as I think the Secretary of State for External Affairs may have indicated to you at a previous meeting, our ongoing programs that had been under way in Grenada. We have sent an official of the department to Grenada and we have certainly indicated our interest in providing additional help of a remedial nature to the Grenadian economy.

It is quite obvious that their interim government must be in place in order for consultations to take place as to what form any additional assistance might take; and you would be aware of the fact that the proposed interim leader of the government, because of health reasons, was unable to decline and that other possibilities for that position are being examined at the present time.

But we have restarted our major CIDA projects which were already undertaken and momentarily stopped by the invasion. We are examining the possibility and feasibility of undertaking further commitments.

Mr. Stevens: I take it, then, that the short answer to my earlier question is that, while the United Kingdom has been able to see fit to earmark \$1 million for new aid specifically dedicated to the helping, in this case, of training a police force in Grenada, Canada is still befuddled and is just not sure what you could do of a concrete nature and of a new initiative, as opposed simply to saying that you are lifting the suspension on some of the programs that you were giving to the former Marxist group.

Mr. Regan: Mr. Chairman, in answering Mr. Stevens' question, I think I have to say that I am quite surprised at a man of his position and responsibility serving the international interests of our country so poorly as to suggest that Canada is befuddled with reference to what to do by way of assistance in the Caribbean.

Mr. Stevens: Grenada.

Mr. Regan: Well, specifically in this case Grenada. I want quite clearly to say that maybe Britain has offered \$1 million

[Traduction]

rôle dans notre position internationale, de même que nos excellentes relations avec nos voisins américains.

Je ne prendrai pas le temps du comité pour examiner tous les aspects de nos relations, à moins que vous n'ayez une question précise à cet égard. Qu'il me suffise de dire que nos politiques étrangères sont non seulement reconnues internationalement, mais aussi très claires pour le public canadien, qui les appuie dans sa très grande majorité.

Le fait que nous appuyons les mesures pacifiques, que nous favorisons tous les efforts de désarmement, caractérisent l'approche du Canada, et j'espère que nous la poursuivrons dans toute politique étrangère que nous aurons à l'avenir.

Quant à la question de la Grenade, bien au contraire, je n'ai trouvé aucun aspect de ma participation en tant que ministre suppléant des affaires étrangères qui ait été «embarrassant», pour citer le terme que vous avez utilisé. Notre position a été claire et appropriée, dès que nous avons su l'existence d'une invasion dans cette région.

Je ne m'attarderai donc pas là-dessus, et j'en arrive à la question précise que vous m'avez posée, pour dire que nous avons pris des mesures pour rétablir—et je pense que le Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures a pu vous en parler lors d'une séance précédente—les programmes que nous avions déjà en place à la Grenade. Nous avons envoyé un fonctionnaire du ministère dans ce pays et nous avons dit que nous tenions vraiment à offrir plus d'aide pour relancer l'économie.

Il est évident que le gouvernement provisoire doit être en place pour que des consultations puissent intervenir quant à la nature d'une aide supplémentaire; vous savez peut-être que pour des raisons de santé, celui qui avait été proposé comme chef provisoire du gouvernement a dû décliner cette invitation, et que l'on examine actuellement d'autres candidatures à ce poste.

Mais nous avons repris nos principaux projets de l'ACDI qui étaient déjà en place et que l'invasion avait momentanément interrompus. Nous examinons la possibilité et la faisabilité de réaliser d'autres engagements.

M. Stevens: Il semble donc, d'après la brève réponse que vous avez donnée à ma question précédente, qu'alors que le Royaume-Uni a jugé bon de consacrer un million de dollars à une nouvelle aide subventionnant dans ce cas la formation d'une force de police à la Grenade, le Canada est encore confus, ne sachant pas exactement que faire de concret, quelle nouvelle initiative prendre, plutôt que de simplement dire que vous acceptiez désormais certains des programmes que vous aviez retirés à l'ancien groupe marxiste.

M. Regan: Monsieur le président, pour répondre à la question de M. Stevens, je dois dire que je suis très surpris qu'un homme de son calibre desserve à ce point les intérêts internationaux du Canada en parlant de la confusion du Canada quant à l'aide apportée aux Antilles.

M. Stevens: À la Grenade.

M. Regan: Oui, précisément dans ce cas à la Grenade. Je tiens à dire clairement qu'il est possible que la Grande-

[Text]

in additional aid, but Canada does not have to take the back seat to any nation on earth in relation to the assistance we have over the years provided to the Caribbean countries, including Grenada. Indeed, if other countries were to follow the example and the quantum of Canadian aid in that area, then the very serious problems that have been encountered and, indeed, in some instances have brought about the destabilization with which the member may be concerned—I suggest the economic opportunities and conditions would have been quite different.

• 1550

So rather than being befuddled, it seems to me that we are extremely clear-headed in moving rapidly to restart the projects that were already under way and to enter into consultations with the interim authorities regarding the type of additional assistance that might be most useful, rather than merely announcing a certain amount as being available.

Mr. Stevens: Then speaking about your clear-headed department, Mr. Minister, could you tell the committee, first of all, whether you are familiar with certain letters that Sandra Gottlieb has had published in *The Washington Post* in which she chooses a “Dear Beverley” type of letter, reciting her impressions as the wife of an ambassador in Washington, and in the letters odd comments are made? My question is this, Mr. Minister. When you hear the two things that I want to quote from Mrs. Gottlieb, was this form of letter, and specifically the two letters I am referring to, cleared through whatever channels you clear these things through in External Affairs? Did she have the blessing of the department to publish this type of thing in the capital of the United States of America?

Secondly, if she did not have a blessing, what exactly is the rule within the department regarding an ambassador to the most significant posting in the world who through his wife is causing this type of statement to be made?

The first thing I refer to is a letter in which, as I say, she is described as a person whose husband is Canada’s ambassador to the United States. In effect she is writing, as I say, to a person called Beverley, and says certain things should be corrected that have been stated by the press and that are somehow always wrong, and she says:

It was wrong, Beverley, what they reported in the papers back home. He did not say . . .

—that is referring to the person referred to by the press, the ambassador . . .

“I’m Caspar Weinberger, Mrs. Gottlieb, your guest of honour”.

She corrects that by saying:

He left out the “guest of honour” part, because it was not so.

That is a rather odd comment for an ambassador’s wife to make in that context. Then of course she goes on in the next letter, or an earlier letter, actually, and says:

The residence’s functions . . .

[Translation]

Bretagne ait offert une aide supplémentaire d’un million de dollars, mais que le Canada n’a de leçon à recevoir d’aucun pays au monde quant à l’aide qu’il donne depuis des années aux pays des Antilles, y compris la Grenade. Si les autres pays suivaient l’exemple du Canada pour ce qui est de leur niveau d’aide, les graves problèmes qui se sont présentés et qui, dans une certaine mesure, ont été la cause de cette déstabilisation dont parle l’honorable député . . . les possibilités et les conditions économiques auraient été tout autres.

Donc, plutôt que d’avoir les esprits brouillés, il me semble que nous avons été extrêmement lucides en faisant redémarrer rapidement les projets que nous avions menés jusque-là et en engageant des consultations avec les autorités provisoires relativement au type d’aide supplémentaire qu’elles jugent le plus utile dans les circonstances. Il me semble que c’est bien mieux que d’annoncer un montant disponible.

M. Stevens: Au sujet de ce ministère extrêmement lucide qui est le vôtre, monsieur le ministre, pouvez-vous nous dire si vous êtes au courant de certaines lettres publiées dans le *Washington Post*, et écrites par Sandra Gottlieb, lettres qui s’adressent à une *Dear Beverley* imaginaire, et dans lesquelles elle livre ses impressions et ses commentaires en tant que femme d’un ambassadeur à Washington? Je serais curieux de savoir si ces deux lettres en particulier, qui contiennent les commentaires de M^{me} Gottlieb, que je vais vous citer, ont été autorisées par les voies normales du ministère des Affaires extérieures. A-t-elle obtenu la permission du ministère avant de publier ces lettres dans la capitale américaine?

Si elle n’a pas obtenu de permission préalable, quelle est la règle du ministère qui s’applique dans son cas particulier, puisqu’elle est la femme de l’ambassadeur qui occupe probablement le poste diplomatique le plus prestigieux au monde?

Dans une première lettre, elle se décrit comme étant la femme de l’ambassadeur du Canada aux États-Unis. Elle est censée écrire à une personne du nom de Beverley et parle de certains comptes rendus erronés dans les journaux:

Ce que les journaux rapportaient, au pays, était tout à fait faux, Beverley. Il n’a pas dit . . .

. . . il s’agit de la personne mentionnée dans les journaux.

«Je suis Caspar Weinberger, madame Gottlieb, votre invité d’honneur.»

Elle rétablit les choses:

Il n’a pas dit: «votre invité d’honneur», parce que ce n’était pas le cas.

C’est un commentaire assez curieux de la part de la femme d’un ambassadeur, dans ce genre de circonstances. Dans une autre lettre, elle fait cette observation:

La fonction de la résidence . . .

[Texte]

—referring to the ambassador's residence . . .

—is something between a private home and a public drinking place.

Now we know what is going on in Copenhagen with the drug ring, but I find it rather startling that the wife of an ambassador is referring to the ambassador's residence in Washington as something between a private home and a public drinking place. My question is, was that screened through External Affairs? Did somebody say, go ahead, that is fine; that is the type of image we would like to have in Washington circles? If not, what rules are wives of ambassadors supposed to be following?

Mr. Regan: Sinclair, if I had not known you so long and had not had an opportunity to know of your many works . . .

The Chairman: Be careful what you say about wives, now.

Mr. Regan: —in the past, I would be quite surprised at what you said, because it would suggest that you were better suited to be a book reviewer than a critic of this department.

Mr. Stevens: Answer the question.

• 1555

Mr. Regan: I will try to answer the question as best I can. The problem is that your question takes about eight minutes, so it has many facets to be answered.

I would start by simply saying, first of all, that it is really going to be an unusual situation, if we have parties in the House of Commons who feel that we should sit around in committee and examine the details of the public writings, books, articles or otherwise of spouses of employees of the government. In this century, whatever your view may be, I think most people would feel that spouses of members in the foreign services are individuals in their own right and have the possibility to engage in employment in accordance with the host government's guidelines and regulations. Mrs. Gotlieb is an established Canadian author in her own right, and has published books in the past, and I find it remarkable to have it suggested that she, as a person who is not an employee of the government or the department, should clear with us in some form of censorship in advance what she is going to write. I would certainly reject that idea.

I believe you might be aware of recent investigations and studies into the status of spouses of our foreign officers, and I think your suggestion is of very direct variance from what has been suggested in those studies. I therefore have to tell you that her comments were not cleared, nor would I have expected them to be cleared. I am aware, and I am sure that Mrs. Gotlieb is aware, that regarding writing relating to matters at the embassy, discretion should be shown, and I am confident she will show that.

You referred to what is happening in Copenhagen. I guess you are referring to the question of a drug seizure. I can tell

[Traduction]

. . . elle parle de la résidence de l'ambassadeur . . .

. . . est à moitié celle d'un domicile privé, à moitié celle d'une taverne publique.

Il y avait bien ce réseau de trafiquants de drogue, à Copenhague, mais il est surprenant d'entendre la femme de l'ambassadeur parler de la résidence de l'ambassadeur, à Washington, comme d'un endroit qui est à moitié domicile privé, à moitié taverne publique. Ce que je voudrais savoir, c'est si ce genre de chose a été approuvée par le ministère des Affaires extérieures. Est-ce que quelqu'un, quelque part, a décidé que c'était bien là l'image que nous voulions donner de nous-mêmes dans les cercles diplomatiques de Washington? Sinon, quelles règles s'appliquent aux femmes d'ambassadeur dans ce genre de circonstances?

M. Regan: Si je ne vous connaissais pas depuis si longtemps, Sinclair, et que je n'avais pas eu l'occasion de lire vos nombreux ouvrages . . .

Le président: Faites attention à ce que vous allez dire au sujet des femmes.

M. Regan: . . . je serais surpris par vos propos, parce que je pourrais avoir l'impression que vous êtes meilleur critique littéraire que critique du ministère pour votre parti.

M. Stevens: Répondez à la question.

M. Regan: Je vais essayer de répondre du mieux que je peux. Le problème est que c'est une question de huit minutes et qu'elle a beaucoup de ramifications.

Je voudrais d'abord dire qu'il est assez curieux qu'il y ait des gens, à la Chambre des communes, qui voudraient que les comités se mettent à examiner en détail les livres, les articles et autres ouvrages des femmes des employés du gouvernement. Quelles que soient vos vues à vous, je pense qu'à notre époque, la plupart des gens estiment que les femmes des membres du service extérieur ont le droit de vivre leur propre vie et de s'adonner à n'importe quelle activité, dans le respect, évidemment, des directives et des règlements des gouvernements hôtes. Il se trouve que M^{me} Gotlieb est un auteur canadien reconnu et de plein droit. Elle a déjà publié dans le passé. Je trouve assez curieuse la suggestion qui veut que même si elle n'est pas un employé du gouvernement ou du ministère, elle devrait se soumettre à une forme de censure de la part du gouvernement ou du ministère avant d'écrire. C'est une suggestion que je rejette sans hésiter.

Vous êtes sans doute au courant des enquêtes et études récentes sur la situation des femmes de nos agents du service extérieur. Or, votre suggestion va directement à l'encontre des recommandations résultant de ces travaux. En tout cas, je puis vous dire que ces commentaires n'ont pas été autorisés au préalable, et n'avaient pas à l'être. Je sais bien, et M^{me} Gotlieb le sait sûrement aussi, que lorsqu'il s'agit des affaires de l'ambassade, une certaine discrétion s'impose. Or, je suis sûr que M^{me} Gotlieb respecte ce critère.

Par ailleurs, vous avez fait allusion à la situation à Copenhague. Vous avez sans doute voulu parler de la saisie de drogue.

[Text]

you that in mid-October the ministry was informed that during the course of an investigation into a large drug ring centred in Copenhagen the Danish police had learned that a locally engaged—I emphasize a locally engaged—maid, a Miss Lene Frantsen . . .

Mr. Stevens: Yes, but centred in the ambassador's residence. Make that clear.

Mr. Regan: —may have been using her self-contained living quarters—that is, self-contained—located on the embassy premises to store drugs. At the request of the director of the Copenhagen police, and in view of the gravity of the situation, the ministry waived the inviolability of the Vienna Convention for this one occasion to enable the local Danish police to enter the residence. Thus they co-operated in every way so that the police could conduct the arrests and the searches as necessary to conclude effectively this aspect of their investigation. Under instructions from Ottawa, officers of the embassy, throughout the arrest and search—and they reserved the right to deny the permission of the police to enter any portion of the residence which they felt could not be shown to be connected reasonably with the nature of the search.

No Canadian personnel accredited to the embassy were in any way known to have been connected with Miss Frantsen's drug-related activities. Although we have been without an ambassador in Copenhagen for some time, this situation is in absolutely no way connected with the circumstances surrounding this arrest and search.

Mr. Stevens: I would like to take the minister through the little beehive which was going on at the ambassador's residence. He forgot to mention the people who were calling and the people who were leaving, and all duly arrested as a result of being part of the drug ring at the residence, in his little explanation of what is going on in Copenhagen.

• 1600

But to come back to Mrs. Gotlieb, Mr. Minister, would you indicate if there are any guidelines within the department on what spouses of embassy officials are expected to do in relation to this type of comment in the press and outside of the—well, in public? If there are, did Mrs. Gotlieb adhere to those guidelines?

Mr. Regan: Mr. Chairman, there are no guidelines, as such, because of the fact that spouses are not employees of the government, and because we believe in the rights of the individual, in that a person does not carry the responsibilities as a consequence of being married to an employee of a particular company. The only expectation is one of discretion, and I am confident that will be followed.

The Chairman: Hopefully.

Thank you, Mr. Stevens. You will be followed by the hon. member from Saskatoon East, Reverend Father Ogle.

[Translation]

Je peux vous dire à ce sujet que vers la mi-octobre, le ministère a été informé du fait qu'au cours d'une enquête sur un réseau de trafiquants de drogue très étendu, à Copenhague, la police danoise a appris qu'une domestique engagée sur place, je souligne ce détail, une dénommée Lene Frantsen . . .

M. Stevens: Elle menait son activité à partir de la résidence de l'ambassadeur, précisez-le.

M. Regan: . . . avait pu utiliser ses appartements particuliers, dotés d'une entrée particulière—j'insiste là-dessus également—dans l'enceinte de l'ambassade, pour entreposer de la drogue. A la demande du directeur de la police de Copenhague, et compte tenu de la gravité de la situation, le ministère a consenti à lever l'immunité de la Convention de Vienne pour cette fois, et à permettre à la police danoise locale d'entrer dans la résidence de l'ambassadeur. Donc, l'ambassade a coopéré de toutes les manières possibles avec la police locale, pour lui permettre de procéder aux arrestations et aux fouilles nécessaires dans le cadre de son enquête. Selon les instructions qu'ils avaient reçues d'Ottawa, les officiels de l'ambassade, au moment des arrestations et des fouilles . . . Ils se réservaient en tout cas le droit de refuser à la police la permission d'entrer dans toute partie de la résidence qui, selon eux, n'était pas raisonnablement liée à la nature des fouilles.

Aucun membre canadien attiré de l'ambassade n'a été mis en cause par l'activité de M^{me} Frantsen en matière de drogue. Même si le poste d'ambassadeur à Copenhague est vacant depuis quelque temps, je peux vous assurer que cette situation n'a absolument rien à voir avec les circonstances qui ont entouré ces arrestations et ces fouilles.

M. Stevens: Je voudrais rappeler au ministre que la résidence de l'ambassadeur était une sorte de petite ruche d'abeilles. Il a oublié de mentionner le fait qu'il y a des gens qui entraient et qui sortaient de l'ambassade, et qui ont été arrêtés parce qu'ils faisaient partie de ce réseau de trafiquants de drogue fonctionnant à partir de la résidence de l'ambassadeur, à Copenhague.

Pour en revenir à M^{me} Gotlieb, monsieur le ministre, pouvez-vous nous dire s'il existe, au ministère, des lignes directrices concernant le comportement que doivent adopter les conjoints des fonctionnaires des ambassades et qui concerneraient ce genre de déclarations publiques faites dans la presse? S'il existe des lignes directrices, M^{me} Gotlieb les a-t-elle respectées?

M. Regan: Monsieur le président, il n'existe pas de lignes directrices proprement dites, étant donné que les conjoints ne sont pas des fonctionnaires; selon nous, l'individu a certains droits, et même s'il est marié à un employé d'une compagnie particulière, il n'est pas visé par les mêmes responsabilités que l'employé. On peut tout de même s'attendre à une certaine discrétion; on étudiera la situation, pour voir si l'on a fait preuve de discrétion.

Le président: Je l'espère.

Honori, monsieur Stevens. Je cède maintenant la parole à l'honorable député de Saskatoon-Est, le Révérend Père Ogle.

[Texte]

Mr. Ogle: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to see the minister today and would like to ask some questions relating to Canadian international aid.

My first question is because I have not yet been able to get a clear answer, and that is, what were the reasons behind cutting off the funding to SUCO, the Quebec French-speaking group that is balanced by CUSO? I have been approached by many members from this organization and they still feel a grave injustice was done when that happened last summer. Also, other members of nongovernment organizations in Canada who are working in international aid are very upset and fearful that the procedure of just a direct cutting off could have very dire consequences down the road for them. So would it be possible for the minister to give a broader explanation of the reasons behind that action? To my mind, that has not been explained well yet.

Mr. Regan: Mr. Chairman, I would say to Father Ogle that he recognizes when we use public funds, the Canadian taxpayers' money, to support any programs undertaken by people who are not an integral part of the government, obviously there must be a first requirement for a proper accounting of the funds. We cannot have a situation in which public money is handed on to groups and Parliament is not able to know how that money was used and have it accounted for. Now, unfortunately, and to the best of my information, that was the problem there. Even though CIDA increased support and paid for additional consulting services to the group, the SUCO group simply was incapable of putting together a reasonably acceptable accounting service.

What we did in this circumstance was to attempt to minimize the damage. With great regret, CIDA therefore had to end the commitment. But it did not simply cut it off. It provided for the funding to continue until March 31, so that there could be an element of continuity. We hope that as a consequence the co-operants will be able to find association with other groups, so that they can continue to serve the countries to which they have been assigned. I believe that is the essence of the situation.

If there should be a further question, Father, I will try to answer it.

Mr. Ogle: I appreciate that there has to be an accurate accounting of funds which go to the nongovernment organizations. There is no question about that.

• 1605

I was wondering if there were other reasons beyond that. Were there any projects or things of that sort that SUCO had become involved with and that the government was unhappy with, or the government did not want to have Canada involved with? Were there other motives? I feel the motive of the finances and the accounting could have been solved by sending in the proper agents to do that. There may have been somebody in the whole organization who was unjust and who was taking money and whatever, but I feel even if that was the case, then we should know about that and the people who had

[Traduction]

M. Ogle: Merci, monsieur le président. Je suis heureux de pouvoir poser certaines questions au ministre portant sur l'aide internationale assurée par le Canada.

Jusqu'à présent, je n'ai pas pu obtenir de réponse précise à cette question; je la reformule donc; pourquoi a-t-on mis fin au financement du SUCO, le groupe québécois qui est le pendant de CUSO? De nombreux membres de cet organisme m'ont dit qu'ils estiment avoir été traités de façon très injuste lorsque cette décision a été prise, l'été dernier. Par ailleurs, d'autres membres d'organismes non gouvernementaux, au Canada, qui travaillent dans le domaine de l'aide internationale sont très bouleversés, et ils craignent que cette façon de procéder n'ait des conséquences néfastes pour eux à l'avenir. Le ministre pourrait-il donc nous donner de plus amples renseignements sur les raisons qui sous-tendent ces mesures? À ce que je sache, on n'en a pas encore donné une bonne explication.

M. Regan: Monsieur le président, le Père Ogle doit reconnaître que lorsque nous utilisons des fonds publics, l'argent des contribuables canadiens, pour financer des programmes entrepris par des gens qui ne font pas partie intégrante du gouvernement, il faut, de toute évidence, exiger en premier lieu une bonne reddition des comptes. On ne peut pas permettre des situations où des fonds publics seraient accordés sans que le Parlement puisse savoir comment ils ont été utilisés et comptabilisés. Or, malheureusement, d'après mes renseignements, c'est là justement que se situe le problème. En dépit du fait que l'ACDI avait augmenté l'aide et assuré, à ses frais, des services-conseils supplémentaires, le groupe SUCO ne pouvait tout simplement pas présenter une comptabilité raisonnablement tenue.

Compte tenu des circonstances, nous avons tenté de minimiser les dégâts. À son grand regret, l'ACDI a dû mettre fin à son engagement. Mais l'agence n'a pas tout simplement supprimé les fonds. Elle a permis au financement de continuer jusqu'au 31 mars, pour assurer une certaine continuité. En conséquence, nous espérons que les coopérants pourront s'associer à d'autres groupes, ce qui leur permettrait de continuer à assurer des services dans les pays où ils ont été affectés. Voilà, essentiellement, à quoi se résume la situation, à mon avis.

Si vous avez d'autres questions à poser sur ce sujet, Père Ogle, je tenterai d'y répondre.

M. Ogle: Je reconnais qu'il faut comptabiliser de façon précise les fonds qui sont impartis à des organismes non gouvernementaux. Je n'en doute point.

Je me demande seulement s'il y avait d'autres raisons. Y avait-il des projets ou des initiatives auxquels participait le SUCO et que le gouvernement voyait d'un mauvais œil, ou ne voulait pas appuyer? Pour ce qui est des finances et des comptes, il aurait suffi d'employer les agents nécessaires. S'il y a des gens à l'intérieur de l'organisation qui ont accaparé l'argent, qui ont commis des actes répréhensibles, ils doivent être démasqués et poursuivis aux termes des lois prévues.

[Text]

done that should be prosecuted according to the laws of fraud, or whatever they are.

So I am asking now, were there other reasons above and beyond the finances? Were there some projects, or work, or something that the organization was doing that were improper? Some of the information I had was that the organization, which is very popular, I think, in French Canada—the majority of the workers in it are French-Canadian—could not get any help from their members when they went to their own members. They could not get anybody to support them. I was surprised at that, because to my mind it is still a very popular group. So I am insisting: were there reasons beyond the financial—because I felt the financial reasons could have been solved and looked after.

Mr. Regan: First of all, Mr. Chairman, I too would be surprised if they were not able to get assistance from their own members, because I think you would agree that the Quebec members in general have been very supportive of overseas work of this type, and of such groups, as well as the work of CIDA in general.

Had there been any cases of fraud, or of illegality of that type, then appropriate action would have been taken. That is clearly the case. This is a matter of inadequate accounting that could not be remedied even when special efforts were made and special assistance provided. I am unaware of any other reason why the project was terminated. This one did appear to be the reason; and an adequate one, unfortunately.

Mr. Ogle: Taking that for granted, then, are there rules or regulations that any nongovernment organization can use and be sure it will not get into the same situation as SUCO did, if that happens to be the only reason why it was cancelled out?

Mr. Regan: Yes, I think a detailed question of that type would be an excellent question for the President of CIDA, when she becomes before the committee. I believe the ideal situation or advice to any group is to work closely with CIDA and know that they are following an accounting system that is satisfactory to CIDA as it feels it must meet its responsibilities.

Mr. Ogle: We will carry that on then with the Chairman of CIDA.

The hon. minister is probably aware today that in the *Montreal Gazette* there was a story about Canada's foreign aid having dropped 63.5% during the past year. Having read the story, I realize that some of the percentages—the numbers have been used in such a way that you can get this number, but in the story I think it is that Canada's aid contributions have dropped back substantially.

Mr. Regan: And was that your impression; that that story was accurate?

Mr. Ogle: It is accurate to the extent that it has some information in it. It is based on some information. I appreciate the fact that percentages can be made up with different relationships to give those kinds of percentage numbers. But

[Translation]

Y avait-il donc d'autres raisons à part le problème des finances? Y avait-il des projets, des initiatives considérés comme inacceptables de la part de l'organisation? D'après ce que j'ai su, l'organisation, qui est très populaire au Canada français—je pense que la majorité de ses membres sont canadiens-français—n'a pas pu avoir l'appui de ses propres députés lorsqu'elle s'est adressée à eux. Elle n'a eu l'aide de personne. J'en ai été surpris, parce que je pensais qu'elle était toujours assez populaire. J'insiste donc. Y avait-il d'autres raisons que le problème des finances, parce que, selon moi, ce problème aurait pu être réglé.

M. Regan: J'aurais été également fort surpris, monsieur le président, que ces gens n'aient pas pu obtenir l'aide de leurs propres députés, parce qu'il me semble que les députés du Québec, de façon générale, se sont toujours montrés très bien disposés à l'égard des groupes comme celui-là, l'ACDI, par exemple, oeuvrant à l'étranger.

S'il y avait eu fraude ou acte illégal, quel qu'il soit, je suis sûr que les mesures appropriées auraient été prises. Or, il se trouve que ce cas particulier était simplement un cas de mauvaise gestion des comptes et qu'il n'y avait pas de solution possible, malgré tous les efforts spéciaux en vue d'y arriver. À ma connaissance, c'est la seule raison pour laquelle le projet a pris fin. Malheureusement, c'est une raison suffisante.

M. Ogle: Si c'est le cas, si c'est la seule raison pour laquelle le projet a pris fin, y a-t-il des règles ou des règlements s'appliquant aux organisations non gouvernementales, comme le SUCO, en vue d'éviter ce genre de situation?

M. Regan: Je pense qu'une question détaillée comme celle-là conviendrait parfaitement au président de l'ACDI, lors de sa comparaison devant le Comité. Je pense que dans cette situation, le meilleur avis qu'on puisse donner à une organisation serait de suivre de très près le système comptable de l'ACDI, lequel permet à l'ACDI elle-même de s'acquitter de ses responsabilités en cette matière.

M. Ogle: Nous y reviendrons donc avec le président de l'ACDI.

Par ailleurs, l'honorable ministre est probablement au courant d'un article paru dans *The Gazette*, de Montréal, voulant que l'aide étrangère du Canada ait subi une baisse de 63.5 p. 100 au cours de l'année écoulée. J'ai moi-même lu l'article. Je sais que les pourcentages et les chiffres ont été manipulés quelque peu, de façon à obtenir ce résultat assez incroyable, mais il n'en demeure pas moins que selon l'article, la contribution du Canada a baissé considérablement.

M. Regan: Vous avez eu l'impression que l'article était juste?

M. Ogle: Dans une certaine mesure. Il y a là certains faits réels. Je sais que les pourcentages peuvent être utilisés de différentes façons pour obtenir certains résultats. Cependant, l'aide financière du Canada n'a-t-elle pas été réduite au cours de l'année? Je vous pose la question.

[Texte]

basically, has Canada's aid financially dropped back this year? That is maybe just what I should ask.

Mr. Regan: I am very pleased that you ask that question. I was hoping there would be a question in Question Period today so that we could clarify it. Unfortunately, or fortunately, the headline in *The Gazette*, "Canada's Foreign Aid Spending Dropped 63.5% Last Year", is not correct. The story also carried by Canadian Press confuses official development assistance, ODA, with official flows and total transfer of resources.

• 1610

Our official development assistance declined only very slightly, to 0.42% of GNP, in 1982, because of the timing of the legislation, Bill C-130, concerning Canada's contribution to international financial institutions. Had payment been made in the calendar year 1982, ODA would have been substantially higher than in 1981.

But apart from ODA, other official flows, the sort of thing that was included in their calculations, include nonconcessional transfers of resources such as credits from the Export Development Corporation; private direct investments by banks; private export credits; grants by voluntary agencies.

The press story mistakenly speaks of a dramatic drop in the level of Canada's foreign aid in 1981. It was the large decrease in the flow of private capital which accounted for the significant decline in the total transfer of resources, which is quite a different thing from a change in the government commitment.

I want to make it quite clear that Canada's commitment to ODA and the use of CIDA for assistance to developing countries remains unchanged, and, I think, extremely good in comparison with most other nations on Earth, though perhaps not yet at the level that we hope eventually will be attained.

Mr. Ogle: Thank you, Mr. Minister.

As you are aware, the north-south task force which presented its report about two years ago indicated that if Canada were to move to the level in aid that the United Nations and other world organizations were asking for, which is 0.07, the percentage of aid would have to be increased each year, and it would have to be a continuous growth, just to make this 0.07.

I believe the fact that the aid is really, if not stagnated in the growth part, actually decreasing—is the government seriously at this time looking at how it is going to have us reach the 0.07 growth of external aid?

Mr. Regan: Well, the government is committed to best efforts to attain that by the end of the decade, and I am satisfied that we have been making progress in that direction. I point out that what you are referring to in the last year is an aberration, because of the timing of the passing of the bill that

[Traduction]

M. Regan: Je suis très heureux que vous me la posiez. J'avais espéré avoir l'occasion d'y répondre au cours de la période des questions, aujourd'hui, parce que je tenais à apporter des éclaircissements à ce sujet. Malheureusement, ou heureusement, selon le point de vue, le titre de *The Gazette*, «Les dépenses du Canada au titre de l'aide à l'étranger ont chuté de 63.5 p. 100 au cours de l'année écoulée», n'est pas exact. L'article, publié aussi par la Presse canadienne, confond l'assistance publique au développement, l'A.P.D., avec les courants officiels et l'ensemble des transferts de ressources.

Notre assistance publique au développement a diminué quelque peu et est tombée à 0,42 p. 100 du P.N.B., en 1982, à cause de l'entrée en vigueur de la loi sur les contributions du Canada aux institutions financières internationales, le projet de loi C-130. Si le versement avait été effectué au cours de l'année civile 1982, l'A.P.D. aurait été considérablement plus élevée qu'en 1981.

Indépendamment de l'A.P.D., des autres contributions officielles, ils se sont servi pour leur calcul, d'autres transferts non concessionnels de ressources, par exemple, les crédits de la Société pour l'expansion des exportations, les investissements privés directs des banques, les crédits d'exportation privés, les subventions des organismes bénévoles.

L'article de presse a tort de parler d'une baisse considérable de l'aide accordée par le Canada à l'étranger en 1981. C'est une diminution considérable des capitaux privés destinés à l'étranger qui est responsable de l'ensemble des transferts des ressources, ce qui est loin d'être un changement de politique gouvernementale.

Je tiens à le préciser, les engagements du Canada envers l'A.P.D. et le rôle joué par l'ACDI dans les pays en voie de développement n'ont pas changé. Au contraire, par comparaison à la plupart des autres pays du monde, et même si nous n'avons pas atteint les objectifs que nous espérons toujours atteindre, ces réalisations sont excellentes.

M. Ogle: Merci, monsieur le ministre.

Comme vous le savez, le groupe de travail Nord-Sud, qui a présenté son rapport il y a environ deux ans, observait que si le Canada désirait atteindre le niveau d'aide réclamé par les Nations Unies et par d'autres organisations mondiales, c'est-à-dire 0,07 p. 100, il faudrait augmenter chaque année, de façon continue, le niveau de l'aide pour atteindre ce 0,07 p. 100.

Or, si l'aide ne diminue pas véritablement, elle traverse du moins une période de stagnation, elle a cessé de croître, et dans ces conditions, est-ce que le gouvernement s'interroge sérieusement sur les moyens d'atteindre ce niveau de 0,07 p. 100?

M. Regan: Le gouvernement a pris l'engagement de faire tout son possible pour atteindre cet objectif d'ici à la fin de la décennie, et je suis convaincu que nous ferons des progrès. Je vous signale que votre argument fondé sur ce qui s'est passé l'année dernière est une aberration, à cause de l'entrée en

[Text]

I referred to in the House. If you wait until next year, I think you will see a more accurate record of what has been happening. I believe we are, and will continue to be, able to make progress in that direction.

Mr. Ogle: One more.

The Chairman: One last question, fine.

Mr. Ogle: It is a different thrust, but I know the minister will be interested in it.

Last week, I and some of my colleagues over here were at the United Nations, and during that period of time I had an opportunity to meet a number of American people, civilians and friends and so on, in New York and area. It would seem that there is a kind of great enthusiasm after the great victory in Grenada. I could hear very clearly a kind of a new war beat, that the United States has regained its power as a military nation and they could beat anybody now.

Has the Government of Canada been doing anything, or sending messages to the United States condemning the presence of military forces in Central America recently?

Mr. Regan: Well, you will know that the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State, Mr. MacEachen, in his recent discussions attained assurances from Mr. Dam, the Deputy Secretary of State of the United States, that their country has no plans to invade Nicaragua. The Canadian position remains that which it has been, one of encouraging all useful steps towards peace and disarmament in Central America, and the strong support, as you are aware, of the Contadora Group and their efforts to achieve stabilization and peace in that area. We have placed our faith in that process and we hope that the climate of tension prevailing in Central America will subside.

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I am confident that Mr. Dam was speaking in a forthright manner when he indicated to Mr. MacEachen that the United States has no plans for military intervention in Nicaragua.

The Chairman: Thank you both.

Next is the vice-chairman of our committee, the hon. member from York South—Weston, Mrs. Apolloni, followed by the hon. member from Edmonton Strathcona.

Mrs. Apolloni: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Minister, I would start, if I may, with a comment rather than a question or a plea, that you would withstand any kind of pressure to impose any kind of guidelines on diplomatic or military spouses. As you will remember, the low morale of the foreign services, and more particularly of the spouses, was very evident in the McDougall report. Also, I would like to make particular reference to the Gotlieb writings. I for one, Mr. Minister, feel the Americans have been damned lucky in getting the Gotliebs. They got two for the price of one—a darn good ambassador and an excellent writer. But if we start telling writers particularly what they should write and what they should not, we are running into all sorts of difficulties. So please withstand that kind of pressure.

[Translation]

vigueur du projet de loi dont j'ai parlé à la Chambre. Si vous attendez l'année prochaine, vous aurez une idée bien plus claire de la situation. À mon sens, nous faisons des progrès et nous allons continuer à en faire.

M. Ogle: Une autre question.

Le président: Une dernière question, parfait.

M. Ogle: Je change de sujet, mais je sais que cela va intéresser le ministre.

La semaine dernière, j'étais aux Nations Unies avec un certain nombre de mes collègues, et j'ai eu l'occasion de rencontrer un certain nombre d'Américains, des civils, des amis, etc., à New York et dans la région. J'ai pu constater que leur grande victoire, à la Grenade, suscitait pas mal d'enthousiasme. Il m'a semblé entendre clairement les tambours de guerre; pour eux, les États-Unis sont redevenus une puissance militaire qui peut battre n'importe qui.

Est-ce que le gouvernement du Canada a fait quelque chose? A-t-on envoyé des messages aux États-Unis pour condamner la présence de forces militaires en Amérique centrale?

M. Regan: Vous devez savoir que le vice-premier ministre et secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, M. MacEachen, a eu des entretiens, récemment, avec M. Dam, le sous-secrétaire d'État des États-Unis, qui lui a assuré qu'ils n'avaient pas l'intention d'envahir le Nicaragua. La position canadienne demeure toujours la même: encourager toutes les mesures susceptibles de conduire à la paix et au désarmement en Amérique centrale et de contribuer au maximum, vous ne l'ignorez pas, aux efforts du Groupe Contadora dont l'objectif est de ramener la stabilité et la paix dans cette région. Nous avons foi en cette initiative et nous espérons que le climat de tension prévalant en Amérique centrale se dissipera.

Je suis convaincu de la franchise de M. Dam lorsqu'il a indiqué à M. MacEachen que les États-Unis n'ont pas l'intention d'intervenir militairement au Nicaragua.

Le président: Merci à tous les deux.

L'intervenant suivant est le vice-président de notre Comité, le député de York South—Weston, M^{me} Apolloni, suivie du député d'Edmonton Strathcona.

Mme Apolloni: Merci, monsieur le président.

Monsieur le ministre, avec votre permission, je commencerai par un commentaire ou un plaidoyer, plutôt qu'une question, en vous demandant de résister à toute pression réclamant l'imposition de directives aux conjoints de diplomates ou de militaires. Vous vous souviendrez que le rapport McDougall a démontré à l'évidence que le moral des services étrangers, et plus particulièrement des conjoints des membres de ces services, était au plus bas. J'aimerais tout particulièrement faire également référence à l'affaire Gotlieb. Personnellement, monsieur le ministre, j'estime que les Américains ont la chance incroyable d'avoir les Gotlieb. Ils en ont deux pour le prix d'un, un excellent ambassadeur et un excellent écrivain. Mais si nous commençons à dire aux écrivains ce qu'ils devraient et ce qu'ils

[Texte]

We also have to remember that diplomatic spouses and military spouses, because they run the same gamut of problems—I do not think anyone expects them . . .

Mr. Regan: Political spouses also.

Mrs. Appolloni: Political too. When they promise to love, honour and obey, they do not promise to love, honour and obey any guidelines laid down by External Affairs or any other department. So watch that.

Mr. Minister, at the beginning of October of this year several of us had the privilege of meeting with Derek Davies, the editor of *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, which is a very prestigious paper in Hong Kong. Mr. Davies obviously was being very polite, as our guest. He did not exactly say we were too naive; he did not say that; but essentially the implication was, in our search for foreign trade, particularly when it came to the case of Taiwan. He said he felt that Canadians, as the British, were too doctrinaire in their approach, that we should perhaps be more pragmatic, as indeed the Chinese are.

I brought this up with your colleague, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, at our last meeting, and suggested . . . As politicians we fully realize the political implications of this, but surely we could go at least as far as some of our allies and concentrate on putting down some unofficial ties, if you will, with Taiwan in the pragmatic interest of trade. Your colleague said that he would not object to a chamber of commerce in Taiwan. What would be your reaction to that, Mr. Minister?

Mr. Regan: I always agree with my colleague, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, of course.

I believe there is a considerable amount of trade taking place between Canada and Taiwan and that there is the potential for more to take place. The Canadian policy that recognizes only one China affects legitimate, private contacts between Canada and Taiwan—trade, tourism, private cultural visits and so on.

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Canadians normally apply for a visa to Taiwan at offices of the Coordinating Council for North American Affairs, operated by Taiwan in the United States, and there is no question but that trade is encouraged. Export programs designed to assist Canadian companies, such as the Program for Export Market Development, PEMD, are available to all Canadian companies irrespective of the potential market.

I would be happy to see the amount of trade grow. We feel that we cannot have governmental contacts, and we certainly are actively exploring the option you have referred to of an

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ne devraient pas écrire, nous courons au-devant des difficultés. Je vous prie donc de résister à ce genre de pression.

Nous ne devons pas oublier également que les conjoints des diplomates et des militaires, étant donné qu'ils rencontrent le même genre de problèmes—je ne pense pas que quiconque attende d'eux . . .

M. Regan: Les conjoints des politiciens ou des politiciennes également.

Mme Appolloni: Également. Lorsqu'ils font leur promesse d'amour, d'honneur et d'obéissance, ils ne font pas la promesse d'aimer, d'honorer et d'obéir aux directives des Affaires extérieures, ou de tout autre ministère. Faites-y donc attention.

Monsieur le ministre, au début du mois d'octobre, plusieurs d'entre nous ont eu le privilège de rencontrer Derek Davies, le rédacteur de *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, journal très prestigieux de Hong Kong. Étant notre invité, il est évident que M. Davies a été très poli. Il n'a pas exactement dit que nous étions trop naïfs—il ne l'a pas dit directement, mais indirectement, il nous l'a laissé sentir—en matière de commerce international, s'agissant tout particulièrement de Taiwan. Selon lui, les Canadiens, tout comme les Britanniques, sont trop doctrinaires dans leurs démarches, ils devraient peut-être être plus pragmatiques, comme le sont les Chinois.

J'en ai parlé à votre collègue, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, lors de notre dernière réunion, et j'ai suggéré . . . En tant que politiciens, nous en comprenons pleinement les implications politiques, mais nous pourrions quand même, pour le moins, aller aussi loin que certains de nos alliés, et tisser quelques liens officieux, si vous voulez, avec Taiwan, pour servir les intérêts pragmatiques du commerce. Votre collègue nous a répondu qu'il ne s'opposerait pas à l'établissement d'une chambre de commerce à Taiwan. Qu'en pensez-vous, monsieur le ministre?

M. Regan: Je suis, bien entendu, toujours d'accord avec mon collègue, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures.

Je crois que les échanges commerciaux entre le Canada et Taiwan sont considérables et que la possibilité de faire plus existe. La politique canadienne, qui ne reconnaît qu'une seule Chine, affecte les contacts légitimes et privés entre le Canada et Taiwan, le commerce, le tourisme, les visites culturelles privées, etc.

Généralement, les Canadiens font une demande de visa pour Taiwan auprès des bureaux du *Coordinating Council for North American Affairs* (Conseil de coordination pour les affaires nord-américaines) de Taiwan, aux États-Unis, et il est indubitable que le commerce est encouragé. Des programmes d'exportation destinés à aider les compagnies canadiennes, comme celui de l'expansion des marchés d'exportation, le PEME, sont à la disposition de toutes les compagnies canadiennes, quel que soit le marché visé.

Je verrais avec plaisir le volume de ce commerce augmenter. Nous estimons ne pas pouvoir établir de contacts gouvernementaux et nous étudions activement l'option à laquelle vous

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office operated by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan to help facilitate further growth in that trade.

Mrs. Appolloni: Mr. Minister, the *Nuclear Industry Review: Problems and Prospects for 1981-2000*, from Energy, Mines and Resources, page 32, says:

Canada's agreement to recognize the People's Republic of China effectively rules out nuclear co-operation between Canada and Taiwan.

But then it goes on:

Taiwan is, after Korea, the world's second largest competitive market for reactors with an aggressive nuclear program based on six American OWR's. It also purchased an experimental Canadian reactor in the early 1970's.

I realize there are difficulties because we do not have government-to-government interface. I realize also that Taiwan has not, I think, signed the non-proliferation treaty, but if it were to sign that treaty, do you see any prospect at all in the fairly near future of Canada being able to sell Candu reactors to Taiwan?

Mr. Regan: I see rather incredible difficulties. First of all, Taiwan has not signed the non-proliferation treaty. Secondly, there is the requirement for the international inspection organization to be able regularly to inspect. Thirdly, there must be an agreement between governments providing such undertakings, and since Taiwan is not a government that is recognized by Canada as long as they continue to purport themselves to be China, then it seems to me there are problems that defy solution in achieving the sale of a nuclear reactor to Taiwan. I think that is unfortunate, but that is the situation at present.

Mrs. Appolloni: Mr. Minister, continuing on the . . .

Mr. Regan: I guess I would want to add to that, as one particularly responsible for trade, that it is a case where we cannot have our cake and eat it too. We have our relations with China, which is where we are selling a tremendous amount of wheat and an increasing number of value-added goods and which in the future is going steadily to grow as a market and become, because of its vast nature, incredibly important. It would indeed be a short-sighted policy for any Canadian government to endanger the incredible long-term potential of that market and of the good relations we have enjoyed with China to achieve the benefit of the sale of a nuclear reactor in Taiwan.

Mrs. Appolloni: And yet, Mr. Minister, several experts in the field say that other countries, such as the U.S., have not suffered vis-à-vis their relations with China because of trade they have conducted with Taiwan.

Mr. Regan: Oh, indeed; and we do trade with Taiwan and I would like to see our trade grow. We have not had the historical trade with Taiwan that the United States has had, but I think there are good opportunities for the growth of two-way trade. Indeed, they are sometimes one of my problems in relation to the amount of certain types of textiles they send

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venez de faire allusion, à savoir l'ouverture d'un bureau de la Chambre de commerce canadienne à Taiwan, pour faciliter encore plus la croissance de ce commerce.

Mme Appolloni: Monsieur le ministre, selon l'étude réalisée par Énergie, Mines et Ressources sur l'industrie nucléaire, ses problèmes et perspectives pour les années 1981 à 2000:

La reconnaissance de la République populaire de Chine par le Canada interdit toute coopération nucléaire entre le Canada et Taiwan.

Un peu plus loin:

Taiwan, après la Corée, est le deuxième marché compétitif le plus important du monde pour les réacteurs, avec un programme nucléaire dynamique reposant sur six réacteurs de la filière américaine. Taiwan a également acheté un réacteur canadien expérimental au début des années 70.

Je comprends qu'il y ait des difficultés, car il n'existe pas de rapports de gouvernement à gouvernement. Je sais également que Taiwan n'a pas, je crois, signé le traité de non-prolifération, mais si ce pays signait ce traité, entrevoyez-vous la possibilité, dans un avenir assez immédiat, de la vente de réacteurs CANDU par le Canada à Taiwan?

M. Regan: J'entrevois plutôt des difficultés incroyables. Premièrement, Taiwan n'a pas signé le traité de non-prolifération. Deuxièmement, il faut que l'organisme d'inspection international puisse procéder à des inspections de manière régulière. Troisièmement, il faut qu'un protocole d'entente soit signé entre les gouvernements, et comme Taiwan n'est pas un gouvernement reconnu par le Canada, tant que ce gouvernement continuera à s'affirmer comme le seul représentant de la Chine, il me semble que ce sont des problèmes insolubles, interdisant toute vente de réacteur nucléaire à Taiwan. Je trouve cela malheureux, mais c'est la situation actuelle.

Mme Appolloni: Monsieur le ministre, toujours à ce même sujet . . .

M. Regan: Je voudrais ajouter qu'en tant que responsable du commerce, c'est un de ces cas où il faut choisir; on ne peut pas tout avoir. Il y a nos rapports avec la Chine, à laquelle nous vendons des quantités énormes de blé et un nombre croissant de produits finis et qui, de plus en plus, devient un marché croissant et, de par sa nature, devient incroyablement important. Qu'un gouvernement canadien mette en danger les possibilités incroyables, à long terme, de ce marché, ainsi que les bonnes relations que nous avons établies avec la Chine, dans le seul but de vendre un réacteur nucléaire à Taiwan serait une décision politique à très courte vue.

Mme Appolloni: Et pourtant, monsieur le ministre, plusieurs spécialistes dans le domaine disent que d'autres pays, tels que les États-Unis, n'ont pas mis en danger leurs rapports avec la Chine pour avoir des échanges commerciaux avec Taiwan.

M. Regan: Bien sûr, et nous commerçons avec Taiwan, et j'aimerais que ces échanges croissent. Notre commerce, historiquement parlant, avec Taiwan n'est pas celui des États-Unis, mais je pense qu'une croissance des échanges dans les deux sens a de bonnes chances. La quantité de certains types de textiles qu'ils exportent chez nous me pose parfois des

[Texte]

into this country. So it would be wrong to suggest that there is not a healthy trade between our countries.

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Mrs. Appolloni: Again, dealing with the Candu reactor for the moment, Romania is already committed. This particular report points out that Australia, with its abundant uranium, could be interested in the Candu, as well as many smaller industrial countries which are clearly desirable customers from both economic and proliferation perspectives. What is the status now of the Candu? How well or how badly are we doing in selling it abroad?

Mr. Regan: In answering that question, may I first just give you a figure to show that our trade with Taiwan is pretty darned substantial. In 1982 we sold \$307 million worth of goods to Taiwan, as compared with \$232 million—well, nearly \$233 million... the previous year. So it is a trade which is having an important growth.

The Chairman: How much have we bought from them?

Mr. Regan: We imported from them \$661 million worth, so we...

Mrs. Appolloni: That is 100% more.

Mr. Regan: Yes.

A Witness: We have a big deficit.

Mr. Regan: Yes, we have a big deficit with Taiwan in trade, and a great amount of it is in textiles.

Now, coming to your question about Australia...

Mrs. Appolloni: The Candu in general, and Australia in specific.

Mr. Regan: I have just returned from a trade mission to Australia, and it certainly continues to appear that Australia has no intention of entering the nuclear electrical generation option in the foreseeable future. Indeed, the present Government of Australia has limited uranium mining in that country to the present mines and to one other possibility, because of some public pressure in that regard. They have very, very substantial quantities of coal and feel they do not have, in the short run, to pursue the nuclear route.

In relation to countries in general, we have been going through a time period when, because of the flattening out of economic growth in the world, and indeed, a serious recession in many parts of the world, there has not been the previous rate of escalation in the usage of electricity that would cause numbers of new countries to look for new sources of generation, and that has imposed a seriously dampening impact upon our efforts to sell Candu reactors.

I believe a number of opportunities are evolving, are coming, and frankly, beyond those you already know from public sources, I would not consider it in the interests of our efforts to sell or to get a head start on some of our competitors in that field to discuss in any order of priority those which I feel are

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problèmes. Il serait donc faux de dire qu'il n'y a pas de bons échanges commerciaux entre nos pays.

Mme Appolloni: Pour revenir au réacteur CANDU, il y a déjà la Roumanie. Ce rapport, en particulier, signale que l'Australie, avec son abondance de réserves en uranium, pourrait s'intéresser au CANDU, ainsi que nombre de petits pays industrialisés qui sont à l'évidence des clients souhaitables, tant du point de vue économique que de la non-prolifération. Quel est le statut actuel du CANDU? Quelle est notre performance, bonne ou mauvaise, de vente à l'étranger?

M. Regan: Pourrais-je tout d'abord vous citer un chiffre indiquant l'ampleur de nos échanges commerciaux avec Taïwan? En 1982, nous avons vendu pour 307 millions de dollars de marchandises à Taïwan, comparativement à 232 millions de dollars—presque 233 millions de dollars—l'année précédente. C'est donc un commerce qui connaît une forte croissance.

Le président: Que leur avons-nous acheté?

M. Regan: Nos importations se sont montées à 661 millions de dollars; donc, nous...

Mme Appolloni: Cela fait 100 p. 100 de plus.

M. Regan: Oui.

Un témoin: Un gros déficit.

M. Regan: Oui, le déficit commercial avec Taïwan est important, et ce sont surtout les textiles qui en sont responsables.

Maintenant, pour ce qui est de l'Australie...

Mme Appolloni: Le CANDU en général, et l'Australie en particulier.

M. Regan: Je reviens justement d'une mission commerciale en Australie, et il continue d'être apparent que l'Australie n'a nullement l'intention d'opter pour la production électrique nucléaire dans un avenir prévisible. Le gouvernement actuel de l'Australie a limité l'extraction de l'uranium aux mines actuellement exploitées, avec la possibilité de l'ouverture d'une mine supplémentaire à cause des pressions de l'opinion publique à ce sujet. Ils ont des quantités de charbon très importantes et ils estiment ne pas avoir, à court terme, à opter pour la filière nucléaire.

Pour ce qui est des autres pays en général, nous venons de traverser une période pendant laquelle, dû au peu de croissance économique et à une récession grave dans certaines parties du monde, le rythme précédent d'utilisation de l'électricité ne s'est pas poursuivi et n'a donc pas incité un certain nombre de nouveaux pays à rechercher de nouvelles sources d'énergie, ce qui a sérieusement freiné nos efforts de vente de réacteurs CANDU.

Un certain nombre de possibilités commencent à se manifester, mais au-delà de ce qui est déjà connu publiquement, je ne pense pas qu'il serait dans notre intérêt de donner la priorité à des efforts exagérés de vente, par rapport à certains de nos concurrents dans ce domaine. Il reste que si le redressement

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opportunities in the near future. But certainly if it spreads beyond North America, where it exists in Canada and the United States at the present time, economic recovery would increase the opportunities we would have.

The Chairman: Thank you, Madam Appolloni.

The hon. member from Edmonton—Strathcona, Mr. Kilgour.

M. Kilgour: Merci, monsieur le président.

Mr. Minister, you indicated to my friend that the major features of Canadian foreign policy should be known to us all. I have been trying to determine these major features now for some weeks. So may I ask you a series of short questions, and you can bring me up to date on some of these various headings?

Mr. Regan: I certainly will do my best to do so.

The Chairman: If you like, Mr. Kilgour, if you have many more, it is a good custom which we try to establish also that if you want to have a more detailed answer, we could also ask for it in writing. So you could get both.

Mr. Kilgour: I will start with an easy one, Mr. Minister. Is it the government's position that increasing conventional forces in NATO would reduce the likelihood of a nuclear conflict in western Europe?

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Mrs. Appolloni: It is far from trade.

Mr. Regan: No, but I have some responsibilities . . .

Do you mind if I consult?

Mr. Kilgour: As long as it does not eat up my time, Mr. Minister.

The Chairman: By a stretch of the imagination, I think he could answer any question.

Mr. Regan: Being number two in the department, I do not like to speculate too far in the absence of Mr. MacEachen. I can give you my basic feeling, that Canada is reluctant to see the increase of any type of armament, and particularly reluctant to see the increase of any type of armament in Europe, where the major superpowers of the world in effect confront each other over such a short distance.

The question of whether the conventional imbalance is best redressed through a build-up on the NATO side, such as I gather you are suggesting . . .

Mr. Kilgour: From the standpoint of avoiding a dreaded nuclear conflict.

Mr. Regan: —or by negotiating significant verifiable and equitable arms control agreements is a very real one. There is a forum for such negotiations existing in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna, but unfortunately those are not active at the present time.

[Translation]

économique en Amérique du Nord, au Canada et aux États-Unis s'étend au reste du monde, nos possibilités croîtront d'autant.

Le président: Merci, madame Appolloni.

Le député d'Edmonton—Strathcona, monsieur Kilgour.

Mr. Kilgour: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Monsieur le ministre, vous avez indiqué à mon ami que les principales caractéristiques de la politique étrangère canadienne devraient être connues de tous. Cela fait maintenant quelques semaines que j'essaie de déterminer quelles sont ces caractéristiques principales. Pourrais-je donc vous poser une série de petites questions, et pourriez-vous me donner les derniers renseignements?

M. Regan: Je m'efforcerai de faire mon possible.

Le président: Si vous le voulez, monsieur Kilgour, si vos questions sont nombreuses, c'est une coutume que nous essayons d'établir, si vous voulez des réponses plus détaillées, vous pourriez demander à les avoir par écrit. Vous pouvez avoir les deux genres de réponses, si vous le voulez.

M. Kilgour: Je commencerai par une question facile, monsieur le ministre. Le gouvernement estime-t-il qu'une augmentation des forces conventionnelles de l'OTAN réduirait la possibilité d'un conflit nucléaire en Europe de l'Ouest?

Mme Appolloni: Nous sommes loin du commerce.

M. Regan: Non, mais j'ai d'autres responsabilités . . .

Voyez-vous un inconvénient à ce que je consulte mes collaborateurs?

M. Kilgour: Non, tant que cela n'empiète pas sur mon temps de parole, monsieur le ministre.

Le président: En cherchant bien, je crois qu'il pourrait répondre à n'importe quelle question.

M. Regan: N'étant pas responsable de ce ministère, je ne voudrais pas m'avancer trop loin en l'absence de M. MacEachen. Je puis vous dire néanmoins ce que j'en pense: le Canada ne souhaite aucune augmentation d'armes, sous quelque forme que ce soit, et en particulier en Europe, où les principales superpuissances du monde se feraient face sur une distance aussi courte.

Quant à savoir si le déséquilibre ne peut être corrigé qu'en passant par un réarmement de l'OTAN, comme vous le suggérez, je crois . . .

M. Kilgour: Uniquement dans le but d'éviter un conflit nucléaire redoutable.

M. Regan: . . . ou en négociant des accords portant sur le contrôle vérifiable et équitable des armements, cette question est très réelle. On peut négocier la réduction mutuelle et équilibrée des forces dans le cadre qui existe à Vienne, mais malheureusement, ces négociations n'ont pas lieu à l'heure actuelle.

[Texte]

The Prime Minister's current initiative includes seeking ways to provide understandings wherein it would not be necessary for any type of armament to be increased, and indeed, where we could find a lessening of tensions and therefore an eventual reduction in nuclear arms.

I am unable to give you a concrete opinion beyond what I have said: that I have doubts whether the increase of conventional arms on both sides in Europe—because if we increase ours, they are likely to increase theirs—I am doubtful that is a path that would lessen the nuclear threat.

Mr. Kilgour: Is the government in favour of merging the talks—the ones that have just been disbanded, and the strategic or long-range nuclear talks?

Mr. Regan: We have reached a conclusion in the department if such a development were to appear feasible, practical, likely, we would support it, yes.

Mr. Kilgour: Another subject. What is your policy towards Cuba, for example?

Mr. Regan: What is our policy in relation to Cuba?

Mr. Kilgour: Yes.

Mr. Regan: Canada has for many years enjoyed good relations with Cuba. We are very substantial trading partners with Cuba, and if my recollection is correct, they are our second-largest Latin American market.

Bob, is that correct?

Mr. Robert Johnstone (Deputy Minister, International Trade, and Coordinator, International Economic Relations, Ministry of State (International Trade)): I am not sure whether they are second-largest. They are big.

Mr. Regan: They certainly were; it may have dropped off a bit in the last couple of years because of the economic difficulties in Cuba and the restructuring they had to go through. But the sale of goods and services to Cuba certainly results in a substantial number of jobs for Canadians.

Mr. Kilgour: The famous quote about the safety of a nun in the Philippines: what is your priority between human rights in countries like the Philippines and Canadian trade or aid to such countries? Are you prepared to use your aid . . .

Mr. Regan: I am not aware of this quote; I am sorry.

Mr. Kilgour: The Prime Minister's visit to the Philippines—sobody made the comment that the safety of a nun in the Philippines was not a priority of the government. For those of us who think the safety of a nun is important, how far are you prepared to go in using your aid to try to do something about human rights in various countries?

[Traduction]

L'initiative lancée par le premier ministre vise, entre autres, à trouver des terrains d'entente pour qu'aucune augmentation d'armes ne soit nécessaire, entraînant ainsi une diminution des tensions et, par conséquent, une éventuelle réduction des armements nucléaires.

Je ne peux vous donner d'opinion plus concrète que ce que je viens de dire. Je doute fort, cependant, que l'augmentation des armes conventionnelles des deux bords, en Europe—car si nous augmentons nos armes, les autres augmenteront vraisemblablement les leurs—permettrait de dissiper la menace nucléaire.

M. Kilgour: Le gouvernement désire-t-il fusionner les négociations, celles qui viennent d'être interrompues et celles qui portent sur les armements nucléaires stratégiques, ou à longue portée?

M. Regan: Nous pensons, au ministère, que si cela pouvait se faire, nous ne nous y opposerions pas.

M. Kilgour: Autre sujet. Quelle politique suivez-vous envers Cuba, par exemple?

M. Regan: Quelle est notre politique cubaine?

M. Kilgour: Oui.

M. Regan: Pendant de nombreuses années, le Canada a toujours eu de bons rapports avec Cuba. Ce pays est un de nos partenaires commerciaux les plus importants, et si je ne m'abuse, il vient au deuxième rang sur le marché latino-américain.

Bob, est-ce exact?

M. Robert Johnstone (sous-ministre, Commerce international, et coordonnateur, Relations économiques internationales, ministère d'État (Commerce international)): Je ne suis pas sûr que ce soit notre deuxième plus gros partenaire, mais ce marché est très important.

M. Regan: Il l'était sans aucun doute. Ces échanges ont peut-être quelque peu diminué au cours des deux dernières années, en raison des difficultés économiques qu'a connues Cuba, et également en raison de la restructuration de ce pays. Mais la vente de biens et services à Cuba permet à un certain nombre de Canadiens de travailler.

M. Kilgour: À propos de cette fameuse citation portant sur la sécurité d'une religieuse aux Philippines, estimez-vous que les droits de la personne dans des pays comme les Philippines sont prioritaires, ou accordez-vous cette priorité aux échanges commerciaux ou à l'aide qu'apporte le Canada à ces pays? Êtes-vous disposés à apporter votre aide? . . .

M. Regan: Je ne sais pas de quelle citation vous voulez parler, excusez-moi.

M. Kilgour: Lors de la visite du premier ministre aux Philippines, quelqu'un aurait dit que la sécurité d'une religieuse aux Philippines, n'était pas le principal souci du gouvernement. Pour ceux d'entre nous qui pensent que la sécurité d'une religieuse est importante, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous disposés à utiliser l'aide que vous accordez à ces pays pour essayer d'influer sur les droits de la personne?

[Text]

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[Translation]

Mr. Regan: I find there are unsatisfactory standards of adherence to human rights in a wide variety of types of regimes of the left and right. I have felt in this imperfect world that we deeply regret the lack of better adherence to human rights. If we were to take every country in which there had been any violations of human rights, right-wing country or left-wing country, and refuse to give aid, if they are developing countries, because such violations have existed, many people we are able to help in relation to their standard of living, in relation to their opportunity to support their families and to build the economy, would suffer as a consequence. Our view is that unless the situation is so grave as to amount to something akin to a breach in diplomatic relations, we have to recognize that aid, when provided, is to the benefit of the people.

Mr. Kilgour: You will be aware that there is a hunger strike, Mr. Minister, in Montreal of 30 people from Bangladesh—refugees. They have been trying to meet with the minister. They have asked if I could arrange an appointment with the minister. Would you give your undertaking that you will meet with the delegation tomorrow, or that he will? He is not present.

Mr. Regan: I am afraid I am unaware of this group of . . .

Mr. Kilgour: There is a hunger strike going on in Montreal. The chairman will be aware of it. There are about 30 refugees from Bangladesh who want to restore democracy and civil rights in their country. They have not eaten, I gather, for something like 10 days. They want to meet with your colleague, Mr. MacEachen. Mr. MacEachen has not given them a time to meet. Are you prepared here in public to give an undertaking that he will meet with a delegation from them tomorrow or the next day?

Mr. Regan: Well, first of all, they have not requested a meeting with me . . .

Mr. Kilgour: It is with your colleague.

Mr. Regan: —and they are presumably not concerned with trade matters. I think since the request has been made to the Secretary of State for External Affairs it is best for the minister to evaluate the circumstance and to respond.

Mr. Kilgour: Well, okay.

You made the statement on a different subject that I made a note of that Canadian relations with the U.S. were excellent, I think was your term.

Mr. Regan: Incidentally, I might say that officials from CEIC are going to Montreal to meet with them.

Mr. Kilgour: Tomorrow?

Mr. de Montigny Marchand (Deputy Minister, Political Affairs, Ministry of State (International Trade)): Very shortly. I do not know when, but I am told that they are going.

Mr. Kilgour: Tomorrow?

M. Regan: J'estime que le respect des droits de l'homme demeure nettement insuffisant dans un certain nombre de pays, qu'ils soient de gauche ou de droite. Dans ce monde imparfait, nous regrettons profondément ce non-respect des droits de la personne. Si nous devons refuser d'accorder notre aide à chaque pays où il y aurait eu violation des droits de la personne, que ces pays soient de droite ou de gauche, et si, de plus, ces pays étaient des pays en développement, car ces violations existent, de nombreuses personnes que nous avons pu aider à hausser leur niveau de vie et à subvenir aux besoins de leurs familles, ainsi qu'à renforcer l'économie, en souffriraient. A moins que la situation soit si grave qu'elle puisse entraîner une rupture des relations diplomatiques, nous devons reconnaître que l'aide que nous accordons profite à la population.

M. Kilgour: Vous savez sans doute que 30 réfugiés du Bangladesh font une grève de la faim, monsieur le ministre, à Montréal. Ils essaient depuis longtemps de rencontrer le ministre, et ils m'ont demandé si je pouvais organiser un rendez-vous avec ce dernier. Pouvons-nous espérer que vous rencontrerez cette délégation demain, ou que le ministre le fera? Il n'est pas présent à l'heure actuelle.

M. Regan: Je crains ne pas être au courant de ce groupe de . . .

M. Kilgour: Ces réfugiés font une grève de la faim à Montréal. Le président doit être au courant. Ils sont environ 30, originaires du Bangladesh, qui veulent restaurer la démocratie et les droits civils dans leur pays. Ils n'ont rien pris, je crois, depuis environ dix jours. Ils veulent rencontrer votre collègue, M. MacEachen. Or, ce dernier ne leur a pas fixé de rendez-vous. Êtes-vous disposé, ici, en public, à vous engager à rencontrer une délégation de ce groupe demain, ou après-demain?

M. Regan: Tout d'abord, ils n'ont pas demandé à me rencontrer . . .

M. Kilgour: Non, mais votre collègue, oui.

M. Regan: . . . et ce ne sont vraisemblablement pas des questions de commerce qui les intéressent. Puisque cette demande a été adressée au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, je pense qu'il revient au ministre lui-même d'évaluer les circonstances et de leur faire part de sa décision.

M. Kilgour: Bien.

Autre sujet. J'ai remarqué que vous aviez dit que les relations qu'entretenait le Canada avec les États-Unis étaient excellentes, et je crois reprendre vos propres mots.

M. Regan: D'ailleurs, je dois dire que des hauts fonctionnaires de la Commission canadienne de l'emploi et de l'immigration s'entretiendront avec eux demain, à Montréal.

M. Kilgour: Demain?

M. de Montigny Marchand (sous-ministre, Affaires politiques, ministère d'État (Commerce international)): Très brièvement. Je ne sais pas quand, mais on me dit qu'ils y vont.

M. Kilgour: Demain?

[Texte]

Mr. Marchand: This week.

Mr. Kilgour: You made the statement that our relations with the U.S. were excellent. I think it is fair to say... Father Ogle and I were there last week and I think that is not an accurate—I do not speak for him, but that is not an accurate reflection of what Canada-U.S. relations are like. I would remind you that your department about a year ago decided that improving Canada-U.S. relations was a major priority. Are you prepared to look at things like the 25% back-in in the National Energy Program and the various matters such as FIRA in order to try to increase American investment in Canada so that we can get some people back to work?

Mr. Regan: I consider our relations with the United States to be extremely important. We are the two largest trading partners in the world.

Mr. Kilgour: We know.

Mr. Regan: You are aware of that.

Mr. Kilgour: Yes.

Mr. Regan: The greatest evidence of the satisfactory level of our relations is the fact that \$112 billion or \$113 billion worth of two-way trade can occur with so few irritations or problems. I find that FIRA is not an issue in the United States any longer. I believe it was an issue in the United States in its earlier years, for instance during the time the Conservative government was in office, and I guess prior to that, but the early perceptions of FIRA have changed. There is a better understanding of what it is. There is a better understanding by American businessmen that there are comparable restrictions on Canadian investment, or other foreign investment, in the United States. I, for instance, as a Canadian, would not be eligible to own a broadcasting station in the United States, or to be engaged in coastal shipping in the United States, or to own a uranium mine or a number of other businesses. So I think as that realization and an understanding of the nature of FIRA spread, and, indeed, I would have to say—because justice delayed is justice denied—as administrative responses to applications became more rapid in FIRA, there has been satisfaction in that regard.

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There is a small segment of the energy industry in the United States that still may have its dissatisfaction and misunderstanding or disagreement, if you like, with what you refer to as one aspect of the National Energy Program, but on the other hand, I can take you to many Canadian businessmen who would find some laws in the United States, such as the limitation on the importation of concrete used in state highways—an area of dissatisfaction.

I think on the whole we have excellent relations, and I believe the regular meetings between Secretary Shultz and Mr. MacEachen, the frequent meetings that Mr. Lumley has with Mr. Baldrige, that I have with Mr. Brock and Mr. Baldrige, and that other ministers have had with their counterparts on an increasing basis over the past two years, have been factors

[Traduction]

Mr. Marchand: Cette semaine.

Mr. Kilgour: Vous avez donc dit que nos relations avec les États-Unis étaient excellentes. M. Ogle et moi-même étions là-bas la semaine dernière, et je pense que ce que vous avez dit ne reflète pas, et je ne parle pas en son nom, l'état des relations canado-américaines. Permettez-moi de vous rappeler que votre ministre avait décidé, il y a environ un an, qu'il était essentiel d'améliorer les relations canado-américaines. Êtes-vous disposés à réviser certaines décisions prises, comme la contribution de 25 p. 100 au Programme énergétique national, ainsi que d'autres questions, comme celle portant sur l'Agence d'examen de l'investissement étranger, en vue d'essayer de multiplier les investissements américains au Canada, pour que nous puissions créer des emplois?

M. Regan: Je considère nos relations avec les États-Unis comme étant extrêmement importantes. Nous sommes les deux plus gros partenaires commerciaux du monde.

Mr. Kilgour: Nous le savons.

M. Regan: Vous le savez.

M. Kilgour: Oui.

M. Regan: La plus grande preuve que je puis vous donner de l'excellence de nos relations est le fait que les échanges commerciaux entre nos deux pays, valant 112 ou 113 milliards de dollars, puissent se faire sans heurts notables. Je pense que l'Agence d'examen de l'investissement étranger n'est plus un problème épineux aux États-Unis. Cela l'a été auparavant, en particulier lorsque le gouvernement conservateur était au pouvoir, et également avant, mais l'attitude prise envers cette agence a changé. On la comprend mieux. Les hommes d'affaires américains se rendent davantage compte que des restrictions comparables sont imposées aux investissements canadiens ou aux autres investissements étrangers aux États-Unis. Par exemple, en tant que Canadien, je ne pourrais pas posséder de station de radiodiffusion aux États-Unis, être propriétaire d'une entreprise de pêche côtière ou posséder une mine d'uranium, ou d'autres entreprises. À mesure que le caractère de cette agence a été mieux compris, je dois dire—car toute justice retardée équivaut à un déni de justice—que la satisfaction règne maintenant, que les réponses administratives aux demandes se sont faites plus rapidement à l'agence.

Une petite partie de l'industrie de l'énergie, aux États-Unis, est sans doute toujours mécontente, et des malentendus existent sur un des aspects du Programme énergétique national, mais, par contre, je puis vous citer de nombreux hommes d'affaires canadiens qui sont mécontents de certaines lois américaines, comme celle portant sur la limite imposée à l'importation du béton utilisé pour paver les autoroutes nationales.

Grosso modo, j'estime que nous avons d'excellents rapports, et je crois que les entretiens qu'ont régulièrement le secrétaire d'État, M. Shultz, et M. MacEachen, M. Lumley et M. Baldrige, moi-même et M. Brock et M. Baldrige, et que d'autres ministres ont avec leurs homologues, et ce, de façon accrue depuis deux ans, ont permis d'améliorer les relations

[Text]

in improving governmental relations, and that in turn is reflected in the community. I believe we are enjoying better relations with the United States than we have in many, many years.

The Chairman: Last question, Mr. Kilgour.

Mr. Kilgour: If relations with the United States are so good, Mr. Minister, why is it that about a year ago, I understand, your department decided, I believe, that their top priority would be one of improving relations with the United States? If relations were as good as you suggest they were, presumably, a year ago, why the sudden emphasis on doing something about our relationship with our major trading partner?

Mr. Regan: Very simply, it was because of the fact that, frankly, I was not satisfied—if you are talking about the time after I came into the office—that our relations in the trade field had improved as much as they should and as much as they could have. They had improved quite a bit by then over the previous period of about three years before; the improvement in the past year has been pretty dramatic. I just do not think anyone can point to any areas of serious problems between Canada and the United States today.

Mr. Kilgour: One supplementary?

The Chairman: A short supplementary—very short.

Mr. Kilgour: In this regard, that of improving Canada-U.S. relations, why did you, sir, instruct our ambassador in Washington on the Wednesday—remember, the landings were on the Tuesday—why did you instruct Mr. Gotlieb that Canadians were to be taken off Grenada in Canadian planes? Were you not putting Canadian sovereignty, or some notion of it, ahead of the safety and possibly the lives of the Canadians on Grenada by that incredible instruction to our senior diplomat in Washington?

Mr. Regan: David, it is a terrible thing when you become the captive of your own propaganda.

Mr. Kilgour: Just answer the question.

Mr. Regan: The answer to the question is that I never gave any such instruction. This is a misconception, which has been encouraged by some of your colleagues. I have again and again made it quite clear that the American offer to remove our people from Grenada was non-time-specific and that we never gave the Canadians on Grenada, ever, any suggestion that they wait for a Canadian plane or not take American planes. Indeed, the Canadians were brought out, most of them, on American aircraft. What we had was a situation in which a Canadian aircraft was immediately available to take them out. The Americans would not say when they would be able to take them out. We wanted that plane to be able to go in.

As it turned out, the Americans were busy with their military operations, which is understandable, and apparently there was not apron space—you have seen the airport, I have not—for them to have planes come in and wait. They could allow the Canadian plane to come in and to go out, if all the

[Translation]

gouvernementales, et nous en avons la preuve un peu partout. Je crois que nous avons de meilleurs rapports avec les États-Unis que nous n'avons eus depuis longtemps.

Le président: Dernière question, monsieur Kilgour.

M. Kilgour: Si les rapports sont si bons avec les États-Unis, monsieur le ministre, comment se fait-il que, il y a environ un an, je crois, votre ministère ait décidé d'accorder la priorité à l'amélioration des relations avec les États-Unis? Si les relations sont aussi bonnes qu'il y a un an, d'après vous, pourquoi vouloir, soudainement, accorder la priorité à l'amélioration des relations avec notre principal partenaire commercial?

M. Regan: Tout simplement parce que je n'étais pas satisfait—si vous faites allusion au moment où j'ai été nommé—du degré d'amélioration de nos relations dans le domaine commercial, car, à mon avis, elles auraient pu être meilleures. Mais ces relations s'étaient déjà améliorées un peu à cette époque, par rapport aux trois années antérieures. Mais l'amélioration que nous avons connue au cours de l'année dernière a été considérable. Je ne pense pas que quiconque puisse citer de réels problèmes qui existent entre le Canada et les États-Unis aujourd'hui.

M. Kilgour: Une question supplémentaire?

Le président: Très brève, alors.

M. Kilgour: Dans le cas de l'amélioration de nos relations avec les États-Unis, pourquoi avez-vous demandé à notre ambassadeur à Washington, le lendemain du jour qui a suivi la prise de la Grenade par les États-Unis, d'assurer le départ des Canadiens de la Grenade dans des avions canadiens? Ne placiez-vous pas la souveraineté du Canada, ou une certaine idée de celle-ci, avant la sécurité, et peut-être même la vie, des Canadiens vivant à la Grenade en avisant ainsi notre ambassadeur à Washington?

M. Regan: David, il est terrible de devenir l'esclave de sa propre propaganda.

M. Kilgour: Contentez-vous de répondre à ma question.

M. Regan: Tout ce que je puis vous répondre, c'est que je n'ai jamais donné d'ordre pareil. Il s'agit d'un malentendu qui a été alimenté par certains de vos collègues. J'ai répété, à de nombreuses reprises, que l'offre faite par les Américains de faire sortir nos concitoyens de la Grenade ne valait pas pour une date précise et, d'autre part, nous n'avons jamais donné à penser aux Canadiens à la Grenade qu'ils devaient attendre un avion canadien et ne pas prendre d'avions américains. En fait, la plupart des Canadiens ont pris des avions américains. Ce qui s'est passé, c'est qu'un avion canadien pouvait les faire sortir immédiatement. Or, les Américains, de leur côté, ne pouvaient pas dire quand ils pourraient les faire sortir. Nous voulions que cet avion puisse atterrir.

Comme vous le savez, les Américains menaient leurs opérations militaires, ce qui est compréhensible, et, apparemment, il n'y avait pas suffisamment de place—vous avez vu l'aéroport, pas moi—pour que des avions y atterrissent et attendent. Ils étaient en mesure de permettre à l'avion

[Texte]

Canadians were immediately there and, indeed, the Canadian plane did go in so as to drop off the people who finally rounded up our Canadians and got them to the airport so they could fly out on whatever plane was there, and it was an American plane. But if the Canadian plane had been allowed to stay there until the Canadians came, then we would have got Canadians out more rapidly of course, than in any other way. But at no time did we say that Canadians should not come out on American aircraft. So you are a victim of some of your people's propaganda in that regard.

• 1645

The Chairman: And I am a victim of the clock, so I will recognize now . . .

L'honorable député de Beauharnois—Salaberry, M. Laniel.

M. Laniel: Monsieur le président, monsieur le ministre.

J'ai deux sujets, en particulier, sur lesquels je voudrais poser une question au ministre. La première c'est au sujet des camions, et la deuxième des textiles.

Mr. Regan: Good.

Mr. Laniel: I hope you do not forget, Mr. Minister, that international trade goes both ways and my questions on trucks is going in the wrong direction in my opinion.

Je me demande, monsieur le président, si le ministre pourrait nous faire des commentaires sur la récente décision de la Société canadienne des postes d'acheter 225 camions postaux de la compagnie GM, mais qui sont fabriqués à 100 p. 100 aux États-Unis.

Mr. Minister, I am sure you are aware that a Canadian company, the Fleet company, has made a bid for those trucks, and that company buys the frame of a truck from GM but, at least the bodies of the trucks are made in Canada. Yet, for a relatively small difference, the Post Office department, the new Post Office society, has decided to buy the GM trucks. So I am not sure that this decision was made in the best interest of Canada.

Monsieur le président, si on lit tout ce qui a été écrit dans les journaux au sujet de cette transaction, je pense que la décision d'acheter un camion qui sera totalement fabriqué aux États-Unis et importé via *GM Canada* est complètement au désavantage du commerce entre notre pays et les États-Unis, c'est-à-dire au désavantage des intérêts des travailleurs canadiens. Les mêmes articles des journaux disaient que cette question allait être révisée par M. Lapointe. Je comprends que cela ne dépend pas directement du ministre du Commerce extérieur, du ministre qui est devant nous, mais comme cette question sera sûrement soumise au cabinet ou du moins à un certain comité du cabinet au sein duquel il pourrait siéger, est-ce que le ministre lui-même a entendu parler, d'abord de cette transaction, et ensuite a-t-il entendu les commentaires qui ont été faits dans les journaux par les représentants de l'industrie comme par les politiciens, les représentants politiques de la province de Québec et même par son collègue, l'honorable Charles

[Traduction]

canadien d'atterrir et de décoller si les Canadiens étaient là, et prêts. En fait, l'avion canadien a atterri pour déposer les gens qui allaient rassembler les Canadiens et les réunir à l'aéroport. Ils sont finalement partis dans un avion américain. Mais si on avait permis à l'avion canadien de rester, nous aurions pu sortir nos gens plus rapidement. Nous n'avons cependant jamais dit que les Canadiens ne pouvaient pas partir à bord d'un avion américain. Alors, vous êtes victime de votre propagande à cet égard.

Le président: Et moi, je suis victime de l'heure; alors, je reconnais maintenant . . .

The honourable member from Beauharnois—Salaberry, Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Minister.

I have two subjects in particular on which I would like to ask questions. The first has to do with trucks, and the second with textiles.

M. Regan: Bien.

M. Laniel: J'espère que vous n'oubliez pas, monsieur le ministre, que le commerce international va dans les deux sens, mais ma question sur les camions ne va pas dans le bon sens, selon moi.

I am wondering, Mr. Chairman, if the minister could make some comment on the recent decision of the Canada Post Corporation to buy 225 postal trucks from the GM Company, which are 100% manufactured in the United States.

Je pense que vous êtes au courant, monsieur le ministre, qu'une compagnie canadienne, *Fleet*, a fait une offre pour ces camions, et que cette compagnie achète le châssis des camions de la compagnie GM, mais au moins, la carrosserie des camions est fabriquée au Canada. Mais à cause d'une petite différence de prix, la Société canadienne des Postes a décidé d'acheter les camions GM. Je ne suis pas convaincu que cette décision est dans les meilleurs intérêts du Canada.

Mr. Chairman, if we read what has been written in the papers about this transaction, I think the decision to buy a truck which is totally manufactured in the United States and imported through GM Canada is completely disadvantageous to trade between our country and the United States, namely to the disadvantage of the Canadian workers. The same newspaper articles said that this question was going to be reviewed by Mr. Lapointe. I understand that this does not depend directly on the Minister of International Trade, the minister who is before us, but as this question will certainly be submitted to the Cabinet, or at least to some Cabinet committee on which he may sit, has the minister heard any discussion, first of all about this transaction, and secondly, comments which have been made in the newspapers and by representatives of the industry, such as politicians, political representatives from the Province of Quebec, and even by his colleague, the honourable Charles Lapointe? May we hope that the Cabinet will take the

[Text]

Lapointe? Est-ce qu'on peut espérer que le cabinet se donnera la peine d'examiner cette question afin d'être bien certain que la décision qui a été prise par la Société des postes soit dans le meilleur intérêt des travailleurs canadiens, et non seulement de GM?

M. Regan: Monsieur le président, je veux vous remercier pour cette question. Je sais peu de l'affaire des camions américains, mais j'étudierai la question avant la réunion du cabinet. Je crois qu'il est très important de relever qu'il est possible pour les étrangers de vendre leurs produits, comme des camions, dans notre pays... in the same way we expect to sell our trucks or other products, such as our cars to the subway of New York, for example, to refer to the Bombardier situation.

• 1650

One problem is in our adherence to international trade rules, and the multilateral trading rules are extremely important to a country like Canada which depends for so much of our GNP upon our exports. If we are too restrictive in relation to our government procurement—that is, in purchases of equipment by our government departments as against companies bidding from other countries—then we will find that the markets in the public sector, if you like, in those countries will be closed to us, also. You well may say that, indeed, often those markets are closed to us anyway, and sometimes they are, but for very obvious reasons, we have to be one of the strongest proponents of liberal, open, multilateral trade and of following the rules of GATT.

I am not too familiar with the particular circumstance you have referred to, so I am not sure if it falls into an area where we have international obligations to allow international tenders, but it would appear that it may. I will inquire into that and be well informed for you when the matter comes before Cabinet.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Chairman, I thank the minister. Actually, my concern was to bring this case to his attention because it is the first opportunity that I have had to do so, and it is the last opportunity between now and the next session. Also, of course, I do not know when this committee will reconvene. It is a chance for me to air this situation again.

If the minister or the Post Office department can prove to me that they made a decision based on the rules of bidding, on the GATT agreement convention and all that, and that is nothing is really contravening our system of bids and submissions, I will not quarrel with the decision. But the fact that it has been brought up in the press and particularly, in the journal *La Presse* in Montreal; that some editorials have been written on this question, and because of the political situation between Ottawa and Quebec, as you very much know about, I just wanted to bring it to the attention of the minister. I hope it will be re-examined by him and by Cabinet.

My second question is about textiles. On September 6, Mr. Minister, you replied to Peter Clark of the Canadian Apparel Manufacturers Institute. At that time you referred to a recent Canadian request for consultation with Hong Kong, China,

[Translation]

trouble to study this question in order to be certain that the decision that has been made by the Canada Post Corporation is in the best interests of Canadian workers and not only of G.M.?

Mr. Regan: Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for this question. I do not know very much about this matter of American trucks, but I will study the question before the Cabinet meeting. I think it is very important to point out that it is possible for foreigners to sell their products, such as trucks, in our country... Comme nous pensons vendre nos camions ou autres produits, tels que nos wagons pour le métro de New York dans le cas de Bombardier.

Nous avons un problème pour ce qui est des règles de commerce international, car ces règles de commerce multilatéral sont extrêmement importantes pour un pays comme le Canada, dont le P.N.B. dépend pour une bonne part de ses exportations. Si nous imposons trop de conditions à nos achats gouvernementaux, aux achats d'équipement par nos ministères auprès de sociétés étrangères nous faisant des offres, nous nous apercevrons que les marchés du secteur public, dans ces pays, nous seront également fermés. Vous rétorquerez peut-être que ces marchés sont de toute façon fermés, et c'est parfois vrai, mais pour des raisons tout à fait évidentes, nous devons être parmi les défenseurs les plus fermes d'un commerce multilatéral ouvert et libéral et des règlements du GATT.

Je ne suis pas très au courant des circonstances particulières dont vous avez parlé, si bien que je ne sais pas si c'est un secteur dans lequel nous avons des obligations internationales visant les appels d'offres internationaux, mais c'est possible. Je me renseignerai, et je saurai de quoi il retourne lorsque la question sera étudiée par le Cabinet.

M. Laniel: Monsieur le président, je remercie le ministre, car je voulais en fait surtout attirer son attention là-dessus, et c'est la première occasion que j'en ai. C'est d'ailleurs probablement la dernière occasion qui m'est offerte avant la prochaine session. Je ne sais pas non plus quand le Comité sera reconstitué. Je suis donc content de pouvoir à nouveau soulever le problème.

Si le ministre ou les Postes pouvaient me prouver que la décision a été fondée sur les règles d'offre, sur la convention du GATT, etc., et qu'il n'y a rien là de contraire à notre système d'offres et de soumissions, je m'en déclarerai satisfait. Du fait, toutefois, que l'on en a parlé dans les journaux, et en particulier dans *La Presse*, de Montréal, que certains éditoriaux ont été rédigés à ce sujet et que, du fait de la situation politique entre Ottawa et Québec, ce problème peut être important, je souhaitais attirer l'attention du ministre. J'espère qu'il le réexaminera et que le Cabinet pourra y réfléchir.

Ma deuxième question porte sur les textiles. Le 6 septembre, vous avez, monsieur le ministre, répondu à Peter Clark, du *Canadian Apparel Manufacturers Institute*, en faisant allusion à une demande récente de consultation, par le Canada, à

[Texte]

Korea and Taiwan, pursuant to the provisions, of our bilateral textile and clothing trade arrangement, with the objective of achieving a more orderly marketing of clothing imports by preventing disruptive concentration in any one quarter of the year. I recall having discussed the whole matter a few times with you, Mr. Minister, and I agree that, like you say in that letter, it is not easy for the government unilaterally to establish global quotas under Article XIX.

However, at the same time, I am concerned very much about the time this government is taking really to protect the garment industry in Canada, which actually has its effect on the whole textile industry. When we look at the statistics, we discover that, in the first 10 months of this year, importation from those 4 countries has increased 31% in comparison with the first 10 months of last year.

• 1655

Of course, you might say that last year the economy was down and we can have difficulty to compare a year where the consumer was spending less. However, if you look at the imports coming from all countries from 1979 up to today, in 1979 149 million pieces of garments were imported; in 1980, 138 million; in 1981, 161 million; in 1982, 159 million... and in 10 months we are up to 175 million pieces of garment.

What are we going to do to save that industry? I understand it is not easy, but when you look at the action of a government that can delay inspection at the border for automobiles... Is it because they are from the Windsor area, that that industry is concentrated in the Windsor area and textiles are spread thinly in small municipalities that cannot defend themselves? I do not know, but I ask myself questions and I think we have to make quick decisions.

Mr. Regan: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Laniel deals with a very important and a very difficult subject.

Under international agreements we have restrictions on the level of imports of the type of garments which he discusses; but, because with the recession overall sales in general were lower, they had lots of room underneath their quota limitations to increase and to take a larger and larger share of the Canadian market.

It was a particularly serious problem last year. It continues to be a problem. Though at one point the shipments were 38% higher, as you pointed out they are now down to 31% higher, which shows that the existing quota system is starting to have some impact as recovery occurs. Nevertheless, the manufacturers in Canada continue to be very concerned, and we are also.

Consultations were held recently with Canada's four major clothing suppliers to ensure that shipments of clothing from these sources proceeded in a more orderly fashion consistent

[Traduction]

l'endroit de Hong Kong, de la Chine, de la Corée et de Taïwan, conformément aux dispositions de nos accords bilatéraux touchant le textile et les vêtements, pour essayer de réglementer un peu les importations de vêtements, en évitant qu'elles soient concentrées sur un trimestre particulier de l'année. Je me souviens avoir discuté de toute cette question à plusieurs reprises avec vous, et je conviens que, comme vous le disiez dans cette lettre, il n'est pas facile pour le gouvernement d'établir unilatéralement des contingentements globaux aux termes de l'article XIX.

Toutefois, je m'inquiète beaucoup de ce que le gouvernement prenne autant de temps pour protéger l'industrie du vêtement au Canada, car cela a des répercussions sur l'ensemble de l'industrie du textile. Lorsque nous considérons les statistiques, nous découvrons que dans les dix premiers mois de l'année, les importations en provenance de ces quatre pays ont augmenté de 31 p. 100 par rapport aux dix premiers mois de l'année dernière.

Vous direz peut-être, bien sûr, que l'année dernière, l'économie n'était pas brillante et qu'il risque d'être difficile de comparer avec une année où la consommation était moindre. Toutefois, si vous considérez les importations que nous avons eues de tous les pays de 1979 à aujourd'hui, en 1979, on a importé 149 millions de vêtements; en 1980, 138 millions; en 1981, 161 millions; en 1982, 159 millions et, dans les dix mois de 1983, nous en sommes déjà à 175 millions.

Qu'allons-nous faire pour sauver cette industrie? Je comprends que ce n'est pas facile, mais, lorsque vous considérez l'action d'un gouvernement qui retarde l'inspection des automobiles à la frontière... Est-ce parce que c'est dans la région de Windsor, parce que l'industrie automobile y est concentrée, alors que l'industrie du textile est éparpillée dans de petites municipalités qui ne peuvent se défendre? Je me pose des questions, et je crois que nous devrions prendre rapidement des décisions.

M. Regan: Monsieur le président, M. Laniel touche là à un problème extrêmement important et complexe.

Aux termes des accords internationaux, nous imposons des restrictions aux importations de vêtements, mais, du fait de la récession, les ventes ont, en général, diminué, et il s'est trouvé que les contingentements n'ayant pas été atteints, les importations ont pris une part plus importante du marché canadien.

Le problème a été particulièrement sérieux l'année dernière. Il le demeure. Quoique à un moment, les importations étaient de 38 p. 100 supérieures, alors qu'elles sont retombées aujourd'hui à 31 p. 100. Cela montre que le système de contingentements commence à se faire sentir, au fur et à mesure de la reprise économique. Néanmoins, les fabricants canadiens restent très inquiets, et nous le sommes aussi.

Nous avons récemment eu des consultations avec les quatre fournisseurs principaux de vêtements à destination du Canada, afin de nous assurer que les importations de vêtements seraient plus régulières et correspondraient aux dispositions normales

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with the orderly marketing provisions of Canada's arrangements with them.

We had hoped that the establishment of an orderly marketing system would see to it that the disruptive effects of large concentration of imports would be avoided in the future. Unfortunately, I have to inform you that these suppliers would not accept the Canadian proposal for the establishment of an orderly marketing system, and as a consequence I am currently examining the results of these consultations with my colleagues in order to determine what action may be taken.

Mr. Laniel: One short question.

The Chairman: Mr. Laniel.

Mr. Laniel: Mr. Minister, beyond all those suggestions that have come from the industry itself, one suggestion has been presented by members of Parliament interested in textiles and the survival of textiles where it is, and not textiles of the old days but the advanced technology of textiles and all that.

Mr. Regan: Garments?

Mr. Laniel: In garments and even in textiles. It is easier in textiles than in garments, but there is a relation. If we do not protect garments, we do not need textiles; we do not need fabrics.

A suggestion which was made by MPs I think is worth while because sometimes we do not get the satisfaction that our so-called negotiators, our so-called ambassadors of textiles, are not also the free traders of the countries. One of the suggestions that MPs have made to you and to other ministers in the past is why not have, like the Americans have, at Geneva or at our negotiation table or close to our negotiation team members of both sides of the House who just go there and see what happens and hear. The textile industry send observers. They are behind the curtains, and it might bring at least the satisfaction to be part of the deal and get the feeling that this voice we hear from our people that is transmitted by us at committees and in the House of Commons is also transmitted by our negotiators at the negotiations talks.

• 1700

I hope some day you will accept at least the presence of MPs attending. Of course they are confidential. It is a big league, those negotiations. But the Americans seem to find a way to bring forward a parliamentary contribution, which we do not seem to accept in Canada. I hope you will keep that in mind.

Mr. Regan: I will keep it very much in mind. I think the participation of members of Parliament in a very wide sphere of public activity is important and desirable. I was a member here between 1963 and 1965, as you were, Mr. Laniel, when we were together, and you will remember that members of Parliament were involved in much, much less than they are now. The role of a member of Parliament has changed

[Translation]

de mise en marché contenues dans les accords que le Canada a passés avec ces pays.

Nous avions espéré que l'établissement d'un système de mise en marché réglementé permettrait d'éviter les soubresauts gênants des importations concentrées sur certaines périodes de l'année. Malheureusement, je dois vous informer que ces fournisseurs ont refusé la proposition canadienne visant l'établissement d'un tel système de commercialisation et qu'en conséquence, j'examine à l'heure actuelle avec mes collègues les résultats de ces consultations, afin de déterminer l'action à prendre.

M. Laniel: Encore une petite question.

Le président: Monsieur Laniel.

M. Laniel: Monsieur le ministre, en plus de toutes les suggestions qui sont venues de l'industrie elle-même, il y en a une qui a été présentée par les députés qui s'intéressent aux textiles et à la survie de l'industrie du textile au Canada, non pas du textile d'autrefois, mais de la technologie de pointe dans les textiles, et cetera.

M. Regan: Pour les vêtements?

M. Laniel: Pour les vêtements, et même pour les textiles. C'est plus facile pour les textiles que pour les vêtements, mais il y a un lien. Si nous ne protégeons pas les vêtements, nous n'avons plus besoin de textiles; nous n'avons plus besoin de tissus.

Les députés me semblent avoir fait une bonne suggestion, car il arrive que nous n'ayons pas la conviction que nos soi-disant négociateurs ou ambassadeurs du textile ne soient pas également les défenseurs du libre-échange de ces pays. Une des suggestions qui vous a été faite, à vous et à d'autres ministres, par les députés, consisterait à avoir, comme les Américains, à Genève, à la table des négociations ou, du moins, auprès de notre équipe de négociation, des députés de la majorité et de l'opposition qui observeraient ce qui se passe. L'industrie du textile envoie des observateurs. Ils restent derrière les rideaux, et ils ont peut-être au moins la satisfaction d'être parties à l'entente, d'avoir l'impression que ce que l'on nous dit, à nous, que ce que nous transmettons aux comités et à la Chambre des communes est également transmis par nos négociateurs à la table des négociations.

J'espère qu'un jour, vous accepterez au moins la présence de députés. C'est évidemment confidentiel. Il faut faire partie de la ligue pour participer à ces négociations. Les Américains, toutefois, semblent trouver le moyen d'apporter une contribution parlementaire que nous ne semblons pas accepter au Canada. J'espère que vous y penserez.

M. Regan: J'y penserai certainement. Je crois que la participation de députés à tout un éventail d'activités publiques est à la fois importante et souhaitable. J'étais député ici, entre 1963 et 1965, comme vous, monsieur Laniel, et vous vous souviendrez que les députés participaient à beaucoup moins de choses qu'aujourd'hui. Le rôle d'un député a énormément changé depuis 21 ans. Je crois qu'ils pourraient participer à

[Texte]

most radically in those 21 years since we first arrived. I think there is opportunity for more, and I will certainly take your suggestion very much under consideration.

Mr. Laniel: Thank you.

Mr. Regan: I do want to say on this subject that we have also, in relation to these garments, tightened inspection at the border, and we are putting a lot of money into modernization of the industry through the Canadian Industrial Renewal Board. So these are other measures aimed at helping the industry.

But we share the big problem with other advanced western countries—continuing problem—of the incursion of textiles, and we are involved in that much, much bigger question of can there be a lasting and stable recovery for the developed world unless the developing countries can find the credit or the money to buy our goods; and can they do that unless we provide better ongoing access for their products into our markets. So it is a very big, complicated, and difficult question. That does not make it any easier when people are laid off and find the jobs they have long had disappear; so I am keenly aware of the problem.

The Chairman: Thank you.

I am very glad the minister registered, because it is my view as an older member that members less and less remember that experience and new members have less and less patience with the system. We could detect that very easily, for anyone who wants to look around.

Mr. Jelinek.

Mr. Jelinek: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I would like very briefly to follow up on questions asked by Mrs. Appolloni about trade with Taiwan. As the Chairman of the Canada-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Committee, of which there are members from both the Liberal and Conservative parties, I was delighted with the line of questioning Mrs. Appolloni put to the minister. I would like to remind the minister and the committee that it was as a result of efforts by this committee that we were able to bring a delegation of businessmen to Canada two weeks ago, who purchased \$170 million worth of Canadian goods and which will now improve that trade imbalance that you mentioned, Mr. Minister.

• 1705

My first question is this and is very simple: In view of the fact that every non-communist industrialized nation in the world has some form of permanent non-official trade mission in Taiwan for the purpose of promoting trade... let us remember that for every \$1 billion worth of trade, according to Statistics Canada, 25,000 new jobs in Canada are created without cost to the taxpayer, why is Canada not involved? Why is Canada virtually the only country left out among all these nations promoting trade with Taiwan on an unofficial basis?

Mr. Regan: If the member was here earlier, he will have heard me say that we are considering that type of representa-

[Traduction]

encore plus de choses, et je réfléchirai certainement à votre suggestion.

M. Laniel: Merci.

M. Regan: Je dirai également à ce sujet que pour ce qui est des vêtements, nous avons resserré les inspections à la frontière et que l'Office canadien pour un renouveau industriel fait de gros efforts pour moderniser l'industrie. Ce sont donc d'autres mesures visant à aider cette industrie.

Nous partageons toutefois ce gros problème lancinant de l'incursion des textiles avec d'autres pays occidentaux industrialisés qui nous obligent à nous demander s'il est vraiment possible d'envisager pour le monde développé une reprise économique durable sans que les pays en développement trouvent le crédit ou l'argent nécessaire pour acheter nos produits; or, peuvent-ils le faire si nous ne laissons pas leurs produits pénétrer nos marchés? C'est donc une question énorme et très complexe. Cela ne facilite pas les choses lorsque les gens sont mis à pied parce que leurs emplois disparaissent. Soyez donc sûr que je suis tout à fait au courant du problème.

Le président: Merci.

Je suis très heureux que le ministre ait parlé de sa longue expérience, car je suis moi aussi député de l'ancienne garde, et je constate que l'on se souvient de moins en moins des années passées, et que les nouveaux députés sont de moins en moins patients vis-à-vis du système.

Monsieur Jelinek.

M. Jelinek: Merci, monsieur le président et membres du Comité. J'aimerais très brièvement revenir sur les questions posées par M^{me} Appolloni à propos du commerce avec Taiwan. Comme président du Comité de l'amicale parlementaire Canada-Taiwan, dont sont membres des députés libéraux et des députés conservateurs, j'ai été enchanté du genre de questions posées par M^{me} Appolloni au ministre. Je rappellerai au ministre et au comité que c'est grâce aux efforts de notre Comité que nous avons pu faire venir une délégation d'hommes d'affaires au Canada il y a deux semaines et qu'ils ont acheté pour 170 millions de dollars de marchandises canadiennes ce qui va améliorer le déficit commercial dont vous parliez, monsieur le ministre.

Ma première question est très simple: Étant donné que tous les pays industrialisés non communistes ont une sorte de mission commerciale permanente officielle à Taiwan pour promouvoir le commerce... rappelons-nous que pour chaque milliard de dollars de commerce international, d'après Statistique Canada, on crée au Canada 25,000 nouveaux emplois sans qu'il n'en coûte rien aux contribuables... pourquoi le Canada n'a-t-il pas une mission de ce genre? Pourquoi le Canada est-il pratiquement le seul pays à ne pas promouvoir le commerce avec Taiwan de façon officielle?

M. Regan: Si le député avait été là tout à l'heure, il m'aurait entendu dire que nous étudions actuellement ce genre de

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tion similar to many of the other countries at the present time. We have had extensive discussions with the Canadian Chamber of Commerce on this matter. I point out to him that while a substantial number of countries now do have such unofficial non-governmental representation in Taiwan but many of them are very recent vintage. For instance, Australia established its office there which is the Australia Commerce and Industry Office, in 1981. Germany also in 1981 and others are of that time period as is the Netherlands, for instance; so . . .

Mr. Jelinek: That makes my question more pertinent. Why are we not following in the footsteps of all the other countries?

Mr. Regan: I am working on it.

Mr. Jelinek: Well, I am delighted to hear that. You are not categorically saying, no, then to establishing an unofficial trade mission in Taiwan, as well as removing the major obstacle which exists between the two countries as far as businessmen's travel is concerned; I mean, the processing of visas in Canada for Canadian businessmen and the Canadian public, and vice versa for Taiwanese businessmen in Taiwan. Instead of a Taiwanese going to Hong Kong and the Canadians having to go to the United States, it would be helpful to have those visa offices process at least, even if not issue, the visas in these respective countries.

Mr. Regan: I am aware of that requirement and, indeed, I find that businessmen from both countries are able to deal with the present situation. There is some slight delay and, I suppose, a tiny bit of irritation in that regard. But your concern for a more efficient manner of dealing with it, while still maintaining our non-governmental type of relations, is something I will take under consideration.

Mr. Jelinek: I repeat that I am pleased to hear what you are saying, because I think this is the first time we have heard from a minister about a change of direction in policy in this regard. Taiwan is willing, able and anxious to trade with us. They are willing, able and anxious to buy our CANDU reactors. In fact, we have been instrumental in bringing together some of the key players between AECL and Taiwan Power Corporation. We have been able to get talks going and, indeed, purchases effected between Taiwanese organizations and Canadian agencies such as the Canadian Wheat Board to complete sales already. I think, Mr. Regan, if you and your government follow what you have just said, seriously and conclusively, then it will be to the benefit of all Canadians as well as, certainly, in the area of job creation. What sort of timetable do you have in mind in this regard?

Mr. Regan: Well, Mr. MacEachen earlier testified here that we do not raise objections to a chamber of commerce which is a private organization in Canada establishing an office in Taiwan to promote trade. I have in mind the possibilities of moving on that matter quite rapidly. It is under very, very active examination, as I have indicated.

• 1710

I only want to leave you finally with my thought, that I believe the movement of private citizens from Taiwan to Canada, businessmen coming here, should be facilitated and

[Translation]

suggestion pour beaucoup d'autres pays également. Nous en avons beaucoup discuté avec la Chambre de commerce canadienne. Je signalerai au député que un nombre important de pays ont en effet des représentants officiels et non gouvernementaux à Taiwan, c'est un phénomène très récent pour pas mal d'entre eux. Par exemple, l'Australie a ouvert son bureau là-bas en 1981, c'est l'*Australia Commerce and Industry Office*. L'Allemagne l'a également fait en 1981 de même que les Pays-Bas, par exemple; donc . . .

M. Jelinek: Ma question n'en est que plus pertinente. Pourquoi ne suivons-nous pas cet exemple?

M. Regan: Nous y travaillons.

M. Jelinek: Je suis ravi de vous l'entendre dire. Vous ne répondez donc pas catégoriquement non à la possibilité d'ouvrir une mission commerciale officielle à Taiwan et de supprimer l'obstacle majeur qui existe entre les deux pays pour les voyages d'hommes d'affaires; à savoir l'obtention de visas au Canada par les hommes d'affaires canadiens et la population canadienne et à Taiwan pour les hommes d'affaires taiwanais. Plutôt que d'obliger le Taiwanese à aller à Hong Kong et les Canadiens à aller aux États-Unis, nous pourrions au moins avoir des bureaux pour transmettre sinon émettre les visas dans ces pays respectifs.

M. Regan: Je suis au courant de la situation et je constate que les hommes d'affaires des deux pays réussissent à s'en tirer ainsi. Cela demande un peu plus de temps probablement et c'est un peu agaçant mais je réfléchirai certainement à la possibilité de procéder plus efficacement tout en maintenant des relations non gouvernementales avec ce pays.

M. Jelinek: Je répète que je suis heureux de vous entendre parler ainsi car je crois que c'est la première fois qu'un ministre s'adresse à nous dans ces termes. Taiwan est disposé, capable et impatient de commercer avec nous. Les Taiwanese sont prêts à acheter nos réacteurs CANDU. En fait, nous avons réussi à réunir les membres influents de l'EAEL et de la *Taiwan Power Corporation*. Nous avons réussi à leur faire entamer des pourparlers et même à ce que des organismes taiwanais et canadiens comme la Commission canadienne du blé procède à certains achats. Je crois, monsieur Regan, que si vous et le gouvernement poursuivez sérieusement cette voie, cela profitera à tous les Canadiens et cela permettra de créer des emplois. Quel genre de calendrier envisagez-vous à cet égard?

M. Regan: Ma foi, M. MacEachen a déjà déclaré que nous ne voyons pas d'objection à ce qu'une chambre de commerce qui est un organisme privé au Canada, ouvre un bureau à Taiwan pour favoriser le commerce. J'envisage que l'on avance assez vite dans ce sens. La question fait l'objet d'un examen extrêmement sérieux comme je l'ai mentionné.

Je tiens simplement à vous laisser sur cette pensée que je crois que le mouvement de citoyens privés de Taiwan au Canada, d'hommes d'affaires qui veulent venir ici, doit être

[Texte]

made easier in every practical way that is consistent with our international responsibilities and our responsibilities to our relations with other countries. But I had occasion, frankly as a result of a complaint that I received seven months ago, to convey to other departments my concern that every effort be made to see to it that the Taiwanese businessmen be facilitated when they appear at our borders and at customs, and because we do not have diplomatic relations is no reason why there should be any additional difficulties for these people coming here to buy Canadian goods. I am confident there has been an improvement as a consequence.

Mr. Jelinek: Our committee, which consists of some 70 members from both sides of the House, wholeheartedly agrees.

On the last question, if I may, this procurement mission which just left with \$170 million worth of Canadian products was led by a Vincent Siew, Director General of the Foreign Board of Trade. You mentioned in your earlier statements that you were concerned about the textile problems being faced by Canadians. Mr. Siew wanted very much to be able to meet with some officials from your department to rectify the problems, to rectify the problems in the textile situation between Canada and Taiwan. Although he did meet briefly with the Prime Minister, the officials from External Affairs refused to have anything to do with Mr. Siew, who only wanted to rectify the problems and save a lot of concern for you and for the Canadian public regarding the textile situation. Why were they refusing to meet with them when he simply wanted to solve the problems that now exist between the two countries in this regard?

Mr. Reagan: I think I would ask Mr. Johnstone to speak to this question, because he was here at the time and involved.

Mr. Johnstone: Really, Mr. Chairman, to Mr. Jelinek, there are two elements to the answer. One is that in the circumstances of Mr. Siew's visit, we were concerned and we have to be concerned about official-to-official contacts and relationships with Taiwan. We have talked . . .

Mr. Jelinek: He met with the Prime Minister.

Mr. Johnstone: —and I think responded positively to your points about a chamber of commerce presence and so forth. We are not negative to the very real possibilities to which your questions are addressed here.

The second point is that with Taiwan we do have established channels for the discussion and negotiation of textile and clothing questions, and those are with the Taiwan Textile Council, or whatever it is called. That is the group which, by agreement with Taiwan, is the channel of communication.

I guess what I would say is here, as indeed in any case when we have discussions with any country, we have our established channels for dealing with what are very complex and delicate questions. Although I was not party to that particular decision,

[Traduction]

facilité et rendu plus facile de toutes les façons possibles conformément à nos responsabilités internationales et à nos responsabilités dans nos relations avec les autres pays. D'ailleurs j'ai déjà eu l'occasion, très franchement, suite à une plainte que j'avais reçue il y a sept mois, de faire comprendre à d'autres Ministères que nous devons faire tous les efforts afin de faciliter les choses pour les hommes d'affaires de Taiwan lorsqu'ils viennent à nos frontières et à la douane, car ce n'est pas parce que nous n'entretiens aucune relation diplomatique avec ce pays qu'on doit faire subir des difficultés supplémentaires à ceux qui viennent ici pour se procurer des produits canadiens. J'ai confiance qu'à la suite de mon intervention la situation s'est améliorée.

M. Jelinek: Notre Comité, constitué de quelque 70 députés des deux côtés de la Chambre est pleinement de cet avis.

J'aimerais revenir à la dernière question, si vous le permettez; cette mission d'achats qui vient de partir avec 170 millions de dollars de produits canadiens était dirigée par Vincent Siew, directeur général de la Chambre de commerce étrangère. Vous avez mentionné dans vos déclarations précédentes que vous vous inquiétiez des problèmes auxquels font face les Canadiens dans le secteur du textile. M. Siew tenait énormément à rencontrer des fonctionnaires de votre Ministère afin de régler les problèmes, les problèmes dans le textile entre le Canada et Taiwan. Bien qu'il ait rencontré brièvement le premier ministre, les fonctionnaires des Affaires extérieures ont refusé d'avoir quoi que ce soit à voir avec M. Siew qui ne voulait que corriger la situation et vous épargner beaucoup de soucis tout comme au public canadien au sujet des textiles. Pourquoi a-t-on refusé de rencontrer cette délégation alors qu'il ne voulait que régler des problèmes qui existent actuellement à cet égard entre les deux pays?

M. Regan: Je vais demander à M. Johnstone de répondre à la question, car il était là et qu'il est au courant.

M. Johnstone: En vérité, monsieur le président, permettez-moi de dire à M. Jelinek, que la réponse comporte deux éléments. D'abord il y a les circonstances de la visite de M. Siew, nous nous préoccupons, et il nous faut le faire, de contacts et de relations de fonctionnaires à fonctionnaires avec Taiwan. Nous avons discuté . . .

M. Jelinek: Il a rencontré le premier ministre.

M. Johnstone: . . . et nous avons répondu de façon positive au point que vous souleviez au sujet de la présence de la Chambre de commerce, etc. Nous ne réagissons pas de façon négative aux possibilités très réelles que sous-entendent vos questions ici.

Le deuxième point c'est que avec Taïwan, nous voulons établir des mécanismes de discussion et de négociation des questions du textile et du vêtement, avec comme interlocuteur, le Conseil du textile de Taïwan, ou je ne sais plus comment on l'appelle. C'est ce groupe, conformément à une entente avec Taiwan qui est le moyen de communication.

Je suppose que je me dois de dire, comme c'est le cas dans les discussions que nous avons avec tout pays, que nous avons des moyens établis de traiter des questions extrêmement compliquées et délicates. Bien que je n'aie pas été partie à

[Text]

I assume the judgment was it was best to stick to that. We have been talking to the Taiwan Textile Council, or whatever they are, in the context that Mr. Regan has spoken to earlier, and we felt it best to stick to that channel.

The Chairman: Thank you both. It is too bad I cannot question.

Next on my list is the hon. Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, Dr. Hudecki, member from Hamilton West.

Mr. Hudecki: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On a different subject, over the year now there have been negotiations, or at least requests, submitted by the Government of Poland for purchasing of wheat from Canada. They are, as we know, in arrears as far as credit goes for about \$1.5 billion, and they are having considerable difficulty in establishing credit here in the country. I wonder what is the stage of negotiations at the present time, if any, and is there any hope they will be . . .

• 1715

The Chairman: Which country?

Mr. Hudecki: Poland.

Mr. Regan: Poland. Again, I think I will ask Mr. Johnstone to respond to that. I am not up to date on their present financial status.

The Chairman: May I interrupt at this time and kindly ask Mr. Kilgour, Mr. McLean and the two others to stay; otherwise, I cannot have a meeting. I am sorry to inform you that Mr. McKnight is not a member of the committee, so that is why I did not recognize him earlier.

Mrs. Appolloni: I thought he was the official critic.

The Chairman: It is a mistake of . . .

Mr. McKnight: We will not take time here . . .

The Chairman: It will be corrected, but on my list, officially he is a member . . .

Mrs. Appolloni: You are so confusing, you Tories.

The Chairman: That is why I was confused, Madam.

Mr. Johnstone, please.

Mr. Johnstone: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To the hon. member, the situation is that after a long delay—and it has been a very long delay . . . discussions and negotiations are in fact engaged with Poland on the question of rescheduling or renegotiation. It will not be easy, but at least they have started after a long delay.

We have had a situation, as you know, sir, where there was a de facto undeclared moratorium simply because in the context of the East-West discussions—NATO, etc.—no discussions

[Translation]

cette décision particulière, je présume que l'on avait jugé qu'il valait mieux s'en tenir à cette procédure. Nous avons déjà parlé au Conseil du textile de Taiwan, ou quel que soit son nom, comme l'expliquait plus tôt M. Regan, et nous estimons qu'il vaut mieux s'en tenir à cela.

Le président: Merci à tous les deux. Il est dommage que je ne puisse poser de questions.

Le suivant sur ma liste est l'honorable secrétaire parlementaire auprès du ministre de la Défense nationale, M. Hudecki, député de Hamilton West.

M. Hudecki: Merci, monsieur le président.

Sur un sujet différent, depuis plus d'un an maintenant il y a des négociations en cours ou tout au moins des demandes de négociations, présentées par le gouvernement de la Pologne en vue d'un achat de blé du Canada. Comme nous le savons, la Pologne a accumulé des arriérés de crédits d'environ 1.5 milliards de dollars, et éprouve des difficultés considérables à établir son crédit ici. Je me demande où en sont actuellement les négociations s'il y en a et s'il y a le moindre espoir qu'elles . . .

Le président: Quel pays?

M. Hudecki: La Pologne.

M. Regan: La Pologne. Encore une fois, je crois que je vais demander à M. Johnston de répondre. Je ne suis pas tout à fait au courant du statut financier actuel de ce pays.

Le président: Puis-je vous interrompre, maintenant, et gentiment demander à M. Kilgour, M. McLean et aux deux autres de rester; sinon, je ne peux pas tenir de réunion. J'ai le regret de vous informer que M. McKnight ne fait pas partie du Comité, et c'est pourquoi je ne lui ai pas cédé la parole précédemment.

Mme Appolloni: Je croyais qu'il était le critique officiel.

Le président: C'est une erreur de . . .

M. McKnight: Nous n'allons pas prendre le temps ici . . .

Le président: La correction sera apportée, sur ma liste officiellement, il est membre . . .

Mme Appolloni: Vous prêtez tellement à confusion, vous conservateurs.

Le président: C'est pourquoi j'étais confus, madame.

Monsieur Johnston s'il vous plaît.

M. Johnston: Merci, monsieur le président.

En réponse à l'honorable député, la situation—c'est qu'après un long retard—le retard a été extrêmement long—les discussions et négociations sont en fait engagées avec la Pologne sur la question d'une refonte de l'échéancier ou d'une renégociation. Cela ne sera pas facile, mais au moins, on a commencé après un long retard.

La situation, comme vous le savez, monsieur, c'est qu'il y a eu un moratoire de facto, non déclaré, simplement parce que dans le contexte des discussions est ouest—l'OTAN etc—

[Texte]

were ongoing with Poland, but they were ... Now the discussions have been re-engaged. Far be it for me to express a view as to how long it is going to take to get them sorted out, because the Poles have very, very real problems, but those discussions are engaged now.

Mr. Hudecki: Has the financial picture of Poland improved any? Are they able to offer funds for purchase or are they still seeking credit at the present time? Are you able to answer that at the present time?

Mr. Johnstone: Their situation has improved somewhat, but it is still very, very difficult for them, very difficult indeed, and their economy has undergone a very serious bashing. It will take them some time to get themselves back into a position where they really are able to meet their inherited as well as future financial obligations.

Mr. Hudecki: Would we be considering helping them from a humanitarian point of view, or does it have to be hard, cold cash or credit before any decisions are made?

Mr. Johnstone: As the minister has reminded me, we have extended a lot of credit to Poland in grain and other areas. What we are engaged in now with the other creditor countries is really an examination—for the first time really sitting down with them in some long time—as to what the facts of the situation are. That is the first step, to understand the facts of the situation and their capacity to meet their obligations over some time period.

Mr. Hudecki: I have another question, again going back to Grenada. We had a delegation of CUSO workers who have felt the work in Grenada has been disrupted and that work previously done has been annihilated by the invasion or the rescue efforts of the United States. They were again wondering whether or not they will be funded sufficiently to continue on with the work.

Would you have any comments on that?

Mr. Regan: No, I think this matter has not yet been determined by CIDA, because it will be dependent upon conditions in Grenada as to whether it is possible to recommence the particular work they were doing. We certainly are watching the situation very carefully. I would not expect any action on this until the interim government is firmly in place and we are able to assess the situation.

Mr. Hudecki: The last question, in order to be fair to our members from the loyal opposition, is again with reference to Grenada. Over the weekend I had an opportunity to view a fall-out, I think, of what had happened in Grenada at a social affair by the Caribbean culture group in Hamilton. The various high commissioners were invited from the member states of the Caribbean, particularly from the Commonwealth Caribbean. Only one of them showed up, and that was the High Commissioner from Trinidad. It was he who brought to the attention of the audience at that time that he was the only one present, and he wondered aloud whether or not this was an aftermath of the fact that other members of the Caribbean group had participated in the invasion and Trinidad did not.

[Traduction]

aucune discussion n'était en cours avec la Pologne, mais ils étaient—on a maintenant repris les discussions. Loïn de moi l'idée d'exprimer une opinion sur combien de temps il faudra pour les tirer d'affaires, car les Polonais, éprouvent des problèmes extrêmement réels, mais les discussions sont maintenant en cours.

M. Hudecki: Est-ce que la situation financière s'est un peu améliorée en Pologne? Est-ce qu'ils peuvent payer leurs achats comptant ou cherchent-ils à obtenir du crédit? Pouvez-vous me le dire en ce moment?

M. Johnstone: Leur situation s'est quelque peu améliorée, mais les choses demeurent extrêmement difficiles, très difficiles vraiment pour eux, et leur économie a subi un grave coup. Il leur faudra un certain temps pour se remettre sur pied et vraiment assumer leurs obligations financières passées tout comme les futures.

M. Hudecki: Serions-nous disposés à aider les Polonais d'un point de vue humanitaire, ou doit-il y avoir des espèces sonnantes ou du crédit sur la table avant qu'une décision soit prise?

M. Johnstone: Comme le ministre me l'a rappelé, nous avons déjà accordé beaucoup de crédit à la Pologne pour l'achat de céréales et autres produits. Ce que nous faisons actuellement, de concert avec les autres pays créanciers, c'est de vraiment examiner pour la première fois vraiment depuis très longtemps la situation. C'est là un premier pas, comprendre les faits et la situation et leur capacité à faire face à leurs obligations sur une certaine période.

M. Hudecki: J'ai une autre question, revenons encore une fois à la Grenade. Nous avons accueilli une délégation de travailleurs du SUCO qui estimait qu'on avait nui à leur travail à la Grenade et que le travail fait précédemment avait été détruit par l'invasion ou les efforts de sauvetage des États-Unis. Ils se demandaient si on allait ou non leur donner un financement suffisant afin de poursuivre leur travail.

Avez-vous des commentaires à ce sujet?

M. Regan: Non, je crois que l'ACDI n'a pas encore décidé, car la possibilité de recommencer leur travail particulier dépendra des conditions à Grenade. Nous allons certainement surveiller la situation de très près. Je ne m'attends à aucune démarche jusqu'à ce que le gouvernement intérimaire soit fermement en place et jusqu'à ce que nous puissions évaluer la situation.

M. Hudecki: Ma dernière question, afin d'être juste à l'égard d'autres membres de l'Opposition loyale porte encore une fois sur la Grenade. Au cours de la fin de semaine, j'ai eu l'occasion de voir une suite, je crois de ce qui s'est produit à Grenade, lors d'une soirée sociale offerte par le groupe culturel des Antilles à Hamilton. ON avait invité les divers hauts commissaires des états membres des Antilles, surtout des Antilles du Commonwealth. Un seul d'entre eux est venu, le Haut commissaire de Trinidad. C'est lui qui a attiré l'attention de l'assistance sur le fait qu'il était le seul présent, et il s'est demandé, publiquement, si c'était une suite ou non du fait que les autres membres du groupe des Antilles avaient participé à l'invasion alors que Trinidad n'en avait rien fait.

[Text]

• 1720

I talked with him, and the information that was passed on to him was very much that which you had indicated took place with relations between the United States and Canada, that they were at the same meeting and that the High Commissioner of Canada got the same information as the High Commissioner of Trinidad. The invasion was not mentioned at all, and they then got word on the following day that indeed this was a fact, that it had occurred.

So could you tell us the state of the English-speaking Caribbean countries? Is the CARICOM still functioning? Are any meetings scheduled, or is there currently a division between those Caribbean English-speaking countries that had participated in the attack—or, rather, in the rescue mission—in Grenada?

Mr. Regan: One of the stated objectives of the Prime Minister was to bring together at the meetings in New Delhi of the Commonwealth the different countries that had taken opposite views on this subject as part of the healing process. I think the fact that the meeting is occurring at this time is a very worthwhile opportunity for a meeting together of at least the Commonwealth Caribbean countries that had different viewpoints and for the healing process to begin. To my knowledge there has not been a CARICOM meeting since those days, but I do not think there has been an occasion for one to occur. I would expect that CARICOM would continue to meet on the basis on which it has in the past.

Mr. Hudecki: Do you feel that there has been any disruption in diplomatic relations between the various countries, between Barbados and the other countries that have been involved?

Mr. Regan: We are not aware of any disruption of relations. There certainly are strains in feelings and there will be the necessity of a healing process.

Mr. Hudecki: Do you feel any comments will be made—or possibly not until after the Commonwealth meeting in India at present?

Mr. Regan: I am not sure there will be comments at any particular moment. I just think the healing process will occur over the coming months.

Mr. Hudecki: Could you tell us what steps are being taken to form an interim government in Grenada? Has any progress been made along that . . .

Mr. Regan: The Governor General had made very substantial progress in that direction. Unfortunately, Mr. McIntyre, who was to be his nominee for head of government, had to withdraw because of health reasons—it related to diabetes, if I recall correctly—and he is now actively considering the nomination or selection of another person for that post, but it would not be appropriate for me to speculate on who that might be in the present circumstance.

Mr. Hudecki: Do you feel these decisions are independently reached, or is there any pressure being put on them by any country as to what direction it goes?

[Translation]

Je lui ai parlé, et les renseignements qui lui ont été transmis ressemblaient beaucoup à ce qui s'est passé entre les États-Unis et le Canada, en ce sens qu'ils étaient à la même réunion, le Haut commissaire du Canada et le Haut commissaire de Trinidad et qu'ils ont obtenu les mêmes renseignements. Il n'a pas du tout été question de l'invasion, et lorsqu'ils en ont entendu parler le jour suivant, c'était un fait, cela s'était produit.

Pouvez-vous donc me renseigner sur l'état des pays antillais d'expression anglaise? Est-ce que CARICOM fonctionne toujours? A-t-on prévu des réunions, ou existe-t-il actuellement une division entre les pays d'expression anglaise des Antilles qui ont participé à l'attaque, ou plutôt à la mission de sauvetage, à Grenade?

M. Regan: L'un des objectifs avoués du Premier ministre était de concilier lors de réunions à la Nouvelle Delhi des différents pays du Commonwealth qui avaient adopté des positions différentes sur la question. Je crois qu'en fait, que la réunion qui se tient en ce moment offre une occasion digne d'intérêt de réunir ensemble au moins les pays Commonwealth des Antilles qui avaient adopté des points de vue différents et pour commencer une réconciliation. A ma connaissance, il n'y a eu aucune réunion de CARICOM depuis ces événements, mais je ne crois pas qu'il y ait eu occasion de tenir une telle réunion. Je présume que CARICOM continuera à se réunir comme par le passé.

M. Hudecki: À votre avis, y a-t-il eu la moindre interruption dans les relations diplomatiques entre les divers pays, entre la Barbade et les autres pays qui ont participé?

M. Regan: Nous ne sommes pas au courant d'une interruption des relations. Il est certain que les sentiments sont tendus et qu'il faudra raccommoder les choses.

M. Hudecki: Croyez-vous que des commentaires seront faits, ou peut-être pas avant la fin de la réunion du Commonwealth qui se tient actuellement en Inde?

M. Regan: Je ne suis pas persuadé qu'il y ait des commentaires à un moment particulier. Je crois simplement que les choses se raccommoderont au cours des mois à venir.

M. Hudecki: Pouvez-vous nous dire quelles démarches ont été faites en vue de former un gouvernement intérimaire à la Grenade? A-t-on réalisé des progrès . . .

M. Regan: Le gouverneur général a réalisé des progrès très considérables en ce sens. Malheureusement, monsieur McIntyre, son choix comme chef de gouvernement, a dû se retirer pour des raisons de santé, liées au diabète, si j'ai bonne mémoire, et il étudie actuellement la nomination ou le choix d'une autre personne à ce poste, mais il ne conviendrait pas que je fasse des spéculations sur qui cela pourrait être, dans les circonstances actuelles.

M. Hudecki: Croyez-vous qu'on en arrivera à ces décisions d'une façon indépendante, ou qu'un pays quelconque exercera la moindre pression en vue d'influencer le choix?

[Texte]

Mr. Regan: We have found no evidence of any pressure being put on him, and I think the Governor General is a man of considerable ability.

Mr. Hudecki: Thank you.

The Chairman: The Minister, as I said, was supposed to leave at 5.00 p.m. I asked him to stay until 5.30 p.m., but probably a few minutes more, Mr. Minister . . . I am between the two of you.

Is it up to me, John?

The hon. member from Waterloo, Mr. McLean, please.

• 1725

Mr. McLean: I want to take just a moment. Today, members of the Shoe Manufacturers' Association of Canada, from Waterloo riding, presented to me a report which I am sure the minister is already familiar with. Bonnie Stuart Shoes Limited and Greb Industries, both from Waterloo region, along with shoe manufacturers across the country, have been calling for an extension of global quotas on footwear imports for five years, after November 1, 1984. As the minister will know, the association commissioned a study on tariffs and trade by a tariff and trade expert, Mr. Rodney Grey, to consider the question of restraints and compensation and retaliation.

Mr. Grey has served as Canadian negotiator in the Kennedy Rounds of GATT and as ADM, Tariff and Trade, and as chief negotiator in the Tokyo Round. The report, which they have tabled, makes the following comment and then quotes Mr. Grey.

This whole question of restraints, compensation and retaliation is a very nebulous subject. To clarify it, our association commissioned a study by Mr. Grey, who has served . . .

Mr. Grey made the following observations in his study, and they quote:

It is our perception that Canadian officials, particularly those charged with responsibility for export promotion, tend to overplay the compensation, retaliation issue in order to discourage Ministers from having frequent recourse to Article XIX. When Ministers seek industry support to engage in GATT negotiations, they do so against the backdrop of GATT rights and obligations, which permit action to prevent serious injury or threats of serious injury, when increased imports result from negotiated concessions. Industrialists have every reason to expect the government to exercise its rights when the facts of the case justify it.

The only useful purpose of retaliation is to demonstrate and dramatize the injured government's irritation by means of a concrete act. The volume of press coverage is far more important than the volume of economic damage. Experience

[Traduction]

M. Regan: Nous n'avons constaté aucune tentative de pression sur lui, et je crois que le gouverneur général est un homme de grande capacité.

M. Hudecki: Merci.

Le président: Le ministre, comme je l'ai dit, était censé partir à 17 heures. Je lui ai demandé de rester jusqu'à 17h30, mais peut-être encore quelques minutes, monsieur le ministre . . . Je suis entre vous deux.

Est-ce à moi de décider, John?

L'honorable député de Waterloo, monsieur McLean, s'il vous plaît.

M. McLean: Je ne vais prendre qu'un instant. Aujourd'hui, les membres de l'Association canadienne des fabricants de chaussures de ma circonscription de Waterloo m'ont présenté un rapport que le ministre connaît déjà, j'en suis persuadé. *Bonnie Stuart Shoes Limited* et *Greb Industries*, tous deux de la région de Waterloo, ainsi que des fabricants de chaussures d'à travers le pays, exigent une prolongation des contingents globaux sur les importations de chaussures de cinq ans, après le 1^{er} novembre 1984. Comme le sait le ministre, l'association a commandité une étude sur les tarifs et le commerce par un expert en la matière, M. Rodney Grey, afin d'étudier la question des contraintes, de l'indemnisation et des représailles.

M. Grey a été négociateur canadien pendant les discussions Kennedy du GATT et sous-ministre adjoint, Tarif et Commerce, ainsi que notre négociateur principal aux pourparlers de Tokyo. Le rapport qu'ils ont déposé fait le commentaire suivant et ensuite cite M. Grey.

Toute cette question de contrainte, d'indemnisation et de représailles est un sujet des plus nébuleux. Afin de le préciser, notre association a commandité une étude auprès de M. Grey, qui a servi . . .

M. Grey formule les observations suivantes dans son étude et on les cite:

Nous avons l'impression que les fonctionnaires canadiens, particulièrement ceux chargés des responsabilités en matière de promotion des exportations, ont tendance à exagérer l'indemnisation et les représailles afin de décourager les ministres de se prévaloir fréquemment des dispositions de l'article XIX. Lorsque les ministres cherchent à obtenir l'appui de l'industrie avant d'entreprendre des négociations du GATT, ils le font avec en arrière-plan, les droits et obligations du GATT, qui permettent de prendre des mesures afin d'empêcher un préjudice grave ou de contrer des menaces de préjudice grave, lorsque des importations accrues découlent de concessions négociées. Les industriels ont toutes les raisons de s'attendre que le gouvernement exercera ses droits lorsque les faits le justifient.

Le seul but utile des représailles consiste à montrer et à marquer la colère d'un gouvernement lésé par un geste concret. Le volume de publicité dans la presse est beaucoup plus important que le volume de dommage économique.

[Text]

demonstrates that the compensation costs little in relation to the benefit of the safeguard action.

Canada has also argued that there should be no retaliation or compensation, if the Article XIX action is justified in GATT terms.

That is the end of the quote.

In the case of the last footwear quotas, which is justified in GATT terms, no country can back up with evidence trade damage, because the quota levels which have been established are so high that they have little or no impact on trade.

I wonder if, first of all, the minister could comment on Mr. Grey's findings. Second, could the minister inform the committee, and let the Canadian shoe industry know, when he will be making decisions on their recommendation to extend the global quotas of footwear imports.

Mr. Regan: Mr. McLean, you are dealing with a difficult subject here. I wonder what Mr. Grey's advice was when he was an official.

I guess sometimes responsibility and knowing that the situation rests with your final decision carries with it a considerable weight. I have to say to you that I believe in some circumstances a country is justified to use the established procedures of GATT to grant temporary protection to a domestic industry against a tremendous thrust of imports, to enable that industry to modernize or become competitive, as long as they make progress in that direction, so that they will not be forced out of existence, so that they can contribute to the economy of the country by becoming more competitive.

• 1730

For me, the toughest part of my job, I think, the part that I anguish over most, is the question of quantitative restrictions on imports. The sale of Canadian goods abroad is just sheer joy—that part of the business. The trade policy is very difficult sometimes, but always interesting.

I regret that it is necessary for us to take these actions, often, by way of protection, as was necessary with shoes. I do believe there is an increasing tendency by developing countries to retaliate against quantitative restrictions. I know Indonesia did that against the United Kingdom very recently; the Chinese did against the United States. In a time when we are getting more and more demands for counter-trade, or our industries are, our exporters are, you can see there is a move in these countries, particularly those which have an unfavourable balance of trade with us, to put the pressures on.

You mentioned the high level of restraint. I asked some shoe manufacturers the other day whether the level of restraint, whether the fact that the restraint program has been enforced, has resulted in their selling more shoes, has improved the

[Translation]

L'expérience démontre que l'indemnisation coûte peu comparée aux avantages d'une mesure de sauvegarde.

Le Canada a également fait valoir qu'il ne devrait y avoir aucune représailles ou indemnisation, si les mesures prises en vertu de l'article XIX sont justifiées aux termes des dispositions du GATT.

Ceci est la fin de la citation.

Dans le cas des derniers contingentements de chaussure, justifiés conformément aux dispositions du GATT, aucun pays ne peut faire la preuve d'un commerce lésé, puisque les niveaux de contingentement établis sont si élevés qu'ils n'ont que peu ou pas de répercussions sur le commerce.

Je me demande, si, tout d'abord le ministre pourrait faire des commentaires sur les constatations de M. Grey, et si deuxièmement, le ministre pourrait nous dire et dire à l'Industrie canadienne de la chaussure, quand il prendra des décisions sur leur recommandation de prolonger les contingentements globaux d'importations de chaussure.

M. Regan: Monsieur McLean, vous abordez là un sujet très difficile. Je me demande quel était l'avis de M. Grey lorsqu'il était fonctionnaire.

Je suppose que parfois, la responsabilité et la connaissance que la situation porte sur votre décision finale, a considérablement de poids. Je dois vous dire que je crois que dans certaines circonstances, un pays est justifié à recourir aux procédures établies du GATT afin d'accorder une protection temporaire à une industrie nationale contre la poussée considérable des importations, afin de permettre à cette industrie de se moderniser ou de devenir plus concurrentielle, pour autant qu'elle réalise des progrès en ce sens, de façon à ne pas être forcée à disparaître, et de façon à pouvoir contribuer à l'économie du pays en devenant plus concurrentielle.

Pour ma part, j'estime que la partie la plus difficile de mon travail, la partie qui me cause le plus d'angoisse, c'est la question des restrictions quantitatives sur les importations. La vente de produits canadiens à l'étranger, voilà tout simplement une grande joie... cette partie-là de mon travail. La politique commerciale est parfois très difficile, mais toujours intéressante.

Je regrette qu'il nous soit nécessaire de prendre ces mesures, souvent comme moyens de protection, comme ce fut le cas pour la chaussure. Je crois que l'on constate une tendance accrue chez les pays en voie de développement aux représailles contre les restrictions quantitatives. Je sais que l'Indonésie a procédé ainsi récemment contre la Grande-Bretagne; les Chinois l'ont fait contre les États-Unis. À une époque où l'on reçoit de plus en plus de demandes d'échanges commerciaux, ou du moins nos industries, nos exportateurs en reçoivent, vous pouvez comprendre que ces pays, surtout ceux dont la balance commerciale nous est favorable, vont exercer des pressions.

Vous avez mentionné le niveau élevé de contraintes. J'ai demandé à quelques fabricants de chaussures, l'autre jour, si le niveau de contraintes, si le fait que nous appliquions un programme de contraintes, leur avait permis de vendre plus de

[Texte]

situation for them. Their answer to me was that they think it would if they had more time; there has not been a long enough time. The problem is, when we are dealing with leather shoes, that if a woman is looking for a particular style of shoe from Italy, and if that is not available, that does not necessarily mean she buys another pair of shoes; because you are not dealing with a situation where they have 2 pairs of shoes. It seems to me many of these people have 10 or 12 pairs that they wear for different occasions—unlike, perhaps, you and me.

Mrs. Appolloni: Watch it, you guys.

Mr. Regan: I am getting close, but I think some people, of both sexes, wear more shoes than others, and buy greater varieties.

So it is hard to tie down, really hard to tie down, how direct is the impact of the restraints on some types of leather shoes.

We have had to deal with the questions of those types of shoes that are not made in Canada, of specialties, and all these problems. I can only say to you, in answer to your important question, that I have received representations from the advisory council... that includes manufacturers, importers, retailers, the Consumers' Association of Canada, among other groups... and that I am evaluating their representations and will be making representations to my colleagues in Cabinet as soon as I have been able to reach a conclusion on a future course in this very difficult matter.

I say difficult in particular because quite aside from direct retaliation, there is a question that every time we put another restriction on the import of something from developing countries, it adds to the aura of protectionism and the attitude of restricting goods from those developing countries and it inhibits their ability to buy our goods. So it is not an easy question in one way or the other. At the same time I want to protect Canadian jobs in every legitimate way that I can. So I can only say to you that I am studying the matter carefully and will try to make a decision quickly.

Mr. McLean: A technical question. The annual review of the department for 1981 was issued in February 1983. Is there a reason for that delay? For committee functioning, that is not extremely helpful.

Mr. Regan: I will take notice of that question.

• 1735

Mr. McLean: I wonder then in the time we have saved on that answer if the chairman will permit my colleague, Mr. McKnight, one question. He has one that he would like to pose to the minister.

The Chairman: Yes. The last questioner today will be the hon. member from Kindersley—Lloydminster.

[Traduction]

chaussures, avait amélioré la situation pour eux. Ils m'ont répondu qu'ils pensaient qu'il faudrait plus de temps; qu'il ne s'était pas écoulé suffisamment de temps. Le problème, lorsqu'il est question de chaussures de cuir, c'est que, si une femme cherche un style particulier de chaussures provenant de l'Italie et s'il n'est pas disponible, cela ne signifie pas nécessairement qu'elle va acheter une autre paire de chaussures; car il ne s'agit pas d'un cas où elles ont deux paires de chaussures. Il semblerait que de nombreuses personnes possèdent 10 ou 12 paires de chaussures qu'elles portent pour des occasions différentes... contrairement, peut-être, à vous et moi.

Mme Appolloni: Attention, les gars.

M. Regan: Je m'approche de l'abime, mais je crois que certaines personnes, des deux sexes, achètent plus de chaussures que d'autres et en achètent une plus grande variété.

Il est donc très difficile d'établir quelles répercussions directes les contraintes ont eu sur certains types de chaussures de cuir.

Nous avons également dû nous pencher sur la question des genres de souliers qui ne sont pas fabriqués au Canada, des souliers spécialisés, tous ces problèmes. Je ne peux que vous dire, en réponse à votre importante question, que j'ai reçu des arguments du conseil consultatif, qui comprend des fabricants, des importateurs, des détaillants, des représentants de l'Association des consommateurs du Canada, parmi d'autres... et que j'évalue leurs arguments et que je saisisrai mes collègues au cabinet de mes recommandations aussitôt que j'aurai pu en venir à une conclusion sur ce que nous allons faire à l'avenir en ce qui concerne cette question très difficile.

Je dis difficile tout particulièrement, car, outre les représailles directes, il y a également le fait qu'à chaque fois que nous ajoutons une autre restriction à l'importation de quelque chose en provenance de pays en voie de développement, cela ajoute à l'air de protectionnisme et au fait de limiter l'achat de nos produits par ces pays en voie de développement et gêne leurs possibilités d'acheter nos produits. Ce n'est donc pas une question facile à résoudre dans un sens ni dans l'autre. En même temps, je tiens à protéger les emplois canadiens de toutes les façons légitimes à ma disposition. Je ne peux donc que vous dire que j'étudie avec grand soin la question et que je vais prendre une décision très prochainement.

M. McLean: Une question technique. Le rapport annuel du ministère pour 1981 a été publié au mois de février 1983. Quelle est la raison de ce retard? Cela n'aide pas exactement le fonctionnement des comités.

M. Regan: Je prends note de la question.

M. McLean: Peut-être, eu égard au temps que nous avons gagné, le président pourrait-il permettre à mon collègue M. McKnight de poser une question au ministre.

Le président: Oui. La dernière personne à poser des questions sera l'honorable député de Kindersley—Lloydminster.

[Text]

An hon. Member: Mr. Watson has his hand up.

The Chairman: Yes, I am sorry.

I should say also that the member is from Wartime, Saskatchewan.

Mr. McKnight: Thank you for the commercial, Marcel.

The Chairman: Yes. I will now ask the hon. member from Châteauguay.

Mr. Watson: After Mr. McKnight, I assume.

The Chairman: No. Briefly, because you came late, otherwise I stay here. It is my birthday at midnight tonight and I do not intend to be here.

Mr. Watson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask the minister a question with regard to the economic relationships we have with China and with Taiwan. I bet you wish I had not started here, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Regan: I have gone through most of it.

Mr. Watson: Okay, but I have a further question. It relates particularly to one aspect of that economic relationship: the potential to export CANDU and our industrial atomic technology.

We have behaved as a country impeccably towards China ever since we recognized her, and I am sure the Chinese appreciate this very much. The economic relationship we have with Taiwan and with China, I would suspect would be actually showing more of a plus for Canada. With regard to wheat exports, I suppose, we export a lot more than we import from China.

With regard to Taiwan, our trade balance runs heavily in favour of Taiwan, and this is the direct result, it seems to me, of the impeccable behaviour we have maintained towards China which has prevented us so far from doing what many other countries seem to be doing and getting away with; namely establishing under the guise of friendship centres, etc., etc., facilities that approximate embassies.

Now the U.S. and Japan have—they are quasi-embassies. Belgium, Britain, France, Germany have friendship centre type things that handle, I understand, visas, etc., and also facilitate trade. We have stayed away from all that. It seems to me that we could be at least considering doing what some of the others are doing, not going as far as the Americans or the Japanese, but taking a step at least in the direction the Europeans have already taken. That would put us in a position, it seems to me, to take advantage of an indicated interest on the part of the Taiwanese in our CANDU system. That problem, Mr. Minister, as you are aware, is related to Taiwan's non-membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency. This has been given as an excuse as to why Canada could not entertain, or rather our atomic energy agency could not deal with Taiwan because Taiwan was not a member, could not give the guarantees that we require of countries. I am informed reliably that there is a mechanism that could

[Translation]

Une voix: M. Watson veut poser une question aussi.

Le président: Oui, excusez-moi.

Je dois également dire que le député de Wartime, en Saskatchewan.

M. McKnight: Merci pour la publicité Marcel.

Le président: Je donne la parole à l'honorable membre de Châteauguay.

M. Watson: Après M. McKnight, je crois.

Le président: Non. Rapidement parce que vous êtes arrivé en retard, sinon je dois rester là. C'est mon anniversaire ce soir à minuit et je n'ai pas l'intention de rester ici.

M. Watson: Merci monsieur le président.

Je souhaiterais poser au ministre une question portant sur nos relations économiques avec la Chine et Taiwan. Je pense, monsieur le ministre, que vous auriez préféré que je commence par une autre question.

M. Regan: J'ai dit presque tout ce que j'avais à dire à ce sujet.

M. Watson: Très bien, dans ce cas j'aurai une autre question à vous poser portant plus particulièrement sur un aspect des relations économiques: le potentiel d'exportation des réacteurs CANDU et de notre technologie nucléaire industrielle.

Le Canada s'est comporté au-delà de tous éloges vis-à-vis de la Chine depuis que nous l'avons reconnue aux Nations Unies et je suis sûr que les Chinois y sont très sensibles. Les rapports économiques que nous entretenons avec Taiwan et la Chine sont, j'aurais tendance à le penser, davantage favorables au Canada. Eu égard aux exportations de blé, je crois que nous exportons beaucoup plus que nous importons d'autres produits de Chine.

En ce qui concerne Taiwan, la balance commerciale penche beaucoup du côté de ce pays, et à mon avis cela découle directement des excellentes relations que nous avons entretenues avec la Chine qui, jusqu'à présent, nous ont empêchés de faire ce que beaucoup d'autres pays font impunément, à savoir établir des centres d'amitié qui font office d'ambassades.

Je dois dire que les États-Unis et le Japon ont à Formose—presque des ambassades. La Belgique, la Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Allemagne ont établi des centres d'amitié qui, je crois, délivrent des visas entre autres choses et qui facilitent également les échanges. Nous avons choisi de faire quelque chose d'autre. Il me semble que nous pourrions à tout le moins envisager de faire ce que les autres font, sans aller aussi loin que les Américains et les Japonais, nous pourrions aller dans le sens dans lequel se sont engagés déjà les Européens. Cela, à mon avis, nous permettrait de nous prévaloir de l'intérêt que Formose a manifesté envers notre système CANDU. Le problème, monsieur le ministre, comme vous ne l'ignorez pas c'est que Taiwan n'est pas membre de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique. On a prétexté cela pour expliquer la raison pour laquelle l'Agence de l'énergie atomique du Canada ne pouvait pas traiter avec Taiwan alléguant que Taiwan ne pouvait donner les mêmes garanties que nous exigeons d'autres

[Texte]

permit this; that the United States could provide the kind of umbrella agreement under which we could deal indirectly with Taiwan on this CANDU issue.

All of these issues are tied together. What I am asking you is, considering there is such an important economic interest to Canada in all this and because the Taiwanese economy is burgeoning, is becoming one of the more important ones in the world, can you undertake to review in concert with your Cabinet colleagues our economic relationship with both China and Taiwan with a view to seeing whether or not Canada could achieve further benefit for our exports?

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Mr. Regan: This is a very real subject, and we have dealt with much of it this afternoon. We are already selling over \$300 million worth of goods a year to Taiwan but buying about \$600 million from them. Obviously we would like to sell them much more; our businessmen would. And I have under very active consideration the possibility of the establishment of an office by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan, which would be comparable to that established by many other countries.

The state of our trade relations with China is quite satisfactory and, while we sell them a tremendous amount of wheat, we are selling them an increasing amount of other, value-added, goods. We have a company working at the moment on contracts for the sale of very heavy mining trucks. We have Canadian oil companies involved in the oil play in the South China Sea. We have a variety of products successfully penetrating that market, and it is a market with vast importance for the future. I appreciate your interest and concern in this direction, and I will examine all ways in which we can have increasing trade with Taiwan consistent with our responsibilities of the 1970 agreement on recognition of the PRC.

Mr. Watson: Including the nuclear question which I put to you?

Mr. Regan: I said earlier that there seems to be extremely difficult obstacles in that regard because, unless Canada's policy changes at some time in the future, and because we require the signature of the non-proliferation treaty . . .

Mr. Watson: But have you examined thoroughly using the U.S. umbrella?

Mr. Regan: We have, but we will continue to review the situation. But we have done so, and we have not been satisfied that traditional Canadian conditions for the sale of CANDUs can be met.

[Traduction]

pays. Je tiens de source sûre qu'il existe une procédure qui nous permettrait de le faire; que les États-Unis pourraient passer un accord cadre en vertu duquel nous pourrions indirectement traiter avec Taiwan à propos du CANDU.

Toutes ces questions sont liées entre elles. Compte tenu du fait qu'il y a des intérêts économiques importants en jeu pour le Canada, et étant donné que l'économie de Taiwan est florissante, qu'elle est d'ailleurs en train de devenir l'une des plus importantes au monde, je vous pose la question de savoir si vous pouviez éventuellement conjointement avec vos collègues au conseil des ministres examiner nos relations économiques bilatérales avec la Chine et Taiwan afin de voir si le Canada pourrait éventuellement exporter davantage?

M. Regan: C'est une question importante dont nous avons beaucoup parlé cet après-midi. Nous vendons déjà plus de 300 millions de dollars de marchandises par année à Taiwan mais par contre nous leur en achetons pour 600 millions de dollars. De toute évidence, nous souhaiterions leur vendre beaucoup plus; nos hommes d'affaires le voudraient. Je suis en train d'étudier très sérieusement la possibilité d'implanter à Taiwan un bureau de la Chambre de commerce canadienne comparable à ceux qui ont été implantés dans beaucoup d'autres pays.

En ce qui concerne maintenant nos relations commerciales bilatérales avec la Chine je dirai qu'elles sont tout à fait satisfaisantes et bien que nous vendions à la Chine un tonnage énorme de blé, de plus en plus nous leur vendons d'autres marchandises comportant une valeur ajoutée canadienne. Pour l'instant, une compagnie canadienne est en train de mettre la dernière main à plusieurs contrats de vente de camions lourds destinés à l'exploitation minière. Des compagnies pétrolières canadiennes se livrent à la prospection pétrolière dans le Sud de la mer de Chine. Différents produits canadiens sont parvenus à percer le marché chinois, un marché dont je dirai qu'il est extrêmement important pour l'avenir. Je comprends l'importance des questions que vous me posez et je vais étudier tous les moyens possibles à notre disposition pour augmenter le volume de nos échanges avec Taiwan compte tenu de nos responsabilités aux termes de l'accord de 1970 relatif à la reconnaissance de la République populaire de Chine.

M. Watson: Notamment la question nucléaire que je vous ai posée?

M. Regan: J'ai dit avant qu'apparemment il y a des obstacles très difficiles à surmonter dans ce domaine parce que, à moins que le Canada ne change de politique nucléaire à l'avenir, et également parce que pour exporter de la technologie nucléaire dans un pays tiers, il faut que ce dernier ait ratifié le traité de non-prolifération nucléaire.

M. Watson: Mais avez-vous étudié la possibilité de recourir à l'accord cadre américain?

M. Regan: Oui, mais nous continuerons d'examiner la situation. Comme j'ai dit, c'est ce que nous avons fait et pour l'instant nous ne sommes pas convaincus que les conditions que le Canada impose d'habitude pour la vente de CANDU puissent être satisfaites.

[Text]

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Watson. Mr. Minister, we have 15 minutes before the bells. I will take on myself to ask one question. I was in China after I went to Korea with the delegation of the International Parliamentary Union; and at our own expense, we decided to go from Korea to China—that is, a delegation of 11 parliamentarians from the Senate, the three parties in the House of Commons, and we were surprised by a question raised to us in Shanghai. I will only open up the subject today, but it seems we could do a lot more in Shanghai. The interest manifested there by businessmen in Shanghai, and the fact that we have no consul general or no trade commission in Shanghai was put to us very briefly.

Second, let me say that I hope whatever may be the new approach to Taiwan and China, that we take ample time and ample opportunity to explain to the Chinese people—I mean China—exactly the meaning of every word. If it were to be reported exactly what my friend and colleague and senior member of the committee said about Taiwan, I think it would again create a lot of confusion with the Chinese. So I hope that we would act in the best interests of Canada, of course, but that we do take the time to explain.

Now, last questioner, for five minutes on my unofficial list is the member from Kindersley—Lloydminster, Mr. McKnight.

Mr. McKnight: Well done! I will be very quick and I appreciate the courtesy. I will just follow briefly on my colleague from Waterloo. Is it possible to use the panel under Article XIX of GATT to establish our footwear industry's problems to the Canadian people? Is it possible to call a panel?

Mr. Regan: To call a panel for what purpose?

Mr. McKnight: To try to establish that the Canadian industry is suffering from the importation of footwear.

Mr. Regan: No.

Mr. McKnight: I am asking.

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Mr. Regan: There is not a procedure, that I am aware of, such that that could be done.

Mr. Marchand: If I may, Mr. Chairman, the Canadian procedures for assessing and, if that is the case, demonstrating industry run domestically through the tribunal system that we have established here in Canada . . .

Mr. McKnight: No, I am not talking about in Canada.

Mr. Marchand: Within the GATT, though, a GATT panel is established—not in advance, so to speak, to examine into a possibility—when an action has been taken. One of the trading partners requests the establishment of a panel, because of a judgment that its rights have been impaired.

Mr. Regan: Violated. When they take action against us, they then apply for . . .

[Translation]

Le président: Merci monsieur Watson. Monsieur le ministre, il nous reste 15 minutes avant la cloche. Permettez-moi de vous poser une question. Je suis allé en Chine après m'être rendu en Corée avec la délégation de l'Union parlementaire internationale, nous nous sommes donc rendus de Corée en Chine à nos frais—c'est-à-dire une délégation de parlementaires du Sénat, et des trois partis de la Chambre des communes, et nous avons été surpris par une question qui nous a été posée à Shanghai. Je ne ferai qu'aborder le sujet aujourd'hui, mais il me semble que nous pourrions être beaucoup plus présents à Shanghai. Là, nos interlocuteurs ont manifesté un certain intérêt pour le Canada et nous ont dit que le Canada n'avait pas de consul général ni de mission commerciale.

Deuxièmement, permettez-moi de dire que j'espère, quelle que soit la nouvelle approche que le Canada adopte vis-à-vis de Taiwan et de la Chine, que nous aurons tout le temps voulu ainsi que l'occasion d'expliquer aux Chinois—aux Chinois de la République populaire de Chine précisément ce que nous disons. Si l'on rapportait exactement ce que mon ami et collègue membre depuis longtemps du Comité a dit de Taiwan, je pense que cela serait de nature à ternir nos relations avec la Chine. J'espère donc que nous agirons dans le meilleur intérêt du Canada bien entendu et pour cela que nous prendrons le temps de bien expliquer nos intentions.

La dernière personne sur ma liste non officielle est le député de Kindersley—Lloydminster, M. McKnight vous avez la parole.

M. McKnight: Parfait. Je serai bref et je vous remercie de votre courtoisie. Je voudrais revenir brièvement sur ce que mon collègue de Waterloo a dit. Est-il possible de recourir à l'article 19 des accords du GATT pour expliquer aux Canadiens les difficultés qu'éprouve l'industrie de la chaussure au Canada? Est-il possible de constituer un Comité qui traiterait de cela?

M. Regan: Constituer un Comité pourquoi?

M. McKnight: Pour essayer d'expliquer aux Canadiens que l'industrie de la chaussure au Canada souffre des importations.

M. Regan: Non.

M. McKnight: Je ne faisais que demander.

M. Regan: Je ne crois pas que l'accord du GATT prévoit une telle possibilité.

M. Marchand: Monsieur le président, si vous me le permettez je dirai qu'au Canada la procédure d'évaluation des résultats d'un secteur donné de l'activité économique relève des tribunaux canadiens . . .

M. McKnight: Non, je ne parle pas du Canada.

M. Marchand: Au sein du GATT toutefois, on peut constituer un comité—pas à l'avance, pour ainsi dire, chargé d'étudier les mesures prises. L'un des partenaires commerciaux en exige la constitution invoquant qu'il a été porté atteinte à ses droits.

M. Regan: Porté atteinte aux droits. Ils prennent des mesures contre nous, et ensuite ils font une demande . . .

[Texte]

Mr. McKnight: Okay, but is there a possibility, or have you looked at the possibility, of Canada's asking for a panel on the footwear industry?

Mr. Regan: Against whom and on what basis? No one has infringed our rights. Only when we are protesting that some country has broken one of the articles of GATT by some action they have taken against us, only then, can we request a GATT panel.

Mr. McKnight: If you did not have quotas, would that allow you to go to a panel?

Mr. Regan: No. We cannot have quotas as a right. We have to use a procedure under the GATT to negotiate quotas with other countries. The sale of goods into our country is not a breach of anything. That does not give us any . . .

Mr. McKnight: No, but dumping is, though, is it not, Mr. Minister?

Mr. Regan: Ah, now, wait, you are talking of a different matter. If someone is dumping, we take anti-dumping action against him. Indeed, Canada takes a great many anti-dumping actions. I know of about nine that are running at the present time.

Mr. McKnight: But you are not using the panel under Article XIX of GATT, the quasi-judicial panel under GATT, to establish hurt for dumping.

Mr. Regan: No.

Mr. McKnight: You are using the Anti-dumping Tribunal within Canada.

Mr. Marchand: We establish it here. Our trading partners within the GATT may go, with respect to any kind of action we might take, and present their view that their trading rights have been impaired because of what we are doing of a restrictive character.

Mr. Regan: Is this a fixed 15-minute bell?

The Chairman: Yes.

Mr. Minister, second to what he is saying, would it not be fair to say, following the questioning of Mr. Laniel, that members of Parliament who have to deal with textiles are very identifiable, and they feel that sometimes these great, great, knowledgeable persons who sit for us on the GATT agreement are not as sensitive to that, and that they have other great, important . . . that is what they say. It seems sometimes that it is the not knowing that is annoying. Maybe, not knowing, they can believe what I just said, but maybe if the facts were put to them prior to the negotiations, so they could pass along their extreme sensitivity about textiles, our negotiators would have that in the backs of their minds . . .

Mr. Regan: I have arranged such a meeting with our officials at times in the past and I would be glad to arrange,

[Traduction]

M. McKnight: D'accord, mais est-ce possible, avez-vous étudié la possibilité que le Canada demande la constitution d'un comité qui serait chargé d'étudier l'industrie de la chaussure?

M. Regan: Contre qui en fonction de quoi? Personne n'a porté atteinte à nos droits. La constitution d'un tel comité n'intervient que lorsque nous alléguons qu'un pays tiers par certaines mesures prises a enfreint les articles du GATT avec préjudice pour nous, c'est seulement dans ce cas que nous pouvons demander la constitution d'un comité du GATT.

M. McKnight: Si les quotas n'existaient pas, pourriez-vous demander la constitution d'un tel comité?

M. Regan: Non. Nous n'avons pas le droit de fixer nous-mêmes les quotas. Il nous faut recourir aux règles du GATT et négocier ces quotas avec les autres pays. Si un pays tiers vend des marchandises au Canada, cela ne saurait être considéré comme une infraction. Cela ne nous donne pas . . .

M. McKnight: Non, mais par contre le dumping est une infraction, n'est-ce pas monsieur le ministre?

M. Regan: Attendez un peu. Vous parlez de quelque chose de différent. Si un pays tiers fait du dumping au Canada, nous pouvons prendre des mesures antidumping à son endroit. De fait, c'est ce que le Canada a fait à de très nombreuses occasions. Pour l'instant il y a neuf poursuites d'engagées.

M. McKnight: Mais l'on n'a pas recours à un comité du GATT constitué en vertu de l'article 9 du GATT, comité de nature quasi judiciaire, pour établir les dommages causés par le dumping.

M. Regan: Non.

M. McKnight: On se sert du tribunal antidumping au Canada.

M. Marchand: Nous établissons ici même s'il y a dumping ou non. Nos partenaires commerciaux au sein du GATT peuvent, compte tenu des mesures que nous pouvons prendre se faire entendre et alléguer qu'il a été porté atteinte à leurs droits commerciaux à cause des mesures restrictives que nous prenons.

M. Regan: Est-ce que la cloche va sonner durant 15 minutes seulement?

Le président: Oui.

Monsieur le ministre, deuxièmement, ne serait-il pas juste de dire à la suite des questions qui vous ont été posées par M. Laniel, que les députés qui se soucient de la santé de l'industrie textile au Canada sont bien connus, et pensent que parfois les experts qui nous représentent au GATT ne sont pas sensibles à leurs préoccupations mais qu'ils ont d'autres choses plus importantes à faire. Il semble que parfois le plus irritant est de ne pas savoir. Peut-être, sans savoir, peuvent-ils croire ce que je viens de dire, mais peut-être que s'ils étaient au courant des faits avant les négociations, ils pourraient sensibiliser nos négociateurs à Genève.

M. Regan: Par le passé, j'ai convoqué à plusieurs reprises des réunions avec nos représentants et je serais très heureux

[Text]

for members of Parliament, meetings with the officials. But I want to say, in defence of the officials, that I think the ones who go out there and negotiate for us are tigers. I think they do their absolute best.

The Chairman: I did not imply that they were not. You understand? I said that they would . . .

Mr. McKnight: Mr. Minister, would you mind telling me why you feel we can gain more bilaterally negotiating with the United States than multilaterally?

Mr. Regan: Are you talking shoes, or what are you talking about?

Mr. McKnight: Everything.

Mr. Regan: Would you put on paper exactly what your question is, then I will . . .

The Chairman: Before the minister leaves, may I say that in view of the great interest that was raised at the very last on your direct responsibility as minister responsible for trade—you were questioned on everything except probably what you were expecting—I think I may in the next session, which will come very soon, use again the annual report that was given to us, if it is given to us again, and call you back. At that time, I will limit discussion on international trade, because I think a lot could be learned from both sides, both by bureaucrats, Mr. Minister, and also by members.

Thank you. Let us go to vote, otherwise . . . I do not want to have an election.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Translation]

d'en convoquer d'autres auxquelles participeraient les députés et les représentants canadiens au GATT. Mais je voudrais dire, pour défendre nos représentants au GATT, que ceux que le gouvernement canadien a envoyés à Genève sont les plus convaincus et les plus mordants. Je n'ai aucun doute qu'ils font tout ce qu'ils peuvent.

Le président: Je ne disais pas le contraire. J'ai tout simplement dit qu'ils pourraient . . .

M. McKnight: Monsieur le ministre, pourriez-vous me dire pourquoi selon vous nous pouvons gagner davantage en négociant bilatéralement avec les États-Unis plutôt qu'en négociant multilatéralement?

M. Regan: Vous parlez de l'industrie de la chaussure ou de quelque chose d'autre?

M. McKnight: De tout.

M. Regan: Pourriez-vous mettre noir sur blanc exactement votre question ensuite j'essaierai . . .

Le président: Avant que le ministre nous quitte, permettez-moi de dire qu'étant donné le grand intérêt manifesté pour vos responsabilités directes en tant que ministre responsable des échanges—on vous a posé une foule de questions sauf peut-être celles auxquelles vous vous attendiez—lors de la prochaine législature, qui va venir très rapidement, il est possible que nous vous demandions de vous représenter devant le Comité pour répondre à des questions sur le rapport annuel qui nous a été remis, s'il nous a été remis. À ce moment-là, nous cantonnerons la discussion à la question des échanges internationaux, parce que, selon moi, monsieur le ministre, les fonctionnaires et les députés pourraient en retirer beaucoup.

Merci. Allons voter, sinon—je ne souhaite pas qu'il y ait des élections.

La séance est levée.



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WITNESSES—TÉMOINS

From the Department of External Affairs:

Mr. Robert Johnstone, Deputy Minister, International Trade and Coordinator, International Economic Relations;

Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Deputy Minister, Political Affairs.

Du ministère des Affaires extérieures:

M. Robert Johnstone, sous-ministre, Commerce international et coordonnateur des relations économiques internationales;

M. de Montigny Marchand, sous-ministre, Affaires politiques.



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
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